

INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE

1974

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INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE, 1974

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PREFACE

This is the eighth annual volume of *International Documents on Palestine* which is published jointly by the Institute for Palestine Studies and the University of Kuwait. The purpose of the series is to put on record the attitudes and policies relating to the Palestine question and the Arab-Israeli conflict of the states and organizations directly and indirectly involved. The collection is divided into three sections: United Nations, International (including Israel) and Arab World.

The United Nations section contains the reports or parts of reports relevant to the Middle East as well as resolutions adopted by the United Nations and its specialized agencies. It should be noted that United Nations annual reports in this volume cover a period from the middle of 1973 to the middle of 1974, so the parts relevant to the October war are included here; the second half of 1974 will be covered in the annual reports for 1975. A selection from the General Assembly's debate on the question of Palestine has also been included in the United Nations section.

The documents contained in the International and Arab World sections have been selected from material, written or oral, originating from governments or groupings of states and their officials and, to a minor extent, from individuals and institutions which represent significant groups of opinion or which are actually or potentially involved in matters relating to the Palestine question. Such material includes treaties, joint communiqués, policy statements, speeches, parliamentary proceedings, interviews and resolutions adopted by conferences and congresses.

In considering items for selection the editors have evaluated their significance in terms of general policy towards the area or as an indirect record of the events of the year. The consequences of the October war dominate as reflected in negotiations leading to the disengagement agreements and reactions towards them particularly in the Arab world, in the Palestine resistance and in Israel. Developments in attitudes towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, growing international recognition of the PLO, and changing relationships between the great powers and the countries of the Middle East are given particular emphasis. Developments in the oil crisis have only been considered insofar as they are directly relevant to US and European policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In selection no attempt has been made to achieve full geographical representation. The distribution of documents among countries both in the International and the Arab World sections reflects the editors' perceptions of those countries' involvement in and influence on events and developments during the year. A large number of countries are represented only indirectly through resolutions and statements of regional organizations such as the Conference of Islamic States and the OAU.

The majority of documents in the Arab World section have been selected from the comprehensive documentary collection *Arab Documents on Palestine* published in Arabic by the Institute for Palestine Studies.

When documents have been reproduced only in part this is indicated in the wording of the title and footnote or, in some cases, by the word “excerpt(s)” after the title of the document.

In the case of documents issued originally in a language other than English the editors have, as far as was possible, used English translations published by journals or agencies of the country of origin. In such instances the footnote simply states “English text” with no reference to the original language. In cases where unofficial English translations have been used they have, when possible, been checked with the original. Other material has been translated especially for this volume. It should be noted that translations from Hebrew have, for technical reasons, been made through Arabic rather than directly into English.

The spelling of names of persons and places is left unchanged in texts appearing in their original versions. In documents translated for this volume familiar Arabic names appear in a form common in the English language press; others are written in a form which, while avoiding diacritical marks, reflects the Arabic spelling as closely as possible.

International and Arab World section documents are arranged chronologically. When a specific date could not be ascertained, the formula of “early”, “mid” or “late” added to the month has been used and the document placed in the approximate chronological sequence. Place is normally designated by city if it is indicated on the document, reliably reported or can safely be assumed; only UN documents carry no indication of place. Within the United Nations section documents are arranged with reference to the organization’s internal structure and only within subsections are documents arranged chronologically.

Abbreviations (e.g. PLO for Palestine Liberation Organization) in the text will be found in the index with a cross reference to the full name.

The Institute for Palestine Studies expresses its gratitude to the University of Kuwait, and particularly to its President and its Secretary-General, for invaluable aid towards the publication of this volume.

The Institute also extends its thanks to the staffs of the libraries of the American University of Beirut, the Palestine Research Centre and the UN Information Centre in Beirut for their cooperation.

Translations from languages other than Arabic and checking of translations from Arabic were done by Institute staff. Rosanna Salbashian was responsible for the proof-reading and Larry Conrad for the index.

LIST OF SOURCES

Below is a list of the parliamentary records, documentary series, annual reports, radio monitoring services, newspapers and periodicals consulted in the compilation of this book, with their publisher when relevant and not obvious, and their place and frequency of publication.

<i>Action</i> (Action Committee on American-Arab Relations)	New York	weekly
<i>Africa Diary</i>	New Delhi	weekly
<i>al-Ahram</i>	Cairo	daily
<i>al-Akhbar</i>	Cairo	daily
<i>Al Hamishmar</i> (Mapam)	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>al-Amal</i> (Phalangist Party)	Beirut	daily
<i>American Journal of International Law</i>	Washington, D.C.	quarterly
<i>al-Anba'</i>	Rabat	daily
<i>al-Anwar</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Arab Palestine Resistance</i> (Palestine Liberation Army)	Damascus	monthly
<i>Arab Report and Record</i>	London	twice a month
<i>Asian Recorder</i>	New Delhi	weekly
<i>Australian Foreign Affairs Record</i>	Canberra	monthly
<i>al-Baath</i>	Damascus	daily
<i>al-Balagh</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Bilad</i>	Jidda	daily
<i>Bild</i>	Hamburg	weekly
<i>Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung</i> (Office of Information, Federal Government)	Bonn	irregular
<i>Bulletin of the Institute for Palestine Studies</i>	Beirut	twice a month
<i>Business Week</i>	New York	weekly

<i>Canada: Statements and Speeches</i> (Ministry of External Affairs, Canada)	Ottawa	irregular
<i>Christian Attitudes on Jews and Judaism</i> (Institute of Jewish Affairs in association with the World Jewish Congress)	London	6 times a year
<i>The Church and the Jewish People Newsletter</i> (World Council of Churches)	Geneva	quarterly
<i>Congressional Record</i>	Washington, D.C.	daily
<i>Current Digest of the Soviet Press</i> (American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Ohio State University)	Columbus, Ohio	weekly
<i>Davar</i> (Histadrut)	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>Department of State Bulletin</i>	Washington, D.C.	weekly
<i>al-Dustur</i>	Amman	daily
<i>al-Dustur</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Europa Archiv</i>	Bonn	twice a month
<i>L'Express</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>al-Fajr al-Jadid</i>	Tripoli	daily
<i>Filastin al-Thawra</i> (Palestine Liberation Organization)	Beirut	weekly
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	New York	quarterly
<i>Foreign Affairs Bulletin</i> (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, East Germany)	East Berlin	3 times a month
<i>Foreign Affairs Record</i> (Indian Council for World Affairs)	New Delhi	monthly
<i>Free Palestine</i>	London	monthly
<i>The Guardian Weekly</i>	Manchester	weekly
<i>Haaretz</i>	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>al-Hadaf</i> (PFLP)	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Hawadith</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>al-Hurriya</i> (Communist Action Organization; DFLP)	Beirut	weekly
<i>Ila al-Amam</i> (PFLP-GC)	Beirut	weekly
<i>Information Bulletin</i> (Communist Party of Israel-RAKAH)	Haifa	monthly

<i>International Affairs</i>	Moscow	monthly
<i>International Herald Tribune</i>	Paris	daily
<i>International Perspectives</i> (Ministry of External Affairs, Canada)	Ottawa	6 times a year
<i>Israel at Peace</i> (Communist Party of Israel-MAKI)	Tel Aviv	monthly
<i>Israel Digest</i> (World Zionist Organization)	Jerusalem	twice a month
<i>Israel Magazine</i>	Tel Aviv	monthly
<i>al-Ittihad</i> (Communist Party of Israel-RAKAH)	Haifa	twice a week
<i>The Jerusalem Post</i>	Jerusalem	daily
<i>Jeune Afrique</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>Jewish Affairs</i> (US Communist Party)	New York	6 times a year
<i>Jewish Chronicle</i>	London	weekly
<i>Jewish Frontier</i> (Labor Zionist Alliance)	New York	monthly
<i>Jewish Observer and Middle East Review</i>	London	weekly
<i>Journal of Palestine Studies</i> (Institute for Palestine Studies)	Beirut	quarterly
<i>al-Jumhuriya</i>	Cairo	daily
<i>Keesing's Contemporary Archives</i>	Bath	weekly
<i>Knesset Records</i>	Jerusalem	daily
<i>Maariv</i>	Tel Aviv	daily
<i>MAPAM Bulletin</i>	Tel Aviv	quarterly
<i>Middle East Economic Survey</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Middle East International</i> (Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding)	London	monthly
<i>Middle East Journal</i>	Washington, D.C.	quarterly
<i>Monday Morning</i>	Beirut	weekly
<i>Le Monde</i>	Paris	daily
<i>al-Montada</i> (Ecumenical Secretariat for Youth and Students in the Middle East)	Beirut	irregular
<i>Moscow News</i>	Moscow	weekly
<i>al-Muharrir</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>al-Nahar</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>National Jewish Monthly</i> (B'nai B'rith)	Washington, D.C.	monthly

<i>National News Agency Bulletin</i> (Ministry of Information, Lebanon)	Beirut	daily
<i>Near East Report</i> (America-Israel Public Affairs Committee)	Washington D.C.	weekly
<i>New Outlook</i> (Jewish-Arab Institute)	Tel Aviv	monthly
<i>New Times</i>	Moscow	weekly
<i>New York Times</i>	New York	daily
<i>New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review</i>	Wellington	monthly
<i>Newsweek-international edition</i>	New York	weekly
<i>Le Nouvel Observateur</i>	Paris	weekly
<i>Orient</i> (Deutsches Orient-Institut)	Hamburg	quarterly
<i>L'Orient-Le Jour</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>Pakistan Horizon</i>	Karachi	quarterly
<i>Palestine Digest</i> (Arab League Office)	Washington, D.C.	monthly
<i>Peking Review</i>	Peking	weekly
<i>La Politique étrangère de la France :</i> <i>Textes et documents</i> (Foreign Ministry, France)	Paris	twice a year
<i>The Pope Speaks</i>	Washington, D.C.	monthly
<i>Quick</i>	Munich	weekly
<i>al-Ray al-Amm</i>	Kuwait	daily
<i>Relazioni Internazionali</i>	Milan	weekly
<i>Review of International Affairs</i>	Belgrade	twice a month
<i>Revista de Política Internacional</i>	Madrid	quarterly
<i>Revue romaine d'études internationales</i>	Bucharest	quarterly
<i>al-Safir</i>	Beirut	daily
<i>al-Shaab</i>	Algiers	daily
<i>Soviet News</i> (Embassy of the USSR)	London	weekly
<i>Der Spiegel</i>	Hamburg	weekly
<i>Summary of World Broadcasts</i> (British Broadcasting Corporation)	London	daily
<i>Survey of Current Affairs</i> (Central Office of Information, UK)	London	monthly
<i>Survival</i> (International Institute for Strategic Studies)	London	6 times a year

<i>al-Thawra</i>	Baghdad	daily
<i>al-Thawra</i>	Damascus	daily
<i>Time-international edition</i>	New York	weekly
<i>The Times</i>	London	daily
<i>Tricontinental</i>	Havana	monthly
<i>UD-informasjon</i> (Foreign Ministry, Norway)	Oslo	irregular
<i>UN Monthly Chronicle</i>	New York	monthly
<i>USSR and Third World</i> (Central Asian Research Centre)	London	8 times a year
<i>Wafa</i> (Palestine Liberation Organization)	Beirut	daily
<i>World Marxist Review Information Bulletin</i>	Toronto	monthly
<i>Yediot Aharonot</i>	Tel Aviv	daily

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United Nations

Annual Reports Submitted to the General Assembly

1

Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization: The Situation in the Middle East¹

August 3, 1974

A. Status of the cease-fire and search for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict

1. Resumption of the consideration of the Middle East problem by the Security Council

On 14 June 1973, the Security Council suspended its examination of the situation in the Middle East in order to reflect further on the results of the discussions that had taken place during its 10 meetings in June and, on 20 July, resumed its consideration of the problem.

The Security Council met between 20 and 26 July to consider the situation in the Middle East on the basis of the Secretary-General's report of 18 May 1973 (S/10929).² A draft resolution was submitted by eight Powers (S/10974), whereby the Council would strongly deplore Israel's continuing occupation of the territories occupied as a result of the 1967 conflict; support the initiatives of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General; express its conviction that a just and peaceful solution to the problem of the Middle East could be achieved only on the basis of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, the rights of all States in the area and for the rights and legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians; and request the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to resume and to pursue their efforts to promote a just and peaceful solution of the Middle East problem. The draft resolution was not adopted by the Security Council owing to the negative vote of a permanent member.

¹ Part I, Chapter 1 of *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1973–15 June 1974, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 1* (UN doc. A/9601), pp. 3–17.

² Doc. 8 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

2. Status of the cease-fire before 6 October 1973

(a) ISRAEL-LEBANON SECTOR

The cease-fire situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector continued to be the subject throughout the summer of 1973 of reports submitted by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council almost on a daily basis (S/7930 and addenda). Those reports showed that the situation in the sector was relatively quiet until 6 October, although there were frequent incidents. Israeli forces personnel continued to occupy daily, during daylight hours, three positions located on Lebanese territory near the Armistice Demarcation Line. There were occasional firing incidents, mostly cases of light weapons fire by Israeli forces across the Armistice Demarcation Line and occasional flights by Israeli forces aircraft over localities in southern Lebanon. The reports also contained complaints received from the Lebanese authorities concerning violations of the cease-fire by Israeli forces.

One incident of a serious nature took place in August 1973. In a report dated 11 August (S/7930/Add.2082), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO stated that he had received a complaint from Lebanon alleging that a Lebanese civilian aircraft leased to Iraq had been intercepted by Israeli aircraft over Lebanese territory and diverted to Israel.

The same complaint was the subject of a letter dated 11 August to the President of the Security Council (S/10983), in which Lebanon, referring to the incident, requested an urgent meeting of the Council to deal with that act which, it said, constituted a violation of Lebanon's sovereignty. Iraq also brought the incident to the attention of the Council in a letter of the same date (S/10984), charging that Israel had committed an act of piracy which threatened international civil aviation.

The Council considered Lebanon's complaint

during five meetings, held between 13 and 15 August. At the conclusion of the discussion, the Council adopted resolution 337 (1973),³ by which it condemned the Government of Israel for violating Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and for the forcible diversion and seizure by the Israel Air Force of a Lebanese airliner from Lebanon's air space. The Council considered that those actions constituted a violation of the Lebanese-Israeli Armistice Agreement of 1949, the cease-fire resolutions of the Council of 1967, the provisions of the Charter and the international conventions on civil aviation. It called on Israel to desist from any and all acts that violated Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and endangered the safety of international civil aviation, and warned it that, if such acts were repeated, the Council would consider taking adequate steps or measures to enforce its resolutions.

In that connexion, the Secretary-General, on 4 September, transmitted to the Council a letter from the Secretary-General of ICAO (S/10990) containing the resolution adopted by the Council of that Organization on 20 August regarding Security Council resolution 337 (1973).⁴

That resolution, together with another resolution adopted by the Assembly of ICAO on 30 August on the forcible diversion and seizure by Israeli military aircraft of a Lebanese civil aircraft, was transmitted to the Secretary-General by the representative of Lebanon on 18 September (A/9161-S/11002).

On 10 September, Israel transmitted a copy of a note it had addressed to the President of the Assembly of ICAO concerning the discovery of rockets and rocket-launchers in the possession of Arab terrorists near the Fiumicino International Airport of Rome with the indication that those weapons were used by the regular armies of Egypt, Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, which, Israel charged, were responsible for delivering the weapons to the Arab terrorists (A/9150-S/10994). The allegation was rejected by Egypt, Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic in a letter dated 25 September (A/9173-S/11003).

(b) ISRAEL-SYRIA SECTOR

The Secretary-General also continued to trans-

mit to the Security Council the reports he received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO concerning the Israel-Syria sector. It appeared from the reports that, from 15 June until 6 October 1973, the situation in that sector remained generally quiet. There were occasional firing incidents and a few cases of overflights by Israeli aircraft of Syrian positions (S/7930 and addenda).

On 14 September, the Syrian Arab Republic complained that, on the previous day, 64 Israeli aircraft violated Syrian coastal air space, forcing Syrian aircraft to take counter-measures, which resulted in five Israeli planes being shot down and eight Syrian planes being hit (A/9151-S/10996). This complaint was also submitted to UNTSO, but the United Nations military observers could not confirm it as the location of the alleged incident was outside the range of the United Nations observation posts.

On the same day, Israel rejected the Syrian charges and said that the incident had been originally provoked by Syrian fighter planes which had attacked a routine patrol of the Israel Air Force over the Mediterranean (A/9152-S/10998 and Corr.1).

(c) THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE ISRAEL-JORDAN SECTORS

No communications were received by the Security Council from the parties regarding cease-fire violations in the Israel-Jordan and the Suez Canal sectors. In the Suez Canal sector where the United Nations maintained a cease-fire observation machinery, no incidents were observed by the United Nations military observers. The parties submitted a few complaints, none of which could be confirmed by United Nations observations (S/7930/Add.2028, 2037, 2073 and 2092).

3. Outbreak of hostilities

(a) FIRST REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND COMMUNICATIONS BY THE PARTIES

On 6 October, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported general heavy air and ground activity in the Israel-Syria and the Suez Canal sectors (S/7930/Add.2141).⁶ In the Suez Canal sector, United Nations observation posts on the east bank had reported that there were intense exchanges

³ Doc. 33 in *ibid.*

⁴ Doc. 48 in *ibid.*

⁵ Doc. 46 in *ibid.*

⁶ Doc. 9 in *ibid.*

of artillery, tank and mortar fire, in addition to intense aerial activity with jet rocket attacks and anti-aircraft fire. The Egyptian forces crossed the Canal at five locations (S/7930/Add.21427-2145). In the Israel-Syria sector, United Nations observation posts reported intense artillery and tank fire by Syrian forces which had crossed the Syrian forward defended localities near Quncitra, as well as bomb and rocket attacks by Syrian and Israeli forces jet aircraft (S/7930/Add.2142-2145).

In the Israel-Lebanon sector, reports from the United Nations observation posts reported many overflights by Israeli and unidentified aircraft in southern Lebanon (S/7930/Add.2143, 2145 and 2146).

In transmitting those reports, the Secretary-General stated that, since receiving the first news of the outbreak of fighting, he had been in constant consultation with the parties concerned, the President and members of the Security Council. In the field, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO had addressed an appeal to the parties to cease all military activity and adhere strictly to the cease-fire (S/7930/Add.2143).

On 6 October, the Syrian Arab Republic charged that Israel had launched a military attack that day all along the cease-fire line, with aircraft penetrating Syrian air space in the northern sector of the front (S/11009). On the same day, Egypt stated, in a letter to the President of the General Assembly (A/9190), that Israeli air formations had that morning attacked Egyptian forces in the area of the Gulf of Suez, while Israeli naval units were simultaneously approaching the western coast of the Gulf of Suez, and had been engaged by Egyptian forces. On 7 October, Israel stated that Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic had launched an attack on 6 October against Israel across the cease-fire lines, and referred to the relevant reports of the United Nations military observers to support this assertion (A/9204-S/11011).

(b) CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
FROM 8 TO 12 OCTOBER 1973

On 7 October, the United States requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the situation in the Middle East (S/11010); in response

to that request, the Security Council held four meetings between 8 and 12 October.⁸

On the afternoon of 11 October, the Secretary-General circulated to the members of the Security Council a statement (S/11021)⁹ in which he warned that, if the fighting continued, it would pose an increasing threat to international peace and security. He expressed concern that, if the United Nations failed in its role, the central point of the Organization's existence would be jeopardized. As Secretary-General, he felt that it was his duty to urge the members of the Council to consider once again how the primary role of the Council could be reasserted in the interests of peace. While he had no illusions about how difficult it was to turn from war to peace, he questioned whether the continuation of war could possibly serve the legitimate sovereign aims of the parties. Therefore he appealed to the Governments in conflict to consider alternative courses before it was too late so that fighting might cease.

During the meeting of the Council held on the evening of 11 October, the Secretary-General again drew attention to the statement.

The Council did not consider any draft resolutions during those meetings and, on 12 October, decided to reconvene at a later date after consultations.

(c) FURTHER REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
AND COMMUNICATIONS BY THE PARTIES

On 8 October, the Secretary-General informed the President of the Council of a request made by Egypt on 7 October to evacuate the United Nations military observers in the Suez sector to Cairo because, owing to the fact that they were behind the Egyptian lines, they were in physical danger and their presence was unnecessary (S/11013).¹⁰

On 9 October, the Secretary-General confirmed his understanding that it had been agreed during consultations by the President with the members of the Security Council that he should accede to Egypt's request (S/11017).

The Chief of Staff, in a report dated 9 October (S/7930/Add.2161), said that the Egyptian authorities had requested the immediate evacuation of the observers to Cairo and that he had replied

⁸ See docs. 18-19 in *ibid.*

⁹ Doc. 25 in *ibid.*

¹⁰ Doc. 24 in *ibid.*

⁷ Doc. 10 in *ibid.*

that the request should be made to the Security Council which, in July, 1967, had established the United Nations observation operation in the Suez Canal sector. However, in view of the request made by Egypt's military authorities in the field that all observers should be evacuated without delay, he had had no alternative but to allow the evacuation. Consequently, seven observation posts on the west bank of the Canal had been closed. On the east bank, five posts had been closed, three had remained operational and, since 6 October, contact had been lost with one. (Subsequently, it was learned that the two United Nations military observers who had been on duty at that post had been killed.) The report added that, in the Israel-Syria sector, two posts had been closed and their observers transferred to other posts at the request of the Syrian forces; all the other observation posts had continued to function. No change had been reported with regard to the observation operation in the Israel-Lebanon sector.

On 9 October, the Chief of Staff also reported that, following the evacuation of the remaining observation posts in the Suez Canal sector, there were no observation operations in that sector. Consequently, until the redeployment later of the United Nations military observers, the reports of the Chief of Staff covered only the Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon sectors. In the former sector, fighting continued at a high level both on the ground and in the air. As from 11 October, Israeli forces units were observed advancing west of their forward defended localities. The Chief of Staff also reported, on 9 October (S/7930/Add:2165), the death of a Norwegian United Nations military observer, with his wife and daughter, during an air attack on Damascus. In Lebanon, the reports indicated mainly aerial activity with Israeli jet aircraft overflying southern Lebanon, although there were also many cases of firing by Israeli and unidentified forces. The Lebanese authorities complained to UNTSO (S/7930/Add:2166) that Israeli jet aircraft had attacked and damaged a radar installation in Lebanon on 9 October. The same complaint was included in a letter from Lebanon to the Secretary-General (A/9212-S/11015).

On 11 October, the Secretary-General issued a note in reply to questions put to him by the representative of Egypt at the 1743rd meeting of the Security Council, on 8 October, stating that

the United Nations military observers had been 30 and 60 miles, respectively, from El Sukhna and El Zaafarana on the Gulf of Suez, which Egypt claimed Israel had attacked on 6 October, and that therefore they had been unable to confirm or deny any incidents there (S/11020).

(d) FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL FROM 21 TO 23 OCTOBER 1973 AND THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS¹¹

On 21 October, the Security Council met at the request of the USSR and the United States to continue its consideration of the situation in the Middle East and, on 22 October, with China not participating in the vote, adopted resolution 338 (1973),¹² in which it called upon the parties to the fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activities immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of the resolution, in the positions then occupied. It also called upon them to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of its resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts. The Council further decided that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations should start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices to establish a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

During the meeting, Israel stated that its compliance with the proposed cease-fire was conditional on its acceptance and observance by all the States taking part in the fighting. On 23 October, the Syrian Arab Republic notified the Secretary-General of its acceptance of Council resolution 338 (1973) conditional upon the other party's undertaking to implement it, Syria's understanding being that the resolution was based on the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied after June 1967 and the safeguarding of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with United Nations resolutions (A/9250-S/11040 and Corr.1). In the course of a statement in the Security Council, Egypt indicated that it had communicated to the Secretary-General its acceptance of the cease-fire resolution on the basis of reciprocity.

On 23 October, the Security Council met again at the request of Egypt to consider the non-

¹¹ Selections in docs. 20 and 21 in *ibid.*

¹² Doc. 34 in *ibid.*

implementation of resolution 338 (1973) and, with one member (China) not participating, adopted resolution 339 (1973),¹³ by which the Council, after referring to its resolution 338 (1973), confirmed its decision on an immediate cessation of all kinds of firing and of all military action and urged that the forces of the two sides be returned to the positions they occupied at the moment the cease-fire became effective. The Council further requested the Secretary-General to take measures for immediate dispatch of United Nations observers to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between the forces of Israel and Egypt, using for that purpose the personnel of the United Nations then in the Middle East and, first of all, those in Cairo.

Later in the meeting, the Secretary-General informed the Council that, in implementation of its resolution 339 (1973), three United Nations observer teams from Cairo were being deployed in the Suez Canal area.

(e) FURTHER REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
AND COMMUNICATIONS TO THE COUNCIL

On 24 October, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on the steps taken by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to implement Council resolution 339 (1973). Three teams of observers, two of which consisted of two patrols, while the other consisted of three, had proceeded from Cairo to designated areas on the Egyptian side of the forward defended localities. Arrangements were also made to deploy observers on the Israeli side. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO recommended an increase in the number of observer teams to 12, which would require 43 additional observers for the sector (S/7930/Add.2219).¹⁴

On the same day, the Chief of Staff reported that the Egyptian authorities had complained that Israel had violated the Security Council cease-fire by redeploying its forces outside the 22 October cease-fire line, opening fire on troops and civilians in the southern sector of the Canal and attacking the Egyptian Third Army south-east of the Canal after the cease-fire. He also reported an Israeli complaint that Egyptian forces had violated the cease-fire south of the Bitter Lakes. The United Nations military observers could not confirm

those complaints as they were not yet deployed in the front area at the time. Three patrols sent from Cairo towards the area of Suez City had to stop short of their destination on the evening of 24 October because of intense exchanges of tank and artillery fire between Egyptian and Israeli forces.

In the Israel-Syria sector, the Chief of Staff also had to adjust the cease-fire observation arrangements to the current situation. Where the forward defended localities had not moved, the existing United Nations observation posts continued to function, but, along the perimeter of the Sassa salient, patrols had to be instituted in lieu of the former observation posts (S/7930/Add.2223). The United Nations military observers reported sporadic artillery fire by Israeli, Syrian and unidentified forces on 24 October. There were also several cases of overflights by Israeli forces aircraft and Syrian anti-aircraft missiles.

In the Israel-Lebanon sector, there had been no change and the observation posts continued to submit reports on the situation there. There were several firing incidents and overflights of Lebanese territory by Israeli forces aircraft on 24 October.

During October and November, the Secretary-General received a number of communications on the situation in the Middle East, some of which contained statements by Governments. Algeria transmitted a letter on behalf of the non-aligned countries condemning Israel's aggression against Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic (A/9218-S/11019).¹⁵ Denmark, on behalf of the nine members of the European Economic Community, transmitted a statement calling for a rapid settlement of the problem on the basis of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) (A/9220-S/11023).¹⁶ The USSR transmitted a statement of 10 October by the World Peace Council urging the United Nations to take measures to compel Israel to implement its resolution, and to impose sanctions against it if it refused to do so (A/9226-S/11031). The members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) also transmitted a statement calling for a just and lasting solution in conformity with resolution 242 (1967) (S/11139). Sierra Leone and Ghana also informed the Secretary-General that they had broken off diplomatic

¹³ Doc. 35 in *ibid.*

¹⁴ Doc. 12 in *ibid.*

¹⁵ Doc. 143 in *ibid.*

¹⁶ Doc. 147 in *ibid.*

relations with Israel (A/9262-S/11059, A/9266-S/11062). A list of African countries, members of OAU, that had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel since June 1967 was transmitted by Mauritius on 29 October (A/9269-S/11065).¹⁷

B. Establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force and developments up to January 1974

1. Establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force

(a) CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL FROM 24 TO 26 OCTOBER

On 24¹⁸ and 25 October, the Security Council met at the request of Egypt to consider Israel's continued violations of Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973) on the cease-fire. On 25 October, the Council, with one member (China) not participating, adopted resolution 340 (1973),¹⁹ under which, after demanding immediate and complete observance of the cease-fire and the return to the positions occupied on 22 October, it requested the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations military observers on both sides. The Council decided to set up immediately, under its authority, a United Nations Emergency Force, to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Nations, except the permanent members of the Council, and requested the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on steps taken to that effect. It requested him also to report on an urgent and continuing basis on the state of implementation of that resolution, as well as Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), and asked all Member States to extend their full co-operation.

At the same meeting, the Council authorized the Secretary-General to proceed in accordance with his proposal that, as an urgent interim measure, contingents of Austria, Finland and Sweden serving with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus proceed to Egypt, and that Major-General Siilasvuo, Chief of Staff of UNTSO, be appointed as the interim Commander of the Emergency Force.

On 26 October, the Council met again to continue its consideration of the question and, acting

on a proposal by the representatives of India and Yugoslavia, decided to authorize the Secretary-General to send additional men from Cyprus, as an interim measure should he consider it necessary, and asked the Secretary-General and the President of the Council to appeal to the parties to co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in its humanitarian endeavours.

(b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 340 (1973)

In pursuance of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) concerning the establishment of a United Nations Emergency Force, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a report (S/11052/Rev.1),²⁰ in which he outlined the terms of reference of the Force, general considerations related to its effective functioning, a proposed plan of action and the estimated cost and method of financing.

With regard to the terms of reference, he said that the Force would supervise the implementation of paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 340 (1973), use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting and co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross. It would have the co-operation of the military observers of UNTSO. The essential conditions for its effectiveness were that it must have the full backing of the Council, operate with the full co-operation of the parties and function as an integrated and efficient military unit.

With regard to the guidelines for the functioning of the Force, the Secretary-General proposed that it be placed under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. The Commander of the Force would be appointed by the Secretary-General with the Council's consent and would be responsible to him. The Secretary-General would keep the Council fully informed and refer to it for decision all matters that might affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force.

The Force must enjoy the freedom of movement and communication required for the performance of its task, as well as the relevant privileges and immunities of the United Nations. It should

¹⁷ A similar list is to be found in note to doc. 167 in *ibid.*

¹⁸ See doc. 22 in *ibid.*

¹⁹ Doc. 36 in *ibid.*

²⁰ Doc. 13 in *ibid.*

operate separately from the armed forces of parties concerned. Separate quarters and, whenever feasible, buffer zones would have to be arranged with the co-operation of the parties.

The Force would be composed of contingents, provided upon the request of the Secretary-General by selected countries, chosen in consultation with the Security Council and the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation.

The Force would be provided with defensive weapons only and would not use force except in self-defence, which would include attempts to prevent it, by forceful means, from discharging its duties. It would proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict would comply with the decisions of the Council. The Force would act with complete impartiality and would avoid any action that could prejudice the rights, claims or positions of the parties, without affecting paragraph 1 of Security Council resolutions 339 (1973) and 340 (1973). The total strength of the Force should be in the order of 7,000 men and it would initially have a mandate of six months. On that basis, the approximate estimated cost of the Force for that period would be \$30 million, the costs to be considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne by the Members in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter.

(c) CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
ON 27 OCTOBER

On 27 October, the Security Council met to consider the report of the Secretary-General (S/11052/Rev.1) and, with one member (China) not participating, adopted resolution 341 (1973),²¹ by which the Council approved the report; decided that the Force should be established for an initial period of six months and that it should continue to operate thereafter, if required, provided the Council so decided.

(d) PROGRESS REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTIONING OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

Pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 340 (1973), the Secretary-General issued progress reports on the establishment and functioning of UNEF (S/11056 and addenda).

In his first report, of 28 October,²² he recalled the terms of Council resolution 340 (1973) and the decision that personnel of the contingents of Austria, Finland and Sweden serving in Cyprus should proceed to Egypt, and added that UNEF had become established with the arrival of those contingents in Cairo on 26 October. Those contingents had been deployed on 27 October and a United Nations presence had been established in the Israeli-controlled area west of Suez City. It was planned also to transfer to the UNEF area the Irish contingent serving with UNFICYP, and consultations for further additions to the Force were in progress. Thus the Force's initial activities had taken place in areas of actual confrontation and had involved supervision of the cease-fire in co-operation with UNTSO observers. On 27 and 28 October, at kilometre marker 109 on the Cairo-Suez road, the first meeting of high-level military representatives of Egypt and Israel was held, in the presence of UNEF officers, to discuss observance of the cease-fire and humanitarian questions. An agreement was reached to allow the transfer of non-military supplies through Israeli-held territory to Egyptian troops on the east bank of the Suez Canal by lorries driven by UNEF soldiers.

(e) COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

On 2 November, the Security Council considered the progress reports of the Secretary-General on UNEF (S/11056 and Add.1). The President made a statement representing the agreement of the members of the Council, from which the delegation of China dissociated itself, on the implementation of the second phase of its resolution 340 (1973) establishing UNEF.²³ Under that agreement, the Secretary-General would immediately consult with countries representing the regional groups, namely, Ghana from the African regional group, Indonesia and Nepal from the Asian regional group, Panama and Peru from the Latin American regional group, Poland from the Eastern European regional group and Canada from the Western European and other States group, the latter two with particular responsibility for logistic support, with a view to dispatching contingents to the Middle East pursuant to the above resolution. The Council's

²² Doc. 14 in *ibid.*

²³ Doc. 38 in *ibid.*

²¹ Doc. 37 in *ibid.*

decision was intended to bring about a better geographical distribution of UNEF and provided that at least three African countries would send contingents.

In a note dated 23 November (S/11127), the President of the Council stated that, on 20 November, the Secretary-General had informed him of his intention to add contingents from Kenya and Senegal to UNEF in conformity with the agreement reached in the Council on 2 November and that, following consultations with all members, he had informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council, with China dissociating itself, had agreed to that addition.

(f) APPOINTMENT OF THE FORCE COMMANDER

On 12 November, the Council considered a letter dated 8 November from the Secretary-General to the President of the Council regarding his intention to appoint Major-General Siilasvuo, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and interim Commander of UNEF, as the Force Commander. The Council signified its consent to that appointment, with the exception of China, which dissociated itself from it, and the President of the Council so informed the Secretary-General (S/11104).

(g) FURTHER PROGRESS REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

In a further progress report on UNEF, dated 4 November (S/11056/Add.2), the Secretary-General indicated that its total strength had risen to 1,004, and described the movement and deployment of the contingents. He indicated that consultations on the dispatch of additional troops were continuing. In addition, pursuant to the Council's decision in resolution 340 (1973), the Force Commander had met with the Israeli Minister of Defence on 29 and 30 October to request that Israeli armed forces return to positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October. The report indicated that no reply had so far been received. On 3 November, the Commander met the Egyptian Minister of Defence. Four more meetings of Egyptian and Israeli representatives were held at kilometre 109, in the presence of UNEF representatives, to discuss withdrawals, possible mutual disengagement and the exchange of war prisoners.

In a progress report on UNEF dated 11 November (S/11056/Add.3), the Secretary-General reported that the strength of the Force had then reached 1,600 men. Advance logistic evaluation teams had been dispatched from Canada and Poland, consultations had continued with a view to implementing the agreement adopted by the Security Council and requests for contingents were submitted to the Governments of Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, Panama and Peru. The Force Commander had again requested the return of Israeli troops to positions occupied on 22 October, in accordance with Council resolution 340 (1973). In the context of the implementation of Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), that matter was referred to in an agreement transmitted to the Secretary-General on 9 November by the United States, which Egypt and Israel were prepared to accept.²⁴ The agreement was signed by the two parties at a meeting at kilometre marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road held on 11 November under the auspices of the UNEF Force Commander (S/11056/Add.3, annex). The Secretary-General had instructed the Force Commander to take the necessary measures and to make available his good offices for carrying out the terms of that agreement.

Under the terms of the agreement: (A) Egypt and Israel agreed to observe scrupulously the cease-fire called for by the Security Council; (B) both sides agreed that discussions between them would begin immediately to settle the question of the return to the 22 October positions in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces under the auspices of the United Nations; (C) the town of Suez would receive daily supplies of food, water and medicine and all wounded civilians in the town would be evacuated; (D) there should be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the east bank; (E) the Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road would be replaced by United Nations checkpoints and, at the Suez end of the road, Israeli officers could participate with the United Nations in verifying the non-military nature of the cargo at the bank of the Canal; (F) as soon as the United Nations checkpoints were established on the Cairo-Suez road, there would be an exchange of all prisoners of war,

²⁴ Doc. 188 in *ibid.*

including the wounded.

After signing the agreement, which was to enter into force forthwith, the parties immediately started discussions under the auspices of the Force Commander on the modalities of its implementation.

In further progress reports dated 14 and 15 November (S/11056/Add.4 and 5), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that, on 14 November, the parties had reached an accord on the implementation of paragraphs C, D, E and F of that Agreement, and that the Force Commander had made a summing up of that accord, which had been accepted by the two parties. It provided in particular for UNEF convoys of non-military supplies to Suez City and to the Egyptian Third Army on the east bank of the Canal, the exchange of all prisoners of war and the evacuation of the wounded civilians in Suez City. The reports indicated that UNEF was carrying out smoothly its responsibilities under the terms of that accord. With regard to the organization and composition of the logistic support elements for UNEF, the report of the Secretary-General, dated 24 November (S/11056/Add.6), indicated in its annex that, as a result of discussions between the Secretariat and the delegations of Canada and Poland, an agreement had been reached on the detailed requirements and division of tasks for the logistic support of the Force, providing a clear and practical division of responsibilities between Canada and Poland.

(h) FURTHER REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE

The Secretary-General continued to transmit reports on the status of the cease-fire based on information submitted to him by UNEF for the Egypt-Israel sector and by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO for the other sectors.

In a report dated 29 October (S/11057),²⁵ the Secretary-General outlined the status of the cease-fire operations carried out by UNTSO since the establishment of UNEF. In the Egypt-Israel sector, there were now nine patrols from the Egyptian side and six from the Israeli side, UNTSO observers in that sector continued to carry out their observation duties and UNEF would have their co-operation in the fulfilment of its tasks. In the Israel-Syria sector, as a result of the readjust-

ment of the cease-fire arrangements following the adoption of Security Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), the UNTSO observation operation consisted of three observation posts and the Quneitra Outstation on the Israeli side, and two observation posts on the Syrian side. The remaining observation posts had been closed and eight patrols had been established: five on the Syrian side and three on the Israeli side. In the Israel-Lebanon sector, the five observation posts continued to function as before.

The reports of the Secretary-General show that military activities had markedly lessened in all three sectors following the establishment of UNEF. However, there continued to be many cases of incidents, particularly in the Egypt-Israel sector, where the level of firings, including tank and artillery fire, remained high from the beginning of November until the implementation, on 25 January 1974, of the Agreement on Disengagement of Forces.

2. Consideration by the General Assembly

At its twenty-eighth session, the General Assembly decided to include the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East" in its agenda and to consider the item in plenary meetings. On 6 and 7 October, the Assembly received communications in connexion with the outbreak of hostilities in the area from the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Egypt (A/9190), the Syrian Arab Republic (A/9203) and Israel (A/9204-S/11011) and, on 8 October, it decided to hear statements of an informative character in connexion with the item. Such statements were made on 8,²⁶ 9 and 10 October.

On 18 December, at its 2206th plenary meeting, the General Assembly approved a procedure proposed by the President of the Assembly whereby the twenty-eighth session would not be declared closed. He informed the Assembly that extensive consultations had indicated that, owing to recent developments in the Middle East, the general sentiment was not to take up the item at that time and that the best course to follow would be to resume the session if circumstances should so warrant. Therefore, should the President believe, after consultations with Member States and with the Secretary-General, that conditions would be

²⁵ Doc. 15 in *ibid.*

²⁶ Doc. 17 in *ibid.*

favourable for the consideration of the agenda item, the session would be resumed at a date established by means of subsequent consultations.

The General Assembly did not consider the item again during the period under review.

3. Peace Conference on the Middle East

On 15 December, the Security Council held a private meeting to discuss the arrangements for the proposed Peace Conference on the Middle East and, with one member (China) not participating in the vote, adopted resolution 344 (1973),²⁷ whereby the Council, after noting that a peace conference on the Middle East situation was to begin shortly at Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations, expressed its hope that the Peace Conference would make speedy progress towards the establishment of a just and durable peace, expressed its confidence that the Secretary-General would play an effective role at the Conference and that he would preside over its proceedings if the parties so desired. The Council also requested him to report on the developments at the Conference and to provide all necessary assistance and facilities for its work.

On 18 December, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Council identical letters from the USSR and the United States (S/11161)²⁸ indicating that they had been informed by the parties concerned of their readiness to participate in the Peace Conference, which would begin at Geneva on 21 December, to be convened by the Secretary-General under the auspices of the United Nations and under the co-chairmanship of the USSR and the United States. They hoped that the Secretary-General would serve as convener and preside in the opening phase and that he would have a representative to keep him informed as the Conference proceeded. They felt that it would be appropriate to secure a favourable consensus of the Council. In his letter of transmittal, the Secretary-General indicated his intention to proceed on the basis of the two letters.

On 19 December, the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General (S/11162) that the members of the Council had taken note of the Secretary-General's letter and the documents attached to it, which they considered to be

in accordance with Council resolution 344 (1973). He added that the French delegation had reaffirmed the reservations that had led it to abstain in the vote on Council resolution 344 (1973) and the Chinese delegation, in conformity with the position it had taken on resolutions 338 (1973) and 344 (1973), dissociated itself from the Council's position.

On 24 December, the Secretary-General, in a report issued in pursuance of resolution 344 (1973) (S/11169),²⁹ stated that, on 21 December, he had convened the Peace Conference on the Middle East in Geneva, at which Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the USSR and the United States of America had been represented. Following two public sessions and one closed session, the Secretary-General summed up the conclusions of the Conference by stating that a consensus had been reached to continue its work through the setting up of a military working group, which would discuss the question of disengagement of forces. The Conference was to continue meeting at the ambassadorial level and would reconvene at the foreign ministerial level as needed.

Included in the Secretary-General's report was the text of the statement made by him at the opening of the Peace Conference at Geneva, in which he expressed his gratification that that unique and historic event was taking place under the auspices of the United Nations, which had been seized of the various aspects of the conflict for more than a quarter of a century and had devoted an immense amount of time and effort both to keeping the peace and to the search for a just and lasting settlement. While no one present underestimated the difficulties of the tasks ahead, the very fact of the Conference and the willingness of the Governments concerned to respond to the new effort to find a just and lasting settlement were a source of encouragement and hope for all mankind. The Secretary-General expressed confidence that the participants would not fail to seize the opportunity to build a lasting structure of peace in the area, as it was an opportunity which might not recur for a very long time.

Meanwhile, in a further progress report on UNEF, dated 11 January 1974 (S/11056/Add.7 and Corr. 1), the Secretary-General gave an account of efforts to implement paragraph B

²⁷ Doc. 39 in *ibid.*

²⁸ Doc. 215 in *ibid.*

²⁹ Doc. 16 in *ibid.*

of the Agreement of 11 November 1973 (S/11056/Add.3, annex). Bilateral discussions in November under the auspices of General Siilasvuo at kilometre 101 on the Cairo-Suez road had not achieved concrete results. The discussions were continued under General Siilasvuo's chairmanship in the Military Working Group, established by the Peace Conference on the Middle East, which held meetings from 26 December 1973 to 9 January 1974. The Secretary-General warned that the situation in the Suez Canal sector, with troops of both parties deployed in close confrontation on both sides of the Canal, was unstable and potentially explosive. Conditions in the area made it difficult for UNEF to interpose its troops effectively; hence the importance of efforts to achieve a disengagement of forces.

4. Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on Disengagement of Forces of 18 January 1974

On 18 January, the Secretary-General informed the President of the Council that, on that day, at a meeting held at kilometre 101 on the Cairo-Suez road, an Agreement on Disengagement of Forces,³⁰ in pursuance of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, had been signed by the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces and the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces, as well as by the Force Commander as witness (S/11198). Under its terms, Egypt and Israel committed themselves to observe scrupulously on land, sea and air the cease-fire called for by the Security Council and to refrain from the time of the signing of that document from all military and paramilitary actions against each other. The Agreement, *inter alia*, provided for the separation of the Egyptian and Israeli forces according to zones and lines contained in a map, issued separately (S/11198/Add.1), and the establishment between the two forces of a zone of disengagement in which UNEF would be stationed. It also provided that armaments and forces would be limited in the area between the Egyptian line and the Suez Canal, as well as in the area between the Israeli line and the line which runs along the western base of the mountains where the Gidi and Mitla passes were located. Furthermore, those limitations would be inspected by UNEF. The detailed implementation of the disengagement of forces would be

worked out by military representatives of Egypt and Israel, who would agree on the stages of the process, which would be completed in not more than 40 days after it had begun. The Agreement, which was not regarded by both parties as a final peace agreement, constitutes a first step towards a final, just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council resolution 338 (1973) and within the framework of the Peace Conference on the Middle East.

In a further progress report of 24 January 1974 (S/11056/Add.8), the Secretary-General stated that, in pursuance of the Agreement on Disengagement of Forces reached on 18 January, further meetings held under the chairmanship of the Force Commander had resulted, on 24 January, in the parties signing maps representing the different phases of disengagement and a time-table for action. On 28 January (S/11056/Add.9), the Secretary-General stated that the implementation of the Agreement had begun on 25 January with the redeployment of forces of the parties in accordance with the agreed plan and the handover to UNEF by Israeli forces of the areas involved. As a result of the disengagement of forces, the Secretary-General added, the supply convoys to Suez City had been discontinued, but those going to the east bank of the Canal were to continue until 30 January. At the request of the two parties and the International Committee of the Red Cross, UNEF had given its assistance in the operation of the recovery of bodies of soldiers killed during the hostilities in the Suez Canal area.

In further progress reports on UNEF, dated 4, 12, 21 February and 4 March (S/11056/Add.10-12, Add.12/Corr.1 and Add.13), the Secretary-General indicated that the redeployment of the forces had proceeded smoothly without incident, while UNEF forces had been interposed and had begun patrolling the UNEF zone of disengagement as well as inspecting the areas limited in armaments and forces. Thus, by 4 March, the disengagement process begun on 25 January had been completed. In accordance with the Agreement, the exchange of prisoners of war had taken place by stages and had been completed on 25 February in the presence of UNEF officers and representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

On 16 March, a further progress report on UNEF (S/11056/Add.14) indicated that the

³⁰ Doc. 50 below.

strength of UNEF, which, on 20 February, had reached 6,973 men, had been reduced to 6,814 as a result of the repatriation of elements of the Peruvian battalion, which had not been subsequently replaced. Elements of six contingents of UNEF were deployed in the UNEF zone of disengagement and elements of three more contingents would be deployed in the zone shortly.

The activities which had thus far been carried out by UNEF with the co-operation of UNTSO included the survey and marking the lines which defined the zone of disengagement, the supervision of the cease-fire and the implementation of the disengagement of forces, the inspection of the areas of limited armaments and forces, the search for mortal remains, the handover of civilians and mine-clearing operations carried out in co-operation with the parties.

C. Developments since January 1974 and the establishment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

1. Developments since January 1974

(a) STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE

During the months that followed the Peace Conference on the Middle East, the Secretary-General continued to circulate further reports (S/11057 and addenda) on the status of the cease-fire in the three sectors, based on the information received from the field.

With regard to the functioning of UNTSO, the Secretary-General, on 9 January (S/11214), asked the President of the Security Council to bring to the attention of its members his intention to appoint Major-General Bengt Liljestrand of Sweden as Chief of Staff of UNTSO as of 1 April. That post had been occupied by Major-General Siilasvuo,³¹ who had been appointed Commander of UNEF on 25 November 1973, and thereafter, in an acting capacity, by Colonel R. W. Bunworth of Ireland.

On 5 February, the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General that the Council had taken note of his letter of 9 January and would have no objection to the appointment of Major-General Liljestrand as Chief of Staff of UNTSO. The delegation of China dissociated

itself from the matter (S/11214).

The reports of the Secretary-General show that, in the Egypt-Israel sector, the level of incidents, including heavy weapons fire and aerial activity, remained high up to the time the Agreement on Disengagement of Forces was reached on 18 January, when there was a marked decrease in activity; the situation became calm by early February. They also indicated that the operations for the disengagement of forces were proceeding without significant incidents.

In contrast to the Egypt-Israel sector, the level of incidents in the Israel-Syria sector continued and increased. After early March and until the end of May 1974, the situation in the sector became increasingly tense, with markedly intensified firing involving the use of artillery, tanks and rockets and later air attacks. On 20 March, the Secretary-General expressed his concern at the deterioration of the situation and appealed to the parties concerned to exercise the utmost restraint and to observe strictly the cease-fire (S/11057/Add.369).

There was also an increase of the incidents in the Israel-Lebanon sector, particularly as regards overflights of Lebanese territory by Israeli forces aircraft.

In a report dated 1 June, issued one day following the signing at Geneva of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, the Chief of Staff reported that all firing had ceased in the Israel-Syria sector as of 1109 hours (GMT) on 31 May (S/11057/Add.504). Thereafter, no further reports were issued, during the period under review, on violations of the cease-fire in the Israel-Syria sector.

From the outbreak of the hostilities in October, the parties to the fighting, in communications circulated to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, exchanged charges and counter-charges regarding incidents of cease-fire violations in their respective sectors.

Israel charged Egypt with continuing large-scale attacks on its forces in an effort to try to effect changes in the cease-fire lines in its favour, while Egypt submitted lists enumerating almost daily cease-fire violations committed by Israel.

In the Israel-Syria sector, Israel charged Syria with continuous cease-fire violations which, it said, underlined a deliberate policy on the part of Syria to create an atmosphere of military con-

³¹ Major-General Siilasvuo was promoted to Lieutenant-General on 6 December 1973.

frontation and effect changes in the cease-fire lines in its favour. Syria also charged Israel with violations of the cease-fire by occupying new positions after the cease-fire had gone into effect.

On 11 April, Israel complained that a group of terrorists had crossed the Lebanese border to the village of Kiryat Shmona on Israeli territory and massacred 18 of its inhabitants, including eight children and five women, and wounded 15 other persons. It said that responsibility for that slaughter had been acknowledged in Beirut by the terrorist organization known as the Popular Front-General Command, and asserted that Lebanon, where terrorist organizations enjoyed freedom of movement and operation, must bear full responsibility for a situation that permitted terror attacks to be carried out from its territory against Israel (A/9515-S/11259).

On 12 April, Lebanon replied that the United Nations observers' reports had not indicated any infiltration from Lebanon to Israel during that week and that Israel had not produced any evidence to substantiate its allegation. No infiltration whatsoever had taken place from Lebanon into Israel and the Lebanese Army was taking measures to prevent any infiltration. The Palestine Liberation Organization had affirmed that it was conducting its resistance movement with elements stationed in Israel. Accordingly, Lebanon could not be held responsible for actions of Palestinians in Israel or elsewhere (A/9516-S/11263).

(b) CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

On 13 April, the Chief of Staff reported that, in addition to the recurrent incursions near the border, there had been artillery fire by Israeli forces across the Armistice Demarcation Line and flights by Israeli jet aircraft over Lebanese territory. Furthermore, the Chief of Staff reported that he had received complaints from Lebanon alleging that, on 12 and 13 April, Israeli forces commandos had infiltrated into Lebanese territory and demolished a number of houses in several villages. Lebanon had requested an inquiry on those incursions (S/11057/Add.402). On 14 April, the Chief of Staff reported that the observers' investigation had shown that houses had been destroyed in several villages. In addition, two women had apparently been killed as a result of an explosion (S/11057/Add.404).

On 13 April, Lebanon requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council stating that, as a result of Israel's aggression against six Lebanese villages, two civilians had been killed, others wounded and 13 civilians kidnapped. Israeli forces had also destroyed 31 houses in those villages (S/11264).

The Council considered the complaint of Lebanon at four meetings, held between 15 and 24 April, and, with two members (China and Iraq) not participating, adopted resolution 347 (1973)³², by which it condemned Israel's violation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and sovereignty and condemned all acts of violence, especially those which resulted in the tragic loss of innocent civilian life. Further, the Council called on all Governments concerned to respect their obligations under the Charter, and called on Israel forthwith to release and return to Lebanon the abducted Lebanese civilians. Finally, it called upon all parties to refrain from any action which might endanger negotiations aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

On 15 May, the Secretary-General issued a statement expressing his deep shock at the news of the terrorist action at Ma'alot in Israel in the early hours of that day. He stated that such violent actions were to be condemned, whatever their motivation, especially when they involved innocent persons, including children. He expressed his earnest hope that the forces for peace which had been at work in recent months would not be diverted from their course by such actions. On 16 May, the Secretary-General repeated the above statement in relation to the attacks by the Israel Air Force on refugee camps and other targets in Lebanon. He noted that this pattern of action and counter-action had bedevilled all attempts to find a peace settlement in the Middle East and had cost the lives of countless innocent people. He again appealed to all concerned to turn away from violence and allow the forces for peace to continue their work.

On 15 and 17 May, the Secretary-General received the texts of statements by the Secretary of State of the United States of America and the Permanent Representative to the United Nations, as well as a resolution passed on 15 May by the

³² Doc. 31 below.

United States Senate, regarding killings of innocents in Ma'alot and the retaliatory Israeli air attacks, which had led to new killings in southern Lebanon. The statements expressed outrage, condemned the cycle of violence which could undermine the search for peace and called on all parties to redouble efforts for a just and lasting peace (A/9534-S/11287 and A/9535-S/11288).

On 17 May, Lebanon charged that the Israel Air Force, on 16 May, had attacked several Lebanese towns, villages and Palestinian refugee camps, killing over 40 people and wounding over 180, in addition to destroying 41 houses. Lebanon charged that, following the tragic developments at Ma'alot, Israel had sought a scapegoat for an act committed by three Palestinians operating from within Israel and had once again launched an attack against innocent Palestinians living in refugee camps (S/11289 and Corr.1).

On 18 May, Israel charged in reply that the massacre at Ma'alot, in which 21 school boys and girls had been murdered and another 70 wounded, was the latest atrocity planned, organized and carried out from Lebanon against Israel. Israel had taken action against terror organizations located in Lebanon, including the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which had declared its responsibility for the massacre, and considered that responsibility for the results of such action fell squarely on Lebanon which continued to make it possible for terror acts to be directed against Israel and its citizens (S/11290).

During the first half of June, the Secretary-General received further communications from Israel charging that Lebanon was continuing to serve as a base for murder and sabotage activities against Israel, and indicating that there had been some clashes in Israeli territory with terrorists who had penetrated from Lebanon (S/11309, S/11314 and S/11319).

During the month of May and up to 15 June, the Secretary-General continued, on the basis of information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, to report persistent incidents of overflights by Israeli planes and commando penetration of Lebanese territory, in addition to artillery fire from Israeli territory and the occasional exchange of fire on both sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line. However, he noted that the level of incidents had markedly decreased in

early June compared to the situation in May (S/11057/Add.514).

(c) EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

Report of the Secretary-General

As the six-month mandate of UNEF was to expire in April 1974, the Secretary-General submitted a comprehensive report on the operation of the Force from its inception on 26 October 1973 until 1 April 1974 (S/11248).³³

After recalling the terms of reference of the Force and describing its establishment and current composition, the Secretary-General reviewed the activities described in the progress reports of UNEF issued over the previous five months. During that period UNEF had suffered four fatal casualties, two of which resulted from accidents and two from other causes. As a result of explosions, 15 were injured. Those activities at various stages had included observance of the cease-fire and supervision of the Agreement on Disengagement; assistance to the parties in negotiations and in implementing agreements; humanitarian activities and co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross in connexion with the exchange of prisoners of war; the transfer of civilians and the search for mortal remains; the convoy of non-military supplies to Suez City and to Egyptian forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal; and co-operation with UNTSO.

One of the remaining problems facing the Force related to restrictions on the freedom of movement of personnel of certain contingents. The Secretary-General affirmed his consistent position that UNEF had to function as an integrated and efficient military unit, contingents of which served on an equal basis, and that no differentiation could be made regarding the United Nations status of the various contingents. He indicated that the matter was being pursued and that he would continue to exert every effort to solve it in a satisfactory way.

Another problem which was given the close attention of the Secretary-General was the rate of reimbursement to contributing Governments for the costs incurred by them as a result of supplying troops to the United Nations.

In connexion with the financial aspects of UNEF,

³³ Doc. 7 below.

the Secretary-General recalled that, by its resolution 3101 (XXVIII)³⁴ of 11 December 1973, the General Assembly had appropriated \$30 million for the initial period of operation, on the basis of his very approximate initial cost estimates, and had given him the financial authority to carry on the operation if the Council should extend the mandate of the Force. While there had been a number of unexpected expenses, including the cost of supplies and equipment for some contingents and of substantial portions of logistic support, as well as increased prices for certain supplies, there had been some offsetting savings as a result of the gradual rate of build-up of the Force. Moreover, consultations in progress with respect to standardized costs and a reimbursement ceiling would also have a bearing on the total cost of the Force, which would be made available in greater detail for submission to the Assembly at its twenty-ninth session for review and approval. It was estimated that the Force would cost more than \$5 million per month for the new six-month period, owing to new expenses, such as those for rotation of contingents, unanticipated expenditures for heavy logistical equipment and continuing cost increases for supplies.

Having reviewed those aspects of the Force's activities, the Secretary-General then observed that the establishment of the Force in October 1973 had been a milestone in the history of the United Nations and had served to defuse a highly explosive situation, which otherwise could well have had major consequences for world peace. After stressing the effectiveness of the Force, as witnessed by the quiet then prevailing in the Egypt-Israel sector, he remarked that the broad geographical basis of the Force was an important feature which was highly encouraging for the future.

The Secretary-General then cautioned that, as the disengagement of forces was only a first step towards the settlement of the Middle East problem, the situation remained unstable and potentially dangerous. The continued operation of UNEF was essential not only to maintain the existing quiet in the Egypt-Israel sector, but also to assist in further efforts for the establishment of a just and durable peace in the area. Consequently, he considered it necessary to recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNEF

for another period of six months. Having made that recommendation, he felt that the mandate as approved by the Security Council was still adequate and he pledged to refer to the Security Council all matters which might affect the nature of the continued effective functioning of the Force.

Consideration by the Security Council

On 8 April, the Security Council met to consider the report of the Secretary-General on UNEF (S/11248) and, with two members (China and Iraq) not participating, adopted resolution 346 (1974),³⁵ by which the Council, after having reviewed the functioning of UNEF, expressed its appreciation to the States which had contributed troops and to those which had made voluntary financial and material contributions for its support; expressed appreciation to the Secretary-General for his efforts in implementing the decisions of the Council regarding the establishment and functioning of UNEF; commended the Force for its contribution to efforts to achieve a just and durable peace in the Middle East; noted the Secretary-General's view that the disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces was only a first step towards the settlement of the Middle East problem and that the continued operation of UNEF was essential not only for the maintenance of the present quiet in the Egypt-Israel sector, but to assist in further efforts for the establishment of a just and durable peace; and accordingly decided that the mandate of UNEF should be extended for a further period of six months, that is, until 24 October 1974. The Council further noted with satisfaction that the Secretary-General was exerting every effort to solve in a satisfactory way the problems of UNEF, including two which required urgent solutions: the rate of reimbursement to Governments supplying troops and the freedom of movement of all contingents in the operational area. The Council further noted with satisfaction the Secretary-General's intention to keep under constant review the required strength of the Force with a view to making reductions and economies when the situation permitted; called upon all Member States, particularly the parties concerned, to extend their full support in the implementation of the resolution; and requested the Secretary-General to report to it on a continuing basis.

³⁴ Doc. 29 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

³⁵ Doc. 30 below.

(d) SUBSEQUENT REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

In further progress reports on UNEF, dated 19 April and 13 May (S/11248/Add.1 and 2), the Secretary-General indicated that the strength of the Force had been 6,788 men on 19 April and 6,645 men on 13 May, and that its activities remained the manning, patrolling and control of the zone of disengagement and inspections of the areas of limited armaments and forces. While no significant incidents had been reported, overflights of the zone of disengagement by unidentified aircraft had taken place and there had been occasional minor incursions into the zone of disengagement by military personnel of the parties, who had been immediately escorted out of the zone. During the period under review, there had been an exchange of civilians between Israel and Egypt, which had been witnessed by UNEF officers and representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The Secretary-General also reported that the parties had agreed, in the presence of a UNEF officer, to recommence the operations for the recovery of the bodies of soldiers killed during the hostilities in the Suez area, relying for that purpose on UNEF assistance. In addition further efforts had been made regarding the question of freedom of movement for all UNEF contingents in the operational area, and consultations had continued with the representatives of the countries contributing contingents to UNEF concerning the possibilities of standardizing costs and determining a ceiling, as requested by the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session.

In a further progress report, dated 20 May (S/11248/Add.3), the Secretary-General stated that, on 18 May, he had been informed by the Permanent Representative of Ireland of his Government's decision to withdraw on 22 May the Irish contingent serving with UNEF, in view of the exceptional strains then imposed on the Irish security forces. The Commander of UNEF had reported that the Irish contingent would be relieved by the Nepalese battalion. The Secretary-General had informed the President of the Council of those developments.

On 21 May, the Secretary-General reported (S/11248/Add.4) that, in a further letter dated 21 May, the Government of Ireland had indicated

that when the need to retain its troops in Ireland had passed, it would be ready to send them again to the Middle East should the United Nations feel that desirable, as it wished to be regarded as continuing its commitment to UNEF.

On 23 May, the President of the Security Council issued a note (S/11296), in connexion with the Secretary-General's reports concerning the request of the Irish Government, in which he informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had no objection to the request and agreed to the course of action set out in those reports. The Chinese delegation dissociated itself from the matter.

2. Establishment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES OF 31 MAY 1974

Report of the Secretary-General

On 29 May, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council (S/11302) about arrangements for signing the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces. The signing would take place on 31 May in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Peace Conference on the Middle East. He asked Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, Commander of UNEF, to be available there, and his personal representative to the Geneva Conference, Mr. Roberto E. Guyer, to represent him at the signing.

On 30 May, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, together with the Protocol to the Agreement concerning the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force.³⁶ He pointed out that those documents called for the creation of a United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF); if the Security Council decided to establish the Force, he would take the necessary steps in accordance with the provision of the Protocol. It was his intention to draw the Force in the first instance from United Nations military personnel in the area (S/11302/Add.1).

Under the terms of the Agreement, Israel and Syria would scrupulously observe the cease-fire on land, sea and air and would refrain from all

³⁶ Doc. 115 below.

military actions against each other from the time of the signing of the document, in implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

It further provided that the two military forces would be separated in accordance with certain principles, which stipulated that: (a) all Israeli military forces would be west of a line designated as Line A, except in the Quneitra area, where they would be west of Line A-1 on a map to be precisely delineated by military representatives of Israel and Syria in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group meeting at Geneva following the signature of the Agreement; (b) all territory east of Line A would be under Syrian administration and Syrian civilians would return to that territory; (c) the area between Line A and Line B would be an area of separation in which the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force would be stationed; all Syrian military forces would be east of Line B; (d) there would be two equal areas of limitation in armaments and forces, one west of Line A and one east of Line B, and the air forces of the two sides would be permitted to operate up to their respective lines without interference from the other side. Furthermore, there would be no military forces between Line A and Line A-1.

The Agreement stated that the precise delineation of a detailed map and a plan for the implementation of the disengagement of forces would be worked out by the military representatives of Israel and Syria in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, who would agree on the stages of this process. They would begin this work 24 hours after the signing of the Agreement and would complete this task within five days. Disengagement would begin within 24 hours thereafter and would be completed not later than 20 days after it had begun.

Under the Agreement, its provisions concerning the cease-fire, the separation of forces and the absence of military forces in the area between Lines A and A-1 would be inspected by personnel of UNDOF. Within 24 hours after its signature, all wounded prisoners of war would be repatriated, and all others upon completion of the work of the Military Working Group. Within 10 days, the bodies of all dead soldiers held by either side would be returned for burial in their respective

countries.

Finally, the Agreement stated that it was not a peace agreement, but a step towards a just and durable peace on the basis of Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

The Protocol concerning UNDOF indicated that both parties agreed that its function would be to maintain the cease-fire, to see that it was scrupulously observed and to supervise the Agreement and Protocol thereto with regard to the areas of separation and limitation. In carrying out its mission, the Force would comply with Syrian laws and regulations and would not hamper the functioning of local civil administration. The Force would enjoy the freedom of movement and communication necessary for its mission. It would be mobile and provided with personal weapons of a defensive character to be used only in self-defence. The strength of UNDOF was set at 1,250, to be selected by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties, from Members of the United Nations that were not permanent members of the Security Council.

Under the terms of the Protocol, UNDOF would be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. It would carry out inspections and report to the parties not less often than once every 15 days, or when requested by either party, and would mark on the ground the lines shown on the map worked out under the Agreement.

Finally, the Protocol provided that Israel and Syria would support a Security Council resolution which would provide for the Force contemplated by the Agreement. The initial authorization would be for six months, subject to renewal by a further Security Council resolution.

*Consideration by the Security Council on
30 and 31 May 1974*

The Security Council met at the request of the United States of America on 30 and 31 May to consider the situation in the Middle East, in particular the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces. The agenda also included the report of the Secretary-General (S/11302 and Add.1), to which were annexed the texts of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces and the Protocol thereto concerning UNDOF. In presenting his report on 30 May, the Secretary-

General expressed the hope and the belief that the achievement of the Agreement on Disengagement would constitute another important step towards a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East. After stating that he would take the necessary steps in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol if the Council so decided, he informed the Council that, in the event of such a decision, it would be his intention to set up the Force on the basis of the same general principles as those defined in his report (S/11052/Rev.1) on the implementation of Council resolution 340 (1973)—which had been approved by the Council in its resolution 341 (1973) of 27 October 1973—and that, at least in the first instance, the Force would be drawn from United Nations military personnel in the area.

On 31 May, after the signing of the Agreement on Disengagement at Geneva on that day, the Council, with China and Iraq not participating in the vote, adopted resolution 350 (1974),³⁷ which was jointly sponsored by the USSR and the United States of America. In that resolution, the Council welcomed the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, negotiated in implementation of Council resolution 338 (1973); took note of the report of the Secretary-General, its annexes and his statement; decided to set up immediately under its authority a United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, and requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to that effect in accordance with his report and the annexes thereto. The Council also decided that the Force would be established for an initial period of six months, subject to renewal by further Council resolution, and requested the Secretary-General to keep it fully informed of further developments.

Following the adoption of that resolution, the Secretary-General suggested to the Council that UNDOF should initially comprise the Austrian and Peruvian contingents of UNEF, supported by logistical elements from Canada and Poland. UNDOF would also comprise those United Nations military observers, in accordance with the terms of the Protocol, who were already deployed in the area. It was the Secretary-General's intention to appoint Brigadier-General Gonzalo Briceño Zevallos of Peru, Commander of the

UNEF Northern Brigade, as interim Commander of UNDOF.

The Security Council, without objection, agreed to the Secretary-General's proposals.

Reports of the Secretary-General on the establishment and functioning of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

In his first progress report, dated 5 June (S/11310), on the implementation of resolution 350 (1974) of 31 May 1974, the Secretary-General indicated that, in response to his request, Austria and Peru had agreed to the transfer to UNDOF of their contingents serving with UNEF. Furthermore, Canada and Poland had also agreed to the transfer of elements of their contingents from UNEF to UNDOF to provide logistic services.

With regard to the implementation of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, he said that the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Peace Conference on the Middle East had begun its work, under the aegis of the United Nations, immediately after the signing of that Agreement. Following discussions at Geneva with Mr. Roberto E. Guyer, his personal representative to the Conference, and Lieutenant-General Siilasvuo, Commander of UNEF, the Secretary-General had given instructions to move advance elements of UNDOF to the operational area on 3 June with a view to making the Force operational there by 5 June. On 3 June, he had appointed Brigadier-General Gonzalo Briceño Zevallos as interim Commander of UNDOF; temporary offices were established in Damascus on the same day. The strength of the contingents being transferred to the Force from UNEF was approximately as follows: Austrian contingent—500; Peruvian contingent—350; Canadian and Polish logistic elements—250;. In addition, 90 UNTSO military observers deployed in the area were to be transferred to UNDOF.

On 6 June, in an addendum (S/11302/Add.2)³⁸ to his report of 29 May on the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, the Secretary-General said that, from 31 May to 5 June 1974, the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Peace Conference on the Middle East under the aegis of the United Nations

³⁷ Doc. 32 below.

³⁸ Doc. 8 below.

had held six meetings. Syrian military representatives had joined the Group and representatives of the co-chairmen of the Conference had also participated in the meetings. At the meeting held on 31 May, Israeli and Syrian military representatives had signed the Agreement on Disengagement and a map attached thereto. In the subsequent meetings, full agreement had been reached on a map showing different phases of disengagement, a disengagement plan (areas and a time-table) and an agreed statement by Lieutenant-General E. Siilasvuo, who had presided over the meetings. The map to which the disengagement plan was attached was signed by the parties at the final meeting on 5 June.

The plan of separation of forces involved the redeployment of Israeli forces from the area east of the 1967 cease-fire line. It also provided for Israeli redeployment from Quneitra and Rafid and the demilitarization of an area west of Quneitra still held by Israel. Under the plan, UNDOF would initially occupy a buffer zone between the parties and, by 26 June, the separation of forces was to be completed. After the completion of each phase of the redeployment of forces set out in the plan, UNDOF would carry out an inspection and report its findings to the parties; after verifying, on 26 June, that the agreed limitation of forces was being observed, it would carry out regular bi-weekly inspections of the 10-kilometre restricted forces area.

Agreement was also reached in the Military Working Group that both sides would repatriate all prisoners of war by 6 June; that they would co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in carrying out its mandate, including the exchange of bodies, also to be completed by 6 June; and that they would make available information and maps of minefields in their respective areas and the areas to be handed over by them.

D. Question of Jerusalem

On 5 June 1973, Morocco complained (A/9087-S/10965) that, during January and February 1973, Israel had notified 51 Moroccan families, comprising 187 persons, that they would have to evacuate their dwellings in the city of Jerusalem. Morocco added that that action constituted a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and was contrary to the relevant

resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

On 17 July, Israel replied that the families in question had been relocated for the purpose of the clearing and reconstruction of slums and the relocation of inhabitants from substandard dwellings to adequate housing (A/9096-S/10969). Furthermore, those families had been offered alternative accommodation in greatly improved conditions.

On 29 March 1974, Jordan complained to the Secretary-General that Israeli authorities were carrying out destructive excavations near the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the surrounding area (A/9507-S/11246). The Chairman of the Supreme Muslim Council in Jerusalem had protested against such excavations, which were said to have caused a crack in the building of the historical Al Jawhariyah School on the western side of the Mosque, and had demanded an immediate halt to those excavations. Pointing out that those excavations could cause the collapse and destruction of several religious and historic buildings and make 3,000 persons living in that area homeless, Jordan requested action to halt any further excavations in the Holy City, which were in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the Hague Convention of 1907, as well as the principles of international law, the United Nations Charter, and the Security Council resolutions on Jerusalem.

In a reply dated 30 April, Israel rejected Jordan's charges as being without any foundation and denied that there had been any excavation under the building in question, which, in view of its age and general state of dilapidation, had to be repaired periodically (A/9527-S/11279). With regard to the excavations conducted in the area of the Temple Mount, they were carried out by distinguished archaeologists who had made invaluable contributions to the knowledge of the different cultures, societies and religions identified with that historic site, without constituting in any way a danger to existing historical and religious monuments.

E. Situation in the occupied territories

During the period under review, the Security Council and the General Assembly received a number of communications relating to the situation of the civilian population in territories affected by the hostilities in the Middle East.

By notes dated 20 July 1973 and 31 May 1974, the Secretary-General drew the attention of the members of the General Assembly and the Security Council to resolutions adopted by the Commission on Human Rights at its 1210th meeting on 14 March 1973³⁹ and its 1254th meeting on 11 February 1974⁴⁰ entitled "Question of the violation of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East" (A/9098-S/10972, A/9540-S/11303).

In letters dated 14 and 18 October 1973, Egypt stated its readiness to comply with the appeal to the parties by the International Committee of the Red Cross to abide by the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and charged Israel with refusing to respond to that appeal (S/11024 and S/11033). On 19 October, Israel replied that Egypt's letters were intended to conceal its responsibility for the attack of 6 October and to falsify Israel's position concerning the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (S/11034).

Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic also submitted charges that Israel was persistently committing aggressive and inhuman acts against civilians in the Israeli-occupied areas, which constituted violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. In a letter dated 14 October (S/11025), Egypt stated that Israeli planes had used high-explosive bombs against heavily populated Nile Delta towns, and, in a letter of 15 October, submitted photographs showing some victims of that attack (S/11028). Egypt complained also that, prior to 6 November, Israeli troops had been forcing civilians to seek refuge in areas where Egyptian advanced positions were located (S/11083). On 3 November, for example, Israeli troops had rounded up the 298 inhabitants of the villages of El-Ganein and Amer, blindfolded them and forced them to evacuate their homes and fields and move to the nearest Egyptian military position (S/11080) and, on 30 October, they had expelled the civilian population from the towns and villages of Goneifa, arrested 600 civilians, fired at the livestock and destroyed shopping centres (A/9273-S/11068). The Syrian Arab Republic also charged that Israeli forces

had shelled and bombed civilian quarters, hospitals and schools, which had resulted in the killing of a large number of civilians.

Israel replied that the charges made by Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic were entirely baseless and distorted the facts in order to divert attention from their own violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 (A/9280-S/11074, S/11096, A/9342-S/11130, S/11183). Furthermore, Israel complained that systematic armed attacks had been launched from Lebanese territory against civilian targets in Israel, including a passenger bus and a border police patrol, acts for which Israel held Lebanon responsible (A/9229-S/11032, A/9251-S/11041, A/9387-S/11143, A/9469-S/11163).

On 19 October, Israel also charged the Syrian Arab Republic with subjecting inhabited localities of an exclusively civilian nature to missile, artillery and air attacks, which had caused heavy civilian casualties (A/9245-S/11035).

Other activities of the United Nations related to this issue are dealt with in the section on assistance to Palestine refugees (see chapter V, section L below) and the section entitled "Question of the violation of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East".

During the period under review, the Security Council and the General Assembly also received a number of communications relating to the treatment of prisoners of war. Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic, on the one side, and Israel on the other, charged each other with mistreatment of prisoners of war and violations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

On 22 November and 8 December, Israel transmitted the texts of complaints it had submitted to the International Committee of the Red Cross at Geneva concerning cases of the murder of Israeli prisoners of war by Syrian military authorities (A/9333-S/11126 and A/9429-S/11148). Israel called upon the International Committee of the Red Cross to take the necessary steps to condemn Syria's acts and to demand that Syrian authorities comply with the laws of war and the international conventions.

On 5 and 14 December, the Syrian Arab Republic transmitted its replies to the complaints

³⁹ Doc. 40 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

⁴⁰ Doc. 35 below.

lodged by Israel with the International Committee of the Red Cross (A/9388-S/11144 and A/9456-S/11157). The Syrian Arab Republic rejected Israeli allegations that Israeli prisoners of war had been tortured and killed and, in turn, charged Israel with mistreatment of Syrian war prisoners and civilians.

On 26 December, Egypt charged that cruel, inhuman and illegal treatment had been inflicted by Israeli authorities on Egyptian prisoners of war, and submitted a list of those prisoners who had been subjected to such mistreatment by the Israeli authorities (S/11173).

In section B.4 above, an account is given of the Agreement reached and action taken to effect the exchange of prisoners of war held by Egypt and Israel as well as the return of civilians held by those countries.

Further details on the situation in the Middle East will appear in the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly.⁴¹

2

Report of the Security Council: The Situation in the Middle East⁴²

November, 1974

A. The search for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict

CONSIDERATION AT THE 1733RD TO 1735TH MEETINGS
(20–26 JULY 1973)

5. In accordance with its decision of 20 April in resolution 331 (1973)⁴³ “to meet following the submission of the Secretary-General’s report to examine the situation in the Middle East” [for an account of the adoption of resolution 331 (1973) and the report of the Secretary-General (S/10929) see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 2* (A/9002, chap. 1)]⁴⁴ the Security Council at its 1733rd meeting on 20 July resumed its consideration of the item on its agenda that read:

“Examination of the Situation in the Middle East:

“(a) Security Council resolution 331 (1973)

“(b) Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 331 (1973) of 20 April 1973 (S/10929).”

6. At the same meeting the President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of the 19 States who had participated in the previous discussion without the right to vote to continue to do so. Subsequently the President also invited the representative of Tunisia, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

7. Opening the discussion, the representative of Egypt said that the Charter endowed the Security Council with the authority to take the measures necessary for the implementation of its decisions, including, among others, expulsion from membership, diplomatic and economic sanctions and coercive military action against an aggressor. Ever since the Council discussed Israel’s attack of 5 June 1967 against Egypt, Jordan and Syria, Israel had been applying a policy of colonization of the occupied territories with the aim of creating new facts in the area. That policy would be abetted by those Council members responsible should the Council fail to act or be prevented from acting in this most serious situation. After recalling the Council’s discussion in June, which he considered had revealed general agreement on key points related to the situation in the Middle East, including the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take action to achieve a just peace, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and respect for the legitimate rights of all peoples including the Palestinians, the representative of Egypt said that in contrast, Israel had stated on 8 June in the Council that no principle and no rule could prejudice the right to self-preservation and defence. In his view, Israel, by insisting on negotiations while Arab territories were under occupation, was seeking to coerce the Arab countries into giving up parts of their homelands. In these circumstances the only option before the Council was to deal with the substance of the problem and to convince Israel that its expansionist policy was contrary to the Charter. The Council should declare Israel’s occupation of the Arab territories a most flagrant violation of the Charter, and should

⁴¹ Doc. 2 below.

⁴² Part I, Chapter 1 of *Report of the Security Council, 16 June 1973–15 June 1974, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 2* (UN doc A/9602), pp. 2–49.

⁴³ Doc. 31 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

⁴⁴ Docs. 2 and 8 in *ibid*.

invite States to refrain from giving Israel any aid or assistance enabling it to maintain its policy of occupation and coercion.

8. The representative of Israel said that efforts to attain a peaceful settlement between Israel and the Arab States could not succeed if they were based on the one-sided contention that the main problem was Israeli withdrawal. Resolutions not based on the parties' consent could not contribute to the attainment of agreement between them. The only resolution that had played any significant role in the Middle East conflict since 1967 was Security Council resolution 242 (1967).⁴⁵ That was so because the resolution had been adopted unanimously following consultation and understanding with the parties. Although the entire resolution was a series of principles, Egypt, in its demands, had singled out some of its concepts and neglected the others. Egypt's demands were contrary, not merely to resolution 242 (1967), but also to the provisions of the Charter. Nothing in the Charter deprived a Member State of the right to defend itself. Furthermore, no principle of the Charter precluded border changes, especially following the use of force in self-defence. Another step to undermine resolution 242 (1967) had been Egypt's demand regarding the alleged issue of the rights of the Palestinians. Egypt sought to replace the resolution's call for a just settlement of the refugee problem by a provision on Palestinian rights. To satisfy the Egyptian demand invoking the principle of self-determination would mean introducing a new element into the framework of resolution 242 (1967) and perhaps dismembering Jordan. The discussion adjourned on 14 June had clarified that all participants understood that resolution 242 (1967) envisaged changes in the 1967 lines between Israel and other Arab States to ensure secure and recognized boundaries. It had also become increasingly apparent that the one method that could bring about agreement between the parties was that of negotiation.

9. The representative of Jordan stated that resolution 242 (1967) aimed at ending the occupation and establishing the conditions for a just and durable peace. As a resolution based on balance between withdrawal and territorial integrity on one hand, and guarantees for peace

on the other, it could have meant nothing less than total withdrawal. Regardless of their technical nationality, the Arab people now under occupation must be granted their full moral rights. Jordan intended to review the structure of the relationship between its two flanks once the occupation ended. His Government hoped that the Council would take into account the facts of the situation and it welcomed the resumption of the efforts of Ambassador Jarring to help put resolution 242 (1967) into effect. Jordan could not acquiesce in a settlement imposed by military and political force, but believed in peace based on the realization of the objective conditions of justice.

10. The representative of the USSR said that in the light of the favourable changes which had taken place in the international atmosphere, the Security Council, which bore primary responsibility for the attainment of a Middle East settlement, had to take constructive steps to solve that problem which constituted a threat to international peace and security. From the debate, it was clear that the will of the overwhelming majority of Council members and United Nations Member States emphasized the following principles, on the basis of which the Council could and must establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East: the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by means of war; the non-use of force in international relations; respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of States in the Middle East and the total and unconditional withdrawal of all Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories; respect for the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine and the need for compliance with resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts and provisions; approval of the Jarring memorandum of 8 February 1971⁴⁶ as an important initiative towards the attainment of a political settlement in total compliance with resolution 242 (1967); and the need for activating the Jarring mission. The key question, however, had always been and continued to be the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories, resolution of that important question on the basis of respect for territorial integrity and a guarantee of the legitimate rights of all States and peoples of the area, including the Arab

⁴⁵ Doc. 268 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

⁴⁶ Annex I to doc. 413 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

people of Palestine.

11. At its 1734th meeting on 25 July, the Council had before it a draft resolution co-sponsored by Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia (S/10974) which read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having examined comprehensively the current situation in the Middle East,

"Having heard in this context the statements of the participants in this debate, including the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Algeria, Chad, Guinea, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania,

"Emphasizing its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

"Emphasizing further that all Members of the United Nations are committed to respect the resolutions of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

"Reaffirming resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967,

"Conscious that the rights of the Palestinians have to be safeguarded,

"Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/10929) which includes an account of the objective and determined efforts of his Special Representative since 1967,

"1. Deeply regrets that the Secretary-General was unable to report any significant progress by him or by his Special Representative in carrying out the terms of resolution 242 (1967), and that nearly six years after its adoption a just and lasting peace in the Middle East has still not been achieved;

"2. Strongly deplores Israel's continuing occupation of the territories occupied as a result of the 1967 conflict, contrary to the principles of the Charter;

"3. Expresses serious concern at Israel's lack of co-operation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

"4. Supports the initiatives of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General taken in conformity with his mandate and contained in his aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971;

"5. Expresses its conviction that a just and peaceful solution to the problem of the Middle East can be achieved only on the basis of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, the

rights of all States in the area and for the rights and legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians;

"6. Declares that in the occupied territories no changes which may obstruct a peaceful and final settlement or which may adversely affect the political and other fundamental rights of all the inhabitants in these territories should be introduced or recognized;

"7. Requests the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to resume and to pursue their efforts to promote a just and peaceful solution of the Middle East problem;

"8. Decides to afford the Secretary-General and his Special Representative all support and assistance for the discharge of their responsibilities;

"9. Calls upon all parties concerned to extend full co-operation to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative;

"10. Decides to remain seized of the problem and to meet again urgently whenever it becomes necessary."

12. Introducing the draft resolution, the representative of India stated that it would inform the parties directly involved of the general thinking of the Council and instruct them in the ways in which, in the Council's opinion, they should move and make progress. The draft resolution was entirely based on facts and their objective consideration and it should not invite any reservations or criticisms.

13. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation, which supported and co-sponsored the draft resolution, would like to underscore the importance of the fifth preambular paragraph which affirmed resolution 242 (1967).

14. The representative of Indonesia said that his delegation attached great importance to paragraph 5, which underlined respect for the rights of the Palestinians. Nevertheless, his delegation would have preferred a stronger draft resolution demanding Israel's withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. However, it was prepared to accommodate the viewpoints of other representatives in the hope of obtaining the necessary votes for its adoption by the Council.

15. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the draft resolution took due account of the following elements which characterized the present difficult situation: first, all United Nations efforts to implement resolution 242 (1967) had failed solely because of Israel's refusal to co-operate

with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General; second, the illegal occupation of the territories of three Member States was continuing; third the demographic, economic and other changes imposed in those territories by Israel in contradiction of all the principles of international law endangered the fundamental rights of the inhabitants; and fourth, the Palestinian political movement could not be destroyed as an active factor in the Middle East without which no definitive solution of the crisis was possible. In his opinion, the Council had no option but to pursue actively its efforts for the implementation of resolution 242 (1967), which he thought represented the minimum expected of the Council.

16. In a further statement the representative of Israel stated that the draft resolution distorted resolution 242 (1967) by selectively taking out of context some of its principles, such as territorial integrity. It dealt in a similar manner with the numerous ideas put to the parties since 1967 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. It referred to Israel's occupation of territories, although it was clear from resolution 242 (1967) that the present cease-fire lines were to be replaced by secure and recognized boundaries. The draft also contained an unwarranted assertion concerning the force of the Council's resolutions. In fact, only resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter could be said to be mandatory. The implication of a resolution of such a nature would be destructive and would mean the end of resolution 242 (1967) as an agreed basis for a settlement.

17. The representative of Egypt drew attention to published statements made in an interview by the Israeli Minister of Defence, indicating that the occupation of Arab territories would remain frozen for 10 years and that the United Nations would be powerless to effect a change even though its composition was against Israel. Because Israel received United States arms it was strong militarily and, according to the Defence Minister, could therefore permit itself to disagree with its friends.

18. The representative of Tunisia said that the Middle East conflict had resulted primarily from the serious injustice done to the people of Palestine, complicated by a series of misunderstandings and acts of aggression. His Government considered, nevertheless, that a solution could be

achieved by negotiation. Unfortunately, Israel's intransigent attitude made a meeting impossible. He confirmed Tunisia's support for the Arab countries and conviction that peace must necessarily proceed through withdrawal from all occupied territories and restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people.

19. At the 1735th meeting on 26 July, the representative of the Sudan said that the draft resolution co-sponsored by his delegation was the minimum that the Council could adopt and dealt primarily with the existing conditions in the area that were frustrating the Council's efforts to bring about a just and lasting peace. Stressing the long attachment of the Palestinian people to their country, he said that it was beyond the capacity of any aggressor to hold back the tide of national aspiration of any people or to maintain any military occupation indefinitely. Persistence on the part of Israel in maintaining its aggression would render peace more and more remote.

20. The representative of Egypt stated that his Government would accept the draft resolution before the Council because if it were adopted, the Council would thus reaffirm that the occupation of the Arab territories was contrary to the Charter and that those territories must be returned. It would also constitute a message to the Arab peoples counselling patience and hope for a just peace, while its rejection would amount to a call upon them to negotiate away part of their territories or else fight for their rights.

21. The representative of Jordan said that restoration of the basic rights of the Palestinians consisted in ending the occupation and enabling the exiles to return to their homes. Jordan would never abandon its citizens under occupation. His delegation hoped that the constructive elements in the draft resolution would become the basis for broad agreement both inside and outside the Council.

22. The representative of France said that his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution because it met the basic needs which should be the primary concern of the Council. Confronted by the dangers of a situation that was a standing threat to international peace and security, it was for the Council to reaffirm its specific responsibility and the principles of a solution acceptable to the parties, and to support the efforts of the Secretary-General and his

Special Representative. The only new element in the draft in relation to resolution 242 (1967) was the reference to the rights of the Palestinians, but that reference, already made in General Assembly resolution 2949 (XXVII),⁴⁷ only reflected the growing concern of the international community.

23. The representative of the USSR stated that his delegation entirely supported the fundamental idea of the draft resolution, which was the need to preserve and actively use the existing machinery of the United Nations in order to ensure a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The USSR agreed with the provision in the draft resolution to the effect that a just peace could be achieved only on the basis of respect for the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and rights of all States in the area and also the lawful rights and aspirations of the Arab people of Palestine. As it was a compromise document, some of its parts were too weak and it failed in particular to reflect the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by war or force. The USSR delegation would have preferred that the draft resolution include a paragraph on the need for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of all Israeli troops from all occupied territories; however, the provision in the draft with regard to Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire made up for that shortcoming. It should also have condemned Israel for maintaining the present dangerous situation and blocking a Middle East settlement.

24. The representative of India pointed out that the draft resolution emphasized the commitment of all Member States to respect the resolutions of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and expressed the hope that by reaffirming resolution 242 (1967), the difficulties encountered by Ambassador Jarring in obtaining acceptance of his aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 would be overcome. While some elements on both sides wished to avoid their obligations under resolution 242 (1967) and revert to the situation before the 1967 conflict, such a development would oblige the Security Council, the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to start all over again and would waste the small progress that had been made. India reaffirmed its stand adopted in 1967 that such territorial adjustments as might be made by

agreement between sovereign States would be acceptable, provided that such agreements were reached after the troops had been withdrawn and that there was no coercion, and provided also that they related to minor adjustments or insignificant changes and did not reflect the weight of conquest or victory or military superiority. India hoped that eventually negotiations would take place, but conditions for starting negotiations between the parties did not exist at that moment. Ambassador Jarring should resume his efforts to promote a just and peaceful solution within the framework of resolution 242 (1967).

25. The representative of Panama said that the draft resolution contained a certain number of constructive elements on which the majority of Council members had already agreed. If those elements were supported and approved by the Council, constructive steps would have been taken towards the achievement of peace in the Middle East.

Decision: *At the 1735th meeting, on 26 July 1973, the eight-Power draft resolution (S/10974) received 13 votes in favour to 1 against (United States of America), China not participating in the vote, and was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.*

26. Following the vote, the representative of China said that a Security Council resolution on the Middle East question must strongly condemn the Israeli Zionists for their prolonged aggression against the Palestinians and other Arab countries and people. It must ask the Israelis to withdraw immediately from Arab territories they occupied. It must call for the restoration of the Palestinian people's national rights. It must call upon all Governments and people to give firm support to the Palestinians and other Arab people in their just struggle to resist aggression, to recover their territories and to restore their national rights. The Middle East question was one of aggression versus anti-aggression, a question of the Palestinians and other Arab people striving for national independence and their national rights, and a question of opposing the super-Powers' interference and contention for spheres of influence in the Middle East. In view of the fact that the draft resolution has failed to reflect fully the principles of the Charter and the position of China, the Chinese delegation had decided not to participate in the vote.

⁴⁷ Doc. 10 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

27. The representative of Guinea said that the draft resolution had represented a strict minimum of progress towards a solution of the Middle East problem. It was with great regret and disappointment that Guinea noted the negative vote of the United States, a vote which not only rendered even more remote the chance of peace in the Middle East, but reinforced the determination of the peoples of the occupied territories to continue their liberation struggle.

28. The representative of Australia said that his delegation had found the draft resolution lacking in balance. For one thing, it made no specific mention of the ultimate necessity for negotiations between the parties directly concerned. Also it might have been preferable at this stage to refer to the Palestinian refugees in the same terms as in resolution 242 (1967). One positive feature of the text, however, was the reaffirmation in the preamble of resolution 242 (1967) which the Australian Government continued to regard as the basis for a settlement of the Middle East problem. And in order to support a continuing and active effort by the United Nations in the Middle East, Australia had decided to vote in favour of the text.

29. The representative of Austria said that his delegation's vote expressed Austria's firm attachment to the principles contained in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). It also expressed Austria's attachment to a peaceful solution of the conflict, making available all peaceful means which the Charter provided. It was the thrust of the draft resolution in affirming those principles and in mobilizing such peaceful means that had had a decisive influence on Austria's attitude towards it.

30. The representative of the United States said that in his delegation's opinion the draft resolution was highly partisan and unbalanced and its adoption could only have added another obstacle to getting serious negotiations started between the parties. Moreover, it would have changed fundamentally resolution 242 (1967). The United States had done its utmost to avoid that result, having presented to the sponsors a series of reasonable amendments to correct the short-comings of the draft resolution. The draft resolution spoke of "the" territories occupied in 1967, unlike resolution 242 (1967), and failed to take notice of several other fundamental elements

of that resolution, which remained the only hope if ultimately there was to be a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.⁴⁸

31. The representative of Peru stated that his delegation had co-sponsored and voted in favour of the draft resolution because it stood as a true contribution to a solution of the Middle East conflict. Peru adhered to the reaffirmation of the validity of resolution 242 (1967).

32. The representative of Kenya believed that the solution to the Middle East situation lay in honest vindication, affirmation and implementation of the formulas and principles contained in resolution 242 (1967). His delegation had voted for the draft resolution in order to register Kenya's complete rejection of the occupation of territories of the other States by force, to register its support for the rights of the Palestinians, and to exemplify commitment to the Charter and the principles of international law.

33. The President of the Council, speaking as the representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation's vote in favour of the draft resolution marked no change in the position which successive British Governments had taken on the Middle East question since the adoption of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The draft resolution reaffirmed resolution 242 (1967), which reconciled the Arab requirement for Israeli withdrawal with the Israeli requirement for secure and recognized boundaries and continued to provide the only firm foundation on which a settlement could be built. There had been no change in the United Kingdom's position with regard to the question of the rights of the Palestinians. The phrase as used in the draft resolution referred essentially to the refugees and their rights under General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and its inclusion did not affect the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Any peace in the Middle East must take account of the legitimate interests and aspirations of the Palestinians. The non-adoption of the draft nevertheless should not be allowed to obscure the unanimity among Council members on a number of elements contained in it. There was full agreement on the request to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to resume and pursue their efforts to promote a just and peaceful solu-

⁴⁸ Full text, doc. 109 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

tion of the problem. It was the Council's task to do what it could to provide renewed impetus to the diplomatic process.

34. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that the Council had found itself unable to impose upon Israel the Charter's principles because of the negative attitude of the United States, which had paralysed all efforts to that end and which continued to do so every time the root causes of the Palestinian question were under discussion. Unless the Arab people of Palestine had its inalienable rights restored to it and unless Israel withdrew from all the occupied Arab territories, Zionist aggression would persist interminably and, hence, the security of that region would remain vulnerable. Any resolution which failed to embody those two conditions without the least ambiguity could not contribute to peace in the Middle East. Israel had been able to pursue its expansionist policy only because of the material, military and moral support provided by the United States. The United States had once again confirmed its policy by vetoing a draft resolution which in any case lacked clarity on the two above-mentioned conditions—the rights of the Palestinians and total withdrawal from occupied territories.

B. Communications, reports of the Secretary-General concerning the status of the cease-fire from 15 June to 6 October 1973 and consideration by the Council

1. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND LEBANON

(a) *Communications to the Council, reports of the Secretary-General and requests for a meeting*

35. During the period from 16 June to 11 August 1973 the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector continued to be the subject of reports submitted by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council almost on a daily basis (S/7930/Add.2024-2036, 2038-2051, 2053-2081). These reports indicated that personnel of the Israeli armed forces had continued to cross the border and occupy during daylight hours some posts located on Lebanese territory near the armistice demarcation line. They also mentioned occasional flights by Israel's jet aircraft over localities in southern Lebanon and contained

complaints by the parties concerning violations of the cease-fire. Some of those complaints could not be confirmed by the United Nations Military Observers because the location of the alleged incidents was outside the operational range of the observation posts.

36. In a report dated 11 August (S/7930/Add.2082), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO said that he had received a complaint from Lebanon alleging that a Lebanese civilian aircraft leased to Iraq had been intercepted by Israeli aircraft over Lebanese territory and diverted to Israel.

37. In a letter dated 11 August (S/10984), the representative of Iraq stated that on Friday, 10 August at 9.45 p.m. Baghdad local time, a Middle East Airlines Caravelle chartered by Iraqi Airways had been intercepted by two Israeli military aircraft after its take-off from Beirut International Airport on a scheduled flight to Baghdad. The plane had been forced to land at an Israeli military base and the passengers and crew had been forced at gunpoint to leave the plane and subjected to hours of interrogation and detention.

38. By a letter dated 11 August addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10983), the representative of Lebanon requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the violation of Lebanon's air space by Israel. The letter stated that on the night of 10 August, Israeli air force planes had invaded the air space of Lebanon and forced a civilian plane to fly into Israel and land at an Israeli military base.

(b) *Consideration at the 1736th to 1740th meetings (13-15 August 1973)*

39. At the 1736th meeting on 13 August, the Security Council included the Lebanese complaint in its agenda without objection. The President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Lebanon, Iraq, Israel and Egypt, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. Subsequently the representative of Democratic Yemen was similarly invited, at his request, to participate in the discussion. The Council further agreed, at the 1737th meeting on 14 August, to a request made by the representative of the Sudan in a letter dated 13 August (S/10986), that it extend an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Talib El-Shebib, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations.

40. Opening the discussion, the representative of Lebanon said that on 10 August between 2045 and 2220 hours Beirut local time, units of Israel's air force had penetrated Lebanese air space and flown over different areas of central and southern Lebanon. Some of them had circulated over Beirut International Airport. At 2100 hours a civilian Caravelle airliner belonging to Middle East Airlines and on lease to Iraqi Airways had prepared to take off from Beirut for Baghdad. At 2135 hours, soon after the plane had taken off, two Israeli Mirage jet fighters had dived towards the plane, and after having intercepted it several miles north of Beirut, ordered it to follow them to Israeli territory, where it had been forced to land at an Israeli military airbase under the threat of being shot down. After it had been forcibly detained over two hours, during which time the passengers had been subjected to military interrogation, it was permitted to take off, and had landed at Beirut Airport at 1.15 a.m. on 11 August. The representative of Lebanon said that that act had been a premeditated act of air piracy, of hijacking and of State terrorism and he called upon the Council to adopt a resolution condemning Israel's action in the strongest terms. Furthermore, the Council should bring any resolutions it might adopt to the attention of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for its consideration.

41. The representative of Iraq said that the complaint before the Council concerned a Government-planned hijacking of a civilian airliner which constituted a declaration by Israel of piracy as an instrument of national policy. The Council, he added, had over the years warned Israel that grave violations of the Charter would not be tolerated and had notified Israel that it would take further steps as envisaged in the Charter. However, the Council so far had failed to put its words into action, and the Zionists continued their aggressions with impunity.

42. The representative of Egypt said that several States, in their observations submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on international terrorism under General Assembly resolution 3034 (XXVII), had distinguished between the terrorist behaviour of individuals and the illicit acts of violence committed by States in direct violation of international law. Israel's aggression on 10 August

was an act of State terrorism in accordance with that distinction, and was in flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter. After pointing out that Israel's act of piracy had occurred in the wake of the United States veto of a draft resolution that would have condemned Israel for its continued occupation of the Arab territories, he added that, as a result of that veto, Israel had been encouraged to commit more aggression. To condemn Israel was not an effective remedy. Punishment in the form of sanctions under the Charter was the only way to prevent the aggressor from continuing its crimes.

43. The representative of Israel said that on the evening of 10 August, Israeli air force jets had diverted a Lebanese aircraft chartered by Iraq for a flight between Beirut and Baghdad, because there had been reason to believe that several terrorist leaders were on the flight. However, the aircraft had been allowed to proceed to its destination after the identity of the passengers had been checked. While Arab terrorists, operating with the support of Arab Governments, stood accused of waging a persistent campaign of world-wide bloodshed directed against helpless civilians, Israeli jets, in the pursuit of such terrorists, had entered Lebanese air space and diverted the plane. Such measures by individual States against terrorism had become even more urgent and indispensable as a result of the sabotage by Arab States of all international action. Israel, he continued, could not forgo its right to self-defence and the duty to protect its citizens. Lebanon had shown no regard for Israel's rights under the cease-fire, and therefore could not complain that Israel did not respect Lebanese rights. He noted that the failure of United Nations organs to take effective steps against the plague of terrorism should not be compounded by Security Council action that would give further satisfaction to terrorists.

44. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the Israeli action constituted an act of aggression against a sovereign State and was an act of air piracy and banditry. Under the Hague Convention of 1970, and the Montreal Convention of 1971, acts of lawless seizure or control of airliners in flight constituted a threat to the safety of persons and property; and any attempt to hijack an airliner or to take control of it by force had been condemned as a

criminal act. Therefore, the Security Council must act speedily and with determination and extend support to the Lebanese and Iraqi protests by condemning the policy of Israel. Israel could not justify its illegal action by slanderous attacks on the leaders of the Palestine resistance movement, who were struggling for the restoration of the dignity and rights of their people. He further called for effective measures by the Council, including sanctions against Israel.

45. At the 1737th meeting on 14 August, the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland deplored all acts of violence committed by individuals or groups of individuals. No Government was entitled to take the law into its own hands and commit acts of violence totally inconsistent with international law, which acts only complicated efforts to find a solution to the problem of international terrorism. That Lebanese air space had been deliberately violated by Israeli military aircraft was an undeniable fact, and the Government of the United Kingdom deplored it. He added that the act must be seen against the background of the Middle East problem as a whole, and underlined the necessity for all concerned to make efforts for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

46. The representative of France said that his country fully supported the legitimate complaint of Lebanon. Israel's military intervention against civil aviation should be condemned by the international community, which could not tolerate acts taken in violation of human rights and the principles of the Charter. He called for the States in the area to keep calm and not act in a manner that might compromise attempts at a settlement on the basis of resolution 242 (1967). In view of the nature of the case under consideration, the Council should condemn the action of the Israeli air force and firmly invite Israel to refrain from such actions in the future and to respect international conventions.

47. The representative of Yugoslavia said that by hijacking a civilian plane, Israel had endangered the lives of the persons on board and committed an act of piracy. What was frightening was that a Government would decide to commit such an act, risking the lives of 100 passengers, so soon after shooting down a Libyan airliner in February 1973, resulting in over 100 deaths. If such actions

were not checked and condemned in the strongest terms, the basic structure of international law would be compromised and individual security eroded. Bearing in mind that it was acting at a time when international terrorism was being considered by the United Nations, the Council should condemn Israel's act of aggression and the repetition of international State terrorism. Beyond condemnation, the Council might consider what effective measures could be taken against Israel in the framework of the United Nations Charter.

48. The representative of Kenya said that in his delegation's view, the Government of Israel, in using its air force to divert civil aircraft, was not serving the cause of an early and lasting peace in the Middle East. That diversion was a clear case of hijacking and had been carefully planned and executed. In addition to violating the Charter and international law, Israel's act specifically amounted to a violation of obligations accepted by that Government in a number of instruments regulating international civil aviation. Besides violating the Chicago Convention of 1944, to which Israel was a party, Israel had acted contrary to the letter and spirit of the Tokyo Convention of 1963, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970) and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971).

49. The representative of China strongly condemned the Israeli Zionists for their act in grave violation of the territory and sovereignty of other countries, which threatened the peace and security of all peoples. He said that the piratical act of the Israeli Zionists had not been accidental but was a continuation of the series of aggressive atrocities which they had perpetrated over a long period against the Palestinian people and other Arab countries and peoples. He said that the Council must fulfil its responsibilities by condemning most severely the Israeli authorities' act and also consider the adoption of effective measures to stop their atrocities.

50. The representative of Australia said that the Australian Government had expressed its strong opposition to terrorists and aircraft hijacking. It saw in the Israeli action implications of the gravest kind both for the safety of passengers and for the security of international air transport and expressed concern that the incident

might lead to an escalation of tension in the Middle East.

51. The representative of Democratic Yemen, rejecting an allegation against his Government by the representative of Israel, stated that thanks to the diligence of the civil aviation authorities and high officials of his Government, the crew and passengers of a Lufthansa plane hijacked in February 1972 and forced to land in Aden had been spared and the plane had left Aden safely. Distortion of the facts and vilification of the Palestine resistance movement was a basic tenet of Zionist policy.

52. The representative of India said that Lebanon's specific complaint could not be completely separated from the general problem of the Middle East. While no Council member questioned Israel's right of self-defence should it be attacked, Israel had no right to take violent and illegal actions on the territories of other States nor to enforce what it conceived to be international law. What Israel had done could not be justified and it must be firmly condemned. Any action that the Council might take must ensure that Israel desist from such actions in the future. Israel's professions that it wanted to live in peace and friendship with its Arab neighbours could only be believed if Israel were to withdraw from the territories illegally occupied by it and if it were to respect the rights of the Palestinians.

53. Exercising his right of reply, the representative of Israel said that the discussion had left no doubt that the real problem was the menace of Arab terrorism, which had caused Israel's defensive action on 10 August. He said that Israel could not accept counsel from other States regarding that action, even if they were permanent members of the Security Council, when the Council had failed ever to condemn terrorist massacres.

54. Also speaking in exercise of the right of reply, the representative of the USSR said that the representative of Israel was attempting to divert the Council's attention from urgent measures required to deal with Israeli air piracy, which had contributed to the explosive situation in the Middle East it had created.

55. At the 1738th meeting on 14 August, the representative of Austria expressed the view that however legitimate the goals might be, certain means employed in their pursuit must be considered inadmissible in all circumstances and at all times.

He said that the Israeli act was contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention on the Safety of International Civil Aviation and was directed against the sovereign rights of another Member State. Therefore, his delegation would support a draft resolution that would deal adequately with the incident.

56. The representative of the Sudan stated that his delegation unreservedly condemned Israel's action as an act of international air piracy that constituted a violation of the Israel-Lebanon Armistice Agreement of 1949, as well as a threat to the safety of international civil aviation. It had to be discussed in the context of the Middle East question as a whole, and the root cause was the occupation of Arab territories by Israel and denial of the Palestinian people's right to their national home. He called for prompt and effective action by the Council and added that nothing short of applying sanctions against Israel would make it pause and think before embarking on similar adventures.

57. The representative of Indonesia said that the Israeli act was a most flagrant violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity. He expressed his delegation's deep regret that the Security Council, by rejecting the draft resolution submitted by the eight non-aligned members of the Council the previous month (S/10974), had missed the opportunity to make a concrete contribution to the solution of the Middle East problem. He said that acts of violence and terrorism arising from the Middle East problem could not be considered apart from their root causes, namely, the injustice inflicted for so long upon the Palestinians and the continued occupation of Arab territories by Israel. The Council should not only condemn Israel's violations but also find ways and means to prevent such acts from happening in the future. If the Council failed to do so it would mean, in effect, that it acquiesced in Israel's policy of terrorism.

58. Addressing the Council in accordance with the decision taken at the 1737th meeting on 14 August, Mr. Talib El-Shibib stated that what was so dangerous and unique about the incident under consideration was that it was an act of national policy by a State Member of the United Nations, an act authorized, carried out and defended by the highest authorities of the State of Israel. The hijacking of the Lebanese aircraft

had confirmed that it was Israel's policy to use State terrorism against the Arab people, and in particular, the people of Palestine. If the purpose had been to apprehend some Palestinian leaders, as the representative of Israel had stated, it would mean that any aircraft which carried a Palestinian leader would be subject to hijacking by Israel. He repudiated Israel's self-arrogated right to kidnap, try, execute or imprison civilians of other countries who had committed no offence on Israeli territory. Rather than charging that Arab Governments harboured Palestinian terrorists, Israel should comply with United Nations resolutions and allow the people of Palestine to return to the homes from which they had been expelled so that they could cease taking refuge in Arab countries. If Israel were allowed to get away with its acts of lawlessness and the Council failed in its responsibilities to safeguard international peace and security, then not only the Middle East but the whole world would be facing untold dangers.

59. The representative of Guinea said that Israel's act had been designed to liquidate the leaders of a revolutionary popular liberation movement. History taught, however, that liquidating the leaders of a popular liberation movement did not liquidate a struggling people, because a people that was fully aware and organized was invincible. His delegation unreservedly condemned the Israeli act and called on the Council to adopt the necessary measures to avoid a repetition of such acts by Israel.

60. The President, speaking as the representative of the United States of America, stated that the United States deplored the violations of Lebanese sovereignty, of the United Nations Charter and of the rule of law in international civil aviation. In connexion with the Israeli Government's explanation of the purpose of its action, he said that national and international efforts to control terrorism must go forward within and not outside the law. The United States Government considered that actions such as Israel's diversion of a civil airliner were unjustified and likely to bring about counteraction on an increasing scale. Recent airline incidents were a reflection of the tensions growing out of the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict. His Government had made and continued to make efforts to improve the security of international civil aviation. However, the Security Council

was meeting to deal with a specific complaint about a specific incident; it should therefore deal promptly with that complaint and determine that international society required rejection of unlawful interference with international civil aviation.

61. At the 1739th meeting on 15 August, the representative of Peru said that his delegation was forced to conclude that Israel's act constituted a deliberate violation of the air space of another State in violation of the principles of international law as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and the Convention on international civil aviation. The Council must take action on those violations and his delegation would support any draft resolution that would condemn the act.

62. The representative of Panama voiced dissatisfaction with Israel's act, which undoubtedly was a violation of the sovereignty of a Member State in contravention of the norms of international civil aviation. The act in question was a typical example of what had been defined in the recent meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on International Terrorism as State terrorism. Panama would always be ready to condemn terrorism, whether committed by States, groups or individuals.

63. At the 1740th meeting on 15 August, the representative of the United Kingdom, on behalf of the delegations of France and the United Kingdom, introduced a draft resolution which read as follows:

[Draft adopted as resolution 337, printed as doc. 33 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.]

Decision: *At the 1740th meeting on 15 August 1973, the draft resolution (S/10987) was adopted unanimously as resolution 337 (1973).*

64. Speaking in explanation of his delegation's vote, the representative of China said that the resolution was inadequate because it failed to put forward effective measures for stopping Israel's acts and should have condemned Israel in stronger terms. Furthermore the Chinese Government could not assume the obligations at the present stage, on civil aviation, under certain international conventions in whose formulation it had not taken part and which it had yet to study.

65. The representative of the Sudan said that the resolution just adopted did not fully satisfy the non-aligned and the Arab countries but, for the sake of unanimity, his delegation accepted

the resolution as a basis for future effective steps and had refrained from introducing another draft resolution.

66. The representative of the USSR said that the Security Council should have taken effective measures, including sanctions, to halt Israel's aggressive acts and to prevent their repetition. However, despite the weakness of the resolution, the Soviet delegation had voted for it since it condemned the actions of Israel against Lebanon and such condemnation reflected the stand of world public opinion against the air piracy and State terrorism practised by the Israeli ruling circles and military clique.

67. The representative of India said that the resolution, though it did not go far enough, went in the right direction and had the merit of enjoying the unanimous support of the Council. It could, however, have been more specific and direct in its warning against any repetition of such actions by Israel.

68. The representative of Indonesia said that his delegation, which would have preferred a more strongly worded resolution, had voted for the text in order to achieve the unanimous condemnation of Israel.

69. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his delegation had voted for the resolution because in some of its essentials it met the requirements of the situation and condemned Israel unequivocally.

70. The President, speaking as the representative of the United States, said that the resolution was an important step towards the reaffirmation of the rule of law in international civil aviation. The condemnation by the Council of a specific incident should serve as no comfort to anyone contemplating illegal acts of terrorism. Rather it was a warning that the world community would no longer tolerate interference with one of the basic means of communication.

71. The representative of Israel said that the resolution was one-sided and ignored the menace of Arab terrorism. He stated that the Government of Israel would continue its struggle against Arab terrorism and protect the rights of its citizens.

72. The representative of Lebanon expressed satisfaction at the unanimous vote cast on the resolution. He said that the moral and political support of the Council reflected international public opinion.

(c) *Subsequent communications and reports*

73. In a note dated 4 September (S/10990) the Secretary-General transmitted a letter from the Secretary-General of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) containing a resolution adopted on 20 August by the Council of that organization in which Israel's violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and its diversion and seizure of the Lebanese aircraft was condemned.

74. By a letter dated 18 September (S/11002), the representative of Lebanon transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of the resolutions adopted by the Council of ICAO on 20 August and by its Assembly on 30 August⁴⁹ condemning Israel for the forcible diversion and seizure of the Lebanese civil aircraft on 10 August by Israeli military aircraft.

75. From 11 August to 6 October the reports of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO regarding the Israel-Lebanon sector (S/7930/Add.2083-2140) described incidents and complaints of the same nature as those mentioned in previous reports for the period 16 July to 11 August.

2. COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General

76. Between 16 June and mid-September, the Secretary-General continued to circulate supplemental information based on reports received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO on the situation in the Israel-Syria sector. The reports related to almost daily firing incidents, crossing of the cease-fire line and overflights by Israeli aircraft of Syrian territory (S/7930/Add.2024, 2026-2033, 2035, 2038-2043, 2048, 2050-2053, 2055-2063, 2065, 2067-2069, 2071-2074, 2078, 2079, 2081, 2084, 2086-2090, 2092-2102, 2104, 2106 and Corr.1, 2108, 2109, 2111-2113, 2115-2118, 2120).

77. In a report dated 12 July (S/7930/Add.2052), the Chief of Staff indicated that Israel had complained of crossing of the cease-fire line and opening of fire at Israeli positions by three tanks of the Syrian forces. This complaint was confirmed. In another report dated 28 August (S/7930/Add.2101), he indicated that Israel had again complained of crossings of the cease-fire line and of attacks on an Israeli patrol with bazooka and

⁴⁹ Docs. 48 and 46 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

automatic fire by a Syrian armed group. However, that complaint had not been confirmed by United Nations observers.

78. In a letter dated 14 September (S/10996), the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic complained that on 13 September 64 Israeli aircraft had violated Syrian coastal air space, forcing Syrian aircraft to take counter-measures, which had resulted in five Israeli planes being shot down and eight Syrian planes being hit.

79. In a reply dated 14 September (S/10998 and Corr.1) the representative of Israel rejected Syria's charge and stated that the incident had been provoked by Syrian fighter planes which had appeared from the direction of the Syrian coast and attacked a routine patrol of the Israeli air force over the Mediterranean. He stated that the number of Israeli aircraft involved and that of the planes lost by both sides had been grotesquely falsified in the Syrian letter.

80. Between mid-September and 6 October, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO continued to report firing incidents in the Israel-Syria sector almost as frequently as in the preceding period, as well as overflights by Israeli jet aircraft (S/7930/Add.2123, 2125-2131, 2135-2137, 2139).

3. REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SUEZ CANAL SECTOR

81. During the period between 16 June and 6 October the Chief of Staff of UNTSO submitted several reports concerning observation of incidents involving the crossing of the canal by Israeli aircraft as reported by the observers and complaints by Israel of flights by Egyptian aircraft over Sinai (S/7930/Add.2028, 2037, 2038, 2073, 2092).

C. *Other matters brought to the attention of the Security Council in connexion with the situation in the Middle East*

82. By notes dated 20 July 1973 and 31 May 1974 (S/10972 and S/11303), the Secretary-General drew the attention of the members of the General Assembly and the Security Council to resolutions adopted by the Commission on Human Rights at its 1210th meeting on 14 March 1973 and its 1254th meeting on 11 February 1974 entitled "Question of the violation of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of

hostilities in the Middle East".⁵⁰

83. In a letter dated 2 August (S/10981) the representative of Egypt transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a declaration made by the secretariat of the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt concerning the position taken by the United States at the Security Council meeting in July. In that declaration it was stated that by its veto of the draft resolution prepared by the group of non-aligned countries, the United States had blocked the way to any true effort towards the achievement of a peaceful settlement, in defiance of the will of the international community and of the United Nations Charter. The Egyptian people, it concluded, had full faith that peoples who believed in freedom and progress would offer their support in the struggle against oppression.

84. In a letter dated 10 September (S/10994) Israel transmitted a note it had addressed to the President of the twentieth session of the Assembly of ICAO in which Israel charged that on 5 September Italian security forces had apprehended near Rome International Airport five Arab terrorists carrying two ground-to-air missiles intended for shooting down Israeli airliners landing at or taking off from that airport. By supplying Arab terrorists with those missiles the Arab countries were committing unlawful interference with international civil aviation and violating the Chicago and Montreal Conventions.

85. In a reply dated 25 September (S/11003) Egypt, Iraq and Syria rejected the Israeli charges and said that Israel's notes contained factual distortions and false accusations against the Arab Governments. On 11 September the representatives of the three countries had addressed a letter to the President of the ICAO Assembly rejecting Israel's allegation.

D. *Outbreak of hostilities on 6 October 1973*

1. REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, COMMUNICATIONS BY THE PARTIES AND REQUEST FOR A MEETING

86. On 6 October, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported (S/7930/Add.2141)⁵¹ general heavy air and ground activity along the Israel-Syria, the

⁵⁰ Doc. 40 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973* and doc. 35 below.

⁵¹ Doc. 9 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

Suez Canal and Israel-Lebanon sectors. He indicated that Egyptian forces had crossed the Suez Canal to the east bank where ground fighting had been reported. Syrian forces had crossed the area between the limits of the forward defended localities (F.D.L.) indicating the cease-fire lines. In subsequent more detailed reports (S/7930/Add.2142⁵²-2145), the Chief of Staff indicated that in the Suez Canal sector intense exchange of artillery, tank and mortar fire continued, in addition to intense aerial activity with jet rocket attacks and anti-aircraft fire, Egyptian bridge building across the Canal and continued Egyptian crossing to the east bank. Subsequently, in reports dated 7 and 8 October (S/7930/Add.2146-2160), he indicated less intense but continued exchange of fire between the two sides in addition to continued aerial activity with rockets, bombing and missile firing by both parties.

87. In the Israel-Syria sector it was indicated (S/7930/Add.2142-2160) that Syrian tanks, armoured personnel carriers, infantry and vehicles had continued to cross the Syrian forward defended localities.

88. In the Israel-Lebanon sector, reports from the United Nations military observers indicated that Israeli jet aircraft had been flying over Lebanese territory and that Israeli forces personnel and vehicles had reoccupied certain positions in the area under observation (S/7930/Add.2143, 2145 and 2146).

89. In transmitting these reports (S/7930/Add.2143), the Secretary-General stated that since receiving the first news of the outbreak of fighting he had been in constant consultations with the parties concerned, the President and members of the Security Council. In the field, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO had addressed an appeal to the parties to cease all military activities and adhere to the cease-fire.

90. On several occasions the Chief of Staff reported (S/7930/Add.2150, 2151 and 2156) on firing on or close to United Nations personnel and installations and indicated that the United Nations observation posts both in the Suez Canal and Israel-Syria sectors had sustained some material damage as a result of the impact of the nearby firing.

91. In a report dated 7 October (S/7930/Add.2150), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported

that the personnel of two observation posts in the Israel-Syria sector had had to be evacuated to Damascus owing to intense fighting in their vicinity.

92. In a letter dated 6 October (S/11009 and Corr.1), Syria charged that Israel had launched a military attack against Syrian forward positions all along the cease-fire line, with formations of Israeli aircraft penetrating Syria's air space in the northern sector of the front.

93. In a letter dated 7 October (S/11011), Israel charged that Egypt and Syria had launched an attack against Israel along the cease-fire lines, as had been confirmed by the United Nations observers. Shortly before the attack, Israel had made it clear that it would not initiate any military action and its Foreign Minister had informed the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council of the situation.

94. In a letter dated 7 October (S/11010), the representative of the United States requested a meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation in the Middle East, bearing in mind that, in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, the Members of the United Nations had conferred primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on the Security Council.

2. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1743RD AND 1746TH MEETINGS (8-12 OCTOBER 1973)

95. At its 1743rd meeting on 8 October,⁵³ the Council included the letter of the United States in its agenda. The representatives of Egypt, Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic were invited, at their requests, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. Subsequently, the representatives of Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Zambia were extended similar invitations.

96. The representative of the United States said that his Government had requested the meeting of the Security Council in order that it might deal urgently with the current situation in the Middle East. For the first time in more than three years, armed hostilities had broken out on a massive scale, breaking the cease-fire. Reports based on United Nations sources appeared to indicate that the air attacks in the Golan Heights had been initiated by Syrian MIG aircraft and that the

⁵² Doc. 10 in *ibid*.

⁵³ Excerpts of the debate are printed in doc. 18 in *ibid*.

first firing on the Suez fronts had been from west to east. Very shortly before the initial attacks the United States had undertaken intensive diplomatic efforts, including direct discussions with Israel and Egypt. Unfortunately those efforts had not prevented the outbreak of hostilities and intensive fighting was continuing. In his view the Council's purpose was to help promote a solution for the tense and dangerous situation. The United States considered that in a situation where fighting was raging unchecked the most appropriate means must be found for halting the military operations. Then conditions must be restored in the area that would be conducive to a settlement of the long-standing differences there. There must be also respect for the rights and positions of all the States in the region. The parties concerned must return to the positions held before hostilities broke out. In all its efforts the Council must be mindful of the need for universal respect for the integrity of the instruments and principles of settlement for the dispute which had received the adherence of the parties and bore the weight of the Council's authority.

97. The representative of Egypt said that on 6 June he had come to the Council to review efforts to secure the implementation of the peaceful settlement as endorsed by the principal political organs of the United Nations and to secure the support of the Council to put an end to Israel's occupation of part of the land of Egypt and of two other Arab States. However, despite the fact that fourteen members of the Council had supported Egypt's claim, the collective will of the Council had been rendered inoperative by the veto of the United States. He went on to charge that Israel advocated a policy of conquest, occupation and territorial expansion. It had rejected Mr. Jarring's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 and had called instead for negotiations, at the same time declaring that Israel would never go back to the pre-5 June 1967 lines. That policy, together with the annexation of Arab Jerusalem and the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories, illustrated the policy of territorial expansion declared by the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister of Israel. The same policy was also demonstrated by the attack of 6 October.

98. On that day Israel's air formations had attacked Egyptian forces stationed in the area of

El Zaafarana and El Sukhna on the western bank of the Gulf of Suez while Israel's naval units had been approaching the western coast of the Gulf. The attack had been aimed at El Sukhna where construction had begun on an oil pipeline carrying oil from Suez to the Mediterranean. Egyptian forces had then crossed to Egyptian territory east of the Suez Canal and had raised the Egyptian flag over its territory there. He asked the Secretary-General if United Nations observers had been located at El Sukhna and El Zaafarana, and whether they could confirm the Israeli attack on those localities. He rejected the suggestion that the parties be asked to return to the positions occupied before hostilities had broken out, as it would mean that one party was called upon to give part of its country to occupation by another.

99. The representative of China said that the Israeli Zionists had been pursuing a policy of aggression and expansion over a long period. They had not only maintained their illegal occupation of Arab territories but on 6 October had flagrantly launched large-scale attacks against Egypt, Syria and the Palestinian guerrillas. His Government expressed its indignation and most strongly condemned the new aggression, and at the same time admired those who were heroically resisting Israel's aggression. He termed the suggestion that Egypt and Syria should withdraw to their position prior to their counter-attack against the aggressor, an open encouragement to aggression and permission for the Israeli aggressors to perpetuate their occupation of Arab territories. He pointed out that the two super-Powers had connived in and supported Israeli policies of expansion and aggression, and that by advertising the fallacious argument about the so-called "*détente*", their purpose had been to lull the will of the Arab and Palestinian people to fight against aggression. The people of the area, however, had taken courageous and bold actions and broken through the situation of "no war, no peace" to resist and expel the aggressors. The Security Council must condemn most strongly all Israeli acts of aggression, give the firmest support to the Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian peoples, demand the immediate withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab territories and call for the restoration of Palestinian national rights.

100. The representative of Israel said that in

another organ of the United Nations that morning he had spoken about the massive armed attack launched against his country from the west and the north and the very cruel loss and suffering it had caused. As for the Egyptian charge about a naval attack at El-Sukhna and El Zaaferana, no such attack had taken place. Although every other course had been tried, it was still time to embark on the adventure of a negotiated peace.

101. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the first objective of the Council should be to secure the earliest possible end to the fighting, which carried with it grave risks that conflagration would spread. The Council should not engage now in attempts to apportion blame and should resist the temptation of looking backwards. The United Kingdom Government still regarded the prescription set out in resolution 242 (1967) as the corner-stone of any settlement. The Council's immediate responsibilities were to issue an urgent call for a cessation of the fighting and to treat the events as a catalyst for starting a genuine diplomatic process to achieve the peaceful settlement that had for too long eluded the Council.

102. The representative of the USSR said that his Government's approach to the situation in the Middle East could not fail to be determined by such a decisive factor as the fact that war was going on there between Israel, which had occupied the land of others, and the Arab States, which were victims of aggression and had striven to recover their land. Therefore, the solution of the problem should be sought by resolving the question of Israel's withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. In his opinion, no new decision was required, but the United Nations must ensure that its previous decisions were put into effect. That required that both parties to the conflict state clearly their readiness to comply with those decisions. Egypt had given its consent; but Israel, which so far had failed to give it, should state its readiness to proceed to a withdrawal of its troops from the occupied territories. Any discussion in the Council could not be isolated from previous decisions by the Council and the General Assembly requiring Israel to withdraw from the Arab territories occupied in 1967. Until Israel indicated its readiness to withdraw all its troops from the occupied territories, any new resolution would once again be exploited by the aggressor to divert attention from the key issue

and to continue its occupation, appropriation and annexation of the lands of others. He drew attention to the statement of the Soviet Government dated 7 October, which was reproduced in document S/11012 (see subsection E, 2 below).

103. At the 1744th meeting on 9 October,⁵⁴ the representative of Yugoslavia said that while the Security Council was trying to find a way out of the Middle East crisis, Israel was ruthlessly bombing urban centres and inflicting grave losses on the peaceful populations of the Arab countries. He quoted from an official communiqué of the Yugoslav Government condemning the Israeli aggression, supporting the just struggle of the Arab countries, and at the same time appealing to all peace-loving forces in the world to take effective measures to extend support and assistance to the Arab countries in their fight for the liberation of their occupied territories. The present escalation of military operations, he continued, had underlined once again the grave responsibility of Israel and those who supported it in blocking avenues conducive to a solution of the crisis, and had shattered the self-deception of the aggressor that its security could be based on the oppression of other peoples and on its own unalterable military superiority. He urged that the Council find an over-all solution of the problem on the basis of Israel's withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, and the realization of the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. The Council should also examine the possibility of applying sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter, if Israel persisted in its aggression.

104. The representative of France expressed his concern at the reported bombing by Israel forces of a building housing representatives of the Soviet Union in Damascus. He noted that operations were currently taking place in the Egyptian and Syrian territories occupied by Israel since June 1967. He stressed that France remained in favour of a negotiated solution under the United Nations resolutions and in particular resolution 242 (1967), and warned that it would be futile to try to impose provisional measures which would settle nothing or impose commitments which were not coupled with sufficient guarantees. The time had come for the Council to attack the roots of the evil rather than confining itself

⁵⁴ Excerpts of the debate are printed in doc. 19 in *ibid.*

to examining current events. There was more or less general agreement on the principles contained in resolution 242 (1967) but there was no agreement on their implementation, and the fact of occupation constituted the major obstacle. It was up to the Council to promote the rapprochement of the parties and its deliberations should be directed to that end.

105. The representative of Austria said that in his Government's opinion one objective must take precedence over all other considerations, namely to put an end to the sacrifice of human life and to stop hostilities without delay. A call for an immediate cease-fire would therefore be the primary task of the Security Council, and that call should be unequivocal, unanimous and strong. It was not the moment to offer advice or attribute blame, but to fulfil that basic humanitarian duty. He felt that such an appeal should be the first step towards a new effort to build a firmer structure of peace on the basis of previous United Nations resolutions, the Charter and in accordance with the aspirations of the people of the area.

106. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that once again his country had been the victim of a war of aggression launched by Israel on 6 October. Once again this year the Council's effort to find a solution to the problems of the Middle East had remained without any concrete results because of the improper use of the right of veto by the United States. As a result of that veto Israel had increased its attacks against the Arab countries, its latest being the air attack against Syria on 13 September. Thus Israel, having sabotaged the activity of the Security Council, was conducting a policy of obstruction designed to prevent any peaceful and just solution to the problem. Commenting on Israel's call for a return to the positions held before 6 October and for negotiations for an agreement on secure borders, he said that no country could agree to negotiate without prior condition while its territory was occupied by a foreign Power and which declared that it would never agree to withdraw from the major part of the occupied territory.

107. In connexion with news reports of Israeli bombing in Damascus, he said that there had been a number of casualties among United Nations and other diplomatic personnel. These barbarous acts showed Israel's contempt for all human values and international conventions. His Foreign Min-

ister had addressed to the Secretary-General a telegram of condolence with regard to the death of United Nations personnel.

108. The Secretary-General thanked Syria's Foreign Minister for his expression of condolences at the death of a United Nations Military Observer, Captain Tjorswaag of Norway, and his wife and daughter in Damascus on 9 October, and added that he had addressed a message of sympathy to Norway's Foreign Minister. He also expressed his sympathy to those Governments whose diplomats had been killed or wounded in Damascus.

109. The representative of the USSR, referring to press communications concerning casualties among Soviet citizens in Damascus as a result of Israel's air raids, said that having been enraged by their defeats on the military fronts, the Israeli aggressors had decided to bomb peaceful areas of cities as a matter of vengeance. The Soviet Union considered that the struggle of the Arab peoples for the liberation of the occupied territories was a sacred and inalienable right and wished once again to unite with them in their fight against the Israel aggression. The Government of Israel must bear responsibility for the loss of human life and property damage caused by its barbaric actions. It would be appropriate for the President, on behalf of the Council, to ask the Government of Israel to put an end to the bombing of peaceful Arab cities and put an end to the massacre of foreigners and others who were in those cities.

110. The President agreed to waive rule 27 of the provisional rules of procedure to enable members to speak in terms of condolence in respect of the tragic news which had reached the Council. A number of the members of the Council expressed their condolences to the Secretary-General and to all those Governments whose people had reportedly fallen victims to the tragic conflict now raging in the Middle East. The President said that he would respect the wishes of the Council and send a message of condolence to the Governments and peoples involved.

111. The representative of Indonesia said that his delegation was of the view that the Council should act speedily in order to achieve a cease-fire and that the parties should return to their original positions, which, however, should be in accordance with resolution 242 (1967). As for real peace, it could only be expected to return if

the rights of the Palestinians were recognized and respected. After recalling that the Council had failed to adopt draft resolution S/10974,⁵⁵ he said that in rejecting it the Council should have been aware that the only option left to Egypt had been the use of force if it wanted to recover its occupied territories. Recalling that the provisions of resolution 242 (1967) had been left open to contradictory interpretations, he said that if that resolution had to be the basis for any solution, the Council had to agree on one interpretation and, in his delegation's opinion, the only interpretation was to follow the sequence of, first, withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories, and then negotiation as to the outstanding issues. Subsequently, secure and recognized borders could be established and peace would have a realistic chance of returning to the area.

112. The representative of India said that for seven years the Arab countries had waited for a peaceful solution on the basis of resolution 242 (1967). When the Council's efforts last July were obstructed by a veto, the message given to Egypt was clearly that force alone was the only way to assert its legitimate rights. Some delegations had indicated that if the present hostilities came to an end, some unknown and unexpected avenues to peace would open, but since there had been no change in the policies of the different Governments, his delegation could not see how that could be, since a cease-fire had been established at least 4 or 5 times during the last 7 years, always as a first step, but had never been followed by a significant second or third step, and all attempts at political settlement had proved abortive. If peace were to return to the Middle East, Israel must withdraw from the occupied territories; it would be unfair and unjust for the Council to ask for a cease-fire that would leave vast territories of Egypt, Jordan and Syria illegally occupied by Israel. Unless withdrawal took place, Egypt had made it clear that there could be no negotiations; India supported that view. There could be no peace unless political problems were examined as a whole and not simply with a view to stopping the bloodshed without taking its causes into account.

113. The representative of the Sudan stated that to call for a cease-fire on humanitarian

grounds was hypocritical; other grounds were needed. This was not a war of revenge but a move to liberate the occupied territories. Many attempts at peace in the past had been foiled by the United States for fear of antagonizing Israel or to protect its design of having a bastion of its interests overseas, impervious to what that meant to the peoples of the area. The Council could not tolerate the fact that the security of Israel should be preserved at the peril of the Palestinians and at the cost of the Arab territories. Any political solution must come to grips with two basic facts: the totally unacceptable occupation of Arab territory and the emergence of the national consciousness of the Palestinian people.

114. At the 1745th meeting on 11 October, the Secretary-General referred to his statement on the conflict in the Middle East issued that day (S/11021),⁵⁶ in which he had warned that if war continued it would pose an increasing threat to international peace and security, and said that he had no illusions about how difficult it was for countries in conflict to turn from war to peace. While he did not wish to deflect any Government from what it believed to be its legitimate sovereign aims, he did, nevertheless, question whether the continuation of the war could possibly achieve those aims. He was deeply concerned also at the wider threat to international peace and security, and appealed to those concerned to consider alternative courses before it was too late, so that bloodshed might cease. He hoped that the members of the Council and other Member States would redouble their efforts toward an end to the fighting.

115. The representative of Egypt said that there had been attacks by Israel's Air Force on airports near Cairo and on Delta towns and villages which were among the most densely populated areas in the world. Those attacks had resulted in a total of 500 civilians killed in addition to the destruction of 67 inhabited houses. He repeated his warning that his Government would do its best to dissuade the military leaders of Israel from continuing these air raids.

116. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that despite the International Red Cross's appeal following the raids on civilian targets in Damascus, the Israeli Air Force had resumed its

⁵⁵ See para. 11 above.

⁵⁶ Doc. 25 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

raids and attacked other cities and other civilian targets, resulting in 100 civilians killed. Further, he wanted to draw the Council's attention to the fact that Israel was using napalm bombs, a fact which reportedly was confirmed by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

117. The representative of Israel said that on 6 October Egypt and Syria had wantonly, and without provocation, decided to end the cease-fire and wage all-out war against Israelis. Now they sought international protection against any Israeli response. They had started a war and were responsible for all its tragic victims. The logical way to stop the war was to restore the cease-fire and then proceed to negotiation of a peace treaty.

118. The representative of Guinea condemned attacks against civilian objectives and populations, renewed its condolences to the people of Syria and wanted to assure the peoples of Egypt and of Syria of her country's unconditional support for their struggle to liberate their territories. Guinea had always maintained that any peaceful solution in the Middle East must impose the evacuation by Israel of the occupied territories and that the Security Council was bound to make that view prevail. The delegation of Guinea asked the Security Council to face up to its responsibilities, otherwise it ran the risk of seeing the world carried away toward a new third world war.

119. The representative of Peru said the situation in the Middle East had been untenable from the point of view of the security of the States of the region. The presence of Israel in the occupied territories of Egypt, Jordan and Syria was a source of insecurity rendered more serious by the measures adopted by Israel to make its occupation permanent. Therefore the Council should discharge its functions under the Charter in conformity with resolution 242 (1967). The Council should make an appeal to end the fighting in terms that would facilitate and, if possible, give an advance indication of the complete and long-term solution of the problem. The Council should not adopt a proposal that would involve approval by the Council of the occupation of territories by force, as this would be contrary to the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force.

120. The representative of Saudi Arabia warned that any makeshift arrangements in the Council that might be brought about by the pressure of

the major Powers to pave the way for a *status quo ante*—before the cease-fire—would not work out, because Arab youth were opposed to the artificial State created by two major Powers. The Council had the responsibility to treat the question not piecemeal but as a whole. Even if the war ended shortly it would be recommenced at a future date either by Israel or by the Arab States and then the interests of all would go with the wind. He questioned whether the major Powers had enough courage to set their petty interests aside, and warned those who helped Israel not to play with fire, because the fire might spread and miscalculations might throw everybody into a world conflict.

121. At the 1746th meeting on 12 October, the representative of Nigeria said that the vital question at issue was not who had fired the first shot but who, in the light of resolution 242 (1967), was the more justified in resorting to the use of force to recover territories, for the present conflict was a continuation of the war which had started in June 1967 when Israel launched a pre-emptive attack on Egypt. While Nigeria recognized and supported the right of Israel to live in peace within recognized and secure boundaries, there should be no mistake about the fact that as long as Israel continued to hold by force one square inch of Arab land, Israel would know no permanent peace. Whatever the final outcome of the fighting, there would be no peace until Arab lands were restored on the basis of resolution 242 (1967) or by force of arms. He cautioned that the super-Powers would not serve the cause of international peace if they escalated the conflict by increasing supplies of arms to the warring parties. It was for that reason that his country urged the Council to exercise courage and order the parties to stop fighting now and take steps to return to the pre-June 1967 positions and comply with all the provisions of resolution 242 (1967).

122. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation viewed with concern and grief the heavy toll of lives lost since 6 October 1973 and in particular lives of innocent civilians. Therefore he was appealing to all the parties to the war to respect humanitarian law during the conflict. In his delegation's opinion, the war had resulted from the non-implementation of resolution 242 (1967), and the sole question in the non-implementation of that resolution was the continued

occupation of Arab territories by Israel contrary to the United Nations Charter. The Organization of African Unity could not turn a blind eye to the fact that the territory of one of its founding member States had been the object of military occupation. In his delegation's opinion, the Council should seek to declare and to enforce an immediate cease-fire, agreement by whoever occupied the other's land to withdraw from such occupation to the pre-5 June lines, and an entry into immediate negotiations to solve the other outstanding problems of the conflict, including implementation of the principles in resolution 242 (1967) giving due attention to the rights of the Palestinians.

123. Speaking as the representative of Australia, the President said that the renewed outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East had caused deep distress and concern to the Australian Government and people. The Charter of the United Nations placed a grave responsibility on the Council and it was members' duty to grasp this responsibility. The first task must be to try, as an initial step, to unite in calling upon the warring parties to stop fighting and thus provide a breathing space in which the arduous task of extending any areas of agreement that can be found to exist in the direction of a just and lasting peace on the basis of resolution 242 (1967) would be undertaken with renewed urgency. It was important that members of the Council consider this volatile situation in a mood and an atmosphere as calm and objective as possible.

124. The representative of the USSR quoted a statement from the Soviet press agency TASS that on 12 October, a Soviet merchant vessel, the *Ilya Mechnikov*, carrying equipment for a hydroelectric complex under construction in Syria had been bombed by Israeli rocket-carrying cutters, and had been sunk in the Syrian port of Tartous. Israel's aircraft had bombed the Soviet Cultural Centre in Damascus, as well as other Syrian and Egyptian cities, resulting in civilian casualties and damage. The Israeli military were turning their deadly weapons against peaceful citizens and civilian targets and even carrying out attacks against ships and purely civilian institutions of countries that were not taking part in the war. The continuation of such actions would lead to grave consequences for Israel.

3. *Further reports of the Secretary-General and communications to the Secretary-General and the Security Council*

125. In a letter dated 8 October (S/11013)⁵⁷ to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General, after recalling the Council Consensus of 9/10 July 1967 (S/8947) to station United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector under the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, informed the President of the Council of a request on 7 October by Egypt to evacuate the United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector to Cairo, because, owing to the fact that they were behind the Egyptian lines, they were in physical danger and their presence was unnecessary.

126. In a letter dated 9 October (S/11017), the Secretary-General confirmed his understanding that it had been agreed during consultations by the President with the members of the Security Council that he should accede to Egypt's request.

127. The Chief of Staff, in a report dated 9 October (S/7930/Add.2161), said that the Egyptian authorities had requested the immediate evacuation of the observers to Cairo and that he had replied that the request should be made to the Security Council which in July 1967 had established the United Nations observation operation in the Suez Canal sector. However, in view of the request made by Egypt's military authorities in the field that all observers should be evacuated without delay, he had had no alternative but to allow the evacuation. Consequently, seven observation posts on the west bank of the Canal had been closed. On the east bank, four posts had been closed, three had remained operational, and contact had been lost with one since 6 October. Subsequently, on 6 November, the Chief of Staff announced that the UNTSO Special Committee of Inquiry had located that post and recovered the remains of the two United Nations military observers who had been on duty there, Captain G. Banse of France and Captain C. Olivieri of Italy. The report added that in the Israel-Syria sector, all the observation posts had continued to function. Two posts had been closed and their observers transferred to other posts at the request of the Syrian forces. No change had been reported with regard to the observation operation along

⁵⁷ Doc. 24 in *ibid.*

the Israel-Lebanon sector.

128. In a further report dated 9 October (S/7930/Add.2165) the Chief of Staff indicated that following the evacuation of the remaining two observation posts in the Suez Canal sector, there were no observation operations there. Consequently, and until the redeployment of United Nations military observers in that sector, the report of the Chief of Staff covered only the Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon sectors.

129. Between 8 and 23 October, when the first cease-fire resolution was adopted by the Security Council, the reports regarding the Israel-Syria sector (S/7930/Add.2162-2198, 2200, 2201, 2203, 2208, 2211, 2212, 2214 and 2218) indicated intense firing from both sides from artillery, mortars, small arms, machine guns and tanks, as well as aerial activity and anti-aircraft fire.

130. In a report dated 9 October (S/7930/Add. 2165) the Chief of Staff reported the deaths of a United Nations military observer, Captain Dirik B. Tjorswaag of Norway, together with his wife and daughter, during an air attack on Damascus. It was also indicated that Israeli forces units were observed advancing west of their forward defended localities (S/7930/Add.2172).

131. In a report dated 20 October (S/7930/Add.2204), it was indicated that observation post November, which had been under continuous fire, had had to be evacuated and that following that evacuation seven other posts in the sector had had to be closed, leaving nine posts operational, one of which had to be evacuated the following day (S/7930/Add.2205).

132. In the Israel-Lebanon sector the reports (S/7930/Add.2162-2209, 2211, 2213, 2214, 2215-2217) indicated mainly aerial activity with Israeli jet aircraft overflying southern Lebanon, although there were also many cases of firing by Israeli and unidentified forces. Lebanon complained on several occasions that Israeli ships had entered Lebanese territorial water and that Israeli personnel and vehicles had crossed the Armistice Demarcation Line into Lebanese territory frequently. The report of the Chief of Staff dated 9 October (S/7930/Add.2166) contained a complaint by Lebanon that Israeli aircraft had attacked and damaged a radar installation in Lebanon.

133. In a letter dated 9 October (S/11015), Lebanon complained that on that day Israel's air force had invaded Lebanon's air space and

destroyed the radar installations in central Lebanon. Furthermore, gunboats had penetrated Lebanon's territorial waters and Israeli mortars had shelled different points in the border region of southern Lebanon.

134. On 22 October the Chief of Staff reported on the status of the United Nations military observers (S/7930/Add.2210).⁵⁸ He stated that the Chief of Staff and eight observers were at UNTSO Headquarters at Government House, Jerusalem. In the Israel-Lebanon sector, there were 32 observers based in Beirut and five observation posts. In the Israel-Syria sector, there were 47 observers and nine observation posts (including five closed), in addition to 41 observers based at Tiberias Control Centre, the Quneitra Outstation and seven observation posts (including three closed).

135. On the west side of the Suez Canal sector, there were 42 observers based at Cairo. The Ismailia Control Centre and the nine observation posts were all closed. On the east side of the Canal, there were two observers at the Kantara Control Centre at Rabah and at the Gaza Outstation two more observers. However, from the nine observation posts which had been closed, there were 39 observers based at Jerusalem.

136. In the Israel-Jordan sector, there were two observers at the UNTSO Liaison Office at Amman.

137. In a note dated 11 October (S/11020), the President of the Security Council indicated that he had received from the Secretary-General a letter dated 9 October, in reply to the questions put to him by the representative of Egypt at the 1743rd meeting of the Council on 8 October. In his reply the Secretary-General stated that the United Nations observers had been 30 and 60 miles respectively from El Sukhna and El Zaafarana on the Gulf of Suez, which Egypt claimed Israel had attacked on 6 October, and that therefore they had been unable to confirm or deny any incidents there.

138. In the period following the outbreak of hostilities, the representative of Israel presented a series of complaints to the Council concerning terrorist attacks on civilian targets in Israel, which it maintained had been perpetrated by infiltrators who had entered Israel from Lebanese

⁵⁸ Doc. 11 in *ibid.*

territory. Israel declared that Lebanon must be held responsible for that situation and all the consequences arising therefrom. These charges were made in letters dated 17 and 24 October and 4 and 14 December 1973 and 8 and 11 February 1974 (S/11032, S/11041, S/11143, S/11163, S/11213 and S/11215).

E. Cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council

1. CONSIDERATION BY THE COUNCIL AT ITS 1747TH AND 1748TH MEETINGS (21-22 AND 23 OCTOBER 1973)⁵⁹

139. At the 1747th meeting of the Council on 21 October the President stated that the meeting had been convened at the urgent request of the representatives of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Council had before it a draft resolution (S/11036), which was co-sponsored by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States, which read as follows:

The Security Council

1. *Calls upon* all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

140. The representative of the United States stated that his delegation together with that of the USSR had called for the meeting to present a joint proposition to the Council. Its aim was to bring an immediate cease-fire in place and promptly begin negotiations between the parties under appropriate auspices looking towards a just and durable peace in the Middle East based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The representative of the United States explained that, in his Government's view, paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, calling for an immediate cease-fire, applied not only to the parties directly concerned but also to those who had joined in the fighting by sending units. His delegation believed that 12 hours should allow ample time to achieve

practical implementation of the paragraph calling for a cease-fire. He noted that paragraph 2, calling for implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts, was linked to paragraph 3, which called for the immediate beginning of negotiations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The United States and the Soviet Union were ready to make their joint good offices available to the parties as a means to facilitate the negotiating process. In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of the United States indicated that his country and the Soviet Union had agreed jointly on that draft resolution and requested immediate action by the Council. He added that both countries believed that there should be an immediate exchange of prisoners of war.

141. The representative of the USSR stated that the absence of a political settlement in the Middle East had caused the war to continue. The dangerous situation which had been created in that area seriously menaced the maintenance of international peace. In order to halt the war, consultations had taken place and had resulted in the jointly submitted draft resolution (S/11036). The Security Council should immediately adopt urgent measures to call a halt to the bloodshed and to implement its resolution 242 (1967). Under appropriate auspices, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations should begin between the parties concerned, aimed at establishing a just and durable peace.

142. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that the two super-Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were again engaged in the game of power politics and spheres of influence. The Middle East had become the chessboard on which these two super-Powers were playing their political game with the destiny of the peoples of that area. As long as the major Powers did not formulate their policies on the basis of justice, there would be conflicts in the Middle East. A possible solution, which would not involve the major Powers, could be found if the Jews wished to live among the Arabs, but not as Zionists.

143. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the Council had two immediate responsibilities: to seek the earliest possible cease-fire, and to treat the renewal of hostilities as a catalyst for starting a genuine diplomatic process which

⁵⁹ Excerpts of the debate are printed in docs. 20 and 21 in *ibid*.

would lead to a settlement. A solution to the Middle East problem was not to be found by military means. The only prescription for a settlement that commanded unanimous agreement was resolution 242 (1967). All energies could be devoted to the implementation of that resolution in all its parts. Therefore, the United Kingdom would vote in favour of the draft resolution. He added that his delegation had interpreted the reference to "appropriate auspices" in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution to mean the auspices of the United Nations. He also urged the United States and the Soviet Union to cease supplying arms to the area once the cease-fire became effective; the United Kingdom had suspended all shipment of arms to the battlefield as soon as the hostilities broke out.

144. The representative of France stated that his delegation would support the draft resolution because it provided for an immediate end of the hostilities as well as for the implementation of all parts of the Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts. France stood by its interpretation of resolution 242 (1967), in particular as regards withdrawal, and by its conception of the role of the Security Council and of its permanent members in the peace settlement and its implementation. Therefore, negotiations "under appropriate auspices" as indicated in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution could mean nothing other than under the aegis of the Security Council.

145. The representative of India expressed his dissatisfaction with the draft resolution for the following reasons: India had maintained that justice must be combined with peace and had emphasized that the Arab lands occupied by Israel must be evacuated before serious negotiations could start; his country had always been cautious about any solution arrived at by the great Powers without full consultation with the general membership of the United Nations. However, since the parties to the fighting seemed to have accepted the joint draft resolution, India would support it. Nevertheless, the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) meant first that the Arab territories must be vacated subject to minor adjustments agreed to by the parties; secondly, that Israel had a right to exist as a sovereign State; and thirdly, that a proper settlement of the rights of the Palestinian people must be accepted.

146. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation would support the draft resolution and hoped that the factors which had frustrated the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) would not occur again. He urged the super-Powers to desist from accelerating the arms race in the area. His delegation believed that an international system would be required to guarantee the implementation of all points of resolution 242 (1967). However, the system should come from the United Nations, and there should be regular reports to the Security Council.

147. The representative of Panama stated that his delegation considered the draft resolution before the Council to be a step in the right direction and therefore would vote in favour of it.

148. The representative of Indonesia stated that resolution 242 (1967) was the basis for solution to the Middle East conflict. However, the Council should agree on one interpretation to the terms of that resolution. Indonesia's interpretation of resolution 242 was to follow this sequence: withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories; then, negotiations as to the outstanding issues, including the rights of the Palestinians. These two aspects, if they were settled, could lead to secure and recognized borders between the parties.

149. The representative of Peru said that despite the obvious imprecisions of the draft resolution, his delegation would not object to it because it had been designed to put an end to bloodshed and to reaffirm Security Council resolution 242 (1967) as the framework for a just and definitive solution to the Middle East problem. He added that Peru considered that the "appropriate auspices" mentioned in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution would directly involve the United Nations through the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

150. The representative of Israel said Israel's compliance with the proposed cease-fire was conditional on its acceptance and observance by all the States taking part in the fighting. The cessation of military activity must include the elimination of the blockade imposed by the Republic of Yemen at the Bab el Mandab Straits. Israel attached great importance to paragraph 3 of the draft resolution which stated that negotiations should start immediately between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the

Middle East. Israel also regarded the release of all prisoners of war as an indispensable condition of any cease-fire agreement.

151. The representative of China reiterated his Government's position that the Security Council ought to condemn Israel for its aggression, support the Arab people for resisting aggression and demand the immediate withdrawal of Israel from the occupied Arab territories and explicitly provide for the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people. The draft resolution before the Council had failed to reflect such a position. He also pointed out that the two super-Powers had revealed their contention as well as collusion in the Middle East and their attempt to impose the situation of "no war, no peace" on the Arab people. Their practice of imposing their views on the Security Council by hurriedly introducing a draft resolution of their concoction and asking for its immediate adoption was most unreasonable. Therefore, China had decided not to participate in the voting on the draft resolution.

152. The representative of the Sudan said that although a cease-fire would be an important step, it would be only a prelude to peace. Peace in the Middle East could only be achieved through the full implementation of United Nations resolutions. To achieve peace, the occupation must be ended and the root causes of the problem—the Palestinian reality—must be dealt with. The draft resolution referred to negotiations under appropriate auspices, and for the Sudan, no auspices were more appropriate than the United Nations. Any other interpretation would be the first transgression of resolution 242 (1967).

153. The representative of Austria stated that his delegation had taken the earliest possible opportunity in the Council to call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and renewed efforts to build a just and lasting peace in the Middle East on the basis of resolution 242 (1967) to which his delegation remained committed. Therefore, his delegation would support the draft resolution.

154. The representative of Egypt stated that the targets of Egypt remained liberation of its lands, preservation of its territorial integrity, and determination that the usurped rights of the Palestinians would be preserved. Those were the targets which the overwhelming majority of the Council and of the General Assembly had confirmed.

155. The representative of Guinea said that her delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution. Guinea had always placed responsibility on the great Powers in conflicts like the Middle Eastern conflict and therefore welcomed their initiative with great relief. She hoped that the adoption of the draft resolution would mean the withdrawal by Israel from all occupied territories and the preservation of the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine. It would also mean that the negotiations envisaged in paragraph 3 would be carried out under the auspices of the United Nations.

Decision: *At the 1747th meeting of the Council on 21 October 1973, the two-Power draft resolution (S/11036) was put to the vote and was adopted by 14 votes to none as resolution 338 (1973).⁶⁰ One member (China) did not participate in the vote.*

156. At the 1748th meeting on 23 October, the representative of Egypt said that he had asked for the meeting to consider the non-implementation of its resolution 338 (1973), and the breaking down of the cease-fire ordered by the Council.

157. The representative of Israel said that on 21 October Israel had expressed its readiness to comply with the proposed cease-fire on the understanding that it would be accepted and observed by all States taking part in the fighting. Immediately after the adoption of resolution 338 (1973), Israel had announced that it agreed to the cease-fire in accordance with that resolution. Of the 10 Arab States attacking Israel, only Egypt had been willing to announce that it would order its forces to cease fire. However, even that announcement had thus far proved to be spurious. Egyptian aggression was the cause of Israel's continued military actions. Israel also regarded the release of the prisoners held in the countries involved as an indispensable condition of any cease-fire agreement.

158. The representative of the United States introduced a draft resolution (S/11039) which was co-sponsored by his country and the USSR which read as follows:

The Security Council,

Referring to its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973,

1. *Confirms its decision on an immediate cessation of all kinds of firing and of all military action, and urges*

⁶⁰ Doc. 334 in *ibid.*

that the forces of the two sides be returned to the positions they occupied at the moment the cease-fire became effective;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take measures for immediate dispatch of United Nations observers to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between the forces of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt, using for this purpose the personnel of the United Nations now in the Middle East and first of all the personnel now in Cairo.

159. The representative of the USSR said that the aim of the draft resolution was to confirm the Council's decision of 22 October for a cease-fire and a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, based on resolution 242 (1967), and for the immediate withdrawal of troops to positions occupied at the time of the cease-fire. The present draft resolution also provided that the Secretary-General be requested immediately to send observers from the United Nations to the cease-fire area. Both sponsors of the draft considered that the troops of the parties should be returned to the positions they occupied at the time the cease-fire adopted in resolution 338 (1973) came into force. The representative of the USSR formally proposed that, in view of the urgency of the question, the draft resolution be put to a vote immediately.

160. Following a procedural discussion, in which the President of the Council and the representatives of China and the Soviet Union participated, the meeting was suspended at 5.10 p.m. and was resumed at 5.30 p.m.

161. The representative of China expressed his dissatisfaction for being arbitrarily interrupted in his speech and for not being allowed enough time to consider the draft resolution. China, he added, firmly opposed the practice of using the Security Council as a tool to be manipulated by the two super-Powers. The sacred fight against aggression and for the recovery of occupied territories waged by the army and people of Egypt, Syria and Palestine had broken through the situation of "no war, no peace", deliberately created by the two super-Powers in the Middle East for their respective interests, and exploded the myth about the "invincibility" of Israel. The dangerous developments in the Middle East, he said, had been caused by the Israel Zionist aggressors with the support and connivance of the two super-Powers. However, the Soviet Union had asserted that the Arab peoples' struggle

against aggression had confronted détente with a "dangerous development of events". This showed that what the Soviet Union called "détente" was based on the submissive prostration of all oppressed nations and peoples before the two super-Powers; but the Arab people would never allow themselves to be controlled by the two super-Powers perpetually. In order to divide up further the spheres of influence in the Middle East and to reimpose the situation of "no war, no peace" on the Arab people, the two super-Powers, after hectic bargaining behind the scenes for their respective interests, had produced a draft resolution at the Council on 22 October 1973. That so-called draft resolution was even more ambiguous than resolution 242 (1967) and could solve no problems. As China had foreseen, as soon as the draft resolution had been adopted, the Israeli Zionists had immediately and flagrantly continued to expand their aggression against Egypt and Syria. Again the United States and the USSR had introduced a new draft resolution on what they called supervising the cease-fire. This draft resolution had failed to condemn Israel's expanded aggression or to make the slightest mention of the demand for immediate withdrawal of the Israeli aggressors. China was opposed to the draft resolution. However, taking into consideration the desire of certain countries concerned, China would refrain from voting on the draft resolution.

Decision: *At the 1748th meeting of the Council, on 23 October 1973, the two-Power draft resolution (S/11039), was put to the vote and was adopted by 14 votes to none as resolution 339 (1973).⁶¹ One member (China) did not participate in the vote.*

162. Following the vote, the representative of the United States said that the United States joined with the Soviet Union in introducing the draft resolution adopted by the Council because of its concern that the cease-fire ordered by the Council on 22 October be made fully effective at the earliest possible moment. He noted that resolution 339 (1973) confirmed the Council's position on the cease-fire and provided for the stationing of observers. It was important that the United Nations resume at once the function of observation of the forces of the parties. The United States would expect the Secretary-General,

⁶¹ Doc. 35 in *ibid.*

through the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), to put observers in place at once and to receive immediately reports from them on events in the area of contact between the two sides. Those reports would be transmitted to the Council forthwith.

163. The representative of Yugoslavia said the Council and all responsible international parties had an obligation and a duty under the Charter to make Israel stop violating the cease-fire and start implementing resolution 242 (1967) immediately. The withdrawal of Israel's occupation forces from all Arab territories seized in the 1967 war back to the lines of 5 June 1967 was a basic provision of resolution 242 (1967), and its implementation meant that Israel must start its withdrawal immediately.

164. The representative of the Sudan stated that resolution 338 (1973) had not achieved much. One would have hoped that the Powers who had worked out the resolution would have also worked out the instruments to enforce its aims. It was the duty of the Council to supplement immediately its resolution with a decision to reinforce the United Nations observers who were already in the area and entrust them with the job of observing and controlling the cease-fire. The Powers who had conceived the resolution might call upon the Secretary-General to help in the translation into action of the Council's decision.

165. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that if the cease-fire was to be maintained, there must be proper arrangements on the ground to supervise it, of the sort which had been tested and had on the whole proved effective. The number of the existing observers might be inadequate for the task they were being called upon to perform; that number might well have to be increased.

166. The representative of the USSR said that the Security Council had again been confronted with a challenge by Israel, which, in violation of the Council's cease-fire decision, had renewed military action against Egypt. At this very moment the armed forces of Israel were continuing in their attempts further to extend their incursions into Egyptian territory. His delegation was gratified that the Council had been able to request the immediate dispatch of observers to the cease-fire line for the purpose of forcing Israel to respect

the Council's decision on the cease-fire, and to withdraw its troops from the territories it had seized after the cease-fire came into effect. In connexion with the violation by Israel of the cease-fire decision, the Soviet Government had published a special, urgent statement which had demanded that Israel immediately cease firing and withdraw its troops to the cease-fire lines of 22 October; the Soviet Government warned Israel of the serious consequences involved in a continuation of its aggressive actions. By delaying a Council decision, China had helped the aggressor to continue its violation of the cease-fire. It was a common basis of Israel and China to slander and blacken the image of the United Nations. That was the position of China in the United Nations. For two years China had done nothing constructive in the United Nations. The anti-Sovietism of the Chinese delegation and the latter's practice of sitting with folded arms while the Security Council adopted decisions on the Middle East played into the hands of the Israeli aggressor. If the volume of weapons supplied to the Arab countries by China was as great as the amount of bile and venom spewed forth by the Chinese delegates in the Security Council and the United Nations, the Arabs would have more of a feeling of being helped by China. The Arab people and its armed forces had shattered the myth of Israel's so-called "invincibility". However, it was the Soviet Union, and not China with its anti-Soviet tirades, which had provided them with weapons and taught them how to use them.

167. The representative of France said that the military operations which were apparently continuing on the Israeli-Egyptian front were likely seriously to jeopardize the start of over-all negotiations on the conflict. France attached the greatest importance to having those negotiations start as soon as possible, and had considered that it was up to the Council to pronounce itself most clearly for an immediate cessation of all hostilities, in accordance with resolution 338 (1973).

168. The representative of India stated that his delegation was guided in its vote by one consideration alone: that the parties actually fighting had accepted the resolution. If those parties showed their willingness to respect the cease-fire, the existing observers might be adequate and indeed more than adequate. However, if the number were not adequate for the task and should

the Secretary-General come to the decision that a significant and substantial increase in the observers was necessary, India would expect the Council to be consulted as a matter of urgency. The observers should be placed on both sides of the opposing forces so that the Council would be assured of co-operation by all sides and receive the best and most objective reports.

169. The representative of Indonesia asked who was going to determine where the location of the forces had been situated at the moment the cease-fire had become effective on 22 October and how that was going to be done. It was crucial for the restoration of peace that operative paragraph 2 of resolution 338 (1973) be implemented in accordance with the only correct interpretation of resolution 242 (1967), namely, immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces to the lines they occupied before the June 1967 war, and discussions on outstanding issues, including respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

170. The representative of Peru said that his delegation agreed that the situation on the battlefield made it necessary for the Council to take immediate action. Nevertheless, the fact that the usual prior consultations had not taken place should not set a precedent. It was not the individual members but the Council as a whole which, under the Charter, had primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security. It was Peru's understanding that the Council's decision to shoulder its responsibility and to state that it was responsible for maintenance of peace meant that the Council would be continually seized of the matter. Peru understood that the appropriate auspices referred to in resolution 338 (1973) directly involved the United Nations through the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

171. The representative of China, in a further statement, reiterated his position, stating that it was the two super-Powers, not China, which had delayed the proceedings of the Council. The representative of the Soviet Union had put forth a totally unreasonable point of procedure in order to deprive the Chinese representative of the right to speak. Such a performance of arbitrary manipulation of the Security Council designed to establish a condominium of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Council constituted an insult to the Council and was entirely intolerable.

As to who helps the Israeli aggressor, it was precisely the Soviet Union that had long maintained diplomatic, trade and cultural relations with Israel. After the 1967 aggression launched by Israel against the Arab countries, the Soviet Union had stepped up sending immigrants to Israel, now over 30,000 per year, including technical and military personnel. To suit the needs of its contention with the other super-Power for hegemony, the Soviet Union was turning on the tap at one time and turning it off at another in giving its so-called military aid to Arab countries. To say that the Soviet Union had supported the struggle of the Arab people was 100 per cent hypocrisy. It was those actions of the Soviet Union that had enabled Israel to continue expanding its aggression.

172. The Secretary-General said that, pending a Council directive, he had instructed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to hold the United Nations observers in readiness in their present locations. Now that the Council had decided that the military observers should be stationed to observe the cease-fire called for in resolution 338 (1973), he would immediately take steps to put them in place in the shortest possible time. It would in all probability be necessary to increase the number of observers available in the area to carry out effectively the intentions of the Council. The Chief of Staff would be in immediate contact with the military authorities concerned with a view to working out the details of the observation operation.

173. The representative of Egypt said that when Egypt accepted the cease-fire resolution 338 (1973) it had understood that the two Powers that had proposed it would guarantee its effectiveness. Resolution 339 (1973) just adopted, urged that forces be returned to positions they were occupying at the moment the cease-fire became effective. Egypt refused to consider such a decision to be only lip-service to principle. The question of the principle of withdrawal which had been asserted by the representative of the United States should have been explained as withdrawal to the lines from which the attack had begun—as referred to in resolution 242 (1967)—those lines of pre-5 June 1967. The second understanding on the basis of which Egypt had made no objection to resolution 338 (1973), was that it should begin the machinery of putting into effect

resolution 242 (1967). Egypt's main objective was the withdrawal of all occupation forces from its lands. Let the sponsors of the resolution make a joint effort to apply the resolution just adopted.

174. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that the two resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973) of 22 and 23 October, respectively, were traps. The two resolutions were more ambiguous than resolution 242 (1967). The Arab people refused to be manipulated by outside forces.

175. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation had voted for the resolution because of its concern about the lives being lost in the Middle East. However, Kenya could not fail to notice the manner in which the super-Powers had presented their two resolutions. Instead of taking heed of the first draft cease-fire resolution 10 days previously, they had stepped up arms supplies, which were being used to inflict large-scale death and destruction. It appeared that the super-Powers took action only when their détente was threatened. Resolution 338 (1973) had not been implemented because of the lack of enforcement machinery. Kenya joined hands with those asking for an increase in strength of the United Nations observer corps to be placed at the disposal of the Secretary-General to enable him to carry out effectively the Council's decision.

176. The Secretary-General said that he had just received a communication from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Syria (S/11040 and Corr.1), which read as follows:

With reference to your cable dated 22 October 1973 transmitting Security Council resolution 338 (1973) adopted on 22 October 1973 at the 1747th meeting, I should be grateful if you would note and inform the Security Council that the Syrian Government has accepted that resolution and states that it has understood the resolution to be based on:

1. The complete withdrawal of Israel from all the Arab territories which were occupied in June 1967 and subsequently;

2. The safeguarding of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations.

The Syrian Government's acceptance of the resolution is conditional upon the other party's undertaking to implement the resolution.

The Secretary-General added that observation teams were being deployed in the Suez Canal area.

2. FURTHER REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND COMMUNICATIONS TO THE COUNCIL

177. On 24 October, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on the steps taken by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to implement Security Council resolution 339 (1973).⁶² The three observer teams, two consisting of two patrols each, and the third consisting of three patrols, had proceeded from Cairo to designated areas on the Egyptian side of the forward defended localities. Arrangements were also being made to deploy observers on the Israeli side. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO recommended an increase in the number of observer teams to 12, which would require 43 additional observers for the sector (S/7930/Add.2219).

178. On the same day, the Chief of Staff reported further complaints of cease-fire violations. In subsequent reports (S/7930/Add.2224, 2228, 2231, 2234 and 2237) the patrols of observers recently deployed began to report on the situation in their area of observation. These reports indicated no change in the situation but contained complaints by the parties regarding ground attacks, aerial bombings and sporadic artillery fire.

179. In the Israel-Syria sector, the Chief of Staff also had to adjust the cease-fire observation arrangements to the current situation. Where the forward defended localities had not moved, the existing United Nations observation posts continued to function, but, along the perimeter of the Sassa salient, patrols had to be instituted in lieu of the former observation posts (S/7930/Add. 2223). The United Nations military observers reported sporadic artillery fire by Israeli, Syrian and unidentified forces on 24 October. There were also several cases of overflights by Israeli forces aircraft and of the use of Syrian anti-aircraft missiles (S/7930/Add.2210, 2225, 2229, 2232 and 2236).

180. In the Israel-Lebanon sector, no change was reported and the observation posts continued to submit reports on the situation there. There were several firing incidents and overflights of Lebanese territory by Israeli forces aircraft on 24 October (S/7930/Add.2221, 2222, 2230, 2233 and 2235).

181. During October and November the Secretary-General received a number of communica-

⁶² Doc. 12 in *ibid.*

tions on the situation in the Middle East, some of which contained statements by Governments.

182. By a letter dated 7 October (S/11012),⁶³ the representative of the USSR transmitted a statement issued by the Soviet Government on the situation in the Middle East in which it was stated that the absence of a political settlement in that area had caused a new outbreak of hostilities after Israel had inflamed the situation and launched military operations. The legitimacy of the demands of the Arab States for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 was in accord with the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by means of war. Without such a withdrawal by Israel, it would be impossible to establish a guaranteed peace for all the States and peoples of the area. The Soviet Union fully supported the legitimate demands of the Arab States and held that responsibility for the present turn of events rested wholly with Israel.

183. By a letter dated 8 October (S/11014), the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Council a message from the Prime Minister of Pakistan urging the Council to take immediate measures to have the occupied Arab territories vacated without further delay.

184. By a letter dated 9 October (S/11016), the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Council a message he had received from the President of Algeria which put the responsibility for the grave events of the Middle East on Israel, expressing the belief that the time had come for the United Nations to do everything in its power to restore just and lasting peace in the region once and for all. By another letter dated 10 October (S/11019),⁶⁴ the representative of Algeria transmitted a declaration on the Middle East situation adopted by the non-aligned countries at a meeting held on 10 October at United Nations Headquarters, condemning the indiscriminate bombing of Syria's civilian population by Israel, which had caused the death of hundreds of innocent civilians, including foreign diplomats, United Nations officials and members of their families.

185. By a letter dated 13 October (S/11023),⁶⁵ the representative of Denmark informed the Secretary-General that following consultations be-

tween the nine member countries of the European Community they had issued a statement in which they expressed concern about the resumption of fighting in the Middle East and appealed to the parties to halt the hostilities. A cease-fire should pave the way for true negotiation and settlement of the conflict in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

186. By a letter dated 16 October (S/11029), the representative of Mauritania transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a message addressed by Mauritania to the President of the United States expressing concern over the news regarding American intervention on the side of Israeli forces against the Arab peoples, who were engaged in the struggle for the recovery of their occupied territory.

187. By a letter of the same date (S/11031), the representative of the USSR transmitted a statement of 10 October by the World Peace Council urging the United Nations to take measures to compel Israel to implement its resolutions and, in case of refusal, to impose sanctions against Israel.

188. By a letter dated 22 October (S/11037), the representative of the Philippines transmitted a statement by his President, in which he appealed to all the parties concerned to avail themselves of the United Nations for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. He considered the full implementation of resolution 242 (1967) a necessary step for that purpose.

189. By a letter dated 23 October (S/11038) the representative of Sierra Leone transmitted the text of a statement by the Government of that country calling upon all parties to the conflict to observe the cease-fire appeal made by the Security Council and calling upon Israel to facilitate the establishment of a lasting peace in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

190. By a letter dated 24 October (S/11045)⁶⁶ the representative of Romania transmitted a declaration made by his Government stating that under the circumstances all efforts should be directed towards the observance of the cease-fire, which should be followed by the achievement of an agreement providing for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab territories, the establishment of an enduring peace and settlement of

⁶³ Doc. 131 in *ibid.*

⁶⁴ Doc. 143 in *ibid.*

⁶⁵ Doc. 147 in *ibid.*

⁶⁶ Doc. 164 in *ibid.*

the Palestinian population in accordance with its legitimate aspirations to a free and independent life.

191. By a letter dated 24 October (S/11050) the representative of Turkey transmitted a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey addressed to the Secretary-General stating that Turkey continued to believe that Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which foresaw the evacuation of the occupied Arab territories as one of the important steps for a permanent solution to the conflict, still contained the necessary elements for the attainment of an honourable and just peace in the Middle East which should safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of all concerned.

192. By a letter dated 29 October 1973 (S/11061) the representative of Mongolia transmitted a statement by his Government saying that the development of events in the Middle East had shown Israel's disregard of the various United Nations Security Council resolutions. Mongolia demanded the immediate cessation of Israeli aggression against the Arab countries, the strict observance of the Security Council resolutions on the Middle East and the complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the Arab territories they had occupied.

193. By a letter dated 6 November (S/11081),⁶⁷ the representative of Denmark transmitted a statement issued in Brussels by the nine Governments of the European Community expressing the hope that after the adoption of resolution 338 (1973), negotiations would begin for reaching a just and lasting peace in the Middle East through the application of resolution 242 (1967). They also felt that the Secretary-General and the Security Council should play a special role to that effect.

194. By a letter dated 25 October (S/11047), the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Security Council the letter he had addressed to Israel on 24 October and Israel's reply on the following day concerning arrangements for the observers of the cease-fire between Israel and Syria. He asked if Israel accepted the cease-fire with Syria and if so, if it was in agreement with the deployment of United Nations military observers in areas under the control of Israel for purposes of observing the cease-fire. In reply Israel con-

firmed that it had accepted the cease-fire with Syria and was in agreement with the deployment of United Nations military observers to observe the cease-fire.

195. By a letter dated 26 October (S/11055), the representative of Egypt informed the Secretary-General that Egypt accepted resolution 340 (1973) as a first step in the implementation of the Security Council decisions and was ready to co-operate in their implementation. Furthermore, Egypt considered that the presence of UNEF on its territory was of a temporary nature and governed by the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law which safeguarded Egypt's sovereignty and territorial integrity. When exercising its sovereign rights concerning UNEF, Egypt would be guided by its acceptance of the Security Council's resolution.

196. By a letter dated 31 October (S/11064),⁶⁸ the representative of Greece, after stating his Government's position on the situation in the Middle East and indicating that resolution 242 (1967) still provided the best basis for a just settlement of the conflict, reiterated its desire to contribute to all efforts for that purpose and declared its readiness to make peace-keeping observers available immediately or to provide a military contingent for UNEF.

F. *Establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force*

1. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1749TH AND 1750TH MEETINGS (24 AND 25 OCTOBER 1973)

197. At the 1749th meeting on 24 October,⁶⁹ the President said that the meeting had been called at the request of Egypt to consider Israel's continuing violations of the Security Council cease-fire resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973) of 22 and 23 October 1973.

198. The representative of Egypt said that a new war had broken out in the Middle East, and at that moment was still going on. Israel had attacked the Egyptian armies on both the east and west banks of the Canal. The United Nations military observers had been prevented by the Israeli military authorities from proceeding to their destinations. He asked the members of the Council to do their best to make sure that the

⁶⁸ Doc. 178 in *ibid.*

⁶⁹ Excerpts of the debate are printed in doc. 20 in *ibid.*

⁶⁷ Doc. 184 in *ibid.*

observers were in their places and asked the two Powers that had brought the resolutions to the Council to see to it that they were strictly implemented, adding that the President of Egypt had asked the President of the United States and General Secretary Brezhnev of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union directly to send forces to help the United Nations observers bring the forces of the parties to the conflict back to where they had been at the time the cease-fire went into effect on 22 October 1973. In conclusion, his delegation hoped that the Security Council resolution submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union on 22 October would be salvaged by those two States themselves or by any other action deemed necessary by the Council.

199. The Secretary-General informed the Council of the action which he and General Siilasvuo, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, had taken in implementation of resolution 339 (1973). He had been in constant touch with General Siilasvuo and the representatives of the parties concerned. General Siilasvuo had been also in contact with both Egyptian and Israeli military authorities in order to carry out the dispatch of United Nations observers. He pointed out two conditions that were essential for the United Nations observers to fulfil their task effectively; first, the complete acceptance of the cease-fire by the parties; second, full co-operation by them with the United Nations observer operation.

200. The representative of Israel, rejecting Egypt's charges as unfounded, said that Egypt had never searched for a peaceful solution at all, and even less so in the Security Council. On 23 October, when the Council had been convened on Egypt's initiative, the fighting had been due to Egypt's failure to comply with Security Council resolution 338 (1973), and Israel's reaction to the Egyptian attacks. The fighting, however, had died down, and it was the time to make an effort to ensure the effectiveness of the cease-fire and to execute all the arrangements necessary for its supervision. He was authorized to reiterate that the Government of Israel would extend its full co-operation to General Siilasvuo.

201. The representative of Egypt said that the Egyptian port of Adabiah and the town of Suez had been attacked by Israel after 0500 hours GMT on 24 October, agreed to as the deadline for the cease-fire, and that the struggle was still

going on. Also, United Nations military observers had not yet been permitted to go because of the determination of Israel that they be post-mortem cease-fire observers, receiving the full co-operation of Israel to observe that its conquest was safeguarded. He deplored Israel's violation of the laws of war and deliberate disrespect for the Fourth Geneva Convention by killing about 200 civilians of the town of Adabiah.

202. The representative of the Sudan said that since the cease-fire had been broken by Israel his delegation considered that the Council should condemn Israel for its latest aggression and immediately and seriously consider the implementation of resolution 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).

203. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the Council was now faced with a new aggressive war by Israel against Egypt. Though the United States and the USSR had a special responsibility to act to assure the implementation of resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), the matter remained a concern of the Council as a whole. The Member States of the Council had to find the best way for the Council to discharge its responsibilities, for example, by deciding on the increase of the number of United Nations observers or considering the possibility of sending United Nations emergency forces to the area.

204. The representative of the USSR said that Israel's violations of the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions were a criminal provocation planned to use the cease-fire for the purpose of taking over new strategic positions advantageous to Israeli imperialism in the Middle East. His Government had warned Israel of the dire consequences that would flow from Israel's violations of the Security Council decisions. The members of the Council should adopt firm measures to ensure Israel's implementation of the decisions and resolutions of the Council. The measures proposed by Egypt were justified and entirely in accordance with the Charter. The time had come for the Council to adopt appropriate strict sanctions against Israel under Chapter VII of the Charter. The United Nations observers included only representatives of the Western States, and therefore the Soviet delegation could not agree with such a unilateral selection by the Secretariat of the United Nations. The Council should consider the equitable geographic distribution aspect of the matter; since the time had come to increase

the number of the observers, the socialist countries and those of the third world would be able to find among their citizens officers who were capable of carrying out that important mission.

205. The representative of Saudi Arabia quoted news reports that United States military equipment was being loaded aboard ship in West Germany for shipment to Israel.

206. The representative of the United States said that since it was not yet possible to assess with certainty through the United Nations observers the conflicting claims of both parties, the Council's urgent tasks were to urge both parties to comply immediately and fully with the cease-fire resolutions and to encourage the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to move as promptly as possible to place additional observers on the spot. He did not agree with the Egyptian Foreign Minister's suggestion that the Security Council invite the Soviet Union and the United States to send armed forces to the area of fighting in order to supervise implementation of the cease-fire. The United States delegation believed that the parties, with the United Nations observers, could and would bring the fighting to an end, and the United States had been in active and serious consultation with the Israeli Government to impress upon it the urgency of absolute adherence to Security Council cease-fire resolutions. The United States delegation also agreed that the forces of the parties should return to the positions they had occupied when the cease-fire had become effective. The fact that there was no agreed basis for firm truce lines emphasized still further the need for completing the organization and placement of the truce supervision force and for ensuring that the Council and the parties be fully informed of the developments and the military commanders of the two sides instructed in compelling terms to stop the fighting.

207. The Council's meeting was suspended. When it was resumed, the representative of Kenya said that in view of the complete breakdown in the cease-fire and an appeal from Egypt for urgent action by the Council, he was introducing the following draft resolution (S/11046) sponsored by Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia, which read as follows:

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and 339 (1973) of 23 October 1973,

Noting with regret the reported repeated violations of the cease-fire in non-compliance with resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973),

Noting with concern from the Secretary-General's report that the United Nations military observers have not yet been enabled to place themselves on both sides of the cease-fire line,

1. *Demands* that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties withdraw to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations military observers on both sides;

3. *Decides* to set up immediately a United Nations Emergency Force under its authority, and requests the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to this effect;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on an urgent and continuing basis on the state of implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973);

5. *Requests* all Member States to extend their full cooperation in the implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).

208. The representative of Guinea said that the aim of the sponsors was in accordance with the desire of the two Powers that had proposed resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973). The sponsors had taken account of all points of view, weighing not only concern shown by the non-aligned members; but also the desire to have the support of all the members of the Council.

209. The Secretary-General stated that he had discussed the cease-fire operation in the Syrian sector both with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Syria and with the Permanent Representative of Israel, and he had requested the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to contact the military authorities on both sides concerning the possibility of adjusting the existing observation arrangements to the current situation. The Chief of Staff had formulated a plan for this purpose. The Secretary-General understood that the reaction of the Syrian authorities to this plan was favourable and that the Israeli authorities had undertaken to give their reaction by the next morning. The United Nations difficulties in immediately setting up an observation system had arisen from the conflict situation in the area and the fact that the

cease-fire called for by the Security Council had not been observed.

210. At the 1750th meeting on 25 October, the representative of Kenya said that as a result of consultations between the members of the Council, three amendments had been introduced to the draft resolution contained in document S/11046 submitted at the previous meeting. Under the first amendment affecting paragraph 1 of the draft resolution the word "withdraw" would be replaced by the word "return"; under the second amendment affecting paragraph 3, the words "under its authority" were placed after the word "immediately" and the words "Emergency Force" would be followed by the new phrase "to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Nations except the permanent members of the Security Council". Finally, the third amendment affecting paragraph 5 consisted of inserting the phrase "to the United Nations" between the word "co-operation" and the word "in".

211. The text of the draft resolution as revised was contained in document (S/11046/Rev.1 and read as follows:

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973) of 22 October and 339 (1973) of 23 October 1973,

Noting with regret the reported repeated violations of the cease-fire in non-compliance with resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973),

Noting with concern from the Secretary-General's report that the United Nations military observers have not yet been enabled to place themselves on both sides of the cease-fire line,

1. *Demands* that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations military observers on both sides;

3. *Decides* to set up immediately, under its authority, a United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Nations except the permanent members of the Security Council, and requests the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to this effect;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on an urgent and continuing basis on the state of implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973);

5. *Requests* all Members States to extend their full

co-operation to the United Nations in the implementation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).

212. The representative of China said that China had always been opposed to the dispatch of the so-called "peace-keeping force" and maintained the same position with regard to the present situation in the Middle East. The dispatch of the United Nations Emergency Force could only pave the way for further international intervention and control, with the super-Powers as the behind-the-scenes bosses, thus leaving endless evil consequences in its wake. However, in consideration of requests repeatedly made by the victims of aggression, China had decided not to participate in the voting on the eight-Power draft resolution instead of vetoing it.

213. The representative of Israel said his country's policy was founded on three principles: cease-fire, negotiations, peace. Israel would favour all constructive efforts to strengthen the cease-fire.

214. The representative of Saudi Arabia raised questions regarding operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution; from what countries would the emergency force be selected; who would pay for it? Moreover, if negotiations lasted for years, Israel might establish settlements in the occupied territories. Egypt's sovereignty over those territories should not be put in jeopardy.

215. The representative of the United States stated that his country supported the draft resolution as amended as a result of consultations. His delegation agreed on the need to increase the number of observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization immediately, and approved of the establishment of a new United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel from Member States except those of the permanent members of the Security Council. He expressed his Government's readiness to facilitate the transportation of that Force to the area.

216. The representative of the USSR stated that his delegation would vote for the draft resolution because it was submitted by a majority of the Council's members, namely, eight representatives of the non-aligned countries, it contained a condemnation of the aggressor, and it envisaged measures to ensure compliance with the Council's decision concerning the cease-fire. However, his delegation had reservations in regard to the

provision which stipulated the exclusion of the permanent members of the Security Council from participating in the United Nations Emergency Force. He reaffirmed the need to ensure equitable geographical representation in the composition of the United Nations Emergency Force as well as the United Nations Permanent Observers by including representatives of the socialist and non-aligned countries. The provision of the draft resolution to the effect that UNEF should be established under the authority of the Security Council meant that the Council itself took decisions concerning all aspects of the establishment of United Nations armed forces and the discharge of the peace-keeping missions entrusted to it. With regard to the financial implication of the resolution, the Soviet delegation believed that the cost of maintaining the United Nations Observer Force should be borne by the aggressor and not by the United Nations.

217. The representative of Guinea expressed the hope that the eight-Power draft resolution would succeed in stopping the bloodshed and would lead the Security Council to assume its full responsibility.

218. The representative of Indonesia said that in order to stop the fighting, the wording of the draft resolution must be acceptable to those who had different views on the problem from those of his own delegation. His delegation also had agreed to the exclusion of the permanent members of the Council from participating in the United Nations Emergency Force, but hoped that they would provide financial assistance for its effective functioning.

219. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that his delegation agreed on the immediate priorities set forth in the eight-Power draft resolution. The exclusion of forces of the permanent members of the Council from the present emergency force should not prejudice the composition of the United Nations peace-keeping force which would be needed to guarantee a final peace agreement in accordance with resolution 242 (1967). His delegation interpreted the phrase "under its authority" in operative paragraph 3 of the eight-Power draft resolution as referring to the ultimate responsibility of the Council for policy and not as assigning to it the day-to-day operational control of the force.

220. The representative of Panama said that his delegation supported the draft resolution before

the Council, which would consolidate the ceasefire. If the draft resolution were adopted, his Government was ready to send a military force which could be incorporated into the United Nations Emergency Force.

221. The representative of Austria said that his delegation would support the eight-Power draft resolution as it had the previous two resolutions. It favoured the widest use of United Nations observers and the immediate setting-up of a United Nations Emergency Force.

222. The representative of Peru said that the Emergency Force should be set up in accordance with criteria of geographical distribution and political balance. The exclusion of contingents from the permanent members from the Force would also be preferable.

223. The representative of France stated that his delegation, with some reservations, would vote in favour of the draft resolution. As for the provision which would exclude the permanent members of the Council from the Emergency Force, his Government had undertaken the commitment to participate in a real peace-keeping force, if the case should arise. His delegation requested a separate vote on paragraph 3 of the revised draft resolution (S/11046/Rev.1) which dealt with the composition of the Force, specifically the words "except the permanent members of the Security Council".

224. The representative of Saudi Arabia asked whether all Powers were willing to contribute to financing the Emergency Force and whether the Secretary-General could give an idea of what the initial expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force would be. The Secretary-General replied that he would report to the Council on the following day the approximate estimate of the expense involved.

225. The representative of Kenya stated that he, like other co-sponsors of the draft resolution, had no objection to complying with the request of the representative of France for a separate vote on the words "except the permanent members of the Security Council".

Decision: *At the 1750th meeting on 25 October the Security Council voted on the revised eight-Power draft resolution (S/11046/Rev.1). A separate vote was first taken on retaining in paragraph 3 of the draft the words "except the permanent members of the Security Council". The result was 13 votes in favour to none*

against, with 1 abstention (France). One member (China) did not participate in the vote. The revised draft resolution as a whole was then put to the vote and was adopted by 14 votes to none as resolution 340 (1973).⁷⁰ One member (China) did not participate in the vote.

226. Following the vote, the Secretary-General stated that he would do his utmost to respond to the requests set forth in the resolution just adopted. Referring to paragraph 2 of the resolution, he said that paragraph 8 of document S/7930/Add. 2219 contained the measures taken thus far to increase the number of observers on both sides. As for the cease-fire in the Syrian sector, both parties had agreed to the adjustment of the observation machinery, and he had instructed General Siilasvuo to proceed immediately to implement the agreed plan.

227. The representative of Egypt said that his Government accepted the resolution just adopted and had decided to grant the Emergency Force all the assistance and co-operation necessary in order to enable it to discharge its tasks. The first task of the United Nations Emergency Force was to let the forces of the two sides return to the positions they had occupied when the cease-fire had gone into effect.

228. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the setting-up of a United Nations Emergency Force was in conformity with the views of the non-aligned countries expressed at their Algiers summit meeting on reinforcing the role of the United Nations in strengthening international peace and security. Despite their feelings about Israel's aggression, the co-sponsors had couched their draft in restrained language in order to facilitate the adoption of the resolution. His delegation hoped and appealed to all to see to it that the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force operation should be smoothly worked out. Proper political and geographical representation should be observed in its composition.

229. The representative of the Sudan emphasized the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Council, particularly the United States of America and the USSR in achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The United Nations Emergency Force should be selected on an equitable geographic basis and its absolute neutrality should be guaranteed.

The United States should spare no effort to remove impediments to achieving aims of the resolution.

230. The representative of India said that it was his delegation's understanding that the operations of the United Nations military observers and the United Nations Emergency Force would be carried out on the sovereign territories of Egypt and Syria and that nothing the Council might do would detract from the exercise of that sovereignty except by their consent. However, these measures should be only the prelude to negotiations which should ultimately lead to the relinquishment of all occupied territories and the establishment of durable peace in the area, enabling all the States in that region to live in security inside their own borders. Any final solution must respect the rights of the Palestinian people. His delegation was confident that money would be forthcoming for the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force. His delegation was also hopeful that the Secretary-General would give the Council concrete and practical proposals for the implementation of the Council's decision.

231. The representative of Nigeria drew the attention of the Council to the statement made by General Gowon that morning, in which the Nigerian Government had declared its decision to break diplomatic relations with the Israeli Government.⁷¹

232. The representative of Kenya, on behalf of the eight sponsors of the draft resolution, thanked all members of the Council for their support in adopting the draft. He said that what remained was a determined effort on the part of all concerned to implement resolution 340 (1973) immediately.

233. The Secretary-General read out the text of his letter (S/11049) to the President of the Security Council sent that afternoon. In the letter, he stated that he would deliver to the Council the report required by resolution 340 (1973). In the meantime, he proposed to arrange for the contingents of Austria, Finland and Sweden—then serving with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)—to proceed immediately to Egypt, and also proposed to appoint General Siilasvuo, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, as the interim Commander of the Emergency Force and to ask him to set up a

⁷⁰ Doc. 36 in *ibid.*

⁷¹ Doc. 167 in *ibid.*

provisional headquarters staff of personnel from UNTSO. He was having consultations with the representatives of the countries concerned. This step—if accepted by the Council—would be without prejudice to the more detailed and comprehensive report on the Emergency Force which he would submit to the Council on 26 October.

234. The President of the Council stated that, since there was no objection, he would take it that the Council authorized the Secretary-General to proceed in accordance with his proposal.

235. Speaking then as the representative of Australia, he expressed his delegation's support for the initiative taken by the non-aligned members of the Council. The real merit of the resolution lay in its moderate and practical approach. In welcoming the proposal to establish a United Nations Emergency Force he said that many important matters of both a mechanical and substantive nature had to be resolved before the Force could become an effective buffer between parties to the dispute. In this context, he noted that the Council's responsibility was to lay down policy and broad guidelines, not to decide every detail of the establishment and operation of the Emergency Force. His Government would be willing to consider sympathetically a request for a contribution to the Emergency Force under appropriate conditions.

2. FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF OBSERVERS AND DISPATCH OF CONTINGENTS FROM CYPRUS (CONSIDERATION AT THE 1751ST MEETING, 26 OCTOBER 1973)

236. At the 1751st meeting on 26 October, the representative of Egypt said that he had come to the Council to warn of a grave danger that was threatening his region and beyond. New hostilities had begun on the Suez and Sinai fronts. Having adopted resolution 338 (1973), 339 (1973) and 340 (1973), the Council had not specified which forces had not obeyed the Council and had tried to use the cease-fire to make territorial gains. However, it was admitted by the Secretary of State of the United States that it was Israel that had made territorial gains after the cease-fire. Red Cross vehicles carrying plasma, water, food and medicine had been prevented by the Israeli forces from proceeding to the Egyptian soldiers in Sinai and were on their way back to Cairo

because of Israeli conditions that Egypt found impractical and impossible. The Council should condemn the Israeli authorities for those intentional obstructions.

237. The representative of Zambia said that on 26 October 1973, his Government had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel, because Israel was responsible for the current crisis in the Middle East through its intransigence about acceding to Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

238. The representative of Israel said that Egypt had violated the cease-fire by attacks against Israeli forces while at the same time charging Israel with attacking and violating the cease-fire. Egypt also accused Israel of breaches of the cease-fire when no fighting at all was going on. The Egyptian charges were completely unfounded and fabricated.

239. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that Israel seemed to be intent on forcing the Egyptian troops in the Suez area either to surrender or to be destroyed. The Israeli demand that the Red Cross convoys be manned by Israeli personnel was unfair and impractical.

240. The representative of the USSR said that Israel had again launched attacks against Egyptian troops, and thus had violated the Security Council decisions calling for an immediate cessation of military activities. The Security Council was bound to draw the necessary conclusions therefrom urgently and without any procrastination. In conclusion, he read a statement made by Mr. Brezhnev, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at a meeting of the World Congress of Peace-Loving Forces in Moscow on 26 October 1973. The statement said, *inter alia*, that the USSR was interested in seeing a genuine, strong and just peace established in the Middle East and that the security of all countries and peoples of that region should be guaranteed. The great value of the Security Council decision of 22 October was that it provided for taking important steps toward the elimination of the very causes of the war. In accord with that decision, the parties concerned should immediately begin talks under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing peace in the Middle East. The Soviet Union was ready to take part in appropriate guarantees.

241. Reporting on developments in connexion with the interim arrangements that he had

proposed on the previous day to the Council, the Secretary-General said that General Siilasvuo had set up a provisional headquarters in Cairo, and that the contingents of Austria, Finland and Sweden were being transferred from Cyprus to Cairo, an operation which was to be completed by the next morning. He had instructed General Siilasvuo to move advance elements of the Force forward with the maximum possible speed. With regard to UNTSO observers he said that there were nine patrols on the Egyptian side and six on Israel-held territory. They were now in the vicinity of the forward positions of the respective forces.

242. The representative of the United States said that in word and deed his country stood for strict observance of the cease-fire. The most constructive contribution the Council could make was to proceed systematically, as quickly as possible, on its mission of ending the fighting and beginning peace negotiations. The Council could proceed to implement resolution 340 (1973), which, if carried out, could lead to real peace.

243. The representative of India said that the Council had failed to introduce any appreciable measure of calm into the area of conflict. The moment had come when the Council should take whatever practical steps it could. He then suggested that, first, the Secretary-General be authorized to send additional men from Cyprus if he considered it a necessary step as an interim measure. His second proposal was that the Secretary-General and the President of the Council should appeal to the parties to co-operate fully and effectively with the International Red Cross.

244. The representative of Yugoslavia said that he supported the two proposals just made by the Indian representative.

245. The President of the Council, referring to the two proposals made by the representative of India and supported by the representative of Yugoslavia, stated that, in the absence of any objection, he considered the proposals made by the representative of India and Yugoslavia as approved by the Council.

246. The Secretary-General said that he would actively consider the first proposal, having in mind the task of the Force in Cyprus and the number of troops available there. With regard to the second proposal, he would consult with the President about the necessary steps. He had been

in touch with the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva and had been kept informed of its efforts.

3. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 340 (1973)

247. In pursuance of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) concerning the establishment of a United Nations Emergency Force, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a report dated 27 October (S/11052/Rev.1),⁷² in which he outlined the terms of reference of the Force, general considerations related to its effective functioning, a proposed plan of action and the estimated cost and method of financing.

248. With regard to the terms of reference, he said that the Force would supervise the implementation of paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 340 (1973), use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting and co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross. It would have the co-operation of the military observers of UNTSO. The essential conditions for its effectiveness were that it must have the full backing of the Council, operate with the full co-operation of the parties and function as an integrated and efficient military unit.

249. With regard to the guidelines for the functioning of the Force, the Secretary-General proposed that it be placed under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. The Commander of the Force would be appointed by the Secretary-General with the Council's consent and would be responsible to him. The Secretary-General would keep the Council fully informed and refer to it for decision all matters that might affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force.

250. The Force must enjoy the freedom of movement and communication required for the performance of its task, as well as the relevant privileges and immunities of the United Nations. It should operate separately from the armed forces of parties concerned. Separate quarters and, whenever feasible, buffer zones would have to be arranged with the co-operation of the parties.

251. The Force would be composed of contingents provided upon the request of the Secretary-General by selected countries, chosen in

⁷² Doc. 13 in *ibid.*

consultation with the Security Council and the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation.

252. The Force would be provided with defensive weapons only and force would not be used except in self-defence, which would include attempts to prevent it by forceful means, 'from discharging its duties. It would proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict would comply with the decisions of the Council. The Force would act with complete impartiality and would avoid any action that could prejudice the rights, claims or positions of the parties, without affecting paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 339 (1973) and 340 (1973). The total strength of the Force could be in the order of 7,000 men and it would initially have a mandate of six months. On that basis, the approximate estimated cost of the Force for that period would be \$30 million, the costs to be considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne by the Members in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter.

4. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1752ND MEETING (27 OCTOBER 1973)

253. At the 1752nd meeting on 27 October 1973, in addition to the letter from the United States (S/11010), the provisional agenda contained the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) (S/11052/Rev.1).

254. At that meeting the Council also had before it a draft resolution (S/11054) sponsored by Australia.

255. The representative of China said that his delegation opposed the dispatch of the so-called United Nations Emergency Force to the Middle East. Accordingly, his delegation could not pay the expenses for the dispatch of the Force, and would not participate in the voting on the Secretary-General's report.

Decision: *At the 1752nd meeting on 27 October 1973, the Security Council adopted the Australian draft resolution (S/11054) by 14 votes to none as resolution 341 (1973). One member (China) did not participate in the vote.*

256. Resolution 341 (1973) read as follows:

The Security Council

1. *Approves* the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 340

(1973) contained in document S/11052/Rev.1 dated 27 October 1973;

2. *Decides* that the Force shall be established in accordance with the above-mentioned report for an initial period of six months, and that it shall continue in operation thereafter, if required, provided the Security Council Council so decides.

257. Following the vote, the representative of France said that the Council should have control over all operations of the Force, particularly the defining of the Force's terms of reference, its duration, its size and its composition. The Security Council must also appoint the commander, decide on the basic directives to be given to that commander, prepare the method of financing, and, finally, ensure constant control over the application of its directives. As the Council was not in a position to direct such a Force on a continuing basis, it was possible to envisage the establishment of a subsidiary organ of the Council under Article 29 of the Charter whose purpose would be to lessen the Council's work. As for the Force's mandate, it should have as its terms of reference the supervision of the implementation of the cease-fire on both sides of the cease-fire lines. The composition of the Force should be such that would give the best possible assurance of its objectivity towards the parties to the conflict. Finally, his delegation would be prepared to accept the principle of complete exemption of the least advanced developing countries from contributions to the financing of the Force.

258. The representative of Guinea said that the Secretary-General's report just approved defined objective provisions taking duly into account the heavy responsibility incumbent on the Council in the maintenance of international peace and security. Peace in the Middle East would depend on their implementation. In voting in favour of the draft resolution and in approving the Secretary-General's report, her delegation had remained convinced that the strict implementation of its provisions could give rise to no ambiguity.

259. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the Secretary-General's report seemed practical, constructive and balanced. The new United Nations Emergency Force should not only keep the guns silent in the Middle East, but should also make a sizable contribution towards achieving a just and a long-awaited peace. With the adoption of the report of the Secretary-General, the

United Nations Emergency Force now clearly had its mandate and its means of functioning.

260. The representative of India said that in sending forces mainly to Egyptian territory, the Council should not overlook the question of Egyptian sovereignty. The Council had had three purposes: a cease-fire, the return of both parties to the positions they had occupied at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October; and negotiations which must start as soon as possible.

261. The representative of the USSR noted that an informal consultative meeting of the Council had unanimously approved his delegation's proposal that Israel should be asked to return its troops to the positions they occupied at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973. His delegation had not opposed the Council's approval of the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the question of measures to implement Security Council resolution 340 (1973) despite the fact that the report contained some points that were not altogether coincidental with the approach of the Soviet Union to the question of establishing United Nations emergency forces and the conduct of United Nations peace-keeping operations.

262. The representative of the Sudan said that paragraphs 3 and 4 (*e*) of the Secretary-General's report did not, in his delegation's understanding, compromise the sovereignty of the Arab Republic of Egypt over its territory. He thanked the representative of France for his suggestion to exempt the least developed countries from contributions to the budget of UNEF. Though his delegation appreciated the motives of the French delegation, he appealed to the latter not to press its suggestion because the least developed countries should not be excluded from contributing to such a noble end. His delegation fully supported the contents of paragraph 7 of the report of the Secretary-General.

263. The representative of Indonesia said that his delegation had voted for the amended report of the Secretary-General, as his delegation was generally in agreement with its provisions. Concerning paragraph 4 (*c*) of the report, consultations "with the parties concerned" should be interpreted as making serious efforts to persuade the parties at least not to object to the contingents selected by the Secretary-General. That was purely a question of territorial sovereignty. As for the financing of the forces, his delegation

understood that paragraph 7 of the report should not be read so as to exclude voluntary contributions.

264. The representative of the United States said that his Government welcomed the action of the Council in approving the Secretary-General's report. His delegation believed that the Emergency Force would from its inception require the full co-operation of the parties concerned and operate as an integrated military unit with efficiency and with special privilege for none. The United States considered the language of the report carefully drawn. For instance, the statement "All matters which may affect the nature of the continued effective functioning of the Force will be referred to the Council for its decision" assured an orderly agreed withdrawal of the Force but only when the Council so decided. His delegation was also satisfied that the phrase "bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation" was consistent with Article 101 of the Charter and assured that all the obvious and necessary criteria would be given appropriate consideration in the composition of the Force. His delegation hoped that the Secretary-General could move as swiftly as possible to implement the resolution just adopted. The United States was prepared to consider requests for assistance to that end. Finally, he expressed his personal satisfaction that his Government had helped to arrange for a meeting of Egyptian and Israeli military representatives under United Nations auspices, to discuss the practical application of the cease-fire.

265. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution in order to help pave the way for the implementation of urgent and necessary steps to bring peace and normalcy to the Middle East. His delegation hoped that the United Nations Emergency Force would effectively prevent the recurrence of fighting in the area. It was also his delegation's hope that the parties concerned would immediately after the cease-fire start the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), beginning negotiations for a just and durable peace.

266. The representative of Panama said that his delegation had voted in favour of the approval of the Secretary-General's report because it seemed to be the best way to implement resolution 340 (1973) of the Council that had established the

United Nations Emergency Force for the Middle East.

267. The representative of the United Kingdom commended the Secretary-General and his staff for his report, which dealt comprehensively and effectively with the immediate issues, and reflected accurately the letter and spirit of the Council's resolutions. For those reasons his delegation had voted for the resolution approving the Secretary-General's report.

268. The representative of Egypt announced that his Government had accepted Security Council resolutions 338 (1973), 339 (1973) and 340 (1973) as a first step in the implementation of the decisions adopted by the Security Council. In giving its consent to the entry and presence of the United Nations Emergency Force on Egyptian territory, his Government was exercising its sovereign rights to enable the United Nations to proceed with the first step and temporary measure towards putting an end to the aggression committed against Egypt since 1967.

269. The representative of Israel said that Israel's policy continued to be guided by three principles: cease-fire, negotiation and peace.

270. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that the United Nations Emergency Force was most likely to be extended for many years, which might bring its total expenditure to over \$1,000 million for a period of six or seven years. The Secretary-General's report should not have bypassed paragraph 1 of Article 17 of the Charter. It was the prerogative of the General Assembly not the Security Council to approve the budget of the United Nations.

271. The representative of the USSR said that he had just received a TASS statement issued that very day, about which he would like to inform the Council members.⁷³ The statement said that in connexion with Middle East events, there had been reports from Washington regarding the United States armed forces' being placed on alert status. In attempting to justify this step, officials had made reference to some alleged actions of the Soviet Union, which allegedly had given grounds for concern. These explanations were absurd, since the acts of the Soviet Union were strictly directed toward assisting the implementation of the Council decision regarding

the cease-fire and the restoration of peace in the Middle East.

5. PROGRESS REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTIONING OF UNEF

272. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 340 (1973), the Secretary-General issued progress reports on the establishment and functioning of UNEF (S/11056 and addenda). In his first report of 28 October (S/11056),⁷⁴ he recalled the terms of Council resolution 340 (1973) and the decision that personnel of the Austrian, Finnish and Swedish contingents serving in Cyprus should proceed to Egypt, and added that UNEF had become established with the arrival of those contingents in Cairo on 26 October. Those contingents had been deployed on 27 October and a United Nations presence had been established in the Israel-controlled area west of Suez city. It was planned also to transfer to the UNEF area the Irish contingent serving with UNFICYP, and consultations for further additions to the Force were in progress. Thus the Force's initial activities had taken place in areas of actual confrontation and had involved supervision of the cease-fire in co-operation with UNTSO observers. On 27 and 28 October, at kilometre marker 109 on the Cairo-Suez road, the first meeting of high-level military representatives of Egypt and Israel was held, in the presence of UNEF officers, to discuss observance of the cease-fire and humanitarian questions. An agreement was reached to allow the transfer of non-military supplies through Israeli-held territory to Egyptian troops on the east bank of the Suez Canal by lorries driven by UNEF soldiers.

6. THE QUESTION OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE (CONSIDERATION AT THE 1754TH MEETING ON 2 NOVEMBER 1973)

273. At the 1754th meeting on 2 November 1973, the provisional agenda included, in addition to a letter from the United States (S/11010), the reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11056 and Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1).

274. The President said that with regard to the item under consideration he was authorized to make the following statement, representing the

⁷³ Doc. 173 in *ibid.*

⁷⁴ Doc. 14 in *ibid.*

agreement of the members of the Council (S/11072):

United Nations Emergency Force (Security Council resolution 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973); implementation—second phase

1. The members of the Security Council met for informal consultations on the morning of 1 November 1973 and heard a report from the Secretary-General on the progress so far made in the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973).

2. After a lengthy and detailed exchange of views it was agreed that in regard to the next stage of implementation of resolution 340 (1973):

(a) The Secretary-General will immediately consult, to begin with, Ghana (from the African regional group), Indonesia and Nepal (from the Asian regional group), Panama and Peru (from the Latin American regional group), Poland (from the Eastern European regional group) and Canada (from the Western European and other States group), the latter two with particular responsibility for logistic support, with a view to dispatching contingents to the Middle East pursuant to Security Council resolution 340 (1973). The Secretary-General will dispatch troops to the area from these countries as soon as the necessary consultations have been completed. The Council members agreed that at least three African countries are expected to send contingents to the Middle East. The present decision of the Council is intended to bring about a better geographical distribution of the United Nations Emergency Force.

(b) The Secretary-General will regularly report to the Council on the results of his efforts undertaken pursuant to subparagraph (a) so that the question of balanced geographical distribution in the Force can be reviewed.

3. The above-mentioned agreement was reached by members of the Council with the exception of the People's Republic of China which dissociates itself from it.

275. The representative of China said that the dispatch of the so-called United Nations Emergency Force would place sovereign Arab States under international control and pave the way for further international intervention, with the super-Powers as behind-the-scenes bosses who had been contending fiercely over the composition of the Force. Both of the two super-Powers were concerned merely about the right of their respective military presences and tried by all means to squeeze in forces which they could influence so as to exercise indirect control, if direct control was not possible. A super-Power which styled itself the friend and benefactor of the Arab countries, while completely disregarding their sovereignty, had contended hard about the composition of the

Emergency Force, and thus revealed its true intention.

276. The representative of Kenya said that his delegation, in a spirit of compromise, had accepted the formula just adopted by the Council in order to set in motion the second phase of the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973).

277. The representative of Indonesia said that his delegation had conveyed its readiness to participate in UNEF if requested and not objected to by the parties concerned. His delegation would be ready to dispatch a contingent to the Middle East within a week after the necessary consultations were completed.

278. The representative of France said that his delegation was gratified that the Council had reached agreement on a text that would facilitate the work of the Secretary-General and encourage him to continue his efforts to set up the United Nations Emergency Force. He hoped that the Council would consider the participation in the Force by other States of Europe of the Nine, particularly Belgium and Italy, which had offered to do so.

279. The representative of Panama said that the armed forces of Panama had accepted the task of providing contingents for the United Nations Emergency Force.

280. The representative of the United Kingdom said that in later stages of the implementation of resolution 340 (1973) the offers made by other members of the European Community to participate in the Emergency Force should be taken into consideration.

281. The representative of the USSR said that the Council had taken a decision in the right direction towards the practical implementation of its resolution 340 (1973) with regard to the selection of contingents to be included in UNEF on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. In its decision the Council had also officially affirmed the principle that countries should be selected for that purpose from every geographic area without exception and without discrimination of any kind. The decision had removed the artificial restrictions on participation in UNEF by the socialist countries and the non-aligned countries, including the countries of Africa. He reaffirmed the unchanging nature of the position of principle taken by the Soviet Union with regard to United

Nations' peace-keeping operations, including the financing of those operations. The Council still must make considerable efforts to ensure full implementation of its resolutions. Furthermore, the United Nations troops should take the necessary measures to have the troops of the parties withdraw to the positions occupied at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October. The Security Council was entitled to know how the agreed instructions to that end from the Secretary-General to the Commander of UNEF had been complied with. A member of the Council had levelled criticisms against that decision of the Security Council, using the old, worn-out, notorious formula about "the two Powers". In objecting to this, he was objecting to the position of the majority of members of the Security Council, who represented the non-aligned countries in the Council. The efforts of that critic and those he represented in the Council were designed to see that there was no peace in the Middle East and that the United Nations took no part in defending justice in the interest of the victims of aggression.

282. The representative of Peru said that his delegation was gratified at the step forward that the Council had taken in implementation of its resolution 340 (1973). The armed forces of Peru would be placed at the disposal of the United Nations Emergency Force.

283. The representative of the United States said that his delegation was gratified that the Council had reached agreement on important steps in implementation of its resolution 340 (1973). It was critically important, he continued, that the Council should have an integrated, harmonious and impartial force which could carry out its duties efficiently.

284. The representative of Australia said that his delegation was glad that agreement had been reached on the fourth step in the process of setting up a United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, thus maintaining the essential momentum for its speedy emplacement.

285. The representative of Yugoslavia expressed the satisfaction of his delegation with the decision just adopted by the Council and pointed out that an effort had been made during consultations to remove all artificial obstacles concerning the composition of UNEF which, according to resolution 340 (1973), had to be established on the principle of equitable geographic distribution.

286. The representative of India said that given good will on all sides, the Council would succeed in making UNEF a really practical, effective international force. He welcomed the co-operation of the great Powers in the establishment of the Force.

287. The representative of Kenya announced that his country had decided to break off diplomatic relations with Israel. The President of Kenya had made a statement rejecting armed occupation and expressing the belief that the rupture would accelerate the implementation of the Security Council resolutions.

288. The representative of China said in a further statement that the representative of the Soviet Union had again used his worn-out language to distort the principled position taken by the Chinese delegation and to sow discord in relations between China and the non-aligned countries. But it was completely futile, because numerous countries of the third world, including many non-aligned countries, could see clearly how the Soviet Union and the other super-Power had made use of the temporary difficulties of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples, selling out their interests and vehemently contending for spheres of influence.

289. The representative of the USSR stressed that the Council had confirmed its decision on the cease-fire and the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the 22 October line, and had also instructed the Secretary-General to send an urgent telegram to the Commander of UNEF to say that he should require Israel's compliance.

290. The Secretary-General assured the Council that he would take immediately the necessary steps to implement the agreement reached by the Council on the second phase of UNEF. As for the request for the return of the Israeli forces to the 22 October line, he had dispatched the cable requested of him on 27 October to the Force Commander. It was his understanding that the official answer to this request was not expected before the Israeli Prime Minister's return from Washington.

291. The representative of Israel said that while the Council was discussing the questions of the Emergency Force, the vital humanitarian problem created by the Yom Kippur aggression remained unresolved. Referring to his letter of 29 October to the Secretary-General (S/11042), he charged Egypt and Syria with inhuman

conduct on the question of prisoners of war. The solution of that question in accordance with the Geneva Convention was a crucial test for the future.

292. The representative of Egypt charged Israel with violating the fourth Geneva Convention by attacking the civilian population of Egyptian villages. He noted with satisfaction the constructive action of the Security Council to put an end to the aggression of the Israeli forces against a State Member of the United Nations.

293. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that the composition of UNEF was not the crux of the matter. The presence of UNEF in the occupied territories would give Israel an assured opportunity to consolidate its hold over them. It was only when the people of the United States got tired of footing the bill for UNEF and aid to Israel that the leaders of Israel would come to their senses and might agree to live in peace with the Palestinians.

7. APPOINTMENT OF THE FORCE COMMANDER (CONSIDERATION AT THE 1755TH MEETING, 12 NOVEMBER 1973)

294. On 12 November the Security Council held its 1755th meeting to consider the appointment of the Commander of UNEF, and adopted the agenda listing the letter dated 8 November from the Secretary-General to the President of the Council (S/11103) regarding the matter.

295. The President stated that he had received a letter in which the Secretary-General, after recalling that he had as an interim measure appointed, with the authorization of the Council, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, as the interim Commander of UNEF, said that it was his intention, if the Council consented, to appoint General Siilasvuo as the Force Commander.

296. As there was no objection, the President was authorized to send the following reply (S/11104) to the Secretary-General:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 8 November 1973 by which you informed me of your intention to appoint General Siilasvuo, at present interim Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force, as the Force Commander, if the Security Council consents. In accordance with your request I have brought this matter to the attention of the members of the Council.

In reply, I wish to inform you that the members of the Security Council give their consent to this appointment, with the exception of the People's Republic of China which dissociates itself from it.

8. FURTHER PROGRESS REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON UNEF

297. In a further progress report on UNEF dated 4 November (S/11056/Add.2), the Secretary-General indicated that its total strength had risen to 1,004, and described the movement and deployment of the contingents. He indicated that consultations on the dispatch of additional troops were continuing with a view to implementing the Council's agreement of 2 November. In addition, pursuant to the Council's decision in resolution 340 (1973), the Force Commander had met with the Israeli Minister of Defence on 29 and 30 October to request that Israeli armed forces return to positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October. The report indicated that no reply had so far been received. On 3 November, the Commander met the Egyptian Minister of Defence. Four more meetings of Egyptian and Israeli representatives had been held at Kilometre 109, in the presence of UNEF representatives, to discuss possible withdrawals, mutual disengagement and the exchange of war prisoners.

298. In a further progress report on UNEF dated 11 November (S/11056/Add.3), the Secretary-General reported that the strength of the Force had reached 1,600 men. Advance logistic evaluation teams had been dispatched from Canada and Poland, and consultations had continued with a view to implementing the agreement adopted by the Security Council. Requests for contingents had been submitted to Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, Panama and Peru. The Force Commander had again requested the return of Israeli troops to positions occupied on 22 October in accordance with resolution 340 (1973). While no reply had been received regarding the implementation of resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), the matter was referred to in an Agreement signed on 11 November by representatives of Egypt and Israel at a meeting at Kilometre marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road under the auspices of the Force Commander.

299. The Secretary-General stated that the text of that Agreement had been transmitted to

him on 9 November by the United States (S/11091)⁷⁵ and that he had immediately instructed the Force Commander to take the necessary measures and to make available his good offices for carrying out the terms of that agreement.

300. Under the terms of the agreement: (A) Egypt and Israel agreed to observe scrupulously the cease-fire called for by the Security Council; (B) Both sides agreed that discussions between them would begin immediately to settle the question of the return to the 22 October positions in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces under the auspices of the United Nations; (C) The town of Suez would receive daily supplies of food, water and medicine. All wounded civilians in the town of Suez could be evacuated; (D) There should be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the east bank; (E) The Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road would be replaced by United Nations checkpoints. At the Suez end of the road, Israeli officers could participate with the United Nations in verifying the non-military nature of the cargo at the bank of the Canal; (F) As soon as the United Nations checkpoints were established on the Cairo-Suez road, there would be an exchange of all prisoners of war, including the wounded.

301. After signing the Agreement, which was to enter into force forthwith, the parties immediately started discussions under the auspices of the Force Commander on the modalities of its implementation.

302. In further progress reports dated 14 and 15 November (S/11056/Add.4 and 5), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that on 14 November the parties had reached an accord on the implementation of paragraphs C, D, E and F of the Agreement, and that the Force Commander had made a summing-up of that accord which had been accepted by the two parties. It provided in particular for UNEF convoys of non-military supplies to Suez City and to the Egyptian Third Army on the east bank of the Canal, the exchange of all prisoners of war and the evacuation of the wounded civilians in Suez City. The report of 15 November and a further report dated 24 November (S/11056/Add.6) indicated that UNEF was carrying out smoothly

its responsibilities under the terms of that accord.

303. With regard to the organization and composition of the logistic support elements for UNEF, the report of the Secretary-General dated 24 November indicated that, as a result of discussions between the Secretariat and the delegations of Canada and Poland, an agreement had been reached on the detailed requirements and division of tasks for the logistic support of the Force, providing a clear and practical division of responsibilities between Canada and Poland.

304. In connexion with the deployment of UNEF in the Egypt-Israel sector, Egypt, in a letter dated 7 November (S/11084), charged that Israel had prevented the Irish contingent from deploying its troops across the Suez Canal to the east bank in defiance of Security Council resolutions and decisions. In a letter dated 10 November (S/11097), Israel replied that the Irish contingent had reached its destination in the area under Israeli control on 9 November, as had been attested by a spokesman for UNEF.

305. On 23 November, the President of the Council, after consultations with all members of the Council, addressed the following letter to the Secretary-General (S/11127):

I wish to inform you that I have brought your letter of 20 November 1973, in which you stated that you had the intention of adding to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East contingents supplied by the Governments of Kenya and Senegal, to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

In reply, I wish to notify you that the members of the Security Council, with the exception of China which dissociates itself from this agreement, agree with the addition of contingents supplied by the Governments of Kenya and Senegal to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.

9. FURTHER REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE

306. The Secretary-General continued to transmit the reports on the status of the cease-fire based on information submitted by UNEF for the Egypt-Israel sector and by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO for the other sectors. Those reports, while showing a decrease in military activities, indicated some cases of artillery, tank and small arms fire. They also showed that there had been aerial activities and complaints by Egypt of Israel aerial bombardment of the Third Army on the east bank of the Canal.

⁷⁵ Doc. 188 in *ibid.*

307. In a report dated 29 October (S/11057)⁷⁶ the Secretary-General gave details of the status of the cease-fire operations being carried out by UNTSO and the deployment of the United Nations observers in their areas of operation since the establishment of UNEF. In the Egypt-Israel sector, there were now nine United Nations patrols from the Egyptian side and six from the Israeli side. UNTSO observers in that sector continued to carry out their observation duties and UNEF would have their co-operation in the fulfilment of its tasks. In the Israel-Syria sector, as a result of the readjustment of the cease-fire arrangements following the adoption of resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), UNTSO observation operations consisted of three observation posts and the Quneitra Outstation on the Israeli side, and two observation posts on the Syrian side. The remaining observation posts had been closed and eight patrols had been established: five on the Syrian side and three on the Israeli side. In the Israel-Lebanon sector the five observation posts continued to function as before.

308. Furthermore, the Secretary-General indicated that the series of reports on the status of the cease-fire issued as "supplemental information" in addenda to document S/7930 would be discontinued and future reports would be issued as addenda to S/11057.

309. The reports of the Secretary-General issued as S/11057/Add. series from 29 October until the end of December showed that military activities had lessened in all sectors following the establishment of UNEF. However, there had been many firing incidents and overflights by aircraft.

310. In the Egyptian-Israel sector the reports (S/11057/Add.1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 18, 19, 21, 26, 27, 32, 33, 36, 39, 42, 47, 48, 51, 56, 59, 62, 65, 69, 72, 75, 80, 82, 85, 87, 90, 93, 96, 97, 102, 106, 109, 112, 115, 118, 119, 122, 127, 130, 133, 136, 142, 145, 148, 151, 154, 157, 160, 163, 166, 169, 172, 175, 178, 181, 184, 186 and 189) showed frequent firing incidents involving artillery, mortar and automatic weapons, as well as aerial activity accompanied by anti-aircraft fire. During that period also the reports indicated that there had been some incidents of firing on or close to United Nations personnel and installations resulting in some injuries and some material damage.

311. In the Israel-Syria sector the reports showed a type of incident similar to those in the Egypt-Israel sector (S/11057/Add.2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 22, 24, 28, 30, 35, 37, 40, 44, 45, 50, 52, 55, 58, 61, 63, 67, 70, 73, 76, 78, 83, 88, 91, 94, 99, 100, 103, 105, 108, 110, 114, 117, 121, 123, 125, 128, 131, 135, 138, 140, 143, 146, 149, 152, 155, 158, 161, 164, 167, 170, 173, 176, 180, 182 and 187). The reports, furthermore, contained complaints by the parties of cease-fire violations.

312. In the Israel-Lebanon sector the reports (S/11057/Add.3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 17, 20, 23, 25, 29, 31, 32, 34, 38, 41, 43, 46, 49, 53, 54, 57, 60, 64, 68, 71, 74, 77, 79, 81, 84, 86, 89, 92, 95, 98, 101, 104, 107, 111, 113, 116, 120, 126, 129, 132, 134, 137, 141, 144, 147, 150, 153, 156, 159, 162, 165, 168, 171, 174, 177, 179, 183, 184 and 188) indicated that Israeli forces had repeatedly reoccupied areas around border pillars, and that there had been some firing incidents and frequent overflights of Lebanese territory by Israeli aircraft. Many of those incidents had been the subject of complaints lodged with UNTSO by Lebanon.

G. *The Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East*

1. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1760TH MEETING (15 DECEMBER 1973)

313. At the 1760th meeting held on 15 December in private, the Security Council included in its agenda the item entitled: "Arrangements for the proposed peace conference on the Middle East". The Council decided without objection to circulate the verbatim record of the meeting as an unrestricted document in accordance with rule 49 of the provisional rules of procedure and to issue a communiqué through the Secretary-General at the close of the meeting.

314. At that meeting the representative of Guinea stated that the "appropriate auspices" mentioned in paragraph 3 of resolution 338 (1973) were clearly those of the United Nations. It was because of the constant respect for the role of the Security Council and the responsibility incumbent upon that body that 10 non-permanent members of the Council (Australia, Austria, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia) had submitted draft resolution S/11156 which she introduced and which read as follows:

⁷⁶ Doc. 15 in *ibid.*

The Security Council,

Considering that it has decided by its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 that talks among the parties to the Middle East conflict for the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 should be held under appropriate auspices,

Noting that a peace conference on the Middle East situation is to begin shortly at Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations,

1. *Expresses the hope* that the Peace Conference will make speedy progress towards the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East;

2. *Expresses its confidence* that the Secretary-General will play a full and effective role at the Conference, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and that he will preside over its proceedings, if the parties so desire;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council suitably informed of the developments in negotiations at the Conference, in order to enable it to review the problems on a continuing basis;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance and facilities for the work of the Conference.

Decision: *At its 1760th meeting, on 15 December 1973, the 10-Power draft resolution (S/11156) was adopted by a vote of 10 to none, with 4 abstentions (France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America), as resolution 344 (1973).⁷⁷ One member (China) did not participate in the vote.*

315. Following the vote, the representative of France said that before the inauguration of the Geneva Conference, a link must be established between the negotiations and the Security Council. Similarly, the terms of the participation of the Secretary-General in the Conference should be clear and precise. In those respects, the draft resolution just adopted was not sufficiently clear. Consequently, his delegation had abstained in the vote.

316. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he fully supported the provisions of the resolution which the Council has just adopted. However, he had preferred to withhold his vote until the two co-sponsors of resolution 338 (1973) were in a position to endorse the resolution just adopted.

317. The representative of the United States said that although negotiations regarding invitations to the Geneva Conference were still pro-

ceeding, there were several problems still remaining. For that reason he had not been authorized to support the resolution at that time, and therefore had abstained. He said that his delegation had already made clear in informal consultations that the United States envisaged that the Secretary-General would preside at the opening session of the Conference and that his representative would be there continuously: in other words, that there would be full involvement of the Secretary-General in the Peace Conference proceedings, as there should be and as had been outlined in the resolution just adopted.

318. The President, speaking as the representative of China, said that his delegation had always opposed any attempt of the two super-Powers to make behind-the-scenes deals at the expense of the interests of the Arab and Palestinian peoples. The Chinese delegation, which had stated its position when the Council adopted resolution 338 (1973), could not accept the present draft resolution which was derived from resolution 338 (1973), and consequently had decided to dissociate itself from the resolution just adopted.

319. The representative of the USSR said that he was speaking in exercise of his right of reply in connexion with a statement of the Chinese representative containing fantastic inventions about some non-existent plot in the Middle East designed, as he saw it, against the interests of the Arab peoples. The best possible answer to the Chinese representative was provided by a quotation from a statement issued at the recent meeting of the Heads of Arab States in Algiers, which said:

With pride we note the whole-hearted political support and military and economic assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to the Arab States in their just struggle for the liberation of occupied Arab territories and the restoration of the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

320. The representative of China said in a further statement that facts spoke louder than words. Members of the Council and the United Nations, and the peoples of all countries, had drawn the proper conclusion from the course of the Israeli-Zionist aggression against the Arab and Palestinian peoples in the Middle East in recent years and from the actual deeds of the two super-Powers, the Soviet Union and the United

⁷⁷ Doc. 39 in *ibid.*

States.

321. In accordance with rule 55 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General issued an official communiqué approved by the Council at the close of the 1760th meeting (S/11159).

322. In a letter dated 18 December (S/11161)⁷⁸ the Secretary-General transmitted to the Council identical letters from the USSR and the United States indicating that they had been informed by the parties concerned of their readiness to participate in the Peace Conference, which would begin at Geneva on 21 December, to be convened by the Secretary-General under the auspices of the United Nations and under the co-chairmanship of the USSR and the United States. They hoped that the Secretary-General would serve as convener and preside in the opening phase and that he would have a representative to keep him informed as the Conference proceeded. They felt that it would be appropriate to secure a favourable consensus of the Council. In his letter of transmittal, the Secretary-General indicated his intention to proceed on the basis of the two letters.

323. On 19 December the President of the Security Council addressed the following letter (S/11162) to the Secretary-General:

I have been requested by the members of the Security Council to inform you, in response to your letter dated 18 December 1973 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11161), that they have taken note of your letter and the documents attached to it, which they consider to be in accordance with resolution 344 (1973) adopted without opposition by the Security Council on 15 December 1973.

I have been informed by the French delegation that it reaffirms the reservations it expressed at the Security Council meeting of 15 December which led it to abstain in the vote on resolution 344 (1973).

The Chinese delegation, in conformity with its position taken on resolution 338 (1973) and resolution 344 (1973), dissociates itself from what has been mentioned in the first paragraph.

2. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

324. In a report issued on 24 December (S/11169)⁷⁹ in pursuance of resolution 344 (1973), the Secretary-General stated that on 21 December

he had convened the Peace Conference on the Middle East in Geneva at which Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the USSR and the United States had been represented. Following two public sessions and one closed session, the Secretary-General summed up the conclusions of the Conference by stating that a consensus had been reached to continue its work through the setting up of a military working group, which would discuss the question of disengagement of forces. Other working groups which it might wish to establish would report to the Conference, which was to continue meeting at the ambassadorial level, and would reconvene at the foreign minister's level as needed.

325. The Secretary-General's report included the text of the statement he had made at the opening of the Peace Conference at Geneva, in which he expressed his gratification that that unique and historic event was taking place under the auspices of the United Nations, which had been seized of the various aspects of the conflict for more than a quarter of a century, and had devoted an immense amount of time and effort both to keeping the peace and to the search for a just and lasting settlement. While no one present underestimated the difficulties of the task ahead, the very fact of the Conference and the willingness of the Governments concerned to respond to the new effort to find a just and lasting settlement were a source of encouragement and hope for all mankind. The Secretary-General expressed confidence that the participants would not fail to seize the opportunity to build a lasting structure of peace in the area, as it was an opportunity which might not recur for a very long time.

H. *Developments after January 1974*

1. FURTHER PROGRESS REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON UNEF

326. In a further progress report on UNEF dated 11 January 1974 (S/11056/Add.7 and Corr.1) the Secretary-General outlined the efforts made to implement paragraph B of the Agreement on 11 November 1973 (S/11056/Add.3, annex). Bilateral discussions in November under the auspices of General Siilasvuo at Kilometre 101 on the Cairo-Suez road had not achieved concrete results. The discussions had continued under General Siilasvuo's chairmanship in the Military Working Group established by the Peace Conference on

⁷⁸ Doc. 215 in *ibid.*

⁷⁹ Doc. 16 in *ibid.*

the Middle East, which had held meetings from 26 December 1973 to 9 January 1974. The Secretary-General warned that the situation in the Suez Canal sector, with troops of both parties deployed in close confrontation on both sides of the Canal, was unstable and potentially explosive. Conditions in the area made it difficult for UNEF to interpose its troops effectively; hence the importance of efforts to achieve a disengagement of forces.

2. AGREEMENT ON THE DISENGAGEMENT OF EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES OF 18 JANUARY 1974

327. By a letter dated 18 January (S/11198 and Add.1), the Secretary-General informed the President of the Council that on that day, at a meeting held at Kilometre 101 on the Cairo-Suez road, an Agreement on the Disengagement of Forces in pursuance of the Geneva Peace Conference had been signed by the Chief of Staff of Egyptian Armed Forces and the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces, as well as by the Force Commander as witness.⁸⁰ Under its terms, Egypt and Israel committed themselves to observe scrupulously on land, sea and air the cease-fire called for by the Security Council and to refrain from all military and para-military actions against each other. The Agreement provided for the separation of the Egyptian and Israeli forces according to zones and lines contained in a map, forwarded separately, and the establishment between the two forces of a zone of disengagement in which UNEF would be stationed. It also provided that armaments and forces would be limited in the area between the Egyptian line and the Suez Canal, as well as in the area between the Israeli line and the line which runs along the western base of the mountains where the Gidi and Mitla passes were located. Furthermore, those limitations would be inspected by UNEF. The detailed implementation of the disengagement would be worked out by military representatives of Egypt and Israel, who would agree on the stages of the process, which would be completed in not more than 40 days after it had begun. The Agreement, which was not regarded by both parties as a final peace agreement, constituted a first step towards a final, just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council resolution 338 (1973) and within

the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East.

328. In a further progress report of 24 January (S/11056/Add.8), the Secretary-General stated that, in pursuance of the Agreement on the Disengagement of Forces reached on 18 January, further meetings held under the chairmanship of the Force Commander had resulted, on 24 January, in the parties signing maps representing the different phases of disengagement and a timetable for action. On 28 January (S/11056/Add.9), the Secretary-General stated that the implementation of the Agreement had begun on 25 January with the redeployment of forces of the parties in accordance with the agreed plan and the hand-over to UNEF by Israeli forces of the areas involved. As a result of the disengagement of forces, the Secretary-General added, the supply convoys to Suez city had been discontinued but those going to the east bank of the Canal were to continue until 30 January. At the request of the two parties and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNEF had given its assistance in the operation of the recovery of bodies of soldiers killed during the hostilities in the Suez Canal area.

329. In further progress reports of UNEF dated 4, 12 and 21 February and 4 March (S/11056/Add.10-13), the Secretary-General indicated that the redeployment of the forces had proceeded smoothly without incident, while UNEF forces had been interposed and had begun patrolling the UNEF zone of disengagement as well as inspecting the areas limited in armaments and forces. Thus, by 4 March, the disengagement process begun on 25 January had been completed. In accordance with the Agreement, the exchange of prisoners of war had taken place by stages and had been completed on 25 February in the presence of UNEF officers and representatives of the ICRC.

330. On 16 March, a further progress report on UNEF (S/11056/Add.14) indicated that the strength of UNEF, which on 20 February had reached 6,973 men, had been reduced to 6,814 as a result of the repatriation of elements of a Peruvian battalion, which had not been subsequently replaced. Elements of six contingents of UNEF were deployed in the UNEF zone of disengagement and elements of three more contingents would be deployed in the zone shortly.

⁸⁰ Doc. 50 below.

331. The activities which had thus far been carried out by UNEF with the co-operation of UNTSO included the survey and marking of the lines defining the zone of disengagement, the supervision of the cease-fire and the implementation of the disengagement of forces, the inspection of the areas of limited armaments and forces, the search for mortal remains, the hand-over of civilians and mine-clearing operations carried out in co-operation with the parties.

3. APPOINTMENT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF UNTSO

332. By a note dated 11 February (S/11214) the President of the Council stated that the Secretary-General had on 9 January asked him to bring to the attention of its members his intention to appoint Major-General Bengt Liljestrand, of Sweden, Chief of Staff of UNTSO as of 1 April, to replace Major-General Siilasvuo, who had been appointed Commander of UNEF on 25 November 1973. In the interim, Colonel R. W. Bunworth, of Ireland, would serve as Acting Chief of Staff until the new Chief of Staff took over on 1 April 1974. The President of the Council informed the Secretary-General on 5 February that the Council had taken note of his letter of 9 January and would have no objection to the appointment of Major-General Liljestrand as Chief of Staff of UNTSO. The delegation of China dissociated itself from the matter.

4. STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AFTER JANUARY 1974

(a) *Reports of the Secretary-General, communications by the parties and request for a meeting*

333. In the first months of 1974 the Secretary-General continued to circulate further reports based on information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO with regard to the status of the cease-fire in the Israel-Lebanon and Israel-Syria sectors, and from the headquarters of UNTSO and UNEF with regard to the situation in the Egypt-Israel sector.

334. In those reports concerning the Egypt-Israel sector, the Secretary-General said that UNEF patrols had reported frequent firing incidents involving artillery, machine-guns and mortars, as well as aerial activities and anti-aircraft fire (S/11057/Add.192, 195, 198, 199, 201, 204, 207, 208, 212, 215, 218, 219, 222, 225, 228, 231, 232, 234, 235, 238, 241, 243, 245, 247, 249, 251,

253, 257, 258, 263, 266, 269, 272, 275, 278, 280, 283, 286, 296, 312).

335. From about the time the Agreement on Disengagement of Forces was reached on 18 January, the reports showed a marked decrease in activity, and the situation was described as remaining calm with the exception of a few sporadic and isolated firing incidents. They also indicated that the operations for the disengagement of forces were proceeding without significant incident. Furthermore, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, UNEF was proceeding with the search for the bodies of those killed during the October hostilities. By early February the reports showed almost no incidents, and after 7 February no reports were received on the situation there.

336. In the Israel-Syria sector there was a continuous pattern of incidents, on which the Chief of Staff of UNTSO submitted daily reports (S/11057/Add.190, 193, 196, 202, 205, 210, 213, 216, 221, 224, 226, 230, 237, 240, 254, 255, 259, 261, 264, 267, 271, 273, 277, 281, 284, 287, 288, 291, 292, 294, 298, 300, 302, 304, 306, 308, 310, 313, 315, 317, 319, 321, 323, 328, 330, 332, 334, 338, 341, 343, 345, 348, 350 and 353). Those incidents involved the use of artillery, mortar and automatic weapons, as well as occasional air activity in the sector consisting of flights by Syrian and Israeli aircraft over the territory of the other party. As the reports indicated, both parties frequently submitted complaints of cease-fire violations. Furthermore, the observers from time to time proposed cease-fires to the parties concerned and this occasionally resulted in a temporary cessation of firing, which resumed shortly thereafter. Incidents of firing on or close to United Nations personnel and installations were also reported, and on a few occasions there were light injuries to personnel and damage to United Nations installations and properties.

337. From early March until about the end of May, the situation in the sector became increasingly tense. The reports (S/11057/Add.356, 357, 360, 362, 363, 365, 366, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 377, 378, 379, 380, 382, 383, 384, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 403, 406, 407, 411, 412, 414, 416, 418, 420, 423, 426, 428, 429, 431, 433, 435, 437, 439, 441, 443, 445, 448, 450, 454, 456, 458, 460, 462, 464, 466, 468, 470, 472, 474, 476, 478, 480, 482, 484, 486, 488, 490, 492, 494, 496, 498, 500,

502 and 504) indicated markedly intensified and more frequent firing of longer duration which involved the use of artillery, tanks and rockets. On 20 March (S/11057/Add.369), the Secretary-General expressed his concern at the deterioration of the situation and appealed to the parties concerned to exercise the utmost restraint and strictly to observe the cease-fire.

338. However, in a report dated 1 June (S/11057/Add.504) issued one day following the signing at Geneva of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces,⁸¹ the Chief of Staff reported that all firing had ceased in the Israel-Syria sector as of 1109 (GMT) on 31 May. Therefore no further reports were issued on violations of the cease-fire in the Israel-Syria sector, during the period under review.

339. In the Israel-Lebanon sector, the reports of the Chief of Staff (S/11057/Add.191, 194, 197, 200, 203, 206, 209, 211, 214, 217, 220, 223, 227, 229, 233, 236, 239, 242, 244, 246, 248, 250, 252, 256, 260, 262, 265, 268, 270, 274, 276, 279, 282, 285, 289, 290, 293, 295, 297, 299, 301, 303, 305, 307, 309, 311, 314, 316, 318, 320, 322, 324, 325, 326, 327, 329, 331, 333, 335, 336, 337, 339, 340, 342, 344, 346, 347, 349, 351, 352, 354, 355, 358, 359, 361, 364, 367, 376, 381, 385, 386 and 396) indicated frequent border crossing by Israeli forces and occupation of some posts near the Armistice Demarcation Line. They showed also some artillery fire and frequent overflights of Lebanese territory by Israeli aircraft.

340. In a letter dated 11 April (S/11259), Israel complained that a group of terrorists had crossed the Lebanese border to the village of Kiryat Shmona on Israel territory and massacred 18 of its inhabitants, including 8 children and 5 women, and wounded 15 other persons. It said that responsibility for that slaughter had been acknowledged in Beirut by the terrorist organization known as the "Popular Front—General Command", and asserted that Lebanon, where terrorist organizations enjoyed freedom of movement and operation, must bear full responsibility for a situation that permitted terrorist attacks to be carried out from its territory against Israel.

341. On the following day, Lebanon replied (S/11263) that the United Nations observers' reports had not indicated any infiltration from

Lebanon to Israel during that week and that Israel had not produced any evidence to substantiate its allegation. No infiltration whatsoever had taken place from Lebanon into Israel, and the Lebanese Army was taking measures to prevent any infiltration. The Palestine Liberation Organization had affirmed that it was conducting its resistance movement with elements stationed in Israel. Accordingly, Lebanon could not be held responsible for actions of non-Lebanese operating outside Lebanon, and in particular for actions of Palestinians in Israel or elsewhere.

342. On 13 April the Chief of Staff reported (S/11057/Add.402) that in addition to the recurrent incursions near the border, there had been artillery fire by Israeli forces across the Armistice Demarcation Line and flights by its jet aircraft over Lebanese territory. Furthermore, the Chief of Staff reported that he had received complaints from Lebanon alleging that on 12–13 April Israeli forces commandos had infiltrated into Lebanese territory and demolished a number of houses in several villages. Lebanon had requested an inquiry on those incursions. On 14 April, the Chief of Staff reported that the observers' investigation had shown that several houses had been destroyed in several villages. In addition, two women had apparently been killed as a result of an explosion (S/11057/Add.404).

343. On 13 April, Lebanon requested (S/11264) an urgent meeting of the Security Council, stating that as a result of Israel's aggression against six Lebanese villages, two civilians had been killed, others wounded and 13 civilians kidnapped. Israeli forces had also destroyed 31 houses in those villages.

(b) *Consideration of the 1766th to 1769th meetings (15–24 April 1974)*

344. At the 1766th meeting on 15 April, the provisional agenda listing the letter of Lebanon (S/11269) was adopted. The representatives of Lebanon and Israel, as well as the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, Egypt and subsequently those of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were invited, at their requests, to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

345. The representative of Lebanon said that on the night of 12–13 April the Israel regular armed forces had attacked six Lebanese frontier villages inhabited solely by civilians. The attacks

⁸¹ Doc. 115 below.

had been carried out under the pretext that the assailants responsible for the Kiryat Shmona incident had come from Lebanon. Lebanon deplored any acts of violence wherever they might occur, but it could not be held responsible for acts committed beyond its borders by elements that were completely outside its control. The Israeli Government had behaved in an identical fashion in the past, immediately after the events that had taken place in Athens, in Munich, in Lod and elsewhere. In attacking six Lebanese villages on 12 and 13 April, Israel had committed a premeditated and obvious act of aggression. Referring to the Council's previous resolutions condemning Israel, the Lebanese representative said that his Government expected that the Security Council would adopt the necessary measures to ensure their application.

346. The representative of Israel said that in recent years Lebanon had become a principal centre for Arab terrorist operations, from which terror attacks had been continuously carried out against Israel. On 11 April, a group of terrorists had crossed the Israel-Lebanon frontier and had massacred 18 persons in Kiryat Shmona, including 8 children and 5 women. Statements made by the leaders of an Arab terrorist movement in Beirut had verified that fact. As long as the Lebanese Government harboured these murder organizations on its territory and tolerated their headquarters in Beirut, it was obvious that its neighbours would treat it accordingly. On 11/12 April, Israel had dynamited 20 empty houses of known collaborators with the terrorists. Israel had come before the Council to accuse the Lebanese Government and all others which harboured, assisted and co-operated with Arab terrorist organizations and to point out that they would not be absolved of their obligation to prevent armed attacks against Israel.

347. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that the question before the Security Council was that of State terrorism practised by Israel, which was fundamentally distinct from acts of individual violence. The Israeli attack on Lebanon was a criminal act in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, the resolutions of the Security Council, the Geneva Convention and the fundamental principles of international law and human rights. The Security Council should condemn such acts and take the measures necessary to prevent a repetition of them.

348. The representative of Egypt said that the acts of the Palestinian movements could not be evaluated in isolation from their plight. There would be no more incidents like that at Kiryat Shmona and no more bloodshed only when Israel indicated a genuine will to recognize the Palestinians, to restore their legitimate rights, and to evacuate the occupied Arab territories. In violation of the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, Israel had committed a series of acts of State terrorism. Israel's latest aggression against Lebanon, coupled with the escalation of its military operations on the Syrian front, would have directly adverse consequences on the chances of peace in the Middle East. If Israel would choose peace instead of war, then it must stop forthwith all irresponsible actions.

349. The representative of Kuwait said that the recent Israeli aggression against Lebanon was a violation of the territorial integrity of Lebanon, contrary to established international obligations including the United Nations Charter. Lebanon was not responsible for acts which had taken place in territories under Israeli control, nor was it responsible for the consequences of Israel's having deprived the Palestinian people of their rights. The Council should not only condemn Israel and reject the Israeli pretext for justifying its action, but must implement the warnings it had already issued.

350. The representative of Israel charged that Syria had encouraged and supplied money and arms to terrorist organizations, including the one responsible for the Kiryat Shmona massacre. He said that Syria and its capital were centres of other terrorist organizations as well.

351. The representative of Saudi Arabia pointed out that 300,000 Palestinians lived in Lebanon and that the Government could not suppress them without provoking civil war. He stated that Israel would have to give up its policy of expansion and exclusiveness in order to live peacefully with neighbouring Arabs.

352. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that, contrary to the claims by the Israeli representative, Israel had been persistently violating the Security Council resolutions calling for an immediate cease-fire and the return of forces to positions occupied on 22 October. It was a fact that Israel had followed a policy of intimidation and aggression designed to force the

Syrian Government to accept its point of view on the disengagement of forces in such a way as to perpetuate its occupation of the Golan Heights.

353. At the 1767th meeting on 16 April, the representative of the USSR said that the Israeli extremists were trying, by means of terror, which had been elevated to the status of State policy, to achieve the fulfilment of their annexationist plans in flagrant violation of the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by means of war or the use of force. The Government of Israel, as was demonstrated by its official armed intrusion into Lebanon, was still defying the Security Council and violating its decisions. The USSR opposed the idea that terrorist actions by individual, irresponsible persons should be used by aggressor States to justify a policy of aggression and the practice of terrorism carried out, as by Israel, as part of State policy. The Security Council had categorically condemned attempts by Israel to justify its aggression by reference to what it called "reprisals". The Security Council should take effective measures to call a halt to acts of aggression by the Israeli militarists. On 11 April, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Brezhnev, had stated that the Middle East situation was still explosive and could not be otherwise so long as there was a continuation of the occupation of Arab lands. The danger lay in the fact that with a certain reduction of tension, the aggressor and its protectors could once again attempt to avoid a radical all-embracing solution of the problem by means of ersatz plans for a Middle East settlement.

354. The representative of Mauritania said that it was Israel, not Lebanon, that was truly responsible for the acts of despair committed by the Palestinian people. The Israeli attack of 12-13 April on Lebanon had been an act of State banditry that could not be justified under any pretext. He was certain that the Council would adopt the measures dictated by the gravity of that act of political banditry, and would compel violence to bow to the rule of law.

355. The representative of China said that the Chinese Government and people had always supported the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in their just struggles to oppose zionism and hegemonism, to recover their lost territories and to regain their national rights. His delegation held

that the Council should sternly condemn the Israeli aggression, demand that Israel stop all aggressive acts and firmly support the just demand of the Lebanese Government and people in resisting aggression and safeguarding their national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

356. The representative of Indonesia said that while his delegation condemned all acts of violence and terrorism, State terrorism by Israel was more intolerable than those acts of violence committed by the desperate and frustrated Palestinian people. Israel's action was a grave violation of the principles of the Charter and would lead only to lawlessness in international relations. His delegation urged the Council to take the adequate and effective steps referred to in resolution 280 (1970) to prevent a recurrence of such acts of official terrorism.

357. The representative of the United Republic of Cameroon said that his delegation condemned Israel's acts of barbarism, particularly because they had been aimed against a friendly and peace-loving country, because they might jeopardize the slim chances for peace in the area, and because the attack had been incommensurate with the pretext invoked to justify it. His delegation was ready to support any initiative by the Council directed not only to the recent Israeli attack against Lebanon but also to the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

358. The representative of the United Kingdom deplored all acts of violence and terrorism in the Middle East, and condemned the brutal and vicious action that had occurred at Kiryat Shmona. His delegation, however, considered that a government-organized operation into the territory of another State in retaliation could not be justified under the Charter. It was the duty of the Council and the United Nations to do all in their power to prevent a new spiral of violence, of terrorism and retaliation from dashing the hopes for peace in the Middle East. In the present circumstances, the Arab peoples should refrain from expressing their indignation in deeds, and Israel should exercise restraint towards its neighbours.

359. The representative of France said that his Government condemned such acts of violence as that carried out by the Palestinian commando group at Kiryat Shmona, but also condemned the raids and reprisals undertaken by Israeli forces on Lebanese soil. The acts of more or less uncontrolled groups could not be equated with those

of a Government. His delegation considered that the Council should denounce all acts of violence, regardless of their origin or reason. The Council should also appeal to all parties to refrain from any act that might jeopardize the hopes that the international community had placed on the negotiations then under way.

360. At the 1768th meeting on 18 April, the representative of Peru said that his delegation could not agree that the incident of Kiryat Shmona justified the Israeli action. The Lebanese citizens captured by Israel must be returned and Israel must reverse its presumed intention to repeat such futile attacks against Lebanon. His delegation was ready to support any action by the Council to put an end to the situation.

361. The representative of Austria said that his delegation deplored the recent instance of violation of Lebanon's territorial sovereignty and integrity, and condemned all other acts of violence, which could not be justified by any political aim. It was essential to break the dreadful spiral of terrorism and reprisal. The Council must do everything to prevent these events from gaining momentum and escalating further.

362. The representative of the Byelorussian SSR said that his delegation firmly opposed the pursuit by Israel of a policy of State terror, as well as terrorist actions which had tragic consequences and harmed innocent victims. In spite of the progress made towards peace in the Middle East, Israel still continued its policy of aggression. The Security Council must take effective measures to call a halt to the acts of piracy and aggression on the part of the Israeli militarists.

363. The representative of Australia said that his Government had repeatedly expressed its sympathy and concern over the situation of the Palestinian refugees, and it fully recognized that there could be no lasting peace in the Middle East unless proper justice was done to them. But his delegation believed that they had done no service to their cause by acting on the scale of savagery of their assault on the innocent people of Kiryat Shmona. By its retaliatory action against Lebanese border villages, Israel had laid itself open to censure. The Council must condemn all acts of violence and reprisal, which could only exacerbate tensions and threaten the precarious progress made towards a settlement over the past few months.

364. The President of the Council, speaking as the representative of Iraq, said that Lebanon, with its limited security forces, could not be held responsible for the incident of Kiryat Shmona, whether or not the three attackers had in fact come from Lebanon. Only restitution of Palestinian rights would end the violence and bloodshed, war and destruction in the Middle East. Referring to a number of acts of terrorism committed by Zionist terrorists since 1940, the Iraqi representative said it was time for the Council to stop issuing warnings to Israel and to decide upon adequate steps to bring about a decisive end to the cycle of violence in the Middle East.

365. The representative of Lebanon emphasized that his delegation demanded that the 13 persons abducted by Israel be returned immediately to Lebanon.

366. At the 1769th meeting on 24 April, the Council had before it the following draft resolution (S/11275) which had emerged from consultations among members of the Council.
[Draft adopted as resolution 347 printed as doc. 31 below.]

367. The representative of Costa Rica said that his delegation deplored the violent events which once again had emerged in the Middle East, and lamented the atrocities of the criminal terrorist acts of Kiryat Shmona. But his delegation was completely in disagreement with reprisal actions undertaken by Israel in violation of the sovereignty of Lebanon. If the Security Council was to adopt any declaration, it should include both a warning to Israel about its incursion into Lebanon and consideration of the terrorist acts of Kiryat Shmona which had led to that action. Nothing should be done to decrease the chances of a dialogue among the parties involved.

368. The representative of Israel said that the draft resolution before the Council was another example of the bias and inequity that prevailed in Council debates on the Middle East, as it did not even mention the massacre of Kiryat Shmona. Israel would continue to hold the Lebanese Government responsible for any armed attacks organized in or perpetrated from Lebanon.

369. The representative of the United States said that in order that the draft resolution (S/11275) might command widespread positive support in the Council, his delegation proposed that paragraph 2 should be amended to read:

"Condemns all acts of violence; especially those which, as at Kiryat Shmona, result in the tragic loss of innocent civilian life, and urges all concerned to refrain from any further acts of violence."

370. The representative of Mauritania said his delegation was against the amendment of the United States for the reason that any reference to Kiryat Shmona would entail the presence of a party other than Lebanon and Israel, and the hearing of that party by the Council.

Decision: *At the 1769th meeting on 24 April 1974, the oral amendment proposed by the United States was put to the vote and rejected by 6 votes in favour (Australia, Austria, Costa Rica, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America) to 7 against, with 2 abstentions (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).*

371. The representative of China expressed support for the following aspects of the draft resolution: condemning Israel's violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and calling on Israel to stop its military actions and threats and to return the abducted Lebanese civilians. At the same time, he pointed out that the draft contained very harmful aspects. It called on "all parties to refrain from any action which might endanger negotiations aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East"; but the crux of the Middle East question lay in the two super-Powers' contention for oil resources and important strategic points and for hegemony there. In advocating a so-called "just and lasting peace in the Middle East", the super-Powers, who were concerned about their needs in contending for hegemony, spread illusions about peace and lulled the fighting will of the Arab and Palestinian peoples. The wording in the draft would also mean asking the Palestinian and Arab peoples to submit to the manipulation of the two super-Powers and forbidding them to take any action of resistance in self-defence. For those reasons, his delegation had decided not to participate in the voting on the draft resolution (S/11275).

372. The representative of Mauritania said that his delegation understood the provisions of operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution as being solely addressed to Israel. Accordingly, his delegation had decided to support the draft resolution.

Decision: *At the 1769th meeting on 24 April*

1974, the draft resolution (S/11275) was adopted by 13 votes to none as resolution 347 (1973). Two members (China and Iraq) did not participate in the vote.

373. In explanation of vote, the representative of the United States said that his Government pledged to continue its efforts to move the parties towards peace. While regretting that its amendment to refer expressly to Kiryat Shmona had not received the necessary support in the Council, his delegation believed that the resolution just adopted did condemn all violence whatever its origin; including the tragedy at Kiryat Shmona.

374. The representative of Indonesia said that although his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution, it considered that the Council should not treat acts of violence committed by desperate and frustrated victims of aggression equally with acts of aggression committed by a country as part of its official policy.

375. The representative of the USSR said that the resolution just adopted by the Council was insufficiently strong and effective. His delegation, however, had supported the resolution because it was acceptable to Lebanon. The position of the genuinely Socialist countries on the Middle East question had been set forth in the official document adopted on 17/18 April 1974 in Warsaw at the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of States Members of the Warsaw Pact. The statement said that the Middle East remained a dangerous breeding ground of international tension. Israel refused to implement United Nations resolutions requesting it to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories. Continuation of the work of the important Peace Conference on the Middle East in Geneva should lead to the solution of the key problems of a Middle East settlement, i.e. withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab lands, ensuring the legitimate rights of the Arab people in Palestine, and guaranteeing the security, integrity, and sovereignty of all States of the area. The agreement on disengagement of troops was the first, preliminary step towards a general settlement; and this must be followed without failure by other steps aimed at implementing all the provisions of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). The position of UNEF was making a positive contribution to the maintenance of peace in the area.

376. The representative of the United Republic of Cameroon said that his delegation interpreted

operative paragraph 2 of the resolution as an expression of compassion by the Council for the innocent civilians who had been killed in the events discussed by the Council, but not condemnation of the political activities of liberation.

377. The President, speaking as the representative of Iraq, said that his delegation had refrained from voting on the draft resolution, because a mere condemnation of Israel did not by itself constitute a sufficient deterrent to Israeli aggression. Furthermore, the resolution implied an attempt to view individual acts of violence on the same level as premeditated acts of aggression by one Member State against another. As for the negotiations and diplomatic efforts in the Middle East referred to in the resolution, his Government continued to reserve its position.

378. The representative of Lebanon said that he wondered whether the condemnations expressed in the resolution were sufficient because past condemnations by the Council had not yielded any positive results. The resolution, among other things, called on Israel promptly to release and return to Lebanon the abducted Lebanese civilians. His delegation took it that the Council wished Israel to do so at the earliest possible moment.

(c) *Subsequent communications and reports of the Secretary-General*

379. By letters dated 15 and 17 May (S/11287 and S/11288), the representative of the United States transmitted the texts of statements by the United States Secretary of State and its Permanent Representative to the United Nations, as well as a resolution adopted by the Senate, regarding the killings of innocent persons in Ma'alot and the retaliatory Israeli air attacks which had led to new killings in southern Lebanon. The statements expressed outrage, condemned the cycle of violence which could well undermine the search for peace in the Middle East, and called on all parties to redouble their efforts to secure a just and lasting peace.

380. In a letter dated 17 May (S/11289 and Corr.1), Lebanon charged that the Israeli air force had attacked several Lebanese towns, villages and Palestinian refugee camps, killing over 40 people and wounding over 180, in addition to destroying 41 houses. Lebanon charged that following the tragic developments at Ma'alot,

Israel had sought a scapegoat for an act committed by three Palestinians operating from within Israel and had once again launched an attack against innocent Palestinians living in refugee camps.

381. On the following day and on 22 May, Israel charged in reply (S/11290 and S/11295) that the latest atrocity planned, organized and carried out from Lebanon against Israel had been the massacre at Ma'alot in which 21 school boys and girls had been murdered and another 70 wounded. Israel had taken action against terror organizations located in Lebanon, including the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which had declared its responsibility for the massacre. It considered that responsibility for the results of such action fell squarely on Lebanon, which continued to make it possible for acts of terror to be directed against Israel and its citizens.

382. During the first half of June, the Secretary-General received further communications (S/11309, S/11314 and S/11319 and Corr.1) from Israel charging that Lebanon was continuing to serve as a base for murder and sabotage activities against Israel, and indicating that there had been further clashes in Israeli territory with terrorists who had penetrated from Lebanon.

383. During the month of April and up to 15 June, the Secretary-General continued, on the basis of information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/11057/Add.404, 405, 408-410, 413, 415, 417, 419, 421, 422, 424, 425, 427, 430, 432, 434, 436, 438, 440, 442, 444, 446, 449, 451, 453, 455, 457, 459, 461, 463, 465, 467, 469, 471, 473, 475, 477, 479, 481, 483, 485, 487, 489, 491, 493, 495, 497, 499, 501, 503, 505 and 506-513) to report the persistence of incidents of overflights by Israeli planes and commando penetration of Lebanese territory, in addition to artillery fire from Israeli territory and occasional exchanges of fire on both sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line. However, in early June he noted (S/11057/Add.514) that the level of incidents had markedly decreased compared to the situation in May.

I. *Extension of the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force*

1. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATED 1 APRIL 1974

384. As the six-month mandate of UNEF was due to expire in April 1974, the Secretary-General

submitted a comprehensive report (S/11248) on the operation of the Force from its inception on 26 October 1973 until 1 April 1974.⁸²

385. After recalling the terms of reference of the Force and describing its establishment and current composition, the Secretary-General reviewed the activities described in the progress reports on UNEF he had issued over the previous five months. During that period UNEF had suffered four fatal casualties (two from accidents and two from other causes) and 15 injured as a result of explosions. The activities of the Force had included, at various stages, supervision of the observance of the cease-fire and of the Disengagement Agreement, assistance to the parties in negotiations and in implementing agreements, humanitarian activities and co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross in connexion with the exchange of prisoners of war, the transfer of civilians and the search for mortal remains, the convoy of non-military supplies to the city of Suez and to Egyptian forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal, and co-operation with UNTSO.

386. One of the remaining problems facing the Force and one which called for immediate solution was related to restrictions on the freedom of movement of personnel of certain contingents. The Secretary-General affirmed his consistent position that UNEF had to function as an integrated and efficient military unit, contingents of which served on an equal basis, and that no differentiation could be made regarding the United Nations status of the various contingents. He indicated that the matter was being pursued and that he would continue to exert every effort to solve it in a satisfactory way.

387. Another problem cited by the Secretary-General was that concerning the rate of reimbursement to contributing Governments for the costs incurred by them as a result of supplying troops to the United Nations. The matter was also being given his close attention.

388. In connexion with the financial aspects of the matter, the Secretary-General recalled that, by resolution 3101 (XXVIII), the General Assembly had appropriated \$30 million for the initial period of UNEF's operation, on the basis of his very approximate initial cost estimates, and

had given him the financial authority to carry on the operation if the Council should extend the mandate of the Force. While there had been a number of unexpected expenses, including the cost of supplies and equipment for some contingents and of substantial portions of logistic support, as well as increased prices for some supplies, there had been some offsetting savings as a result of the gradual rate of build-up of the Forces. Moreover, consultations in progress with respect to standardized costs and a reimbursement ceiling would also have a bearing on the total cost of the Force, which would be made available in greater detail for submission to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session for review and approval. It was estimated that the Force would cost more than \$5 million per month period, owing to new expenses such as those for rotation of contingents, unanticipated expenditures for heavy logistical equipment and continuing cost increases for supplies.

389. Having reviewed those aspects of UNEF's activities, the Secretary-General observed that the establishment of the Force in October 1973 had been a milestone in the history of the United Nations and had served to defuse a highly explosive situation, which otherwise could well have had major consequences for world peace. After stressing the effectiveness of the Force, as witnessed by the quiet then prevailing in the Egypt-Israel sector, he remarked that the broad geographical basis of the Force was an important feature which was highly encouraging for the future.

390. The Secretary-General then cautioned that as the disengagement of forces was only a first step towards the settlement of the Middle East problem, the situation remained unstable and potentially dangerous. The continued operation of UNEF was essential not only to maintain the existing quiet in the Egypt-Israel sector, but also to assist in further efforts for the establishment of a just and durable peace in the area. Consequently, he considered it necessary to recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNEF for another period of six months. Having made that recommendation, he felt that the mandate, as approved by the Security Council, was still adequate and he pledged to refer to the Security Council all matters which might affect the nature of the continued effective functioning of the Force.

⁸² Doc. 7 below.

2. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1765TH MEETING
(8 APRIL 1974)

391. At its 1765th meeting on 8 April, the Council included the following item in its agenda: "The situation in the Middle East:

"Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11248)".

392. At that meeting the Council had before it a draft resolution (S/11253) elaborated in the course of consultations among all the members of the Council.

393. The representative of China said Israeli Zionist aggression and the super-Powers' contention for hegemony in the area were the root cause of the Middle East problem. To achieve a genuine settlement Israel must withdraw from the Arab territories, the Palestinian people must regain their national rights, and the super-Powers must cease to practice hegemonism and power politics in the Middle East. China, he added, supported the Arab and Palestinian peoples in their struggle to recover their lost territories and regain their national rights. As for UNEF, China had always opposed it in principle. The Chinese delegation had refrained from casting a veto on resolution 340 (1973) only out of consideration for the desire of the victims of aggression, and would not participate in the voting on the draft resolution prolonging the mandate of UNEF.

394. The representative of Kenya said that experience had shown that unless the parties to the conflict were separated by a neutral force like the United Nations, the mere calling for a cease-fire would, in many cases, have no appreciable positive end. After recalling that resolution 340 (1973) had called for the return of the forces to positions occupied on 22 October, he pointed out that the forces that had advanced beyond the 22 October line had now withdrawn even behind the 1967 cease-fire line. Thus the Security Council resolution had been implemented and the image of the Council had been improved.

Decision: *At its 1765th meeting, on 8 April 1974, the draft resolution (S/11253) was put to the vote and was adopted by 13 votes to none as resolution 346 (1974). Two members (China and Iraq) did not participate in the vote.*

395. Resolution 346 (1974) read as follows: [Text in doc. 30 below.]

396. Following the vote, the representative of

Peru said that the work of UNEF had been decisive for the preservation of calm in the area, and therefore the renewal of its mandate for another six months was indispensable. Although his Government would continue to contribute to the new effort with the same enthusiasm, it was, nevertheless, concerned about the problem of reimbursement and hoped that it would be solved very speedily.

397. The representative of Mauritania said that since the cease-fire was precarious, the least incident could lead to a resumption of hostilities, a possibility that could not be ruled out so long as the territories of Egypt, Syria and Jordan continued to be under occupation and so long as the Palestinian people remained expelled from their homeland. UNEF, he added, must continue on an emergency basis and carry out its activities under the terms of reference determined by the Council. He stressed that the Force should be regarded as an integrated military unit and enjoy full freedom of movement, and that all contingents must be treated on a footing of equality.

398. The representative of the United Republic of Cameroon said that during the past six months, UNEF had at all times had the confidence of the Security Council and the parties concerned and had been able to function as an integrated military unit. He also noted with gratification that the financial estimates of the functioning of the Force had been adhered to, without affecting its efficiency, and that its geographical composition was useful and should be borne in mind in the future. After noting that the situation was still tense despite the positive accomplishments of the United Nations in the area, he said that, because the presence of UNEF was still necessary in the region, he had supported the extension of the mandate of the Force.

399. The representative of the USSR said that, while his delegation would have preferred a stronger resolution, the question of the stay of UNEF in the Middle East was closely bound up with the development of the general situation in the region. It continued to be particularly important that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and subsequent resolutions 338 (1973), 339 (1973) and 340 (1973) be strictly complied with as an essential prerequisite for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union, Comrade Brezhnev, had declared on 29 January 1974 that the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concerning troop disengagement was a positive step, but only a partial measure of a purely military nature. Matters could not be allowed to rest there; the Geneva Conference must press for a radical political settlement, which could be obtained only if Israeli troops were withdrawn from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and if the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine were respected. The Soviet delegation considered that systematic supervision by the Security Council of the activities of UNEF was helping matters substantially; it noted with satisfaction that the Secretary-General was submitting periodic progress reports to the Council on this subject. It welcomed the fact that it has been possible not only to refrain from increasing the strength of the Force, but to get by with a strength of less than 7,000. UNEF's operations should be carried out with the least possible cost; and the Security Council was entitled to expect that appropriations for UNEF would not exceed the level established by the General Assembly. Concerning the freedom of movement for UNEF's contingents, he said that Israel should halt all the restrictive measures and discrimination practised against the contingents of any country included in the composition of UNEF, as they were United Nations troops conducting an international United Nations peace-keeping operation entrusted to them by the Council. The Council, on the other hand, must see to it that the principle of equitable geographical distribution should be applied in all the command posts and units of the Force as well as in the Secretariat department which was conducting UNEF affairs. Furthermore, it was essential that all UNEF contingents should be placed on an equal footing as regards reimbursement of costs. He concluded that as the questions raised by his delegation had been taken into account in the Council's resolution, his delegation had not opposed the extension of the mandate of UNEF for another period of six months.

400. The representative of Costa Rica said that his delegation was very happy to vote in favour of the resolution that had just been adopted. He noted that the report indicated very clearly the Secretary-General's concern and dedication in ensuring effective implementation of the measures decided upon by the Council concerning the re-establishment of peace in the Middle East.

401. The representative of Austria said that UNEF had in six months fulfilled what had been expected of it. It had become an indispensable instrument in controlling a highly dangerous situation and had provided the basis for supplementary efforts to obtain the separation and disengagement of opposing forces. However, much more must be done to prevent recurrence of fighting and to bring about a fundamental change in the situation. In that respect a United Nations contribution might be the continued existence and service of UNEF.

402. The representative of the Byelorussian SSR stated that the establishment of UNEF and its successful operation had been helped by the general trend toward détente, which had also created conditions for a start toward the solution of the Middle East problem. Another positive factor in the establishment and functioning of UNEF had been the close attention paid by the Secretary-General to the views of members of the Council as stated in the course of informal consultations. His delegation was alarmed at discrimination practised by Israel in regard to certain contingents. With regard to the question of financing, there had been delay in revising standards for expenditure and setting an upper limit for reimbursement. Those matters needed to be resolved as quickly as possible.

403. The representative of Indonesia said that the problem of reimbursement and of freedom of movement of all contingents required a solution; Indonesia hoped that it would be possible for the Secretary-General to start very soon the process of reimbursing the countries contributing contingents to UNEF, if necessary partially until the availability of funds made full reimbursement possible. Indonesia also hoped that it would be able to eliminate discriminatory treatment in order to achieve the maximum efficiency and economy in the functioning of UNEF.

404. The representative of the United States said that his Government would continue to extend its full support to the efforts of UNEF, which had played an indispensable role in re-establishing peace in the Middle East. The Force had made possible the implementation of the cease-fire ordered by the Council last October and subsequent agreement on the disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces. The contribution made by UNEF to peace in the Middle East far

outweighed any difficulties caused by differences of opinion regarding questions of financing and operations.

405. The representative of Australia said that the continued presence of UNEF was indispensable to the continuation of the quiet at present prevailing in the area of operation and to the creation of an atmosphere in which a successful and final solution could come about. He noted with gratification that the Secretary-General did not expect the need of any increase in the Force and that he would keep under constant review its strength with a view to making reduction in economies.

406. The representative of the United Kingdom said that while his Government had no desire to see an emergency force of this nature become permanent, it believed that the Force was performing an invaluable service and making an important contribution to the efforts for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Referring to the problems pointed out by the Secretary-General, he said that his Government was confident that the Secretary-General would be able to resolve them and would constantly keep in mind the possibility of reductions and economies in the Force, provided that these could be made without lessening its effectiveness in carrying out its mandate.

407. The representative of France said that his delegation approved fully the Secretary-General's report and was of the opinion that the Force had been able to fulfil the terms of the mandate entrusted to it. He added that, regarding the question of reimbursement and that of freedom of movement of all contingents, he shared the concern and the views of many and was of the opinion that a formula should be devised and applied that would do away with the present disparities. Any hindrance of the freedom of movement of all contingents was contrary to the Charter and Council resolutions. The terms of the mandate of the Force as defined in the Secretary-General's report of 27 October 1973 seemed to cover the situation quite adequately. The same would not be the case when a peace agreement had been arrived at between the parties. Then the role of the Force would be to guarantee not only the cease-fire but peace, and that peace-making Force should also include contingents supplied by the permanent members of the Council.

408. Speaking as the representative of Iraq, the President said that his country had dissociated itself from the Council's resolutions by which the present role of the United Nations was defined. However, Iraq recognized its responsibilities as a United Nations Member and had fulfilled its financial obligations towards the financing of UNEF. With regard to the question of reimbursement paid to the Governments contributing contingents to UNEF, he said the disparity in the rate of reimbursement was clearly a question of discrimination. As for the limitation on the freedom of movement of certain UNEF contingents, it was an act of discrimination by Israel against certain countries furnishing contingents to UNEF. He warned that, if practices of discrimination were allowed to continue, the future participation of Governments in the formation of United Nations peace-keeping forces would be in jeopardy and the whole principle of equitable geographic distribution and composition would be in danger.

3. SUBSEQUENT REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON UNEF

409. In further progress reports on UNEF dated 19 April and 13 May (S/11248/Add.1 and 2), the Secretary-General indicated that the strength of the Force had been 6,788 men on 19 April and 6,645 men on 13 May, and that it continued to patrol and control the zone of disengagement and to inspect the areas of limited armaments and forces. While no significant incidents had been reported, overflights of the zone of disengagement by unidentified aircraft had taken place and there had been occasional minor incursions into the zone of disengagement by military personnel of the parties, who had been immediately escorted out of the zone. During the period under review there had been an exchange of civilians between Israel and Egypt, which had been witnessed by UNEF officers and representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

410. The Secretary-General also reported that the parties had agreed, in the presence of a UNEF officer, to recommence the operations for the recovery of the bodies of soldiers killed during the hostilities in the Suez area, relying for that purpose on UNEF assistance. In addition, further efforts had been made regarding the question of freedom of movement for all UNEF contingents in the operational area, and consultations had continued

with the representatives of the countries contributing contingents to UNEF concerning the possibilities of standardizing costs and determining a ceiling, as requested by the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session.

411. In a further progress report dated 20 May (S/11248/Add.3), the Secretary-General stated that on 18 May he had been informed by the Permanent Representative of Ireland of his Government's decision to withdraw the Irish contingent serving with UNEF, in view of the exceptional strains then imposed on the Irish security forces. The Irish Government had indicated that it would send air transport in order to repatriate the contingent on 22 May. The Commander of UNEF had reported that the Irish contingent would be relieved by the Nepalese battalion. The Secretary-General had informed the President of the Council of those developments.

412. On 21 May, the Secretary-General reported (S/11248/Add.4) that in a further letter dated 21 May the Government of Ireland had indicated that when the need to retain its troops in Ireland had passed, Ireland would be ready to return them to the Middle East should the United Nations feel that desirable, as it wished to be regarded as continuing its commitment to UNEF even though it could not supply troops at the time.

413. On 23 May, the President of the Security Council issued a note (S/11296) in connexion with the Secretary-General's reports concerning the request of the Irish Government, in which he informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had no objection to the request and agreed to the course of action set out in those reports. The Chinese delegation dissociated itself from that matter.

J. Establishment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES OF 31 MAY 1974

(a) Report of the Secretary-General

414. On 29 May, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council (S/11302) about arrangements for signing the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces. The signing would take place on 31 May in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the

Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. He had asked Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, Commander of UNEF, to be available there at that time, and had also designated his personal representative to the Geneva Conference, Mr. Roberto Guyer, to represent him at the signing.

415. On 30 May, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council (S/11302/Add.1) the text of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, together with the Protocol to that Agreement concerning the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force.⁸³ He pointed out that those documents called for the creation of a United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). If the Security Council decided to establish the Force, he would take the necessary steps in accordance with the provision of the Protocol. It was his intention to draw the Force, in the first instance, from United Nations military personnel in the area.

416. Under the terms of the Agreement, Israel and Syria would scrupulously observe the cease-fire on land, sea and air and would refrain from all military actions against each other from the time of the signing of the document, in implementation of resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

417. It further provided that the two military forces would be separated in accordance with certain principles, which stipulated that: (a) all Israeli military forces would be west of a line designated as Line A, except in the Quneitra area where they would be west of Line A-1 on a map to be precisely delineated by military representatives of Israel and Syria in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group meeting in Geneva following the signature of the Agreement; (b) all territory east of Line A would be under Syrian administration and Syrian civilians would return to that territory; (c) the area between Line A and Line B would be an area of separation in which the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force would be stationed; (d) all Syrian military forces would be east of Line B; (e) there would be two equal areas of limitation in armaments and forces, one west of Line A and one east of Line B, and the air forces of the two sides would be permitted to operate up to their respective lines without interference from the other side. Furthermore, there would be no military forces between Line A and Line A-1.

⁸³ Doc. 115 below.

418. The Agreement stated that the precise delineation of a detailed map and a plan for the implementation of the disengagement of forces would be worked out by the military representatives of Israel and Syria in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference, who would agree on the stages of this process. They would begin this work 24 hours after the signing of the Agreement and would complete this task within five days. Disengagement would begin within 24 hours thereafter and would be completed not later than 20 days after it had begun.

419. Under the Agreement, its provisions concerning the cease-fire, the separation of forces and the absence of military forces in the area between Lines A and A-1 would be inspected by UNDOF personnel. Within 24 hours after its signature, all wounded prisoners of war would be repatriated, and all others upon completion of the work of the Military Working Group. Within 10 days, the bodies of all dead soldiers held by either side would be returned for burial.

420. Finally, the Agreement stated that it was not a peace agreement, but a step towards a just and durable peace on the basis of resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973.

421. The Protocol concerning UNDOF indicated that both parties agreed that the function of the Force would be to maintain the cease-fire, see that it was scrupulously observed and to supervise the Agreement and Protocol thereto with regard to the areas of separation and limitation. In carrying out its mission, the Force would comply with Syrian laws and regulations and would not hamper the functioning of local civil administration. The Force would enjoy the freedom of movement and communication necessary for its mission. It would be mobile and provided with personal weapons of a defensive character to be used only in self-defence. The strength of UNDOF was set at 1,250, to be selected by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties, from Members of the United Nations that were not permanent members of the Security Council.

422. Under the terms of the Protocol, UNDOF would be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. It would carry out inspections and report to the parties not less often than once every 15 days or when requested by either party, and would mark on the

ground the lines shown on the map worked out under the Agreement.

423. Finally, the Protocol provided that Israel and Syria would support a Security Council resolution which would provide for the Force contemplated by the Agreement. The initial authorization would be for six months, subject to renewal by a further Security Council resolution.

*(b) Consideration at the 1773rd and 1774th meetings
(30 and 31 May 1974)*

424. In a letter dated 30 May (S/11304) the representative of the United States requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation in the Middle East, in particular, the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces.

425. At its 1773rd meeting on 30 May, the Council included the United States letter in its agenda, together with the report of the Secretary-General (S/11302 and Add.1).

426. The Secretary-General said that the Council had before it his report, to which were attached the texts of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces and the Protocol concerning the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. The announcement of agreement was most welcome and encouraging news. He would take the necessary steps in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol, if the Council so decided. In that event, it would be his intention to set up the Force on the basis of the same general principles as those defined in his report (S/11052/Rev.1) on the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) which the Council had approved in resolution 341 (1973). It would also be his intention that the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force would be drawn, in the first instance at any rate, from United Nations military personnel already in the area.

427. At the 1774th meeting on 31 May, the Council had before it a draft resolution (S/11305/Rev.1) sponsored by the USSR and the United States. The representatives of Israel and Syria, at their request, were invited to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

428. The representative of the United States said that his Government welcomed the Israeli-Syrian Disengagement Agreement, which together with the agreement reached earlier on the disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces would open the way for progress in Geneva toward the

achievement of an enduring settlement in the Middle East. As the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force provided for in the Protocol to the Agreement would play a key and indispensable role in maintaining a cease-fire and seeing that it was scrupulously observed, he asked that the Council authorize the creation of that Force. The draft resolution before the Council was grounded in the recent successful actions of the Council and the Secretary-General's statement on the previous day. The general principles which had guided the United Nations Emergency Force clearly applied to all aspects of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, including the assurances of its continued effective functioning for the duration of the mandate established by the draft resolution. He urged its speedy adoption.

429. The representative of the USSR said that he was authorized to inform the Council that his Government, which had taken part in numerous contacts preparing the way for the agreement, favourably assessed the Agreement on Disengagement of Syrian and Israeli troops and at the same time considered it necessary to stress that the Agreement was only a step towards the fulfilment of the major task, which was the total liberation of Arab territories from Israeli occupation. Accordingly, the task of the Geneva Conference was to find a solution on that basis which would be in the interest of peace and security and would protect the legitimate interests of all the States and peoples in the region, including the Arab people of Palestine. In that respect his country would continue to do everything possible along those lines, including its role as a participant in the Geneva Conference. The Soviet delegation approved the statement of the Secretary-General on 30 May to the effect that the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force would be created on the basis of the general principles set forth in the Secretary-General's previous report (S/11052/Rev.1). His delegation also agreed that UNDOF would be recruited from the military personnel of the United Nations Emergency Force already in the area, so that the expenses connected with the maintenance of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East would not be increased. Finally, since the mandate of UNDOF was for a period of six months, its renewal should be approved by the Council in a new resolution on the subject. With that understanding, his delegation

hoped that the members of the Council would support the draft resolution before the Council.

430. The representative of China said that to seek a fundamental solution of the Middle East question, it was imperative to stop the hegemonism and power politics practised by the two super-Powers in the region, to demand Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and to restore completely to the Palestinian people their national rights. China had always held to its principled position on the dispatch of troops in the name of the United Nations under whatever form. It was only out of consideration for the attitude of the victims of aggression that the Chinese delegation had decided not to participate in the voting on the draft resolution before the Council.

431. The representative of Iraq said that on 8 April, during the 1765th meeting he had explained his country's position regarding the role of the United Nations forces in the area, and dissociated Iraq from the pertinent Security Council resolutions defining the role of those forces. His delegation therefore would not participate in the voting on the draft resolution contained in document S/11305/Rev.1, which was now before the Council:

Decision: *At the 1774th meeting, on 31 May 1974, the draft resolution (S/11305/Rev.1) was adopted by 13 votes to none as resolution 350 (1974). Two members (China and Iraq) did not participate in the vote.*

432. Resolution 350 (1974) read as follows:

[Text in doc. 32 below.]

433. Following the vote, the representative of Australia said that his Government, as had been stated by the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, welcomed the announcement of the Disengagement Agreement between Israel and Syria signed in Geneva. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his statement, had paid tribute to the statesmanship shown by both Governments, and the untiring efforts of the United States' Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger. His Government stood ready to play whatever part it might be asked to play within the framework of the United Nations in ensuring that the Agreement was put into full effect.

434. The representative of Costa Rica said that his delegation congratulated the Governments of Syria and Israel for the conclusion of the troop disengagement agreement on the Golan Heights. His delegation also wished to congratulate Mr. Kissinger, the Secretary of State of the United

States. The United States had taken a position in keeping with its immense world responsibility.

435. The representative of Indonesia said that the spirit of accommodation and the momentum so far achieved must not be lost. It was the need to keep the fragile peace in the area from relapsing that necessitated the presence of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force in the area. It was upon the basis of these considerations that his delegation had supported the draft resolution just adopted.

436. The representative of Mauritania said that the Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement was not a peace agreement, but simply a first step towards a just and lasting peace in the area. Furthermore, the presence of the Force should in no way be prejudicial to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic.

437. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation was happy to vote for the resolution before the Council. He would like to repeat congratulations to the two Governments for the efforts which they had made to reach the Agreement and to the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, for the remarkable part he had played in helping to achieve the Agreement. The functions of the Force, he added, should be carried out as economically as could be done without impairing the Force's efficiency. His Government stood ready to play its part in any way, and in particular in the composition of any peace-keeping force which might be needed to guarantee a final peace agreement in accordance with resolution 242 (1967).

438. The representative of France said that the Security Council must decide upon the modalities governing the Force according to the Protocol annexed to the Disengagement Agreement. It was to be hoped that the Secretary-General would very soon be able to supply the Council with more detailed information on the financial implications of the creation of a new force. Commenting on the exclusion of the permanent members from the Force, he expressed his Government's readiness to participate in any future peace-keeping force which would maintain not only the cease-fire but peace in the area.

439. The representative of Austria said that the Disengagement Agreement between Israel and Syria was a historic event which, it was hoped, would pave the way towards the attainment of a

peaceful, just and durable settlement of all the problems of the Middle East. The Council had just created a new United Nations peace-keeping force, and it was not necessary to reiterate his Government's positive and favourable attitude in regard to United Nations peace-keeping operations.

440. The representative of the United Republic of Cameroon said that his delegation shared the view that the mandate and the conditions for the functioning of the Force should be completely in keeping with the views expressed by the Secretary-General in his report of 27 October 1973 (S/11052/Rev.1).⁸⁴

441. The representative of Peru said Peru had heard with great happiness the news of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces. The Council's action in creating a United Nations Disengagement Observer Force was an integral part of the Agreement between the parties, and demonstrated that the United Nations was inextricably linked to the task of creating peace in the Middle East.

442. The representative of the Byelorussian SSR said that the signing of the Israeli-Syrian troop disengagement agreement represented a great success for all those interested parties that had taken part in the talks. Following that Agreement, the work of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East should be resumed for the discussion of the fundamental aspects of the Middle East problem. His delegation supported the expressed intention of the Secretary-General on the organization and the principles of the recruitment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force.

443. The President, speaking as the representative of Kenya, said that the Israeli-Syrian Agreement was a historic development, and his Government applauded this important step on the road towards the establishment of a just and durable peace in the area. His delegation wished the Geneva peace talks a speedy and successful conclusion.

444. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that his delegation supported the resolution just adopted by the Council. It considered that the Agreement on Disengagement between Syrian and Israeli Forces was a first step along the

⁸⁴ Doc. 13 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

road to a just and stable peace in the Middle East on the basis of resolution 338 (1973), which was based on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories and safeguarding the national rights of the Palestinian people.

445. The representative of Israel said that his Government was in agreement with the draft resolution just adopted, and added that the Agreement signed that morning would provide a great opportunity for bringing about a positive change in the relations between Israel and Syria.

446. In presenting his proposals for interim arrangements to give effect to resolution 350 (1974), the Secretary-General suggested that the initial composition of UNDOF should comprise the Austrian and Peruvian contingents from the United Nations Emergency Force, supported by logistical elements from Canada and Poland. UNDOF should also comprise those United Nations military observers, in accordance with the terms of the Protocol, who were already deployed in the area. He also proposed to appoint as Interim Commander of UNDOF Brigadier-General Gonzalo Briceño Zevallos of Peru who would be assisted by staff officers drawn from UNEF and UNDOF. The parties concerned had accepted those arrangements. While the new operation would inevitably involve additional expenditure, he would make every effort to keep it to the minimum.

447. The representative of the USSR said that while his delegation had no objection in principle to most of the Secretary-General's proposals, it would prefer to have no increase in the strength of the peace-keeping force or in expenditures for its financing. In his view, a reduction of the Canadian contingent would reduce the general expenditures, without detriment to the cause, as its strength far exceeded the indicated level.

448. The representative of the United Kingdom said that, as he understood it, there was no suggestion that the Secretary-General's report should be put to a vote in the Council, nor was there any suggestion of a reduction in the size of any of the contingents.

449. The President stated that since there did not appear to be any objection, he assumed that the Council agreed to the proposals made by the Secretary-General. It was so decided.

(c) Reports of the Secretary-General on the establishment and functioning of UNDOF

450. In his first progress report dated 5 June (S/11310) on the implementation of resolution 350 (1974), the Secretary-General indicated that in response to his request, Austria and Peru had agreed to the transfer to UNDOF of their contingents serving with UNEF. Furthermore, Canada and Poland had also agreed to the transfer of elements of their contingents from UNEF to UNDOF to provide logistic services.

451. With regard to the implementation of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, he said that the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference had begun its work under the aegis of the United Nations, immediately after the signing of that Agreement. Following discussions in Geneva with Mr. Roberto Guyer, his personal representative to the Conference, and Lieutenant-General Siilasvuo, Commander of UNEF, the Secretary-General had given instructions to move advance elements of UNDOF to the operational area on 3 June with a view to making the Force operational there by 5 June. On 3 June, he had appointed Brigadier-General Gonzalo Briceño Zevallos of Peru as interim Commander of UNDOF, and the latter had established temporary offices in Damascus on the same day. The strength of the contingents being transferred to the Force from UNEF was approximately the following: Austrian contingent—500; Peruvian contingent—350; Canadian and Polish logistic elements—250. In addition, 90 UNTSO military observers deployed in the area were to be transferred to UNDOF.

452. On 6 June, in an addendum (S/11302/Add.2)⁸⁵ to his report of 29 May on the Agreement on Disengagement, the Secretary-General said that from 31 May to 5 June 1974, the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the aegis of the United Nations had held six meetings. Military representatives of Syria had joined the Group and representatives of the co-chairmen of the Conference had also participated in the meetings. At the meeting held on 31 May, the military representatives of Israel and Syria had signed the Agreement on Disengagement and a

⁸⁵ Doc. 8 below.

map attached thereto. In the subsequent meetings, full agreement had been reached on a map showing different phases of disengagement; a disengagement plan (areas and a time-table) and an agreed statement which had been signed also by Lieutenant-General Siilasvuo, who had presided over the meetings and had read the statement at the final meeting held on 5 June 1974.

453. The plan of separation of forces involved the redeployment of Israeli forces from the area east of the 1967 cease-fire line. It also provided for Israeli redeployment from Quneitra and Rafid and the demilitarization of an area west of Quneitra still held by Israel. Under the plan, UNDOF would initially occupy a buffer zone between the parties and, by 26 June, the separation of forces was to be completed. After the completion of each phase of the redeployment of forces set out in the plan, UNDOF would carry out an inspection and report its findings to the parties; after verifying, on 26 June, that the agreed limitation of forces was being observed, it would carry out regular bi-weekly inspections of the 10-kilometre restricted forces area.

454. Agreement was also reached in the Military Working Group that both sides would repatriate all prisoners of war by 6 June; that they would co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in carrying out its mandate, including the exchange of bodies, also to be completed by 6 June; and that they would make available all information and maps of minefields in their respective areas and the areas to be handed over by them.

K. Communications concerning violations of the cease-fire

455. After the outbreak of hostilities in the area on 6 October 1973 the Security Council and the Secretary-General received many communications in which Egypt, Israel and Syria exchanged charges and countercharges of cease-fire violations in their respective sectors.

456. The letters from Israel containing complaints of violations of the cease-fire by Egypt were dated 16, 24, 26, 29 and 31 October; 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 28 November; 2, 6, 13, 19 and 26 December; 4, 10, 11 and 15 January (S/11030, S/11043, S/11051, S/11053, S/11058, S/11063, S/11069, S/11073, S/11076, S/11078, S/11079 and Corr.1, S/11082, S/11088,

S/11089, S/11098, S/11101, S/11105, S/11108, S/11111, S/11114, S/11117, S/11135, S/11141, S/11147, S/11155, S/11164, S/11170 and Corr.1, S/11181, S/11188, S/11189 and S/11194). They charged Egypt with initiating many cases of artillery, small arms and tank fire, firing of ground-to-air missiles, forward movements of forces and air attacks. Furthermore, according to the Israeli letters, Egypt had tried to construct a bridge across the Canal, from west to east, in order to improve its lines in an attempt to open the ring encircling its Third Army. Israel also charged that there had been many instances of crossing cease-fire lines in flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions 338 (1974) and 339 (1974).

457. The letters from Egypt containing complaints of violations of the cease-fire by Israel were dated 24 and 25 October; 1, 3, 9, 11, 13, 16, 21 and 27 November; 21, 24 and 29 December; 7, 11, 14 and 16 January (S/11044, S/11048, S/11070, S/11077, S/11095, S/11102, S/11109, S/11118, S/11124, S/11134, S/11167, S/11171, S/11176, S/11184, S/11191, S/11196 and S/11197) and contained lists of many cases of small-arms fire, bombing and artillery shelling by Israeli forces. Israel was also charged with air lifting soldiers and large crates by helicopter to Gebel Aataka in an attempt to reinforce and consolidate positions occupied by its forces after the cease-fire. Egypt rejected Israel's allegations of cease-fire violations as attempts to seek pretexts to violate the cease-fire with a view to launching extensive military operations.

458. In Israel's letters dated 3, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 23 and 29 November; 4 and 14 December; 6, 16 and 29 January; 5, 12 and 16 February; 11, 15, 19, 22 and 27 March; 2, 10, 16, 22 and 28 April; 3, 8, 14, 21, 24, and 26 May (S/11075, S/11087, S/11090, S/11099, S/11100, S/11106, S/11107, S/11110, S/11113, S/11116, S/11128, S/11136, S/11142, S/11158, S/11182, S/11186, S/11195, S/11203, S/11209, S/11217, S/11222, S/11232, S/11235, S/11236, S/11240, S/11243, S/11249, S/11257, S/11267, S/11270, S/11277, S/11282, S/11284, S/11286, S/11293, S/11297 and S/11298) complaining of cease-fire violations by Syria, it charged Syria with continuous use of artillery, small-arms and tank fire. It charged that Syria was attempting to advance its positions in order to effect changes in the cease-fire line. Israel also rejected Syria's assertion that it had occupied new positions after

the cease-fire, insisting that the positions had been held by Israeli forces before the cease-fire.

459. In Syria's letters dated 1, 9, 19 and 26 November; 12 February; 14, 20, 27 and 28 March; 4, 6, 9, 10, 15, 17, 19, 24 and 29 April; 3, 20 and 28 May (S/11067, S/11094, S/11119, S/11132, S/11219, S/11234, S/11238, S/11244, S/11245, S/11251, S/11252, S/11255, S/11258, S/11265, S/11266, S/11268, S/11269, S/11274, S/11278, S/11281, S/11292 and S/11300) containing complaints of cease-fire violations by Israel, it was charged that Israel had occupied new positions after the cease-fire had become effective, and had directed shelling and small-arms fire across the cease-fire line.

L. Communications concerning the situation in and around Jerusalem and its Holy Places

460. In a letter dated 5 July 1973 (S/10965), the representative of Morocco complained that during January and February 1973, Israel had notified 51 Moroccan families, totalling 187 persons, that they would have to evacuate their dwellings in the city of Jerusalem. He stated that that action constituted a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and was contrary to the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

461. In a reply dated 17 July (S/10969), the representative of Israel stated that the families in question had been relocated for the purpose of clearing and reconstruction of slums and the relocation of inhabitants from substandard dwellings to adequate housing. Moreover, those families had been offered alternative accommodations in greatly improved conditions.

462. In a letter dated 29 March 1974 (S/11246), the representative of Jordan complained that Israeli authorities were carrying out destructive excavations near the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the surrounding area. The Chairman of the Supreme Muslim Council in Jerusalem had protested against such excavations, which were said to have caused a crack in the historic building of Al Jawhariah School on the western side of the Mosque, and had demanded an immediate halt to those excavations. Pointing out that the excavations could cause the collapse and destruction of several religious and historic buildings, and render 3,000 persons living in that area homeless, Jordan requested action to halt any further excavations in the Holy City,

which were in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the Hague Convention of 1907 as well as the principles of international law, the United Nations Charter, and the Security Council resolutions on Jerusalem.

463. In a reply dated 30 April (S/11279), the representative of Israel rejected Jordan's charges as being without any foundation and denied that there had been any excavation under the building in question, which, in view of its age and general state of dilapidation, had to be repaired periodically. As to the excavations conducted in the area of the Temple Mount, they were carried out by distinguished archaeologists who had made invaluable contributions to the knowledge of the different cultures, societies and religions identified with that historic site, without posing any danger whatsoever to existing historical and religious monuments.

M. Communications concerning the treatment of the civilian population in occupied territories and of prisoners of war in violation of the Geneva Conventions

464. During the period under review, the Secretary-General received a number of communications from the parties containing charges and counter-charges related to the treatment of civilian populations in localities which had been affected in the hostilities. The parties also exchanged charges and counter-charges regarding the treatment of prisoners of war in violation of the Geneva Conventions.

465. In letters dated 14 and 18 October 1973 (S/11024, S/11033), the representative of Egypt expressed his Government's readiness to comply with the appeal to the parties by the International Committee of the Red Cross to abide by the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and charged Israel with refusing to reply to the appeal. In a reply dated 19 October (S/11034), Israel stated that Egypt was attempting to conceal its responsibility for the aggression that began on 6 October and to falsify Israel's position in respect of the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

466. In letters dated 1, 5, 7, 8 and 20 November, and 20 and 24 December (S/11068, S/11080, S/11083, S/11093, S/11122, S/11168 and S/11172) Egypt charged that Israel was persistently committing aggressive and inhumane acts against civilians in the Israeli-occupied areas, which

constituted violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War.

467. In letters dated 14 and 15 October (S/11025 and S/11028), Egypt charged that Israeli planes had used high explosive bombs in the highly populated Nile delta towns, and submitted photographs showing some victims of those bombs.

468. On 1 November (S/11068), Egypt complained that on 30 October, the Israeli military forces had expelled the civilian population from the towns and villages of Goneifa, arrested 600 civilians, fired at the livestock and destroyed shopping centres.

469. On 5 November (S/11080), Egypt charged that on 3 November, Israeli forces had rounded up 298 inhabitants of the villages of El Ganein and Amer and had forced them to evacuate their homes and fields and move to the nearest Egyptian military position, and on 7 November (S/11083), Egypt also charged that in the few days preceding 6 November, Israeli forces had been rounding up civilians and compelling them to seek refuge in areas near Suez where Egyptian advanced positions were located.

470. Israel replied to the foregoing Egyptian charges in letters dated 3 and 9 November, 6 December 1973, 3 and 7 January 1974 (S/11074, S/11096, S/11112, S/11146, S/11180/Rev.1, and S/11183) stating that those charges were entirely baseless and full of distortion of the facts, and were intended to divert attention from Egypt's own violations of the Geneva Conventions.

471. On 14 November (S/11112) Israel referred to Egypt's letter of 8 November (S/11093), containing charges that Israel had hampered the humanitarian activities of the ICRC in connexion with wounded and captured prisoners of war, and stated that, contrary to those charges, it was Egypt that must bear responsibility for preventing the exchange of wounded prisoners and for failing even to provide a full list of the names of prisoners of war held by it, despite Israel's prompt provisions of lists of all prisoners of war it was holding.

472. In letters dated 10 and 31 October, 20, 21 and 29 November, and 5, 14 and 18 December 1973, and 17 and 21 February, 9 April and 6 May 1974 (S/11018, S/11066, S/11120, S/11123, S/11138, S/11144, S/11157, S/11160, S/11220, S/11227, S/11256 and S/11283), the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic charged that Israeli

forces had shelled and bombed civilian quarters, hospitals and schools, killing a large number of civilians, and that Israel was maltreating Syrian prisoners of war, in violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

473. In letters dated 19, 24 and 29 October, 7, 22 and 26 November and 8, 9 and 26 December 1973 and 27 March 1974 (S/11035, S/11042, S/11060, S/11085, S/11126, S/11130, S/11148, S/11149, S/11151, S/11174 and S/11242), the representative of Israel rejected the charges lodged by Syria and in turn charged that Syrian forces had subjected civilian localities to missile, artillery and air attacks that had caused heavy civilian casualties. Israel also charged that Syria was violating the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war, and forwarded copies of complaints it had lodged with the ICRC.

474. In a letter dated 2 January 1974 (S/11177), Israel charged that, as a result of the freedom of movement and action enjoyed by the terrorist organizations in Lebanese territory, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine had attempted on 31 December 1973 to carry out an assassination attempt on the life of Mr. Joseph Edward Sieff in London because, as a spokesman of the terror organization said, of his important role in the world Zionist movement.

3

Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA (Introduction)⁸⁶

September 5, 1974

1. The current extension of the mandate of UNRWA will come to an end on 30 June 1975, so that it will fall to the session of the General Assembly to which this report is presented to decide whether the mandate should be further extended and, if so, for how long. Before the end of the current extension the Agency will, at the end of April 1975, complete 25 years, nearly a whole generation, of service to the Palestine refugees. The perpetuation of what had originally been seen

⁸⁶ Introduction to *Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1973–30 June 1974, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth session, Supplement No. 13* (UN doc. A/9613), pp. 1–15.

as an enterprise of limited duration reflects the intractable nature of the political problem in which the problem of the Palestine refugees is embedded, the unique involvement of the United Nations in both problems, their importance to the international community, and failure to implement United Nations resolutions that might have facilitated a solution of them.

2. It is not merely the effects of institutionalization over a quarter of a century and their implications for a temporary organization of the United Nations that would seem to make the question of an extension of the mandate at this time more than a routine one. In addition, and more importantly, the latest round of Arab-Israeli hostilities, in October 1973, and its immediate consequences have had a profound effect on the political situation inside and outside the Middle East, one which has not yet spent itself. The Commissioner-General suggests that when the General Assembly deals with the extension of UNRWA's mandate, it will not be too early to set in motion a review of the Agency's constitution, structure and programmes. This is emphatically not to say that UNRWA has outlived its usefulness; or that the dismantling could be contemplated of an organization providing services which are essential to the refugees, which have become part of the social and economic fabric of the host countries, and which, in the continued absence of a political solution, are an important element of stability in the whole region; or that any change in the mandate could be made immediately at the forthcoming twenty-ninth session. Nevertheless, with the prospect of negotiations, however fraught with uncertainty, under United Nations auspices, and with growing recognition of the political dimension of the Palestine refugee problem, an extension ought to be accompanied by recognition that the situation may develop in such a way as to require a reassessment and reorientation of the Agency's responsibilities in order to ensure their continuing relevance to the needs of the Palestine refugees and the Agency's ability to respond adequately, in accordance with United Nations resolutions, to the requirements of a new situation. Moreover, as will appear later in this report, there are serious grounds, despite the elimination of the deficit for 1974, for anxiety about the Agency's viability. If on this occasion no preliminary steps are taken towards a review, the

Agency, and the General Assembly, may be overtaken by events.

3. It may be useful therefore to the General Assembly if brief reference is made to the original mandate of the Agency and to its current mandate. The decision to establish UNRWA, which succeeded the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, a body co-ordinating volunteer relief work by such organizations as the Red Cross and the Friends' Service Committee—and which constituted what might now be called a "focal point"—was taken a year after the adoption by the General Assembly on 11 December 1948 of resolution 194 (III), which had an important bearing on the evolution of UNRWA's work. Paragraph 11 of this resolution, which has been annually recalled by the General Assembly, sought to assure to the Palestine refugees the choice between repatriation and compensation; the failure to offer such a choice contributed in such large measure to the failure to solve the problem of the refugees by repatriation to their former homes or, if they so wished, resettlement elsewhere. In it the General Assembly resolved "that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible".

4. Resolution 194 (III) also established a Palestine Conciliation Commission, of which France, the United States of America and Turkey became members and which had a wide mandate including the assumption, so far as necessary, of the functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine and the task of facilitating "the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation". The implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) was thus the concern of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, not of UNRWA.

5. The original mandate of UNRWA was contained in paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, under which the Agency was established: "(a) to carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works programmes as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission; (b) to

consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available." The Economic Survey Mission (the "Clapp Commission") referred to in (a) had been appointed by the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

6. The Economic Survey Mission had warned against facile optimism about a solution to the refugee problem through economic development and resettlement, and not simply because of political and emotional obstacles. Nevertheless, attempts to pursue this approach were made until the 1950s, when it was gradually abandoned and the Agency turned, first, to assistance for small-scale individual economic enterprise, and eventually, from 1960 onwards, to education and training as a preparation for individual and family economic independence. It should be noted, incidentally, that of the amount of \$200 million authorized for a programme of economic development and resettlement during the period 1951 to 1954, only about \$38 million was contributed (of which the unexpended balance was subsequently used for education and training and as working capital from which deficits were met in later years).

7. Meanwhile in 1959 the Secretary-General submitted a report to the General Assembly at its fourteenth session (A/4121 and Corr.1) in accordance with his undertaking at the thirteenth session to make such proposals for the continuation of United Nations assistance to Palestine refugees as he might consider helpful or necessary to put forward to the General Assembly. After an economic analysis of the area as a whole he concluded that given sufficient capital for economic development over a long period, and subject to the prior, or at least the concurrent, resolution of political and psychological problems, the refugees should be regarded not as a liability but as an asset for the future. The Secretary-General therefore recommended the continuation of UNRWA pending, as expressed by the General Assembly (resolution 393 (V)), the "reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement".

8. Despite their increasing participation in the economic life of the host countries and considerable individual and family rehabilitation as a result of the economic and social support provided by

UNRWA's programmes and by the opportunities for employment offered to them during periods of stability and economic advance, the refugees continued to reiterate their desire for repatriation, and attention was drawn annually by the General Assembly to the lack of any progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III).

9. The hostilities of 1967 brought a second wave of displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons, this time from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights and involving others than refugees of 1948. The conditions of 1948 were recreated, with new tented camps and fresh misery, economic progress and integration were set back, and impetus was to be given to the growth of Palestinian national consciousness. Security Council resolution 242 (1967), of 22 November 1967 affirmed, in paragraph 2, the necessity "for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem" and once again the General Assembly called for the speedy return of those displaced. Comparatively few have been allowed to return in the course of seven years,⁸⁷ and it would appear from the number of applications to the Agency for transfer of registration that proportionately fewer of those returning have been Palestine refugees of 1948—about 8,000 against the figure of just 50,000 for returning displaced refugees and displaced persons given by the Government of Israel on 9 November 1973 to the Special Political Assembly.

10. The mandate of UNRWA was widened by General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967,⁸⁸ and subsequent annual resolutions to the same effect, to include the provision of "humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and are in serious need of immediate assistance as a result of the recent hostilities". The assistance provided by UNRWA under this heading in east Jordan is described in paragraph 54 of this report. It should be noted, however, that the burden of caring for the displaced persons is otherwise borne exclusively by the host

⁸⁷ See the reports of the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolutions 2963 C and D (XXVII), docs. 4 and 5 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

⁸⁸ Doc. 253 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

Governments in the countries in which they have taken refuge—Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The cost to the host Governments of this burden has, of course, been an addition to their substantial expenditure on services for the refugees which supplement UNRWA's services, including in some cases the whole cost of secondary education, and to their other costs of administration arising out of the presence of the refugees within their borders. Information supplied by the host Governments on services rendered by them that relate to the refugees is contained in table 18 of annex I.

11. There were variations in the terms of the General Assembly's mandate to the Agency during the first 10 years, but since 1961 it has been reduced to an expression of thanks to the Commissioner-General and his staff for their efforts to provide "essential services for the Palestine refugees", with the addition from 1965 to 1970 of a directive to the Commissioner-General to take "such measures, including rectification of the relief rolls, as to assure, in co-operation with the Governments concerned, the most equitable distribution of relief based on need" or words to that effect. In practice the mandate, with its reference to "essential services", has been taken by the Agency to mean the maintenance of the programmes of relief, health and education and such additional assistance in time of emergency as circumstances appeared to require and the Agency was able to provide. Unfortunately, financial stringency resulting from chronic financial crisis and the persisting threat of reductions in services that has accompanied it have concentrated attention on maintenance of all activities in full, to the exclusion of consideration of the adjustment of priorities to meet changing conditions.

12. UNRWA has an Advisory Commission but no governing body with executive power. The only body that can take a decision at a governmental level and issue directions to the Commissioner-General is therefore the General Assembly, as the Commissioner-General pointed out in paragraph 47 of the report for 1972/1973 (A/9013),⁸⁹ with reference to the implications of the financial situation for the Agency's ability to maintain services in full.

Finance and management

13. The alarm expressed in last year's report and in the report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/9231) about the financial prospects for 1974 proved fully justified. A deficit of \$3.9 million was incurred for 1973 and, despite an appeal by the Secretary-General on 11 February 1974 (A/9582) after consultation with the Working Group, the estimated deficit for 1974 persisted at the level of about \$10 million until nearly the end of June, any minor increase in income being offset by increased costs.

14. In May 1974, the Commissioner-General informed the Secretary-General and the host Governments that unless there were a very early significant improvement in income, reductions in services would be inevitable in order to avoid financial collapse in the course of 1974. Owing to the magnitude of the deficit and the composition of Agency income and expenditure, these reductions were likely to involve the number or scale of rations, the elimination with effect from the beginning of the 1974/1975 school year of the preparatory (lower secondary) cycle of education and restrictions on or the elimination of other activities, even if some reductions were imposed as early as 1 July 1974. At the request of the host Governments a meeting of the Advisory Commission was convened and the Commissioner-General agreed to defer in the meantime any action to reduce services in the hope that various efforts in progress to obtain more funds would be successful. On 30 May 1974, the Deputy Commissioner-General reported the position to the Working Group in the course of a visit to United Nations Headquarters.

15. At the meeting of the Advisory Commission on 26 June 1974, the representative of the United States announced that a special contribution of \$4.2 million would be made, subject to presidential determination by 30 June 1974, for an emergency programme towards the cost of elementary education and the representative of France announced on behalf of the European Economic Community that an additional contribution of \$7.9 million would be made by the Community to meet the cost of the preparatory cycle of the education programme. The Advisory Commission expressed appreciation of these additional contributions

⁸⁹ See doc. 3 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

and, with a view to 1975 when the problem would recur in a worse form, and "considering that the financing of UNRWA is a responsibility of the whole international community", appealed urgently to the Secretary-General "to examine, in consultation with Member States, the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA, and other United Nations organizations, ways and means of assuring the Agency in 1975 and succeeding years of sufficient financial resources to maintain its services and, bearing in mind especially the statement of the host Governments on the level and volume of the Agency's services, to improve and extend these services to all Palestine refugees in need".

16. The effect of the additional contributions from the European Economic Community and the United States, amounting together to \$12.1 million, was to eliminate the deficit for 1974 and to provide some margin for increases in costs not budgeted for during the remainder of the year and, possibly, a much needed but modest improvement in the cash position at the beginning of 1975. Among the costs not budgeted for was reconstruction or repair of Agency installations and facilities and Agency-built shelters in camps in south Lebanon demolished or damaged in Israeli air or sea raids in May and June 1974, the cost of which, assuming only asbestos sheet roofs for shelters, was estimated at about \$435,000. (The cost of reconstruction and repair if privately-built shelters or extensions were included and the roofs were concrete, was estimated at between \$900,000 and \$1 million.) Allowing for this capital expenditure and for further increases in cost-of-living allowances for local staff with effect from 1 July 1974 (paragraph 18 below), expenditure in 1974 is estimated at \$86 million.

17. The cash position will be affected by the need for advance purchase in September for use in 1975 of flour to the value of about \$10 million but cash should nevertheless be sufficient until the end of the year, with a crisis occurring again at the beginning of 1975 and rapidly becoming more acute. The expenditure estimated to be necessary to maintain programmes in 1975 is \$108.9 million, against which no more than \$69.7 million can be assumed in income, leaving a deficit of \$39.2 million, an amount only \$1 million less than the whole of the expenditure budget for 1967. Economic factors adverse to the

Agency have radically changed the dimensions of the budgetary problem, as can be seen from the figures given in table A in paragraph 204 below for actual recurrent expenditure on activities in 1973 and estimated recurrent expenditure on the same activities in 1975: in the case of activities in which food-stuffs are used the rate of increase exceeds 100 per cent.

18. These adverse factors are the rise in the prices of all supplies, especially flour, the cost of which accounts for 76 per cent (\$29 million) of the basic ration programme; the continued appreciation of three of the local currencies against the United States dollar and other currencies of major importance in the Agency's income; and local increases in the cost of living, which, for the period of the report, ranged from 11 per cent in Syria to 47 per cent in Gaza. Of the requirement of 116,000 tons of flour for basic rations and other programmes (supplementary feeding, training centre meals), only 29,000 tons is expected to be donated in kind in 1975; the balance of 87,000 tons must be purchased, and while the price of flour in 1971 was about \$70 a ton, the 1975 estimates assume a price of \$260 and current prices in the market are even higher. In regard to exchange rates the Agency's difficulties may be illustrated by the appreciation of the Lebanese pound against the United States dollar by about 25 per cent in the last two years. The additional cost to the Agency of buying the local currencies required for goods and services in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan has thus risen sharply. The rates of inflation in the area of operations impose a severe strain on the budget through their impact on cost-of-living allowances paid to staff in compensation. Because of the nature of the Agency's programmes it is a large employer (over 15,000 local staff of whom over 9,000 are in education) and local staff remuneration accounts for 41.6 per cent (\$45.3 million) of the 1975 budget. In September 1973, with effect from 1 May 1973, and again in February 1974, with effect from 1 January 1974, the Commissioner-General had to approve increases in cost-of-living allowances in various Fields, in compensation for inflation in 1972/1973, at a total cost of more than \$4.4 million in a full year; incorporation of part of cost-of-living allowances in salaries and extensions of some salary scales, with effect from 1 July 1974, will cost nearly \$1.7 million in 1974 (of which \$1.3 million,

relating to separation benefits, is non-recurrent); and delayed, cumulative and more recent effects of inflation are such that another increase in cost-of-living allowances, with effect from 1 July 1974, at a cost of about \$3.6 million in a full year is foreseen. This extra expenditure is necessary but the decision to incur it is not an easy one under a system of uncertain, voluntary financing and in the absence of a governing body with power to decide on both income and expenditure.

19. In a situation in which local staff remuneration is such an important item in the budget, the cost of living is rising steeply, the budget is in deficit or only precariously and temporarily in balance, the number of staff is so large and the political environment is unstable, staff relations weigh heavily on the administration of an organization. The scale and complexity of UNRWA's problems in this respect would make them important at any time—the Agency employs half as many staff again as the United Nations Secretariat, including the United Nations Office at Geneva and the economic commissions—and at the present time they constitute a source of anxiety second only to the Agency's financing, to which they are closely related. It is understandable that UNRWA's local, almost entirely Palestine refugees, staff should be anxious about their future at this time and that this anxiety should be reflected in their attitude towards matters in dispute between them and the Agency's management such as remuneration and other conditions of service. Many have served UNRWA conscientiously and effectively since its early days and have a sense of dedication and loyalty to their work for their fellow-refugees and to the Agency; but they are affected by what takes place around them, they cannot be indifferent to the political future of the Palestine refugees and the Palestinians generally, and they see events moving forward without knowing what that future holds for them. They are also sensitive to the unprecedented rise in the cost of living, and they are aware that, with inflation (and in the Gaza Strip a radical change in the value of money), their Provident Fund credits in local currencies, like all cash savings, have depreciated in value. These problems merit sympathetic understanding and in any arrangement for the eventual termination of UNRWA they will require special attention (as will those problems of the very small international

staff). It is not the presentation of demands for improvements in conditions of service, a normal and proper function of staff representation for which machinery has been provided, that causes disquiet. It is the pressing of demands by such tactics as strikes and occupation of offices, and of demands that go far beyond compensation for rises in the cost of living and far beyond the most optimistic assessment of foreseeable income, in disregard of the Agency's very real financial difficulties. If this course of action is persisted in, the Agency may find itself unable to carry out its mandate, with calamitous results for staff as well as refugees as a whole.

General operations

20. As of 30 June 1974 refugees registered with the Agency totalled 1,583,646, an increase, from natural growth, of 2.8 per cent during the year covered by the report. Of this number only slightly more than half, 52.4 per cent, were in receipt of rations. Most refugees were not living in camps: the registered camp population as of 30 June 1974 was only 36 per cent of the total, the proportion in camps varying from 59.8 per cent in the Gaza Strip to only 25.2 per cent in the West Bank because of the exodus from the Jordan valley camps near Jericho during and immediately after the fighting in 1967. The distribution of the refugees within the area of operations (Lebanon, Syria, east Jordan, West Bank, Gaza Strip) is shown in table 4 of annex I. It will be noted that 614,110 are in the occupied territories. Of those registered in Syria, 17,000 (including natural increase) left the Golan Heights area in June 1967 and so far as is known none has been allowed to return by the Israeli authorities; even with the disengagement on the Syrian-Israeli front return to Quneitra was impossible owing to the destruction of the town. Of those in east Jordan about 260,500 were registered in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip before 1967, of whom the Agency believes no more than 40,000 to 50,000 may have moved to east Jordan from the West Bank before June 1967, the remainder fleeing during or in the aftermath of the fighting. From the Agency's records of requests for re-registration on return to their original place of refuge only about 8,000 have been allowed to return to the West Bank and to the Gaza Strip.

21. It is important to realize, if one is to understand the context of UNRWA's operations, that,

as is the case with human beings everywhere, no single stereotype fits the refugees as a whole, certainly not the pejorative one that occurs frequently of miserable inhabitants of squalid camps, living an aimless existence on an international dole. Many camps are overcrowded with poor living conditions because of lack of urban land for expansion or lack of funds for major improvements to raise minimum standards of sanitation and amenity, and many refugees constitute cases of severe hardship because of the lack of any breadwinner in the family who can supplement the Agency's meagre basic ration. But the refugees live, are educated and find work in widely varying circumstances, with correspondingly different problems and opportunities for themselves and for the Agency. Wherever they live, the refugees are affected by and in turn affect political, economic and social conditions.

22. The Agency's programmes take the form of relief, mainly the basic ration of flour, rice, cooking oil and sugar, but including supplementary feeding for small children and other vulnerable groups; health services, including clinics with the emphasis on preventive medicine, especially maternal and child welfare and environmental sanitation in camps; and education, including both general education and vocational training. As is made clear in the foot-note to paragraph 58 below, the Agency is not responsible for the administration or policing of the camps, in which 36 per cent of the refugees live, and the expression "UNRWA refugee camps" or "United Nations refugee camps" is misleading if taken to mean more now than that these camps are inhabited by some of the refugees—less than half—to whom UNRWA provides services and that UNRWA has installations in them for this purpose such as distribution centres for rations, feeding centres for small children, clinics and some schools. Other schools, the teacher or vocational training centres, warehouses and Area and Field offices are outside the camps. Many refugees have built additions to their dwellings in the camps and they maintain them in repair themselves, apart from some assistance given by the Agency in the form of materials for hardship cases or in special circumstances or in the case of communal dwellings such as old Army barracks. Apart from some replacement of tents in emergency camps in Syria and Jordan and the construction in Gaza camps referred to in

paragraph 74 of last year's report and in previous reports, there was no construction of shelter by the Agency in recent years. There has been growing support from the refugees for self-help projects to improve amenities, as reported below e.g., in paragraphs 25 *et seq.* A particularly useful contribution to humanizing life in many camps is work with young people carried out with assistance and encouragement from voluntary organizations and the Agency. It includes youth activities, training in leadership and community service, summer camps for children and other out-of-school activities; special activities for pre-school children and special training for the handicapped.

23. Operations were affected in various ways by the war of October 1973 and its aftermath but there was no such widespread displacement of population as occurred in 1967. An acute shortage of supplies resulted from the disruption of shipping to the Middle East caused by the hostilities, and after borrowing supplies from Governments where possible, the Agency was compelled temporarily to vary or reduce the components of basic rations. The expectations and controversies, hopes, doubts and general uncertainty about the future generated by subsequent political developments; the tension in Lebanon, and its reflection elsewhere, aggravated by the series of Israeli military raids; the persisting financial crisis and overhanging threat of reductions in services: all had their psychological effect on the refugees and therefore indirectly on the Agency and its operations.

24. In Lebanon during the hostilities of October 1973 on the Syrian front frequent Israeli overflights caused fear among refugees and led to the absence of children from schools, the interruption of other services and the temporary evacuation of Nabatieh camp. The Israeli raids in May and June 1974 resulted in heavy loss of life and extensive damage to refugee shelters and UNRWA installations at Nabatieh, Ein el-Hilweh and Rashidieh camps. In June, in further raids, more refugee lives were lost and shelters and UNRWA installations damaged at Ein el-Hilweh, Rashidieh and Burj el-Shemali. In all, 37 refugees were killed and 206 injured in the raids. Loss of life and damage to property were particularly severe at Nabatieh camp, where 17 refugees were killed and only 70 of the 400 families escaped destruction of or damage to their dwellings. As a result of

the raids, there has been an exodus of refugees from the camps in south Lebanon, some leaving altogether and others only during the day-time. With the assurance of tents from the Jordanian Government and UNICEF, it would have been possible to establish a temporary camp for evacuees from Nabatieh, but they preferred to remain dispersed among the local population for fear of further raids. Immediate emergency assistance, such as blankets, clothing, medical aid and construction materials, was provided by the Agency to refugees in need in all camps affected, and voluntary organizations such as the Lebanese Red Cross and the Palestine Red Crescent also gave assistance.

25. Self-help projects in Lebanon included construction of drains, sewers and a well at a total cost of approximately \$75,000, contributed about equally by Agency and refugees. In discussions with the Government Department concerned and representatives of the Higher Political Committee for Palestinians proposals for the resumption of verification of eligibility for rations, suspended since 1969, were formulated, with a view to eventual allocation of rations to children not receiving them, but they had not been put into effect by 30 June 1974. Government officials and police have not yet returned to the refugee camps, from which they were withdrawn in October 1969, responsibility for the refugee population as a whole, resting, in effect, with the Higher Political Committee for Palestinians on behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization. In September 1973 the Palestinian Higher Political Committee informed the Government and the Agency of the intention to return all occupied buildings not formerly used by Government representatives, though none has so far been returned. A number were subsequently destroyed in air raids, and most of the small buildings that remain occupied were formerly used by the Government or are old buildings which were not in use by the Agency before occupation.

26. In Syria, eight refugees are known to have been killed and 37 injured during the October war. Largely as a result of the war the completion of construction contracts was seriously delayed because of a lack of building materials. Prices of construction materials rose sharply, in some cases as much as 100 per cent, with the result that contractors were unable to complete work at the

agreed cost and potential contractors were unwilling to submit fixed-price tenders. The Syrian-Israeli disengagement had little effect on Agency operations. For the reasons mentioned in paragraph 20 above, refugees could not yet return to Quneitra district, but almost all had returned to places in the former Sasa salient.

27. In east Jordan, the Field with the largest number of refugees and displaced persons, the Agency continued to co-operate closely with the Government in caring for them. Some progress was made in rectification of ration rolls, with 4,500 rations transferred to children not previously receiving them from refugees verified as dead or absent. Involvement and interest in the UNRWA/UNESCO education programme was again stimulated by exhibitions of work and inter-school sports which parents and the public were encouraged to attend. Self-help projects continued: roads and school boundary walls were constructed and playing areas paved. Labour and materials for these projects cost over \$50,000, of which the Agency provided only about \$4,500 and the refugees and other contributors the remainder.

28. In the West Bank consumer prices rose by over 40 per cent during the period under report, an indication of the magnitude of the problem of inflation faced by the refugee population and also by the Agency in compensating its employees and procuring supplies locally within its budget for the conduct of its operations. Employment in Israel of refugees and others from the West Bank and Gaza virtually ceased during the hostilities but by the end of the period of report had regained its previous level. There was again remarkable development in self-help projects, the value of those completed totalling \$65,000. The Agency contributed \$14,600 and the refugees the remainder, which included \$21,500 to projects to which the Agency gave no assistance.

29. In Gaza no progress was made in the provision of housing for those shown by the joint survey in the first half of 1973 to be inadequately housed. The Agency continued to press the Israeli authorities for action now that the need had been recognized by them and by the end of the period there were indications that action to deal with the most pressing cases would shortly be taken. Demolition of shelters by the Israeli authorities continued at Rafah camp (see A/9013, paras. 27, 75 and 76; and A/9155) in pursuance of their

programme of road construction and was accompanied by some new construction. Refugees whose shelters were demolished were offered new houses for purchase on the instalment plan or shelters vacated by others. According to the Agency's figures, during the period from 1 July 1967 to 30 June 1974, 11,473 rooms, affecting 4,209 refugee families, were demolished, against the completion of construction and allocation of only 3,190 rooms to 1,443 of these refugee families. While some of those whose dwellings were demolished were provided with or found for themselves vacant accommodation in Gaza town or in the camps, the deficit in housing and the effect on living standards in this respect is significant. It must be set against the substantial cash earnings from employment in Israel, as must the alarming rise in the cost of living of 47 per cent during the reporting period. The conscientious application of long-standing verification procedures made possible further progress in rectification of ration rolls and the admission to them during the period 1 July 1973 to 30 June 1974 of 23,113 children formerly not in receipt of rations.

Health

30. The Agency maintained in full its health programme, providing clinical and preventive medical services for refugees inside and outside camps at the level of those made available by the host Governments to the generality of their populations, and environmental sanitation in camps. Some modest improvements were made in services, facilities and equipment, and in the environment of camps in some cases with the active participation of the refugees in self-help schemes. In accordance with the Agency's agreement with the World Health Organization, the health services remained under the technical supervision of WHO. The Twenty-seventh World Health Assembly again expressed concern for the health and well-being of the Palestine refugees, particularly those in the occupied territories or displaced from these territories. The text of resolution WHA27.42 of 21 May 1974 is reproduced in annex II.⁹⁰

31. No case of a disease subject to International Health Regulations, including cholera, was reported. Rapidly rising costs made necessary increases in subsidies for private hospital beds,

and by 30 June 1974 the annual rate of expenditure on the health programme as a whole for 1973, including common costs such as supply, transport and administration, had increased by 11 per cent over 1972.

32. A modest three-year development plan for health services was drawn up in the hope that funds would be available for its gradual implementation during the period 1974-1976. It provides for replacement or improvement of unsatisfactory premises, the improvement of out-patient specialist services, establishment of additional clinical laboratories, more comprehensive pre-school supervisory health care, further improvements in environmental sanitation through assistance to refugee self-help schemes, and the introduction of a measure of preventive mental health care for elementary school and pre-school children to complement the present school services.

33. As in previous years Governments and non-governmental bodies have given valuable assistance to the Agency's health services by providing funds, staff, specialized technical advice and guidance, free hospital, X-ray and laboratory services, medical supplies, layettes and food-stuffs, and by co-operation in mass vaccination campaigns. Other donors met the operational costs of individual units such as health centres, MCH clinics or rehydration/nutrition centres. Funds were also received for professional training in medical and related subjects at universities and other institutions. The Commissioner-General would like to record his appreciation of this valuable assistance from these bodies and of the co-operation which the Agency has continued to receive from the Ministries of Health in the Agency's area of operations.

Education

34. The year was marked by continued growth in the education system at a rate similar to that for 1972/1973. There were 268,324 pupils in UNRWA/UNESCO elementary and preparatory schools, an increase of 12,340 over last year, with an increase of 283 teachers to 7,662 and the formation of 16 new schools (total 562) by double-shifting to cater for the extra pupils. As funds for school construction were limited by what was available from special contributions, only a very modest building programme (for details, see paragraph 119 below) was possible, just sufficient

⁹⁰ Doc. 43 below.

to avoid triple-shifting, but not sufficient to prevent an increase of 5 per cent in double-shifting. In elementary schools in Jordan and Syria double-shifting is now approaching 90 per cent, a situation with serious implications.

35. In the education programme progress was made despite interruptions due to disturbances. The October 1973 hostilities caused a loss of six weeks' instruction in some areas of Syria and of two weeks or less elsewhere. In Lebanon interruptions were distressingly frequent: the school year began two weeks later than usual as a result of strikes by some teachers, subsequently each month was marked by a loss of several school days because of absences by pupils or teachers, mainly in reaction to local and international events of significance to the Palestine refugees, and in May classes had to be suspended for the remainder of the school year as a result of actual or threatened Israeli air and sea strikes in south Lebanon.

36. A number of qualitative improvements in the education programme were introduced despite financial difficulties: four local posts of subject supervisor to Arabic/Islamic religion and five posts of subject supervisor to physical education were established, and also local posts of assistant teacher—training specialist in physical education, school libraries and home economics. These senior local posts, filled by Palestine refugees, are concerned with the supervision and training of teachers in the special subjects. Progress can also be reported in the provision of books for school libraries and the training of teachers in operating the libraries. With 81 per cent of all Agency teachers now in possession of a basic professional qualification for teaching at the elementary level and the same percentage at the preparatory level in possession of specialized qualifications for subject teaching, the emphasis in in-service teacher training by the Institute of Education has shifted to refresher courses and *ad hoc* courses to meet special needs of key personnel, such as head-teachers, supervisors and teacher training instructors, and of qualified teachers.

37. The two-year project of financial assistance by the United Nations Development Programme under which the experience of the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education is made available to Governments in the region in co-operation with UNICEF (see A/9013, paras. 35 and 39)⁹¹ was due to end on 30 June 1974. In April 1974 a

joint UNDP/UNESCO delegation visited the Institute to evaluate the project and after discussion with UNRWA and UNICEF recommended its extension for a further two-and-a-half years.

38. As regards the two Educational Development Centres, the establishment of which was reported last year (see A/9013, para. 36),⁹¹ the centre in Gaza has been located in renovated premises of an unused dormitory block of the Gaza Vocational Training Centre and a new building is being constructed in Amman for the centre in east Jordan; the local staff for both centres have been appointed and the Chief of the Amman centre appointed by UNESCO has assumed duty.

Relations with other organs of the United Nations system

39. UNESCO and WHO have continued their collaboration with UNRWA in the education and health programmes, thereby assuring professional competence in them. The UNESCO staff, including associate experts, made available to UNRWA from or through UNESCO, without reimbursement, now number 23. The number of WHO staff made available by WHO, without reimbursement, is 5.

40. Other assistance was received from various United Nations organs and agencies: a total of \$16,477 was realized by 30 June 1974 in response to the WHO appeal under resolution WHA24.32 of 18 May 1971; UNICEF continued to provide certain procurement services free of charge. UNRWA co-operates with UNHCR in publicizing the UNHCR record "Top Star Festival" and will receive a percentage of the profits.

41. The UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education provided a notable example of inter-agency co-operation. Under a UNDP regional project most of the cost of the Institute was met by UNDP, with UNESCO as executing agency and UNRWA as contractor to UNESCO; UNESCO provided staff and \$25,333 towards other costs; UNICEF met the cost of extension services through which the experience of the Institute is made available to Ministries of Education in the region, the provision of these services being co-ordinated by the UNESCO Regional Office for Arab countries, the UNICEF Regional Office and UNRWA;

⁹¹ See doc. 3 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

and UNRWA met the residual cost of the Institute and provided administrative and other supporting services.

42. At UNRWA's request, the International Labour Organisation undertook a study of the Agency's Area Staff Provident Fund scheme and made recommendations which are under consideration in consultation with the Area staff (see paras. 163 and 164 below). The Agency was also assisted by exchanges of commodities with the World Food Programme. The Assistant Secretary-General for General Services in the United Nations Secretariat made a study of the functions of senior management at Agency headquarters and provided advice to the Commissioner-General, and other assistance was received from the United Nations Secretariat in administrative and legal matters and also in radio communications.

43. The Agency's accounts for 1973 were audited by the Auditor-General of Colombia on behalf of the United Nations Board of Auditors.

Assistance from voluntary agencies and other non-governmental organizations

44. The Commissioner-General again gratefully acknowledges the generous assistance provided by a large number of voluntary agencies, business and professional organizations and individuals. Many of these contributors follow the operation of the Agency's programmes closely through correspondence and field visits, with benefit to the Agency's work.

45. The projects financed by these contributions are noted in the appropriate sections of the present report. The main organizations were: American Friends Service Committee Inc; American Near East Refugee Aid, Inc. (ANERA); the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO); Australians Care for Refugees (AUSTCARE); the Canadian Save the Children Fund; the Christian Reformed World Relief Committee of the USA; the Council of Organizations for Relief Services Overseas, Inc. (CORSO) of New Zealand; Federations of Business and Professional Women; the Finnish Refugee Council; the Gulbenkian Foundation; Japanese business organizations; the Lutheran World Federation; the Norwegian Refugee Council; OXFAM of the United Kingdom; Pontifical Mission for Palestine; the Swedish Save the Children Federation (Rädda Barnen); the Unitarian Service Committee of Canada; the Women's

Auxiliary of UNRWA; the World Alliance of Young Men's Christian Association; and Zonta International. Contributions made direct to UNRWA from non-governmental sources are recorded in table 17 of annex I.

46. The Commissioner-General also wishes to pay tribute to the devoted service rendered direct to the refugees by voluntary agencies in the area of the Agency's operation (see table 19 of annex I).

Conclusion

47. The foregoing and the body of the report which follows give, the Commissioner-General hopes, sufficient indication of the stresses and strains to which the Agency is subjected to make understandable his concern about its ability to continue to provide essential services to the Palestine refugees effectively and in accordance with its mandate from the General Assembly, when account is taken of the size to which the organization has now grown, its chronic financial difficulties and the unusual characteristics of its operations and staffing. The Agency has now entered a critical year; critical because the situation in the Middle East, at least so far as the Palestine refugees are concerned, is more fluid and volatile than for many years; critical, because the Agency faces a deficit of unprecedented magnitude—\$39 million in a budget of \$109 million—with which it is extremely doubtful if traditional methods and sources of financing can deal adequately; critical, too, because a decision by the General Assembly on the extension of the Agency's mandate beyond 30 June 1975 must be made during the period of a few months which may determine whether there is any hope of an early solution, acceptable to the United Nations, of the Arab-Israeli conflict and with it of the Palestinian and the Palestine refugee problem or whether there is to be again deadlock with all that would imply. If the Agency is to play a constructive role, it requires more positive guidance from the General Assembly and the firm assurance of much greater financial support.

Special Reports Submitted to the General Assembly

4

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly Resolution 3089C (XXVIII) concerning persons displaced from Israeli-occupied areas since the June War⁹²

September 17, 1974

1. The present report is submitted to the General Assembly in pursuance of its resolution 3089 C (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, which dealt with the displaced persons who had fled the Israel-occupied areas since the outbreak of hostilities in June 1967 and with the refugees who had been removed from their camps in the Gaza Strip. In paragraph 4 of the resolution, the General Assembly called upon Israel immediately to take steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants, to desist from all measures that obstruct the return of the displaced inhabitants, including measures affecting the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories, and to take effective steps for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed in the Gaza Strip and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation. In paragraph 5 of the same resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), to report as soon as possible, and whenever appropriate thereafter, but in any case not later than the opening date of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, on Israel's compliance with and implementation of paragraph 4 of the resolution.

2. By a note verbale dated 29 January 1974 addressed to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, the Secretary-General drew attention to his reporting responsibility under paragraph 5 of the resolution and requested the Government of Israel to forward to him, as soon as possible, any relevant information on the implementation of the respective provisions. In a second message to the Permanent Representative, dated 27 June 1974, the Secretary-General requested the Government of Israel to make the required information available to him not later

than 30 August 1974, as he planned to submit the report that had been requested of him before the opening of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

3. By a note verbale dated 20 August 1974, the Permanent Representative of Israel on instructions from his Government, conveyed to the Secretary-General the following comments:

For years the annual debates in the General Assembly on the reports of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA have been exploited by Arab and other delegations for political and propaganda purposes, in a manner which complicates and confounds the issues and hinders efforts to deal with the reports in a way which would promote the real interests and well-being of the refugees and displaced persons. It is against this background that General Assembly resolution 3089 C (XXVIII) was adopted. This resolution failed to take into account the actual conditions prevailing in the area. Instead, it contained a variety of untrue allegations against the Government of Israel. For this reason, the Israel delegation was among those who cast their votes against it.

Nevertheless, as stated on previous occasions, the Government of Israel is conscious of the humanitarian aspects of the problem of the displaced persons who fled as a result of the hostilities of June 1967. At the same time, it should be noted that the conditions prevailing in the area are not such as to permit a large-scale return of these persons. Certain Arab Governments continue to give aid and support to terrorist organizations as well as to other subversive activities. Moreover, the willingness of the Government of Israel to permit, on humanitarian grounds, the return of a number of displaced persons has been exploited for infiltrating trained terrorists and saboteurs. Pending a peace settlement, it is therefore necessary to reconcile the return of displaced persons with the Government's responsibility for the safety, welfare and security of the local population and the security of the State itself.

Thus, during the last year, as in previous years, the Government of Israel has continued to facilitate the return of persons who were displaced in 1967. The arrangements for family reunion and hardship cases have been maintained, and co-operation in this respect with the local Arab authorities has continued. The total number of displaced persons who have returned to their homes since 1967 is now over 53,000. During the debate on the report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, the Israel delegation will provide more details on this matter.

As to the security measures taken by the Israel authorities in refugee camps in the Gaza area in 1971, the extreme gravity of the situation that made these measures necessary is well known. Terrorist organizations based

⁹² UN doc. A/9740. The resolution is printed as doc. 26 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

in the Arab States, and supported by them, had conducted in that area a campaign of indiscriminate murder and sabotage. The main victims of that criminal campaign were the local Arab inhabitants, including refugees. The purpose of that activity was to create an atmosphere of violence and insecurity in the Gaza area and to prevent, by intimidation and fear, all efforts to improve the situation.

The measures taken by the Israel authorities in refugee camps were designed to put an end to the reign of terror and murder, in pursuance of their responsibility, as stipulated also in Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967⁹³, to ensure the safety, welfare and security of all the inhabitants in the area under their control. In view of the conditions obtaining in the refugee camps, it was necessary to lay out access roads there, and this unavoidably involved the demolition of a number of shelters.

Those measures have met with considerable success and the security situation in the Gaza area has greatly improved ever since. Violence and terror have been virtually eliminated and the local inhabitants, including refugees, have been enabled to engage in work and other normal activities without fear of terrorist attacks on their lives.

As explained on several previous occasions, every possible care was taken to avoid undue hardship to the inhabitants whose shelters had to be demolished. Alternative accommodation was provided and accepted by most of these people, but some refugees preferred arrangements of their own choice. It has subsequently transpired that some of the arrangements made at the time by a number of refugees did not prove satisfactory to them. Consequently, a joint survey of these cases was conducted in 1973 by the Israel authorities in Gaza and representatives of UNRWA and, during the last year, further action has been taken by the Israel authorities to provide suitable housing for those still in need of it.

4. The Secretary-General has obtained from the Commissioner-General of UNRWA such information as is available to him regarding the return of refugees registered with the Agency. As indicated in paragraph 5 of the report submitted by the Secretary-General last year pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2963 D (XXVII) (A/9156),⁹⁴ the Agency is not involved in any arrangements for the return of the refugees and its information is based in the main on Agency records relating to requests by returning refugees for retransfer of rations to the areas to which they have returned. The Agency would not be aware

of the return of any refugees who did not ask for the provision of rations or services. So far as is known to the Agency, between 1 July 1973 and 30 June 1974, 455 displaced refugees returned from east Jordan to the West Bank and 142 from east Jordan to the Gaza Strip. In addition, 19 refugees returned to the Gaza Strip from Egypt. The Agency does not operate in the occupied Golan Heights, but knows of no cases of refugees returning there from among those displaced in Syria. Taking into account the figures given in this connexion in last year's report (A/9156), the information available to the Agency, based on requests for the retransfer of rations, accounts for about 8,000 displaced refugees as having returned to the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between July 1967 and July 1974. This number is a small proportion (15 per cent) of the total number of displaced refugees and displaced persons reported by the Permanent Representative of Israel, in his note of 20 August 1974 to the Secretary-General, as having returned.

5. The following report on developments concerning the matters relating to refugees in the Gaza Strip referred to in the resolution is based on information received from the Commissioner-General of UNRWA.

6. Since the publication of the Secretary-General's report of last year, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2963 C (XXVII) (A/9155),⁹⁵ there have been 12 cases of punitive demolition of refugee shelters in the camps in the Gaza Strip. The Agency has continued to protest to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs against such demolitions and has asked for their cessation. Appropriate claims for compensation have also been made to the Israel military authorities, but, as in previous cases of punitive demolition, these claims have not been paid.

7. Reference was made in last year's report (A/9155, paras. 5, 6 and 7) to the joint survey, conducted by the Agency and the Israel authorities in 1973, of families considered by the Agency to be still unsatisfactorily housed as a consequence of the large-scale demolitions in 1971 in the Gaza Strip (described in documents A/8383 and Add.1 and A/8814).⁹⁶ This survey had shown that, of a total of 942 families surveyed, 706 families were still

⁹³ Doc. 246 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

⁹⁴ Doc. 5 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

⁹⁵ Doc. 4 in *ibid*.

⁹⁶ Doc. 7 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

inadequately housed, of whom 266 were considered to be serious cases of hardship (A/9155, para. 7). The Agency's claim for compensation, of approximately \$417,000, payment of which would have enabled it to construct new housing, has not been met, and the Agency has continued to press the Israel authorities at various levels for urgent action to provide adequate accommodation for these refugee families. Eventually, it was formally confirmed to the Commissioner-General, by letter of 11 August 1974 from the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that, as a first step in a programme of rehousing, 56 of the hardship cases, from the Rafah Camp, would be given free accommodation in a nearby housing project established by the Israel authorities. This housing project is the same one in which the refugees who were affected by the Israeli road construction in 1972/1973 in Rafah Camp were offered new housing for purchase (see A/9155, paras. 9, 10 and 11).

8. The Israel authorities have also declared their intention, as the next step in the programme, to make available in new housing in the Bureij area 100 houses (or residential units) free-of-charge to other hardship cases from the Beach and Jabalia Camps. Discussions are taking place between the Agency and the Israel authorities in Gaza on the arrangements for the construction of this new housing.

9. There is therefore an assurance from the Israel authorities of housing for 156 of the 266 hardship cases. The Agency is pursuing with the Israel authorities the housing of the balance of the hardship cases, as a first priority, and also of the other families unsatisfactorily housed.

10. There were further demolitions in the Rafah Camp, the reason for which given by the Israel authorities was security considerations. By 30 June 1974, 149 Agency-built shelter rooms, 6 shelter rooms built with the Agency's assistance and 160 privately-built shelter rooms were demolished, affecting 148 families. The demolitions were carried out by the refugees concerned in order to salvage materials (see A/9155, para. 11). The refugees affected are being given the option by the Israel authorities of purchasing housing, on the instalment plan, in a housing project constructed by the military authorities in the vicinity of the camp (and of the international line between the Gaza Strip and Sinai), or occupying Agency shelters in the camp vacated by

other refugees opting for the new housing whose shelters were not affected by the demolitions. Compensation is paid to the refugees by the Israel authorities only for demolished privately-built rooms and additions.

11. Of the 148 families who demolished their shelters, 132 opted for new accommodation in the housing project constructed by the Israel authorities. Of the remaining 16 families, 6 have been allocated vacated shelters in the camp, 4 have moved elsewhere and the remaining 6 are believed to be in temporary accommodation.

12. In view of the different contexts in which demolitions have taken place and the new housing schemes which have been established in the Gaza Strip, it may be useful to distinguish the various categories. One category is that in which the Israel authorities, in response to a protest by the Agency in 1969, have given advance notice to the Agency of their intention to demolish shelters in order to construct or widen roads through a camp for security reasons, and have refrained from actual demolition in order to give the Agency time to construct alternative accommodation at the expense of the Israel authorities. Reference may be made to the Commissioner-General's annual reports to the General Assembly for 1969–1970,⁹⁷ 1970–1971,⁹⁸ 1971–1972,⁹⁹ and 1972–1973.¹⁰⁰ In this case, the new housing offsets the demolition of the shelters.

13. A second category is constituted by the large-scale demolition of shelters in the Jabalia, Beach and Rafah Camps in July/August 1971, in which adequate alternative accommodation was not provided in advance of demolition and the consequences of which for the refugees have been brought out in preceding reports (A/8383 and Add.1, A/8814 and A/9155).¹⁰¹

14. A third category consists of the demolitions which began towards the end of 1972 and affected the Rafah and Khan Yunis Camps. In this case, the refugees affected are given the option of purchasing new government housing (generally of a higher standard than the shelters demolished) or of moving into shelters vacated by those who have opted for the new Israel Government housing

⁹⁷ Doc. 316 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

⁹⁸ Doc. 408 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

⁹⁹ Doc. 3 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

¹⁰⁰ Doc. 3 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹⁰¹ See notes to paragraphs 6 and 7 above.

and whose shelters were not affected by the demolitions. Compensation is paid only for privately-built shelters and additions. It should be explained here that the Israel authorities have undertaken three new housing projects in the vicinity of Rafah and one in Khan Yunis, with a second project near Khan Yunis apparently now under consideration. In addition, there are schemes for the sale of plots of land to Gaza inhabitants, including refugees. Accommodation in these housing projects can be acquired only by purchase, but may be effected on an instalment plan. These projects were not intended to provide free accommodation in replacement of demolished shelters and the Agency has not been involved in their planning or construction. It is only very recently that (as indicated in paragraph 7 above) the Israel authorities have agreed to make available some accommodation in one of the projects, free-of-charge, for refugee families in hardship as a result of demolitions unrelated to the projects.

15. The fourth and final category consists of the punitive demolition of shelters. No alternative accommodation is provided in such cases and compensation is paid only for any accidental damage caused to adjacent structures and not for the demolished shelters.

16. Certain pertinent figures have been provided by the Commissioner-General and are given below relating to the demolition of refugee shelters and the provision of alternative accommodation.

17. Between July 1967 and 30 June 1974, 11,473 shelter rooms (falling within one of the four categories mentioned above) were demolished in the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip by or at the instance of the Israel authorities, affecting 4,209 refugee families. Of these families, 878 have been provided with free alternative accommodation in new housing constructed by the Agency at the expense of the Israel authorities (category 1, para. 12 above) and a further 25 families have also been provided with new housing constructed by the Agency with funds derived from the settlement by the Israel authorities of a claim for the demolition of the original shelters. An additional 429 families have purchased new housing in one of the new Israel housing projects (category 3, para. 14 above); 43 families affected by the large-scale demolitions in July/August 1971 (category 2, para. 13 above) have also purchased such housing. Sixty-eight other families have obtained alter-

native accommodation in the shelters in the camps vacated by those who have opted for the new Israel Government housing and whose shelters were not affected by the demolitions. In brief, of the 4,209 families affected, 1,443 have found alternative accommodation in a total of about 3,190 rooms (averaging about 3 rooms per family) in new housing or in shelters vacated in connexion with new housing. As reported earlier (see A/8383 and Add.1 and A/8814), some alternative accommodation was provided, rent-free for a period, within the Gaza Strip and in El Arish, for families whose shelters were demolished in July and August 1971, but a large number remained inadequately housed (see para. 7 above).

18. It should be added that the construction of more new housing by the Israel authorities is in progress, as indicated in paragraph 14 above. The Agency understands that the construction projects in the vicinity of Rafah should, when completed, provide about 530 residential units of two or three rooms each, in addition to the units already completed and allotted. It is not clear, however, whether, as in previous cases, this new housing will be available only for purchase.

5

Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine¹⁰²

September 30, 1974

1. In paragraph 3 of resolution 3089 B (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973,¹⁰³ the General Assembly noted with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 2 of Assembly resolution 194 (III) and requested the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof and to report thereon as appropriate, but no later than 1 October 1974. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request.

2. In its twenty-fourth¹⁰⁴ and twenty-fifth¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Published as Annex to UN doc. A/9789 dated October 4, 1974.

¹⁰³ Doc. 26 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹⁰⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, agenda item 32, document A/6451. [original note.]

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 34, document A/6846. [original note.]

reports, covering the periods from 24 December 1965 to 30 September 1966 and from 1 October 1966 to 30 September 1967, the Commission responded to earlier requests by the General Assembly in its resolutions 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965 and 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966, in connexion with the implementation of paragraph 2 of resolution 194 (III). In those reports the Commission noted that examination of various ways in which it might be possible to intensify its efforts with any prospect of advancing matters towards the implementation of paragraph 2 of resolution 194 (III) had compelled the conclusion that all the ways envisaged presupposed substantial changes in the situation. The events which had occurred in 1967 and thereafter complicated an already very complex problem. However recent developments in the Middle East encourage the Commission to believe that prospects may have improved.

3. In the course of 1972, in response to formal requests from interested parties, and after consultation with the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, the Commission decided that these interested parties could have access to certain documents¹⁰⁶ of the Commission with the understanding that the recipient Governments will continue to treat valuation figures contained

therein on a confidential basis. Copies of such documents would be furnished on the understanding that any expenses shall be borne by the delegation concerned.

4. In accordance with the Commission's decision to make available to the interested parties upon request copies of certain documents and materials in its possession, and in pursuance of such a request by Egypt, the duplication work was undertaken and completed in June 1974, at which time copies of the relevant set of documents were transmitted to the Permanent Mission of Egypt. On 31 May 1974, the Commission received a request from Jordan for copies of the same set of documents and the Commission agreed that the Permanent Mission of Jordan be supplied also with the same set of documents as Egypt.

5. The Commission is encouraged by the efforts which have been made during the several months towards a Middle East settlement which could lead to a just and lasting peace in the area. However the circumstances governing the possibilities open to the Commission have remained up to now essentially unchanged. The Commission hopes that recent developments will permit it to carry forward its work vigorously, and remains determined to do so.

¹⁰⁶ (a) Microfilms of land registers received from the Mandatory Government;
 (b) RP-1 forms (identification of property parcels including individual valuation figures);
 (c) Index of owners' names (which provides means of direct reference to the holdings recorded in the name of each owner). [original note.]

6

Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories¹⁰⁷

November 4, 1974

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¹⁰⁷ UN doc. A/9817, excluding Letter of Transmittal and Annex.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories was established by the General Assembly in resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968.¹⁰⁸ By that resolution the General Assembly decided to establish the Special Committee, composed of three Member States; requested the President of the General Assembly to appoint the members of the Special Committee; requested the Government of Israel to receive the Special Committee, to co-operate with it and to facilitate its work; requested the Special Committee to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arose thereafter; and requested the Secretary-General to provide the Special Committee with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its task.

2. The following Member States were appointed on 12 September 1969 to serve on the Special Committee: Somalia, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia. The Government of Somalia appointed Mr. Abdulrahim Abby Farah, Permanent Representative to the United Nations at that time, as its representative on the Special Committee. The Government of Sri Lanka appointed Mr. H.S. Amerasinghe, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, as its representative on the Special Committee. The Government of Yugoslavia appointed Mr. Borut Bohte, Associate Professor of the Faculty of Law of Ljubljana University and Member of the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia, as its representative on the Special Committee. On 24 June 1971, the Government of Somalia informed the Secretary-General that Mr. Hussein Nur Elmi, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations, had been appointed to act instead of Mr. A.A. Farah on the Special Committee. On 26 April 1974, the President of the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session informed the Secretary-General that Somalia had decided to withdraw from the Special Committee and that, in conformity with paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII), he had appointed Senegal a member of the Special Committee. On 30 April 1974, the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United

Nations informed the Secretary-General that his Government had appointed Mr. Keba M'Baye, Chief Justice of Senegal (Premier Président de la Cour suprême du Sénégal), as its representative on the Special Committee.

3. On 5 October 1970, the Special Committee submitted its first report¹⁰⁹ in accordance with Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII) and 2546 (XXIV) of 11 December 1969.¹¹⁰ The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 744th to 751st meetings from 7 to 11 December 1970. On 15 December 1970, the General Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolution 2727 (XXV).¹¹¹

4. On 17 September 1971, the Special Committee submitted its second report (A/8389 and Corr.1 and 2),¹¹² prepared in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV) and 2727 (XXV). On 10 December 1971, the Special Committee submitted a third report (A/8389/Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1 and 2)¹¹³ containing information which had become available after the completion of its second report. Those reports were discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 798th to 803rd meetings, from 13 to 16 December 1971. On 20 December 1971, the General Assembly considered the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolution 2851 (XXVI).¹¹⁴

5. On 25 September 1972, the Special Committee submitted its fourth report (A/8828)¹¹⁵ in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV) and 2851 (XXVI). The report was discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 849th to 855th meetings from 30 November to 7 December 1972. On 15 December 1972, the General Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolution 3005 (XXVII).¹¹⁶

6. On 15 October 1973, the Special Committee submitted its fifth report (A/9148)¹¹⁷ in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolutions

¹⁰⁹ Doc. 317 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

¹¹⁰ Doc. 351 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.

¹¹¹ Doc. 337 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

¹¹² Doc. 409 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

¹¹³ Doc. 412 in *ibid.*

¹¹⁴ Doc. 430 in *ibid.*

¹¹⁵ Doc. 5 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

¹¹⁶ Doc. 13 in *ibid.*

¹¹⁷ Doc. 7 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹⁰⁸ Doc. 256 in *International Documents on Palestine 1968*.

2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI) and 3005 (XXVII). On 20 November 1973, the Special Committee submitted a supplement to its fifth report (A/9148/Add.1). The report and its supplement were discussed in the Special Political Committee at its 890th and 892nd to 897th meetings from 19 to 26 November 1973. In addition, the Special Political Committee considered the report of the Secretary-General (A/9237), submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3005 (XXVII). On 7 December 1973, the General Assembly examined the report of the Special Political Committee and adopted resolutions 3092 A (XXVIII) and 3092 B (XXVIII).¹¹⁸

7. The present report has been prepared in accordance with the terms of General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII), 2546 (XXIV), 2727 (XXV), 2851 (XXVI), 3005 (XXVII) and 3092 B (XXVIII).

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK

8. The Special Committee continued its work under the rules of procedure contained in its first report to the Secretary-General.

9. The Special Committee held a series of meetings at United Nations Headquarters from 4 to 7 February 1974 to review its mandate consequent on the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 3092 B (XXVIII) and to decide on the organization of its work for the year. The Special Committee decided to continue its system of monitoring information on the occupied territories and to hold periodic meetings to analyse the information to keep track of the occupying Power's policies and practices in the occupied territories. At those meetings, the Special Committee reviewed information on the occupied territories which had become available since 15 October 1973, the date of the adoption of its fifth report (A/9148). The information to which the Special Committee attached importance related to reports in December 1973 of the expulsion of eight persons, prominent in the life of the West Bank. The Special Committee decided that it would hear the testimony of those persons and of others who had first-hand and corroborative evidence of conditions in the occupied territories and that it would travel to the Middle East for

that purpose.

10. At the meetings, the Special Committee decided to communicate with the Governments concerned. On 6 February 1974, the Special Committee addressed a letter to the Governments of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic referring to Assembly resolutions 3092 A and B (XXVIII) and stating that it was ready to receive any information, preferably the identity and whereabouts of individuals who could give evidence of a first-hand or corroborative nature, relating to the policies and practices referred to in resolution 3092 B (XXVIII).

11. The Governments of Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic were asked to furnish further information on allegations of violations of human rights that they had made earlier.

12. The Governments of Jordan and Lebanon were requested to furnish information on the whereabouts of the eight persons who were reported to have been expelled from the West Bank by Israel in December 1973.

13. On 6 February 1974 the Special Committee, in an effort to secure the co-operation of the Government of Israel, addressed the following note to the Secretary-General:

"The Special Committee has examined General Assembly resolutions 3092 A and B (XXVIII) entitled 'Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories', adopted on 7 December 1973. In resolution 3092 B (XXVIII) the Assembly:

"*Deplores* the continued refusal of the Government of Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories..."

and

Requests the Secretary-General:

"(a) To render all necessary facilities to the Special Committee, including those required for its visits to the occupied territories with a view to investigating Israeli policies and practices affecting the human rights of the population of those territories".

The Special Committee notes that, in the course of the debate on its report [A/9148 and Add.1] at the twenty-eighth session, the representatives of Israel confirmed their Government's refusal to co-operate with the Special Committee.

In the view of the Special Committee, as expressed in all its reports to date, a visit to the occupied territories would be most helpful in the execution of its mandate. For this reason, and notwithstanding the statements made by the Israeli representatives this past session, the Special Committee would be most grateful if another

¹¹⁸ Doc. 28 in *ibid.*

attempt were made by you on its behalf to obtain the co-operation of the Government of Israel.

14. On 7 June 1974 the Secretary-General addressed the following note to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations:

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations and has the honour to draw his attention to General Assembly resolutions 3092 A and B (XXVIII), entitled 'Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories'.

The Secretary-General would in particular call attention to paragraph 10 (a) of resolution 3092 B (XXVIII) in which the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to 'render all necessary facilities to the Special Committee, including those required for its visits to the occupied territories with a view to investigating Israeli policies and practices affecting the human rights of the population of those territories'.

The Secretary-General would appreciate the assistance of the Government of Israel in enabling him to comply with this request of the General Assembly.

15. On 12 March 1974 the Chairman of the Special Committee addressed the following letter to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC):

I have the honour, on behalf of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, to draw your attention to resolutions 3092 A and B (XXVIII) entitled 'Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories', adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session.

In operative paragraph 9 of this resolution [3092 B (XXVIII)] the General Assembly requested the Special Committee, 'pending the early termination of Israeli occupation, to continue to investigate Israeli policies and practices in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, to consult, as appropriate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the welfare and human rights of the population of the occupied territories, and to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter'.

The General Assembly has addressed similar requests to the Special Committee in the past. It may be recalled that, in accordance with these requests, correspondence was exchanged between the Special Committee and your organization on questions of common interest, in particular, the implementation by Israel of the Fourth

Geneva Convention¹¹⁹ in the occupied territories of the Middle East. The Special Committee understands the predicament in which your organization finds itself in its attempt to implement a humanitarian instrument in such a complex and delicate political situation as that prevailing in the occupied territories; indeed the Special Committee itself has had to function under similar difficulties and, in fulfilling the mandate given to it by the General Assembly, has had to dispense perforce with visits to the occupied territories apart from being denied all co-operation from the Government of Israel. In an attempt to overcome this problem, the Special Committee has, ever since its first report (A/8089, paras. 155-156), recommended an alternative arrangement. This recommendation was repeated in the subsequent reports of the Special Committee (A/8389 and Corr.1 and 2, paras. 90 and 91; A/8828, paras. 93-99; A/9148, para. 148).

The Special Committee has, therefore, noted with great interest the ICRC's proposal made on 12 December 1973 for the setting up of joint commissions of inquiry. As you are aware, the ICRC's proposal is almost identical to that made by the Special Committee for the first time in 1970.

The Special Committee also notes that, in the appeal issued on 21 January 1974, the ICRC referred to its proposal and reminded all States parties to the Geneva Convention 'whether involved or not in the Middle East conflict, of the common responsibility which they assumed'. Similarly, the General Assembly in 1971 [resolution 2851 (XXVI)] and 1972 [resolution 3005 (XXVII)] requested all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention to do their utmost to ensure that Israel respects and fulfils its obligations under that Convention. In the same appeal, the ICRC referred to the conflict between political and humanitarian considerations, resulting in the deprivation of the subjects of these Conventions from the protection afforded by those instruments. The Special Committee shares the view that implementation of such Conventions should not be conditional. It would hope that finally, perhaps with the support of your organization, an acceptable formula could be found to ensure the inhabitants of the occupied territories the protection of which they have been deprived since 1967.

In view of the several points held in common by the Special Committee and the ICRC, and the shared desire for ensuring the proper discharge of international obligations particularly as regards international humanitarian law, it would be a service to our common cause if the Special Committee could receive from the ICRC any further information available to it. The Special Committee will hold a short series of meetings in Geneva in

¹¹⁹ Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949 (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287). [original note.]

May and would be glad to hear from the ICRC on that occasion.

16. On 4 April 1974 the ICRC delegate to International Organizations replied as follows:

On behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the communication which you were good enough to address to the President of the Committee on 12 March 1974.

The International Committee has taken note of the desire of the General Assembly, reiterated in its resolution 3092 B (XXVIII), that the Special Committee should consult, as appropriate, with this organization.

The International Committee is also aware of the efforts made by the Special Committee in recent years to discharge its mandate as evidenced by the recommendations which were made by the Special Committee in several of its reports to the General Assembly and which you mention in your letter.

Furthermore, the International Committee notes that the steps which it took in December 1973 and January 1974 have not escaped the attention of the Special Committee.

As we have had occasion to point out in previous exchanges of correspondence, the information which the International Committee makes public is naturally at the disposal of the Special Committee. On the other hand, it must be repeated that the functions which the Red Cross, under the Geneva Conventions of 1949,¹²⁰ is required to discharge with regard to all the parties to a conflict oblige it, on grounds of discretion and impartiality, to communicate the results of certain activities, or certain approaches, to the directly interested parties only.

After allegations of violations of the Geneva Conventions were brought to its notice by each of the belligerents following the resumption of hostilities in the Middle East in October 1973, the International Committee, in a spirit of impartiality, transmitted to all the parties to the conflict its proposal for the establishment of joint commissions of inquiry.

Moreover, the call addressed to the States parties to the Geneva Conventions on 21 January 1974, reminding them of their obligations to respect and also ensure respect for those Conventions, was made as a result of difficulties encountered by the International Committee in the discharge of its functions, difficulties which were depriving the victims of the conflict of the assistance and protection to which they were entitled.

Hence, although the proposals made by the International Committee on 12 December 1973 coincide to some extent with suggestions made by the Special Committee, both the proposals and the appeal of 21 January 1974 differ from those suggestions in that they are addressed to all the parties to the Middle East conflict.

In these circumstances, it does not seem advisable

that any information other than what is normally available through the press releases, information notes and annual reports of the International Committee should be submitted by it to the Special Committee, whose mandate concerns only one of the parties to the conflict.

You yourself have in fact been good enough to acknowledge the particularly difficult conditions in which the International Committee has to discharge its functions and endeavour to divorce humanitarian problems from any political context; the Special Committee will no doubt understand that the attitude of the International Committee in this matter is dictated solely by the interests of the victims needing protection.

17. On 2 April 1974 the Government of Egypt transmitted to the Special Committee its reply to ICRC on the ICRC proposal to establish commissions of inquiry into alleged violations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions by Egypt and Israel.

18. The Special Committee held a second series of meetings, from 3 to 17 May 1974, to examine information on the occupied territories, including allegations of violations of human rights in the occupied territories made by the Governments of Egypt and Jordan. Meetings were held at Geneva from 3 to 7 May 1974, at Beirut on 8 and 9 May 1974, at Damascus on 9 May 1974 and at Geneva from 10 to 17 May 1974. Witnesses were heard at the meetings at Beirut and Damascus. On 14 and 15 May 1974 the Special Committee viewed two films that had been made during the period 1969 to 1973 in the occupied territories and heard the testimony of their producer.

19. The Special Committee decided to secure copies of the films it had viewed, as well as copies of uncut filmed interviews it had also viewed, and to make these parts of the evidence recorded by it in accordance with its mandate.

20. The Special Committee scheduled a third series of meetings for September 1974.

21. On 7 September 1974, the Special Committee met at Geneva to discuss the request of the Syrian Arab Republic that the Special Committee investigate the allegation that Israeli forces had devastated the town of Quneitra during their withdrawal from 4 to 24 June 1967 in implementation of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, signed at Geneva on

¹²⁰ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75 (1950), Nos. 970-973. [original note.]

31 May 1974 (S/11302/Add.1, annex A).¹²¹ The Special Committee travelled to Damascus on 8 September 1974, visited Quneitra on 9 September 1974 and returned to Geneva on 10 September 1974. The Special Committee held meetings on 11 and 12 September 1974 to examine additional information on the occupied territories and to consider its report.

22. The Special Committee held a further series of meetings at United Nations Headquarters from 22 to 25 October 1974 to complete its consideration of its report to the Secretary-General and to adopt it.

III. MANDATE

23. The Special Committee's interpretation of its mandate was contained in its first report to the Secretary-General, in which the Special Committee determined the scope of its investigation in answer to the following questions:

(a) Which are the territories that should be considered "occupied territories"?

(b) Who is covered by the term "population" of the occupied territories?

(c) What are the "human rights" of the population of the occupied territories?

(d) What are the "policies and practices" referred to in General Assembly resolutions 2443 (XXIII) and 2546 (XXIV)?

In its subsequent reports (A/8389 and Corr.1 and 2, chap. II; A/8389/Add.1 and Corr.1 and 2, para. 8; A/8828, chap. II and A/9148, chap. I), the Special Committee reiterated this interpretation in the light of the relevant General Assembly resolutions and continued to exercise its functions according to that interpretation. The Special Committee considers that the General Assembly requested it to investigate practices and policies of the Government of Israel affecting the human rights of the population of the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the hostilities of June 1967. Subsequent to the implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on disengagement of forces in pursuance of the Geneva Peace Conference (S/11198, annex), signed on 18 January 1974,¹²² and the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces (S/11302/Add.1, annex

A), signed on 31 May 1974,¹²³ the demarcation of the areas under occupation was altered as indicated in the maps attached to those agreements (S/11198/Add.1 and S/11302/Add.3). In its first report, the Special Committee defined those rights as, briefly, those which the Security Council referred to as "essential and inalienable" in its resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967. The instruments of international law in which those rights are defined are the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949,¹²⁴ the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.¹²⁵

24. In its fifth report to the Secretary-General (A/9148, para. 15), the Special Committee considered that, by resolution 3005 (XXVII), the Assembly had broadened its mandate to include the application of The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (14 May 1954).¹²⁶ The Special Committee cited the relevant provisions of that Convention and gave its interpretation of international law relating to protection of cultural property in occupied territories. In addition, the Special Committee gave due attention to the question of rights concerning property in occupied territories and the relevant sections of The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. It did so because of the considerable evidence before it on the disposal of property in the occupied territories by the occupying Power or by agencies for which it was responsible.

25. The Special Committee must emphasize that the population of the occupied territories, by the very fact of its being in a territory occupied as a result of hostilities, is entitled to the special protection afforded by international law. This protection, in so far as the right to return is concerned, equally applies to those persons normally resident in the areas now under occupation, but

¹²¹ Doc. 115 below.

¹²² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 972, p. 135. [original note.]

¹²³ *The Hague Conventions and Declarations, 1899-1907* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1918). [original note.]

¹²⁴ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 249, No. 3511, p. 215. [original note.]

¹²⁵ Doc. 115 below.

¹²⁶ Doc. 50 below.

who have left those areas under the pressure of the hostilities. This was stated by the Special Committee in its first report.

26. The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 are the specific instruments that provide this special protection. As stated in article 154 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, "this...Convention [is] supplementary to Sections II and III of the Regulations annexed to the...Conventions of The Hague".

27. These instruments seek to protect the person and property as well as the identity of the population under occupation. The right of the population of the occupied territories to an identity of their own is further strengthened by the unequivocal pronouncements of the General Assembly, notably its resolution 181 (II) of 20 November 1947, whereby their right to a homeland was acknowledged.

28. The mandate of the Special Committee, therefore is, to ascertain whether the policy or practices of the occupying Power constitute an infringement of the rights of the population of the occupied territories.

29. The Special Committee's procedure has been and remains to determine whether the evidence before the Special Committee proves beyond reasonable doubt that the policies and practices of the Government of Israel in the occupied territories constitute an infringement of those rights which are protected under international law in conditions of occupation, taking into account the reasons adduced by the Government of Israel in justification of such policies and practices.

IV. ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE

30. Consequent on the adoption of General Assembly resolution 3092 B (XXVIII), the Special Committee continued its investigation of allegations of violations of human rights of the population of the occupied territories.

31. The Special Committee, though still denied access by the Government of Israel to the occupied territories to conduct its investigation on the spot, continued to follow, on a day-to-day basis, developments in the occupied territories [via] reports of statements by members of the Government of Israel and other Israeli leaders. The Special Committee

expanded its coverage to include a representative section of the Arab press. The Special Committee had before it evidence furnished by Governments in substantiation of allegations made to it by those Governments. The Special Committee heard the testimony of 21 persons (A/AC.145/RT.59-61). In addition, the Special Committee took note of information contained in United Nations documents, some of which contained the texts of letters from the Governments of Israel, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic. The Special Committee also took note of the information communicated to it by the International Committee of the Red Cross and contained in its publications, among them, principally, *The ICRC in Action Information Notes* and the annual report of the ICRC.¹²⁷ The Special Committee took note of other evidence in the form of studies and reports prepared by organizations and individuals engaged in research on the Middle East question, such as the Institute of Palestine Studies of Beirut and, in the form of films, such as "Jerusalem...Never" and "They did not exist".

32. As in the past, the Special Committee did not allow its investigation to suffer from the Government of Israel's refusal to co-operate with it. However, there remain certain allegations, the investigation of which could be more thoroughly conducted *in situ*. The investigation of such allegations continues to be seriously hampered by the Government of Israel's persistent denial to the Special Committee of access to the occupied territories.

33. In its investigation of the policies and practices followed by Israel in the occupied territories to establish whether or not those policies and practices were in violation of the human rights of the population of those territories, the Special Committee examined those sources which it deemed unimpeachable, namely the statements made by the members of the Government of Israel and other Israeli leaders, as well as Israeli reports of measures being taken in the occupied territories, where such statements and reports have not been challenged, contradicted or refuted.

34. At the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the Chairman of the Special Committee expressed the Special Committee's view in the Special Political Committee that it saw no further

¹²⁷ Doc. 220 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

purpose in furnishing the Assembly with more evidence until and unless major changes in the situation took place. It had presented the Assembly, through the Secretary-General, with all the necessary information and it was incumbent on the General Assembly to take appropriate action to remedy the situation of the civilians of the occupied territories. In the present report the Special Committee restricts itself to those areas of civilian life in the occupied territories where marked changes were detected, the situation in general remaining that reflected in the Special Committee's previous reports. In particular, the Special Committee wishes to state that, despite the implementation of the agreements on disengagement of forces reached during 1974, the situation so far as the civilians under Israeli military occupation was concerned was not materially altered as the overwhelming majority of the civilian population brought under Israeli occupation in 1967 continued to remain under such occupation. In this sense, therefore, no change has occurred in the situation which forms the subject of the Special Committee's investigation.

35. The Special Committee found the evidence of Dr. Walid Kamhawi, physician, Mr. Abdul Jawad Saleh, Mayor of El-Bireh, Mr. Hussein Gaghoub, practising lawyer, Mr. Dameen Hussein Oudeh, trade unionist, Mr. Abdul Mohsen Abu Meizer, practising lawyer, Mr. Arabi Musa Awwad, teacher and Mr. Jiries Awwad Qawwas, politician, who appeared before the Special Committee at Beirut, particularly interesting. This was the testimony of persons who, by reason of their profession, had had daily experience of life under military occupation and who were in a position that brought them in regular contact with a vast range of civilian persons and military occupation authorities. The Special Committee has had their testimony transcribed and issued as its documents A/AC.145/RT.59 to 61. Their testimony gave the Special Committee relevant additional information on the various aspects of life under occupation.

36. The Special Committee received evidence relating to the following allegations of violation of human rights of the population of the occupied territories:

(a) Annexation and settlement of the occupied territories by Israel;

- (b) Demolition of houses;
- (c) Mass arrests;
- (d) Prison conditions;
- (e) Curfews, administrative detention and other measures;
- (f) Expulsion and denial of the right to return;
- (g) Measures of economic exploitation.

In the paragraphs that follow, the Special Committee has endeavoured to give a representative selection of the evidence that it received.

A. EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE POLICY OF ANNEXATION AND SETTLEMENT

37. The following evidence received by the Special Committee relates to the allegations of the continued existence of a policy of annexation and settlement of the occupied territories by Israel.

1. *Continued existence of a policy of annexation and settlement*

38. On 15 May 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported a statement by the Minister of Tourism, Mr. Moshe Kol, to the effect that Israel was setting up settlements in the occupied territories in order to remain there, "as this represents the future map of Israel".

39. On 31 July 1974, Radio-Israel reported a statement made by the Prime Minister, Mr. Yitzak Rabin, in the Knesset, in connexion with the attempt that had been made by some Israeli groups to establish a settlement in the village of Sebastia, north-west of Nablus. According to the report, the Prime Minister stated that the Government of Israel's policy of settlement of the occupied territories "was based on a series of priorities, on security and political considerations, on settlement requirements and on the existing possibilities and restrictions . . . Only the Government of Israel has the right to decide when and where to establish a settlement and no infringement of this right would be accepted by the Government . . . the Government will continue to establish settlements according to its plans and official decisions and it shall do all that is necessary to prevent the establishment of unauthorized settlements".

40. On 14 August 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported a statement made by the Minister of Defence, Mr. Shimon Peres, to the effect that the Government of Israel had its own priorities regarding the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories. Those priorities existed with regard

to settlements in the Jordan Valley, the Rafah area (southern Gaza Strip), the Jerusalem area and the Golan Heights. According to the same statement, settlement in the northern part of the West Bank was postponed to a later date.

41. On 14 August 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported a statement made by the Minister of Justice, Mr. H. Zadok, in the Knesset, declaring that settlement in the West Bank was regulated by the Government by virtue of the fact that Government permission had to be obtained to live in that area since, under military law, the West Bank was a "closed area". According to the statement, moving from Israel to the West Bank without an authorization issued by the military commander was considered an infringement of the law regulating the conditions of entry into the West Bank; staying in the West Bank was not forbidden *per se*—it was forbidden when it was the result of moving into the area to settle or to help someone else to settle. The Minister quoted article 4 of the regulation controlling entry into the occupied territory of the West Bank whereby offenders are liable to two years' imprisonment, to a fine of £I 2,000, or to both.

2. Implementation of the policy of annexation and settlement in the occupied territories

(a) Gaza Strip

42. On 14 March 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that the Jewish National Fund had completed "preparation" of land on 200 out of 600 *dunams* set aside for "Yamit", an Israeli town planned to be established in the Gaza Strip. According to the same report 500 prefabricated housing units were to be set up and the Jewish National Fund had completed plans to link the planned town of "Yamit" with the Israeli settlements already established near Rafah.

43. On 20 March 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported that the foundation stone of the first house in "Yamit" had been laid: the location of the projected town was given as 1.5 km from the coast and 8 km west of the Northern Road in Sinai.

44. On 3 March 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported plans to establish "during the commencing year" in the Gaza Strip, six *moshavim*, three *kibbutzim* and one municipal centre. According to the Jewish agency, these settlements were planned "to develop gradually into a town". On 14 March 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported that large-scale "land reclamation works" had been undertaken in the Rafah

area for the four settlements planned for Rafah. The statement was attributed to Mr. W. Tsur of the Jewish National Fund.

45. On 25 June 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported that the Ministerial Committee for Settlement of the Territories of the Government of Israel had approved the establishment of a new kibbutz in the area between Gaza City and Khan-Unis.

46. On 30 July 1974, Radio-Israel broadcast that "reclamation" work had started on 1,800 *dunams* in the Rafah area.

47. On 20 August 1974, *Ma'ariv* and Radio-Israel and, on 21 August 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported the establishment of three new settlements in Rafah called "Succoth", "Messora" and "Eshel". According to the Radio-Israel broadcast, this brought the number of settlements in the area to seven.

48. On 2 August 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported a Government decision to establish six Nahal settlements in Rafah "in the commencing weeks".

49. On 13 September 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported the approval by the Committee for Settlement of the Territories of the establishment of four *moshavim* in Rafah.

(b) Golan Heights

50. On 3 and 7 May 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* carried reports of an announcement by Minister Israel Galili of a Government decision "that Israel will never give up the settlements in the Golan Heights".

51. The *Jerusalem Post*, on 3 May 1974, reported the establishment of a new kibbutz in the Golan Heights called "Hanev".

52. An earlier report by *Ma'ariv*, on 28 March 1974, announced the budget of the Jewish National Fund Settlement Department for 1974, allotting £134 million "for development of additional means of production and new agricultural branches in the new settlements in the Golan Heights". On 4 April 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported a statement by the Director of the Jewish National Fund and Development Authority in the Golan Heights declaring that "a record £120 million" would be spent in the Golan Heights during the new fiscal year on "preparing" 14,000 *dunams* of land for farming, building sites, field tracts and expansion of water resources.

53. On 12 July 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported a statement by the Minister of Housing, Mr. A.

Ofer, announcing that an industrial urban centre was planned for the Golan Heights and was to be started in September 1974.

54. On 19 August 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported that the Jewish National Fund was "preparing" 30 *dunams* of land in the Golan Heights for a regional agricultural centre "to provide services" to agricultural settlements in the northern Golan Heights.

55. On 17 September 1974, at 1900 hours, Radio-Israel broadcast that the settlers who had originally established themselves in Quneitra without Government approval had received official recognition by the competent Government authorities and were to be transferred to a permanent settlement in central Golan Heights. The Radio-Israel correspondent is quoted as stating that housing for the settlers had already been started and special funds approved for the settlements. Industrial complexes were to be built to provide work for the settlers.

(c) West Bank

56. On 24 July 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported a statement by Mr. Moshe Dayan, former Minister of Defence, in the Knesset, concerning the West Bank. According to this report, Mr. Dayan stated that the West Bank was part of the fatherland and that Israelis had the right to settle there on a permanent basis in accordance with Government decisions, but that it was not necessary to take possession of the Arab land or to rule over the Arabs of the West Bank.

57. On 17 June 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported that the Jewish National Fund had reached an advanced stage in "preparing" land around the Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley; the land was to be used for those settlements.

58. On 24 July 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported a statement by the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Y. Rabin, to the effect that the Israeli settlements established in the Jordan Valley were being set up "on the assumption that they will remain there and be included in [Israeli] control".

59. On 10 July 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported the planned establishment of a new settlement south of Hebron. According to the report, the foundation of the first 40 buildings had been laid and the settlement was to be populated by orthodox Jewish immigrants from the United States, the first 10 families having already arrived in Israel.

60. On 14 August 1974, *Ma'ariv* and *An-Nahar*

carried a report which had already appeared in the WAFA—Palestine news agency—dispatch of 13 August 1974 concerning the number of Israeli settlers in the group of settlements known as the Etzion-Bloc: 300 Israelis were reported living in Kfar-Etzion, 100 in Rosh-Zurim where "two large groups of new immigrants" were expected, and there were 150 housing units in a regional centre called Alon-Shevut, most of which were already occupied. According to the report the Etzion-Bloc settlers requested the Defence Minister, Mr. Peres, to evacuate Arab inhabitants living nearby and to annex their land. The Minister is reported as stating that the request would be examined but he did not see "at that stage any way to grant the settlers significant additions of land".

61. Reports appeared in January, June and September 1974 in the Israeli and the international press of attempts to establish settlements near Nablus by groups of Israelis who had not received Government authorization to do so and of the consequent reaction of the Government of Israel to those attempts.

(d) Sinai

62. On 28 March 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported a statement by the Government of Israel's Chief of the Civilian Administration of Southern Sinai, Mr. R. Aloni, announcing an additional expenditure of £130 million for construction of new houses in the Israeli settlements at Sharmel-Sheikh and the acceleration of development projects.

63. On 30 July 1974, at 1300 hours, Radio-Israel reported a statement by the Commerce Minister, Mr. H. Bar-Lev, declaring that Southern Sinai "was one of the most vital areas for the security of Israel" and that the Israeli settlement of Ophira was to become an industrialized city in 10 years' time. Mr. Aloni was quoted as stating that it was planned to have 1,000 families living there by 1978.

64. On 15 September 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that 15 families were living in a new housing project at Sharmel-Sheikh and that another 44 families were to be given the keys of their houses within a few days.

B. DEMOLITION OF HOUSES

65. The following evidence received by the Special Committee relates to the allegations of

the continued resort to a policy and practice of demolition of houses.

66. On page 9 of the *Annual Report, 1973* of the International Committee of the Red Cross, it was stated that "a number of houses were destroyed in 1973, leaving many people homeless in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the Jordan".

67. On 10 December 1973, the *Jerusalem Post* reported the demolition of five houses in the village of Deir Abu Da'if, near Jenin, after four men had been arrested.

68. Mr. H. Gaghoub, a Nablus lawyer, testified before the Special Committee on 8 May 1974 (A/AC.145/RT.60, pp. 13-15) that the Israeli military occupation authorities had demolished houses of individuals before charges were brought against them and that some of those individuals had been subsequently acquitted by the Courts.

69. On 31 December 1973, the *Jerusalem Post* reported the destruction of three houses in a village near Nablus "because of the owners' involvement in recent sabotage incidents in the district".

70. On 10 January 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that two houses, whose "owner [had been] arrested three weeks earlier on suspicion of membership in hostile organization", were demolished at Damoun, near Nablus.

71. On 17 January 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that a house was demolished at Jamma'in, near Nablus, under the same circumstances as in the preceding paragraph.

72. On 21 March 1974, *Ma'ariv* carried a report of the demolition of a house and the sealing of a house and a bakery at Nablus.

73. On 1 April 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* and *Ma'ariv* carried reports on the demolition of houses at Jenin that were rented by a person whose son, Hassan Abu Halami, had been arrested two months earlier and accused of being a guerrilla.

74. On 17 April 1974, reports appeared in *Ha'aretz* and the *Jerusalem Post* of the destruction of a house at Nablus.

75. On 29 April 1974, *Ha'aretz* and the *Jerusalem Post* reported the destruction of three houses at Faq-uah, 12 km north of Jenin; the houses belonged to three suspects who had been arrested two months earlier.

76. On 17 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported the destruction of the house of the father of Kamal Darduk, who had been accused of killing an

Israeli soldier.

77. On 3 June 1974, *Ha'aretz*, *Ma'ariv* and the *Jerusalem Post* carried reports of the destruction of a house in Jerusalem that had been rented by two brothers accused of murdering an Israeli taxi driver.

78. On 10 June 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported the destruction of a house at Tulkarm that had been inhabited by a 24-year-old suspect who had been arrested a month earlier and against whom no charges had been filed.

79. On 17 June 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported the destruction of a house and sealing of three rooms at El-Aqra, near Jenin, after the arrest of four young inhabitants.

80. On 25 June 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported the demolition of the house of a young inhabitant of the Beit-Alama refugee camp near Nablus.

C. MASS ARRESTS

81. The following evidence received by the Special Committee relates to the allegation of the continued adoption of measures, such as indiscriminate mass arrests, to intimidate the civilian population.

82. On 3 December 1973, the *Jerusalem Post* reported the arrest of 43 persons at Nablus.

83. On 31 December 1973, the *Jerusalem Post* reported the arrest of "a number of persons".

84. On 17 January 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported the arrest of 20 persons at Nablus.

85. On 4 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported the arrest of 70 persons at Nablus during the previous night.

86. On 4 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported the arrest of "several secondary school students" at Jenin and Tulkarm.

87. On 8 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported the arrest of "dozens of suspects" at Nablus, Tulkarm and the Gaza Strip.

88. On 8 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported the arrest of "several persons between 20 and 30 years of age" at Tulkarm.

89. On 10 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported the arrest of "several persons" at Tulkarm.

90. On 19 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported the arrest of 160 persons, "most from the occupied territories", at Bnei-Braque. Of these, "140 were held and questioned all day and all night by agents of the police and the security services".

On 21 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported their release.

91. On 21 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* and the *Jerusalem Post* reported the arrest of 20 persons, most of them from East Jerusalem.

92. On 24 April 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported the arrest of "dozens of Arabs" from the West Bank and East Jerusalem: 10 from Nablus, 4 from Tulkarm, 3 from Jenin and the rest from Ramallah and other towns in the West Bank. Those arrests were described by *Ma'ariv* on 24 April 1974 as preventive detention to forestall disturbances on Israeli Independence Day. On 28 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported the release of these persons.

93. On 24 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported the arrest of "a group of terrorists" at Ramallah.

94. On 24 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported the arrest of 20 persons from East Jerusalem.

95. On 28 April 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported the arrest of five persons from East Jerusalem and "scores of others" in the West Bank.

96. On 28 April 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported the arrest of "more than 40" persons in East Jerusalem. On 2 May 1974, *Ha'aretz* and *Ma'ariv* reported the arrest of "dozens" of persons at Nablus.

97. On 2 May 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that "scores" of persons in the West Bank were still in custody for a second week.

98. On 12 May 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported the arrest of "dozens" of persons at Tulkarm.

99. On 14 and 15 May 1974, *Ma'ariv* and *Ha'aretz* reported the arrest of about 100 young Arabs, aged 22 to 30, in the West Bank.

100. On 14 June 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported the arrest of six persons from Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarm.

101. On 16 June 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported the arrest of four persons from East Jerusalem.

102. On 27 June 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported the arrest of 31 persons, including 19 young women and 3 girls, in the Nablus area.

103. On 22 July 1974, Radio-Israel and, on 24 July 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported the arrest of six persons from Arqa, near Jenin.

104. On 24 July 1974, Radio-Israel reported a statement by the Police Minister, Mr. S. Hillel, in the Knesset, that 92 persons from Jerusalem and the West Bank were arrested during March and April 1974. Of these, 20 had been released, 42 were still in prison and 30 were scheduled to go on trial.

105. On 15 July 1974, Radio-Israel reported a statement by the Defence Minister, Mr. Peres, in the Knesset, declaring that 800 persons from the occupied territories had been in prison for the preceding six months on charges of sabotage. WAFA, the Palestine news agency, reported the same statement on 24 July 1974 and gave the figure of 811, of which 507 were from the West Bank and 304 from the Gaza Strip.

106. On 25 August 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* quoted United Kingdom newspaper reports that 1,200 persons had been arrested since January.

107. On 24 August 1974, the *International Herald Tribune* quoted a *New York Times* report that according to "the Israeli Government official, 896 persons had been arrested in the West Bank".

D. PRISON CONDITIONS

108. The following evidence received by the Special Committee relates to the allegations of ill-treatment of detainees and prison conditions.

109. On 12 March 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported that the inmates of Nablus prison had been refusing visits from relatives for two weeks "as a protest against the attitude of the prison authorities towards them".

110. On 5 March 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that 200 soldiers and police were guarding Ramallah maximum security prison after there had been reports of a riot.

111. On 3 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported that the inmates of Nablus prison had gone on a work strike, in addition to their month-long refusal to receive family visits. According to the report, the inmates were protesting against ill-treatment.

112. On 8 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported a demonstration by 200 persons at Nablus against "the attitude of the prison authorities". On 9 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported an end to the prisoners' strike at Nablus. On 15 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported that the strike was renewed.

113. On 14 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported that a demonstration at Nablus by students protesting against treatment of prisoners in Nablus prison had been prevented.

114. On 18 April 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported an announcement by the Police Minister, Mr. S. Hillel, of far-reaching relaxations in Nablus prison.

115. On 30 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported a riot

by six inmates in Nablus prison.

116. On 10 July 1974, Wafa, the Palestine news agency, reported that five inmates whose names were given had been seriously ill-treated in Sarafand and Al-Jalmah prisons.

117. On 26 August 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported that a man from Ramallah was sentenced to life imprisonment in Ramallah on 25 August 1974. According to the report, the man, Mohamed El-Rafaty, 32, had been arrested at the end of 1972.

E. CURFEWS, ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION AND OTHER MEASURES

118. The following evidence received by the Special Committee relates to the allegation of measures adopted by the occupation authorities to harass the local civilian population. Such measures include curfews, administrative detention and other measures.

119. On 26 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported the imposition of a curfew on five villages, namely, Duma, Aqraba, Beit-Furiq, Majdal, Beni-Fadel.

120. On 8 May 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported a prohibition of grazing in the Jordan Valley affecting the villages of Beit-Furiq, Beit-Dajan, Aqraba, Salen and Mair.

121. On 24 September 1974, *Al-Ahram* reported an Associated Press dispatch concerning new restrictions imposed on civilians at Jenin. According to the report, no males were allowed to leave Jenin while an investigation continued into the killing of an Israeli in that town.

122. On 19 June 1974, *Ha'aretz* reported that 150 persons had been placed in administrative detention since April 1974.

123. On 26 July 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that "several communist activists" in the West Bank were being placed in administrative detention. *Ha'aretz* reported the administrative detention of approximately 100 persons described as "communists" on 23 July 1974.

124. On 9 July 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported the administrative detention of 12 persons from Nablus, practically all from the liberal professions.

F. EXPULSION AND DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO RETURN

125. The following evidence received by the Special Committee relates to the allegation of the continued practice of expulsion of civilians

from the occupied territories and the denial of civilians who had left the occupied territories of the right to return to their homes.

126. On 10 December 1973, the *Jerusalem Post* reported the expulsion of eight persons from the West Bank. Six of these persons were among those heard by the Special Committee during 1974.

127. On 14 March 1974, *Ma'ariv* and the *Jerusalem Post* reported the expulsion of two persons from the West Bank.

128. Radio-Israel and *Ma'ariv* reported on 22 and 23 July 1974 respectively that Israeli authorities were preparing to take measures to expel those persons who had not left after the expiry of their three-month permit to stay in the occupied territories under the "summer visitors programme"; 300 such persons were reported to have stayed. According to the reports these persons were liable to heavy penalties.

129. On 1 August 1974, *Ha'aretz* and Radio-Israel announced the resettlement in 29 new houses of refugees who had been left homeless in 1971 when "security roads" were built in the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip. The reports also announced plans to resettle 300 Bedouin families who had been removed from their homes two years earlier.

G. ECONOMIC MEASURES

130. The following evidence received by the Special Committee relates to the allegation of the continued exploitation of the resources of the occupied territories in violation of the applicable international law.

131. On 13 January 1974, the *Jerusalem Post* reported a statement by a Harvard University economist, Thomas Stopper, to the effect that Israel was earning \$400 million per year in oil revenues from Sinai oil wells.

132. On 16 April 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported that 35,000 persons from the occupied territories were officially employed in Israel in addition to "hundreds of others who are employed illegally". The statement was attributed to the then Labour Minister, Mr. Y. Rabin. A report in *Ha'aretz* on 26 May 1974 gives the figure of 38,000 workers from the occupied territories. On 5 September 1974, a report in *Ma'ariv* put the "real figure" at 80,000.

133. On 5 September 1974, *Ma'ariv* reported that, as a result of the employment of workers from

the occupied territories in Israel, wages in the occupied territories had been forced up. Despite this, the West Bank was suffering from a shortage of labour.

V. DESTRUCTION OF THE TOWN OF QUNEITRA

A. BACKGROUND

134. In response to a request by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic that the Special Committee visit Quneitra to investigate the destruction which it alleged had been caused by the Israeli forces, before their withdrawal under the agreement on disengagement of forces (S/11302/Add.1, annex A), the Special Committee decided that, since the allegation referred to the period when Quneitra was under Israeli occupation, the matter came within its terms of reference and a special visit to the area was therefore justified.

135. The Special Committee examined the complaint of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic (A/9568-S/11396) and the reply of the Government of Israel (A/9570-S/11408).

136. The Special Committee arrived at Damascus on 8 September 1974 and spent the day of 9 September 1974 inspecting the town of Quneitra on foot and by car. During the course of its visit, the Special Committee recorded the evidence of two of the nine persons who had lived at Quneitra throughout the whole period of occupation. The Special Committee returned to Geneva on 10 September 1974. On 11 and 12 September 1974, it discussed its observations and decided to seek expert opinion from a person or persons having knowledge of civil engineering, ballistics and explosives on the manner in which the widespread destruction could have been caused and the time of its occurrence.

137. On 12 September 1974, the Special Committee addressed the following letter to the Secretary-General:

It would be most desirable if the Special Committee could be provided with expert opinion on the manner in which this widespread destruction and devastation could have been caused and the time of its occurrence.

The Special Committee is of opinion that the expert advice which it seeks would demand knowledge of civil engineering as well as of ballistics and explosives.

The Special Committee, therefore, has decided that a competent person or persons with the requisite quali-

fications and experience be engaged by the United Nations to undertake this assignment and submit a report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The report would have to be submitted to the Secretary-General in time for transmission to the Special Committee before 14 October 1974.

The reports should be fully substantiated, even graphically if necessary, and should deal with the following points:

(a) To what extent the damage and destruction was, or would most probably have been caused by

- (i) Aerial bombardment, shelling or artillery fire;
- (ii) The use of heavy equipment, such as bulldozers;
- (iii) Explosives or other means.

(b) During what period such damage or devastation would have been caused.

As the matter is of the utmost urgency, the Special Committee would be grateful if prompt action could be taken to give effect to its decision.

138. On 24 October 1974, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and General Assembly Affairs addressed the following letter to the Special Committee:

I refer to your letter of 12 September 1974 addressed to the Secretary-General in which you requested the services of an expert or experts in the field of civil engineering, ballistics and explosives to assist the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories in its investigations concerning the destruction of Quneitra.

As you know from our earlier conversations, considerable difficulty has been encountered in obtaining the release of an expert or experts with the requisite qualifications, but you may be certain that the Secretariat will continue its efforts to meet the request of the Special Committee.

B. OBSERVATIONS

139. The Special Committee arrived at Quneitra at about 10 a.m. on 9 September 1974 and spent in all about five hours in the town. During its inspection, the Special Committee was accompanied by the Governor of Quneitra and officials of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic.

140. The town of Quneitra presented a spectacle of total devastation, a complete wasteland. With very few exceptions, almost all the buildings, both public and private, were in ruins.

141. Two types of destruction were manifest, one of which was far more extensive than the other. The buildings were nearly all of solid concrete

structure with heavy flat concrete roofs. In most cases, the roofs had collapsed practically intact and retained their structural pattern and shape. It was obvious that supporting corner pillars and interior structural supports had been demolished. In these cases, there were no signs of damage by fire nor were there any outward signs of the use of incendiary and other bombs. In a few cases the buildings had been smashed and the entire structure had been shattered without any slabs of concrete remaining in entire sections, as in the case of the buildings previously mentioned. In the second type of case, the steel rods providing reinforcement for the concrete were twisted and mangled. There was no evidence of craters that could have been caused by aerial bombardment. The streets of the town showed no marks of damage. The destruction, whatever its cause, had been selective and reflected a degree of precision and deliberateness that was inconsistent with aerial bombardment and the indiscriminate consequences of such hostile action. Of the buildings that were still habitable, one was being used by UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observation Force), another was serving as the office of the Governor of Quneitra. Public utilities, such as water supply and electricity supply, had been put out of use and were gradually being restored. Electric pylons and electric poles on the main streets had been almost entirely destroyed. A two-storey building which had been a school accommodating a total of approximately 1,500 children, as stated by a former teacher of English in that school, was a total wreck. The military hospital of Quneitra, it was alleged, had been used by the Israeli army until it was evacuated in 1970; thereafter the occupying Israeli forces were alleged to have used the building for target practice. It was clear to the Special Committee that the building had been used for such a purpose. It had been subjected to machine-gun and grenade assault from outside. The Special Committee observed that windows had been completely blasted and smashed. The walls of rooms were intensively pockmarked with bullet holes and the partition walls and floors were extensively damaged. The rear of the building was intact. The building has been rendered totally unfit for use.

142. The Special Committee noted that the structure of three minarets and a church was not destroyed; one mosque had its minaret damaged

by a shell and showed a gaping hole.

143. The Special Committee visited the Christian cemetery. Its attention was drawn to some of the graves, the tombs of which were in the shape of solid masonry structures above the ground; in most cases the doors to the tombs showed marks of having been opened by hand grenades and automatic weapons and the funerary offerings had been pillaged. The Special Committee saw skeletons in coffins in different stages of decomposition. It was alleged that the Syrian Christian custom provided for the dead to be buried with their most cherished worldly possessions, much of which were gold ornaments. These had been removed.

144. In brief, the town of Quneitra was one vast scene of unredeemed desolation. In contrast, pictures of Quneitra, as it stood before the occupation, showed a modern city with well-laid-out streets, solid structures indicating a level of prosperity which its present condition totally belied.

145. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic alleged that "during the implementation of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces signed in Geneva on 31 May 1974, upon the withdrawal from the occupied Syrian territory, the Israeli forces perpetrated crimes of destruction of Syrian civilian villages, especially the destruction of the city of Quneitra, using for this aim explosives and bulldozers" (A/9568-S/11396).

146. The Government of Israel replied that it was "a matter of common knowledge that the damage and destruction caused in front-line villages and in the town of Quneitra are the direct result of acts of aggression carried out by Syria in various periods since 1967, culminating in its war of aggression against Israel in October 1973 ..." (A/9570-S/11408).

147. The Special Committee noted that the destruction of Quneitra extended to nearly all houses and buildings, public or private, to the local reservoir, the local electricity supply lines, and the Christian cemetery.

C. CONSIDERATIONS

148. The first question to be determined was whether the devastation was caused:

- (a) By aerial bombing;
- (b) By artillery or other ground-based shelling;

- (c) By fire;
- (d) By mechanical or manual means;
- (e) By a combination of one or more of these methods.

149. The second question that arose was whether and to what extent the devastation of Quneitra was or was not due to acts of war. If the devastation resulted from an act of war, it would have occurred:

- (a) During the 1967 hostilities; or
- (b) During the 1973 hostilities; or
- (c) During repeated attacks from Syrian territory against Israeli forces when these held the town.

150. As a result of its inspection of the town, the Special Committee was in a position to eliminate certain of those hypotheses. The Special Committee studied additional evidence to enable it to form its conclusions.

151. The Special Committee observed that both parties appeared to agree that the present state of Quneitra was a result of events that occurred some time during the period from 1967 to 1974, while Quneitra was under occupation. The Israeli contention added that the actual state resulted from "acts of aggression carried out by Syria in various periods since 1967", including the October 1973 hostilities. Press reports describing the city—for example, the *Jerusalem Post* report of 26 June 1974 (the day of the completion of the disengagement plan) described Quneitra as "a total ruin hardly a single building having survived the six years of intermittent warfare intact"—would suggest that the devastation took place before 26 June 1974.

152. The evidence available to the Special Committee indicated that during the 1967 hostilities, the town of Quneitra was taken without fighting. In his report dated 2 October 1967, Mr. Nils-Göran Gussing, Special Representative appointed by the Secretary-General in implementation of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) stated: "although reports from Israel sources indicate that Quneitra was taken without fighting, the Special Representative observed throughout the city that nearly every shop and every house seemed to have been broken into and looted. A visit to one apartment building confirmed the thoroughness with which the looting had been done, and showed that in some cases dwellings had been set on fire after looting had occurred".¹²⁸

¹²⁸ Doc. 271 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

153. In October 1973, it appeared that there was no fighting in Quneitra either. That was stated by two eye-witnesses, Mrs. Waded Nassif and Mr. Zudhi Shkay, who appeared before the Special Committee during its visit to Quneitra. Mrs. Nassif had made the same statement to the Israeli press when interviewed prior to the end of the occupation (*Jerusalem Post*, 30 June 1974, "One woman's stand in Quneitra", by George Leonof).

154. The Special Committee found it difficult to resist the conclusion that little, if any, damage was done to Quneitra during the hostilities of June 1967 and October 1973. It was commonly accepted that during the interim period no bombardment of Quneitra took place, either sporadically or intensively.

155. The hypothesis that devastation was not caused by warfare was further strengthened by the following considerations:

(a) The repeated references in the Israeli press to Quneitra as "a ghost town" where most of the structures in the town were still standing (see, for example, the *Jerusalem Post* reports on 14 and 16 July 1972 under the following titles "Rubble cleared in Quneitra" and "Quneitra clearing to be limited to rubble");

(b) The testimony of the two eye-witnesses in Quneitra, who stated that the devastation took place during the last few days preceding the withdrawal of the Israeli forces;

(c) The fact that, despite the nearly complete destruction of houses, buildings and structures, the roads were undamaged,

(d) The fact that nearly all structures had been demolished in the same manner, namely by the application of tremendous force (pulling or pushing) to some or all of the supporting structures (walls or pillars), thus causing the roof to collapse and bring down with it the entire building—a result that could have been achieved only by the use of heavy equipment such as bulldozers;

(e) The existence of traces of the tracks of heavy equipment leading to certain buildings that had been demolished—these traces disappeared at the point where the rubble had collapsed. This indicated that heavy equipment had been used for the specific purpose of demolishing the building;

(f) The existence of earth ramps that had been constructed to provide access to the upper portion of the supporting pillars of buildings indicating

that this method of demolition had been used to enable the heavy equipment to weaken the supporting structures and at the same time to withdraw without the risk of having the building collapse on the heavy equipment;

(g) The fact that the United Nations Observer Post, situated in the town and which had been in existence in Quneitra since 1967, was intact, whereas most surrounding structures had been razed to the ground;

(h) The absence of vegetation on the ruins indicated that the destruction was obviously a recent occurrence, especially in the case of two adjoining houses which had been destroyed by explosives and where new small shoots were sprouting in the charred vegetation.

D. CONCLUSIONS

156. All relevant factors, taken together, created in the Special Committee the certainty that the devastation of Quneitra was predominantly a single and deliberately executed operation, that it was recent and that it took place from the ground, nearly always by the application of heavy equipment and sometimes by the use of explosives. Even a layman without any expert knowledge of ballistics or explosives could say that for the most part the destruction had not been caused either by aerial bombardment or by ground-fire or in the course of hostilities. It was too systematic and orderly to have been the result of the indiscriminate shelling and bombardment which occur in the course of hostilities.

157. For those reasons, the Special Committee felt a deep-seated conviction that the total devastation could not but have taken place recently and systematically and prior to the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and that the Israeli occupying authorities were responsible for the devastation of Quneitra. This constitutes a violation of article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and falls within the scope of article 147 of the same Convention.

158. The gravity of the circumstances would, in the Special Committee's opinion, appear to justify the appointment of a commission to study the legal consequences of the devastation of Quneitra, particularly within the context of articles 53 and 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, bearing in mind the provisions of article 6 (b) of

the Statute of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg,¹²⁹ and given the nature and the extent of damage caused, to assess the damage involved and to make the necessary recommendations.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

159. In this report the Special Committee has analysed the evidence that came before it since the adoption of its fifth report (A/9148). The Special Committee has continued its investigation as reflected in its earlier reports which were considered by the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth sessions.

160. In examining the evidence before it, the Special Committee has restricted itself to the examination of those areas of civilian life in the occupied territories where marked changes were detected. It did so since, as it stated before the Special Political Committee at the twenty-eighth session (A/SPC/PV.890), the Special Committee saw no further purpose in furnishing the General Assembly with more evidence until and unless major changes took place in the policies and practices followed by Israel in the occupied territories.

161. The evidence before the Special Committee indicated that the policies and practices pursued by the occupying Power in the occupied territories, in so far as they affected the human rights of the population of those territories, have not changed to any marked extent with regard to certain aspects, considered by the Special Committee in chapter III above.

162. In its fifth report, the Special Committee gave details of the policy of annexation and settlement of the occupied territories and the manner in which it was being implemented. The evidence before the Special Committee this year indicates that this policy, which is contrary to articles 47 and 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, continues to exist and to be put into effect. Thus, plans have been announced for the establishment of new settlements in the occupied territories—for example, in the Golan Heights and in the Gaza Strip—and they are being put into effect.

¹²⁹ *The Charter and Judgment of the Nürnberg Tribunal: History and Analysis* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 49.V.7), annex II. [original note.]

163. By the same token, the measures reported by the Special Committee in its previous reports as being in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, continue to be adopted.

164. In this context, the Special Committee notes that ICRC, in its *Annual Report, 1973*, states the following:¹³⁰

Despite further ICRC approaches, the Israeli authorities maintained their stand that the question of the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 in occupied territories should be left open, allowing the ICRC to exercise its activities on an empirical basis.

The ICRC therefore tried to ensure, from one case to another, as thorough an implementation as possible of the provisions of the Fourth Convention. Thus in various fields facilities granted by the Israeli authorities enabled the delegates, as in the past, to aid the victims of the conflict.

In other cases, however, owing to Israel's stand, the ICRC failed to obtain satisfaction. The ICRC can only deplore a situation which deprives the victims of full protection and of their rights under the Fourth Convention.

The Special Committee has already stated that, in its opinion, the Fourth Geneva Convention is fully applicable to the territories under Israeli military occupation.

165. The evidence before the Special Committee indicates further that there has been a marked increase in the adoption of certain measures which are contrary to the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and which are tantamount to harassment of the civilian population. Thus, for example, demolition of houses, which is in violation of articles 33 and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, has during 1974, assumed alarming proportions, as shown by the Special Committee in chapter III above. ICRC expressed its concern over this policy in its *Annual Report, 1973* in the following terms:

The plight of those victimized by the Israel army's destruction of houses in occupied territory was a matter of continued concern for the ICRC, which regards the practice as being contrary to the provisions of articles 33 and 53 of the Fourth Convention.

A number of houses were destroyed in 1973, leaving many people homeless in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank of the Jordan.

ICRC delegates approached the Israeli authorities

in an effort to persuade them to refrain from such action; they also rendered aid to the victims.

166. The same observation applies to the practice of mass arrests, which is a violation of article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This practice is referred to in chapter III above. The scale of these arrests, which had subsided in preceding years, has once again assumed alarming proportions. On the other hand, the evidence before the Special Committee shows that the number of expulsions has been reduced.

167. The measures of economic exploitation referred to in chapter III above constitute a violation of articles 46 and 55 of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 (see A/9148,¹³¹ paras. 16–22).

168. The Special Committee draws special attention to its conclusions on the allegation that the town of Quneitra was deliberately destroyed by Israeli forces (see paragraphs 156–158 above).

169. It follows from the evidence before the Special Committee that the occupying Power continues to behave in the occupied territories and to act towards the population of these territories in flagrant violation of the basic rights of the above-mentioned population and in defiance of relevant international conventions.

170. The Special Committee, therefore, would reiterate its conviction that the situation of the civilian population of the occupied territories will only be rectified once the occupation, itself a violation of their basic human rights, is terminated.

171. The Special Committee would draw attention once again to the proposal that it has repeatedly made for the adoption of an arrangement inspired by the Protecting Power formula envisaged under the Geneva Conventions which protects civilian persons living in occupied territories.¹³³ This machinery or one similar to it should be established to provide future protection for the population of the occupied territories.

¹³¹ Doc. 7 in *ibid.*

¹³³ The Special Committee, in each of its reports, has recommended:

"(a) That the States whose territory is occupied by Israel appoint immediately either a neutral State or States, or an international organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality and effectiveness, to safeguard the human rights of the population of the occupied territories;

"(b) That suitable arrangements be made for the proper

¹³⁰ Doc. 220 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

VII. ADOPTION OF THE REPORT

172. The present report was approved and signed by the Special Committee on 25 October

representation of the interests of the large population in the occupied territories which has not yet been given the opportunity of exercising the right of self-determination; and

“(c) That a neutral State or international organization, as described in (a) above, be nominated by Israel and be associated in this arrangement.”

Under this arrangement, the State or States or international organization so nominated might be authorized to undertake the following activities:

“(a) To secure the scrupulous implementation of the provisions relating to human rights contained in the Third and

1974 in accordance with rule 20 of its rules of procedure.

(Signed) H.S. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka)
Chairman

K. M'BAYE (Senegal)
B. BOHTE (Yugoslavia)

Fourth Geneva Conventions and in particular to investigate and determine the facts in the case of allegations of the violation of the human rights provisions of these Conventions or of other applicable international instruments;

“(b) To ensure that the population of the occupied territories is treated in accordance with the applicable law;

“(c) To report to the States concerned and to the General Assembly of the United Nations on its work.”

Reports Submitted to the Security Council

7

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force for the period October 26, 1973, to April 1, 1974¹³⁴ April 1, 1974

INTRODUCTION

1. This report, which covers the period from the inception of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) on 26 October 1973 to 1 April 1974, presents a summary of developments relating to UNEF on which information was submitted to the Security Council in my progress reports on the Force (S/11056 and Add.1-14), as well as an account of events which have taken place since my last progress report (S/11056/Add.14). The purpose of the report is to provide the Security Council with a comprehensive picture of the activities of UNEF in pursuance of the mandate laid down by the Council in its resolutions 340 (1973) and 341 (1973) of 25 and 27 October 1973.

2. During this period, the military situation in the area of responsibility of UNEF has passed from one of direct and active military confrontation to the present state of disengagement of forces and of substantial compliance, in the Egypt-Israel sector, with the cease-fire provisions of the Council's resolutions 338 (1973), 339 (1973) and 340 (1973)¹³⁵. In this process, the tasks of the Force pursuant to its mandate as approved by the Council have gone through three main phases, first as an interposing force and observation element between the Egyptian and Israeli forces, later in controlling the separation and disengagement process, and at present in manning the zone of disengagement and inspecting the zones of limited armaments and forces. In carrying out these tasks, UNEF has played an indispensable role as a peace-keeping instrument.

I. ESTABLISHMENT AND COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

A. Establishment of UNEF

3. In my first progress report on 28 October 1973 (S/11056)¹³⁶ I informed the Council that the United Nations Emergency Force, set up by Security Council resolution 340 (1973), had become operational in the evening of 26 October 1973, when Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, acting as interim Force Commander, assumed command over the first elements of the Force. These had been transferred to the mission area from the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and consisted of Austrian, Finnish and Swedish troops, to which Irish troops from UNFICYP were added as from 30 October. These elements were subsequently brought up to battalion strength by additional troops provided by the four countries. Since that time and at different intervals, six additional contingents, in the order of arrival, those from Peru, Panama, Ghana, Indonesia, Senegal and Nepal, as well as the Canadian and Polish logistic elements, have arrived in the mission area. As regards Kenya's participation in the Force, consultations with that Government are still underway. The above-mentioned contingents were selected in consultation with the Security Council.

B. Composition

4. As of 1 April 1974, the strength of the Force, including UNEF headquarters and brigade headquarters staff, was as follows:

Austria	613
Canada	1,074
Finland	602
Ghana	508
Indonesia	551
Ireland	266
Nepal	571
Panama	406
Peru	352
Poland	824
Senegal	399
Sweden	622
Total	6,788

¹³⁴ UN doc. S/11248, excluding list of contents. The map which is part of the report is printed after p. 126. Subsequent reports on UNEF are not included in this volume.

¹³⁵ Docs. 34-36 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹³⁶ Doc. 14 in *ibid*.

C. Functions and guidelines

5. The functions of the Emergency Force are outlined in the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) (S/11052/Rev.1)¹³⁷, which was approved by the Council by its resolution 341 (1973). According to its terms of reference, the Force is to supervise the implementation of paragraph 1 of the Council's resolution 340 (1973), which demanded the immediate and complete observance of the cease-fire and return to the positions of 22 October 1973; it is to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting and to co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its humanitarian endeavours in the area. In the fulfilment of its tasks, the Force is to have the full co-operation of the military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

6. The essential conditions for the Force to be effective and the guidelines for its establishment and operation are set out in the same report (S/11052/Rev.1, paras. 3-4).

7. Specific tasks consistent with its terms of reference were entrusted to UNEF by the Agreement of the parties of 11 November 1973 regarding the implementation of Security Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973) (S/11056/Add.3, annex) and by the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on disengagement of forces in pursuance of the Geneva Peace Conference (S/11198 and Add.1)¹³⁸. The Force is at present fulfilling its tasks and carrying out inspections in the areas defined in the latter Agreement.

8. Discussions have been held by UNEF with officials of Egypt and Israel respectively in connexion with the negotiation of agreements on the status of the Force. These discussions are being pursued with a view to concluding agreements that will embody the principles of the Charter and of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations as well as the experience of previous United Nations peace-keeping operations, so as to ensure the independent functioning of the Force in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council. It is hoped that these negotiations will lead shortly to a successful outcome.

9. The Force Commander continues the prac-

tice of separate high-level meetings with military representatives of Egypt and Israel concerning the implementation of the terms of reference of the Force and the inspections conducted by UNEF in the areas of limited armaments and forces. Since the maintenance of full co-operation with the parties is an essential condition for carrying out the tasks of the Force (S/11052/Rev.1, para. 3), UNEF maintains close contact with the military liaison staffs of Egypt and Israel.

10. One of the problems still outstanding relates to restrictions on the freedom of movement of personnel of certain contingents. I have consistently taken the position that UNEF must function as an "integrated and efficient military unit", that its contingents serve on an equal basis under the command of the Force Commander and that no differentiation can be made regarding the United Nations status of the various contingents. The matter is being pursued.

Discipline

11. The discipline, understanding and bearing of the soldiers of the United Nations Emergency Force have been of a high order, reflecting credit on the soldiers and on their commanders, as well as on the countries that contribute contingents to the Force.

Casualties

12. During the first five months of operation, UNEF has suffered four fatal casualties and 15 injured as a result of the explosion of mines and other explosive devices. Another soldier was killed in an accident while driving in the supply convoy to the town of Suez. One member of the Force was killed in a traffic accident, and two others died from other causes.

II. DEPLOYMENT AND LOGISTICS

A. Deployment

13. During its first five months, the deployment of the Force has been subject to frequent changes. As indicated above, the original role of the Force in interposing itself between the armed forces of Egypt and Israel in areas of direct confrontation was followed by the manning of successive temporary buffer zones during the process of disengagement. The operational details of the initial deployment and control of these zones were described in my progress reports to the Security Council in the S/11056/. . . series.

14. In my last progress report (S/11056/Add.14,

¹³⁷ Doc. 13 in *ibid.*

¹³⁸ Doc. 50 below.

paras. 5-7), I indicated that it was the intention of the Force Commander to deploy three additional battalions—those of Austria, Ghana and Panama—in the present UNEF zone of disengagement, bringing to nine the number of battalions in the zone. This redeployment started on 18 March and was completed on 24 March 1974. The present UNEF area of deployment lies between the Egyptian and Israeli lines, defined in paragraph B.2 of the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on disengagement of forces of 18 January 1974, as shown on the map attached to the Agreement (S/11198/Add.1).

15. The location of UNEF battalions in the zone of disengagement is as follows from north to south in this order:

(a) Irish battalion: Base camp in the Rabah area. It is manning a forward command post, a reserve position and five outposts in the UNEF zone in a sector from the Mediterranean Sea to the road leading from Kantara to Baluza.

(b) Panamanian battalion: Base camp in the Rabah area. It is manning a forward command post, one reserve position and six outposts in the zone of disengagement from the southern limit of the Irish sector to a line at mid-point between Kantara and Ismailia.

(c) Peruvian battalion: Base camp in the Rabah area. It is manning a forward command post and five outposts in the zone of disengagement from the southern limit of the Panamanian sector to a line directly east of Ismailia.

(d) Swedish battalion: Base camp at Ismailia. It is manning a forward command post and eleven outposts in the zone of disengagement in a sector from the southern limit of the Peruvian sector to a line 5 kilometres to the south, parallel to the Deversoir-El Tasa road.

(e) Indonesian battalion: Base camp at Ismailia. It is manning a forward command post and eight outposts in the zone of disengagement in a sector from the southern limit of the Swedish battalion to a line east of the middle part of Great Bitter Lake.

(f) Ghanaian battalion: Base camp at Fayid-Fanara. It is manning a forward command post and six outposts in the zone of disengagement from the southern limit of the Indonesian battalion to a line east of the southern end of Great Bitter Lake.

(g) Austrian battalion: Base camp at Suez. It is manning a forward command post and six outposts in the zone of disengagement from the

southern limits of the Ghanaian sector to a line due east of the southern end of Little Bitter Lake.

(h) Senegalese battalion: Base camp at Suez. It is manning a forward command post, a reserve position and seven outposts in the zone of disengagement from the southern limit of the Ghanaian sector to a line due east of Suez.

(i) Finnish battalion: Base camp at Suez. It is manning a forward command post, a reserve position and 11 outposts from the southern limits of the Senegalese sector to the Gulf of Suez.

(j) Nepalese battalion: It is based in Cairo, engaged in receiving its allotment of vehicles and communications equipment, conducting a training programme and acting as the Force Reserve.


16. The Canadian and Polish logistic elements continue to operate from their base camp in Cairo and provide logistic, engineering, transport and communications support for the Force.

17. The total strength of the nine battalions assigned to the UNEF zone of disengagement is approximately 4,000 officers and other ranks. These are distributed between the command posts and manned positions within the zone and the base camps where, in accordance with normal military practice, they are assigned to local reserve functions and perform the necessary regimental, rotation and construction tasks. In addition to constant patrolling, the manned positions in the zone are maintained 24 hours a day. Because of the nature of the terrain of the zone, which is a desert area and contains no inhabited localities or longitudinal roads, it would have been impractical to establish and maintain the base camps in the zone of disengagement itself. The shortage of tentage and equipment, as well as the presence of uncleared minefields, has also hampered the deployment of UNEF troops in the zone.

18. Pending its planned move to Ismailia, the headquarters of the Force remains in Cairo. The headquarters of the Northern Brigade is at Rabah and the headquarters of the Southern Brigade is at Suez. A liaison office is maintained in the premises of UNTSO headquarters in Government House, Jerusalem.

B. Accommodations of the Force

19. UNEF battalion base camps have been set up as close as possible to the disengagement zone in the areas of Rabah, Ismailia, Fayid and Suez. The present arrangements in this regard are as follows:




UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE
HEADQUARTERS
CAIRO

DEPLOYMENT SITUATION AS OF 1200 GMT 27 MARCH 1974

IN CAIRO

- Force Headquarters
- Canadian Logistic Component
- Polish Logistic Component
- Nepalese Contingent



IN CAIRO

Force Headquarters
Canadian Logistic Component
Polish Logistic Component
Nepalese Contingent

(a) The Northern Brigade headquarters and the Irish, Panamanian and Peruvian base camps are located under canvas in the area of Rabah.

(b) The Swedish and Indonesian base camps are housed in buildings in Ismailia.

(c) The Ghanaian base camp is accommodated in an old army camp on the west shore of Great Bitter Lake in Fayid-Fanara.

(d) The Austrian, Senegalese and Finnish base camps are housed in buildings in Suez, as is the Southern Brigade headquarters.

(e) The Nepalese battalion and the Polish and Canadian logistic support elements are accommodated at Shams Camp, Cairo, mainly under canvas.

20. The Force has faced and still is confronted with acute accommodation problems which have been alleviated by establishing certain base camps in Egyptian-owned buildings put at the disposal of the force by the Egyptian authorities at different stages of the operation.

21. One method of solving the long-term accommodation problem is to locate all base camps of the UNEF battalions in army camps. However, no adequate areas for camps have yet been made available, and such facilities would, in any case, require extensive financial commitments for renovation, reconstruction and housing. In the meantime, it is expected that the authorities concerned will continue to extend their co-operation and understanding in dealing with this problem and that the Force will be offered adequate facilities if and when the buildings at present occupied as base camps are vacated.

22. The logistic support base of the Force, at present located at Shams Camp, Cairo, accommodates the Canadian and Polish logistic elements as well as the Nepalese battalion. This base will be moved in the near future to Camp Alagla in Ismailia, which has been made available by the Egyptian authorities. The new camp will facilitate the logistic support of the Force by shortening the distance to the United Nations zone of disengagement. It will, however, require extensive engineering work before it is put to full use. It will also be necessary to find shortly new accommodation for the Nepalese battalion and base camp.

23. The Polish medical services, which have not yet entered into full operation owing to the lack of accommodation, will be established in the buildings at present occupied by the Indonesian battalion

in Ismailia. This will necessitate finding new premises for the Indonesian base camp.

24. As indicated above, it is planned to move the headquarters of the Force from Cairo to Ismailia as soon as practicable. The headquarters will be located in the buildings at present occupied by the base camp of the Swedish battalion, which will then have to be relocated.

25. The accommodation plans and budgetary arrangements of the Force have been made on the customary assumption that the Governments of Israel and Egypt will extend their full co-operation to the Force by making available to it the necessary facilities for accommodation of headquarters and camp areas.

C. Logistic support

26. The distribution of logistic tasks between the Canadian and Polish contingents was the subject of a memorandum of understanding drawn up after detailed discussions between the Secretariat and the two delegations concerned (S/11056/Add.6, annex). On the basis of that memorandum, the logistic support elements of the Force have been carrying out the activities set out below.

27. The Canadian logistic support element is organized into three independent units under the operational control of UNEF headquarters, namely the signals unit, the service unit and the air transport unit. The signals unit provides communications for the Force and has permanent detachments in each battalion base camp. This unit operates by means of telex, voice communications, land line, switchboards and signals dispatch service. The service unit handles all aspects of the supply of the Force and provides maintenance of vehicles and equipment, movement control and postal facilities. The air transport unit provides airlift support for the Force.

28. The Polish logistic support element has a transport company which provides the transportation needs for the Force and operates from the logistic support base in Cairo. It serves all the battalions deployed in the zone of disengagement. The engineering company is engaged in numerous tasks, including mine and explosive clearance, construction and supervision of works in UNEF premises and water purification plants for the provision of drinking water to UNEF troops, especially those stationed in the zone of disengagement. As indicated above, the Polish medical services will be established in Ismailia and, in the

meantime, have been providing medical assistance and conducting laboratory tests for the Force.

III. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

A. *Observance of the cease-fire and implementation of the disengagement Agreement*

29. Reports of the Secretary-General on the situation regarding the observance of the cease-fire in the UNEF area of responsibility, based on reports of UNEF units and UNTSO military observers, were circulated in the S/11057/Add. ... series. Since the time when the implementation of the Agreement on disengagement of forces began under UNEF supervision on 25 January 1974, the military situation has remained quiet.

30. Inspections of the areas of limited armaments and forces, as provided in the Egypt-Israel Agreement on disengagement of forces (S/11198), continue to be carried out by UNEF on a weekly basis, with the assistance of UNTSO military observers, accompanied by Egyptian and Israeli liaison officers in the respective areas. According to the terms of the Agreement, the findings of the inspections are made available only to the parties. The Force Commander lends his assistance and good offices in cases where one of the parties raises questions concerning the observance of the agreed limitations on armaments and forces.

B. *Negotiations and agreements*

31. The Force Commander and his staff have played an active role, within the context of the UNEF mandate, in meetings and negotiations, as well as in the implementation of agreements reached by the parties in matters pertaining to the cease-fire, disengagement of forces and humanitarian questions.

32. The first meeting between military representatives of Egypt and Israel in the presence of UNEF officers was held at kilometre marker 109 on the Cairo-Suez road, on 27 October 1973. Four subsequent meetings were held at that location, on 29 and 30 October and on 1 and 3 November. These exchanges of views covered matters relating to the observance of the cease-fire, return to the positions held on 22 October 1973, possible mutual disengagement and establishment of buffer zones manned by UNEF, as well as humanitarian questions (S/11056, para. 13, and S/11056/Add.2, para. 16).

33. These matters were subsequently discussed at meetings held at kilometre marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road, and within the context of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, as set out below.

(i) *Disengagement*

34. On 9 November 1973, the Permanent Representative of the United States of America handed to me a letter transmitting a message of the Secretary of State of the United States (S/11091).¹³⁹ The message contained the text of an agreement that the Governments of Egypt and Israel were prepared to accept for the implementation of paragraph 1 of Security Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).

35. I instructed the Force Commander to make available his good offices, and General Siilasvuo entered into contact with both parties, who agreed to hold a meeting under his auspices on 11 November at kilometre marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road. The agreement was signed on that date, and the parties immediately started discussions on the modalities of its implementation under the auspices of the Force Commander. On 14 November, an accord was reached between the parties on the implementation of paragraphs C, D, E and F of the Agreement of 11 November; the terms of this accord were summed up by the Force Commander (S/11056/Add.5) and implementation began immediately. This included the withdrawal of Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road and their replacement by United Nations checkpoints.

36. Discussions on the implementation of paragraph B of the Agreement were held at kilometre marker 101 at intervals during the month of November 1973. In the course of those discussions, the parties exchanged proposals on alternative disengagement plans.

37. The matter was later taken up by the Military Working Group, established within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, held under the auspices of the United Nations, as mentioned in Security Council resolution 344 (1973) (see the report of the Secretary-General of 24 December 1973 in document S/11169).¹⁴⁰ The Force Commander acted as

¹³⁹ Doc. 188 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹⁴⁰ Doc. 16 in *ibid*.

chairman of the Military Working Group, which held six meetings in Geneva on 26 and 28 December 1973 and on 2, 4, 7 and 9 January 1974. In these meetings there was a detailed and frank preparatory discussion of possible alternative plans.

38. Negotiations then took place at other levels in the area. After a successful outcome of these negotiations, on 18 January 1974, at a meeting held at kilometre marker 101, an Agreement on the disengagement of forces in pursuance of the Geneva Peace Conference was signed by the Chiefs of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces and of the Israel Defence Forces, and by the Force Commander as witness (S/11198). Further meetings were held during January at kilometre marker 101 under the chairmanship of the Force Commander, in order to work out procedures for the implementation of the Agreement on the disengagement of forces.

39. At the final meeting held on 24 January, the parties agreed to a plan for implementing the disengagement of forces in successive phases. A time-table of the redeployment to be undertaken during each phase by the parties and by UNEF was also agreed upon. The process of disengagement of forces began on 25 January (S/11056/Add.9).

40. The disengagement operation proceeded with precision and was successfully completed, on schedule, on 5 March (S/11056/Add.13).

41. Under the Agreement on the disengagement of forces of 18 January 1974, the military forces of Egypt and Israel were to be separated and deployed west of Line A and east of Line B, respectively, as shown in the map attached to the Agreement (S/11198/Add.1).

42. The survey and marking of the full length of Line B was effected by UNTSO military observers, under UNEF supervision, with the assistance of Israeli surveyors. This task was completed on 2 February 1974 (S/11056/Add.10). The survey and marking of Line A by UNTSO military observers under UNEF supervision and with the assistance of Egyptian army surveyors was completed on 30 March 1974. Both Lines A and B are marked with barrels painted in black with the UN lettering in white.

(ii) *Humanitarian activities and co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross*

43. Under its terms of reference, (S/11052/Add.1, para. 2 (b)), the Force is required to

“co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its humanitarian endeavours in the area”. Accordingly, UNEF has established close contact with the ICRC representatives and has extended its assistance in the negotiations conducted by the parties on humanitarian matters.

44. As set out below, UNEF has likewise been instrumental, in co-operation with the Red Cross as appropriate, in carrying out the exchange of prisoners of war and transfer of civilians, operating supply convoys for the town of Suez and for Egyptian troops on the east bank of the Suez Canal and arranging for the recovery of the bodies of soldiers killed during the October war.

(iii) *Exchange of prisoners of war and transfer of civilians*

45. The exchange of prisoners of war, including the wounded, was part of the Agreement regarding the implementation of Security Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973) signed by the military representatives of Egypt and Israel on 11 November 1973 (S/11056/Add.3, annex). The modalities for implementation of that Agreement were discussed by the parties at meetings held under the auspices of the Force Commander. The exchange of prisoners of war, which also included evacuation of the wounded from the town of Suez, began on 15 November 1973 with the assistance of the ICRC, which made aircraft available for this purpose. The repatriation of prisoners of war was completed on 22 November 1973.

46. Fifteen subsequently captured prisoners were handed over by the Israeli to the Egyptian authorities on 14 February in the presence of UNEF officers and ICRC representatives. On 25 February, another 56 prisoners were repatriated from Israel to Egypt.

47. ICRC representatives and UNEF officers on 4 March 1974 witnessed the transfer in the zone of disengagement of 65 civilians from Israel to Egypt and the return of two civilians from Egypt to Israel. On the same date, 200 students crossed from Israeli-held territory into Egypt.

(iv) *Convoys of supplies to Egyptian troops on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and to the town of Suez*

48. At the first meeting held at kilometre marker 109 on the Cairo-Suez road on 27 October 1973 between military representatives of Egypt and Israel, in the presence of UNEF officers, an

agreement was reached regarding the transfer of supplies to Egyptian troops on the east bank of the Suez Canal. In pursuance of that agreement, UNEF organized a system of truck convoys, using vehicles made available to UNEF by the Egyptian authorities. On 28 October, the first lorries of a convoy comprising 125 trucks proceeded from kilometre marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road, through Israeli-held territory, to a point on the west bank of the Suez Canal, where the lorries were unloaded. Members of the Israeli Defence Forces inspected the contents at the unloading point under UNEF and Red Cross supervision. Egyptian soldiers crossed the Suez Canal from the east and loaded the supplies into amphibious vehicles for transfer to the east bank of the Canal where UNEF personnel were also stationed to supervise the unloading operation.

49. The parties agreed on 28 October 1973 to an additional convoy of 50 truckloads of supplies which, following the same procedure, started moving across the Canal on 7 November.

50. Pursuant to paragraphs C and D of the Agreement of 11 November 1973 (S/11056/Add.3), the town of Suez would receive daily supplies of food, water and medicine and there would be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the east bank of the Canal. With the agreement of the parties, the convoys to both the town of Suez and the east bank proceeded at regular intervals as from 15 November under UNEF's responsibility and with UNEF drivers. At the request of the Secretary-General, the Governments of Austria, Finland and Sweden provided additional military personnel as drivers for these supply trucks. With the commencement of the process of disengagement of forces, these supply convoys ceased to operate on 26 January 1974:

(v) *Search for bodies*

51. A meeting between Israeli and Egyptian representatives took place at kilometre marker 101 on 27 January 1974, with a UNEF representative in attendance, in order to co-ordinate the operation for the recovery of the bodies of soldiers killed during the hostilities in the Suez Canal area (Operation Omega). UNEF assistance in carrying out this operation was requested by the parties and by ICRC.

52. It was agreed that teams comprising Egyptian and Israeli representatives, as well as a UNEF

officer or UNTSO military observer would, as from 29 January, conduct searches on the east bank of the Canal in Egyptian territory and in Israeli-controlled areas. Bodies would also be exhumed from cemeteries in the presence of ICRC officials who would arrange for their hand-over.

53. In order to expedite the operation, and with the agreement of the parties, specially trained dog teams have been used with success by UNEF since 18 February. The operation, which was to have concluded on 5 March, was extended by agreement between the parties until 31 March. The bodies recovered have been turned over to the respective national authorities.

C. *Co-operation with UNTSO*

54. As provided in its terms of reference, UNEF has had the co-operation of UNTSO military observers for carrying out, under the operational control and supervision of UNEF, certain of the tasks entrusted to the Force.

55. The provisional headquarters staff of UNEF set up by the interim Force Commander on 26 October 1973 consisted of military observers from UNTSO; indeed, the availability of such officers was a key factor in the success of UNEF during the first weeks of operation. Up to the commencement of the process of disengagement of forces, UNTSO military observer patrols operated along the cease-fire lines in the Egypt-Israel sector. The observations of the military observers of UNTSO were incorporated with the observations of UNEF's own military units in the Secretary-General's reports on the status of the cease-fire (S/11057/Add. ... series).

56. During the process of disengagement of forces, UNTSO military observers were assigned to conduct inspections on the redeployment of forces.

57. With the establishment of the UNEF zone of disengagement, the Force Commander has entrusted to the UNTSO military observers the task of carrying out periodic inspections of the areas of limited armaments and forces under the control of UNEF brigade commanders.

58. In addition, UNTSO military observers have actively participated in the search for the mortal remains of soldiers killed during hostilities in the area, as well as in the marking of the lines of disengagement of forces. In carrying out these

tasks, UNTSO military observers acted under the command of the UNEF Force Commander.

59. The contribution of experienced UNTSO military observers has been a valuable asset to UNEF. In accordance with the terms of reference of the Force (S/11052/Rev.1, para. 2 (c)), and in close co-operation with the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, the services of these officers will continue to be used as necessary in the performance of the tasks of UNEF.

IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

60. By its resolution 3101 (XXVIII) of 11 December 1973,¹⁴¹ the General Assembly, on the basis of very approximate initial cost estimates submitted by the Secretary-General, appropriated \$30 million for the initial period of UNEF's operation. Since that time, there have been a number of unexpected expenses attributable, for example, to the fact that a number of troop contributors were unable to provide their contingents with the required supplies and equipment, which therefore had to be purchased by the United Nations; to the fact that substantial portions of logistic support (except for initial transportation) were not contributed free of charge to the United Nations as had been assumed in the estimates; and to the need to relocate the headquarters of the Force as a consequence of the disengagement process. Other items, including rations and allowances, have proved to be somewhat higher in cost than estimated. Price increases have also been experienced in such items as petroleum, oil and lubricants. On the other hand, the gradual rate of build-up of the Force resulted in somewhat greater offsetting savings in costs than had been anticipated. The result of consultations now in progress with respect to standardized costs and a reimbursement ceiling will also have a bearing on the costs of the Force. United Nations accounts pertaining to UNEF, based as they are on information which must be received from Force Headquarters and from Governments, inevitably lag behind actual expenditures. More accurate and detailed information on the costs for the first six months, as well as on costs beyond 24 April 1974, should be available for submission to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session,

which will then be in a position to consider what adjustments and changes are necessary.

61. With respect to the standardized cost and ceiling study, I am hopeful that the consultations now under way with all the Governments concerned will lead to an agreed and satisfactory solution to this difficult and sensitive problem. Any agreement reached will, of course, be submitted to the General Assembly for review and approval, as requested by the Assembly at its twenty-eighth session.

62. Though all of the cash problems in connexion with UNEF have not yet been fully solved, the financial authority given to me by the General Assembly in its resolution 3101 (XXVIII) of 11 December 1973 will permit me to carry on the operation, if the Security Council extends the mandate of the Force. Various aspects of financing the Force, including some of those to which I have alluded earlier in this report, will, of course, have to be dealt with and the necessary additional actions taken by the General Assembly. With respect to the estimated cost of the Force of \$5 million per month for the six-month period beyond 24 April 1974, a slight increase in the amount would seem to be inevitable in the present circumstances. This increase, if it comes about, would be due to new expenses, such as the expense of necessary rotation of contingents, unanticipated United Nations expenditures for heavy logistical equipment and continuing cost increases for such items as petroleum, oil and lubricants and rations. Much will depend on the willingness of Member States to continue to provide services free of charge, as was done for some items during the initial period.

63. Regarding the present financial situation, I wish to report that by the end of March 1974, payments on the contributions due from Member States have so far been received from 38 Member States in the amount of \$19.5 million plus a \$0.3 million voluntary contribution in cash made by the Government of Japan. In addition, a number of Member States have made available transport facilities free of charge to the United Nations for the movement of contingents and equipment to the mission area. The costs defrayed by them are estimated to total some \$15 million. As the Council is aware, the original estimates for UNEF were based on the assumption that initial transport would be provided free of charge.

¹⁴¹ Doc. 29 in *ibid.*

V. OBSERVATIONS

64. The establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force by the Security Council at the height of the crisis in the Middle East in October 1973 is a milestone in the history of the United Nations.

65. Less than 30 hours after the decision of the Security Council, the first elements of UNEF arrived in the mission area. Their arrival, and the immediate actions taken by them, served to defuse a highly explosive situation which could otherwise well have had major consequences for world peace.

66. The contrast between the extremely tense and violent situation that existed in October 1973 and the quiet now prevailing in the Egypt-Israel sector is clear testimony to the effectiveness of the Force in implementing the agreements reached on the diplomatic level. In addition to its normal peace-keeping functions, the Force has also shown its efficiency and usefulness in its co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross in a variety of humanitarian tasks, such as exchanges of prisoners, provision of non-military convoys and the search for the bodies of soldiers killed during the October hostilities.

67. Another important feature of UNEF is its broad geographical basis. That units from so many different regions and with such different backgrounds could work harmoniously and efficiently for the common cause of peace is highly encouraging for the future.

68. Although quiet now prevails in the Egypt-Israel sector, the situation in the area remains unstable and potentially dangerous. The disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces is only a first step, although a very important one, towards the settlement of the Middle East problem. The continued operation of UNEF is essential not only for the maintenance of the present quiet in the Egypt-Israel sector but also to assist, if required, in further efforts for the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East. I therefore consider it necessary to recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNEF for another period of six months.

69. Despite the changes that have taken place since the time of the establishment of the Force, I feel that the original mandate as approved by the Security Council on the basis of my report of 27

October 1973 (S/11052/Rev.1) is still generally adequate to cover the activities which UNEF is at present undertaking. Of course, I shall continue to refer to the Security Council all matters which may affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force.


70. As a result of steps I have taken recently, I am hopeful that it will be possible to keep the strength of UNEF within the figure of 7,000 as originally proposed. In the light of the present situation, and provided there are no new developments which will require unforeseen major commitments, I do not anticipate that any increase in the strength of UNEF will be necessary. I shall keep under constant review the required strength of the Force with a view to making reductions and economies when the situation allows. Naturally, any such changes will be referred to the Security Council.

71. In connexion with the strength and composition of the Force, two problems have arisen which require urgent solution. One concerns the rate of reimbursements to contributing Governments for the costs incurred as a result of supplying troops to the United Nations. The other relates to the freedom of movement of all contingents in the operational area. The Security Council may be assured that I am giving close attention to both problems and shall continue to exert every effort to solve them in a satisfactory way.


72. The financial aspects of UNEF are a matter to which I have given close attention, and I shall spare no effort to ensure that the Force functions as economically as possible without impairing its efficiency. The obvious need for economy must, of course, be balanced by the necessity to administer and support the Force in a way commensurate with the importance of its task and with the difficult conditions under which it has to operate.


73. In concluding this report, I wish to place on record my gratitude to the Governments contributing troops to the United Nations Emergency Force. My gratitude goes also to the many Governments which have given assistance of one kind or another to the United Nations to facilitate the establishment of the Force, particularly to those Governments which have provided airlift free of charge to the United Nations for the transport of contingents to the mission area or have made voluntary contributions over and above their

SEPARATION OF FORCES



EXPLANATION OF PROCESS





DEMOCRATIC ARMY
Arms and Ammunition

Phase no. 1 Thursday 6th June - Friday 14th

1. UNDOF positioning between the present ;
2. IDP redeployment in No. 1a area
3. Syrian army and IDP thinning out in No. 1a area and IDP in No. 1a area (Hafid Ave
4. IDP handing over to UNDOF no. 1a area
5. UNDOF positioning in No. 1a buffer area

Phase no. 2 Saturday 15th June - Thursday 1

1. Syrian Army starts redeployment in no. 1
2. IDP redeployment in no. 2a area
3. Syrian Army and IDP thinning out in No. 1 and in no. 1a area
4. UNDOF inspection of thinning out in No. 1a area and no. 1a area.
5. IDP handing over to UNDOF No. 1a area
5. UNDOF positioning in No. 2a buffer area

Phase no. 3 Wednesday 19th June - Sunday

1. Syrian Army redeployment in No. 2a area
2. IDP redeployment in No. 3 area
3. IDP thinning out in No. 3 area and 1 (Kuneitra sector)
4. UNDOF inspection of thinning out in 1a area and no. 1a area and no. 1a area
5. IDP handing over to UNDOF no. 3a area

Phase no. 4 Monday 24th June - Wednesday

1. Syrian Administration in No. 3a area
2. IDP redeployment in No. 4 area
3. IDP handing over to UNDOF No. 4 area
4. UNDOF inspection of thinning out in No. 4 area and no. 4 area between and A-1 lines west of Kuneitra and 1a Syrian Administration in No. 4 area



Note: Scale and same place in
Lines A, B and A-1 are
according to the Agreement

Phase no. 1 Thursday 6th June - Friday 14th June	Time Table
1. UNDOF positions between the present lines	6.6 - 8.6
2. IDP redeployment in No. 1a area	9.6 - 14.6
3. Syrian army and IDP thinning out in No. 1 areas and I in No. 4a area (Hafid area)	9.6 - 14.6
4. IDP handing over to UNDOF no. 1a area	14.6 - 16.00
5. UNDOF positioning in No. 1a buffer area	14.6 - 18.00

Phase no. 2 Saturday 15th June - Tuesday 18th June	Time Table
1. Syrian Army starts redeployment in no. 1a area	15.6 - 08.00
2. IDP redeployment in no. 2a area	15.6 - 18.6
3. Syrian Army and IDP thinning out in No. 2 areas and in no. 3 area	15.6 - 18.6
4. UNDOF inspection of thinning out in No. 1 areas and no. 4a area.	16.6
5. IDP handing over to UNDOF No. 2a area	18.6 - 16.00
6. UNDOF positioning in No. 2a buffer area	18.6 - 18.00

Phase no. 3 Wednesday 19th June - Sunday 23rd June	Time Table
1. Syrian Army redeployment in No. 2a area	19.6 - 08.00
2. IDP redeployment in No. 3a area	19.6 - 23.6
3. IDP thinning out in No. 3 areas and 4b (Kincler sector)	19.6 - 23.6
4. UNDOF inspection of thinning out in No. 2 areas and no. 4a area and no. 1a area	20.6
5. IDP handing over to UNDOF No. 3a area	23.6 - 16.00

Phase no. 4 Monday 24th June - Wednesday 26th June	Time Table
1. Syrian Army redeployment in No. 3a area	24.6 - 08.00
2. IDP redeployment in No. 4 areas	24.6 - 25.6
3. IDP handing over to UNDOF No. 4 areas	25.6 - 16.00
4. UNDOF inspection of thinning out in No. 2a and No. 4 areas and in the area between A and A-1 lines west of Kunelira and 4b area	25.6
5. Syrian Army redeployment in No. 4 areas	25.6 - 18.00



Note: Scale and some place names added for convenience.
Lines A, B and A-1 are labelled on the map according to the Agreement on Disengagement.

budgetary assessments.

74. I wish also to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Commander of the Force, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, to its officers and men and to its civilian staff, as well as to the military observers of UNTSO who co-operate with and assist UNEF in the fulfilment of its task, for the exemplary manner in which they have performed their important and difficult duties.

8

Report of the Secretary-General on negotiations regarding implementation of the Syria-Israel disengagement agreement¹⁴²

June 6, 1974

1. Pursuant to paragraph D of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces (S/11302/Add.1, annex A), the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference under the aegis of the United Nations held six meetings in Geneva from 31 May to 5 June 1974. Military representatives of Syria joined the Working Group, and representatives of the Co-chairmen of the Conference also participated in the meetings.

2. At the meeting held on 31 May, the military representatives of Israel and Syria signed the Agreement on Disengagement and a map attached to it. Following a brief intermission, the Military Working Group began work, in accordance with the Agreement, on the precise delineation of a detailed map and a plan for the implementation of the disengagement of forces.

3. In the subsequent meetings, the Working Group reached full agreement on the following:

- (a) A map showing different phases of disengagement;
- (b) A disengagement plan and areas and a timetable;
- (c) A statement read by Lt. General E. Siilasvuo, who presided over the meetings.

The map, to which the disengagement plan was attached was signed by the military representatives of Israel and Syria at the final meeting held on

5 June 1974.¹⁴³ The agreed statement was also signed by General Siilasvuo at the same meeting, in conformity with an understanding between the parties.

4. The plan of separation of forces involves the redeployment of Israeli forces from the area east of the 1967 cease-fire line. It also provides for Israeli redeployment from Quneitra and Rafid and the demilitarization of an area west of Quneitra still held by Israel.

5. Prior to any Israeli redeployment, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) will occupy, between 6 and 8 June, a buffer zone between the parties. The plan is to be implemented in the area of separation as specified in the Agreement. Separation of forces should be completed by 26 June. There is also provision for the return of Syrian civilian administration to the UNDOF area of separation.

6. UNDOF will carry out an inspection of the redeployment of forces after the completion of each phase on dates fixed in the time-table attached to the plan of separation of forces and will report its findings forthwith to the parties. In order to determine that both parties have redeployed their forces in the limited forces areas, UNDOF will verify on 26 June 1974 that the limitation of forces agreed to by the parties is observed by the parties, and it will thereafter effect regular bi-weekly inspections of the 10-kilometre restricted forces areas.

7. Agreement was also reached within the Working Group on the following points:

(a) Israel and Syria undertake to repatriate all prisoners-of-war still detained by them, not later than 6 June;

(b) Israel and Syria will co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in carrying out its mandate, including the exchange of dead bodies, which is to be completed on 6 June 1974;

(c) Israel and Syria will make available all information and maps of minefields concerning their respective areas and the areas to be handed over by them.

¹⁴² UN doc. S/11302/Add.2. See doc. 115 below for the text of the agreement. Reports on UNDOF are not included in this volume.

¹⁴³ This map was published on July 9, 1975, in UN doc. S/11302/Add.3, and is printed after p. 132.

General Assembly Debate: The Question of Palestine

9

General Assembly, 2282nd meeting; statement by the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO¹⁴⁴

November 13, 1974

MR. ARAFAT (interpretation from Arabic): In the name of the people of Palestine and the leader of its national struggle, the Palestine Liberation Organization, I take this opportunity to extend to you, Mr. President, my warmest congratulations on your election to the presidency of the twenty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

We have, of course, long known you to be a sincere and devoted defender of the cause of freedom, justice and peace. We have known you also to be in the vanguard of the freedom-fighters in their heroic Algerian war of national liberation. Today Algeria has attained a distinguished position in the world community and has assumed its responsibilities both in the national and in the international fields, thus earning the support and esteem of the entire human family.

I also avail myself of this opportunity to extend my sincerest appreciation to Mr. Kurt Waldheim, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for the great efforts he has made and is still making to enable us to assume our responsibilities in the smoothest possible way.

In the name of the people of Palestine I take this opportunity to congratulate three States that have recently been admitted to membership in the United Nations after obtaining their national independence: Guinea-Bissau, Bangladesh and Grenada. I extend our best wishes to the leadership of those Member States and wish them progress and success.

Mr. President, I thank you for having invited the Palestinian Liberation Organization to participate in this plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly. I am grateful to all those representatives of States of the United Nations who contributed to the decision to introduce the question of Palestine as a separate item of the agenda of this Assembly. That decision made possible the Assembly's resolution inviting us to address it on the question of Palestine.

This is a very important occasion. The question of Palestine is being re-examined by the United Nations, and we consider that step to be a victory for the world Organization as much as a victory for the cause of our people. It indicates anew that the United Nations of today is not the United Nations of the past, just as today's world is not yesterday's world. Today's United Nations represents 138 nations, a number that more clearly reflects the will of the international community. Thus today's United Nations is more nearly capable of implementing the principles embodied in its Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as being more truly empowered to support causes of peace and justice.

Our peoples are now beginning to feel that change. Along with them, the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America also feel the change. As a result, the United Nations acquires greater esteem both in our people's view and in the view of other peoples. Our hope is thereby strengthened that the United Nations can contribute actively to the pursuit and triumph of the causes of peace, justice, freedom and independence. Our resolve to build a new world is fortified—a world free of colonialism, imperialism, neocolonialism and racism in each of its instances, including Zionism.

Our world aspires to peace, justice, equality and freedom. It wishes that oppressed nations at present bent under the weight of imperialism might gain their freedom and their right to self-determination. It hopes to place the relations between nations on a basis of equality, peaceful coexistence, mutual respect for each other's internal affairs, secure national sovereignty, inde-

¹⁴⁴ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/PV.2282, pp. 2-51; the UN text has been compared with the English translation of the original Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), November 14, 1974, as published in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, IV, 2 (Winter 1975), pp. 181-194. Discrepancies with the Arabic are included in footnotes to the text.

pendence and territorial unity on the basis of justice and mutual benefit. This world resolves that the economic ties binding it together should be grounded in justice, parity and mutual interest. It aspires finally to direct its human resources against the scourge of poverty, famine, disease and natural calamity, toward the development of productive scientific and technical capabilities to enhance human wealth—all this in the hope of reducing the disparity between the developing and the developed countries. But all such aspirations cannot be realized in a world that is at present ruled over by tension, injustice, oppression, racial discrimination and exploitation, a world also threatened with unending economic disaster, war and crisis.

Great numbers of peoples, including those of Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Palestine, among many others, are still victims of oppression and violence. Their areas of the world are gripped by armed struggles provoked by imperialism and racial discrimination, both merely forms of aggression and terror. Those are instances of oppressed peoples compelled by intolerable circumstances into a confrontation with such oppression. But wherever that confrontation occurs it is legitimate and just.

It is imperative that the international community should support these peoples in their struggles, in the furtherance of their rightful causes, in the attainment of their right to self-determination.

In Indo-China the peoples are still exposed to aggression. They remain subjected to conspiracies preventing them from the enjoyment of peace and the realization of their goals. Although peoples everywhere have welcomed the agreements on peace reached in Laos and South Viet-Nam, no one can say that genuine peace has been achieved, nor that those forces responsible in the first place for aggression have now desisted from their attacks on Viet-Nam.¹⁴⁵ The same can be said of the present military aggression against the people of Cambodia. It is therefore incumbent on the international community to support these oppressed peoples, and also to condemn the oppressors for their designs against peace. Moreover, despite the positive stand taken by the Democratic Republic of Korea with regard to a

peaceful, just solution of the Korean question, there is as yet no settlement of that question.

A few months ago the problem of Cyprus erupted violently before us. All peoples everywhere shared in the suffering of the Cypriots. We ask that the United Nations continue its efforts to reach a just solution in Cyprus, thereby sparing the Cypriots further war and ensuring peace and independence for them instead. Undoubtedly, however, consideration of the question of Cyprus belongs within that of Middle Eastern problems as well as of Mediterranean problems.

In their efforts to replace an outmoded but still dominant world economic system with a new, more logically rational one, the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America must nevertheless face implacable attacks on these efforts. These countries have expressed their views at the special session of the General Assembly on raw materials and development. Thus the plundering, the exploitation, the siphoning off of the wealth of impoverished peoples must be terminated forthwith. There must be no deterring of these peoples' efforts to develop and control their wealth. Furthermore, there is a grave necessity for arriving at fair prices for raw materials from these countries.

In addition, these countries continue to be hampered in the attainment of their primary objectives formulated at the Conference on the Law of the Sea in Caracas, at the Population Conference and at the Rome Food Conference. The United Nations should therefore bend every effort to achieve a radical alteration of the world economic system, making it possible for developing countries to develop. The United Nations must shoulder the responsibility for fighting inflation, now borne most heavily by the developing countries, especially the oil-producing countries.¹⁴⁶ The United Nations must firmly condemn any threats made against these countries simply because they demand their just rights.

The world-wide armaments race shows no sign of abating. As a consequence, the world is threatened with the dispersion of its wealth and the utter waste of its energies. Armed violence is made more likely everywhere. We expect the United Nations

¹⁴⁵ The Arabic text reads: "... for the forces responsible in the first place for aggression are determined that Vietnam should remain in a state of disturbance and war."

¹⁴⁶ The Arabic text reads: "The United Nations must resolutely oppose forces that are trying to lay the responsibility for inflation on the shoulders of the developing countries, especially the oil producing countries."

to devote itself single-mindedly to curbing the unlimited acquisition of arms; to preventing even the possibility of nuclear destruction; to reducing the vast sums spent on military technology; to converting expenditure on war into projects for development, for increasing production, and for benefiting common humanity.

And still, the highest tension exists in our part of the world. There the Zionist entity clings tenaciously to occupied Arab territory; Zionism persists in its aggressions against us and our territory. New military preparations are feverishly being made. These anticipate another, fifth war of aggression to be launched against us. Such signs bear the closest possible watching, since there is a grave likelihood that this war would forebode nuclear destruction and cataclysmic annihilation.

The world is in need of tremendous efforts if its aspirations to peace, freedom, justice, equality and development are to be realized, if its struggle is to be victorious over colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, and racism in all its forms, including Zionism. Only by such efforts can actual form be given to the aspirations of all peoples, including the aspirations of peoples whose States oppose such efforts. It is this road that leads to the fulfilment of those principles emphasized by the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Were the *status quo* simply to be maintained however, the world would instead be exposed to prolonged armed conflict, in addition to economic, human and natural calamity.

Despite abiding world crises, despite even the gloomy powers of backwardness and disastrous wrong, we live in a time of glorious change. An old world order is crumbling before our eyes, as imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism, the chief form of which is Zionism, ineluctably perish. We are privileged to be able to witness a great wave of history bearing peoples forward into a new world which they have created. In that world just causes will triumph. Of that we are confident.

The question of Palestine belongs to this perspective of emergence and struggle. Palestine is crucial amongst those just causes fought for unstintingly by masses labouring under imperialism and aggression. It cannot be, and is not, lost on me today, as I stand here before the General Assembly, that if I have been given the opportunity

to address the General Assembly, so too must the opportunity be given to all liberation movements fighting against racism and imperialism. In their names, in the name of every human being struggling for freedom and self-determination, I call upon the General Assembly urgently to give their just causes the same full attention the General Assembly has so rightly given to our cause. Such recognitions once made, there will be a secure foundation thereafter for the preservation of universal peace. For only with such peace will a new world order endure in which peoples can live free of oppression, fear, terror and the suppression of their rights. As I said earlier, this is the true perspective in which to set the question of Palestine. I shall now do so for the General Assembly, keeping firmly in mind both the perspective and the goal of a coming world order.

Even as today we address the General Assembly from what is before all else an international rostrum we are also expressing our faith in political and diplomatic struggle as complements, as enhancements of armed struggle. Furthermore we express our appreciation of the role the United Nations is capable of playing in settling problems of international scope. But this capability, I said a moment ago, became real only once the United Nations had accommodated itself to the living actuality of aspiring peoples, towards which an Organization of so truly international a dimension owes unique obligations.

In addressing the General Assembly today our people proclaims its faith in the future, unencumbered either by past tragedies or present limitations. If, as we discuss the present, we enlist the past in our service, we do so only to light up our journey into the future alongside other movements of national liberation. If we return now to the historical roots of our cause we do so because present at this very moment in our midst are those, who, while they occupy our homes, as their cattle graze in our pastures, and as their hands pluck the fruit of our trees, claim at the same time that we are disembodied spirits, fictions without presence, without traditions or future. We speak of our roots also because until recently some people have regarded—and continued to regard—our problem as merely a problem of refugees. They have portrayed the Middle East Question as little more than a border dispute between the Arab States and the Zionist entity. They have imagined

that our people claims rights not rightfully its own and fights neither with logic nor valid motive, with a simple wish only to disturb the peace and to terrorize wantonly. For there are amongst you—and here I refer to the United States of America and others like it—those who supply our enemy freely with planes and bombs and with every variety of murderous weapon. They take hostile positions against us, deliberately distorting the true essence of the problem. All this is done not only at our expense, but at the expense of the American people, and of the friendship we continue to hope can be cemented between us and this great people, whose history of struggle for the sake of freedom¹⁴⁷ we honour and salute.

I cannot now forgo this opportunity to appeal from this rostrum directly to the American people, asking it to give its support to our heroic and fighting people. I ask it whole-heartedly to endorse right and justice, to recall George Washington to mind, heroic Washington whose purpose was his nation's freedom and independence, Abraham Lincoln, champion of the destitute and the wretched, also Woodrow Wilson whose doctrine of Fourteen Points remains subscribed to and venerated by our people. I ask the American people whether the demonstrations of hostility and enmity taking place outside this great hall reflect the true intent of America's will? What, I ask you plainly, is the crime of the people of Palestine against the American people? Why do you fight us so? Does such unwarranted belligerence really serve your interests? Does it serve the interests of the American masses? No, definitely not. I can only hope that the American people will remember that their friendship with the whole Arab nation is too great, too abiding, and too rewarding for any such demonstrations to harm it.

In any event, as our discussion of the question of Palestine focuses upon historical roots, we do so because we believe that any question now exercising the world's concern must be viewed radically, in the true root sense of that word, if a real solution is ever to be grasped. We propose this radical approach as an antidote to an approach to international issues that obscures historical origins behind ignorance, denial, and a slavish obedience to the present.

The roots of the Palestinian question reach back into the closing years of the 19th century, in other words, to that period which we call the era of colonialism and settlement¹⁴⁸ as we know it today. This is precisely the period during which Zionism as a scheme was born; its aim was the conquest of Palestine by European immigrants, just as settlers colonized, and indeed raided, most of Africa. This is the period during which, pouring forth out of the west, colonialism spread into the furthest reaches of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, building colonies, everywhere cruelly exploiting, oppressing, plundering the peoples of those three continents. This period persists into the present. Marked evidence of its totally reprehensible presence can be readily preceived in the racism practised both in South Africa and in Palestine.

Just as colonialism and its demagogues dignified their conquests, their plunder and limitless attacks upon the natives of Africa with appeals to a "civilizing and modernizing" mission, so too did waves of Zionist immigrants disguise their purposes as they conquered Palestine. Just as colonialism as a system and colonialists as its instrument used religion, colour, race and language to justify the African's exploitation and his cruel subjugation by terror and discrimination, so too were these methods employed as Palestine was usurped and its people hounded from their national homeland.

Just as colonialism heedlessly used the wretched, the poor, the exploited as mere inert matter with which to build and to carry out settler colonialism, so too were destitute, oppressed European Jews employed on behalf of world imperialism and of the Zionist leadership. European Jews were transformed into the instruments of aggression; they became the elements of settler colonialism intimately allied to racial discrimination.

Zionist theology was utilized against our Palestinian people: the purpose was not only the establishment of Western-style settler colonialism but also the severing of Jews from their various homelands and subsequently their estrangement from their nations. Zionism is an ideology that is imperialist, colonialist, racist; it is profoundly reactionary and discriminatory; it is united with anti-Semitism in its retrograde tenets and is, when all is said and done, another side of the same

¹⁴⁷ The Arabic text includes: "...for the sake of freedom and the unity of its territories..."

¹⁴⁸ The Arabic text includes: "...the era of colonialism and settlement and the transition to the eve of imperialism."

base coin. For when what is proposed is that adherents of the Jewish faith, regardless of their national residence, should neither owe allegiance to their national residence nor live on equal footing with its other, non-Jewish citizens—when that is proposed we hear anti-Semitism being proposed. When it is proposed that the only solution for the Jewish problem is that Jews must alienate themselves from communities or nations of which they have been a historical part, when it is proposed that Jews solve the Jewish problem by immigrating to and forcibly settling the land of another people—when this occurs, exactly the same position is being advocated as the one urged by anti-Semites against Jews.

Thus, for instance, we can understand the close connexion between Rhodes, who promoted settler colonialism in south-east Africa, and Herzl, who had settler colonialist designs upon Palestine. Having received a certificate of good settler colonialist conduct from Rhodes, Herzl then turned around and presented this certificate to the British Government, hoping thus to secure a formal resolution supporting Zionist policy. In exchange, the Zionists promised Britain an imperialist base on Palestinian soil so that imperial interests could be safeguarded at one of their chief strategic points.

So the Zionist movement allied itself directly with world colonialism in a common raid on our land. Allow me now to present a selection of historical truths about this alliance.

The Jewish invasion of Palestine began in 1881. Before the first large wave of immigrants started arriving, Palestine had a population of half a million; most of the population was either Moslem or Christian, and only 20,000 were Jewish. Every segment of the population enjoyed the religious tolerance characteristic of our civilization.

Palestine was then a verdant land, inhabited mainly by an Arab people in the course of building its life and dynamically enriching its indigenous culture.

Between 1882 and 1917 the Zionist Movement settled approximately 50,000 European Jews in our homeland. To do that it resorted to trickery and deceit in order to implant them in our midst. Its success in getting Britain to issue the Balfour Declaration once again demonstrated the alliance between Zionism and imperialism. Furthermore, by promising to the Zionist movement what was

not hers to give, Britain showed how oppressive was the rule of imperialism. As it was constituted then, the League of Nations abandoned our Arab people, and Wilson's pledges and promises came to nought. In the guise of a mandate, British imperialism was cruelly and directly imposed upon us. The mandate document issued by the League of Nations was to enable the Zionist invaders to consolidate their gains in our homeland.

In the wake of the Balfour Declaration and over a period of 30 years, the Zionist movement succeeded, in collaboration with its imperialist ally, in settling more European Jews on the land, thus usurping the properties of Palestinian Arabs.

By 1947 the number of Jews had reached 600,000; they owned about 6 per cent of Palestinian arable land. The figure should be compared with the population of Palestine, which at that time was 1,250,000.

As a result of the collusion between the mandatory Power and the Zionist movement and with the support of some countries,¹⁴⁹ this General Assembly early in its history approved a recommendation to partition our Palestinian homeland. This took place in an atmosphere poisoned with questionable actions and strong pressure. The General Assembly partitioned what it had no right to divide—an indivisible homeland. When we rejected that decision, our position corresponded to that of the natural mother who refused to permit King Solomon to cut her son in two when the unnatural mother claimed the child for herself and agreed to his dismemberment. Furthermore, even though the partition resolution granted the colonialist settlers 54 per cent of the land of Palestine, their dissatisfaction with the decision prompted them to wage a war of terror against the civilian Arab population. They occupied 81 per cent of the total area of Palestine, uprooting a million Arabs. Thus, they occupied 524 Arab towns and villages, of which they destroyed 385, completely obliterating them in the process. Having done so, they built their own settlements and colonies on the ruins of our farms and our groves. The roots of the Palestine question lie here. Its causes do not stem from any conflict between two religions or two nationalisms. Neither is it a border conflict between neighbouring states. It is

¹⁴⁹ Instead of "some countries" the Arabic text reads "the United States."

the cause of a people deprived of its homeland, dispersed and uprooted, and living mostly in exile and in refugee camps.

With support from imperialist and colonialist Powers, it managed to get itself accepted as a United Nations Member. It further succeeded in getting the Palestine Question deleted from the agenda of the United Nations and in deceiving world public opinion by presenting our cause as a problem of refugees in need either of charity from do-gooders, or settlement in a land not theirs.

Not satisfied with all this, the racist entity, founded on the imperialist-colonialist concept, turned itself into a base of imperialism and into an arsenal of weapons. This enabled it to assume its role of subjugating the Arab people and of committing aggression against them, in order to satisfy its ambitions for further expansion on Palestinian and other Arab lands. In addition to the many instances of aggression committed by this entity against the Arab States, it has launched two large-scale wars, in 1956 and 1967, thus endangering world peace and security.

As a result of Zionist aggression in June 1967, the enemy occupied Egyptian Sinai as far as the Suez Canal. The enemy occupied Syria's Golan Heights, in addition to all Palestinian land west of the Jordan. All these developments have led to the creation in our area of what has come to be known as the "Middle East problem". The situation has been rendered more serious by the enemy's persistence in maintaining its unlawful occupation and in further consolidating it, thus establishing a beachhead for world imperialism's thrust against our Arab nation. All Security Council decisions and appeals to world public opinion for withdrawal from the lands occupied in June 1967 have been ignored. Despite all the peaceful efforts on the international level, the enemy has not been deterred from its expansionist policy. The only alternative open before our Arab nations, chiefly Egypt and Syria, was to expend exhaustive efforts in preparing forcefully to resist that barbarous armed invasion—and this in order to liberate Arab lands and to restore the rights of the Palestinian people, after all other peaceful means had failed.

Under these circumstances, the fourth war broke out in October 1973, bringing home to the Zionist enemy the bankruptcy of its policy of occupation, expansion and its reliance on the

concept of military might. Despite all this, the leaders of the Zionist entity are far from having learned any lesson from their experience. They are making preparations for the fifth war, resorting once more to the language of military superiority, aggression, terrorism, subjugation and, finally, always to war in their dealings with the Arabs.

It pains our people greatly to witness the propagation of the myth that its homeland was a desert until it was made to bloom by the toil of foreign settlers, that it was a land without a people, and that the colonialist entity caused no harm to any human being. No: such lies must be exposed from this rostrum, for the world must know that Palestine was the cradle of the most ancient cultures and civilizations. Its Arab people were engaged in farming and building, spreading culture throughout the land for thousands of years, setting an example in the practice of freedom of worship, acting as faithful guardians of the holy places of all religions. As a son of Jerusalem, I treasure for myself and my people beautiful memories and vivid images of the religious brotherhood that was the hallmark of our Holy City before it succumbed to catastrophe. Our people continued to pursue this enlightened policy until the establishment of the State of Israel and their dispersion. This did not deter our people from pursuing their humanitarian role on Palestinian soil. Nor will they permit their land to become a launching pad for aggression or a racist camp predicated on the destruction of civilization, cultures, progress and peace. Our people cannot but maintain the heritage of their ancestors in resisting the invaders, in assuming the privileged task of defending their native land, their Arab nationhood, their culture and civilization, and in safeguarding the cradle of monotheistic religion.

By contrast, we need only mention briefly some Israeli stands: its support of the Secret Army Organization in Algeria, its bolstering of the settler-colonialists in Africa—whether in the Congo, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Azania or South Africa—and its backing of South Vietnam against the Viet-Nameese revolution. In addition, one can mention Israel's continuing support of imperialists and racists everywhere, its obstructionist stand in the Committee of Twenty-Four, its refusal to cast its vote in support of independence for the African States, and its opposition to the demands of many Asian, African

and Latin American nations, and several other States in the Conferences on raw materials, population, the Law of the Sea, and food. All these facts offer further proof of the character of the enemy which has usurped our land. They justify the honourable struggle which we are waging against it. As we defend a vision of the future, our enemy upholds the myths of the past.

The enemy we face has a long record of hostility even towards the Jews themselves, for there is within the Zionist entity a built-in racism against Oriental Jews. While we were vociferously condemning the massacres of Jews under Nazi rule, Zionist leadership appeared more interested at that time in exploiting them as best it could in order to realize its goal of immigration into Palestine.

If the immigration of Jews to Palestine had had as its objective the goal of enabling them to live side by side with us, enjoying the same rights and assuming the same duties, we would have opened our doors to them, as far as our homeland's capacity for absorption permitted. Such was the case with the thousands of Armenians and Circassians who still live among us in equality as brethren and citizens. But that the goal of this immigration should be to usurp our homeland, disperse our people, and turn us into second-class citizens—this is what no one can conceivably demand that we acquiesce in or submit to. Therefore, since its inception, our revolution has not been motivated by racial or religious factors. Its target has never been the Jew, as a person, but racist Zionism and undisguised aggression. In this sense, ours is also a revolution for the Jew, as a human being, as well. We are struggling so that Jews, Christians and Muslims may live in equality, enjoying the same rights and assuming the same duties, free from racial or religious discrimination.

We do distinguish between Judaism and Zionism. While we maintain our opposition to the colonialist Zionist movement, we respect the Jewish faith. Today, almost one century after the rise of the Zionist movement, we wish to warn of its increasing danger to the Jews of the world, to our Arab people and to world peace and security. For Zionism encourages the Jew to emigrate out of his homeland and grants him an artificially created nationality. The Zionists proceed with their terrorist activities even though these have proved ineffective. The phenomenon of constant

emigration from Israel, which is bound to grow as the bastions of colonialism and racism in the world fall, is an example of the inevitability of the failure of such activities.

We urge the people and governments of the world to stand firm against Zionist attempts at encouraging world Jewry to emigrate from their countries and to usurp our land. We urge them as well firmly to oppose any discrimination against any human being, as to religion, race, or colour.

Why should our Arab Palestinian people pay the price of such discrimination in the world? Why should our people be responsible for the problems of Jewish immigration, if such problems exist in the minds of some people? Why do not the supporters of these problems open their own countries, which can absorb and help these immigrants?

Those who call us terrorists wish to prevent world public opinion from discovering the truth about us and from seeing the justice on our faces. They seek to hide the terrorism and tyranny of their acts, and our own posture of self-defence.

The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists, cannot possibly be called terrorist, otherwise the American people in their struggle for liberation from the British colonialists would have been terrorists; the European resistance against the Nazis would be terrorism, the struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples would also be terrorism, and many of you who are in this Assembly hall were considered terrorists. This is actually a just and proper struggle consecrated by the United Nations Charter and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As to those who fight against the just causes, those who wage war to occupy, colonize and oppress other people, those are the terrorists. Those are the people whose actions should be condemned, who should be called war criminals: for the justice of the cause determines the right to struggle.

Zionist terrorism which was waged against the Palestinian people to evict it from its country and usurp its land is registered in our official documents. Thousands of our people were assassinated in their villages and towns; tens of thousands of others were forced at gunpoint to leave their

homes and the lands of their fathers. Time and time again our children, women and aged were evicted and had to wander in the deserts and climb mountains without any food or water. No one who in 1948 witnessed the catastrophe that befell the inhabitants of hundreds of villages and towns—in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramle and Galilee—no one who has been a witness to that catastrophe will ever forget the experience, even though the mass blackout has succeeded in hiding these horrors as it has hidden the traces of 385 Palestinian villages and towns destroyed at the time and erased from the map. The destruction of 19,000 houses during the past seven years, which is equivalent to the complete destruction of 200 more Palestinian villages, and the great number of maimed as a result of the treatment they were subjected to in Israeli prisons, cannot be hidden by any blackout.

Their terrorism fed on hatred and this hatred was even directed against the olive tree in my country, which has been a proud symbol and which reminded them of the indigenous inhabitants of the land, a living reminder that the land is Palestinian. Thus they sought to destroy it. How can one describe the statement by Golda Meir which expressed her disquiet about “the Palestinian children born every day”. They see in the Palestinian child, in the Palestinian tree, an enemy that should be exterminated. For tens of years Zionists have been harassing our people’s cultural, political, social and artistic leaders, terrorizing them and assassinating them. They have stolen our cultural heritage, our popular folklore and have claimed it as theirs. Their terrorism even reached our sacred places in our beloved and peaceful Jerusalem. They have endeavoured to de-Arabize it and make it lose its Moslem and Christian character by evicting its inhabitants and annexing it.

I must mention the fire of the Aksa Mosque and the disfiguration of many of the monuments, which are both historic and religious in character. Jerusalem, with its religious history and its spiritual values, bears witness to the future. It is proof of our eternal presence, of our civilization, of our human values. It is therefore not surprising that under its skies the three religions were born and that under that sky these three religions shine in order to enlighten mankind so that it might express the tribulations and hopes of humanity, and that it might mark out the road of the future

with its hopes.

The small number of Palestinian Arabs who were not uprooted by the Zionists in 1948 are at present refugees in their own homeland. Israeli law treats them as second-class citizens—and even as third-class citizens since Oriental Jews are second-class citizens—and they have been subject to all forms of racial discrimination and terrorism after confiscation of their land and property. They have been victims of bloody massacres such as that of Kfar Kassim, they have been expelled from their villages and denied the right to return, as in the case of the inhabitants of Ikrit and Kfar-Birim. For 26 years, our population has been living under martial law and was denied the freedom of movement without prior permission from the Israeli military governor, this at a time when an Israeli law was promulgated granting citizenship to any Jew anywhere who wanted to emigrate to our homeland. Moreover, another Israeli law stipulated that Palestinians who were not present in their villages or towns at the time of the occupation were not entitled to Israeli citizenship.

The record of Israeli rulers is replete with acts of terror perpetrated on those of our people who remained under occupation in Sinai and the Golan Heights. The criminal bombardment of the Bahr-al-Bakar School and the Abou Zaabal factory are but two such unforgettable acts of terrorism.¹⁵⁰ The total destruction of the Syrian city of Kuneitra is yet another tangible instance of systematic terrorism. If a record of Zionist terrorism in South Lebanon were to be compiled, the enormity of its acts would shock even the most hardened: piracy, bombardments, scorched-earth, destruction of hundreds of homes, eviction of civilians and the kidnapping of Lebanese citizens. This clearly constitutes a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and is in preparation for the diversion of the Litani River waters.

Need one remind this Assembly of the numerous resolutions adopted by it condemning Israeli aggressions committed against Arab countries, Israeli violations of human rights and the articles of the Geneva Conventions, as well as the resolutions pertaining to the annexation of the city of Jerusalem and its restoration to its former status?

The only description for these acts is that they

¹⁵⁰ The Arabic text includes here: “The destruction of the Libyan aircraft is another unforgettable act.”

are acts of barbarism and terrorism. And yet, the Zionist racists and colonialists have the temerity to describe the just struggle of our people as terror. Could there be a more flagrant distortion of truth than this? We ask those who usurped our land, who are committing murderous acts of terrorism against our people and are practising racial discrimination more extensively than the racists of South Africa, we ask them to keep in mind the United Nations General Assembly resolution that called for the one-year suspension¹⁵¹ of the membership of the Government of South Africa from the United Nations. Such is the inevitable fate of every racist country that adopts the law of the jungle, usurps the homeland of others and persists in oppression.

For the past 30 years, our people have had to struggle against British occupation and Zionist invasion both of which had one intention, namely the usurpation of our land. Six major revolts and tens of popular uprisings were staged to foil these attempts, so that our homeland might remain ours. Over 30,000 martyrs, the equivalent in comparative terms of 6 million Americans, died in the process.

When the majority of the Palestinian people was uprooted from its homeland in 1948, the Palestinian struggle for self-determination continued under the most difficult conditions. We tried every possible means to continue our political struggle to attain our national rights, but to no avail. Meanwhile, we had to struggle for sheer existence. Even in exile we educated our children. This was all a part of trying to survive.

The Palestinian people produced thousands of physicians, lawyers, teachers and scientists who actively participated in the development of the Arab countries bordering on their usurped homeland. They utilized their income to assist the young and aged amongst their people who remained in the refugee camps. They educated their younger sisters and brothers, supported their parents and cared for their children. All along, the Palestinian dreamt of return. Neither the Palestinian's allegiance to Palestine nor his determination to return waned; nothing could persuade him to relinquish his Palestinian identity or to forsake his homeland. The passage of time did

not make him forget, as some hoped he would. When our people lost faith in the international community which persisted in ignoring its rights and when it became obvious that the Palestinians would not recuperate one inch of Palestine through exclusively political means, our people had no choice but to resort to armed struggle. Into that struggle it poured its material and human resources. We bravely faced the most vicious acts of Israeli terrorism which were aimed at diverting our struggle and arresting it.

In the past 10 years of our struggle, thousands of martyrs and twice as many wounded, maimed and imprisoned were offered in sacrifice; all in an effort to resist the imminent threat of liquidation, to regain our right to self-determination and our undisputed right to return to our homeland. With the utmost dignity and the most admirable revolutionary spirit, our Palestinian people has not lost its spirit in Israeli prisons and concentration camps or when faced with all forms of harassment and intimidation. It struggles for sheer existence and it continues to strive to preserve the Arab character of its land. Thus it resists oppression, tyranny and terrorism in their ugliest forms.

It is through our popular armed struggle that our political leadership and our national institutions finally crystallized and a national liberation movement, comprising all the Palestinian factions, organizations, and capabilities, materialized in the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Through our militant Palestine national liberation movement, our people's struggle matured and grew enough to accommodate political and social struggle in addition to armed struggle. The Palestine Liberation Organization was a major factor in creating a new Palestinian individual, qualified to shape the future of our Palestine, not merely content with mobilizing the Palestinians for the challenges of the present.

The Palestine Liberation Organization can be proud of having a large number of cultural and educational activities, even while engaged in armed struggle, and at a time when it faced increasingly vicious blows of Zionist terrorism. We established institutes for scientific research, agricultural development and social welfare, as well as centres for the revival of our cultural heritage and the preservation of our folklore. Many Palestinian poets, artists and writers have enriched Arab culture in particular, and world culture

¹⁵¹ Instead of "the one year suspension" the Arabic text reads "the expulsion." In fact, the General Assembly on October 5, 1974, voted to reject South Africa's credentials.

generally. Their profoundly humane works have won the admiration of all those familiar with them. In contrast to that, our enemy has been systematically destroying our culture and disseminating racist, imperialist ideologies, in short, everything that impedes progress, justice, democracy and peace.

The Palestine Liberation Organization has earned its legitimacy because of the sacrifice inherent in its pioneering role, and also because of its dedicated leadership of the struggle. It has also been granted this legitimacy by the Palestinian masses, which in harmony with it have chosen it to lead the struggle according to its directives. The Palestine Liberation Organization has also gained its legitimacy by representing every faction, union or group as well as every Palestinian talent, either in the National Council or in people's institutions. This legitimacy was further strengthened by the support of the entire Arab nation, and it was consecrated during the last Arab Summit Conference, which reiterated the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in its capacity as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, to establish an independent national State on all liberated Palestinian territory.

Moreover, the Palestine Liberation Organization's legitimacy was intensified as a result of fraternal support given by other liberation movements and by friendly, like-minded nations that stood by our side, encouraging and aiding us in our struggle to secure our national rights.

Here I must also warmly convey the gratitude of our revolutionary fighters and that of our people to the non-aligned countries, the socialist countries, the Islamic countries, the African countries and friendly European countries, as well as all our other friends in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The Palestine Liberation Organization represents the Palestinian people, legitimately and uniquely. Because of this, the Palestine Liberation Organization expresses the wishes and hopes of its people. Because of this, too, it brings these very wishes and hopes before you, urging you not to shirk a momentous historic responsibility towards our just cause.

For many years now, our people has been exposed to the ravages of war, destruction and dispersion. It has paid in the blood of its sons that which cannot ever be compensated. It has borne the burdens of occupation, dispersion, eviction and

terror more uninterruptedly than any other people. And yet all this has made our people neither vindictive nor vengeful. Nor has it caused us to resort to the racism of our enemies. Nor have we lost the true method by which friend and foe are distinguished.

For we deplore all those crimes committed against the Jews, we also deplore all the real discrimination suffered by them because of their faith.

I am a rebel and freedom is my cause. I know well that many of you present here today once stood in exactly the same resistance position as I now occupy and from which I must fight. You once had to convert dreams into reality by your struggle. Therefore you must now share my dream. I think this is exactly why I can ask you now to help, as together we bring out our dream into a bright reality, our common dream for a peaceful future in Palestine's sacred land.

As he stood in an Israeli military court, the Jewish revolutionary, Ahud Adif, said: "I am no terrorist; I believe that a democratic State should exist on this land." Adif now languishes in a Zionist prison among his co-believers. To him and his colleagues I send my heartfelt good wishes.

And before those same courts there stands today a brave prince of the church, Bishop Capucci. Lifting his fingers to form the same victory sign used by our freedom-fighters, he said: "What I have done, I have done that all men may live on this land of peace in peace." This princely priest will doubtless share Adif's grim fate. To him we send our salutations and greetings.

Why therefore should I not dream and hope? For is not revolution the making real of dreams and hopes? So let us work together that my dream may be fulfilled, that I may return with my people out of exile, there in Palestine to live with this Jewish freedom-fighter and his partners, with this Arab priest and his brothers, in one democratic State where Christian, Jew and Moslem live in justice, equality, fraternity and progress.

Is this not a noble dream worthy of my struggle alongside all lovers of freedom everywhere? For the most admirable dimension of this dream is that it is Palestinian, a dream from out of the land of peace, the land of martyrdom and heroism, and the land of history, too.

Let us remember that the Jews of Europe and the United States have been known to lead the struggles

for secularism and the separation of Church and State. They have also been known to fight against discrimination on religious grounds. How can they then refuse this humane paradigm for the Holy Land? How then can they continue to support the most fanatic, discriminatory and closed of nations in its policy?

In my formal capacity as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and leader of the Palestinian revolution I proclaim before you that when we speak of our common hopes for the Palestine of tomorrow we include in our perspective all Jews now living in Palestine who choose to live with us there in peace and without discrimination.

In my formal capacity as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and leader of the Palestinian revolution I call upon Jews to turn away one by one from the illusory promises made to them by Zionist ideology and Israeli leadership. They are offering Jews perpetual bloodshed, endless war and continuous thralldom.

We invite them to emerge from their moral isolation into a more open realm of free choice, far from their present leadership's efforts to implant in them a Masada complex.¹⁵²

We offer them the most generous solution, that we might live together in a framework of just peace in our democratic Palestine.

In my formal capacity as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, I announce here that we do not wish one drop of either Arab or Jewish [blood] to be shed; neither do we delight in the continuation of killing, which would end once a just peace,¹⁵³ based on our people's rights, hopes and aspirations had been finally established.

In my formal capacity as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and leader of the Palestinian revolution I appeal to you to accompany our people in its struggle to attain its right to self-determination. This right is consecrated in the United Nations Charter and has been repeatedly confirmed in resolutions adopted by this august body since the drafting of the Charter. I appeal to you, further, to aid our people's return to its homeland from an involuntary exile imposed upon it by force of arms, by tyranny, by oppression, so that we may regain our property,

our land, and thereafter live in our national homeland, free and sovereign, enjoying all the privileges of nationhood. Only then can we pour all our resources into the mainstream of human civilization. Only then can Palestinian creativity be concentrated on the service of humanity. Only then will our Jerusalem resume its historic role as a peaceful shrine for all religions.¹⁵⁴

I appeal to you to enable our people to establish national independent sovereignty over its own land.

Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat: do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.

War flares up in Palestine, and yet it is in Palestine that peace will be born.

THE PRESIDENT (interpretation from Arabic): On behalf of the General Assembly I should like to express our deep thanks to Mr. Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Movement and leader of the Palestinian revolution, for his valuable and moving statement to the Assembly.

10

General Assembly, 2283rd meeting; statement by Israel¹⁵⁵

November 13, 1974

MR. TEKOA (Israel): I come before the General Assembly on behalf of a nation which has struggled through 20 centuries for its liberty and equality and for the restoration of its independence. I rise to speak in the name of a people which having at long last regained its freedom and sovereignty in its national homeland remains embattled, beleaguered by those who deny to it the rights of all nations. One third of the entire Jewish people was annihilated in the Second World War, which gave birth to the United Nations. A million Jewish soldiers in the Allied armies and in partisan ranks helped make the United Nations a reality. Representatives of the Jewish people

¹⁵⁴ For the last three sentences the Arabic text reads:

"Only then will our people be able to contribute all their energies and resources to the field of civilization and human creativity. Only then will they be able to protect their beloved Jerusalem and make it, as they have done for so many centuries, the shrine of all religions, free from all terrorism and coercion."

¹⁵² The Arabic text includes: "... a Masada complex and make it their destiny."

¹⁵³ The Arabic text reads: "neither do we delight in the continuation of killings for a single moment, once a just peace..."

¹⁵⁵ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/PV.2283, pp. 17-37.

were among those who drafted the Charter of the United Nations.

Yet today Arab States, most of which knew not the struggle that made the world safe for the United Nations; Arab States, some of whose leaders collaborated with the forces of darkness in their fight against the United Nations, are in the vanguard of a fanatical assault on the Jewish people, an assault that tramples to dust the ideals of the United Nations.

On 14 October 1974 the General Assembly turned its back on the United Nations Charter, on law and humanity, and virtually capitulated to a murder organization which aims at the destruction of a State Member of the United Nations. On 14 October the United Nations hung out a sign reading "Murderers of children are welcome here".

Today these murderers have come to the General Assembly, certain that it would do their bidding. Today this rostrum was defiled by their chieftain, who proclaimed that the shedding of Jewish blood would end only when the murderers' demands had been accepted and their objectives achieved.

On 14 October the United Nations and Governments which made the invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) possible became the object of worldwide criticism. Editorials and caricatures in the press and demonstrations on all continents expressed revulsion at the spectacle of the United Nations tearing asunder its own principles and precepts and paying homage to bloodshed and bestiality.

Today bloodshed and bestiality have come here to collect the spoils of the United Nations surrender. This surrender must be absolute they told the world this morning. The victim of bloodshed and bestiality should not even defend himself.

The United Nations is entrusted with the responsibility to guide mankind away from war, away from violence and oppression, toward peace, toward international understanding and the vindication of the rights of peoples and individuals. What remains of that responsibility now that the United Nations has prostrated itself before the PLO, which stands for premeditated, deliberate murder of innocent civilians, denies to the Jewish people its right to live, and seeks to destroy the Jewish State by armed force?

Throughout the years, the United Nations has

dealt with the problems of many peoples in many parts of the world. On no people, however, has it lavished greater attention than on the Arab inhabitants of Palestine.

Is it because the problems of others have been solved?

Has the Kurdish people, subjected to a continuing war of annihilation by the Iraqi Government, ever had its plight discussed and its rights upheld by the United Nations? Has this Organization tried to avert the massacre of half a million non-Moslem Africans in South Sudan? Have the fundamental human and political rights of the hundreds of millions who live under totalitarian régimes been ensured by the United Nations?

Is it because the needs of others are less pressing and less deserving than the needs of the Palestinians?

Are the Arabs of Palestine suffering starvation as are, according to United Nations statistics, almost 500 million people in Asia, Africa and Latin America? Has the United Nations left the Palestinian refugees without assistance as it has tens of millions of refugees all over the world, including Jewish refugees in Israel from Arab lands? Are the Palestinian refugees the only ones who cannot be reintegrated as others have been? Have the Palestinian Arabs no State of their own? What is Jordan if not a Palestinian Arab State?

The real reason for the special consideration accorded to questions concerning the Arabs of Palestine has been one and one only—the continuous exploitation of these questions as a weapon of Arab belligerency against Israel. As King Hussein said of the Arab leaders: "They have used the Palestine people for selfish political purposes". This is also the real motivation of the present debate.

In fact, no nation has enjoyed greater fulfilment of its political rights, no nation has been endowed with territory, sovereignty and independence more abundantly than the Arabs.

Of common language, culture, religion and origin, the Arab nation stormed out of its birthland in the seventh century and conquered one people after another until its rule encompassed the entire Arab peninsula, the Fertile Crescent and North Africa.

Everywhere in these areas ancient cultures were replaced by the Arab civilization. Everywhere

the vanquished were, with a few exceptions, assimilated into the Arab nation. There was, however, one people which refused to disappear and to shed its national identity. Whether in the Land of Israel or in regions such as present-day Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Morocco, the Jewish people maintained its national personality and preserved its own culture and faith.

Now, as a result of centuries of acquisition of territory by war, the Arab nation is represented in the United Nations by twenty sovereign States. Among them is also the Palestinian Arab State of Jordan.

Geographically and ethnically Jordan is Palestine. Historically both the West and East Banks of the Jordan river are parts of the Land of Israel or Palestine. Both were parts of Palestine under the British Mandate until Jordan and then Israel became independent. The population of Jordan is composed of two elements—the sedentary population and nomads. Both are, of course, Palestinian. The nomad Bedouins constitute a minority of Jordan's population. Moreover, the majority of the sedentary inhabitants, even on the East Bank, are of Palestinian West Bank origin. Without the Palestinians, Jordan is a State without a people.

That is why when on 29 April 1950 King Abdullah inaugurated the commemorative session of the Jordanian Parliament he declared: "I open the session of the Parliament with both banks of the Jordan united by the will of one people, one homeland and one hope".

On 23 August 1959, the Prime Minister of Jordan stated: "We are the Government of Palestine, the army of Palestine and the refugees of Palestine".

Indeed, the vast majority of Palestinian refugees never left Palestine, but moved, as a result of the 1948 and 1967 wars, from one part of the country to another. At the same time, an approximately equal number of Jewish refugees fled from Arab countries to Israel.

It is, therefore, false to allege that the Palestinian people has been deprived of a State of its own or that it has been uprooted from its national homeland. Most Palestinians continue to live in Palestine. Most Palestinians continue to live in a Palestinian State. The vast majority of Palestinian Arabs are citizens of that Palestinian State.

"Jordan is Palestine and Palestine is Jordan", declared on 9 December 1970 the late Dr. Kadri

Toukan, a prominent West Bank leader and former Foreign Minister of Jordan.

Mr. Anwar Nuseibe, another Palestinian West Bank personality and a former Jordanian Defence Minister, stated on 23 October 1970: "The Jordanians are also Palestinians. This is one State. This is one people. The name is not important. The families living in Salt, Irbid and Karak maintain not only family and matrimonial ties with the families in Nablus and Hebron. They are one people".

This is recognized even by the PLO Covenant, and the Rabat resolutions¹⁵⁶ do not alter this reality.

Even if the appellation "Palestinian" were confined to the West Bank, there is today, as already indicated, an overwhelming preponderance of Palestinians of West Bank descent in the population of the East Bank, as well as in the Jordanian Government. For instance, Queen Alia, Prime Minister Rifa'i, more than half of the Cabinet Ministers and of the members of Parliament, the Speaker of the Parliament, the Mayor of Amman, all hail from the West Bank.

Certain Palestinians might be unhappy with their system of Government, with the constitutional structure of their State or with its leadership. This, however, can in no way substantiate a claim that the Palestinian Arabs have been shorn of their rights as a people. Like all other branches of the Arab nation, the Palestinians too possess the political entity within which they exercise their national, political and cultural rights. To the extent that some of their needs have not been fully satisfied, to the extent that some aspects of their national identity require solutions, they could be dealt with in the context of negotiations between Israel and its eastern neighbour, the Palestinian State of Jordan.

In these circumstances it is obvious that the initiators of the discussion of the so-called question of Palestine are concerned primarily not with the realization of the rights of the Palestinians, but with the annulment of the rights of the Jewish people. Israel's destruction and the denial to the people of Israel of its rights to self-determination and independence are the officially enunciated objectives of the PLO at whose behest the Arab Governments have asked for this debate. By

¹⁵⁶ Doc. 308 below.

doing so, by initiating the invitation extended to the PLO and by the decisions adopted at the recent Rabat Conference, the Arab Governments have reaffirmed their association with the umbrella organization of the Arab murder squads. This is not surprising. The PLO did not emerge from within the Palestinian community. It is not representative of the Palestinian community. It is a creation of the Arab Governments themselves. It was established at the first summit meeting of the Heads of Arab States in Cairo in 1964 as an instrument for waging terror warfare against Israel. Its Covenant stipulates: "The establishment of Israel is fundamentally null and void. The claim of historical or spiritual ties between Jews and Palestine does not tally with historical realities. The Jews are not one people with an independent personality". In the pursuit of its objectives the PLO employs the barbaric method of deliberate murder of guiltless civilians. This is not the accidental loss of civilian lives that occurs in warfare against military targets, but wilful, cold-blooded, carefully prepared, bestial assaults on innocent and defenceless children, women and men in towns and villages, in schools and market places, at airports, in the air and on the ground. No wonder that associations of anti-Nazi freedom-fighters have repeatedly condemned the PLO atrocities as crimes reminiscent of Nazi savagery.

Support for the PLO's murderous ideology and sinister objectives is expressed in the United Nations in various terms. References are frequently made to "the root problem" of the Palestinian question, a euphemism for Israel's statehood. On occasion speakers lash out unabashedly against Israel's independence, slander it as colonialism, call for its replacement by a second Palestinian Arab State, in addition to Jordan. At times, the terms employed are more general, such as restoration of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, self-determination, and so on. Since the 8 June 1974 Cairo meeting of the PLO and the Rabat Summit Conference the talk is of establishing PLO authority in territories wrested from Israel, making it clear that this would be only a first step towards Israel's elimination.

Indeed, whatever the phraseology, its true meaning remains obvious.

In a press conference held at United Nations Headquarters, after the General Assembly vote on 14 October 1974, the PLO representative

declared:

"Our short-term goal which has been approved by our congress, is to establish in any and every part liberated in Palestine a national authority provided that in no way should that compromise our right to the whole of Palestine."

The official organ of the Syrian Government *el-Baath* wrote on 17 October 1974 about the 14 October resolution to invite the PLO:

"The United Nations resolution constitutes a victory of the principle of armed struggle which began in the war of liberation on 6 October. This is so because the world does not respect anything but the language of revolutionary violence which is the only language to be used at this time."

Yasser Arafat made this view even more specific. In an interview published on 21 October 1974 in the Cairo daily *Rose el-Yussuf* he declared: "I do not see the possibility of a peace settlement in the Middle East, but a fifth war."¹⁵⁷

On 28 October the Arab Governments and the PLO decided at Rabat that the immediate goal should be the establishment of a PLO base to the east of Israel. The ultimate objective remained the same—the destruction of Israel and its replacement by an Arab State.

At a press conference in Rabat on 30 October, Yasser Arafat had no qualms about confirming that this was the meaning of the decision adopted two days earlier. He said that the establishment of PLO authority in areas that might be evacuated by Israel would be "the first stage towards the creation of a democratic State where Jews, Christians and Moslems could coexist". And this he reiterated in interviews published in *The New York Times* on 9 November, in *Time* magazine of 11 November, and in other recent pronouncements, including this morning's statement. Still fresh in the minds of all are Arafat's own explanations that such terminology is used only because it is more "civilized", and that behind it looms, as always, the design to deprive the Jewish people of its independence, to liquidate the Jewish State and to establish on its ruins another Arab State in which Jews would again live as a minority as they do today, persecuted and tortured in Syria, and as they did in the past in countries such as

¹⁵⁷ A partial English translation of this interview was published in the *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), IV, 2 (Winter, 1975), pp. 172–175.

Iraq, Yemen or Algeria, suffering all the pain and sorrow of oppression.

This is the supposedly moderate objective of PLO's leader, the man who continues to serve as commander of el-Fatah-Black September, the gangster who received \$5 million from President Qadafi of Libya as a prize for the slaughter of Israeli sportsmen at the Olympic Games in Munich, the criminal who personally directed the murder of diplomats in Khartoum.

Some of his henchmen disagree with his "civilized" terminology. They would like him to be more outspoken, more blunt, as he was when he told the Italian weekly *L'Europa*: "Our goal is the destruction of Israel . . . Peace for us means Israel's destruction, nothing else."

Arafat, today, prefers the Nazi method. The Nazis killed millions of Jews in death camps, the gates of which bore the sign "Work brings freedom". Arafat kills Jewish children and seeks to strangle the Jewish State under the slogan of creating a "democratic Palestine". Neither kings nor presidents, neither artifices of speech nor the plaudits of accomplices or of the misguided can conceal this sinister fact.

The speakers who opened today's debate have confirmed its real purpose—to undermine Israel's rights, to question the inalienable right of the Jewish people to its homeland, to strengthen and encourage the PLO in its activities directed against the life of Israel and of its people, to establish a PLO springboard from which the murder organization can continue its efforts to destroy the Jewish State. This is what justice means to the PLO. This is what the PLO's olive branch is.

Jewish history is the saga of a people which has remained one with its land through millenia of independence and foreign conquest, of uprooting and dispersion, of struggle to rebuild its statehood and of final restoration of national liberty. Unparalleled national tragedies, centuries of suppression, repeated massacres through the ages culminating in the genocide of 6 million by the Nazis, have never weakened the Jewish people's attachment to its land and its resolve to live in it in freedom and independence. Since the dawn of history thousands of years ago and until the creation of Jordan in a part of Palestine, no people, other than the Jewish people, ever established or even thought of establishing a State of its own in the land of Israel. No people, except for the Jewish

people, ever looked upon the land of Israel as a separate entity. To the Jewish nation, however, this land has been the very essence of its existence.

Even when defeated by the Roman Empire and carried off to bondage in foreign countries, the Jews of the Diaspora continued to live in spirit in their homeland. They prayed for rain when rain was needed in the land of Israel. They celebrated the harvest when it was harvest time in Israel. They retained the customs of the land, its traditional holidays and its ancient language. Above all, they never ceased to struggle against the consequences of foreign imperialist subjugation. They never stopped striving to regain their independence and sovereignty. In the Land of Israel itself, though decimated by successive conquerors, the Jewish community clung to the soil of its forefathers, determined that the day should come when it would be free again.

If in world history there is a classic example of a struggle for national liberty, it is the struggle of the Jewish people, pursued for almost 2,000 years in resistance to imperialism and colonialism, exile and dispersion, racial discrimination and physical annihilation. To vilify this age-long struggle, Zionism, to question the Jewish people's equality with other nations, to deny the Jewish people's right to self-determination and independence in its homeland is wilful blasphemy. It is a sacrilege of the most revered concepts of the equality of peoples and of national liberation. It is Nazi-like abuse of the kind that has been heaped upon the Jewish people through the ages by bigots, racists and anti-Semites. How sad that such anti-Jewish prejudices should be rampant in the United Nations.

The Jewish people, however, has defended its rights, fought and bled for centuries, outlived empires and survived holocausts not to be swayed from its course by a gang of murderers who thrive on Jewish blood or by the whims of régimes which claim to seek justice for Palestinian Arabs, but openly deny it to Jews.

The choice before the General Assembly is clear. On the one hand there is the Charter of the United Nations; on the other there is the PLO, whose sinister objectives, defined in its Covenant, and savage outrages are a desecration of the Charter.

On the one hand there is Israel's readiness and desire to reach a peaceful settlement with the

Palestinian Arab State of Jordan in which the Palestinian national identity would find full expression. On the other hand there is PLO's denial of Israel's right to independence and of the Jewish people's right to self-determination.

The choice is between understanding and continued conflict in the Middle East, between suppression of terror and its encouragement, between satisfying the needs of Palestinians through the peace-making process already under way or undermining that process by trying to introduce into it a murder organization which aims at the elimination of one of the negotiating parties.

The question is: should there be peace between Israel and its eastern neighbour or should an attempt be made to establish a Palestine Liberation Organization base to the east of Israel from which the terrorist campaign against the Jewish State's existence could be pursued?

On 14 October the General Assembly opted for the PLO,¹⁵⁸ it opted for terrorism, it opted for savagery. Can there be any hope that it might now undo the harm it has already done, by that action, to the cause of peace in the Middle East and to humanity in general? Israel has also made its choice.

The United Nations, whose duty it is to combat terrorism and barbarity may agree to consort with them. Israel will not.

The murderers of athletes in the Olympic Games of Munich, the butchers of children in Ma'alot, the assassins of diplomats in Khartoum do not belong in the international community. They have no place in international diplomatic efforts. Israel shall see to it that they have no place in them.

Israel will pursue the PLO murderers until justice is meted out to them. It will continue to take action against their organization and against their bases until a definitive end is put to their atrocities. The blood of Jewish children will not be shed with impunity.

Israel will not permit the establishment of PLO authority in any part of Palestine. The PLO will not be forced on the Palestinian Arabs. It will not be tolerated by the Jews of Israel.

Israel will continue to strive for peace with the Arab States. Peace would bring a new era of development, social progress and happiness for all the States and all the peoples of the Middle East.

In its decision of 21 July 1974¹⁵⁹ the Government of Israel declared that it would work towards negotiating a peace agreement with Jordan and that in the Jordanian-Palestinian Arab State east of Israel the specific identity of the Jordanians and Palestinians will find expression in peace and good-neighbourliness with Israel. This remains Israel's policy.

However, if the peace-making process becomes paralysed as a result of the Rabat and General Assembly resolutions, Israel will find a way, by the exercise of its sovereignty, to ensure its political and security interests, while also doing justice to the Arab population living in the administered areas.

No resolution of the General Assembly can mask the murderous nature of the PLO. No resolution can wash the hands of Yasser Arafat and his henchmen clean of the blood of their innocent victims. No resolution can confer respect on a band of cutthroats. No resolution can establish the authority of an organization which has no authority, which does not represent anyone except the few thousand agents of death it employs, which has no foothold in any part of the territories it seeks to dominate. The PLO will remain what it is and where it is—outside the law and outside of Palestine.

A resolution that would respond to the PLO demands would, however, encourage the extremists in the Arab world who reject a peaceful settlement with Israel and call for continued war against it.

I repeat, Israel remains ready to take, together with the Arab States, the road of peace. Should they, however, espouse continued hostility and aggression, the Arab States will find Israel equally ready. The Jewish people's independence will be safeguarded with the same determination, with the same perseverance, with the same firmness with which it has been restored after an age-long struggle and defended since. The Jewish people's hymn, Israel's national anthem, says:

Two thousand years we cherished the hope
To live in freedom in the Land
Of Zion and Jerusalem.

To those in this Assembly who challenge or ignore our rights we reply: in freedom the people of Israel shall live now and forever.

¹⁵⁸ Doc. 20 below.

¹⁵⁹ Doc. 135 below.

11

General Assembly, 2284th meeting; statement by the President of Lebanon¹⁶⁰**November 14, 1974**

PRESIDENT FRANJIEH (interpretation from French): Mr. President, I wish to thank you for the welcome that you have extended to me and to take this opportunity to reiterate Lebanon's congratulations on your election as President of the General Assembly. I also express my sincere wishes for your success. Your unanimous election is a recognition of your eminent personal qualities and a tribute to the noble sister country which you represent with such dignity.

I should also like to express my profound appreciation to the Secretary-General, Mr. Waldheim, for his untiring efforts for the realization of the objectives of the Charter and in the service of world peace and co-operation among nations.

As I appear before this Assembly on behalf of Lebanon, and also on behalf of the Heads of State of the other 19 Arab countries Members of the United Nations, I should like first to define the significance and the scope of the mission entrusted to me.

I am fully conscious that in recalling and defending the national rights of the Palestinian people here before you, I am indeed defending the very principles of the United Nations Charter; that in defending the manifest justice of the Palestinian and Arab cause I am also defending the cause of universal justice itself, for justice is indivisible; and in so doing, I am also defending the cause of peace, for peace is inseparable from justice. Therefore I am confident that my endeavour is consonant with the sincere, lasting and fruitful co-operation which must be developed between our Arab world and the world at large. In this way, I am conforming with the most authentic and constant vocation of Lebanon—a land of tolerance and a human synthesis of harmony and brotherhood. This Lebanon, which has been shaped by the grace of God and the achievements of its own people—is it not a prefiguration of a possible world delivered from the reign of violence and from policies inspired by racial and religious exclusivism?

It is the highest considerations of reason and heart that make Lebanon stand by the Palestinian people, expelled from their homeland. They are considerations of human solidarity, of Arab brotherhood, and all other considerations stemming from geography and history. We are located in the immediate vicinity of Palestine. We have sheltered, as we should, hundreds of thousands of our Palestinian brethren, whom Israel is pursuing with its unjustifiable acts of violence so often condemned by various international organs. At the same time, Israel, in its vindictiveness, is bent on attacking the civilian population of Lebanon, repeating as recently as this very week—yesterday afternoon—its murderous raids on southern Lebanon. These raids afflict us in our bodies and souls and threaten our security.

But my country is qualified by considerations of a still higher order to address this Assembly of nations. It is because, in view of its small territory and its presence and role in this wide world, Lebanon has explicitly linked its destiny to that of law; because its very existence is an illustration of the primacy of the values we call justice, liberty and brotherhood; because faith, charity and tolerance, which are virtues everywhere, are for us also cornerstones of our State policy. For all these reasons, my country considers itself a natural messenger of peace based on justice, and brings to the support of the Palestinian people an eloquence which goes far beyond the merely verbal, since it expresses the persuasive power of our way of life and action.

As we address ourselves to the principles of law and justice, we would also like to convey the message of wisdom.

What does wisdom teach? Wisdom teaches that violence is shortlived; that it cannot serve to ensure a true and definitive peace; that it proves particularly vain and inhuman when it is exercised against the fundamental rights of a whole people, as in the case of the Palestinian people; that violence cannot but intensify the determination of that people in its resistance within the occupied territories and its will for liberation exercised from without; that this is the lesson of history concerning all movements of resistance and liberation; and that, finally, looking back over the road travelled by our Palestinian brethren for almost half a century in safeguarding their identity and their national rights, no one could doubt their ultimate

¹⁶⁰ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/PV.2284, pp. 2-12.

success.

In rendering justice to them today, the United Nations is only anticipating what history makes inevitable, and thus saving our area and the entire world from new convulsions, constantly more serious, more dangerous and, perhaps, more widespread.

In this respect, the most obstinate blindness finally yields to every-day realities. At each stage of the tragedy, our Arab world asserts itself, in its true character that has been too long ignored: a land of revelation, a crossroads between three continents, occupying an exceptional strategic position, rich in inexhaustible spiritual and material resources, capable of a great contribution to all aspects of human progress, if it were allowed a climate of untroubled and trustworthy co-operation in conditions of peace.

Peace? What peace? Let us listen to those sublime words of His Holiness Pope Paul VI, which impress us by their vivid topicality:

Peace is not a trap. . . Still less a totalitarian and pitiless tyranny, and above all not violence. . . If we look at where it truly derives from, we realize that it plunges its roots into man's sense of loyalty. And what do we call this human sense of loyalty? Justice. Why, then, convinced as we are of this irrefutable truth, do we delay by trying to give peace a basis other than that of justice?

For 25 years, since the "abomination of desolation" has descended upon the Holy Land, the nations have delayed too long any sincere and determined search for ways and means which could lead to the peaceful solution of the tragic problem of Palestine. It is not my intention here to draw up an inventory of the mistakes, omissions and delays which, since the first resolution adopted by the United Nations in 1947, have contributed to the permanent establishment of violence at the very heart of this problem, thereby setting in motion a dynamic which has systematically warded off any chance of other solutions.

I would only recall throughout that period all the resolutions of the General Assembly and all the decisions of the Security Council have been violated and even scorned by Israel, including, in particular, those which since 1969 have "reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, declared that the full respect of those rights was an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace, condemned the Governments which were denying the national

rights of this people, confirmed the legitimacy of its struggle by all available means, considered that the acquisition and the conservation of a territory, in violation of the right of self-determination, was inadmissible and constitutes a flagrant violation of the Charter".

I should also recall that since 1971 the Assembly has on many occasions reaffirmed the same principles and requested the Security Council and the Member States to take effective measures to implement them. Moreover, the Assembly has invited the Member States attached to the ideals of freedom and peace to lend all their political, moral and material assistance to the peoples which, like the Palestinian people, are fighting for their self-determination and independence.

In reality, the "Question of Palestine" has, for many reasons and under all sorts of pretexts, long been submerged in the murky and mysterious waters of an international policy related to the diverse problems arising from the situation in the Middle East. Thus we could not see the wood for the trees.

But here at long last, this question emerges again and asserts itself in a clearer and more realistic picture of the situation. The General Assembly is undertaking, finally, to translate into facts the notion which has always been evident to us and which is now recognized by all—the authentic identity of the Palestinian people. It has recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the legitimate representative of that people, and has consequently invited that organization to participate in the Assembly's deliberations in the plenary meetings.

You have finally heard the truth from those who are the most knowledgeable because they have suffered more than anyone. They are the true spokesmen, rightly recognized as such.

The presence among us of a Palestine, although still suffering and not yet fully restored to its national rights, nevertheless constitutes a stage towards the success of a just cause and the culmination of a just fight.

May I add that this is encouraging evidence of a searching of conscience by the United Nations which we hope will this time take active and effective form.

The question of Palestine concerns the fate—that is, the happiness or the misery, even, the life or death—of millions of human beings. The spread

of this conflict of historic dimensions could no longer be prevented, and a war in the region could endanger peace everywhere else in the world.

It is now our role, the role of all of us here, here in the serenity of this august Assembly, to assert the rule of law and ensure the triumph of justice. The international community cannot remain indifferent any longer to the sufferings and the justified impatience of the Palestinian people, nor can it feign unawareness that all the territories conquered by force must be restored. Additional courage and wisdom are henceforth required of us when we look for the solution to this major conflict.

The recognition of the Palestinian people and of its representatives represents acceptance only of a half truth. We will accept the entire truth by helping that people to recover fully its national rights. Here lies the realistic approach to the heart of the problem. Here also lies the key which will open all the prospects for an effective and worthy solution, and which will revive all hopes.

The fate which has been reserved for Jerusalem should alone have sufficed to arouse our consciences. Jerusalem is not just a parcel of land. It is the noble centre from which generations of men have drawn their faith, and where they find their roots. How can we talk of peace when the only place which brings together and unites Moslems, Christians and Jews around one single God has become a place of division and hate? When the Holy City appears as one of the most striking examples of Israel's refusal to abide by the repeated resolutions of the United Nations? When, despite the condemnations pronounced by the United Nations and by UNESCO, Israel persists in the defiguration, degradation and undermining of the Holy Places, and in particular the foundations of the venerated Al-Aqsa mosque?

We are, perhaps—we can be—on the threshold of a dynamic process of true peace. I call upon your Assembly to seize this opportunity.

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General Assembly, 2287th meeting; statements by Jordan and the USSR¹⁶¹

November 15, 1974

MR. AL-MUFTI (Jordan) (interpretation from Arabic): Jordan, in taking part in this historic debate on the question of Palestine, is fully and most profoundly cognizant of the far-reaching gravity, dimensions and obligations that are involved, for our debate concerns the elements of life for a whole people—the Palestinian people, upon whom has fallen a catastrophe almost unique in its all-embracing ferocity. This is so even when measured against a world history which is fraught with every kind of calamity. And while the outcome of this question affects primarily the Palestinian Arab people, it also affects, in a fundamental way, the fate of every other Arab people. The repercussions of this question on the fate of world peace are so obvious as to require no elaboration or proof.

Jordan welcomes the participation of representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the debate on the question of the Palestinian people, as it welcomes its leadership of the struggle for the restitution of the national rights of the Palestinian people on their national soil in Palestine. Jordan, which has shouldered the task of direct responsibility for a substantial segment of this brother nation, for two consecutive decades, fully realizes the burden of the responsibility now entrusted to our brethren in the Palestine Liberation Organization. We wish their efforts every success, while recognizing the immensity of the burden which falls upon them.

While fulfilling its historic, national and moral responsibilities towards its brothers, the Palestinian people, with whom we have shared our common hopes and agonies, the good days and the bad days, and the joint efforts at building in every field of life, Jordan reiterates its national commitment to remain forever a pillar of support to the Palestinian people, and their brothers. Jordan will remain the staunch supporter of the Palestinian people until their aspirations are fulfilled and their national rights are fully restored over their soil, in accordance with their leadership's formulations

¹⁶¹ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/PV.2287, pp. 17–20, 26–32, 97–110.

and in accordance with what the peoples of that Arab nation and of peace-loving nations throughout the world hope they will achieve.

We should also bear in mind that the United Nations that bears responsibility for the tragedy of the Palestinian people is not the United Nations of today, which represents the vast emancipated masses of mankind. The United Nations then was, by and large, a small minority of mankind, dominated by Powers whose sense of justice and conscience were, to say the least, minimal, and which were oblivious to the rights, aspirations and suffering of the less-privileged peoples of the world.

But even with that qualification of the United Nations of that time, the partition of Palestine, though lacking in validity, was devised in such a way as to leave for the Palestinians important centres of the country which at the time were considered by the Zionist leaders as not worthy of their interests and aims. Thus, the Israelis, exploiting the Palestinians' spontaneous, and, in the circumstances, understandable dejection at the dismemberment of the country, seized the opportunity to grab the maximum amount of territory that their superior military preparedness made possible.

Almost 80,000 of their well-organized, well-equipped Haganah—not to mention the lesser terrorist organizations—launched a systematic campaign of terror and territorial conquest against an almost totally unarmed population. The Israelis thus seized almost four-fifths of Palestine, even before the end of the British Mandate on 14 May 1948.

The Israeli reply to mere civil disorder and demonstration by the Palestinians—an activity which takes place in every country in the world as a protest against minor issues—was the full might of their military machine. The Israelis were thus able to fulfil their preconceived plans and ambitions to conquer most of the country, and seize an area far in excess of what the United Nations had allotted to them under the partition plan. Moreover, by organized terror they expelled the majority of the inhabitants of Palestine, who for over 25 years have constituted the suffering masses known as "the Palestinian refugees", and Israel confiscated their lands and properties.

In the face of this organized attack by the Israelis

against Palestine, some Arab States were forced to send some contingents of their armies to meet this threat to the Palestinians, particularly after news reached them of some of the more notorious massacres of Palestinians, such as at Deir Yassin, where 250 people were killed, mostly women and children. The result of the Israeli plan was the exile of over a million Palestinians from their land and their homes.

After the cease-fires, truces and armistices which the big Powers imposed, efforts were made to achieve a viable, just and lasting settlement. The opportunity was eagerly grasped by the Arab States concerned—as evidenced by their agreement to the Lausanne Protocol on 12 April 1949—but was rejected by Israel.

It is important to recall on this occasion that the United Nations accepted Israel into its fold only after recalling its resolutions of 29 November 1947 and 11 December 1948, and after it had taken note of the declarations and explanations made by the representative of Israel to the *Ad Hoc* Committee concerning implementation of the said resolutions.

It is now evident that Israel's primary acceptance of the Lausanne Protocol as the basis for solving the issue was merely a manoeuvre to obtain membership of the United Nations. This is corroborated by the fact that in its declaration of independence on 14 May 1948 Israel deliberately refrained from delineating its boundaries. Following the 1967 war, one Israeli leader declared: "Israel's boundaries will be the farthest point that Israeli soldiers can reach." Another Israeli leader declared that the first generation achieved the armistice lines of 1949; the second generation reached the cease-fire lines of 1967, and that it was now for succeeding generations to achieve Israel's ultimate goals in territorial conquest and acquisition.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is closely linked to the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian people. This relationship, based on culture, nationalism, geography, history and common aspirations, was reinforced by the Kingdom's historical association with the development of the Palestinian cause. The Jordanian Army, then young and small in size, was in the forefront of the Arab armies which came to the assistance of the Palestinian people in 1948. It succeeded in defending the West Bank and Jerusalem against Israeli depoliation.

The identity of aspirations and brotherhood

reached its peak when agreement was reached between the leaders of Jordan and of the West Bank to establish a constitutional political unity. That was accomplished after the general elections which took place in 1950. The new People's Assembly which emerged issued, by unanimous consent, a decision proclaiming the unity, while: "... preserving the Arab rights in Palestine and the defence of those rights by all legitimate means, and without prejudice to the final settlement of their just cause, within the framework of the national aspirations, Arab co-operation and international justice..."

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has adhered to this principle and this commitment and has exerted its efforts towards their fulfilment. Jordan's principal objective over the past quarter century since the establishment of unity was not the assumption of the Palestinian rights or identity—as the Israelis claim, in order to cover up their occupation of the whole of Palestine. The land of Palestine is the land of Palestine, and the land of Jordan is the land of Jordan.

The unity which was established between the two Banks was a unity between the Jordanian people and the Palestinian people living on the West Bank. Israel's efforts to grab Palestinian territory—the whole Palestinian territory—and to cover up this aggressive design by semantics and the manipulation of words, at the expense of the Palestinian people and the Jordanian people alike, represent a brazen attempt which must be rejected.

The Arab peoples are entitled to build their unity in the manner and at the appropriate time of their choosing. But Arab territories, regardless of their location, cannot be disposed of, and are not open to occupation and usurpation by any aggressive party.

Jordan has exerted every effort, in international forums, to expound the rights of the Palestinian people. It has also had to bear the brunt of continued Israeli attacks ever since 1949 when it signed, along with the other Arab countries concerned, the Armistice Agreements. Within the framework of unity, the Palestinian Arabs marched towards consolidating their roots in their territories which had escaped aggression and made their contribution towards the prosperity of the West Bank and the Kingdom as a whole in creating a modern and stable society.

While the unity of the two Banks existed, the

Jordanian leadership was anxious to keep the Palestinian identity alive before the world, convinced that at the appropriate time, and when the practical and international circumstances become propitious, the Palestinian people must exercise their categorical right to self-determination and unite themselves in a unified entity."

In 1967, the Israeli leadership decided to deal with the consequences of its 1948 aggression by yet another massive aggression against the neighbouring peoples, in the forefront of which was the people of Palestine in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, in addition to the peoples of Egypt and Syria.

Israel achieved its immediate military objective by occupying the territories of three Arab States and refusing to withdraw, even within the framework of a political settlement. It also continued to deny the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, which have been on the records of United Nations resolutions since 1948. Jordan, together with the other Arab countries that had been the targets of Israeli aggression, made continued and persistent efforts, at the international level over a period of seven years, to bring about Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab lands within the framework of a just political settlement. But all such efforts came to naught; they were wrecked on the rocks of Israeli arrogance and intransigence. The increased Israeli avarice and inflexibility only served to augment the Arabs' determination to adhere to their rights and to struggle for their redemption.

Within this framework, the Palestinian resistance movement expanded and grew, as did also an intensified Palestinian feeling that the initiative in the effort to recover the Palestinian rights that had been usurped *in toto* by Israel's occupation of the whole of Palestinian territory in 1967, should be in Palestinian hands. The changes in local and international factors convinced the Arab countries as well as the Palestinian resistance movement that the time had come for the Palestinian resistance movement to assume the full responsibility, on behalf of the people of Palestine and in their own name, to work for the restitution of Palestinian rights by all the means provided for in the United Nations Charter, and within a framework which would restore to the cause of the Palestinian people its true character, that of a cause in confrontation with aggressive and expan-

sionist Israeli policies.

During October of this year, the Arab States unanimously endorsed this principle and this policy, and the State of Jordan agreed to its endorsement. Jordan will continue to be, as I said at the outset, a bulwark of support and assistance to the Palestinian people in their efforts and the efforts of their leaders to achieve justice in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and to establish the principle of peace based on justice.

Any just and permanent solution to the question of Palestine and any assistance rendered to the people of Palestine must be inspired by a few simple and fundamental principles.

The first of these principles is to reaffirm the right to repatriation of the people of Palestine who have been forcibly expelled from their homes. This is a principle which the General Assembly has repeatedly and categorically affirmed over the past 25 years in various resolutions.

The second principle, concomitant with the first, is the right to self-determination and national independence.

There is also, of course, the right of the Palestinian people to struggle for their rights, and the duty of the international community to support such a struggle.

The United Nations, by adopting these principles, would be taking an important step forward towards tackling the roots of the crisis in the Middle East. And even though many steps must follow before a final solution is achieved, the road always begins with a first step. The United Nations, in whose lap the Palestinian tragedy was born, should fittingly be the architect in the formulation of the just, human and lasting solution.

MR. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The delegation of the Soviet Union would like to join in the condolences of the group of countries of Eastern Europe as expressed from this rostrum by the Chairman of the group, the representative of Czechoslovakia, on the death of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, Mr. Sakka. For its part, our delegation also wishes to express its condolences on this very unhappy occasion, and I should like to express my personal condolences to my friend the permanent representative of Saudi Arabia in the United Nations, Mr. Jamil Baroodi.

In recent years in the international arena, thanks primarily to the efforts of the socialist and other peace-loving countries, considerable positive changes have occurred tending towards the reduction of international tension, a reaffirmation of the principle of peaceful co-existence among States, a lessening of the threat of a thermonuclear war and the non-use of force in order to settle conflicts among States. In these conditions and against the background of this general improvement in the international climate our particular concern is aroused by the very complex and dangerous situation which continues to exist in the Middle Eastern region. The main reason for this is seen to be rooted in the fact that Israel, with the support of external forces, continues to pursue an aggressive and expansionist policy vis-à-vis the Arab States and stubbornly refuses to withdraw from the Arab lands it has seized; it is grossly flouting the legitimate national rights of the Arab peoples and is provocatively ignoring all the decisions of the United Nations aimed at bringing about a settlement of the Middle East conflict. The extent and repulsiveness of the aggressiveness and expansionism of Israel has become much more clear and understandable to everyone who listened carefully to the brilliant and cogent statement made by the President of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Mr. Arafat.

The fundamental and consistent position of the Soviet Union with regard to the situation in the Middle East and a Middle Eastern settlement is well known. The Soviet Union has been consistently in favour of establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East taking account of the interests of all the States and peoples in that area. To do this, it is essential first of all to ensure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the Arab lands which they seized in 1967 and also to ensure the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. Unless these key, paramount problems are solved, there can be no lasting peace in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union considers that there should be no delay in taking steps to bring about a radical political settlement in the Middle East. We are in favour of the immediate resumption of the Geneva peace conference which provides the most appropriate forum for ensuring that the Middle East problem is considered in its full complexity and that decisions are found which

will satisfy the parties involved in the conflict, including of course the representatives of the Arab people of Palestine.

The question of Palestine, which appears on the agenda of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, in which it was included on the initiative of the Arab States with the support of the overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations, and which has been accepted by the Organization for consideration, occupies a central place in the whole range of problems relating to a Middle East settlement. The General Assembly of the United Nations has frequently had occasion at its plenary meetings to discuss matters relating to the situation in the Middle East. However, the present discussion of the question of Palestine differs in importance and scope from all previous discussions for the simple reason that for the first time this question is being discussed with the participation of a high-level delegation from the Palestine Liberation Organization, which has been invited to participate as the generally acknowledged representative of the Palestinian people. In this way the Arab people of Palestine now have an opportunity of being directly involved in the discussion in this authoritative international forum—that is, in the General Assembly—of a matter which is indissolubly linked with the fate and the age-old struggle of that heroic people for its legitimate national rights.

The United Nations has taken an historic step towards recognizing the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine when, by a majority of 105 votes, with only 4 opposing votes, the Assembly took the decision to invite the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the discussion of the Palestine question at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.¹⁶²

That decision undoubtedly was a manifestation of the growing international recognition of the justice of the purposes for which the Arab people of Palestine are fighting. The result of the vote on that resolution showed that the international community and the United Nations recognize and acknowledge the reality of the situation in the Middle East and are mindful of the urgent need to settle the Palestine question as an integral part

of an over-all Middle East settlement.

The Soviet Union, guided by its fundamental position on the Palestine issue, and in regard to the question of a Middle East settlement as a whole, together with other socialist and non-aligned States actively supported the proposal of the group of Arab States Members of the United Nations that the General Assembly should discuss the question of Palestine at its twenty-ninth session. The Soviet Union was a sponsor of the General Assembly resolution which invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to be present and to represent the Palestinian people in order directly to participate in the discussion of the question of Palestine in the General Assembly.

The discussion of the question of Palestine at this session of the General Assembly should bring a substantial contribution to the struggle to ensure the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine and thus help to speed up the struggle for the liquidation of this dangerous hotbed and source of military conflict in the Middle East.

The Palestine question, as obviously everyone understands, is a very acute, urgent and primarily political one which affects the interests and the fate of an entire people which is defending its legitimate national rights. It has become quite obvious and abundantly clear to one and all that this question cannot simply be reduced to one of refugees. The aggressor and those who protect it are still trying to reduce this question to this single aspect. It is only by guaranteeing the rights of the Palestine people, including the right to self-determination and the right to their own statehood, that a realistic and concrete approach can be found to a constructive settlement of this question within the context of the efforts aimed at bringing about a just settlement in the Middle East.

We are profoundly convinced that there can be no durable peace in the Middle East, unless a solution to the problem of guaranteeing the legitimate rights of the Palestine people in accordance with the Charter and the decisions of the United Nations is found which is acceptable to the Palestine people itself and which is in accordance with its national interests.

The question regarding the recognition of and respect for the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian Arabs is acquiring more and more significance as the years go by, because the fact that an entire people has been deprived of an

¹⁶² Doc. 20 below.

opportunity to achieve its rights is one of the most serious sources of permanent tension in the Middle East. As a result of the aggression of Israel, the Arab people of Palestine has for more than a quarter of a century been deprived of any opportunity to enjoy its inalienable right to self-determination, which has been recognized and frequently confirmed by United Nations resolutions.

The Middle East conflict itself to a large extent was the result of the fact that the legitimate rights of the Palestine people were trampled underfoot and because of the oppression and persecutions which were visited upon the Palestinian Arabs.

The Arab people of Palestine has had to suffer severe trials. The Palestinian people, 3 million strong, is still deprived of those legitimate rights which are recognized as being due to all peoples in the world, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and contemporary international law. Half the Palestinians have been expelled from their homeland; they are suffering severe privations; they have been economically impoverished; and they are politically without any rights. The reason for this is well known. It can be seen in the fact that the ruling circles of Israel, with the support and patronage of external forces, primarily international Zionism, are pursuing in the Middle East an expansionist policy of aggression, international banditry and usurpation and seizure of foreign lands.

In violating international law and the decisions of the United Nations on the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force, Israel has for more than a quarter of a century aspired to expand its territory at the expense of the neighbouring Arab States and has pursued a policy of the forced expatriation of the Arab people of Palestine. Moreover, the Israeli aggressor has not only expelled an entire people from its traditional lands but also uses force and threats even against those States, such as Lebanon, for example, which have welcomed into their territory the Palestinians that have been expelled from their land by this wicked and cruel enemy.

The aggressiveness and the illegitimacy of the actions of Israel and Zionist circles towards the Arab people of Palestine and its legitimate rights have been particularly clearly demonstrated in recent days. In reply to the decision of the General Assembly to invite the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the discussion of the

question of Palestine, the Zionist circles have carried out demonstrations unprecedented in their character and cynicism against both the Palestinians and the United Nations and aimed at preventing the General Assembly from discharging its functions according to the Charter and discussing the question of Palestine with the participation of all the parties concerned. They have covered themselves with infamy before the entire world by burning the flag of the United Nations. The Zionists have openly and with impunity threatened to assassinate the representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization in New York, headed by the well-known revolutionary fighter, Yasser Arafat. The demonstrations organized by Zionist circles show not only their hostile attitude to the rights of the Palestinian Arabs but also their complete disrespect for the United Nations itself.

As far as the ruling circles in Israel are concerned, they have planned and instigated this entire campaign of hostility and hatred by their warlike statements and refusal to hold negotiations with the representatives of the Arab people of Palestine, threatening a new bloody war in the Middle East. Two former Israeli Ministers participated in this hostile and inflammatory campaign. Israeli statesmen, who so often say such a great deal about the right of their State and their people to an independent and secure existence, for some reason deliberately forget or directly deny that the same right to an independent and secure existence should be acknowledged as belonging to every people, including the Arab people of Palestine. It is strange, to say the least, to see the logic of the Israeli politicians and diplomats who speak from this rostrum. According to this logic, the struggle of the Palestine people for its rights is regarded almost as an international crime, whereas the aggressive policies of Israel—their seizure and acquisition of Arab lands, their ignoring of international decisions and their burning of the United Nations flag—are depicted as an international blessing and thus as protecting the national rights of Israel. The Palestinian people is waging a just and increasing struggle for its national rights. In essence, that struggle is a national liberation movement. It is precisely from that angle that the Palestinian movement is regarded in the resolutions of the United Nations, and in particular in General Assembly resolution 2649 (XXV) of 30 November 1970.

In attempting to mislead world public opinion regarding the genuine purposes and aims of the Palestinian struggle, Zionist propaganda and the representatives of Israel in the United Nations are depicting the Palestine movement as merely terrorist activities on the part of small and inconsiderable groups of Palestinians. In this connexion, the view is held among delegations at this twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly that Yasser Arafat spoke from this rostrum with an olive branch in his hand, but the representative of Israel made a terrorist speech. The whole world has now become convinced, particularly after the statement of Yasser Arafat from this rostrum at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, that the Palestinian people are fighting for a just cause, for their legitimate rights, against cruel and unscrupulous usurpers and that that struggle has now won broad international support. This is borne out by the reception given by the General Assembly to the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat.

Year by year the authority of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the guiding force in the struggle of the Palestinian people, is growing. In this connexion we cannot fail to reflect upon the importance of the decisions adopted at the meeting of Arab Heads of State at Rabat in October of this year, which showed the unity of views of the Arab States on questions relating to the Middle East settlement, and their support of the right of the Palestinian people to create an independent national authority under the aegis of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people throughout the territory of Palestine, which belongs to it and will be liberated from hostile occupation.

The Palestine movement, a resistance movement, is becoming more mature and has now turned into a weighty and genuine factor in the political situation in the Middle East. It is quite obvious that no solution to the problem of how the Arab peoples of Palestine can regain their legitimate rights, within the context of the efforts being made to bring about a political settlement in the Middle East, can be achieved without the full participation of the Palestine representatives at all stages of the talks relating to the Palestine problem. It is essential that the representatives of the Palestinian people, in the form of a delegation from the Palestine Liberation Organization, should take an

independent part in the efforts made to bring about a peace settlement in the Middle East on an equal footing with other participants in the Geneva Peace Conference. No settlement behind the back of the Palestinian people, or that circumvents their interests, can be either just or durable.

That is a fact which has now become clear to all. The duty of the United Nations is not only to confirm once again the national rights of the Palestinian people and to emphasize the need for them to be realized as the most important component in the common efforts being made to establish a durable peace in the Middle East, but also to condemn resolutely and unreservedly those who prevent this and who threaten not to allow the Palestinians to return to their homeland. The main object is to ensure the implementation of the United Nations resolutions and to use the full authority of this international Organization to support the just struggle of the Palestinian people for their rights so that they can bring that struggle to a successful conclusion.

The Soviet Union firmly and unswervingly supports the struggle of the Arab peoples, including the Arab people of Palestine, against the imperialist policies of aggression and for a just and durable peace and for a solution to the key problems relating to the Middle Eastern settlement, and is in favour of guaranteeing the free development of the Arab peoples and their social and economic progress. The Soviet Union has consistently striven to establish a genuine peace in the Middle East, a peace which would be in accordance with the interests of all peoples in that area without exception, and it will spare us no efforts to achieve that end. The broad and constantly developing friendly co-operation between the Soviet Union and Syria, Egypt, Iraq and other Arab States, and with the leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization, is a not inconsiderable factor which will help to remove the consequences of aggression and bring about a just peace.

In describing the policies of the Soviet Union on the question of a Middle East settlement, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Comrade Gromyko, in his report in the Kremlin on 6 November of this year in connexion with the celebration of the fifty-seventh anniversary of the great October socialist revolution declared:

"The Soviet Union is consistently in favour of establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle

East. But this cannot be brought about so long as Israel keeps the Arab territories it has seized, and the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine are not guaranteed. No one can deny the Palestinian Arabs their legitimate right to self-determination, including their own statehood. The Soviet Union has rendered and will continue to render support to the just struggle of the Arab peoples including the people of Palestine.”

13

General Assembly, 2288th meeting; statements by Syria and China¹⁶³

November 18, 1974

MR. KELANI (Syrian Arab Republic) (interpretation from Arabic): On behalf of the President of the Syrian Arab Republic I should like to express sincere condolences to the Government and delegation of Ireland on the passing of the President of Ireland.

The cause of Palestine is once again being discussed in the United Nations, and so it is that this issue has again emerged in the very setting in which it came up for the first time 27 years ago. The Palestinian people has suffered much because Zionism, imperialism and Israel have plotted against Palestine and because they have tried to avoid the issue of Palestine, believing that in so doing they can wipe away any traces of the Palestinian question except, of course, the human traces represented by the problem of the refugees.

Year after year that problem is discussed in the United Nations and the Organization invites various Member States to come to the assistance of the Palestinians expelled from their homeland. If the question of Palestine is being discussed today, if the entire scope of all its elements is being discussed—the whole tragedy that has existed ever since the Balfour Declaration—it is because today we are aware of the responsibility of the United Nations, and of the General Assembly in particular, to the people of Palestine and its problems.

The present situation of the Palestinians, who

have been victims ever since 1947, is one in which the basic principles of the United Nations have been violated. That has happened because the United Nations and the General Assembly created Israel. In 1947, when the United Nations had existed for only two years, the General Assembly adopted a resolution, and now, almost a quarter century later, we can say that the issue, as it has been discussed in the United Nations, in a sense reflects the very tragedy of the United Nations.

In accordance with the Charter and the humanitarian principles of justice, the Palestinian question must now be discussed in a new context. The General Assembly must learn some lesson from what it has gone through for more than a quarter century. That is, perhaps, particularly true because the Palestinian question is the only matter the General Assembly has ever discussed at such length.

There has been much suffering, and doubtless the problem poses a real threat to international peace and security. In the years 1947–1973, a period of 26 years, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Commission on Human Rights, the Economic and Social Council, the World Health Organization and UNESCO have adopted a total of 299 resolutions, 67 of which concern the rights of the Palestinian people. Those figures may not be entirely accurate, but I can say they do not include the numerous resolutions adopted by a number of international conferences and specialized agencies.

The sum and substance of the Palestinian issue is, after all, all the rights of a people, from the right to exist to the right to self-determination. It is only natural that Zionism and Israel should deny the Palestinian people its rights, for had they not done so Zionism could not have created Israel as the first stage in the over-all plan to seize control of the entire Middle East. Israel's ambitions are not confined to what has been done so far. We are familiar with Zionist doctrine. We are familiar with its policies, which shed considerable light on the ambitions of Zionism. For the past 27 years we have had much evidence of its ambition. The dialogue we are entering into today on the question of Palestine is but a way of opposing those Zionist ambitions.

I do not wish to use up the time of the Assembly by discussing Israel's doctrine and Israel's thinking, but if we are thoroughly to understand how Israel

¹⁶³ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/PV.2288, pp. 31–41, 47–55, 63–70.

was created through expansion, terror, the expulsion of the Palestinian people and the settling in Palestine of foreigners from all over the world instead of the people who belong there, one need only mention three documents.

On 10 May 1973, the newspaper *A'Hadot* published a statement by Moshe Dayan, the then Minister of Defence, in which he said that Israel had been created at the expense of the Arab. He said: "We did not come and settle in a vacant, empty land. The land had been inhabited by Arabs, and today we are settling Jews where Arabs lived before. We are changing an Arab country into a Jewish country." Moshe Dayan made another statement, published by *The Jerusalem Post* on 30 September 1968, in which he said: "We are trying everywhere to possess the land. We are settling Jewish elements. The inhabitants of the land have been deprived of their rights. The Arabs do not approve of our acts, but if we wish to pursue our action on Israeli soil against their will, then we need only annihilate them. Our destiny in fact requires that we be at war with the Arabs." The third document from which I should like to quote is an article written by Ian Gilmour, the [former] Minister of Defence of Great Britain. It was published in *The Times* and quoted by *A'Hadot* on 28 January 1974.

The expansion of Israel, by occupying Arab lands, is a fact which has emerged from Zionist doctrine. Those who expect Zionism not to expand territorially are very much like those who feel that the water will not run off. The expulsion of the Arabs, the settling of Israelis, is a plan which has been carried out in minute detail.

The existence of the Palestinian army has alerted the Israeli and Zionist leadership. They wish to deny the existence of the Palestinian people and they have said that that was a land without people. So it was that Israel started successive wars, which every one is well familiar with, all in an attempt to realize one of their aims, that aim being to make people forget entirely the tragedy of the Palestinian people, that aim also being to include the name of the Palestinian people in the list of those peoples who indeed no longer exist. But the facts of history are there regardless of what Israel claims, regardless of what the imperialist Powers say.

The Palestinian people have resisted the injustices of which they have been victims for many

long years, all in the hopes that the resolutions of the General Assembly will ultimately be implemented. Israel and the imperialist forces which are supporting it are obstructing the will of the international community. That is why the people of Palestine have proclaimed their revolution, the aim of which is to recover their rights, of which they have been deprived, over their land, a land which belongs to them and to no one else.

The position of the people of Palestine, as regards their rights, has been unequivocal, as shown in the various stages of the struggle of the people of Palestine. Ever since the creation of the Zionist movement all the way up to the First World War, the people of Palestine began to have doubts about Jewish immigration. In the second stage, that is, from the end of the First World War up until the creation of Israel in 1948, the people of Palestine were well aware of the danger of the alliance between Zionism and imperialism symbolized in the Balfour Declaration. The Palestinian people rose up then to defend their homeland against Zionism and imperialism.

So it was that Palestine became the arena for relentless Arab struggle. So it was that the Palestinians had to resort to arms to recover their rights and their lands. So it was that in 1920, 1921, 1929, 1933 and up until 1936 a number of revolutions broke out in Palestine which continued all the way until the beginning of the Second World War. After the end of the Second World War, when Zionism in a determined way created its usurping State, the Arab nation threw itself into a fight against British and Zionist imperialism.

The people of Palestine did not confine themselves to these measures which showed their determination to assert their rights. They resorted to what was in a sense a negative action, for they refused to sell their land and refused to go along with what Zionism wished at the time to force on them.

So it was that during 30 years of British occupation, for that entire period when Zionist settlements were encouraged, Zionism put a plan slowly but surely into effect. As the General Assembly knows, the Palestinians refused to sell their land to the Jews. The statistics which were published by the British Government have proved that the area of the land obtained by Zionists since 1929 at a time when Zionist acquisitions were beginning to be recorded, was less than 4 per cent of the

entire area of Palestine. Part of the land which became Jewish property was land which had been sold by non-Palestinian, non-Arab owners.

Hence, ever since the creation of Israel the Palestinian people have been dispossessed of their possessions. Palestinian resistance and the sacrifices which were made over more than 30 years were not able to prevent a national catastrophe. The Palestinian people then became a people of refugees, victims of imprisonment and of oppression. And today, part of the Palestinian people are subject to occupation, whereas the rest of the Palestinians are refugees.

So today the Palestinians have decided to take the initiative to defend their homeland, to defend their national rights, resorting to all means, resorting to force as much as to words and actions. The representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization has only recently set forth their cause. Now PLO has spoken to the General Assembly from this rostrum and that is because the Palestinian people, through PLO, have succeeded in resisting and in defending their rights.

The revolutionary momentum which has been much in evidence in Jordan recently, which has also led to a very serious situation, is such that the Palestinian people in Jerusalem rose up and have opposed the Jewish army. That proves the determination of the people of Palestine to win their freedom and gain their independence, relentlessly supporting PLO. The Palestinian people who are fighting lawfully and justly, because they have been deprived of their rights, act in accordance with the logic of the Jewish terrorist Menahem Begin who said, "I struggle, therefore I exist". The Palestinian people have been struggling and have been active in a just struggle, therefore they exist.

Israel must make a choice between two things: either they must recognize the rights of all Palestinians, all their rights and all that that entails in terms of consequences, or Israel must continue to suffer the effects of myths, of legends, by continuing to force the Palestinians into exile and to deprive them of their rights and to continue to suffer from the results of that exile; and they must continue then to accept the consequences of such action.

The Palestinian people, like every other people of the entire world, has inalienable rights—rights set forth unambiguously in the United Nations

Charter, in international conventions, commitments and resolutions, including General Assembly resolutions. The Palestinians have rights which are set forth in the Charter and recognized by international law and in the many documents and resolutions of the United Nations.

Those rights, whether those of Palestine or the people of Palestine, may be described as follows: fundamental, inalienable rights—rights which cannot be denied or usurped. There is also the right to equality: equality with all other people. There is a right to self-determination in Palestine, the land of the Palestinians; the right to freedom and national liberation; the right to sovereignty: sovereignty over the Palestinian homeland, and the right to national independence; the right to return to one's home; human rights and fundamental freedoms; civil, political and religious rights; economic rights; social and cultural rights; the right to Palestinian nationhood; the right to private property; the right to compensation for properties seized or forcefully expropriated; the rights of Palestinians in Palestine; the right to seek all forms of moral and material assistance and finally to exercise the right to self-determination; the right to struggle with all means to assert one's right to self-determination, and, like all other people that have suffered from imperialism and colonialism, to exercise one's right to self-determination.

What I have said applies to past years. This year, the recognition of the rights of the Palestinians has soared, as it were, for the General Assembly decided at this session to inscribe on its agenda a special item on the question of Palestine. In resolution 3210 (XXIX)¹⁶⁴ it recognized that the Palestinian people is the principal party to the question of Palestine and that that people is represented by a responsible organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization, which should be allowed to express its aspirations in the Assembly. The decision was taken that the Palestine Liberation Organization should participate in our debates, that it was the legal body through which the Palestinians should exercise their rights under the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

¹⁶⁴ Doc. 20 below.

If it has finally been recognized that the Palestinians have these inalienable rights and if a factor in that recognition has been the struggle of the Palestinians, a tribute must be paid to the thousands of persons who shed their blood for that cause. Despite the conspiracy mounted against the Palestinian question, despite the attempts to drown the question with minor problems, despite the fact that for 22 years the question was treated as a question of refugees, it has now been recognized that the Palestinian people have rights, rights which they have never renounced.

There are many United Nations documents attesting to that fact. In successive annual reports submitted to the General Assembly by the Directors-General of UNRWA, stress is laid on the fact that the Palestinians continue to feel allegiance to Palestine, the land from which they were expelled, and that they have never renounced either their homeland or their rights. I shall confine myself to quoting the following excerpt from the introduction to his annual report submitted to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly by U Thant:

"...people everywhere, and this certainly applies to the Palestinian refugees, have a natural right to be in their homeland and to have a future". (A/6701/Add.1, para. 49).¹⁶⁵

The Palestinian people, who were the victims of a particular type of colonialism, were uprooted and expelled from their homes. Their right to return therefore has particular importance. It is a right for which they have struggled, especially since the United Nations recognized that right and accorded it priority in its documents. On 11 December 1948 the Assembly adopted a resolution on the legal aspects of the Palestinian problem, on the rights of the Palestinian people, on the rights of the refugees. It has since then adopted many resolutions confirming that resolution, setting forth the mandates of the Conciliation Commission and of UNRWA, dealing with economic plans to provide work for the refugees, and so forth. All those texts have stressed paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III).

The discussion of the problem of refugees is doubtless of great importance, but the right to

repatriation is of even more importance. It is a right that was stressed time and again between 1949 and 1973. In that period the Assembly adopted 27 resolutions stressing paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III). Thus, for 27 years the General Assembly has constantly referred to this right to repatriation. It has never been a right linked to other conditions. However, Israel, in order to prevent the Palestinians from exercising that right, has maintained its right to confiscate the property of Palestinians. In that respect three laws have been promulgated: the law on abandoned land, the law on vacant houses and the law on property. Those laws have prevented the Palestinians from returning. An examination of the right to repatriation within the context of the right of the Palestinians to their property has great importance in view of the injustice done to the Palestinian people.

However, the official statistics published by the administering Power and submitted to the United Nations show that in 1947 the Jews owned only 5.6 per cent of the total land in Palestine. The report which contains that document includes a map showing the lands owned by Arabs and by Jews in each region. Yet Israeli expansionism has managed to increase the percentage of land owned by the Jews from 5.6 per cent in 1947 to 71 per cent of the surface area of Palestine in 1949. In conformity with laws it has enacted, Israel has taken the liberty of confiscating Palestinian property, both movable property and real estate; they also seized other Arab lands whether their owners were living there or had become refugees. I will give an example of the grave injustice suffered by the Palestinians: there were 370 new colonies created between 1948 and 1953, 350 of which were created on the lands of what are called absentee Arabs.

According to both ancient and modern historical documents, the rights of the Palestinians to their land, Palestine, are clearly attested to from the historic and legal standpoint. Those rights have been violated by Israel through several means.

First comes the Israeli refusal to implement the United Nations resolutions which confirm these rights; it has more than once been stated that Arabs have to accept the *fait accompli* of Israel's conquest. However, between 1948 and 1974 there have been several *faits accomplis*, all aimed at destroying these rights or at considering them obsolete; in other words, they may be spoken of as

¹⁶⁵ Doc. 272 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

a part of history, but they cannot be re-established nor is there any question of a struggle to exercise them. But we wonder, if the *fait accompli* became the basis for international law and relations among peoples, what would the world situation amount to?

I do not want to engage in a legal discussion, but I would just say here that jurists have said that a *fait accompli* can never be a precedent recognized by international law, as long as the victims of that *fait accompli* do not accept it and as long as they oppose it, for a Government imposed by force or founded on force cannot cancel a right. An invasion can never give the invader a legal right to possess a land by force.

I shall quote the following from Phillip Marshall Brown's book *Sovereignty in Exile*, written in 1941: "Occupation in itself is illegal and it cannot amount to possession of a land. A people has sovereignty even if this sovereignty has been diminished or curtailed for a period of time."

The *fait accompli* carried out by Israel can never do away with Palestinian rights, with the right of the Palestinian people who have opposed the *fait accompli*. Sometimes they have even engaged in a revolution which has resulted in the shedding of blood. Arab countries have struggled against this *fait accompli* in four wars, and the United Nations has opposed it by adopting 300 resolutions in 27 years. In continuing to deny this *fait accompli*, in refusing to accept it, the Palestinian people are engaging in a relentless struggle, a bitter struggle which is the very source of the Arab-Israeli conflict. That is why the Arab-Israeli conflict can only be resolved when the Palestinian problem, which lies at its base, is solved.

It should be said that total respect for the inalienable rights of the Palestinians and their exercise of those rights are essential for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, taking into account the fact that the Palestinians are a party directly concerned, an essential party to this peace.

The history of Palestine since the end of the First World War until 1974, and particularly since 1947, reveals to us the tragedy of a people exiled in the course of four wars, a people which has undergone many sufferings. This tragedy invites us to assume our responsibilities and to establish a just and lasting peace, since this is a people which has an inalienable right to self-determination without

foreign intervention. It has to exercise its right to its national independence and sovereignty, as well as its right to see all its lands returned to its children, lands from which they were expelled in 1947.

The exercise of these rights is essential to enable the Palestinian people to exercise its right to self-determination.

To build peace in the Middle East, there are two essential pillars, the two sides of a unique, indivisible whole. First, the Palestinian people should exercise its rights. Secondly, Israel should withdraw from all occupied territories.

MR. HUANG (China) (interpretation from Chinese): First of all, the Chinese delegation would like to express warm welcome to the delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization who have come to attend the session. We have listened attentively to the speech delivered at the plenary meeting by Mr. Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization. His speech has reflected the just voice of the millions of Palestinian people and their determination to wage persistent struggles for the restoration of their national rights.

On the initiative of the Arab countries, the current session of the General Assembly decided by an overwhelming majority to consider the question of Palestine at the plenary meeting and to invite the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the deliberations as the representative of the Palestinian people. This was a decision of great historic importance. This is the first time in the history of the United Nations that the General Assembly is discussing the question of Palestine as an important political question under a separate item and that the representatives of the Palestinian people have been invited to the General Assembly as the principal party directly concerned with the question. This is the result of the persistent struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples and the result of the mutual support and assistance of the third world countries in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism. It provides one more evidence that the world situation is undergoing profound changes. The third world countries are playing an ever greater role in international affairs. The days are gone forever when one or two super-Powers could arbitrarily mani-

pulate the United Nations and control this international forum.

The origin of the so-called question of Palestine dates from a far back period. The Middle East, embracing Palestine, has long been an important scene of rivalry among the imperialist Powers for hegemony. As early as the beginning of the First World War, the Palestinian and other Arab peoples unfolded the movement for national liberation. At the same time, the then imperialist Powers began to foster Zionism for the purpose of realizing their scheme of repressing the Arab national liberation movement and carving up the Middle East. In 1948 the imperialists artificially created the State of Israel to be planted as a dagger in the heart of the Arab world. Thereafter, the Israeli Zionists, supported and abetted by imperialism, have incessantly committed aggression and expansion against Palestine and the Arab countries and launched several large-scale wars of aggression within the short space of two decades and more. They evicted over a million Palestinian people who had lived in their homeland for generations, plunging those people into the dire misery of being homeless and destitute over a long period. Furthermore, they invaded and occupied large tracts of Arab territories, inflicting untold sufferings on the countries and people concerned.

As is known to all, after the Second World War the United States replaced the influence of the old-line imperialists in the Middle East. Later, socialist Soviet Union degenerated into social-imperialism. In order to contend for world hegemony, these two super-Powers have been stepping up their rivalry for spheres of influence in the Middle East, which is strategically important and rich in oil resources. One of the super-Powers has long used Israel as its tool for expansion in the Middle East. Openly declaring its being "committed" to Israel, it is sending an enormous and unceasing supply of sophisticated weapons and economic assistance in brazen support of Israel's aggression and expansion. At times, it also makes overtures of one kind or another, yet, at bottom, it still sides with the Israeli aggressors. The other super-Power, under the signboard of supporting the Arab countries and the Palestinian people, is actually employing its reactionary dual tactics. Taking advantage of others' difficulties, it racks its brains to infiltrate into this region. Through the sale of munitions, it tries to control the source

of their supply of arms in addition to the extortion of privileges and fabulous profits; while at the same time it uses the suspension of arms supply as political blackmail and even resorts to intervention and subversion to force the recipient countries to submit to its policy. In the 1967 war, its activities of betrayal brought setbacks to certain Arab countries.

In October last year when the fight against Israeli aggression had just started, it resorted to the same old trick to obstruct and sabotage the resistance war of the Arab countries and the Palestinian people against aggression at a critical juncture of the war. On the other hand, it continued to provide Israel with manpower and potential soldiers to bolster up the Israeli Zionists. Not long ago, in a deal with the other super-Power, it further committed itself to multiply the number of emigrants to Israel. Small wonder the chieftains of the Israeli Zionists have gone out of their way to praise this, calling it "perhaps the most wonderful thing that we have heard in the past year". Over a long period, in tune with the other super-Power, it has described the Palestine question as a so-called "problem of refugees" and vilified the persistent armed struggle of the Palestinian people as "riots", in an attempt to wipe out the Palestine liberation cause altogether—all this is a well-known fact. Recently, with the changes in the situation, it has altered its tactics to make itself appear as a most loyal supporter of the Palestine cause. However, in none of the changes of this super-Power has it departed from its ultimate aim, that is, to maintain a "no war, no peace" situation in the Middle East for contention with the other super-Power and expansion of its spheres of influence. Its own deeds have revealed the true features of sham support to and real betrayal of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples as characteristic of this super-Power which styles itself the "natural ally" of the Arab and Palestinian people.

In summary, the essence of the Middle East and Palestine questions lies in the Israeli Zionist aggression and the contention between the two super-Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, for hegemony in the Middle East versus the struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples against aggression and hegemonism.

Over the past two decades and more, the Palestinian and other Arab peoples have never

ceased their fight. Holding aloft the banner of fighting against Zionism, imperialism and hegemonism, they have shed blood, laid down their lives and pressed forward wave upon wave in their heroic and dauntless struggles. They have written a brilliant, indelible and inspiring chapter in the annals of the liberation struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. Particularly in the October war of last year, the Palestinian people, together with the Egyptian, Syrian and other Arab peoples, firmly took up arms to break through the "no war, no peace" situation imposed on them by the super-Powers, victoriously exploded the myth of Israeli "invincibility" and brought about an excellent situation through their fighting. United against the common enemy, the Arab oil-producing countries used oil as a weapon in their struggle. This just action not only dealt telling blows at Zionism and hegemonism but also opened up a new dimension for the third world countries' struggle in defence of national resources against imperialist plunder and exploitation. The situation is developing in a direction more and more favourable to the Palestinian and other Arab peoples, and unfavourable to the super-Powers and Israeli Zionism. Not long ago, the Arab countries held their seventh summit conference in an atmosphere of united struggle. The resolution unanimously adopted by the conference firmly supports the Palestine revolutionary cause and the just struggle of the Palestinian people for the restoration of their national rights.¹⁶⁶ This reflects the further awakening of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples and their strong will to uphold unity, persevere in the struggle against Zionism and hegemonism, safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Arab countries and regain the national rights of the Palestinian people. The positive achievements of this conference have won the praise and support of the third world and all justice-upholding countries and peoples.

It is necessary to point out here that over the years the United Nations, under the manipulation of the super-Powers, adopted a most unjust attitude on the Palestine question. The United Nations has held many deliberations and adopted numerous resolutions on the Middle East situation and the Palestine question. The one referred to most often is resolution 242 (1967) adopted by the

Security Council after the 1967 war. All these resolutions have the common feature of twisting the question of restoration of the Palestinian people's national rights into a so-called "problem of refugees" with the obvious aim of totally obliterating the sacred national rights of the Palestinian people. It is only natural that this has been categorically rejected by the broad masses of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. The Chinese people fully support their just position.

The Chinese Government and people have always stood on the side of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples who have been subjected to oppression and aggression and firmly support their just struggle. We have never been opposed to the Jewish people. However, we are resolutely opposed to the Zionist policies of expansion and aggression. Ever since the founding of the People's Republic of China we have refused to have any contact with the Israeli Zionists who persist in aggression. We are resolutely against the two super-Powers' contention in the Middle East and against their support and abetting of the Israeli Zionists. We maintain that the United Nations must rectify its past unjust attitude on the Palestine question and adopt a just resolution on this question to recognize the Palestinian people's national rights and support their restoration. In our view, the struggle for the restoration of the Palestinian national rights and the struggle for the recovery of lost Arab territories form an integral whole. In the interest of a real settlement of the Palestine question, the Israeli Zionist aggressors must withdraw from all the occupied Arab territories, the Palestinian people must regain all their national rights and, moreover, it is necessary to maintain high vigilance and firmly oppose all super-Power schemes of aggression, subversion, control and interference against Palestine and the Arab countries and peoples.

History is created by the masses of the people. The Arab nation is a great nation. The Palestinian and other Arab peoples are heroic peoples. In the final analysis, the Palestinian people can regain their national rights and the Arab countries can recover their lost territories only by relying on their own close unity and unremitting struggle, with the support of the people of the whole world. We are confident that the Palestinian and other Arab peoples who have been tempered through prolonged struggles, fully utilizing and pressing

¹⁶⁶ Doc. 308 below.

forward the current favourable situation, firmly getting rid of super-Power interference and control and strengthening their unity to persevere in all forms of struggle including armed struggle, will certainly win complete victory in their cause of national liberation. All ideas overestimating the enemy's strength and underestimating the people's strength are groundless. The road will be tortuous, yet the future is surely bright.

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General Assembly, 2289th meeting; statements by Japan, the USSR and China¹⁶⁷

November 18, 1974

MR. SARITO (Japan): On behalf of my delegation I wish at the outset to express deep regret over the untimely death of His Excellency Mr. Erskine Childers, President of Ireland, and to extend our condolences for the loss of that great statesman to the delegation of Ireland. I wish also to associate myself with previous speakers in extending deep sympathy to the delegation of Saudi Arabia on the sudden passing of His Excellency Mr. Omar Sakkaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia.

The General Assembly decided unanimously to take up the question of Palestine after its long absence from the agenda. We supported that decision because we considered that a debate here on this important question would be of great assistance to international efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem.

The question of Palestine is the heart of the Middle East problem, and its solution is an absolutely essential element of any peaceful settlement in this vital region. There will be no just and lasting peace in the Middle East unless it is solved.

Since the armed conflict last autumn, and thanks in large part to the statesmanship of the leaders of the countries directly involved in this question, and the tireless efforts of those who helped them in their difficult negotiations, there has been important progress towards peace in the Middle East. The Government of Japan welcomed these developments as the first step towards lasting peace in the region. Further efforts are required now, however, to maintain the momentum towards peace, to

prevent a recurrence of armed conflict, and to take a further step towards real peace. The present debate on the question of Palestine, therefore, has a special significance.

My delegation voted in favour of the resolution inviting the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to take part in the present debate because we believe this is essential for our discussion of this very important question. The participation of the Palestinian people is vital because they are the people directly involved, and if they were absent our debate would lack reality.

My delegation wishes to welcome the delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization to our debate and to express our sincere hope that the debate, with the participation of representatives of the Palestinian people, will be conducted in a constructive manner, in a common effort to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question. I have no doubt that if the debate is conducted in such a constructive spirit, it will produce a better atmosphere and contribute greatly to a peaceful Middle East settlement.

The Government of Japan has consistently taken the position that a just and lasting peace should be achieved in the Middle East as soon as possible through the prompt application of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in its entirety. It is the considered view of my Government that any settlement of the Middle East problem should include two basic elements: that is, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied in the 1967 war; and respect for the integrity and security of the territories of all countries in the area, with guarantees to that end.

Regarding the question of Palestine, my Government has held throughout that recognition of, and respect for, the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, on the basis of equality with their neighbours, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, are essential for the achievement of peace in the Middle East. Another essential principle is that Palestinians should be able to exercise their right to choose either to return to their homes or to receive compensation for their property in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.

The question of Palestine is one of the most complex problems facing the international community today. The gap between the positions of

¹⁶⁷ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/PV.2289, pp. 41-45, 86-92.

the parties concerned is still very wide. In order to achieve a settlement of this exceedingly difficult and important question, it is absolutely necessary to try to narrow this gap and eventually to close it. This may require a maximum spirit of co-operation and conciliation on the part of all concerned, as well as a departure from their long-established images and perceptions of each other. A fundamental reappraisal of their relationships with each other is urgently required in view of the danger of renewed fighting if meaningful peace negotiations do not get under way soon.

I believe that if the Palestinian Liberation Organization were to work in a constructive spirit for a political settlement of the Palestine question through peaceful means, that Organization would enjoy increasing international support and would play a vital role in achieving a settlement of the Palestinian question.

The United Nations has been deeply involved in the question of Palestine for a quarter of a century and has its own share of responsibility for this immensely complex and tragic question: The United Nations should play an important role in international efforts to this end and should be ready to play any role that the interested parties may request. I can assure you, Mr. President, that the Government of Japan will give firm support to all United Nations activities that will contribute to a peaceful settlement and will do its utmost to make an active contribution to all such efforts.

MR. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The statement of one of the speakers at the morning meeting today¹⁶⁸ contained the kind of very routine slander which we have all grown very tired of about the There is no need to enter into polemics with that speaker. The purpose of his statement was obvious—that is, to divert the attention of the General Assembly and the United Nations as a whole from the question that has been raised here by the Arab countries, with the support of the socialist and non-aligned countries, the question of the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine, rights that have been trampled underfoot as a result of the Israeli aggression.

The very best answer to that speaker and to his slanderous fabrications against the Soviet Union has already been given by the representative of the Arab people of Palestine, the outstanding leader of that people, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Mr. Yasser Arafat. Only recently, in a telegram to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev, Mr. Arafat expressed his profound gratitude for the resolute position adopted by the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community in support of the Palestinian people and their just cause. He stated:

Our people will not forget the position of fundamental principle adopted by you and by the people of the great Soviet Union in supporting us in this difficult moment for us, when our people are suffering the blows of imperialism and Zionism, which are trying to eliminate our national existence.

That is the very best answer to the slanderous statement of the speaker this morning, who produced nothing but a mass of lies and fabrications against the Soviet Union's position in the Middle East.

The statement made by Mr. Arafat recently to the General Assembly also contained an expression of thanks to the Soviet people.¹⁶⁹

The Palestinian people know very well who is helping them. They know the extent of the help given by the Soviet people to the people of Palestine in their legitimate struggle for their inalienable rights, for their freedom.

That is the voice of the Arab people, the voice of truth. The other voice, the voice asserting the opposite about the position of the Soviet Union, is the voice of calumny and lies.

What was the speaker trying to achieve by coming to this rostrum and slandering the Soviet Union and its policy? Who stands to gain from those provocative fabrications, whose purpose is to damage Soviet-Arab relations and drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries and to divert attention from the aggressor and those supporting and assisting the aggressor? The answer to those questions is clear—and it is clear not only to us but to all the Arab people. The provocative policy of that speaker, of his delegation and of his authorities are, objectively speaking, of

¹⁶⁸ See the statement by China in doc. 13 above.

¹⁶⁹ Doc. 9 above.

benefit only to Israel and to its imperialist, Zionist protectors. All the remarks by that speaker are grist to the mill of Israel. When they make slanderous attacks on the Soviet Union and try—in vain—to sow distrust of the Soviet Union among the Arab delegations, it is Israel that benefits. Such a position on the part of that speaker is a stab in the back of, an act of treachery to, the Arab peoples, the heroic Palestinian people, and all those who truly give them fraternal help at a tense moment in the difficult struggle being waged for their independence and their inalienable rights.

That is the true meaning of these attacks on the Soviet Union. But these efforts are all in vain; they will come to nothing. The Soviet Union has been in the past and will remain a true friend of the Arab people. Its policy of support for the Arab peoples and countries that are victims of Israeli aggression is a matter of fundamental principle and is pursued consistently by it.

We refute these pathetic slanderous attacks on Arab-Soviet friendship by these adventurers who are trying to stir up discord. The Arab people of Palestine know exactly who their friends are. They know who is helping them against Israeli aggression and who, although clad in the robes of a friend, is trying through anti-Soviet demagoguery to mask his failure to support the policy of achieving peace and the withdrawal of the troops of the aggressor, his failure to help promote a just settlement of this matter and the return of the Arab peoples to their lands.

If the country which that speaker represents—and it is not a small country, but a great Power trying to achieve world hegemony—granted the militant Arab peoples as much assistance as the Soviet Union, or at least a comparable amount of assistance, the Arab peoples would be only too glad to receive it. If the delegation of that country were to use the energy which it wastes here in disseminating slander against the Soviet Union on a more worthy cause—that is, the cause of real assistance to and genuine support for the Arab people of Palestine in their struggle and the other Arab peoples victims of Israeli aggression—and if it were to do that in, among other things, the discussion of the question of Palestine in the General Assembly, the Arab countries and peoples would regard that as 1,000 times more useful.

MR. CHUANG (China) (interpretation from Chinese): In his speech just now, Mr. Malik

tried to embellish himself by attributing all the good things to himself. But the Soviet representative's reply is both blustering and hollow. He did not have the guts to touch on the series of facts cited in our speech about the dual tactics of the Soviet Government in contending for hegemony in the Middle East and in dealing with the Arab and Palestinian people's struggle against aggression. This has all the more exposed its guilty conscience and indefensible position.

The Soviet representative has time and again unblushingly bragged about the so-called Soviet military "assistance" to the Arab countries. But why did he not dare to talk about the essence of this so-called military "assistance"? Who was it that took advantage of others' difficulties to reap fabulous profits through munition deals in the war? Who is it that has carried out blackmail and asked for all kinds of privileges by means of the so-called military "assistance"? And who was it that used the arms supply as political blackmail to sabotage the Arab peoples' just struggle against aggression at the critical juncture of the October war last year? All these facts have been openly exposed and severely condemned on many occasions by the just Arab public opinion. Can these facts be obliterated by playing deaf and dumb or accusing others as "anti-Soviet"? You have styled yourselves a "natural ally" of the Arab and Palestinian people and have always bragged about your "selfless assistance". If this were true, why do you not dare, in response to the call of the Chinese representative, openly to declare that all your military assistance for the Arab countries' resistance to foreign aggression will be free and gratis and that you will no longer be a merchant of death or, at least, that you will not press for debt-servicing if you charged for your weapons in the past, or to be more generous, that you will simply publicly declare the cancellation of all these military debts and let them be gone with the wind. Will not that be more practical?

As for the Soviet Government's long-time flirting with the Israeli Zionists and its connivance at their aggression against Palestine and Arab countries, it is all the more a fact known to everyone. The Soviet Union has in recent years sent large numbers of emigrants to Israel, supplying the Israeli Zionists with enormous manpower in pursuance of their policy of aggression and expansion. This is indeed a case of one super-Power

providing the money and guns and the other providing manpower. Though each has its own selfish aim, yet their different acts lead to the same result of augmenting the Israeli Zionists' strength for expanding aggression. Such are the evident facts. How can you deny them? The United Nations adopted a resolution which condemned Israel's transfer of population to its illegally occupied territories and urged all States "to refrain from any action which Israel will exploit in carrying out its policy of colonizing the occupied territories" (General Assembly resolution 3092 B (XXVIII), para. 6).¹⁷⁰ While instructing its representative to vote in favour of the said resolution, the Soviet Government greatly increased its emigration to Israel. Is this not a glaring violation of the United Nations resolution? Does this not constitute a direct support to the Israeli Zionists? You are talking about one thing while doing another. Is this not ample evidence to prove your downright hypocrisy and duplicity?

The objective facts show that the frantic contention between the two super-Powers for hegemony in the Middle East is the root cause of the turbulence in that region. The Arab and Palestinian people have come to see ever more clearly that in order to recover the lost Arab territories and regain the national rights of the Palestinian people, it is imperative not only to oppose firmly the Israeli Zionist policies of aggression and expansion but firmly to oppose and get rid of super-Power intervention, infiltration and control.

THE PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): We have just heard the last speaker on the list in exercise of his right of reply.

Before adjourning, I should like once again to draw the attention of the General Assembly to the fact that, with the exception of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China, no other delegation has inscribed its name to exercise any kind of right of reply. I am saying this for the information of the General Assembly and for all useful purposes. I am also saying this for the information of a certain section of the press which felt compelled to distort a sovereign decision of the General Assembly and to ascribe to it motives which are incompatible with the strict and rigorous application of the rules of procedure and, in particular of the provi-

sions of the inalienable right of each delegation to exercise its right of reply as often as circumstances may require.

15

General Assembly, 2290th meeting; statement by Egypt¹⁷¹

November 19, 1974

MR. ANWAR (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): This is the first time in the history of the United Nations that the General Assembly debates in its plenary meetings the cause of a people who are struggling to secure their rights, in the presence of their representatives and with the effective and positive participation of those representatives in the deliberations which affect the destiny of their people and their homeland. This is indeed a praiseworthy precedent in the field of development of international relations, and the Egyptian delegation sees in this positive development a sound step in our persistent efforts to implement provisions of the Charter and to realize its principles and goals. With this step, people struggling against colonialism for the sake of their right to self-determination can participate in political work which aims at building an edifice of justice and equality, as called for in the Charter.

The resolution of the General Assembly of 14 October last¹⁷² to invite the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the Palestinian question was a sound and just one. What makes it more effective is that the General Assembly will discuss the national cause of the Palestinian people and not merely the human tragedy of the Palestinian people.

Developments in the world have facilitated the adoption of the resolution. Foremost among these developments is the fact that the General Assembly which is today considering the Palestinian question is one which gives expression to the international community more truthfully and reflects to great degree its free and genuine will.

¹⁷¹ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/PV.2290, pp. 6-11, 13-15, 16-21.

¹⁷² Doc. 20. below.

¹⁷⁰ Doc. 28 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

The General Assembly now includes representatives of various peoples from Asia, from Africa and from other parts of the world whose struggling nations have achieved their fundamental rights, particularly the right to self-determination, after long strife. Therefore, the Assembly is more capable of understanding the sufferings of the Palestinian people, sufferings which resulted from the denial of their rights and of their legitimate demands.

With its present composition, the General Assembly shoulders a historic responsibility. It is in a position to contribute truly, as it has contributed in recent years, to the achievement of justice for people struggling for self-determination, freedom, and independence.

For more than 20 years, the General Assembly has not dealt with the essence of the Palestinian problem or with the position and fate of the Palestinian people. As a result, some have imagined that the question had been frozen or even shelved. They have also imagined that with the lapse of time, this question would be nothing more than a chapter in history which tells us that once upon a time, there were people on the land of Palestine, who were later scattered and then disappeared, and what remains of them are groups of refugees, the solution of whose problem can be confined to contributions for their subsistence and relief.

Events have clearly demonstrated that ignoring the essence of the problem, that failing to deal with the question, and that blocking attempts to reach a just settlement have made the Palestinian people more determined to achieve their rights and to carry on their struggle until the whole world has felt that without solving the Palestinian question, there can be no just and durable peace.

There are even those who have been under the illusion that Palestinians are dead wood, and the Israeli leaders have absurdly gone to the extent of alleging that "there is nothing called the Palestinian people". Events have proven that those under such an illusion are merely burying their heads in the sand.

Zionists have exerted efforts to make the world community forget, or feign to forget, the question of Palestine, at a time when peoples had risen to demand the achievement of equality, justice and independence. Zionists have thus tried to obstruct the current of history. They have always sought to impose a *fait accompli* by force on the

Palestinian people, but this they will never be able to do.

The Palestinian people came here to present their case in this hall and from this rostrum, declaring that justice was their goal, peace their beacon and the Charter their guiding document. They have not come here to make threats or issue warnings. They have come to this Assembly holding an olive branch as a sign of the peace to which they aspire and the tolerance in which they believe. They have come here not only to call for the achievement of their aspirations to freedom and independence but also to declare that freedom and independence are an end as well as a means. Freedom and independence are an end which will ensure for them the achievement of the aspirations and rights which others have attained. They are also a means by which the Palestinian people can contribute to collective work by nations and peoples to enrich the wealth of mankind with all that means for the benefit of all, without any discrimination based on race, colour, religion or language.

We are confident that the message conveyed to the Assembly by Mr. Yasser Arafat in the name of the Palestinian people, from this rostrum on 13 November, has not gone and will not go unheeded.¹⁷³ The meaning of the message will not escape the attention of people who have a sense of equity and justice. Here, from this rostrum, in this hall, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization raised the banner of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both of which express the determination that every individual and every nation has the right to freedom and equality, and that the world has the right to justice and peace.

The right of the Palestinian people to resort to all possible means to obtain and defend their rights is parallel to the duty of every country to refrain from all acts of force designed to prevent peoples from exercising their right to self-determination, freedom and independence. In resorting to any means to exercise their right to self-determination peoples are entitled to demand and receive assistance in accordance with the Principles and Purposes of the Charter. This is what members of

¹⁷³ Doc. 9 above.

the General Assembly have in fact determined in various resolutions, the wording and aims of which are based on the principles of the Charter.

There is not the slightest doubt that continuance of the use of force to prevent the Palestinian people from exercising its rights has to be met with the resistance of that people, which has been steadfast in protecting its fundamental rights. The Palestinian people will stand united against any attempt to usurp or violate those rights. The Assembly will perhaps agree with us that the demonstrations which are taking place in occupied Palestinian territory at present provide most convincing proof of what we are saying. The flagrant suppression of the Palestinian people in the occupied land of Palestine and the unprecedented atrocities and murder to which their innocent martyrs are being exposed indeed merit condemnation by the General Assembly and the international community.

The Palestinian people has contributed to the civilization of the world but it has been compelled by forces which adopt terrorism, racism and oppression as a policy to resist and struggle against Zionist forces which have falsified its history and distorted its achievements in every field of human endeavour, in the fields of knowledge, culture and art. Zionist forces have destroyed hundreds of Palestinian towns and villages. They have killed and massacred thousands of innocent Palestinians. Zionism's record of massacres and mass expulsion cannot be forgotten. There is Deir Yassin, there is Kfar Yassim, there is Ikrit, there is Kfar Birim. And there are many more, including Safad, and Khan Yunes. All those names cannot be erased from the history of Zionist terrorism in the Middle East. The terrorist acts of the Zionist gangs are too well known to be enumerated or recalled here. There is also the official terrorism of the State of Israel which by doing the work of terrorists hopes in vain to weaken the will of the Palestinians. But these acts of terrorism only serve as an impetus to resistance and struggle.

Zionism has also desecrated the Holy City of Jerusalem, and there is bound to be incessant action until the sacred places are restored to their faithful owners, protectors and guardians.

The question of Palestine is that of a people whose fundamental rights have been usurped, whose economic wealth has been looted and whose

contribution to civilization has been denied. It is a people which has been rendered homeless as a result of a conspiracy unprecedented in history. Some have suffered from the denial of their fundamental rights, while the political rights of others have been usurped, many have been exposed, and still are to the looting of their economic resources. But the Palestinian people has suffered more than any other because it has been subjected to all these forms of oppression in addition to being rendered homeless. The whole of its homeland has been confiscated, and there are even those who deny the very existence of a Palestinian people. This is a very sad chapter in the history of the world, and perhaps the Palestinian people will find some kind of consolation in the fact that the world community is now acknowledging their existence and their right to their homeland. In fact, the international body, particularly after the liberation of the peoples of Asia and Africa, has never opposed the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination as an established and inalienable right.

Consequently, the question before the Assembly today is not one which deals with the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people since these rights are inalienable and firmly established, and the Charter of the United Nations has further consolidated them. The Assembly's deliberations here should deal with the means which would enable the Palestinian people to exercise these rights, of which they have been deprived for so long. We have to remember that this is closely connected with the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East, and it is our earnest wish that the Assembly's resolution in this respect will herald a fundamental change and a turning-point in history. We earnestly wish this resolution to be one that will terminate the several decades of conflicts and wars which have arisen as a result of Israeli expansionist policies that have rendered the Palestinian people totally homeless and resulted in the complete occupation of its land.

The United Nations in several resolutions has asserted and reasserted the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. In so doing, these resolutions have been based on the aims, principles and provisions of the Charter. What the Palestinian people is demanding now is to exercise this right, and this is the only way to ensure that the area will enjoy peace instead of being plagued with

tension—tension which exists and will continue to exist as long as this right is denied. Let us remember that the Charter in Article 1 stipulates that the purposes of the United Nations are, *inter alia*, to maintain international peace and security. These purposes cannot be achieved unless the right to self-determination is respected and unless an end is put to the policies of terrorism, coercion and violation.

It follows, therefore, that the Palestine question should be considered not only within the framework of its given factors but also within the framework of constant and necessary efforts to preserve international peace and security, which must undoubtedly be given priority provided that they are based on justice. The Charter and its principles should serve as a guide for the preservation of international peace and security.

The right to self-determination is today foremost among the principles on the basis of which the United Nations functions. It is the first aim of the United Nations. It is a principle which has been consolidated by the struggle of peoples—the peoples of Asia, Africa and others—against colonialism, against usurpation, against oppression. The national liberation movement, of which the Palestinian liberation movement constitutes an indivisible part, reached its zenith during the past decade, thus adding to the process of applying and developing the legal and political principles in the United Nations. Here we should mention that the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and other fundamental declarations which form part of the structure of the United Nations aim at consolidating the right to self-determination and other inalienable rights. These declarations serve to consolidate the basic principle of the Charter, and the people of Palestine have come here to submit their case within the framework and on the basis of the Charter.

It becomes obvious, therefore, that the demands of the Palestinian people today should embody affirmation of its fundamental rights, particularly the right to return to its homeland and to exercise the right to self-determination without any outside interference, and that they should also embody the national independence and sovereignty of the Palestinians, as well as the right to resort to all means to secure these rights in accordance with the Charter and in accordance with its principles

and aims.

It is incontestable that the Palestinian people is a principal party to the Middle East problem and that the Palestinian question and its solution in conformity with the principles of the Charter and of justice have to be part and parcel of a process of establishing a durable peace in the Middle East. As long as this question remains unsolved, and as long as the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people are not restored and exercised—just as they have been exercised by other peoples—we shall never see the durable peace to which we all aspire, and any peace in the area cannot last.

The aim of the international community, as defined by the United Nations, is to establish a just and durable peace in the Middle East. This policy finds clear expression in the principles of the Charter and in the resolutions of the United Nations, which have condemned the acquisition of territories by force. This entails respect for the integrity of territories and the political independence of all States. This policy also finds clear expression in the principles of the equality, justice and self-determination of peoples.

It is clear from all this that we are operating within the framework of the Charter and that we are upholding the principles of the Charter in order to restore peace in the area, which has long suffered from oppression, from expansionist policies, from occupation and from the usurpation of rights. We earnestly hope that our efforts will lead to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Israel has been trying to impose a policy of *fait accompli* on the Arab countries. It has failed in this and it will also fail in imposing a *fait accompli* on the Palestinian people. In his statement before the Assembly on 13 November,¹⁷⁴ the Israeli representative's utterances had no meaning other than a declared intention of clinging to an expansionist policy and persisting in ignoring the rights of the Palestinian people.

This Israeli attitude indicates that Israel has not absorbed the lesson of the glorious October war. It seems to us that Israel has forgotten the valour of the Egyptian soldier, the Syrian soldier and the Arab soldier in that war. It also seems that Israel is not aware of the international isolation in which it finds itself and that it is indifferent to the unani-

¹⁷⁴ Doc. 10 above.

mous will of the countries and peoples of this world. Israel persists in that policy, knowing that the doors of massive financial and military assistance are wide open for it.

We reiterate from this rostrum what President Anwar El Sadat has repeatedly said—that in its quest for a durable peace, Egypt will not hesitate to shoulder its duties, together with its sister Arab countries. Egypt will shoulder its full responsibility *vis-à-vis* the continued Israeli challenge and Israel's obstruction of efforts that are being exerted to achieve peace. Israel is trying today to create the circumstances that would enable it to launch a new aggression. We warn Israel against the consequences and we hold it responsible for the deterioration of the situation in the area and for foiling all efforts that have been exerted to reach a peaceful and just settlement.

We are confident that the various countries and peoples—the non-aligned countries, the African countries, the Asian countries, the Latin American countries, the Islamic countries, the Socialist countries, and the European countries—will consider the question of the Palestinian people in the light of the principles and aims of the United Nations Charter. We are confident that they will take steps to ensure the application of those principles to achieve those aims and that they will uphold the rule of law, thus reaffirming the historical development towards a world where justice and equality prevail and where a just and durable peace reigns.

16

General Assembly, 2292nd meeting; statements by the UK and France¹⁷⁵

November 20, 1974

MR. RICHARD (United Kingdom): It has long been the view of the British Government that in any debate on the Middle East the views of the Palestinian people must be listened to. Indeed, I said so myself on 14 October in this Assembly, and if the Assembly will forgive me I shall now quote from my statement. I said:

The British Government has made plain many times its belief that no peace settlement in the Middle East is possible that does not take account of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. The British Foreign Secretary has several times spoken of the need for any settlement to provide for a personality for the Palestinian people. It follows, therefore, that we consider it right that the views of the Palestinians should be heard. (2268th meeting, p. 56)

I would reaffirm that position today.

Whatever else can be said of this debate, it would seem that a Palestinian voice has been heard clearly and unmistakably in this Assembly. If the consequence is that thereby the political process has been advanced, then again so much the better. But political dialogue is not the same thing as universal agreement, and discussion is different from unanimity. It certainly does not follow that in any such discussion all delegations must agree or that they must necessarily support the same resolution in order to show their support for the dialogue itself. On the contrary, if there is to be a meaningful discussion it requires, does it not, mutual tolerance and compromise. It is in that spirit, therefore, that I speak today.

The sharp rise in tension in the Middle East last weekend demonstrated how fragile the peace is and how easily the fears of each side can be aroused. My Government's chief aim is to promote a just and lasting peace in the area. We shall do all in our power to ensure that the peace negotiations Mr. Kissinger is at present conducting are not prejudiced or in any way put at risk. We see no more encouraging way for the complex and difficult problems of the Middle East to be brought to a peaceful conclusion than through his skilful and persistent diplomacy.

My Government continues to believe that full implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), as called for in Security Council resolution 338 (1973), is an indispensable requirement for the attainment of a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East question. That resolution sets out the basic requirements of the Arab States and of the Israelis. On the one hand, it calls for the withdrawal of Israeli occupying forces. On the other hand, it reaffirms the principle that Israel, like other States in the area, is entitled to live in peace with its neighbours within secure and recognized borders. We must surely do nothing in this Assembly that might undermine those

¹⁷⁵ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/PV.2292, pp. 27–32, 43–51.

key principles.

Resolution 242 (1967) sets out a way by which the Arab States and Israel can work out how to live in peace together. But the relations between the Arab States and Israel are not the whole of the problem. There is also the question with which we are concerned here today—the question of the Palestinians, which is perhaps the oldest and most complex of all the questions involved in the dispute between Israel and the Arab world.

Resolution 242 (1967), passed as it was over seven years ago, took no account of what has since become an increasingly evident aspect of the Middle East scene. That is the belief of the Palestinians that they are a separate people; that they are a people distinct from the peoples of the lands in which many of them now live; that they are indeed a people with a just claim to express their own identity within the territory with which they are historically associated, and that, as such, they have political rights which extend beyond the rights of refugees referred to in resolution 242 (1967). My Government has much sympathy with those sentiments; indeed, it would be impossible not to sympathize with them. The Palestinians are central to the Middle East conflict and any attempt to ignore them will only exacerbate matters. They must be fully involved in any settlement. The international community in the Middle East must find a way to enable the Palestinian people to express their personality and to exercise their legitimate political rights; but that this must be done in a manner which does not infringe upon nor call into question the right of Israel as a State to exist in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. This right is the right of Israel as a State and not merely that of Israelis as individuals. This is in our view an all-important proviso and neglect of it will do much damage to the search for peace which we all desire to foster.

In this connexion may I say how much I welcomed the firm statement of the representative of Nigeria when he said from this rostrum yesterday:

...the reality of the existence of Israel as a sovereign State should be acknowledged. A realistic search for peace in the area demands that the Israelis be guaranteed security within agreed borders. (2291st meeting, pp. 18–20)

This seemed to us to be a firm statement of a principle fundamental to any future settlement.

My Government will, therefore, continue to support efforts to find a solution based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), and giving due recognition to all the realities of the Middle East. The resolutions I have cited must be supplemented—but not supplanted and not distorted out of shape or recognition—by an acknowledgement that the intergovernmental settlement for which they provide must now be broadened to include a place for the Palestinian people as well.

As Mr. Callaghan said in the House of Commons on 30 October:

The three fundamental needs which such a settlement must satisfy remain the same. Israel must have satisfaction of her need for recognition by her neighbours of her permanence as a State and of her legitimate security requirements. Israel's Arab neighbours must have satisfaction on the withdrawal of Israeli occupying forces. And provision must be made for satisfaction of the needs of the Palestinians, by which I mean not only the rights of individual Palestinian refugees, as was laid down for so many years by the General Assembly, but also the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people.

Finally, let me say this. An opinion canvassed by many commentators after the Rabat summit¹⁷⁶ was that it was a good thing that at last this very central issue was out in the open; that at last the contestants—the Palestinian people and the Israeli people—might be face to face. I see the force of this argument. There is much talk nowadays of the need to identify your problem precisely, before you begin to tackle it. But there is no profit in identifying your problem unless at the same time you are willing to take the practical measures needed to solve it. In a problem as profound and as complex as the one before us today, there can be no hope of a solution if the parties adopt rigid attitudes, if they deny any particle of justice to their opponent's case and if they bind themselves from the start to make no concessions. My plea today is therefore to both sides—and I am talking about both the matter and the manner of the negotiations—and it is a plea for flexibility, for moderation, for pragmatism, and indeed for a

¹⁷⁶ For the decision of the Arab summit at Rabat as regards Palestine, see doc. 308 below.

willingness to contemplate the possibility of compromise.

MR. DE GUIRINGAUD (France) (interpretation from French): Since a large number of representatives have already spoken in this debate and have dealt with the question of Palestine in great detail, I shall not revert to the genesis of that question but, rather, shall confine myself to present developments. I do not believe it is necessary to stress how disquieting the situation in the Middle East now is. While it is true that we are discussing the "Question of Palestine", the fact is that it is the whole of the situation in the Middle East, with its many aspects, that is being considered by our Assembly, which, more than ever, must demonstrate its sense of responsibility.

In agreeing, on 14 October last,¹⁷⁷ to hear the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, our Assembly took a decision that was both natural and crucial: natural because the moment has come to hear directly from these Palestinians, who have made the world aware of the fact that they are a people; crucial because this awareness of the Palestinian fact is a new element without which, we know full well, any settlement of the conflict would be inoperative and doomed to failure sooner or later.

We have therefore listened with the greatest attention to the statement in which Mr. Yasser Arafat described for us his dream for the future of the Palestinian people. We might perhaps have wished that a closer link had been established between what was proposed to us and what the United Nations had done thus far during the past quarter of a century in attempting to settle the Israeli-Arab conflict. However, for our part we wish to support all those views of the Palestinian Chairman that can pave the way for peace, the olive branch he offered to us, and which we should accept.

It is in this spirit that the Foreign Minister of France held an important interview with Mr. Yasser Arafat on 21 October last. We felt, as I think everybody feels, that this people wished to overcome its frustrations, that its great abilities needed to be redirected into other fields, including the political area, that is, the area of realism.

No revolution, no struggle, however just, is an end in itself. The times when facts should be placed in an over-all context, and each party, each country concerned, must make contact with the realities that compose that over-all context.

The most authoritative voices in my country have been among the first to recognize the Palestinian reality. On 24 October last, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, President of France, stated:

The key to the problem is the understanding that there can be no durable peace in the Middle East if there is no just settlement of the Palestine question. Once the international community has recognized the existence of a Palestinian people, what is the natural aspiration of this people? It is to have a homeland.

Other statements made throughout the world by leading figures, and the place given to the Palestinian question by the press, and at international meetings, all increasingly confirm with every day that passes the importance of this factor in the negotiations aimed at a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

We hope that Israel will in turn accept this major political factor. It is all too clear, indeed, that a true peace cannot be established in the Middle East without taking into account the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and, at the same time, the rights of Israel as a State on an equal footing with the other Members of the Organization.

As one of the speakers before me said, the interests of all States and peoples in the Middle East must be taken into account. Another speaker said that peace entails the respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of all States. In these circumstances, we believe that it is essential that any text that emerges at the end of our debate should be balanced, and it should accordingly take into account all the elements in the situation as referred to in all the resolutions adopted over a period of 25 years by our Assembly and by the Security Council on a political settlement in the Middle East.

Among those resolutions, I shall, of course, refer to resolution 242 (1967) which makes the settlement contingent, on the one hand, upon the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories and, on the other hand, undertakings ensuring for all the States in the region the right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

¹⁷⁷ Doc. 20 below.

I should like to make it clear in this connexion that the Israeli borders, in our opinion, should correspond, except for possible minor adjustments to be agreed on by the parties, to its borders on 4 June 1967.

We have a twofold task: to recognize the general principle of self-determination, and to reconcile it with the two principles governing the settlements to which I have referred. In other words, we should take into account the human and historical legitimacy of a Palestinian homeland, and we should bring about a situation where the State of Israel, which was admitted into our Organization on 11 May 1949, can coexist peacefully with all its neighbours, both benefiting from all the rights and, of course, respecting the obligations recognized in the Charter.

Those are a few considerations which I consider might be useful at this particularly difficult stage. Peace in this profoundly troubled region, remains fragile. If the Palestinians felt that their legitimate rights were not being recognized, or if Israel felt that its very existence was threatened, then the worst could be feared.

More than ever, we believe that only a formula for an over-all settlement, even if the search for this formula has to go through successive phases and piecemeal arrangements, can enable us to reconcile the concerns of all the parties involved. It is accordingly in that direction that the international community, represented by our Assembly, should exert its efforts in particular by encouraging the resumption of the Geneva negotiations. This means that we must bear in mind all the elements of the problem—I repeat, all the elements—when we come to take our decision on any texts before us.

If it is true that United Nations represents continuity in justice and law, let us see that we safeguard this continuity, without which everything would revert to darkness and obscurity.

Having thus defined the general position of my country, I should like now to address myself to the two main protagonists in this debate, the Israelis and the Palestinians. The striking feature of the history of these peoples is their common misfortune: both have known suffering and exile.

Born in the cradle of Western civilization they have both suffered the worst vicissitudes. Neither has been spared. Will they be able to find in this community of sacrifices a reason for mutual understanding and coexistence? Is it really im-

possible to return to Jerusalem its role as a sacred centre for the three great monotheistic religions? Is it unreasonable to think that the resources devoted to armaments will one day be placed at the service of the entire region? It seems to me that these are the real problems, the solution of which is the condition of peace and security for all the peoples of the Middle East.

In conclusion, I should like to express the hope that our Assembly will take an informed decision on the difficult problem before us, aware of its own responsibilities, aware of the aspirations of the peoples of the Middle East and aware of the interests of peace.

17

General Assembly, 2294th meeting; statement by the USA¹⁷⁸

November 21, 1974

MR. SCALI (United States of America): The question of Palestine, as the speakers who have preceded me have amply demonstrated, has commanded more attention from the United Nations than almost any other single issue. The United Nations has not resolved the basic conflict in the Middle East, but it has limited the terrible consequences of this dispute. As we once again confront this issue, it is fitting that we remind ourselves of the long and honourable history of the United Nations' efforts to maintain the peace. We should also pay tribute to those who serve in the United Nations peace forces in the area and to those who provide humanitarian assistance to the victims of war.

We must not forget the thousands of human beings who have suffered and who continue to suffer from this conflict.

Those who seek a genuine resolution of the Middle East problem must keep ever in mind the continuing plight of people who have left their homes because of that conflict and have been unable to return. Continuing efforts by the international community to alleviate the hardships of those people are essential, but those efforts alone are not a solution.

¹⁷⁸ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/PV.2294, pp. 26–31.

Only a just and lasting solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute can halt the killing, stop the suffering, and heal the wounds. The goal of this Organization must be to seek ways to promote movement to that end while avoiding any measure which might make such movement more difficult.

Last year's outbreak of war in the Middle East demonstrated for the fourth time in a quarter of a century that military forces alone cannot resolve the issues which divide Arab and Israeli. It must be clear by now that more violence cannot bring peace. It will only intensify hatreds, complicate differences, and add to the sum of human misery.

The sole alternative to the sterile pursuit of change through violence is negotiation. That path is less dramatic, but in the end it is far more likely to produce acceptable change. The great achievement of the past year has been that the parties to the conflict have at last accepted that alternative, and that they have for the first time begun to make it work. A landmark in this effort, and in Arab-Israeli relations, is set forth in Security Council resolution 338 (1973), in which the Security Council for the first time called for immediate negotiations

...between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace...

The acceptance by the parties of the negotiating process set in motion by resolution 338 (1973) has led to the convening of the Geneva Peace Conference, and to the subsequent, successful efforts to negotiate separate disengagement agreements between the forces of Egypt and Israel, and Syria and Israel. In each of these disengagement agreements the parties reaffirmed their acceptance of the principle of a step-by-step negotiated settlement. They did so by agreeing to include the following statement as the final paragraph of each accord:

This agreement is not regarded...as a final peace agreement. It constitutes a first step toward a final, just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council resolution 338 and within the framework of the Geneva Conference. (*S/11198, p. 3*)¹⁷⁹

The consequences of a possible breakdown in this negotiating process cannot be overemphasized. War has ravaged the Middle East four times in 26 years because people did not believe that

constructive dialogue between the parties was possible. A fifth war would threaten the security of every country and produce no permanent gains for any.

The primary objective of the United States Government, therefore, has been to maintain the momentum of the negotiating process. Secretary Kissinger recently returned from a visit to the Middle East, where he explored with every leader he consulted in the area the vital question of how to continue building on the progress already achieved. The answer to that paramount question still hangs in the balance.

If the negotiating process is to continue, each party must remain committed to negotiations. Each must be prepared to accept a negotiated peace with the others and each must be prepared to see decisions on how to proceed evolve through understandings among the parties. That is how the Geneva Conference was convened, under the co-chairmanship of the Soviet Union and the United States. That is why, when the parties agreed to attend the conference, they also agreed that the role of other participants would be discussed at the Conference.

The foundation of such steps towards peace is the acceptance by all parties of the principles of resolution 338 (1973)—to engage in the give and take of negotiation with the objective of achieving a permanent peace settlement among them on a basis that all parties can accept. If any of the parties rejects that governing principle or questions the right to exist of any of the parties to the negotiation, our best hopes for negotiation and for peace are lost. Certainly it must be understood by all that Israel has a right to exist as a sovereign, independent State within secure and recognized boundaries.

In the course of this debate there have been speakers who have sought to equate terror with revolution, who profess to see no difference between the slaughter of the innocents and a struggle for national liberation. There are those who wish to compare the American Revolution and the many other wars of liberation of the past 200 years with indiscriminate terrorism.

If there were instances during the American Revolution where innocent people suffered, there was no instance where the revolutionary leadership boasted of or condoned such crimes. There were no victims, on either side, of a deliberate policy

¹⁷⁹ Docs. 50 and 115 below.

of terror. Those who molded our nation and fought for our freedom never succumbed to the easy excuse that the end justifies the means.

We hope that all Member nations will reaffirm their support for a negotiated settlement in the Middle East, and their support for Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). We know that those resolutions are the basis on which progress has so far been possible. We believe they remain the best hope for continued progress. To seek to alter them not only risks dangerous delays but could destroy prospects for peace in the foreseeable future.

Certainly we can all accept the fact that the negotiations can take place only when the parties are willing to negotiate. My Government is convinced—and the successes of the past year strengthen our conviction—that the only way to keep the parties committed to negotiations is to move forward through a series of agreements, each substantial enough to represent significant progress, yet each limited enough for Governments and peoples to assimilate and accept. Each of these steps helps attitudes to evolve, creates new confidence and establishes new situations in which still further steps can be taken. With this approach, the parties have over the past year succeeded in taking the first substantial steps in decades towards reconciling their differences.

It is my Government's firm conviction that the way to move towards a situation more responsive to Palestinian interests is not through new resolutions or dramatic parliamentary manoeuvres, but by weaving the Palestinian interests into the give and take of the negotiating process. Through this evolutionary process, Palestinian interests can be better reflected in the new situations which are created.

The United States Government thus believes that the most important contribution this Assembly can now make towards resolving the issue before us is to help establish an international climate in which the parties will be encouraged to maintain the momentum towards peace. We are equally convinced that the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people can be promoted in this negotiating process, and that these negotiations will lead to a just and lasting peace for all the peoples in the Middle East.

18

General Assembly, 2296th meeting; statement by the PLO¹⁸⁰

November 22, 1974

THE PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I should like now to inform the General Assembly that the delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization wishes to address the General Assembly, in accordance with the decision of the General Assembly adopted on 14 October 1974 in resolution 3210 (XXIX)¹⁸¹ and in the context of our consideration of item 108 of the agenda, examination of which we have not yet completed.

I should like to know the views of the General Assembly in regard to the desire of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Is there any objection to having the PLO address the General Assembly? As I hear no such objection, we can therefore ask the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization to address the General Assembly, and I invite him to do so.

MR. AL-KADDUMI (Palestine Liberation Organization) (interpretation from Arabic): May I be permitted at the outset to express, in the name of our fighting and militant Palestinian people, our grateful appreciation to all those who have helped us to come to this international forum to participate in a serious and responsible search for an equitable solution to the Palestine question so that a lasting peace may be achieved that will dispel the nightmares of fear and insecurity. Our people, wherever they are dispersed in these historic moments, which inspire us with hope, expresses to you its profound thanks and high appreciation for the positions taken and the resolutions adopted by you, considering them a constructive step towards the restitution of its historic and national rights. Our Palestinian people, who have been deprived of the right to shape their own destinies and who have been kept outside this international forum for 25 years—a period during which we have undergone the most severe trials in our history—considers the invitation that you have addressed to us to come here after our long absence as a sign of encouragement which restores our confidence in this international institution and in its

¹⁸⁰ Excerpted from the provisional verbatim record, UN doc. A/PV.2296, pp. 111–118.

¹⁸¹ Doc. 20 below.

capacity to shoulder its responsibilities in enforcing right, justice and peace.

Despite all the wounds and sufferings of the past, we have come here with uplifted hearts, with minds open to all objective views, bearing in one hand the olive-branch as a symbol of peace, and in the other the rifle of the fighter to protect our existence and our just cause. We have come here with the confidence of the fighter and with the hope of being able to live in security, in peace and in freedom. We have set forth to you in full frankness and sincerity our dreams and aspirations. We have extended our hand to all those who have shared our human and our national aims so that we may fight together in order to construct a State built on a single, fraternal society coexisting in complete legal equality as between rights and duties, protected from everything that could be a source of discrimination based on ideology, religion or national origin. We were perfectly aware, at the time when we set forth our views, of the obstacles and hindrances which could obstruct their realization. However, and as our brother Yasser Arafat has said, do we not have the right to dream?¹⁸² Palestine, this country of three monotheistic religions—does it not deserve such a great dream? We have appealed for coexistence. The combat was forced upon us. We advocated participation in a single shared destiny for our future generations. We have met with death and extermination. We launched an appeal for an open democratic society. We have suffered expulsion and discrimination. We have been accused of terrorism despite all the ideas and thoughts that we stand for and despite all our struggle which is the contrary of everything that has been alleged.

The valiant Arab resistance in Transjordan is met, on the part of the Israeli occupiers, with death and oppression—irrefutable proof of the policies of the Zionist enemy who would ignore and oppress that people.

As to legitimate self-defence, the defence of the people and the fatherland, this is a duty which is an honour to every citizen and a legitimate right consecrated by international conventions and by the United Nations Charter itself.

Despite the evils done to us by certain people, particularly by those who consider themselves responsible for the fate of war and peace in the

world, in ignorance of the most elementary and obvious realities, and continuing to give proof of their complete partiality for the logic of the enemy and for his expansionist policy of settlement, we are indeed proud to find in this hall friends and brothers and non-aligned people who have raised high the flag of justice and have assured to our cause everything that will make up for the wrongs done to us by others, and that have inspired in us a greater hope for the future. Thus the olive branch is in our hand and will remain in our hand. They have not succeeded in tearing it away from us. Our confidence in the international community grows ever greater and becomes more and more profound. The isolation of Israel inside this hall is but a reflection of its historic international isolation.

We have listened to all of the speakers who have spoken in this hall. We have listened attentively to the minority who have spoken against us. We have listened to those who have done justice to us and to those who have shared in this triumph of justice.

This experience will be a tremendous source of assistance to us in planning our future policy.

That minority which, with Israel, rejects our dream of coexistence in a democratic society has asked us to recognize the facts of the present-day world. But it has offered us no solution. On the contrary, it has tried to exploit the various positions in order to serve Israel and its expansionist objectives.

Those who have tried to take our olive branch away from us have already tried to seize our rifles also. But they are making a grave mistake. Those who thought they would be able to gull us were not able to make the distinction between peace and surrender. We are for peace, an honourable and just peace. We adhere to our commitment. Those who wanted to transform this discussion of the question of Palestine into a discussion of greater security for the State of Israel must realize that there will never be peace in that area without justice, and there will never be justice without the recognition of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people.

Every oppressed people has the right to self-determination and national independence in its fatherland, without any foreign interference.

I must say in all frankness and objectivity that the continued existence of Palestinians in refugee

¹⁸² See doc. 9 above.

camps will mean continued tension in the area. Because of that, the Palestinians must return to their homes and their property. That is their legitimate right, a right that has been enshrined in the United Nations Charter and that has been confirmed today by the General Assembly's historic resolution.

Those are the bases for justice, the bases which will re-establish peace. They have been set forth here by our delegation, the delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization. What has Israel offered to us? Its representative, who came to our land from a European country carrying the flag of conquest and colonization, has invited us to take Jordan as a fatherland instead of Palestine. That invitation is really very strange; it would transform conquest into international law, and make oppression and usurpation permissible. Israel has offered us death and dispersion, it has offered us destruction by napalm bombs. It has offered us bombardment from Phantoms, which it obtains as part of the assistance and encouragement furnished by the United States.

For that reason, we shall not lay down our rifles of revolution. We shall use them to reject death and destruction for our people, who have been exposed to the danger of extermination.

The Palestine Liberation Organization, the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, proclaims from this rostrum that it has come here with all the determination required to give the United Nations a historic opportunity to prove to all the peoples of the world that it is still able to play a role in strengthening peace and justice. That fact has been confirmed here today.

We hope that your hearts will remain open to our cause and to our struggle. We hope, too, that our stay here has contributed to making our position clear. We hope that we have presented to you a more positive approach to the facts of the struggle taking place in the land of Palestine.

We do want to keep the olive branch in our hands. But, equally, we want the olive branch

in the emblem of the United Nations to become something more than a mere image without any content. We must recognize that we did not come here to seek reconciliation with the Zionist terrorists and usurpers. We came here to bear witness to the historic difference between us and the Zionists. We regard diplomatic activities as a complement to our activities on the battlefield. We know that our revolutionary practices and our accomplishments towards restoring peace and freedom are in conformity with the positive position of the international community with respect to our rights. That is why we consider that the increased support for our cause is primarily support for our struggle and encouragement to us to continue that just struggle.

We cannot leave this hall without paying a tribute to those who have fallen in defence of the cause of justice, to all the citizens of the world who have committed themselves to putting into effect the principles of humanity, liberty and peace.

The Palestine Liberation Organization, like our Palestinian people, is happy to see the United Nations at its side today, supporting its cause, reaffirming its right to self-determination and independence on the soil of its forefathers.

We are pleased to thank all those who have spoken here on behalf of the cause of justice and peace, and we state before this human community that the Palestinian people will always serve the cause of justice, peace, liberty and the right of peoples to self-determination.

I should like to thank particularly Mr. Kurt Waldheim, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the President of this General Assembly, our brother Abdelaziz Bouteflika, for the efforts they made in sponsoring this discussion, in facilitating our delegation's task and in making it possible for everyone to participate in the democratic dialogue which we have witnessed here.

THE PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): The Assembly has concluded its consideration of agenda item 108, "Question of Palestine".

UNESCO Report

19

Report of the Director-General submitted to the Executive Board of UNESCO on Israel's archaeological activities in Jerusalem¹⁸³

May 17, 1974

1. The Executive Board, at its 93rd session (12 September—11 October 1973), was informed by the Director-General that he had designated Mr. Raymond Lemaire, Professor of architecture at the University of Louvain and Secretary-General of the International Council of Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), as his representative for Jerusalem (document 93 EX/17 Add.1 Rev.).

2. The Executive Board then took the following decision:

“The Executive Board,

1. *Recalling* the Security Council resolutions 252 of 21 May 1968, 267 of 3 July 1969 and 298 of 25 September 1971, and resolutions 2253 and 2254 (4 and 14 July 1967) of the United Nations General Assembly, concerning measures and actions affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem and resolution 2949 (paragraphs 7 and 8) of 8 December 1972, concerning the policies and practices affecting the physical character or demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories,

2. *Recalling* resolutions 3.342, 3.343 and 3.422 adopted by the General Conference at its fifteenth and seventeenth sessions and decisions 4.4.2, 4.3.1, 4.3.1, 4.3.1, 4.4.1, 4.3.1 and 4.5.1 (parti-

cularly its paragraph 7), adopted by the Executive Board at its 82nd, 83rd, 84th, 88th, 89th, 90th and 92nd sessions respectively, regarding the preservation of religious and cultural properties, particularly in the City of Jerusalem,

3. *Noting* that, since the 88th session, the Executive Board has decided that Unesco should be present in the City of Jerusalem in an attempt to ensure the effective implementation of the resolutions and decisions adopted by the General Conference and the Executive Board in this connexion,

4. *Taking note* of documents 93 EX/17 and 93 EX/17 Add.1 Rev.,

5. *Decides* to re-examine at its 94th session this question in its substance and consequently invites the Director-General to present to the Executive Board at that session a comprehensive report on the implementation of this and the aforementioned resolutions and decisions.”

(93 EX/Decision 4.5.1)¹⁸⁴

3. Since then, on instructions from the Director-General and as his representative, Mr. Raymond Lemaire has undertaken two missions to Jerusalem, the first from 6 to 14 December 1973, the second from 16 to 23 April 1974, and on both occasions he reported to the Director-General.

4. The facts noted and the observations made by Mr. Lemaire concerning the questions which were the subject of the General Conference and Executive Board resolutions referred to in 93 EX/Decision 4.5.1 above are summed up in the attached Annex.

¹⁸³ UNESCO doc. 94/EX 14.

¹⁸⁴ Doc 42 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

ANNEX

*Facts noted and observations made by
the Director-General's Representative for Jerusalem*

I. EXCAVATIONS AROUND HAREM-ESH-SHARIF

1. These excavations, which were mentioned in the information note (88 EX/47) submitted by the Director-General to the Executive Board at its 88th session (6 October—2 November 1971) have continued since then in the same zone. The area excavated has been somewhat extended to the south of the enclosure, between the "Double Gate" and the road called Derekh-ha-Offel, on a vacant site where a few recent buildings were demolished with a view to making a National Park. An old part of the town, a heavily built up area, with important and often well preserved remains of dwellings going back to Herodian and Byzantine times, was brought to light.

2. The following points deserve mention:

(a) In order to strengthen the base of the southern wall of the temple enclosure, at the western corner, three large concrete buttresses more than 4 m. high have been erected to transmit the pressures exerted behind the wall by the mass of earth to the base of the neighbouring Ommiad Palace. Calculations and experiments with models have demonstrated that under the least favourable circumstances it is possible that this part of the wall of the enclosure, uncovered to a height of almost 20 m., might get out of plumb, for the normal safety coefficient is no longer reached when more than 16 m. are uncovered. The buttresses are intended to compensate for this difference. They have been carefully constructed, and the side of the old wall against which the concrete was placed was first protected by a sheet of vinyl. If these buttresses are demolished, which might be necessary if the base of the walls proves to be over 4 m. 40 thick—a hypothesis envisaged at present on the strength of electrical resistance tests—the original wall could be freed without damage. It should be observed that the wall was uncovered to this height when it was built and that it remained for at least a century, until the temple was demolished by Titus in 70 A.D. The original parts, which have been preserved to a height of 15 m., show no sign of movement worth mentioning. The tests carried out appear to support this conclusion. Lastly, it should be noted that no other part of the wall has been

uncovered to a comparable height and that there is no reason to anticipate a similar danger elsewhere;

(b) The school house, built around 1960, was situated on a hillock produced by the excavations made all around it. As its stability was to some extent jeopardized by the works, it was demolished;

(c) The excavations in front of the "Double Gate" and the "Triple Gate" in the southern wall of the temple have brought to light the monumental stairways which led up to the terrace of the temple built by Herod the Great. Restoration of these stairways is in progress. For this purpose the original stones found in the course of excavations are being used, along with quite a number of new stones, which can be distinguished by their colour and their size. Some of the steps are hewn out of the rock;

(d) The base of the south-west corner of the wall of the Herodian way, which followed the bottom of the Tyropoeon valley, has been freed. This way, which runs in a north-western direction, is paved with large limestone flags in a good state of preservation.

(e) A permanent exhibition has been arranged in the rooms of the citadel to give the visitor information about the excavations.

(f) Perusal of some of the documents prepared gives one the impression that some of the criticisms that have been levelled at the methods used in the excavations are groundless. The excavations are being carried out by a perfectly well qualified team of experts of various kinds, who are extremely attentive to all aspects and to all the periods of which remains have been found on the site. The same care is expended on the preservation of remains of the Ommiad palaces as on those of the Herodian period.

II. EXCAVATIONS IN THE JEWISH QUARTER

3. The object of these excavations is to study the substratum of this zone before the buildings demolished between 1947 and 1967 are reconstructed. Carried out with the utmost care and employing the most expert methods, these excavations have already led to discoveries of the greatest importance in relation to the history of Jerusalem,

including a city wall from the time of the Kings, a house burnt down by the troops of Titus, with its furniture and the charred remains of a woman occupant, the famous "Nea" basilica, and streets and dwellings, chiefly Herodian and Byzantine. The excavations are being continued systematically. Since 1971 the remains of a great Byzantine palace and an exceptionally well preserved sample of the urban fabric of the Roman period have been uncovered.

III. CLEARANCE OF THE WESTERN WALL OF THE TEMPLE AND CONSERVATION OF THE MONUMENTS IN THE ZONE ABOVE THE TUNNELS

4. No major work has been carried out in the "tunnels" since 1971. However, it is possible that the gallery running along the west wall of the temple may have been extended a few metres. Its present length is about 215m. It extends to within a few metres of Bab-el-Nadhir, one of the large gates of Haram-esh-Sharif. A part of the galleries dug in the earth banking beneath Arab buildings has been consolidated by steel bents. Another part is still propped up with wood, which has been freshly treated with Carbonileum and is in a good state of preservation.

(a) Situation in December 1973

5. As it is damp in the galleries, the wood may be attacked by cryptogams or xylophagous insects. If the wood were to give way, the situation would be disastrous for the buildings above. Whenever it rains, the water runs into the mass of the earth banking through the numerous open courtyards to be found within the buildings standing on the surface, and the stability of some of the buildings erected above the excavated zone has been imperilled.

6. Considerable damage has been caused to several parts of *Sharabeh House*. Following soil subsidence, walls have sunk, with the result that some of them are cracked or have got slightly out of plumb. The cracks have been stopped up, braces been put under the groundfloor vaults, and steel and concrete bonds have been installed in the upper part of the walls affected. The work is efficacious from the engineering standpoint, but the effect is inelegant, and would be unacceptable if it were not that the work is of a provisional nature, and restoration will later be carried out in accordance with the rules of art.

7. The western wall of the building, containing *Fityani Tomb*, is cracked, but has manifestly been so for a long time, and the damage is unrelated to the digging of the tunnel. This is a building belonging to the Madrassa Uthmaniya, dating back to 1440. It has all the features of Mameluke architecture in Jerusalem, and is of exceptional importance as a monument.

8. No other case of damage to buildings in the vicinity of the western wall of the temple in the zone affected by the digging of the gallery has been reported by the engineer responsible for the maintenance and restoration of the monuments belonging to the Moslem community.

(b) Situation in April 1974

9. The *Madrassa Jawhariya*, in the immediate vicinity of Bab-el-Hadid, one of the principal gates of Haram-esh-Sharif, consists of a wing in Mameluke style running parallel to the street and another of more indigenous style running across the former and meeting *Ribat Kurd*. The building on the street has some not very large cracks in the walls and vault upstairs, which nevertheless indicate that the building is being pulled away from the wall of the enclosure of Haram-esh-Sharif, on to which it was built. The cracks are due to a slight subsidence of the ground under the northern part of this part of the building, which supports a series of relieving arches on which the upper storey rests. The damage to the wing running crosswise is more considerable. The eastern wall of this wing is caving in, with the result that cracks are appearing in the vaults in the transverse walls, and we are faced with a serious stability problem. Total collapse of the building is to be feared.

10. This part of the building stands on a kind of terrace about four metres high, supported by a wall forming a parapet. This wall, which was rebuilt in 1973, is already cracked. It is falling down towards the southern end. It extends into a vaulted passage whose eastern wall has a large crack, horizontal in the centre and slanting at the ends. This crack clearly indicates a settling of the foundations under a part of this wall. However, the crack is narrow (about 5 to 8 mm.), which means that there is no great subsidence of the ground.

11. What is striking is that the zone of subsidence is in a line with the one which shook *Ribat Kurd*

in 1973 and which does not seem to be completely stabilized yet. This zone, of a total length of about 40 m., is parallel to the enclosing wall of Haram, from which it is separated by from four to six metres. The tunnel dug to free the base of the enclosing wall passes beneath. The depth of the earth banking separating the ceiling from the tunnel is a matter of dispute.

12. What can the cause of the subsidence be? The fact that throughout its whole length it runs parallel to the tunnel and in its immediate vicinity leads one to think that the tunnel is not unconnected with it. Although the latter was dug nearly four years ago, soil movements can be caused by it in the vicinity, circumstances permitting. Now in this connexion two facts must be noted. The first is that the movement in the buildings occurred after an exceptionally wet winter. Accumulated water percolating through the soil may be the cause of the subsidence of earth against the wood casing of the tunnel. The second fact could have similar effects; it is the increase in Jerusalem's water supply, the city's water consumption having quadrupled since 1967. The drainage system, however, is not able to cope with this consumption, and a large part of the water therefore flows into the soil, causing a greater or lesser degree of subsidence in certain places.

13. However, the subsidence undoubtedly does not suffice to explain the extent of the movements observed in the walls of the transverse wing. Here the soil movement has had the effect of starting up movements in the wall, which are caused basically by structural weakness due to the crumbling of the mortar, the rather inexpert use of materials (a phenomenon observed elsewhere in the Old City, where an entire house collapsed at the end of the winter in Aquabat el Takiga Street) and above all the lack of any continuous support at the base of the wall. A part of the wall rests on the ruins of a vault long since collapsed.

14. In conclusion, the subsidence of earth due to the tunnel is not unconnected with the movement of the buildings situated above. However, such subsidence has not caused much damage where the structures are sound. On the other hand, it starts off a number of more extensive movements, which may be dangerous, where structures are weak or worn. The unstable buildings have already been evacuated.

15. According to the information obtained by

the Director-General's representative:

(a) It was decided that in the coming months the wooden props should be replaced throughout the tunnel by a definitive and durable system of consolidation. The tunnels will be reinforced by steel bents, and the casing will also be of metal, with concrete filling on the outside. This technique seems satisfactory to the Director-General's representative from the standpoint of both durability and the method of installation, which must be such as to obviate any movement while the work is being carried out.

(b) The financial resources required for restoring the buildings are now available. The Director-General's representative is of the opinion that a complete restoration should be carried out, and not merely reinforcement work, which is sometimes unsightly, as at Ribat Kurd.

IV. RESTORATION OF THE EL AKSA MOSQUE

16. Restoration work is progressing slowly. The methods employed could well be improved.

V. RESTORATION OF SUQ-EL-QATTANI AND VARIOUS BUILDINGS IN HARAM-ESH-SHARIF

(a) *Situation in December 1973*

17. The Suq, one of the finest in Jerusalem, is situated in front of one of the main gates of Haram-esh-Sharif. It was built in the fourteenth century. It is architecturally well preserved, but until a year ago it was in a lamentable state of neglect and disrepair. Its renovation and arrangement might be carried out with more respect for the old materials and structures. The vaults, formerly plastered, have been scoured. The new stones have been set in the old masonry without much care. The jointing is in dark grey cement. The electrical wiring has been fitted into the facing stones, which have then been "repaired" with cement. In this case, too, the methods employed could be improved.

(b) *Situation in April 1974*

18. Restoration work on the Suq, already well advanced in December 1973, has now been completed. The arcades built on to the eastern face of the wall in the seventeenth century have been freed. The Maugrabin Mosque, which contains the Museum, has been restored and the Museum itself is being renovated. Restoration methods have been improved: lime mortar is

being used for the jointing instead of cement, and in stone-cutting more regard is shown for the old techniques.

VI. RESTORATION OF THE HOLY SEPULCHRE

19. Work is progressing very slowly. There is nothing much new to report, except the fact that the supports of the rotunda have been repaired largely in accordance with the approved project: the pillars repaired after the burning of the monument in 1808 have been replaced by copies of the fourth-century Constantinian columns. These had been removed and used again in the eleventh century. Some of them were found still standing, but in a very poor state of repair. Architects are still not agreed as to what shape the capitals should be. Better co-ordination of the teams carrying out the work is to be desired.

VII. TOWN-PLANNING AND THE CONSERVATION OF THE CITY AND THE HISTORIC SITE

20. It is thought by many that the preservation of Jerusalem entails not only that of the city itself but also that of its environs, and, in particular, of the dramatic yet harmonious relationship be-

tween the City and the Valley of the Kedron, the surrounding hills and gardens (the Mount of Olives, Mount Zion, Gethsemane), the mountains of Judaea, the neighbouring desert, the villages nearby, Bethany, Siloah. In their view, the preservation of a wider area than the City of Jerusalem is essential. They consider that Jerusalem would suffer irreparable damage if the site and the landscape were spoilt as a result of bad administration of the territory, anarchic urban growth and uncontrolled speculation in property.

Situation in April 1974

21. The Director-General's representative was informed that the preparation of a new master plan for the city was contemplated, since the existing plan gave rise to problems, in particular, in regard to traffic and zones for building. In the absence of legislation to protect the city's heritage of monuments and historic sites, it would seem that only adoption of the master plan procedure is likely to "freeze" the situation for a time. Advantage should be taken of this respite to work out satisfactory town-planning regulations.

Resolutions and Decisions

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

20

General Assembly Resolution 3210 (XXIX) inviting the PLO to participate in the General Assembly debate on Palestine¹⁸⁵

October 14, 1974

The General Assembly,

Considering that the Palestinian people is the principal party to the question of Palestine,

Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings.

21

General Assembly Resolution 3211A (XXIX) financing the UN Emergency Force and the UN Disengagement Observer Force¹⁸⁶

October 31, 1974

The General Assembly,

Recalling that the present authority of the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the United Nations Emergency Force, as provided by paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 3101 (XXVIII) of 11 December 1973, expires on 31 October 1974,

Taking note of Security Council resolution 362 (1974) of 23 October 1974, which extended the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force for the period from 25 October 1974 to 24 April 1975 inclusive,

Noting further that the present mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force,

which was established by the Security Council in resolution 350 (1974) of 31 May 1974, continues until 30 November 1974 inclusive,

1. *Decides* to authorize the Secretary-General to enter into commitments not to exceed \$5 million for the United Nations Emergency Force (including the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force) for the period from 1 November to 30 November 1974 inclusive, in order to allow adequate time for consideration by the General Assembly of the report of the Secretary-General on the financing of the Force;

2. *Also decides* to apportion the above-mentioned expenses among Member States in accordance with the scheme as set forth in General Assembly resolution 3101 (XXVIII).

22

General Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIX) recognizing the rights of the Palestinian people and placing the "Question of Palestine" on the provisional agenda of its next session¹⁸⁷

November 22, 1974

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Palestine,

Having heard the statement of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,¹⁸⁸

Having also heard other statements made during the debate,

Deeply concerned that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has yet been achieved and recognizing that the problem of Palestine continues to endanger international peace and security,

Recognizing that the Palestinian people is entitled to self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Expressing its grave concern that the Palestinian

¹⁸⁵ UN doc. A/RES/3210 (XXIX). Adopted at the Assembly's 2268th plenary meeting by 105 votes to 4, with 20 abstentions. For voting details, see Appendix F.

¹⁸⁶ UN doc. A/RES/3211 A (XXIX). Adopted at the Assembly's 2273rd meeting by 87 votes to 3, with 2 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix F. Section B of the resolution is in doc. 24 below.

¹⁸⁷ UN doc. A/RES/3236 (XXIX). Adopted at the Assembly's 2296th plenary meeting by 89 votes to 8, with 37 abstentions. For voting details, see Appendix F.

¹⁸⁸ Doc. 9 above.

people has been prevented from enjoying its inalienable rights, in particular its right to self-determination,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Recalling its relevant resolutions which affirm the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination,

1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including:

(a) The right to self-determination without external interference;

(b) The right to national independence and sovereignty;

2. *Reaffirms also* the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return;

3. *Emphasizes* that full respect for and the realization of these inalienable rights of the Palestinian people are indispensable for the solution of the question of Palestine;

4. *Recognizes* that the Palestinian people is a principal party in the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East;

5. *Further recognizes* the right of the Palestinian people to regain its rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

6. *Appeals* to all States and international organizations to extend their support to the Palestinian people in its struggle to restore its rights, in accordance with the Charter;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to establish contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization on all matters concerning the question of Palestine;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

9. *Decides* to include the item entitled "Question of Palestine" in the provisional agenda of its thirtieth session.

23

General Assembly Resolution 3237 (XXIX) giving the PLO observer status in General Assembly activities¹⁸⁹

November 22, 1974

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Palestine,

Taking into consideration the universality of the United Nations prescribed in the Charter,

Recalling its resolution 3102 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973,

Taking into account Economic and Social Council resolutions 1835 (LVI) of 14 May 1974 and 1840 (LVI) of 15 May 1974,

Noting that the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, the World Population Conference and the World Food Conference have in effect invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in their respective deliberations,

Noting also that the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in its deliberations as an observer,

1. *Invites* the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer;

2. *Invites* the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer;

3. *Considers* that the Palestine Liberation Organization is entitled to participate as an observer in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps for the implementation of the present resolution.

¹⁸⁹ UN doc. A/RES/3237 (XXIX). Adopted at the Assembly's 2296th plenary meeting by 95 votes to 17, with 19 abstentions. For voting details, see Appendix F.

24

**General Assembly Resolution 3211 B (XXIX)
financing the UN Emergency Force and the
UN Disengagement Observer Force¹⁹⁰**

November 29, 1974

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force and of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force as well as the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,

Bearing in mind Security Council resolutions 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973, 346 (1974) of 8 April 1974, 350 (1974) of 31 May 1974, 362 (1974) of 23 October 1974 and 363 (1974) of 29 November 1974,

Recalling its resolutions 3101 (XXVIII) of 11 December 1973 and 3211 A (XXIX) of 31 October 1974,

Reaffirming its previous decisions regarding the fact that, in order to meet the expenditures caused by such operations, a different procedure is required from that applied to meet expenditures of the regular budget of the United Nations,

Taking into account the fact that the economically more developed countries are in a position to make relatively larger contributions and that the economically less developed countries have a relatively limited capacity to contribute towards peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures,

Bearing in mind the special responsibilities of the States permanent members of the Security Council in the financing of such operations, as indicated in resolution 1874 (S-IV) of 27 June 1963 and other resolutions of the General Assembly,

I

1. *Decides* to appropriate the amount of \$30 million authorized and apportioned by paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 3101 (XXVIII) for the operation of the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the period from 25 April to 24 October 1974 inclusive;

2. *Decides further*, in accordance with the *ad hoc*

arrangement in paragraph 2 of resolution 3101 (XXVIII), to appropriate an additional amount of \$19.8 million for the operation of the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the period from 25 October 1973 to 24 October 1974 inclusive in the proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1974–1976 as follows:

(a) \$12,503,700 among the Member States referred to in paragraph 2 (a) of resolution 3101 (XXVIII);

(b) \$6,886,440 among the Member States referred to in paragraph 2 (b) of resolution 3101 (XXVIII);

(c) \$399,960 among the Member States referred to in paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 3101 (XXVIII);

(d) \$9,900 among the Member States referred to in paragraph 2 (d) of resolution 3101 (XXVIII);

II

1. *Decides* to appropriate an amount of \$40 million for the operation of the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force from 25 October 1974 to 24 April 1975 inclusive, and requests the Secretary-General to continue to maintain a Special Account for the Force;

2. *Decides further*, as an *ad hoc* arrangement, without prejudice to the positions of principle that may be taken by Member States in any consideration by the General Assembly of arrangements for the financing of peace-keeping operations:

(a) To apportion an amount of \$25,260,000 for the above-mentioned six-month period among the Member States referred to in paragraph 2 (a) of resolution 3101 (XXVIII) in the proportions provided therein;

(b) To apportion an amount of \$13,912,000 for the above-mentioned six-month period among the Member States referred to in paragraph 2 (b) of resolution 3101 (XXVIII) in the proportions provided therein;

(c) To apportion an amount of \$808,000 for the above-mentioned six-month period among the Member States referred to in paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 3101 (XXVIII) in the proportions provided therein;

(d) To apportion an amount of \$20,000 for the above-mentioned six-month period among the Member States referred to in paragraph 2 (d)

¹⁹⁰ UN doc A/RES/3211 B (XXIX). Adopted at the Assembly's 2303rd meeting by 92 votes to 3, with 10 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix F.

of resolution 3101 (XXVIII) in the proportions provided therein;

3. *Reiterates* for the purpose of the present resolution the definition of the term "economically less developed Member States" contained in paragraph 3 of resolution 3101 (XXVIII);

4. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force at a rate not to exceed \$6,666,667 per month for the period from 25 April to 31 October 1975 inclusive, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond 24 April 1975, the said amount to be apportioned among Member States in accordance with the scheme set out in the present resolution;

5. *Stresses* the need for voluntary contributions to the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force both in cash and in the form of services and supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to ensure that the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force are conducted with a maximum of efficiency and economy, and in this connexion endorses the comments of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in paragraph 23 of its report.

25

General Assembly Resolution 3240 A.B.C (XXIX) on the Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories¹⁹¹

November 29, 1974

A

The General Assembly,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the principles and provisions of the Universal Declara-

tion of Human Rights,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, as well as of other relevant conventions and regulations,

Recalling its resolutions on the subject, as well as those adopted by the Security Council, the Commission on Human Rights and other United Nations bodies concerned and by specialized agencies,

Considering that the implementation of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 cannot and should not be left open in a situation involving foreign military occupation and the rights of the civilian population of those territories,

Deploring the continued refusal by Israel to allow the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories access to the occupied territories,

Having considered the report of the Special Committee,¹⁹²

1. *Commends* the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories for its efforts in performing the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly;

2. *Calls upon* Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;

3. *Expresses the gravest concern* at the continued and persistent disregard by Israel of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and other applicable international instruments, in particular the following violations:

(a) The annexation of parts of the occupied territories;

(b) The establishment of Israeli settlements therein and the transfer of alien population thereto;

(c) The destruction and demolition of Arab houses, villages and towns;

(d) The confiscation and expropriation of Arab property in the occupied territories and all other transactions for the acquisition of land involving the Israeli authorities, institutions or nationals on the one hand, and the inhabitants or institutions of the occupied territories on the other;

(e) The evacuation, deportation, expulsion, displacement and transfer of Arab inhabitants

¹⁹¹ UN doc. A/RES/3240 A.B.C. (XXIX). Adopted at the Assembly's 2303rd plenary meeting by the following votes:

Part A: 95 to 4, with 31 abstentions

Part B: 121 to 0, with 7 abstentions

Part C: 89 to 4, with 36 abstentions

For voting details see Appendix F.

¹⁹² Doc. 6 above.

of the occupied territories, and the denial of their right to return;

(f) Mass arrests, administrative detention and ill-treatment of the Arab population;

(g) The pillaging of archaeological and cultural property;

(h) The interference with religious freedom and practices, as well as family rights and customs;

(i) The illegal exploitation of the natural wealth, resources and population of the occupied territories;

4. *Declares* that those policies of Israel constitute not only a direct contravention to, and violation of, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles and provisions of the applicable international law concerning occupation and the basic human rights of the people, but also an impediment to the establishment of a just and lasting peace;

5. *Reaffirms* that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the occupied territories, or any part thereof, are null and void;

6. *Reaffirms further* that Israel's policy of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in the occupied territories is a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and of the relevant United Nations resolutions, and urges all States to refrain from any action which Israel will exploit in carrying out its policy of colonizing the occupied territories;

7. *Demands* that Israel desist forthwith from the annexation and colonization of the occupied Arab territories as well as from all the policies and practices referred to in paragraph 3 above;

8. *Reiterates* its call upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories and to avoid actions, including actions in the field of aid, which might be used by Israel in its pursuit of the policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;

9. *Requests* the Special Committee, pending the early termination of the Israeli occupation, to continue to investigate Israeli policies and practices in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to

ensure the safeguarding of the welfare and human rights of the population of the occupied territories, and to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General:

(a) To render all necessary facilities to the Special Committee, including those required for its visits to the occupied territories with a view to investigating Israeli policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;

(b) To ensure the widest circulation of the reports of the Special Committee and of information regarding its activities and findings, by all means available through the Office of Public Information of the Secretariat;

(c) To report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session on the tasks entrusted to him;

11. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirtieth session the item entitled "Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories".

B

The General Assembly,

Affirming that the promotion of respect for the obligations arising from the Charter of the United and other instruments and rules of international law is among the basic purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,

Recalling that Israel and those Arab States whose territories have been occupied by Israel since June 1967 are parties to that Convention,

Reaffirming that States parties to that Convention undertake, in accordance with article 1 thereof, not only to respect but also to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances,

1. *Reaffirms* that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967;

2. *Calls once more upon* Israel to respect and to comply with the provisions of that Convention in the Arab territories occupied by Israel;

3. *Urges* all States parties to that Convention to exert all efforts in order to ensure respect for and compliance with the provisions thereof in the Arab territories occupied by Israel.

C

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, in particular section V thereof concerning the destruction of the town of Quneitra,

Recalling that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, provides that any destruction by the occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, to the State, to other public authorities or to social or co-operative organizations is prohibited,

Noting the Special Committee's deep-seated conviction that the Israeli forces and the Israeli occupying authorities were responsible for the deliberate and total devastation of Quneitra, in violation of article 53 of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and under article 147 thereof,

Noting further the Special Committee's opinion that the gravity of the circumstances would justify the appointment of a commission to study the legal consequences of the devastation of Quneitra, particularly within the context of articles 53 and 147 of the Geneva Convention, bearing in mind the provisions of article 6 (b) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, confirmed by the General Assembly in its resolution 95 (I) of 11 December 1946,

1. *Endorses* the conclusion of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories that Israel is responsible for the destruction and devastation of the town of Quneitra;

2. *Regards* Israel's deliberate destruction and devastation of the town of Quneitra as a grave breach of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and condemns Israel for such acts;

3. *Requests* the Special Committee, with the assistance of experts, designated if necessary in consultation with the Secretary-General, to undertake a survey of the destruction in Quneitra and to assess the nature, extent and value of the damage caused by such destruction;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make avail-

able to the Special Committee all the facilities necessary in the performance of its task and to report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

26

**General Assembly Resolution 3263 (XXIX)
calling for the establishment of a nuclear-
weapon-free zone in the Middle East¹⁹³**

December 9, 1974

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Desiring to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security by bolstering and expanding the existing regional and global structures for the prohibition and/or prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons,

Realizing that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones with an adequate system of safeguards could accelerate the process towards nuclear disarmament and the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Recalling the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its sixty-second session, held in Cairo from 1 to 4 September 1974, on this subject,

Recalling the message sent by His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah of Iran on 16 September 1974 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Considering that the establishment of zones free from nuclear weapons, on the initiative of the States situated within each zone concerned, is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to halting the proliferation of those instruments of mass destruction and to promoting progress towards nuclear disarmament, with the goal of total destruction of all nuclear weapons and their means of delivery,

Mindful of political conditions particular to the region of the Middle East and of the potential

¹⁹³ UN doc. A/RES/3263 (XXIX). Adopted at the Assembly's 2309th plenary meeting by 128 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix F.

danger emanating therefrom, which would be further aggravated by the introduction of nuclear weapons in the area,

Conscious, therefore of the need to keep the countries of the region from becoming involved in a ruinous nuclear arms race,

Recalling the Declaration on Denuclearization of Africa issued by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in July 1964,

Noting that establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would contribute effectively to the realization of aims enunciated in the above-mentioned Declaration on Denuclearization of Africa,

Recalling the notable achievement of the countries of Latin America in establishing a nuclear-free zone,

Also recalling resolution B of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, convened at Geneva on 29 August 1968, in which the Conference recommended that non-nuclear-weapon States not comprised in the Latin American nuclear-free zone should study the possibility and desirability of establishing military denuclearization of their respective zones,

Recalling the aims pursued by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, in particular, the goal of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons,

Recalling resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, in which it expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States,

1. *Commends* the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

2. *Considers* that, in order to advance the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, it is indispensable that all parties concerned in the area proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons;

3. *Calls upon* the parties concerned in the area to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

4. *Expresses the hope* that all States and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States, will lend

their full co-operation for the effective realization of the aims of this resolution;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ascertain the views of the parties concerned with respect to the implementation of the present resolution, in particular, with regard to its paragraphs 2 and 3, and to report to the Security Council at an early date and, subsequently, to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirtieth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

27

General Assembly Resolution 3330 (XXIX) on the report of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA¹⁹⁴

December 17, 1974

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2656 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2728 (XXV) of 15 December 1970, 2791 (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, 2964 (XXVII) of 13 December 1972 and 3090 (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973,

Having considered the report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

Taking into account the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1973 to 30 June 1974,¹⁹⁵

Gravely concerned at the alarming financial situation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, imminently endangering the essential minimum services being provided to the Palestine refugees,

Emphasizing the urgent need for extraordinary efforts in order to maintain, at least at their present minimum level, the activities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

¹⁹⁴ UN doc. A/RES/3330 (XXIX). Adopted at the Assembly's 2322nd plenary meeting without vote.

¹⁹⁵ See doc. 3 above for the Introduction.

1. *Commends* the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for its work;

2. *Notes with appreciation* the report of the Working Group;

3. *Requests* the Working Group to continue its efforts for the financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for a further period of one year in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary services and assistance to the Working Group for the conduct of its work.

28

General Assembly Resolution 3331 A.B.C.D (XXIX) reaffirming the Palestinians' right to repatriate, extending the mandate of UNRWA and condemning Israel's military attacks on refugee camps¹⁹⁶

December 17, 1974

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3089 B (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973 and all previous resolutions referred to therein, including resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1973 to 30 June 1974,¹⁹⁷

1. *Notes with deep regret* that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed by the General Assembly in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952 for the reintegra-

tion of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;

2. *Expresses its thanks* to the Commissioner-General and to the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

3. *Notes with regret* that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III)¹⁹⁸ and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation of that paragraph and to report as appropriate, but no later than 1 October 1975;

4. *Directs attention* to the unprecedented seriousness of the financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report;

5. *Notes with concern* that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions which met the serious budget deficit of the past year, this increased level of income to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East will fall short of the funds needed to cover essential budget requirements in the coming year;

6. *Calls upon* all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report, and therefore urges non-contributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions;

7. *Decides* to extend until 30 June 1978, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

¹⁹⁶ UN doc. A/RES/3331 A.B.C.D. (XXIX). Adopted at the Assembly's 2322nd plenary meeting by the following votes:

Part A: 122 to 0, with 3 abstentions

Part B: Adopted without vote

Part C: Adopted without vote

Part D: 105 to 6, with 17 abstentions

For voting details see Appendix F.

¹⁹⁷ See doc. 3 above for the Introduction.

¹⁹⁸ See doc. 5 above.

B

The General Assembly,

Having recognized the continuing responsibility of the United Nations towards the Palestine refugees by extending the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for a further period of three years from 1 July 1975,

Noting that in the critical financial situation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East the financing from voluntary contributions of the expenses for salary of international staff employed by the Agency limits the amount available for local costs,

Noting also that international staff are made available to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the World Health Organization on a non-reimbursable basis,

Decides that the expenses for salary of international staff in the service of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East which would otherwise be a charge on voluntary contributions should with effect from 1 January 1975 be financed by the regular budget of the United Nations for the duration of the Agency's mandate.

C

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2452 C (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2535 C (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, 2672 B (XXV) of 8 December 1970, 2792 B (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, 2963 B (XXVII) of 13 December 1972 and 3089 A (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1973 to 30 June 1974,

Concerned about the continued human suffering resulting from the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 2252 (ES-V), 2341 B (XXII), 2452 C (XXIII), 2535 C (XXIV), 2672 B (XXV), 2792 B (XXVI), 2963 B (XXVII) and 3089 A (XXVIII);

2. *Endorses*, bearing in mind the objectives of those resolutions, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities;

3. *Strongly appeals* to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to contribute generously for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.

D

The General Assembly,

Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,

Recalling also its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, 2672 D (XXV) of 8 December 1970, 2792 E (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, 2963 C and D (XXVII) of 13 December 1972 and 3089 C (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973,

Emphasizing the necessity of full implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions,

Having considered the report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the report of the Secretary-General of 17 September 1974,

Noting that the Israeli occupation authorities have persisted in adopting measures that obstruct the return of the displaced population to their homes and camps in the occupied territories—including changes in the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories, by the displacement of inhabitants, the transfer of population, the destruction of towns, villages and homes, and the establishment of Israeli settlements—in violation of the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, as well as the pertinent United Nations resolutions,

Reaffirming that it considers those measures

null and void,

Noting also that the Israeli armed forces have repeatedly attacked refugee camps and that those raids have resulted in heavy loss of life and extensive damage to refugee shelters and installations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

1. *Reaffirms* the right of the displaced inhabitants to return to their homes and camps and deplores the refusal of the Israeli authorities to take steps for their return;

2. *Calls once more upon* Israel immediately to:

(a) Take steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants;

(b) Desist from all measures that obstruct the return of the displaced inhabitants, including measures affecting the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories;

3. *Reiterates its call upon* Israel immediately to:

(a) Take effective steps for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed in the Gaza Strip and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation;

(b) Desist from further removal of refugees and destruction of their shelters;

4. *Deplores* Israeli military attacks on refugee camps and calls upon Israel immediately to desist from such attacks;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to report as soon as possible, and whenever appropriate thereafter, but in any case, not later than the opening date of the thirtieth session of the General Assembly, on Israel's compliance with and implementation of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the present resolution.

29

General Assembly Resolution 3336 (XXIX) reaffirming the right of the Arab states to permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the occupied territories¹⁹⁹

December 17, 1974

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the relevant principles of international law and the provisions of the international

conventions and regulations, especially the fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, concerning the obligations and responsibilities of the occupying Power,

Recalling its previous resolutions on permanent sovereignty over natural resources, particularly their provisions supporting resolutely the efforts of developing countries and the peoples of the territories under colonial and racial domination and foreign occupation in their struggle to regain effective control over their natural resources,

Recalling the pertinent provisions of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, and its resolution 3176 (XXVIII) of 17 December 1973 on the first biennial over-all review and appraisal of progress in the implementation of the Strategy,

Recalling also its resolution 3005 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, in which it affirmed the principle of the sovereignty of the population of the occupied territories over its national wealth and resources and called upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize or co-operate with, or assist in any manner in, any measures undertaken by the occupying Power to exploit the resources of the occupied territories or to effect any changes in the demographic composition or geographic character or institutional structure of those territories,

Bearing in mind the pertinent provisions of its resolution 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, containing the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and its resolution 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, containing the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Order,

Recalling further its resolution 3175 (XXVIII) of 17 December 1973, entitled "Permanent sovereignty over national resources in the occupied Arab territories", and deploring that Israel has not complied with its provisions, in particular those contained in paragraph 2,

1. *Reaffirms* the right of the Arab States and peoples whose territories are under Israeli occupation to full and effective permanent sovereignty over all their resources and wealth;

2. *Reaffirms further* that all measures undertaken

plenary meeting by 99 votes to 2, with 32 abstentions. For voting details see Appendix F.

¹⁹⁹ UN doc. A/RES/3336 (XXIX). Adopted at the 2323rd

by Israel to exploit the human, natural and all other resources and wealth of the occupied Arab territories are illegal, and calls upon Israel immediately to rescind all such measures;

3. *Further reaffirms* the right of the Arab States, territories and peoples subjected to Israeli aggression and occupation to the restitution of and full compensation for the exploitation, depletion, loss and damages to the natural and all other resources and wealth of those States, territories and peoples;

4. *Declares* that the above principles apply to all States, territories and peoples under foreign occupation, colonial rule, alien domination and *apartheid*, or subjected to foreign aggression;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant specialized agencies and United Nations organs, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, to prepare a report on the adverse economic effects on the Arab States and peoples, resulting from repeated Israeli aggression and continued occupation of their territories, to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

SECURITY COUNCIL²⁰⁰

30

Security Council Resolution 346 (1974) extending the mandate of the UNEF for six months²⁰¹

April 8, 1974

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973 and 341 (1973) of 27 October 1973 and the agreement reached by members of the Security Council on 2 November 1973 (S/11072),

Having reviewed the functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force set up under these resolutions as reported by the Secretary-General,

Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 1 April 1974 (S/11248)²⁰² that in the present

circumstances the operation of the United Nations Emergency Force is still required,

1. *Expresses its appreciation* to the States which have contributed troops to the United Nations Emergency Force and to those which have made voluntary financial and material contributions for the support of the Force;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Secretary-General for his efforts in implementing the decisions of the Security Council regarding the establishment and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force;

3. *Commends* the United Nations Emergency Force for its contribution to efforts to achieve a just and durable peace in the Middle East;

4. *Notes* the Secretary-General's view that the disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces is only a first step towards the settlement of the Middle East problem and that the continued operation of the United Nations Emergency Force is essential not only for the maintenance of the present quiet in the Egypt-Israel sector but also to assist, if required, in further efforts for the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East and accordingly decides that, in accordance with the recommendation in paragraph 68 of the Secretary-General's report of 1 April 1974 (S/11248), the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force, approved by the Security Council in its resolution 341 (1973) of 27 October 1973, shall be extended for a further period of six months, that is, until 24 October 1974;

5. *Notes with satisfaction* that the Secretary-General is exerting every effort to solve in a satisfactory way the problems of the United Nations Emergency Force, including the urgent ones referred to in paragraph 71 of his report of 1 April 1974 (S/11248);

6. *Further notes with satisfaction* the Secretary-General's intention to keep under constant review the required strength of the Force with a view to making reductions and economies when the situation allows;

7. *Calls upon* all Member States, particularly the parties concerned, to extend their full support to the United Nations in the implementation of the present resolution;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on a continuing basis as requested in resolution 340 (1973).

²⁰⁰ In 1974 the membership of the Security Council was as follows: Australia, Austria, Byelorussia, Cameroon, China, Costa Rica, France, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mauritania, Peru, USSR, UK and USA.

²⁰¹ UN doc. S/RES/346 (1974). Adopted at the Council's 1765th meeting by 13 votes to 0; China and Iraq did not participate in the voting.

²⁰² Doc. 7 above.

Security Council Resolution 347 (1974) condemning Israel's violation of Lebanon's territorial sovereignty by military acts and threats²⁰³

April 24, 1974

The Security Council,

Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1769/Rev.1,

Having noted the contents of the letters dated 12 and 13 April from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/11263, S/11264) and that dated 11 April 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Israel (S/11259),

Having heard the statements of the Foreign Minister of Lebanon and of the representative of Israel,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions,

Deeply disturbed at the continuation of acts of violence,

Gravely concerned that such acts might endanger efforts now taking place to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

1. *Condemns* Israel's violation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and sovereignty and calls once more on the Government of Israel to refrain from further military actions and threats against Lebanon;

2. *Condemns* all acts of violence, especially those which result in the tragic loss of innocent civilian life, and urges all concerned to refrain from any further acts of violence;

3. *Calls on* all Governments concerned to respect their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

4. *Calls on* Israel forthwith to release and return to Lebanon the abducted Lebanese civilians;

5. *Calls upon* all parties to refrain from any action which might endanger negotiations aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

²⁰³ UN doc. S/RES/347 (1974). Adopted at the Council's 1769th meeting by 13 votes to 0; China and Iraq did not participate in the voting.

Security Council Resolution 350 (1974) welcoming the Israel-Syria disengagement agreement and establishing a UN Disengagement Observer Force for an initial six month period²⁰⁴

May 31, 1974

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General contained in document S/11302 and Add.1, and having heard his statement made at the 1773rd meeting of the Security Council,

1. *Welcomes* the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces,²⁰⁵ negotiated in implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;

2. *Takes note* of the Secretary-General's report and its annexes and his statement;

3. *Decides* to set up immediately under its authority a United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to this effect in accordance with his above-mentioned report and the annexes thereto. The Force shall be established for an initial period of six months, subject to renewal by further resolution of the Security Council;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed of further developments.

Security Council Resolution 362 (1974) extending the mandate of the UNEF for six months²⁰⁶

October 23, 1974

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973), 340 (1973), 341 (1973) and 346 (1974),

²⁰⁴ UN doc. S/RES/350 (1974). Adopted at the Council's 1774th meeting by 13 votes to 0; China and Iraq did not participate in the voting.

²⁰⁵ Doc. 115 below.

²⁰⁶ UN doc. S/RES/362 (1974). Adopted at the Council's 1799th meeting by 13 votes to 0; China and Iraq did not participate in the voting.

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11536),

Noting the opinion of the Secretary-General that "although quiet prevails in the Egypt-Israel sector, the over-all situation in the Middle East will remain fundamentally unstable as long as the underlying problems are unresolved",

Noting also from the report of the Secretary-General (S/11536) that in the present circumstances the operation of the United Nations Emergency Force is still required,

1. *Decides* that the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force should be extended for an additional six-month period, that is, until 24 April 1975, in order to assist in further efforts for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

2. *Commends* the United Nations Emergency Force and those Governments supplying contingents to it for their contribution towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

3. *Expresses* its confidence that the Force will be maintained with maximum efficiency and economy;

4. *Reaffirms* that the United Nations Emergency Force must be able to function as an integral and efficient military unit in the whole Egypt-Israel sector of operations without differentiation regarding the United Nations status of the various contingents as stated in paragraph 26 of the report of the Secretary-General (S/11536) and requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to that end.

34

Security Council Resolution 363 (1974) extending the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force for six months²⁰⁷

November 29, 1974

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/11563),

Having noted the efforts made to establish a durable and just peace in the Middle East area and the developments in the situation in the area,

Expressing concern over the prevailing state of tension in the area,

Reaffirming that the two agreements on disengagement of forces are only a step towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973),

Decides:

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months;

(c) That the Secretary-General will submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

35

Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1 (XXX) deploring Israel's continued defiance of international law and violation of human rights in the occupied territories²⁰⁸

February 11, 1974

The Commission on Human Rights,

Guided by the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the principles and provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

Recalling the pertinent United Nations resolutions on the situation in the occupied territories and on the protection of human rights and the fundamental freedoms of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories, including the resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights,

²⁰⁷ UN doc. S/RES/363 (1974). Adopted at the Council's 1809th meeting by 13 votes to 0; China and Iraq did not participate in the voting.

²⁰⁸ *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council*, 56th Session, Supplement No. 5, (E/5464, E/CN.4/L.1268), p. 47. The resolution was adopted by 21 votes to 1, with 8 abstentions.

Taking note of the reports of the United Nations and other international humanitarian organizations on the situation of the occupied Arab territories and their inhabitants,

Greatly alarmed by the continuation of the violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by Israel, in the occupied Arab territories, in particular the destruction of houses, expropriation of Arab properties, ill-treatment of prisoners, the pillaging of the archaeological and cultural heritage and the exploitation of the natural resources of those territories, and interference in family life and religious freedom and practices,

Deeply concerned over Israel's persistence in establishing settlements in the occupied Arab territories, implementing massive programmes of immigration, continuing the deportation and transfer of the indigenous population and refusing the return of the refugees and displaced persons to their homes,

1. *Deplores* Israel's continued grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the occupied Arab territories, which have been considered by the Commission on Human Rights as war crimes and an affront to humanity;

2. *Deplores* Israel's persistent defiance of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and its continued policy of violating the basic human rights of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories;

3. *Reaffirms* that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, the demographic structure and the status of the occupied Arab territories, including occupied Jerusalem, are null and void;

4. *Declares* that Israel's policy of annexation, establishment of settlements and transfer of an alien population to the occupied territories is in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles and provisions of international law concerning occupation, the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people;

5. *Calls upon* Israel once more to comply with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and to acknowledge and abide by its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention and to implement all the relevant United Nations resolutions;

6. *Further calls upon* Israel to stop immediately the establishment of settlements in the occupied Arab territories and to rescind all policies and measures affecting the physical character and demographic composition of those territories;

7. *Reaffirms* that Israel's policy of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in the occupied territories is a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and of the relevant United Nations resolutions;

8. *Calls upon* all States to do their utmost to ensure that Israel respects the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, and that it desists from all acts and policies aimed at changing the physical character and demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories, particularly through the establishment of settlements and the deportation and transfer of the indigenous inhabitants;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of all Governments, the competent United Nations organs, specialized agencies and regional intergovernmental organizations, and to give it the widest possible publicity and to report to the Commission on Human Rights at its next session;

10. *Decides* to place on the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session, as a matter of high priority, the item entitled "Questions of the violation of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of hostilities in the Middle East".

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

36

**UNESCO General Conference Resolution 18C/
6.33 permitting aid granted to the Arab
League to be used for activities of interest
to the PLO²⁰⁹**

October 25, 1974

The General Conference,

Noting the recommendations formulated by the Executive Board in its 95 EX/Decisions 7.7 and 7.8,

Noting the report of the Legal Committee on the proposed modification of 12C/Resolution 7.21 concerning the Participation Programme contained in the above-mentioned decision,

Decides to add to resolution 7.21 adopted at its twelfth session a new provision worded as follows: 'Notwithstanding the provision made in Section A, paragraph 3 (e), the aid provided for under the present resolution may be granted to the League of Arab States when the aid requested is calculated to contribute to activities of direct interest to the Palestine Liberation Organization recognized by the League of Arab States and is closely connected with the programme of Unesco.'

37

**UNESCO General Conference Resolution 18C/
17.3 inviting the PLO to send observers to the
Conference sessions and granting the obser-
vers the right to speak in UNESCO meet-
ings²¹⁰**

October 25, 1974

The General Conference,

Noting the recommendations formulated by the Executive Board in its 95 EX/Decisions 7.7 and 7.8,

Noting the report of the Legal Committee on the proposed amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference contained in the

above-mentioned decision,

Decides to make the following alterations to its Rules of Procedure:

Section I. Sessions

Rule 6

(a) Insert after new paragraph 5 a new paragraph worded as follows:

'6. The Executive Board shall before each session of the General Conference include the Palestine Liberation Organization, recognized by the League of Arab States, in the appropriate list for it to send observers to that session. The Director-General shall notify the Palestine Liberation Organization of the convening of the session and shall invite it to send observers.'

(b) Renumber final paragraph accordingly.

Section XIII. Right to speak

Insert after Rule 67A a new rule worded as follows:

'Rule 67B The Palestine Liberation Organization Observers from the Palestine Liberation Organization, recognized by the League of Arab States, may make oral or written statements in plenary meetings and in the meetings of committees, commissions and subsidiary bodies, with the consent of the presiding officer.'

38

**UNESCO General Conference Resolution 18C/
18.2 inviting the PLO to send observers to
UNESCO meetings²¹¹**

October 25, 1974

The General Conference,

Noting the recommendations formulated by the Executive Board in its 95 EX/Decisions 7.7 and 7.8,

Noting the report of the Legal Committee on the proposed amendment to the 'Regulations for the general classification of the various categories of meetings convened by Unesco' contained in the above-mentioned decision,

Decides to make the following alteration to the 'Regulations for the general classification of the various categories of meetings convened by Unesco':

General

Insert a new Article worded as follows:

'Article 7B. Without prejudice to the other provisions

²⁰⁹ *Records of the General Conference, Eighteenth Session, Vol. I, Resolutions* (Paris, 1974), p. 82. Adopted at the 15th plenary meeting.

²¹⁰ *Records of the General Conference, Eighteenth Session, Vol. I, Resolutions* (Paris, 1974), p. 123. Adopted at the 15th plenary meeting by 86 votes to 2, with 17 abstentions.

²¹¹ *Records of the General Conference, Eighteenth Session, Vol. I, Resolutions* (Paris, 1974), p. 124. Adopted at the 15th plenary meeting by 87 votes to 2, with 20 abstentions.

of these Regulations, the General Conference, the Executive Board or the Director-General, according to the category of meetings shall invite the Palestine Liberation Organization, recognized by the League of Arab States, to send observers to the meetings referred to in these Regulations.'

39

UNESCO General Conference Resolution 18C/3.427 condemning Israel for altering the historical features of Jerusalem and recommending that assistance to Israel be withheld²¹²

November 20, 1974

The General Conference,

Taking into account the importance attached by Unesco, in accordance with its Constitution, to the protection and preservation of the world heritage of monuments of historic or scientific value,

Taking into account also resolution 2253 of 4 July 1967 and resolution 2254 of 14 July 1967 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly calling on Israel to nullify the measures it has taken to change the status of the City of Jerusalem and to refrain from them in the future, and Security Council resolution 267 of 3 July 1969 and resolution 298 of 25 September 1971 expressing regret at Israel's disregard of the United Nations resolutions on the preservation of the status of Jerusalem,

Aware of the exceptional importance of the cultural property in the Old City of Jerusalem, not only to the countries directly concerned but to all humanity, on account of their unique cultural, historical and religious value,

Recalling that since the fifteenth session of the General Conference (1968) the Organization has urgently called on Israel to desist from any archaeological excavations in the City of Jerusalem and from any alteration of its features or its cultural and historical character, particularly with regard to Christian and Islamic religious sites (15C/Resolutions 3.342 and 3.343; 82 EX/Decision 4.4.2, 83 EX/Decision 4.3.1, 88 EX/Decision 4.3.1, 89 EX/Decision 4.4.1, 90 EX/Decision 4.3.1; and 17C/Resolution 3.422),

Bearing in mind that, at its seventeenth session, the General Conference, in resolution 3.422:

(a) *Noted* 'that Israel persists in not complying with the relevant resolutions and that its attitude prevents this Organization from undertaking the mission which is incumbent upon it under the terms of the Constitution';

(b) *Invited* 'the Director-General to continue his efforts to establish the effective presence of Unesco in the City of Jerusalem and thus make possible the actual implementation of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Executive Board for that purpose';

Recalling that the Executive Board, at its 94th session (decision 4.4.1):²¹³

(a) was convinced by the purport of the Director-General's report on the mission of his representative to the City of Jerusalem that 'Israel persists in not complying with the relevant resolutions and that its attitude prevents this Organization from undertaking the mission which is incumbent upon it under the terms of its Constitution',

(b) condemned Israel's persistent violation of the resolutions adopted by the General Conference and the Executive Board in this regard,

(c) has submitted the matter to the General Conference to take such appropriate measures as are within its competence,

Whereas Israel, in persistently violating the resolutions adopted by the General Conference and the Executive Board with a view to preserving the cultural heritage of the City of Jerusalem, defies wilfully the world's conscience and the international community,

Whereas the General Conference cannot remain passive before Israel's continuous persistence in violating its resolutions,

Guided by precedents adopted by the General Conference since the fourteenth session upon the persistent violation of its resolutions and the violation of the aims stipulated in the Constitution (14C/Resolution 11, 15C/Resolutions 9.12 and 9.14, 16C/Resolution 8 and 17C/Resolution 10.1),

1. *Reaffirms* all the resolutions mentioned above and insists on their implementation;

2. *Condemns* Israel for its attitude which is contradictory to the aims of the Organization as stated in its Constitution by its persistence in

²¹² *Records of the General Conference, Eighteenth Session, Vol. I, Resolutions* (Paris, 1974), p. 59.

²¹³ Doc. 42 below.

altering the historical features of the City of Jerusalem and by undertaking excavations which constitute a danger to its monuments, subsequent to its illegal occupation of this city;

3. *Invites* the Director-General to withhold assistance from Israel in the fields of education, science and culture until such time as it scrupulously respects the aforementioned resolutions and decisions.

40

UNESCO General Conference Resolution 18C/46.1 supplementing the list of member states empowered to participate in the regional activities of UNESCO²¹⁴

November 21, 1974

The General Conference,

Recalling resolution 5.91 adopted at its thirteenth session concerning the definition of regions with a view to the execution of regional activities in which the representative character of States is an important factor,

Conscious of that fact that the groups listed in that resolution do not include all the Member States of Unesco,

Recognizing the fundamental principle whereby every Member State has the right and duty to participate fully and regularly in the Organization's regional and international activities,

Desirous of helping to ensure that every Member State may exercise this right and perform this duty,

Having examined document 18C/43 concerning the 'definition of regions with a view to the execution by the Organization of regional activities'.

1. *Decides* to supplement as follows the list, drawn up at its thirteenth session, of Member States empowered to participate in regional activities in which the representative character of States is an important factor:

Member States

Australia
Bangladesh
Barbados

Canada
German Democratic Republic
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Malta
New Zealand
Oman
Portugal
Singapore
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Arab Emirates
United States of America

Associate Members

Namibia
Papua New Guinea

Region

Asia and Oceania
Asia and Oceania
Latin America and the Caribbean
Europe
Europe

Africa
Latin America and the Caribbean
Asia and Oceania

Europe
Asia and Oceania
Arab States
Europe
Asia and Oceania
Europe and Asia and Oceania
Arab States
Europe

Region

Africa
Asia and Oceania

2. *Decides* to examine at its nineteenth session any outstanding questions, together with the cases of States which may become Members of the Organization after the adoption of this resolution.

41

UNESCO General Conference Resolution 18C/13.1 recommending that UNESCO cooperate with the Arab states and the PLO to provide the inhabitants of the occupied territories with the means to education and culture to preserve their national identity²¹⁵

November 23, 1974

The General Conference,

Recognizing that access to national education and culture is one of the fundamental human rights affirmed by the Charter of the United Nations and the Unesco Constitution,

²¹⁴ *Records of the General Conference, Eighteenth Session, Vol. I, Resolutions* (Paris, 1974), p. 183. Adopted at the 42nd plenary meeting. On 19 October 1974, Israel submitted to the General Conference a draft resolution requesting that it should be included among the states authorized to participate in the European regional activities. The General Conference rejected the draft resolution by 48 votes to 33 with 26 abstentions.

²¹⁵ *Records of the General Conference, Eighteenth Session, Vol. I, Resolutions* (Paris, 1974), p. 118. Adopted at the 47th plenary meeting.

Recalling that military occupation of territories by foreign forces constitutes a constant danger to peace and human rights, including the inalienable right to national education and cultural life,

Noting with anxiety that, as is apparent from the report by the Director-General (doc. 18C/16), the populations in the occupied Arab territories are not enjoying their inalienable and inviolable rights to national education and cultural life,

1. *Invites* the Director-General to exercise full supervision of the operation of educational and cultural institutions in the occupied Arab territories, and to co-operate with the Arab States concerned and with the Palestine Liberation Organization with a view to providing the populations in the occupied Arab territories with every means of enjoying their rights to education and culture so as to preserve their national identity;

2. *Urgently appeals* to Israel to refrain from any act that has the effect of hindering the populations of the occupied Arab territories in the exercise of their rights to national education and cultural life, and invites it to allow the Director-General of Unesco to carry out the task referred to in the foregoing paragraph;

3. *Invites* the Director-General to report to the Executive Board on the implementation of this resolution.

42

UNESCO Executive Board Decision 94 EX/4.4.1 condemning Israel for continued alterations of Jerusalem and the occupied territories in violation of UN resolutions²¹⁶

June 24, 1974

The Executive Board,

1. *Recalling* the Security Council resolutions 252 of 21 May 1968, 267 of 3 July 1969 and 298 of 25 September 1971, and resolutions 2253 and 2254 (4 and 14 July 1967) of the United Nations General Assembly, concerning measures and actions affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem, and resolution 2949 (paragraphs 7 and 8) of 8 December 1972, concerning the policies and practices affecting the physical character or demo-

graphic composition of the occupied Arab territories,

2. *Recalling* resolutions 3.342, 3.343 and 3.422 adopted by the General Conference at its fifteenth and seventeenth sessions, and decisions 4.4.2, 4.3.1, 4.3.1, 4.3.1, 4.4.1, 4.3.1 and 4.5.1 (particularly its paragraph 7), adopted by the Executive Board at its 82nd, 83rd, 84th, 88th, 89th, 90th and 92nd sessions respectively, regarding the preservation of religious and cultural properties, particularly in the City of Jerusalem,

3. *Noting* the report of the Director-General (94 EX/14) on the visits of December 1973 and April 1974 made by his representative to the City of Jerusalem,²¹⁷

4. *Convinced* from certain aspects of the report that "Israel persists in not complying with the relevant resolutions, and that its attitude prevents the Organization from undertaking the mission which is incumbent upon it under the terms of the Constitution";

5. *Being aware* that the General Conference according to its resolution 3.422 of the seventeenth session had authorized the Board to consider the necessary measures to be taken towards Israel, should the occasion arise,

6. *Condemns* the persistent violation by Israel of the aforesaid resolutions and decisions adopted by the General Conference and the Executive Board;

7. *Decides* to submit the matter to the General Conference at its eighteenth session for decisions to be taken on further appropriate measures within its competence.²¹⁸

²¹⁶ *Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the Executive Board, 94th Session.*

²¹⁷ Doc. 19 above.

²¹⁸ See doc. 39 above.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

43

World Health Assembly Resolution WHA 27.42 deploring Israel's failure to return Palestinian refugees and displaced persons to their homes and calling on Israel to allow the Special Committee of Experts free movement in the occupied territories²¹⁹

May 21, 1974

The Twenty-seventh World Health Assembly,

Recalling resolution WHA26.56 on the health conditions of the refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East as well as the population of the occupied territories;

A

Having considered the Director-General's report on health assistance to refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East;

Alarmed by the deterioration of the health conditions of the Palestinian refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East;

Deeply concerned by the fact that Israel continues to refuse the return of the Palestinian refugees and displaced persons to their homes, which is gravely affecting their physical and mental health,

1. *Deplores* the failure of Israel to abide by the relevant United Nations and World Health Assembly resolutions calling for the immediate return of the Palestinian refugees and displaced persons to their homes as well as numerous calls for refraining from such practices as the destruction of refugee shelters;

2. *Requests* the Director-General to intensify and increase the Organization's programmes and health assistance to the refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East and to submit a report to the Twenty-eighth World Health Assembly on steps taken in this regard;

B

Noting with appreciation the establishment of

the Special Committee of Experts to study the health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied territories in the Middle East;

Having received the report of the Special Committee and noting from its content that the Committee was not able to visit the Arab territories under Israeli occupation to fulfil the objective of resolution WHA26.56,

1. *Requests* the Special Committee to complete as early as possible the fulfilment of its mandate and submit to the Twenty-eighth World Health Assembly a comprehensive report, covering all health aspects, based on a field investigation;

2. *Urges* the Government of Israel to cooperate fully with the Special Committee and particularly to facilitate its free movement in the occupied territories;

3. *Requests* the Director-General to continue to provide the Special Committee with all facilities necessary for the performance of its mission.

44

World Health Organization Executive Board Resolution EB53.R34 requesting a committee of experts to be appointed to study health conditions of inhabitants of the occupied territories²²⁰

January 22, 1974

The Executive Board,

Having considered the report of the Ad Hoc Committee to select three Member States to appoint members to serve on the Special Committee of Experts to study the health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied territories in the Middle East, pursuant to part B of resolution WHA26.56 and to resolution EB52.R21,

1. *Notes* the report and thanks the Committee for its work;

2. *Requests* the Committee in consultation with the Director-General to endeavour to constitute as quickly as possible the Special Committee of Experts in order that the latter can submit a report on its activities to the Twenty-seventh World Health Assembly;

²¹⁹ *Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 217, 27th World Health Assembly, Resolutions, Annexes, p. 19. Adopted at the Assembly's 13th plenary meeting by 82 votes to 2, with 19 abstentions.*

²²⁰ *Official Records of the World Health Organization, No. 211, Executive Board, 52nd Session, Resolutions, Annexes, p. 26. Adopted at the 13th meeting.*

3. *Further requests* the Committee to continue contacting the States mentioned during the discussion at the fifty-second session of the Executive Board; other States may also be approached; and

4. *Asks* the Committee to report to the representatives of the Executive Board at the Twenty-seventh World Health Assembly, as well as to the Executive Board at its fifty-fourth session.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION ORGANIZATION

45

**International Civil Aviation Organization
Assembly Resolution A21-7 forbidding air
traffic to and from Jerusalem airport with-
out Jordan's authorization²²¹**

October 15, 1974

Whereas Jerusalem airport lies in the Arab occupied territories and is registered under the jurisdiction of Jordan in ICAO Middle East Air Navigation Plan;

Recalling that Articles 1, 5 and 6 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation provide that Contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory and that no scheduled air services, or non-scheduled international air services for the purpose of taking on or discharging passengers, cargo or mail, may be operated over or into the territory of a Contracting State except with the special permission or other authorization by that State;

The Assembly resolves that all Contracting States should, in implementation of the above relevant Articles of the Convention, take all necessary measures to refrain from operating, or giving permission to any airline to operate any air service, whether scheduled or non-scheduled, to or from Jerusalem airport, unless prior permission is granted pursuant to the provisions of the said Articles.

²²¹ Adopted by 52 votes to 3 with 38 abstentions.

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION

46

**International Labour Organization General
Conference Resolution condemning Israel's
policies of occupation, racial discrimination
and violation of trades union freedoms
against the Arab peoples in the occupied
territories²²²**

June 20, 1974

The General Conference of the International Labour Organisation,

Considering that "universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice", as is proclaimed in the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation,

Considering that the Declaration of Philadelphia solemnly proclaims that "all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity",

Considering that the right to work, the right to freedom of movement and the right of association are inalienable rights recognised by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by the international community,

Considering that it is incumbent upon the International Labour Organisation to safeguard these rights and to seek to strengthen them,

Recalling the adoption by the International Labour Conference of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and of the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111),

Emphasising that the Israeli authorities have ratified those Conventions,

Recalling that the International Labour Conference, in its resolution concerning trade union rights and their relation to civil liberties, unanimously adopted at its 54th Session, clearly stated that without independence and political liberty no trade union right could be fully and genuinely exercised by the workers,

Recalling also that in the same resolution the International Labour Conference invited the Governing Body of the International Labour Office

²²² Adopted by 224 votes to 0 with 122 abstentions.

to extend and expand its efforts to eliminate the discriminatory practices on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, nationality and political and trade union opinions which still exist in several countries, particularly in countries and territories under a colonial régime or foreign domination in any form,

Considering the resolutions adopted by the International Labour Conference at recent sessions concerning the racial discrimination being suffered by the indigenous populations of South Africa, Guinea-Bissau and other African territories subject to a colonial régime or foreign domination, in which the workers' conditions of life and work are similar to those of the Arab working peoples under Israeli occupation,

Recalling, moreover, Resolutions 9 (XXVII), 3 (XXVIII) and 4 (XXIX), adopted on 15 March 1971, 22 March 1972, and 14 March 1973 respectively by the Commission on Human Rights at its 27th, 28th and 29th Sessions, which condemn Israel's persistent violations of human rights in the occupied territories,

Seriously concerned at the continuing violation,

by the Israeli authorities, of human rights and workers' rights in the occupied Arab territories, and deeply disturbed at the dangerous consequences of this violation;

1. *Declares* that any occupation of territory following aggression constitutes in itself a permanent violation of basic human rights and in particular of trade union and social rights.

2. *Condemns* the policy of racial discrimination and violation of trade union freedoms, impairing basic human freedoms, which the Israeli authorities are pursuing against the Arab peoples.

3. *Invites* the Governing Body of the International Labour Office and the Director-General—

(a) to use all the means at the disposal of the International Labour Organisation to put an immediate end to these violations and discriminatory practices;

(b) to take all measures capable of guaranteeing the freedom and dignity of the Arab workers in the occupied territories.

4. *Requests* the Director-General to submit to an early session a special report on the implementation of this resolution.

International

Radio interview statements by Chancellor Kreisky of Austria describing the purposes of a visit by a Socialist International delegation to the Middle East¹

Vienna, January 8, 1974

Reporter: ... One of the first questions addressed to the Chancellor concerned a foreign policy issue. It had earlier been learnt that the Austrian Chancellor was to lead a delegation of the Socialist International to the Middle East. The delegation is to include Callaghan, a former British Minister, and the West German Social Democrat Wischnewski. It is to visit both sides, the Arab as well as the Israeli, and to make a mediation attempt. How is this delegation to be composed and what will be its aims?

A. I want to emphasize that this will not be a mediation attempt but only the first formal attempt of the Socialist International to establish direct contact with the Arab States. To speak here of mediation would, in my opinion, be unfounded. Such a mediation would, I believe stand little chance of success. But I do consider it very important to obtain first-hand information about the position of some of the Arab States. Naturally it must be taken into account that the Israeli Workers' Party is a member of the Socialist International and that this must not be regarded as an action directed against that Party. However, our object is naturally to try and make proposals for a peaceful settlement in that part of the world.

Q. Will this visit be in any way co-ordinated with the mediation efforts of the US Secretary of State?

A. No, this is an entirely unofficial endeavour and in no way a mediation attempt. It is what is known as a fact-finding mission—hard facts are to be established, elucidated, so that we can obtain a picture of how best to establish peace in that part of the world in a manner that does justice to all concerned.

Q. Mr. Chancellor, will you, when in the Arab countries, reaffirm your view that the Israelis should

withdraw from the occupied territories? You declared only recently in a Sudanese paper that, in your opinion, this was the only way to achieve peace in this region.

A. But this Sudanese paper declared at the same time—correctly—that I have also advocated Israel's right to safe borders. This was accurately reported by that Sudanese paper.

Q. Will you also reiterate your original position regarding withdrawal from the occupied territories?

A. Austria voted for this UN resolution at the time. I certainly cannot adopt a position different from that which we—and incidentally all others as well—officially adopted at the UN.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Iraq of Foreign Minister Malecela of Tanzania (excerpts)²

Baghdad, January 15, 1974

In response to the invitation from Mr. Murtada Said Abd al-Baqi, member of the Revolutionary Command Council and Foreign Minister, Mr. John Malecela, Foreign Minister of Tanzania, paid an official visit at the head of a Tanzanian delegation to the Republic of Iraq from December 31, 1973, to January 5, 1974.

Reviewing the Palestine question the two sides agreed on the necessity of supporting the Palestine revolution in the realization of its aims of liberation and eliminating aggression. They considered that any plan or solution which does not guarantee the right of the Palestinian people to return to their land and home or to become masters of their own destiny will not lead to the establishment of security or peace in the area or the world. The sides considered the Palestine liberation movement an inseparable part of the Arab and world liberation movement.

The two sides also expressed support for the struggle of the African peoples and the Palestinian

¹ Broadcast by Austria radio in German; partial English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4496/A/1; reprinted by permission.

² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), January 16, 1974.

people in their fight against imperialism and colonialism and the colonialist settlement plans in Africa and Palestine. They considered the policy of racial discrimination which Zionism is following in Palestine and the colonialist racist regimes in southern Africa to be in contravention of the Charter of Human Rights and the stage of civilization which humanity has attained. They agreed that the responsibility for destroying the racist and colonialist regimes rests at the feet of all the peoples of the world.

49

Announcement by US President Nixon of the Egypt-Israel disengagement agreement³

Washington, January 17, 1974

Ladies and gentlemen: I have an announcement that I am sure will be welcome news, not only to all Americans but to people all over the world. The announcement has to do with the Mideast, and it is being made simultaneously at 3 o'clock Washington time in Cairo and in Jerusalem, as well as in Washington.

The announcement is as follows:

In accordance with the decision of the Geneva Conference, the Governments of Egypt and Israel, with the assistance of the Government of the United States, have reached agreement on the disengagement and separation of their military forces. The agreement is scheduled to be signed by the Chiefs of Staff of Egypt and Israel at noon Egypt-Israel time, Friday, January 18, at Kilometer 101 on the Cairo-Suez Road. The Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force, General Siilasvuo, has been asked by the parties to witness the signing.

A brief statement with regard to this announcement, I think, is in order.

First, congratulations should go to President Sadat, to Prime Minister Meir, and their colleagues, for the very constructive spirit they have shown in reaching an agreement on the very difficult issues involved which made this announcement possible.

Also, we in the United States can be proud of the role that our government has played and particularly the role that has been played by Secretary Kissinger and his colleagues in working to bring the parties together so that an agreement could be reached, which we have just read.

The other point that I would make is with regard to the significance of the agreement. In the past generation there have been, as we know, four wars in the Mideast, followed by uneasy truces. This, I would say, is the first significant step toward a permanent peace in the Mideast. I do not understate, by making the statement that I have just made, the difficulties that lie ahead in settling the differences that must be settled before a permanent peace is reached, not only here but between the other countries involved. But this is a very significant step reached directly as a result of negotiations between the two parties and therefore has, it seems to me, a great deal of meaning to all of us here in this country and around the world who recognize the importance of having peace in this part of the world.

The other point that I would make is with regard to the role of the United States. Our role had been one of being of assistance to both parties to bring them together, to help to narrow differences, working toward a fair and just settlement for all parties concerned where every nation in that area will be able to live in peace and also to be secure insofar as its defense is concerned.

Looking to the situation in the world generally, I think we could probably say that the area of the world that potentially is the one in which the great powers can be brought into confrontation is the Mideast, that that area more than any other is in that category, as recent events have indicated.

Now, the announcement we have made today is only a first step, but it is a very significant step. It paves the way for more steps which can lead to a permanent peace. And I personally shall see that all negotiations, any efforts which could lead to that permanent peace, not only between Egypt and Israel but between the other countries involved, have the full and complete support of the Government of the United States.

Thank you.

³ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXX, 1807 (February 11, 1974), pp. 145-146. The disengagement agreement is printed as doc. 50 below.

Agreement between Egypt and Israel on disengagement of forces⁴

Kilometre 101, Cairo-Suez road, January 18, 1974

A. Egypt and Israel will scrupulously observe the cease-fire on land, sea and air called for by the United Nations Security Council and will refrain from the time of the signing of this document from all military or paramilitary actions against each other.

B. The military forces of Egypt and Israel will be separated in accordance with the following principles:

1. All Egyptian forces on the east side of the canal will be deployed west of the line designated as Line A on the attached map. All Israeli forces, including those west of the Suez Canal and the Bitter Lakes, will be deployed east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.

2. The area between the Egyptian and Israeli lines will be a zone of disengagement in which the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed. UNEF will continue to consist of units from countries that are permanent members of the Security Council.

3. The area between the Egyptian line and the Suez Canal will be limited in armament and forces.

4. The area between the Israeli line (B on the attached map) and the line designated as Line C on the attached map, which runs along the western base of the mountains where the Gidi and Mitla Passes are located, will be limited in armament and forces.

5. The limitations referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 will be inspected by UNEF. Existing procedures of UNEF, including the attaching of Egyptian and Israeli liaison officers to UNEF, will be continued.

6. Air forces of the two sides will be permitted to operate up to their respective lines without interference from the other side.

C. The detailed implementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked out by military representatives of Egypt and Israel, who will agree on the stages of this process. These representatives will meet no later than 48 hours after the signature of this Agreement at Kilometre 101 under the aegis of the United Nations for this purpose. They will complete this task within five days. Disengagement will begin within 48 hours after the completion of the work of the military representatives and in no event later than seven days after the signature of this Agreement. The process of disengagement will be completed not later than 40 days after it begins.

D. This Agreement is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement. It constitutes a first step toward a final, just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council resolution 338 (1973) and within the framework of the Geneva Conference.

For Egypt:

Mohammad Abdel Ghani EL-GAMASY

Major-General

Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces

For Israel:

David ELAZAR

Lieutenant-General

Chief of Staff of the Israel

Defence Forces

Witness:

Ensio P. H. SIILASVUO

Lieutenant-General

Commander of the United Nations

Emergency Force

⁴ Text as transmitted by UN Secretary-General Waldheim to the President of the Security Council on January 18 as annex to UN doc. S/11198, *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1974*, pp. 84-85; the map (*ibid.*, p. 86) was transmitted on January 23 with UN doc. S/11198/Add. 1, but is not included here. See, however, doc. 7 above.

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Statement by UK Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home to the House of Commons welcoming the Egypt-Israel disengagement agreement and announcing the termination of the embargo on arms sales to the Middle East⁵

London, January 21, 1974

Members will ... have learned with great satisfaction that agreement has now been reached between the Egyptian and Israel Governments, through the good offices of the United States, upon the disengagement of the opposing armies and their separation by a substantial zone to the east of the Suez Canal in which the troops of the U.N. Emergency Force will take up their positions.

The House will applaud the tireless work which Dr. Kissinger has put into the achievement of this major step towards peace, for that is what it is. I was glad to have the opportunity to discuss these matters with Dr. Kissinger early this morning.⁶

The present situation provides an opportunity to establish a permanent settlement of the dispute between Israel and the Arabs. It is an opportunity that must not be missed. Above all, it is essential that the disengagement of the Egyptian and Israel armies, which we welcome with such relief, should be seen not as an end in itself but as a promising starting-point which makes it possible to press ahead with negotiations towards a full and permanent peace settlement. . . .

I should add that this latest development obviously has a bearing on the question of the supply of military equipment to the parties to the conflict, about which M.P.s expressed much concern during the period of the fighting.

While the disengagement agreement is far from being a guarantee of lasting peace, it will certainly reduce drastically the dangers of military confrontation, and the Government have decided accordingly that we need no longer continue to suspend delivery of the military supplies to the 'battlefield' countries which we held up when the fighting broke out on October 6.

We will of course continue to scrutinize any

⁵ Partial text as published in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (Bath), vol. XX, February 4-10, 1974, p. 26340.

⁶ Kissinger met Sir Alec at London Airport (Heathrow) on his way to Washington from the Middle East.

future requests with the same care and against the same criteria as we have consistently applied in the past.

I hope that all concerned will now use this hard-won agreement as a foundation on which to build the durable peace that has for so long been denied to the peoples and countries of the Middle East.

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Speech by Israel Prime Minister Meir to the Knesset explaining the Sinai disengagement agreement (excerpts)⁷

Jerusalem, January 22, 1974

Several Egyptian leaders have accompanied the agreement with various statements, some of them disturbing, which have been designed apparently for the public in the Arab countries and, especially, for the rulers of the extremist Arab states who are not satisfied with the agreement. But a careful examination of statements by authorised spokesmen of the Government of Egypt show that the Government of Egypt intends to start clearing the Canal and fitting it for shipping, and to work for the population and rebuilding of the abandoned towns and the restoration of normal civilian life in the Canal area. These statements confirm our assumption that the Egyptian Government prefers to rehabilitate the deserted Suez Canal zone and turn it once again into an artery of life. If this aim actually begins to be achieved without delay, it can be a highly significant turning point in the development of the region, a turning point from war in the direction of peace.

It may be said that had it not been for Egypt's negative balancesheet in the Yom Kippur War, had our forces not broken through and taken up positions on the western side of the Canal, it is very doubtful whether Egypt would have consented to the cease-fire agreement, to participation in the peace conference, and to the agreement on the separation of forces signed on January 18; and the conditions would not have been

⁷ Excerpted from the text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, January 23, 1974, p. 5.

created for the opening of the Canal as a natural result of this agreement.

In agreeing to the separation of forces in accordance with the provisions of the agreement we signed, we did not ignore various considerations associated with the international sphere and Israel's relations with other states. We took into account both regional and global circumstances, including our relations with the United States.

Members of the Knesset.

We did not sign the agreement on the separation of forces because of military inferiority or military necessity. We signed the agreement with the object of advancing towards a permanent peace settlement and, above all, in order to prevent escalation into a renewal of the war.

On November 13 I told the Knesset: "The stabilization of the cease-fire and the relaxation of military tension are important and essential objectives for the prevention of the resumption and continuation of the war. This aim is in itself sufficient in order that we should make every effort to attain it—particularly since we desire to regard it as a service towards an even loftier goal—the achievement of peace. In the course of this war that was forced upon us, the IDF broke through to the western side of the Canal, where they represent a well-established military fact. However, it is not Israel's aim to remain there permanently. We are anxious for an end to the war and the promotion of the peace process. We want to see in this agreement a first step towards negotiations, with a view to a true peace between ourselves and the neighbouring states. We know that this goal cannot be attained by a shortcut—but it can certainly be approached step by step, insofar as our neighbours are ready for it."

Between October 22 and today there have been 1,075 incidents in that area. The number of our soldiers killed has totalled 22, and the number of wounded 107.

The alternative to this agreement is nothing but the renewal of war. There have indeed been days when this possibility seemed almost inevitable. I have no doubts as to the strength of the IDF—had warfare been resumed, the IDF would have overcome the aggressor. But responsible and sober judgement requires us to prefer a different line of development—a path that will open up and strengthen prospects of advancing

towards peace, providing this agreement is not imposed, but is arrived at under reasonable circumstances and leaves at our disposal strong positions in case the agreement is violated.

The agreement is the fruit of our victory in the war, but we do not ignore the fact that it also reflects Egypt's achievements during the first days of the fighting.

Our military strategic position along the new line on the Egyptian front will be firm. The lines on which the IDF will be based, in accordance with the agreement, are suitable to their military purpose in the event of fighting. Throughout the entire region east of the Gidi and Mitle passes, the IDF will remain deployed in all the strength required, prepared for any eventuality. The forces stationed within the restricted zones complement the basic military deployment of the IDF and their capability to meet any violation of the cease-fire.

The agreement on the separation of forces will enable us to release some of the reserves, in stages, as has already been pointed out by the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff.

We are not relying on the UN forces, but on ourselves. However, under prevailing conditions, so long as there is no peace, importance attaches to the stationing of the UN force in order to maintain the agreed buffer zone between the forces, as long as the withdrawal of the UN force is not carried out by a unilateral decision—for any sign of an Egyptian demand for the withdrawal of the UN force without Israel's consent would be an indication of menacing plans and would enable Israel to react appropriately, as called for in the actual circumstances.

Members of the Knesset.

Our friend, the United States, under the leadership of President Nixon, and with the consistent support of the American Congress, has maintained the policy of encouraging negotiations between the parties for a solution of the conflict, whilst observing in practice the principle of strengthening Israel. This policy entails ensuring that Israel shall be able to conduct negotiations from a position of strength—and not from weakness.

The growth of Israel's strength has been greatly assisted by this policy, and I have every reason to believe that the United States will continue to be alert to Israel's security requirements, maintaining a continuously positive approach.

When deciding in favour of the agreement, we took Egypt's motives and arguments into account wherever these appeared to us to be reasonable; and I will state expressly that we were anxious to find a basis of mutual interest and lay the foundations for relations based on reciprocal trust. I am convinced that the agreement which was signed is also greatly to the interest of Egypt. We are not deterred by the advantages Egypt will derive from it.

Throughout the process of negotiation, our representatives were firm in protecting the country's vital security interests and came to the conclusion that to the best of the Government's judgement and in the considered opinion of our security advisers, we are assured of the practical ability both to maintain the agreement and to defend ourselves and react effectively should it be violated.

On the assumption that Egypt will adhere to the commitments she has undertaken in everything concerning the amount of troops and equipment, and in the hope that Egypt will actually restore normal civilian life in the Canal area, we may witness that positive development which we desire with all our hearts.

The consideration that an agreement may be violated could lead to our baulking at any agreement. The Government refuses to adopt this argument, although it takes various possible developments into account. We believe that the best and truest guarantee for the maintenance of the agreement on the separation of forces is rooted in the vital interests of both parties.

I will not go so far as to say that by this agreement we have achieved everything that we wanted to attain, just as Egypt had not gained all it wished for. We did our best to exhaust all the possibilities of negotiation, and the agreement achieved is preferable to the other alternatives and possibilities.

Members of the Knesset.

The line that we shall establish in Sinai, according to the agreement, does not constitute a permanent border for times of peace. The agreement states, as mentioned earlier, that this is a first step towards that peace. It has been our position from the start that the separation of forces is not the ultimate goal, for we are prepared to negotiate with Egypt on a durable peace within

defensible borders. And insofar as it depends on us, we shall regard the separation of forces as an achievement which facilitates the creation of a suitable atmosphere for speeding up the prospects of peace.

The negotiations conducted with the assistance of Dr. Kissinger were wholly confined to the stabilization of the cease-fire and the separation of the forces. We were not required to make—nor did we undertake—any commitments beyond the scope of these subjects.

Members of the Knesset.

To my great regret, I cannot indicate any progress in contacts with the Government of Syria over the issues of prisoners and separation of forces. The Syrian Government persists in its stubborn refusal to let us have the list of our prisoners or to enable the Red Cross to visit them. This refusal is unsurpassed in its brutality. Dr. Kissinger was unable to tell us that he had succeeded in his efforts to move matters from the state of deadlock, but we have been promised that his efforts will continue.

The Government of Israel reiterates that we will not discuss a separation of forces with Syria, nor participate with her in the Geneva conference, before the lists of our dear ones in Syrian captivity are handed to us. This position of ours is supported by all political elements which do not turn their backs upon elementary human precepts. Members of the Knesset.

I have limited myself to the subject of the agreement on the separation of forces on the Egyptian front, and I call upon the Knesset to support the Government in its decision. Should the Knesset approve the agreement, its implementation will commence, as planned, on Friday, January 25.

Yesterday, at the opening of the Knesset, I said that we faced difficult decisions during the tenure of the Eighth Knesset. Our capacity to stand firm in the political and military arenas depends on the revelation of Israel's distinctive qualities in the social, educational and economic spheres. We need strength and internal unity to stand up to the constructive efforts, the tasks of absorption and the struggles of our era. And I am confident that we can muster the courage and sober wisdom to fulfil our mission.

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Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger explaining the US role in the Egypt-Israel disengagement agreement, regretting the continuation of the oil embargo, and looking forward to a Syria-Israel disengagement⁸

Washington, January 22, 1974

Secretary Kissinger: I will go right to the questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we had a number of second- and third-hand reports from senior American officials and Congressmen, and so forth, about the question of whether you on your trip in concluding this [Egyptian-Israeli] agreement, or getting it concluded, made any commitments on behalf of the United States—or beyond that, whether there are any unpublished understandings which put the United States in the position of being a diplomatic guarantor. And I thought it would be helpful if you would tell us yourself about this.

A. Let me sum up the documents that exist and then explain our understanding of their significance.

First, there is an agreement between Egypt and Israel signed by the Chiefs of Staff of Egypt and Israel at kilometer 101—and which has been published in the newspapers.

Secondly, there exists an undertaking about the limitation of forces in the zones of limited armament, and elsewhere, between Egypt and Israel that came about as the result, technically, of a U.S. proposal made by the United States to both sides. The reason was that both sides found it easier to accept a U.S. proposal as to the limitation of their forces than to accept limitations which seemed to be demanded by the other side about their deployment.

This proposal was transmitted in a letter by the President to the heads of government of Egypt and Israel in which it was pointed out that acceptance of this identical document—that signature of this document would constitute acceptance and that it would thereby become part of the basic agreement. It therefore does not constitute a U.S. guarantee, but it was a device by which the United States made it possible to convey to the other their acceptance of certain limitations on the armaments. This, at the request of both

sides, has not been published; and since it is not a U.S. obligation, we felt we had to acquiesce in the views of the parties.

Thirdly, in the process of negotiating the agreement, both of the parties asked us questions about the intentions of the other that were not part of the formal agreement but that nevertheless made it easier for them to plan their own course.

And we therefore, sometimes in writing, sometimes orally, would do one of two things. We would either ask one of the parties what its intention was with respect to the problem at issue, and we would then communicate that statement of intentions to the other side, in effect saying: "We have been informed that the Egyptian Government"—or that the Israeli Government—"plans to do the following." Sometimes we were asked what our interpretation was of certain clauses, and in that case we did that—sometimes in writing, sometimes orally. In the cases that now come to my mind, it turned out that our interpretations were identical with the interpretations of both of the parties, and therefore it was essentially irrelevant.

Now, are we guarantors of the agreement? In the sense of having a formal obligation to take specific action in case of violation of the agreement, we are not guarantors.

In the sense that we will be in some way involved if the agreement breaks down, all of recent history in the Middle East indicates that if there is an outbreak in the Middle East, the United States is involved whether or not it has engaged in prior diplomatic activity. It is certain that if there is another conflict, one or both of the parties are going to ask us for diplomatic support—and in that sense it is of course true that our judgment as to who violated the agreement will affect the course that we will pursue. But in the legal sense, there is no obligation that the United States has taken to enforce the agreement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if you will follow up this question—having read the four or five whatever you call them, assurances, it struck me that all of them were given to Israel. Didn't Egypt need any? Was Mr. Sadat so self-assured that he didn't ask for any—

A. No, there were some assurances given to Egypt as well.

Q. Would you tell us some more? We have read in the papers those you gave to Israel, but nothing about Egypt.

⁸ Excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXX, 1807 (February 11, 1974), pp. 137–139, 141–142.

A. Well, the ones you read in the papers that were given to Israel had previously been leaked by the Government of Israel. The ones that were given to Egypt have not been released—but they are of the same nature.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said at your previous, or last, news conference, that it was increasingly inappropriate for the Arab oil embargo to continue while the United States was engaged in a mediating effort. Now that that effort has been successful, in its first stage at least, what is your feeling about the continuation of the oil embargo? And can you report any progress in that area?

A. Well, we have had every reason to believe that success in the negotiations would mark a major step towards ending the oil embargo. We would therefore think that failure to end the embargo in a reasonable time would be highly inappropriate and would raise serious questions of confidence in our minds with respect to the Arab nations with whom we have dealt on this issue.

Q. Mr. Secretary, back on the question of the documents—doesn't this leave the public record of the administration, and the United States, in a rather strange position with these unpublished documents? And does this not raise a question of where the administration is heading in its relations with Congress, where there have been very strong demands in recent years for full documentation of international accords?

A. The congressional leaders were given a detailed account of all of these assurances as well as of the content of any unpublished document.

Secondly, it makes a great deal of difference whether we publish a document to which the United States is a party and which therefore spells out an American obligation—or whether we publish a document which, in effect, spells out the obligations of other parties and in which we played a mediating role because of the confidence these other parties had in us. I would suggest that there is an enormous difference in these two situations. Nevertheless the congressional leaders have been informed about these matters.

Q. Mr. Secretary, going back to your answer on oil, you mentioned that—you used the phrase something about a "reasonable" period of time that this could be lifted. Is it a proper assumption that when the disengagement has been completed, when this 40-day cycle is over, that it is at that time you would think the oil embargo ought to be lifted?

A. I think in more ambitious terms.

Q. Do you mean even before that?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is word from—

A. Wait a minute—

Q. Have you got some assurances from Mr. Sadat that he would use his influence in the oil-producing countries in this embargo?

A. I don't think it would be appropriate to go into all the details of the conversation between President Sadat and myself, but I have made clear the U.S. position on the oil embargo and I believe that it is clearly understood by all of the leaders with whom I have spoken.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the prospects now for agreements between Israel and Syria and Israel and Jordan? And in that connection, has your own personal diplomacy superseded the Geneva Conference?

A. With respect to Syria and Israel, on the occasion of my visit to Syria the Syrian Government put forward some ideas with respect to the disengagement of forces on the Syrian front. It's the first time that the Syrian Government put forward concrete suggestions on any phase of the negotiations. We have transmitted those ideas to the Government of Israel, which is now studying them and which has promised us an answer sometime after their Cabinet meets next Sunday.

We hope that a process can be generated by which the disengagement of forces on the Syrian side can be negotiated with the same seriousness as on the Egyptian side, and we have indicated that we would be prepared, if the two parties request it, to offer our good offices.

I might say also that the visit to Syria led to an improvement in the bilateral relations between the United States and Syria, one example of which is the fact that an American citizen who has been held in Syria on the charge of espionage since July of 1972 is being released tomorrow. His name is John Bates, and Mr. Vest [George S. Vest, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations] can give any of you who want to pursue it further particulars.

With respect to Jordan, the United States believes that all parties that have frontiers with

Israel should participate in the process of negotiation, and we favor negotiations, as well, between Israel and Jordan.

The framework for the negotiations that have taken place was established by the Geneva Conference. The cochairmanship between us and the Soviet Union is taken very seriously by us; and we are keeping, and have kept, the Soviet Union informed of all of the actions which we have taken, which we believe are consistent with the consensus resolution which ended the last meeting of the Geneva Conference and which carried out the spirit of this.

My personal role has been produced by the fact that both parties found it easier to convey certain ideas through an intermediary and because, given the hostility in the area, it was useful to have a more impartial third party convey certain considerations and particular assurances. It is to be hoped that as these negotiations develop, and as the parties gain confidence in each other, the role of a mediator will become less crucial. But given the importance to the peace of the whole world of making progress toward a settlement in the Middle East, I don't want to take a dogmatic position on that issue.

Q. Mr. Secretary.

A. Marilyn [Marilyn Berger, Washington Post].

Q. Mr. Secretary, in mentioning the documents that do exist you said the second document is an undertaking of limited forces in zones of limited armaments and elsewhere. Can you spell that out a little bit, and does this involve limitation on weapons that could reach the other side?

A. It concerns primarily the limitation of weapons within the zones of limited armaments and some understandings with respect to offensive capabilities.

Q. Does each side then take on the responsibility not to acquire offensive capability?

A. No, it is strictly a deployment question.

54

Statement by Foreign Minister Mimic of Yugoslavia welcoming progress in the Middle East and declaring that a final settlement depends on Israel's withdrawal⁹

Belgrade, January 23, 1974

Despite the cessation of hostilities and the commencement of the Geneva talks, the Middle East crisis continues to trouble the world as not a single cause of it has been removed to date.

The Yugoslav Government and the public of this country have followed attentively both the beginning of the negotiations in Geneva and the negotiations on military disengagement in the Suez Canal area. Yugoslavia has always advocated and has herself invested efforts, and supported and welcomed all efforts by others, to find ways of achieving a lasting and just peace in the Middle East. And it can be achieved only on condition that the familiar resolutions of the Security Council and UN General Assembly are implemented consistently. This is the light in which we look upon the efforts of the participants in the Geneva Conference and on the Agreement between the Arab Republic of Egypt and Israel on military disengagement.¹⁰

In our opinion, it will be possible to appraise the worth of that agreement definitively after further development shows the extent to which it was truly the first step in the direction of finding, by peaceful means, an integral, just and lasting solution to the Middle East crisis. This means that it is indispensable to secure the soonest possible evacuation by Israel of all territory belonging to the Arab countries that were the victims of aggression, territory that was occupied in the 1967 war, and subsequently. For the final assessment of the importance of this agreement, special significance attaches to the restoration of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, which assumes that their authentic representatives will immediately and directly be included in the solving of the crisis.

Any procrastination by Israel in acting along

⁹ English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXV, 572 (February 5, 1974), pp. 15, 18; made during a speech before the Federal Assembly.

¹⁰ Doc. 50 above.

these lines and any different approach holds the danger of freezing the present situation or imposing half-way measures that are not conducive to substantive solution but rather to aggravation of the Middle East situation with even more perilous and unforeseeable consequences to peace and security not only in that region but throughout the world.

We appreciate the efforts of everyone in international life who contributes to a just solution of the Middle East crisis but we are profoundly convinced that the interests of the entire international community can be safeguarded only through the United Nations. Present developments lay even greater stress on the need for the UN, and now above all the Security Council and the UN Secretary-General, to be engaged in the most direct possible way in seeking solutions to the Middle East crisis both in the interests of general world peace and security, and for the purpose of assuring that all the nations and countries of this region achieve their legitimate rights.

55

Statement by Foreign Minister Moro of Italy discussing Italy's Middle East policy¹¹

Rome, January 23, 1974

First of all I should like to express here the satisfaction of the Italian government at the disengagement on the Sinai front. This consolidates the truce and opens up a concrete perspective for peace. The parties to this dialogue who have reached a first happy settlement have displayed courage and an understanding of the problem. Particular homage should be rendered to the indefatigable, inspired and intelligent American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The disengagement foreshadows larger-scale negotiation involving other Arab countries, beginning with Syria, in a process of peace which could be irresistible.

Certainly the problems still being posed are of

great complexity and offer many difficulties, aggravated as they are by a long-standing mistrust and a war which has lasted more than a generation. The path will still be long and arduous. But the contact which has been reestablished between the adversaries, the activities of UNO which China, although not in agreement with, did not wish to disturb, the presence of an effective mediation by the two super powers (the Nixon-Brezhnev pact is still functioning, after some difficult moments)—all are important elements permitting a calmer judgement of the grave crisis and of its evolution towards a settlement of the historic conflict. But what can we ourselves do and what have we done?

We have had a number of contacts with the political representatives of the Arab countries in Rome, New York and Copenhagen. We have sent missions to Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In these contacts we have been concerned with finding out about the development of the Arab position in order favourably to influence the Geneva negotiations, as well as to express our position which after all is not new. Concerning the discussion about the non-activity of Italy and of Europe with regard to the urgent need for reestablishing and guaranteeing a just peace in the tormented Middle East area, I think I can say that it is due to insufficient information and that it is not at all realistic. I do not think that anyone really thinks that in this domain Italy could have done something substantial to push the belligerents to a ceasefire and to substitute diplomatic dialogue for armed dialogue. Italy could not do it, nor could the other European nations—all the more reason why Italy could not.

The proximity of the arena of conflict and the communality of traditions, ideals and interests do not provide an effective means for intervention unless they are matched by a large economic, political and military power. That is why we have given all our support to efforts deployed by the UN to obtain a ceasefire; we have refrained from actions, after all not required, which could have inflamed tension; we have made an appeal to Europe. We chose a European harmonization within the limits this imposes because we feel that a non-formal contribution to the Arab-Israeli conflict can be made by a Europe speaking as far as possible with a single voice and not by each European country in isolation.

¹¹ Made in a statement to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Italian Senate; translated from the partial Italian text, *Relazioni Internazionali* (Milan), XXXVIII, 5 (February 2, 1974), pp. 120–122. Foreign Minister Moro was due to leave for Egypt, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Iran and Saudi Arabia on January 28.

For this reason we promote the joint declaration of the nine EEC governments of October 13 and November 6. It is on the basis of this last declaration that the attitude of the community countries is based, with some slight differences. This European assessment has suddenly found a reflection in the Arab world, the representatives of which were in Copenhagen on December 15, on the occasion of the European summit, to propose the initiation of a total dialogue with Europe.

The government favours that the European community on the one hand and the countries of the Arab world on the other, should confront broadmindedly and with an eye to coming generations, the given facts of their relations in all areas—industrial, agricultural, technological, scientific, cultural and political. In the immediate future the government is for Europe declaring itself disposed to participate in a system of guarantees which would be elaborated to ensure peace and stability in the Middle East. Such a participation would certainly be in the well-understood interests of the parties which have not ceased to confront one another for the last quarter of a century, as well as in the interests of the powers which have the major responsibility in the maintenance of world peace.

But certainly neither Italy nor Europe, nor any other country can, at the present point of tension and risk, prevent themselves from having their own opinion on the just and effective method of putting an end to a conflict which more than any other threatens peace and risks bringing about a confrontation between the big powers.

This is why the Italian government has given its approval to the UN resolutions and in particular those of the Security Council, number 242 of 1967 and number 338 of 1973, underlining more than once that resolution 242 should have been totally and integrally applied, without any reservation. Regarding the Palestinian people, I have told parliament more than once and already on October 3, 1970 that the Palestinian factor has become during the events a political problem which cannot be set aside in a stable reorganization of the area.

In reality, contrary to what some people say who imagine that they have found a simple means to resolve a difficult problem, the Palestinians are not seeking help, they are seeking a country. Thus the problem is to protect the national rights

of the Palestinian people who must not be deprived of the possibility of deciding their own fate. The problem seems very difficult when one thinks that the Arab world has not yet defined a common position on this point and that the existence, integrity and security of Israel must be guaranteed in this context.

But such a difficulty does not release us from the urgent effort of demonstrating our initiative and working for the realization of this essential condition for peace and makes no less forcible the assertion of the rights of the Palestinian people.

Concerning Israel I should like to say quite clearly, since this concern presents itself, that Israel and the Arab states must coexist, live together behind secure and recognized borders and see their security guaranteed like independent states. It is a sign of the maturity of consciousness that in the Arab world in general this conviction should be evidenced and should be so well rooted that the conditions for achieving peace are gathered together from the beginning, and that in these circumstances an opportunity is offered, that Israel should not let pass, to strengthen a basic political established fact. It is an opportunity to which Israel's friends should contribute and should not allow to be lost. The knowledge and certitude of being able to live within secure and recognized borders certainly have their price: that required in resolution 242 when it declares that the acquisition of territories obtained by force is inadmissible and requires Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. Resolution 2949 adopted by the General Assembly on December 8, 1972 and voted for by Italy with 85 other countries, reaffirms this position.

Italy referred to this principle in the common declaration of the Nine of November 6, which asserts the necessity to put an end to the Israeli occupation of territories conquered in war. We have had no doubts about the complete and non-partial character of this indication, as some have thought. And if we did have any we would have dispensed with the violent argument raised by the opposition against the Italian government and the other European countries in this circumstance.

From the illegality of territorial acquisition by force, an illegality that we have often had occasion to confirm, arises the necessity to abandon all the occupied territories. The negotiation thanks

to which the resolutions have been achieved and which is in progress cannot constitute a preliminary of the principle of the inacceptability of territorial acquisition. It must be recognized that in the special political context of the Middle East the abandonment of the occupied territories is a condition for peace, which must be conceived of as the fruit of a political negotiation which ensures the security, certainly essential, of the state of Israel for both the present and the future, rather than of military facts, and by agreement expressed in the form of international guarantees and recognition. All the provisions of resolution 242 constitute a whole which cannot be dissociated. These positions are realistic in the same way that everything in politics is realistic. To assume this position does not at all signify eroding the strength of feeling existing in the European countries and Italy, linking to our inheritance of civilization the preservation of the state of Israel in its own interest. In recalling the sad days of its history Europe well knows, as regards itself, that the survival of the state of Israel is also a homage due to the victims of racial discrimination and Nazi oppression.

This debt must be paid. But the friends of Israel should say, in our present historical context, at what price and in what manner the security of Israel can be guaranteed—Israel no longer as a fortress under siege but as a component of a geopolitical complex in which coexistence and collaboration can give the best fruits for the good of the people of the Middle East and for peace in the world.

56

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Foreign Minister Fahmy of Egypt (excerpts)¹²

Moscow, January 24, 1974

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt Ismail Fahmy made an official friendly visit to the Soviet Union on January 21–24, 1974, at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

In the course of the talks which proceeded in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding further development of Soviet-Egyptian relations was considered, as well as international problems of mutual interest.

The two Sides came to a unanimous conclusion that the past period in the development of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation has highlighted its great significance not only for the peoples of the two countries, for the Arab states and the Soviet Union, but that it meets the interests of maintaining peace throughout the world. This cooperation rests not on temporary considerations of expediency, but on long-term foundations of principle by which the two Sides are guided in developing relations between them. This course pursued by the Soviet Union and Egypt can do no damage to anyone, on the contrary, its implementation is able to continue to contribute to further international detente and the strengthening of universal peace.

It was noted that the events in the Middle East in October last year again reaffirmed the strength and durability of Soviet-Egyptian friendship, its great significance in the struggle against the imperialist aggression in the Middle East, for peace, security and social progress of the Arab peoples. The Sides emphasized the desire to develop and strengthen mutual relations on the firm and long-term basis of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt of May 27, 1971.¹³

The Soviet Side reaffirmed the consistency and invariability of its policy on questions of strengthening Soviet-Egyptian friendship and in the struggle for the elimination of the aftermath of Israeli aggression.

During conversations particular attention was paid to the situation now obtaining in the Middle East, to the struggle for a just settlement and establishment of a durable peace in that area.

The Sides noted with satisfaction that the convening of the Geneva Peace Conference marks a major step towards normalizing the Middle East situation. The Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt have confirmed their resolve to do everything in their power so that the Conference is crowned with success, and agreement

¹² Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 5 (February 2, 1974), pp. 14–15.

¹³ Doc. 125 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

on establishing a lasting peace in the area on the basis of the UN Security Council's resolutions is reached.

The Sides considered the situation which emerges in connection with the signing of the agreement on the disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces.¹⁴ They pointed out that the disengagement agreement has a positive significance, taking into account that it is to be followed up by a radical settlement in the Middle East on the basis of full implementation of the Security Council decisions, including Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, and Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973. The Ministers stressed the importance of an early and effective solution of the fundamental questions faced by the Geneva Peace Conference.

The Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt reaffirmed that the establishment of a lasting and just peace in the Middle East is impossible without the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967, without respect for the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. It was noted that the Palestinian problem cannot be considered and resolved without representatives of the Arab people of Palestine. The Sides declared for equal participation of these representatives in the work of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East in the near future.

It was emphasized that a very important factor in the struggle for a just settlement in the Middle East is close coordination of actions of the Soviet Union and Egypt at all stages of this struggle, including in the work of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, in all its working bodies that may be formed.

When exchanging opinions on questions of the international situation, the Ministers noted the coincidence of viewpoints on pressing problems of the struggle for stronger peace and international security, including universal and complete disarmament, abolition of colonialism and neo-colonialism, prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons for all time.

The importance and usefulness was stressed of maintaining, in accordance with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, regular contacts, exchange of opinion and coordination of action between the representatives of the Soviet Union

and Egypt at all levels on questions of bilateral Soviet-Egyptian relations and the international situation.

The Sides are unanimous that the visit of the ARE Foreign Minister to the Soviet Union has contributed to further strengthening of mutual understanding, trust and development of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt.

The ARE Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Fahmi has invited the USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko to make an official visit to Egypt.

The invitation was accepted with gratitude. The date of the visit will be fixed later.

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Statement by Prime Minister Kirk of New Zealand announcing the despatch of a delegation to the Middle East and defining New Zealand's attitude to the area¹⁵

Wellington, January 26, 1974

In the past few weeks we have had useful discussions in Wellington with the Egyptian Ambassador to New Zealand, Mr. Marzouk, and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, Mr. Ghobash. The Government believes, however, that it should not only follow up these discussions but make contact promptly with as many other governments in the Middle East and Gulf area as possible. The Hon. Mr. Rowling, Minister of Finance, has already visited Teheran and had talks with the Iranian Government. The forthcoming mission will therefore extend our links of communication with other important governments in the area. The Government aims to explore the possibilities of developing closer relations both politically and in trade. The mission will keep in mind any likely opportunities for our own products. The mission will also be holding its discussions against the background of current domestic and world concern over oil supplies. Over 80 percent of New Zealand's imports of oil are derived from this area. But essentially the goodwill mission is a diplomatic one concerned with the development of long-term relations with the Arab States, although there

¹⁴ Doc. 50 above.

¹⁵ *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review* (Wellington), XXIV, 1 (January, 1974), pp. 33-34.

may be some short-term consequences. It is now a particularly opportune time to undertake such a visit. The prospects now seem better than for many years to achieve a general political settlement in the Middle East.

As the mission is about to depart it is fitting to explain the general attitude of the New Zealand Government to that situation. The mission will need to outline the Government's views on this question in conjunction with its other tasks. The mission will explain that the Middle East is an area in which, since the Second World War, New Zealand has not been closely involved. But the Middle East dispute has represented a threat to the peace of the world. We cannot, though we are small and distant from the region, fail to be uninterested in it. We are a substantial trading nation and our security and livelihood rest on a settled international order and a healthy world economy. But these can be critically affected by events in the Middle East. As a conscientious member of the United Nations dedicated to the ideals of collective security, New Zealand has sought in that organisation to join in practical ways of helping out. We have contributed to the United Nations observer corps in the area. From a humanitarian standpoint we have also contributed a good deal, over the years, to the United Nations fund for Palestine refugees. After a long and bitter period of hostility involving the Arab States whose territory has been occupied by Israel, the Government now warmly welcomes the limited agreement reached on 17 January between Egypt and Israel providing for the disengagement and partial withdrawal of their forces.¹⁶ I hope this will lead on to a broader agreement at Geneva. There must be a durable solution to the two major problems—territorial occupation, and the refugee question—on the basis of the just implementation of Security Council resolution 242 of 1967 in all its parts. This resolution provides the basis for a settlement by offering the Arab States an affirmation that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible. Hence it requires the return to them of lands occupied by Israel in the June war of 1967. More generally, the right of all states in the region to live in peace and security is recognised by the New Zealand Government. Account should also be taken of

the rights and aspirations of the Palestine people in any settlement.

I sincerely wish success for the difficult negotiations at the Peace Conference at Geneva. The international community as a whole has a deep concern for the finding and application of a just solution for all parties, in conformity with the Charter and with the acceptance of the great majority of the members of the United Nations.

58

Declaration by a conference of Communist parties of Western Europe (excerpts)¹⁷

Brussels, January 27, 1974

A conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of the capitalist countries of Europe was held in Brussels, January 26–28, 1974, with the agenda:

“The Present Crisis of Capitalism in Europe, the Struggle of Communist Parties for Social Progress, Democracy, National Independence, for Peace and Socialism, and Their Struggle for the Unity of Workers and Democratic Forces.”

The Conference was attended by representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Belgium, West Berlin, Cyprus, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.

The Mediterranean region, with the cooperation of the states and the anti-imperialist, anti-fascist and peace forces there, must become a region of peace and détente. The Communist Parties reaffirm their solidarity with the Arab peoples and stress the necessity of rapidly arriving at a political solution of the Middle East conflict, based on the application of the UN resolutions, with the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, and recognition of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, and on the rights of the Arab people

¹⁶ Doc. 50 above.

¹⁷ *L'Humanité* (Paris), January 28, 1974; excerpted from the English translation, *World Marxist Review Information Bulletin* (Toronto), XII, 3 (April 5, 1974), pp. 43, 51.

of Palestine, and on the rights of all peoples and all states in the region to existence, independence, sovereignty and security.

59

Interview statements by Foreign Minister Jobert of France on the prospects for an Arab-European Conference and France's role in a settlement of the Middle East conflict¹⁸

Damascus, January 29, 1974

Q. The firm stand which France has adopted on the Arab cause and the national rights of the Palestinian people, based on the principles of right and justice, has played a principal role in the changed attitude of other European countries, an attitude which manifested itself in the common declaration of the Nine. Thus a favourable climate was created for the consideration of cultural and economic relations between Europe and the Arab countries. It is in the context of this change, without doubt, that you have promoted the idea of an Arab-European Conference. Will you specify, then, on the one hand, the prospects that you envisage and the role that France and Europe can play in the settlement of the current conflict and, on the other hand, the objectives of the proposed conference?

A. Well, I am going to speak to you first about the objectives of the conference. And even before I speak to you about the objective, I will talk about the reasons for our position. I believe that even if there were no Middle East conflict there would be a necessity, at the present time, for the European countries to have contacts with the Arab countries. It is this analysis that we are trying to make all understand, and I believe that we will have no great difficulty in doing so. Then there is the Middle East conflict, a conflict whose difficulties have led a certain number of countries, and not the smallest, to interest themselves directly in this question and even to think that they hold the keys, and the right keys, to a settlement. Even

though they might not be pressed to use the bunch of keys, let's say that they have had difficulty in finding the right key. But I ask myself at this time, if they have found it at all. Consequently our proposal of a conference between the Arab and the European countries gains a different perspective. There is a place for Europe; Europe must be listened to and she has many ways to make herself heard, though perhaps not at once in the Geneva Conference, as is being said. In the long-term development plans she can, with concerted action, bring into this area a factor of equilibrium which would be useful not only to the Arab countries but equally useful to the European countries. At the international level, in a general way, I do not want to exaggerate the prospects that I am outlining but it is certain that all the countries need to make a choice, and, moreover, a choice which is more than just an alternative. I like multiple choices and I believe that when nations want to be independent, they should be able to choose several lines, and they should prove that they can make a firm decision. This is essential, as we see well from your position, and it is also exhausting. Solidarity, at this time, regional solidarity, interregional solidarity is certainly a valuable concept which it is appropriate to develop. I would like now, if I am not abusing the patience of the Syrian television viewers, especially those in Damascus, to say that, regarding the current initiatives for a settlement of the conflict, we French are in a comfortable position at this time and we are likewise preoccupied.

Our position is relaxed since, as you know, we are not in this Geneva conference; though some would have wished us to be, we are not.

Q. It is Syria, is it not?

A. Yes, I know Syria, in fact, wished for our presence and for Britain's and we are obliged to Syria for this attitude which she has expressed most clearly and which is known very well; moreover, I have had the occasion to thank your President of the Republic for this position. But we are not there and starting from that present fact, we take account of the things that allow us to maintain our positions. If they have perhaps a theoretical, general or juridical side, well, we do not have to re-examine our positions. Our feeling is very simple; we have always considered that a Middle East settlement would not have any chance of

¹⁸ Interview broadcast on Syrian radio and television; excerpted and translated from the French text, *La politique étrangère de la France: Textes et documents*, 1st semester, 1974 (Paris: La documentation française, 1974), pp. 68-70. Jobert was in Damascus January 28-29, 1974.

lasting if it was not supported by the great majority of states.

Q. Even if it has been approved by the United States and the Soviet Union?

A. Well, even with these magnificent guarantees, I do not believe that, in the Arab world, a settlement that is not satisfactory would last very long. That, in fact, is the whole problem, but anyway, we haven't reached that stage yet. We are at the simple phase of disengagement of forces; disengagement has been accomplished in the south; it has not in the north—you know that better than anyone. We have worked like the devil since the end of the fighting; besides, is it possible to speak of an end to the fighting? For three days now, I believe, there has been firing in the Golan. That is our attitude, very definite but also tinged with a little scepticism concerning the efforts that are currently being exerted. These efforts will not be effective, until they are supported by a definite plan, with precise dates, leading exactly to what has been the definition of a satisfactory settlement, that is to say, withdrawal from the occupied territories, freedom of navigation, with international guarantees, right and justice for everyone, and secure and recognized borders. I have outlined our attitude very quickly. It is a bit ideal but it is necessary to stretch towards this ideal if one wants a permanent peace to be established in this area.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Rumania of King Hussein of Jordan (excerpts)¹⁹

Bucharest, January 30, 1974

In response to an invitation from H.E. Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Rumania, H.R.H. King Hussein ibn Talal of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan paid an official visit to Rumania in the period January 29–30, 1974.

Regarding the Middle East situation the two

heads of state expressed their concern over the continuing conflict in the region. They emphasized the necessity of finding a just political solution to the crisis. They consider that the continuing occupation by Israel of the Arab territories conquered as a result of the 1967 war causes permanent tension and the danger of outbreaks of new aggressive military action.

Having studied the results achieved so far regarding the disengagement of forces the two heads of state consider it necessary to realize a disengagement between the forces of the Arab states involved in the conflict and the Israeli forces as quickly as possible.

The two heads of state agreed that the achievement of a lasting peace in the Middle East is only possible by way of a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories occupied in 1967 and guarantee of the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of all states in the region and by way of realizing a just settlement of the problem of the Palestinian people and allowing it the right of self-determination.

The two sides expressed their hope that the conference convened recently in Geneva will produce the anticipated result by establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the US of Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR (excerpts)²⁰

Washington, February 5, 1974

A. A. Gromyko, Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Foreign Minister, who was on a visit in Washington from February 3 to 5, at the invitation of the US Government, had talks with US President R. Nixon and Secretary of State H. Kissinger.

Special attention was paid to the Middle East. Both Sides attach great importance to their particular role at the Geneva conference, the need for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and

¹⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), January 31, 1974.

²⁰ Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 8 (February 23, 1974), p. 3.

advance towards this goal within the framework of the Geneva peace conference.

62

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Syria of President Tito of Yugoslavia (excerpts)²¹

Damascus, February 7, 1974

In response to an invitation from Hafez El Assad, President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Josip Broz Tito, President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and his wife made an official visit to the Syrian Arab Republic between February 5 and 7, 1974.

Yugoslavia resolutely supports, just as she has done so far, the liberation struggle of the people of Syria for recovering all the territories which the Israeli aggressors occupied in the 1967 war and later. Paying tribute to the army and people of Syria for the determination and courage they exhibited in the October war, the Yugoslav side expressed its readiness to actively assist the reconstruction of the Syrian economy which had suffered large-scale destruction.

The two presidents agreed that the governments and relevant economic authorities of the two countries devise a programme of long-term economic cooperation between the two countries within the shortest possible time.

The Syrian side expressed profound gratitude to the Yugoslav side for the comprehensive, active and effective support which the Yugoslav peoples and their government had extended to the Arab people of Syria and their armed forces during the liberation war.

Both sides gave special attention to the present phase of development of the Mid-Eastern crisis, which was characterized by delay and manoeuvres on the part of Israel designed to obstruct the implementation of the UN resolutions requesting Israel's withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied during the 1967 war and later and recognition

of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The two presidents indicated that a just and durable peace can only be achieved on condition of Israel's immediate and complete withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in the war of 1967 and afterwards and restoration of the legitimate national rights to the Arab people of Palestine including their right to self-determination.

Discussing the efforts being made to achieve a lasting and just peace in the Middle East, the two presidents expressed the view that the agreement on troop disengagement in the region of the Suez Canal should be a first step towards a comprehensive settlement of the crisis on the basis of the aforementioned principles and in the spirit of the UN resolutions. The two sides also consider that the UN—which had passed numerous resolutions that could ensure a just and durable peace if they were to be implemented—should play an important and effective role in the efforts being made to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East region.

The two sides are deeply convinced that ignoring the above mentioned ideas and principles threatens to delay a final settlement, and favours piecemeal solutions which would inevitably provoke fresh complications and aggravate the situation with even more adverse and unpredictable consequences for peace and security in the Middle East and the world at large.

The two sides solemnly declare that the attempts to solve the Mid-Eastern problem by peaceful means do not affect in any way the natural right of the Arab countries—victims of aggression and foreign occupation—to fight with all available means to suppress aggression and put an end to Israel's occupation of their national territories, all the more so as Israel is maintaining its occupation of Arab territories in defiance of international law and the UN resolutions.

²¹ Excerpted from the English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXV, 573 (February 20, 1974), pp. 17, 18.

²² Doc. 50 above.

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Speech by President Bhutto of Pakistan made at the opening session of the Second Islamic Summit Conference (excerpts)²³**Lahore, February 22, 1974**

Dear brothers:

It is only natural that the leaders of the Muslim world, even when coming to this meeting, should have their minds full of a variety of concerns—some national, others regional, all bearing on Muslim interests. But this conference cannot address itself except to the specific purpose for which it has been convened as a sequel to the war of October, 1973. All of us are aware that the previous Summit Conference, which was held in Rabat in 1969, was convened to consider the question of Jerusalem following the outrage committed under Israeli occupation to the Holy Al-Aqsa Mosque.²⁴ Likewise, this Conference has a circumscribed agenda. By adopting the agenda, we do not deny that there are other vital issues which agitate Muslim minds. These are burning issues too. Your host country, for instance, has been a victim of international conspiracies and is concerned with an intense question in which, it believes, its stand is based on nothing but justice and concern for Muslim rights. However we would be doing a disservice to the Conference if we sought to exploit this platform to ventilate our national standpoints. If Muslims sustain their unity, if they mutually strengthen themselves, if they place equity above expedience, if they perceive the direction of historic forces, a time will come when such issues can be discussed without apology or awkwardness. At present, this conference is primarily concerned with the pre-eminent issues that are inscribed on its agenda and that concern the heartland of Muslim life and culture.

The situation in the Middle East is an outgrowth of the problem of Palestine, and the core of the problem, viewed both historically and concentrically, is Al-Quds or Jerusalem. Fifty years ago, there was no Palestine problem; there was only a country named Palestine. Only the right arrogated to itself by Western colonialism enabled one Western nation to promise to a section of another people, namely the Jews, the country of a third,

the Arabs. It needs to be reiterated that it is this fundamental injustice, this uprooting of a people from their homeland and the planting of an alien population on it, that evokes the resentment of the entire Muslim World. The malady consists of a cancerous outgrowth of colonialism, the establishment of settler regimes or the imposition of immigrant minority rule. The root cause of the conflict is not an innate animosity between the Muslim and the Jew, or even between the Arab and the Jew. As Muslims, we entertain no hostility against any human community. When we say this we do not exclude the Jewish people. To Jews as Jews we can only be friendly; to Jews as Zionists, intoxicated with their militarism and reeking with technological arrogance, we refuse to be hospitable. The pogroms inflicted on them during the centuries and the holocaust to which they were subjected under Nazism fill some of the darkest pages of human history. But redemption should have come from the Western world, and not have been exacted, as it was, from the Palestinian people.

The tragedy of Palestine has agitated Muslim minds for half a century. The outrage of its partition in 1947 and the graver injury of its occupation by Israel in 1967 have been intolerable because the territory is part of the spiritual centre of the Muslim world. The Palestine question was referred to the world Organization at a time when that Organization was hardly representative of the international community. The plan which it put forward for the partition of Palestine would not obtain a passing consideration today by the majority of its membership, consisting of the Third World nations that are sworn to the principle of the self-determination of peoples. Even at that time, the Muslim nations reminded the Western world of its own long-term interests and of the folly of forcibly driving a wedge into the Middle East. These reminders proved fruitless. These importunities were scorned.

This is the historic dimension of the Middle East problem which cannot be banished from sight even when present realities are to be focussed upon. Israel has gorged and fattened on the West's sympathies, nurtured itself on violence and expanded through aggression. It has brought suffering to the inhabitants of the land which it usurped, sequestered their patrimony and ejected

²³ Excerpted from the English text as published in *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), XXVII, 1 (1st quarter, 1974), pp. 196–200.

²⁴ The declaration of the 1969 conference is doc. 168 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.

them by the hundreds of thousands. Its neighbouring nations have been robbed of their peace and tranquillity. Its apologists have sought to justify its repeated resorts to force on the ground of security. But nothing could be clearer than that belligerence towards its neighbours will only turn Israel into an international ghetto. Force can not bring security, nor obduracy peace.

After 1967, Israel became more and more arrogant. It derided the censure of its actions by the United Nations. Its advocates became increasingly apathetic to the growing signs of the untenability of the situation arising from the war of 1967. The result was that an iniquitous, indeed and absurd, situation was frozen and the forces of security became immobile.

This was the cause of the war of 1973. A recourse to war can never be a happy decision. Which nation would willingly sacrifice the flower of its manhood or wish to forfeit its development and mortgage its progress? But situations arise in which there is no choice but war against the usurper. Such a situation was created for the Arab people. Tribute is due to them for meeting it manfully. Let us pay homage to those who laid down their lives in the sands of Sinai and the Heights of Golan. These martyrs died in the cause of justice and human dignity.

The war has released currents which could flow towards a just settlement of the Middle East problem. The Arab cause has been actively supported by a vast segment of humanity. The nations of Africa have demonstrated their solidarity with Arabs and placed principle above expediency. Under the pressure of the economic forces, if not through a perception of the rights and wrongs of the situation, the Western Powers have awakened to the urgency of a definitive settlement of the Middle East problem. The mediatory processes which have thus been put into motion are not to be disdained. These are good auguries. But they can vanish if an apathy towards the root of the problem, and a satisfaction at partial solutions, begins to sway the policies of those who have supported Israel. On their part, the Arab states have shown that their approach to the problem is not theological, like Israel's, but one which visualises a series of peaceful adjustments with disengagement.

Disengagement, however, is not peace. It can turn peace into a mirage if it operates as a

substitute for a comprehensive settlement. We have a right to expect that the peace which is negotiated in Geneva will deal with all the issues integral to the Middle East conflict. The withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied since 1967, the restoration of the Holy City to Arab sovereignty and the restitution of the rights of the Palestinian people are the essential elements of settlement. All these elements derive from the rational principles of a just and durable peace. All of them come within the four corners of Resolution 242, if that resolution is rightly interpreted.

The exponents of the Israeli view contend that the Security Council resolution envisages the possibility of Israel retaining a part of the occupied Arab territories. This contention is sought to be based on the provision regarding the right of every State in the region "to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries". The perversity of such an interpretation is evident from the fact that the resolution as a whole, states its objective to be "the fulfilment of Charter principles". What principle is more basic to the Charter of the United Nations than the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by the use of force? Furthermore, no State can arrogate to itself the right to determine secure borders if these encroach on the territory of another. No State claims such a right. The security of a State's frontiers depends on their conformity to international law. A nation's defence strategy is based on its recognised frontiers and not on its aggressive appetites. Finally, the question arises, whose security comes first? Certainly, on the record of the aggressions committed during the last 27 years, it is the Arabs who need secure borders against Israel and not Israel against the Arabs.

Among the Arab territories occupied by Israel, Al-Quds holds a special place in Muslim hearts—a unique symbol of the confluence of Islam with the sacred traditions of Abraham, Moses and Jesus, all of them Prophets whom Muslims hold in the highest reverence. Jerusalem is inscribed on our souls as the site of, in the words of the Holy Quran, "the mosque the precincts of which Allah has blessed". Associated as it is with the ascension of the last Prophet, it is tied to our inmost spiritual fibre. Except for an interval during the crusades, it has been a Muslim city—repeat, a Muslim

city—from the year 637 A.D. For more than 1300 years, Muslims have held Jerusalem as a trust for all who venerated it. Muslims alone could be its loving and impartial custodians for the simple reason that Muslims alone believe in all the three prophetic traditions rooted in Jerusalem.

We gladly recognise that Jerusalem affects the cherished sensibilities of men and women of three world faiths. But there are 2,000 million Muslims and Christians, and 15 million Jews in the world. Out of these, less than three million owe their allegiance to Israel. What principle of justice would confer on this minority the right to hold dominion over the Holy City? What except a kind of cynicism can allow the city of peace to be treated by Israel as the spoils of war?

I must make it clear that it is not our position on Jerusalem but Israel's which is contrary to the objective criteria by which the status of territories is determined. It is Israel which cites the name of a religion and a culture and invokes its memories or emotions in order to lend justification to acts that are wholly illegal. Such attempts can only make a conflict inevitable and bring in its train a religious war. Viewed in a non-religious perspective the question of Jerusalem's status can not be unrelated to the sovereign rights of the people of Jerusalem itself, the majority of whom were Arabs, violently expelled and uprooted from the western part in 1948. Nor can the special attachment of Jewish people to Jerusalem override the principle of the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by force. The Jewish right to Jerusalem certainly connotes the right of access and worship. We can not recognise any additional right.

On the basis of all these considerations, the issue of the Holy City of Jerusalem admits of no doubt or division in our ranks. Let me make it clear from this platform that any agreement, any protocol, any understanding which postulates the continuance of Israeli occupation of the Holy City or the transfer of the Holy City to any non-Muslim or non-Arab sovereignty will not be worth the paper it is written on. This is not a threat. I am saying it in full awareness of the intricacies of the negotiations which may be underway. Not to give this warning would be encourage an illusion which will be fatal to the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East. On this respect there is a fire in our hearts which no

prevarication, no skilful evasion on their part, will ever be able to quench.

The international community, and particularly those States which sponsored the partition of Palestine in 1947, bear a heavy responsibility to redress the injustice perpetrated on the Palestinian people. If it were not also tragic, what could be more bizarre than the phenomenon of a people being dispossessed of its homeland and condemned to live in agony and dispersion, not in imperialism's hoary past but in our day and age. Who can not understand their anger at seeing immigrants from all over the world invited, nay cajoled, to settle on their homeland? It is not the eruptions of insensate violence, disowned by their leadership, but the purity of their rights which must influence the world's attitude to their problem.

The States gathered here today are committed by the very fact of their adherence to the Charter of the Islamic Conference to strive for the restitution of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. This is our obligation not only to the people of Palestine, not even merely to the cause of Islamic brotherhood, but also to the larger cause of universal peace. We see glimmers today of a new recognition of the need to resolve the problem of Palestine. This recognition has been earned by the heroic sons and daughters of Palestine through their suffering, their fortitude and the constancy of their commitment.

64

Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Rumania regarding the recent visit of President Ceausescu to Libya, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq (excerpts)²⁵

Bucharest, February 22, 1974

The Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. which met February 22, 1974, reviewed with special satisfaction the fruitful results of the visit of Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party and President of the Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Rumania, to the Libyan Arab Re-

²⁵ Excerpted and translated from the French text, *Revue romaine d'études internationales* (Bucharest), VIII, 2 (1974), pp. 127-130.

public, the Lebanese Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Iraqi Republic.

In the spirit of the principled policy carried out by our country, which has always and continues to stand for a political solution to the interstate conflict, the position of Rumania was expressed in the framework of the talks with these countries—a position according to which a just and lasting peace cannot be achieved in the Middle East without a withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab territories occupied in the 1967 war, or without creating all the conditions required in order that the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of every people in the area be assured, so that efforts can be concentrated on the road of economic and social development. A just and lasting peace also means a settlement of the Palestinian people's problem. In this respect it must be given its full rights in deciding its own destiny conforming to its national aspirations and its right to ensure its well-being and happiness.

In the framework of the talks, the President of the Council of State, Nicolae Ceausescu, saluted—in the name of the Party and the Rumanian state—the understanding reached between Egypt and Israel on military disengagement,²⁶ a first step in the pursuit of the political struggle, and of moving towards a retreat of Israeli troops from all occupied territories. The hope was expressed that an adequate understanding also be reached concerning Syria, with the creation of the conditions necessary for liberation of occupied Syrian territory in the shortest possible time.

The Executive Committee judges that through the position and ideas expressed by the General Secretary of the Party concerning the Middle East situation within the framework of talks with the leaders of the respective states, with the leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and with other representatives of progressive forces in the country, the visit is inscribed as a contribution by socialist Rumania to the political solution of the conflict in the Middle East, to the discovery of realistic solutions in harmony with the interests of the peoples of this area, of peace and international détente.

The Executive Committee is particularly satisfied with President Nicolae Ceausescu's meetings and interviews during his visit with the leaders of certain communist, progressive and democratic parties and of the Palestine Liberation Organization, seeing in them a powerful new affirmation of the solidarity of the Rumanian Communist Party with the respective political parties and organizations, a contribution to a reinforcement by the progressive anti-imperialist forces of the unity and cohesion of the communist and international workers' movement.

65

Resolution on the Middle East and the Palestine cause adopted by the Second Islamic Summit Conference²⁷

Lahore, February 23, 1974

The Middle East and the Palestine cause

The second Islamic Summit Conference held in Lahore, from 22 to 24 February, 1974 (29 Moharram to Safar, 1394);

Recalling the declaration adopted by the conference of heads of States and Governments of Islamic countries held in Rabat from 9 to 12 Rajab (22 to 25 September 1969)²⁸ and the resolutions adopted by Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on the issue of Palestine and the Middle East crisis;²⁹

Inspired by the principles and provision of the Charter of the Islamic Conference and that of the United Nations;

Noting with appreciation and pride the heroic sacrifices made by the Palestinian people and the front-line Arab countries facing the Zionist aggressor;

Having considered the recent developments in the Middle East and the serious situation resulting from the continued Israeli occupation of the territories of three sister Arab States of the Islamic Conference Organization, the continued usurpa-

²⁷ English text as published in *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), XXVII, 1 (1st quarter, 1974), pp. 202–204.

²⁸ Doc. 168 in *International Documents on Palestine 1969*.

²⁹ Docs. 66 and 308 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*; doc. 51 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*; doc. 71 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

²⁶ Doc. 50 above.

of the land of Palestine and the expulsion of its people;

Considering that this situation constitutes a violation of the Charter and resolution of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights seriously jeopardising international peace and security;

Affirming that the acquisition by Israel of Arab territories through war and the use of force is inadmissible and constitutes a flagrant violation of the objectives and principles of the United Nations posing a serious threat to world peace and jeopardising the security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Arab states;

Reaffirming the legitimate character of the struggle of the Palestinian people against Zionist racist colonialism and for the restoration of their legitimate national rights, and above all for the right to return to their homeland and to self-determination;

Expressing its deep concern over Israel's persistence in Judaizing Jerusalem and altering its demographic, religious, historical, social, cultural and economic character in violation of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations in this respect and the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949;

Considering that the support given by the member countries of the Islamic Conference to their sister Arab States in their struggle to recover all occupied territories and to restore the legitimate national rights of the people of Palestine, is a duty imposed by Muslim solidarity which should take a concrete and effective form;

Convinced that the military, economic, political and moral support given to Israel by some countries, particularly the USA, enables it to pursue the execution of its policy of aggression and to consolidate its occupation of Arab territories.

Considering that maintaining relations with Israel in the political, economic, commercial, communications and other fields, would enable it to consolidate its occupation of Arab lands and to persist in the execution of its expansionist policy;

1. *Decides*:

(A) To give full and effective support to Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle for recovering all their occupied lands by all means;

(B) To take action in all fields to force Israel

to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from all the Arab territories occupied since June, 1967, and undertakes to adopt every adequate measure to bring about that withdrawal;

2. *Requests* all States to support, by all means, the people of Palestine in their struggle against Zionism, racist and settler colonizations and for the restoration of their full national rights and confirms that the restoration of these rights is a sine qua non for the establishment of a just and lasting peace;

3. *Reaffirms* that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian nation in its just struggle;

4. *Requests* member States where no PLO offices exist as yet to provide all facilities towards that end in conformity with the resolutions of previous Islamic conferences;

5. *Proclaims* the strong attachment of Muslims to the Holy City of Jerusalem and the firm determination of their Governments to liberate it and to restore Arab sovereignty over it and that Jerusalem should not be the subject of bargaining or concessions;

6. *Condemns* Israel's violation of Human Rights in the occupied Arab territories, its rejection to implement the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the protection of civilians during war and its policy of judaizing the very nature and cultural character of the occupied territories, and considers that such Israeli practices are war crimes and a challenge to humanity at large;

7. *Regards* as null and void all the measures—and their effects—taken by Israel to change the democratic, social, cultural and economic character of the occupied Arab territories, including those designed to annex and judaize the Holy City of Jerusalem;

8. *Condemns* all states that provide Israel with military, economic and human assistance and requests them to put an end to this practice immediately;

9. *Hails* the constructive initiatives of sister African countries, member States of the Organization of African Unity, as well as of other friendly countries in supporting Arab rights and severing diplomatic relations with Israel;

10. *Calls upon* member States of the Islamic Conference to continue their support of African causes and their struggle against colonialism and racist regimes, particularly in Rhodesia,

South Africa and the Portuguese colonies, and to put an end to all forms of co-operation and dealings with these regimes, in particular to stop all shipments of oil and prevent any derogation to that rule;

11. *Calls upon* member States which still have relations with Israel, to sever these relations in all fields, thus supporting Islamic solidarity;

12. *Calls upon* the representatives of all member States to coordinate their activities in international forums so as to ensure the implementation of these resolutions;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of these resolutions and to report to the Conference thereon.

66

Resolution on Jerusalem adopted by the Second Islamic Summit Conference³⁰

Lahore, February 23, 1974

The Second Islamic Summit,

Re-affirming its commitment to the resolutions of the first Islamic Summit and of the preceding conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers concerning Al-Quds, the holy city of Jerusalem,

Recalling, once again, the deep attachment of the Muslims to the Holy City of Jerusalem which for them is the first Qibla and the third holiest shrine,

Considering that Israel's continued occupation of Jerusalem and its attempts to annex and Judaize it, its defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, and the acts of destruction and profanation of the holy places that have occurred under its occupation, have exacerbated tensions in the Middle East and aroused indignation among peoples throughout the world,

Aware of the necessity to safeguard the spiritual and moral values symbolized by the sacred shrines in the Holy City of Jerusalem,

Noting the United Nations General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) and Security Council resolutions 250 (1968), 251 (1968), 267 (1969), 271 (1969), 298 (1971) on

Jerusalem and in particular resolution 252 (1968) which expressly enunciates the principle that acquisition of territory by the use of force is inadmissible,

1. *Condemns* the measures taken by Israel to Judaize the Holy City of Jerusalem and its refusal to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council demanding that all measures purporting to annex the Holy City of Jerusalem to Israel or to change the religious and historical character of Jerusalem be rescinded and considered as being null and void:

2. *Calls for* the immediate withdrawal of Israel from the Holy City of Jerusalem:

3. *Declares* that the restoration of the Holy City of Jerusalem to Arab sovereignty is a paramount and unchangeable prerequisite for any solution in the Middle East and that any solution which does not restore this position will not be acceptable to the Islamic countries, and rejects any attempt to internationalize it:

4. *Decides* to continue the struggle for the liberation of the Holy City of Jerusalem and the preservation of holy shrines and insists that it should not become the object of any bargaining concessions, and welcomes any friendly efforts for this purpose.

67

Declaration adopted by the Second Islamic Summit Conference (excerpt)³¹

Lahore, February 24, 1974

I

In the name of Allah, most gracious, most merciful.

The Kings, Heads of State and Government and representatives of the Republic of Afghanistan, Algerian Democratic and Popular Republic, State of Bahrain, People's Republic of Bangladesh, Republic of Chad, Arab Republic of Egypt, Republic of Gabon, Gambia, Republic of Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Indonesia, Empire of Iran, Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, Kingdom of Morocco, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, State of Kuwait, Republic of Lebanon, Arab Republic

³⁰ English text as published in *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), XXVII, 1 (1st quarter, 1974), p. 204.

³¹ Excerpted from the English text as published in *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), XXVII, 1 (1st quarter, 1974), pp. 204-205, 206.

of Libya, Malaysia, Republic of Mali, Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Republic of Niger, Sultanate of Oman, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, State of Qatar, Senegal, Democratic Republic of Somalia, Republic of Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Republic of Tunisia, Republic of Turkey, Republic of Uganda, State of United Arab Emirates, the Yemen Arab Republic, Palestine represented by the PLO, the Representative of the Republic of Iraq, attending as an observer met at the Second Islamic Conference held in Lahore from 22 to 24 February 1974. The Secretary-General of the Arab League, Delegation of *Motamr-Al-Alam-Al-Islami*, and Secretary General of *Rabita-tul-Alam-Islami* attended as guests.

The patriarch of Antioch and all the Orient also attended the Summit Conference.

III

Having considered the present situation in the Middle East they declared that:

1. The Arab cause is the cause of all countries, which oppose aggression and will not suffer the use of force to be rewarded by territory or any other gains.

2. Full and effective support should be given to the Arab countries to recover, by all means available, all their occupied lands.

3. The cause of the people of Palestine is the cause of all those who believe in the right of a people to determine its own destiny by itself and by its free will.

4. The restitution of the full national rights of the Palestinian peoples in their homeland is the essential and fundamental condition for a solution to the Middle East problem and the establishment of lasting peace on the basis of justice.

5. The international community, and particularly those States which sponsored the partition of Palestine in 1947, bear the heavy responsibility to redress the injustice perpetrated on the Palestinian people:

6. Al-Quds is a unique symbol of the confluence of Islam with the sacred divine religions. For more than 1300 years Muslims have held Jerusalem as a trust for all who venerate it. Muslims alone could be its loving and impartial custodians for

the simple reason that Muslims alone believe in all the three Prophetic religions rooted in Jerusalem. No agreement, protocol or understanding which postulates the continuance of Israeli occupation of the holy city of Jerusalem or its transfer to any non-Arab sovereignty or makes it the subject of bargaining or concessions will be acceptable to the Islamic countries. Israeli withdrawal from Jerusalem is a paramount and unchangeable prerequisite for lasting peace in the Middle East.

7. The constructive efforts undertaken by the Christian churches all over the world and in the Arab countries, notably in Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan and Syria to explain the Palestinian question to the international public opinion and to the world religious conferences and to solicit their support for Arab sovereignty over Jerusalem and other holy places in Palestine should be appreciated.

8. Any measure taken by Israel to change the character of the occupied Arab territories and in particular, of the holy city of Jerusalem, is a flagrant violation of international law and is repugnant to the feelings of the States members of the Islamic Conference and of the Islamic world in general.

Those African and other countries which have taken an honourable and firm position in support of the Arab cause are worthy of the highest appreciation.

The present trends, "towards a just peace cannot but concentrate on the roots of the question, and disengagement cannot be viewed but as a step towards the complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories and the full restitution of the national rights of the Palestinian people."

68

Speech by President Giri of India made at a dinner in honour of visiting President Sadat of Egypt (excerpt)³²

New Delhi, February 24, 1974

Mr. President you guide the destinies of a country which is the cradle of civilisation, the meeting place of the three continents of the old world, a centre of culture and scholarship, and a bastion of Afro-Asian solidarity. For the last quarter of a century and more, however, Egypt, along with other Arab countries has had to face the problem of an expansionist and aggressive neighbour. We saw how a great part of the national energies of Egypt was diverted to rectifying this unacceptable and intolerable situation, with the result that the tasks of economic reconstruction and social and cultural regeneration could not proceed as fast as they would otherwise have. Mr. President you have broken this stalemate.

The great achievements which your country has recently recorded under your wise and dynamic leadership have earned universal respect and admiration. These achievements constitute one of the most significant events of modern times, they also illuminate a brilliant page in the long and glorious annals of your great history. We salute your victories, and we pay homage to the great sacrifices of your countrymen. The courage and determination of your people, guided by your wisdom, your vision and your humanity, guarantee the success of your just cause.

In the long Arab struggle for this cause, you have had our full support. The ideals for which you have fought are the same ideals of justice, honour and civilised conduct in human affairs which we have shared down the centuries, which we cherish and which we will always defend. The usurpation of territory by force, the expulsion of innocent people from their homes, the use of threat and violence in international relations, all of which the Arab people have suffered for so long, have aroused the indignation and sympathy of the people of India. While we share your joy and satisfaction at your great successes, we have no illusions of the difficult days ahead. Along with

your many friends, we shall stand by you and give whatever support we can in this great struggle of the Arab people.

69

Communiqué issued by the International Meeting for Peace and Justice in the Middle East³³

Rome, February 24, 1974

On February 23–24, an international meeting for peace and justice in the Middle East was held in Rome, with the participation of representatives of the national organizations of the following countries and the following international organizations: Argentina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic, Great Britain, Hungary, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine (PLO), Republic of Guinea, South Africa (ANC), Syria, USSR, Yugoslavia, Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, World Peace Council, Christian Conference for Peace, World Federation of Democratic Youth, World Federation of Trade Unions, International Union of Students.

The meeting broadly discussed the new situation created in the Middle East following the October War, the beginning of the Geneva Conference and the new importance assumed by the oil question in world economic relations as a result of manoeuvres by the international oil monopolies.

It noted with satisfaction that the cause of peace and justice in the Middle East has made important progress, both in world public opinion and in government circles, as a result of increasingly general realization of the necessity for withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories occupied since 1967, for recognition of the legitimate national rights, including self-determination, of the Palestinian Arab people, of which the PLO is the sole legitimate representative, and for the achievement of a just and durable peace which will ensure the security and just rights of all the

³² Excerpted from the English text, *Foreign Affairs Record* (New Delhi), XX, 2 (February, 1974), p. 35.

³³ English text as published in *Arab Palestinian Resistance* (Damascus), VI, 5 (May, 1974), pp. 74–76; the Palestinian delegation abstained on some points included in the document.

peoples and States in the region.

The agreement on disengagement of troops on the Egyptian front and the present negotiations for disengagement on the Syrian front must be a first step towards a general political solution to the Middle East crisis, through full implementation of the relative Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly. But despite these positive developments, powerful imperialist circles are still working to hinder détente and impede a successful development of the Geneva Conference. The situation continues to be dangerous, and it is therefore imperative to reach a quick and just settlement.

Given the favourable reactions to previous initiatives and activities aimed at achieving peace with justice in the Middle East, the meeting therefore concluded that an intensification of efforts at all levels and in all parts of the world to strengthen and broaden a world-wide movement is indispensable. To this end, it was decided to call an International Conference for Peace and Justice in the Middle East, to be held in Italy in the near future.

Such a Conference, it was felt, would strongly contribute to the cause of peace and justice in the Middle East, if it set as its aims the mobilization of world public opinion for the successful development of the Geneva Conference, for full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and other related General Assembly Resolutions, for total withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied since 1967, for recognition of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, for cessation of the state of belligerence in the Middle East and for the achievement of a just and durable peace which will ensure the security and just rights of all the peoples and States in the region.

The meeting therefore decided to create an International Organizing Committee, composed of representatives of the national organizations of Britain, France, Italy, the USA and the USSR and the international organizations supporting the initiative of the Conference. The Committee will act in consultation with all the parties involved and will meet before the end of April 1974, to take the necessary steps for convening the Conference.

The meeting empowered the Italian Committee to give the widest possible publicity to the present

document and to the aims of the Conference, as stated above.

The meeting appeals to all the national and international organizations represented in Rome and to other organizations which choose to support the initiative to begin immediately to promote an intense activity to ensure the broadest and most representative participation of political, economic, social and religious forces at the Conference for Peace and Justice in the Middle East.

70

Statement by Prime Minister Chou En-lai of China expressing support for Middle East developments independent of the super-powers³⁴

Peking, February 26, 1974

The crux of the Middle East question is the fierce rivalry between the two superpowers for hegemony there. Driven by their respective selfish interests, they have, for a long time, supported and connived at Israeli aggression and done their utmost to maintain a state of "no war, no peace" to the great detriment of the Arab people including the Palestinian people. Breaking loose from superpower constraint and control and backed by the entire Arab people, the Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian peoples rose up in resistance last October and dealt heavy blows at the Israeli aggressors. That was a demonstration of the heroism of the people of Arab countries and Palestine fighting in unity against their common enemy. It greatly fortified the morale of the Arab people and deflated the arrogance of the aggressor. The October war was also a new eye-opener, enabling people to see more clearly who are the enemies of the Arab people and who their friends. Just when the Arab people were waging their dauntless resistance, a superpower that styled itself a "friend" of the Arab people rabidly rebuked and obstructed their struggle lest the flames of war should engulf itself. At the same time, it took advantage of the opportunity to do big business in munitions and reap enormous war profits. This fully exposed

³⁴ Excerpted from the partial English text of the speech given at a banquet in honour of visiting President Boumedienne of Algeria, *Peking Review*, XVII, 10 (March 8, 1974), pp. 6-7.

its features of sham support and real betrayal.

The struggles centred around the Middle East question since last October have fully demonstrated that the superpowers are paper tigers, while it is the people of the Arab world who are really powerful. But the superpowers, dictated by their greedy nature, definitely will not easily let go. In the new circumstances, they are continuing their contention and expansion in this region. The struggle of the Arab people including the Palestinian people will still be long and complicated. So long as Israel does not withdraw from the occupied Arab territories and so long as the Palestinian people's national rights are not restored, the people of Arab countries and Palestine will definitely not let up in their struggle, they are entitled to use all possible weapons of struggle, and there will surely be no tranquillity to speak of in the Middle East.

As always, the Chinese Government and people will firmly support the people of Arab countries and Palestine in their just struggle to recover their lost territories and regain their national rights. We are convinced that, while the road they traverse in their struggle is tortuous, the prospects are bright. The great people of Arab countries and Palestine, persevering in unity against imperialism and in struggle, will ultimately realize their national aspirations.

71

Joint communiqué on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Foreign Minister Hussein of Iraq (excerpts)³⁵

Moscow, February 27, 1974

In response to an invitation from the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet Government Comrade Saddam Hussein, Deputy General Secretary of the Regional Command of the Arab Socialist Baath party and Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council of the Republic of Iraq, paid a friendly visit to the Soviet Union in the period February 25–27, 1974.

³⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), February 28, 1974.

During discussion of international questions special interest was shown in investigating the situation in the Arab area, and the two sides agreed that the establishment of a just and firm peace in the area is possible only through the liberation of all the occupied Arab territories and the assurance of the national rights of the Arab Palestinian people. The two sides resolutely condemned the attempts of imperialist circles and reactionary forces to reassert and implement their control over this area in one form or another and to suppress the movement of liberation and to obstruct the progress of countries moving towards independent social advancement. They affirmed the solidarity of the Republic of Iraq and the Soviet Union with the peoples struggling to erase the traces of neocolonialism and racial discrimination and for the sake of world security and peace.

The two sides believe that the cohesion of the Arab states in the face of imperialist aggression and the strengthening of their cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries should be regarded as among the most important preconditions for success in their struggle against Israeli aggression and for the strengthening of their national independence and as a further step on the road towards economic and social progress.

The Soviet Union announced that it will continue, as in the past, to extend its support and aid to the Arab states in their just struggle for liberation.

72

US announcement of progress in negotiations in Syria and Israel¹

Washington, February 27, 1974

Secretary of State Kissinger has informed the President of the following:

The Secretary of State is authorized by the Government of Syria to transmit to the Government of Israel a list of the total number of Israeli

³⁶ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXX, 1814 (April 1, 1974), p. 338; the announcement was also broadcast on Damascus radio in Arabic (BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4539/A/1).

prisoners of war now held by the Government of Syria. There are 65 names on the list.

Second, the Government of Syria has agreed that Red Cross visits to the Israeli prisoners of war it holds shall begin on the morning of March 1.

The Government of Israel will give its ideas on disengagement of Syrian and Israeli forces to the Secretary of State on March 1 for transmittal to the Government of Syria. The Secretary of State will personally take those ideas to Damascus.

73

Joint US-Egypt announcement of the resumption of diplomatic relations¹

Cairo and Washington, February 28, 1974

The Governments of Egypt and the United States have agreed to resume diplomatic relations on February 28, 1974.

The two governments express the hope that this step will develop and strengthen relations between their countries and contribute substantially to better mutual understanding and cooperation.

The Government of Egypt has named Dr. Ashraf Ghorbal as Ambassador to the United States. The President of the United States intends to nominate Mr. Hermann Eilts as Ambassador to Egypt.

74

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to China of President Boumedienne of Algeria (excerpts)³⁸

Peking, March 2, 1974

At the invitation of Acting Chairman of the People's Republic of China Tung Pi-wu and Premier of the State Council Chou En-lai, His Excellency Houari Boumedienne, President of the Council of Revolution and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria, paid an official visit to the People's Republic of China from February 25 to March 2, 1974.

³⁷ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXX, 1814 (April 1, 1974), p. 338.

³⁸ Excerpted from the English text, *Peking Review*, XVII, 10 (March 8, 1974), p. 10.

The two sides consider the resistance of the Arab people, including the Palestinian people, against Israeli aggression to be an important component of the struggle of the people of the world against imperialism. Their resistance has won the sympathy and support of the Third World and all the countries and people in the world who uphold justice. The root cause of the Middle East question lies in Israeli Zionist aggression and the contention between the big powers. The Arab people, including the Palestinian people, will not cease their struggle so long as the Arab countries have not recovered their occupied territories and the Palestinian people have not regained their national rights. The two sides reaffirm their resolute support for the people of Egypt, Syria and Palestine in their struggle against Israeli Zionist aggression and for the recovery of their occupied territories as well as for the Palestinian people in their struggle to regain their national rights. The two sides are firmly convinced that the Arab people, including the Palestinian people, will win the final victory in their just struggle.

75

Radio interview statement by Chancellor Brandt of West Germany discussing relations with the US after disagreements following from the October war³⁹

Bonn, March 4, 1974

Q. After the Middle East war there was a certain amount of discord between Bonn and Washington. Has that been cleared up?

A. At that time there were misunderstandings of one kind or another. We are now very close together as regards these matters. You can see an indication of this in that my visit to the region next month has been coordinated in detail, just as the Americans keep us informed of their various efforts there.

³⁹ Broadcast on Westdeutscher Rundfunk; excerpted and translated from the German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 31 (March 6, 1974), p. 286.

On the American side there are certain reservations over West European efforts aimed not only at establishing a dialogue as a group with the Arabs as a group, but also to reach an agreement. That is naturally a process which will be spread over several months. I believe that on this point also we shall gradually arrive at an agreeable accommodation. In areas where there still today are differences of opinion it is not between Washington and Bonn.

76

Proposal issued by the EEC Foreign Ministers regarding cooperation with the Arab countries⁴⁰

Brussels, March 4, 1974

1. The nine Governments of the member states of the European Community confirm the importance they attach to the talks that took place in Copenhagen on Dec. 14 and 15 with the Foreign Ministers of Algeria, Sudan and Tunisia as well as the Ministers of State of the Arab emirates, who, speaking in the name of all the Arab countries, expressed the wish that the countries of the Community should develop their relations with the Arab world and engage with it in long-term cooperation in all fields, notably the economic, technical and cultural.

2. The nine wish, on their part, to continue the dialogue thus begun and develop from it mutually beneficial cooperation including in relations, existing or developing, with the Community.

3. In the first analysis, the nine believe that this cooperation should be realized by concrete actions, in numerous fields like industry, agriculture, energy and raw materials, transportation, science and technology, financial cooperation and training of cadres, for example.

4. The first objective of the Arab and European governments would be, in the opinion of the latter, to organize among themselves as soon as possible contacts which would permit them to express their initial views on the character to be

developed and on the efforts to be made to undertake it. The nine propose, as a first step, and at as soon a date as possible, a meeting between their own President, the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany and the representative or representatives that the Arab governments wish to designate. The Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany will undertake these meetings in his double capacity, presiding over the political cooperation of the nine and over the European Economic Council.

5. In light of the results of the foregoing the nine are prepared to undertake afterward, at the European and Arab expert level, for example at a working group level, a study of the ways and means of cooperation between them, to arrive at concrete recommendations as soon as possible.

6. If the results of their work justify it, in the opinion of the two parties, a conference of the foreign ministers of the Community and of the Arab countries can be organized to take the necessary decisions.

77

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR (excerpts)⁴¹

Cairo, March 5, 1974

From March 1 to March 5, A. A. Gromyko, Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, paid an official visit of friendship to the Arab Republic of Egypt, at the invitation of the Egyptian Government.

Muhammed Anwar Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, received A. A. Gromyko. In the course of their conversation, many problems were discussed, particularly those pertaining to Soviet-Egyptian relations. The conversation proceeded in a friendly and businesslike atmosphere.

Talks were held between Ismail Fahmi, Foreign Minister of the ARE, and A. A. Gromyko, Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs

⁴⁰ Unofficial translation of the French text as published by the *New York Times*, March 5, 1974, p. 6. Copyright 1974 by The New York Times Company; reprinted by permission.

⁴¹ Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 11 (March 16, 1974), pp. 2-3.

of the USSR, which also took place in a friendly and businesslike atmosphere.

During the conversation and talks, international problems of interest to both Sides were discussed and, first of all, the Middle East problem, and also questions connected with the further development of relations between the two states.

The Sides reaffirmed their determination to strengthen the bonds of friendship and cooperation between them in various spheres on the firm and long-term foundations laid by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of May 27, 1971.⁴²

The Sides are unanimous in that the level of relations achieved in the years of cooperation in various fields is of great importance both for the Soviet Union and Egypt and for the cause of maintaining peace as a whole. Proceeding from this, the Sides are fully resolved to maintain and develop the relations established in the process of their joint struggle against imperialism, colonialism and aggression, and they will not allow anyone to harm these relations.

During the talks, the range of problems connected with the current situation in the Middle East was comprehensively discussed. The Sides confirmed once again the need to work, using all the means available, for the achievement of a just and lasting settlement in line with the Security Council's resolutions, No. 242 of November 22, 1967, and No. 338 of October 22, 1973, which provide for the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the occupied Arab territories and for ensuring the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. In this connection, the Sides reiterated that the implementation of the agreement on the disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli troops should be viewed as the first step towards this goal, as an organic part of an overall settlement in the Middle East.

The Sides reaffirmed their readiness for practical examination of all the aspects of accommodation in the Middle East within the framework of the Geneva conference, the convocation of which they regard as an important success of the peace forces. They expressed a unanimous view that the conference should facilitate the implementation of the

UN resolutions and, first of all, Resolution No. 242 of the Security Council.

Both Sides hold a unanimous view regarding the importance and necessity of the Soviet Union's participation in all the stages of a Middle East settlement, including all the working bodies that will be set up at the Geneva conference.

The Sides are unanimous in that representatives of the Arab people of Palestine should take part in the Geneva conference.

A. A. Gromyko had a meeting with Y. Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in the course of which they discussed questions concerning ensurance of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. The talk proceeded in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and friendship.

The Egyptian Side expressed satisfaction with the Soviet Union's consent in principle to take part in restoration work on the Suez Canal.

The Sides confirm the necessity of regularly exchanging views and coordinating actions at all levels between the two countries both on questions of bilateral relations and on problems of the current international situation, on the Middle East problems in the first place.

The Sides point out that the meetings and talks which took place during the visit are an important contribution to the cause of the further development and strengthening of friendly relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union.

The President of the Arab Republic of Egypt Muhammed Anwar Sadat renewed the invitation to L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to visit the Arab Republic of Egypt.

On behalf of the Soviet Government, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR invited the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt I. Fahmi to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union. The invitation was accepted with gratitude; the time of the visit will be agreed upon later.

⁴² Doc. 125 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

78

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Uganda of President Qadhafi of Libya (excerpts)⁴³

Kampala, March 5, 1974

At the invitation of H.E. Hajj Idi Amin Dada, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council of the Libyan Arab Republic, paid an official visit to the Republic of Uganda in the period Safar 9–11, 1394 AH, corresponding to March 3–5, 1974 AD.

President Idi Amin affirmed his complete support for the Arab cause and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to its land asserting the necessity of Arab unity in the face of the expansionist Zionist enemy. President Idi Amin noted that the unity symbolized in the oil embargo decision after the recent war was an active and effective force in international relations.

On that basis he repeats his call on the Arab leaders to continue studying all means of strengthening Arab unity.

Colonel Muammar Qadhafi expressed his full appreciation of the leading role played by President Hajj General Idi Amin on the continent of Africa in the elimination of Zionism from Africa. He commended the efforts of President Idi Amin towards establishing peace in East Africa as exemplified in the excellent relations between Uganda and Tanzania.

The two Presidents reaffirmed their support for the Palestinian people in its struggle to liberate its land usurped by Zionist tyranny.

79

Statements by US Department of State official Kellogg regarding US aid to Jews emigrating from the USSR, made before a Congressional subcommittee⁴⁴

Washington, March 5, 1974

Mr. Long: . . . Tell me about the Jewish refugees. How is that aid administered to the refugees?

Mr. Kellogg: The money comes to our office—

Mr. Long: Does that go through the Israeli Government?

Mr. Kellogg: No. It goes through a Jewish voluntary agency which expends it, with our office giving the money to the Jewish agency and then the program is approved between us and administered jointly.

Mr. Long: What agency is that?

Mr. Kellogg: This is the United Israel Appeal in this country and—

Mr. Long: They raise private money too, I suppose?

Mr. Kellogg: Very large sums.

Mr. Long: How does that compare with what we are helping out with?

Mr. Kellogg: Would you like that specific figure, sir?

Mr. Long: Yes, a ball park estimate. Is it bigger than what we are providing?

Mr. Kellogg: May I supply that for the record?

Mr. Long: Yes.

[The information follows:]

The current operating budget for the year ending March 31, 1974 for the resettlement of migrants and refugees is: Jewish Agency for Israel \$720 million of which United Israel Appeal allocation amount is \$470 million.

⁴⁴ Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies of the House Committee on Appropriations in response to questions by Representatives Long (Dem.) and Passman (Dem.). Excerpted from US Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, *Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1975, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations*, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, 1974, Part I, pp. 174–177. Mr. Kellogg was Special Assistant to the Secretary for Refugee and Migration Affairs.

⁴³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Fajr al-Jadid* (Tripoli), March 6, 1974.

Mr. Long: Is this program keeping up with the problem of the Jewish refugees settling in Israel?

Mr. Kellogg: At the moment I would say that it is, with an annual flow of approximately 34,000 to 35,000 refugees from Russia to Israel at the present time.

Mr. Long: But there are a lot of other refugees to Israel. The Russians aren't even the majority, are they?

Mr. Kellogg: Yes; they are. The total I believe, if I recall correctly, was about 55,000 refugees to Israel last year of which approximately 34,500 came from Russia.

Mr. Long: Are you offering any projections about what the refugee situation will be like this year and next year? Is it going to be bigger or smaller as far as the Soviet Union is concerned?

Mr. Kellogg: We are dealing with a difficult question there, Mr. Congressman, but the authorities that know the answer best predict about the current flow continuing this coming year and the year following.

Mr. Long: This will depend pretty much on the policy of the Soviet Union, which could change.

Mr. Kellogg: That is correct.

Mr. Long: Do you happen to know whether they are letting out all the ones who want to get out?

Mr. Kellogg: It is very hard to say, but I think there are those that can't leave or have to wait a long period of time.

Mr. Long: I know they make it very difficult for some people. I suppose there are those who have incurred the displeasure of the Soviet machine for one reason or another.

I just wondered quantitatively whether most of the Jews wanting out of the Soviet Union are getting out.

Mr. Kellogg: It is very difficult to know the answer to that. The indications are, however, that there is a large backlog that have not yet been able to move.

Mr. Long: If you have anything on this I hope you will put it in the record and give us some feeling about the numbers who would like to get out and what is keeping them from getting out.

[The information follows:]

Backlog of Soviet Jews Wishing to Emigrate

There is no way to ascertain how many of the approximately 3 million Jews in the Soviet Union will seek to abandon Soviet citizenship and nationality in order to migrate to Israel or elsewhere. Projections vary from a very low percentage to a very high one, depending on the political and ideological convictions of the source. We are unaware of any disinterested expert estimate. Nor can we anticipate developments within the Soviet Union or in the Middle East which might act to increase or decrease the migration. Our present information is that about 100,000 persons still in the Soviet Union have applied for exit permits or otherwise indicated their desire to move to Israel. It is a continuing process and this backlog, as the migration proceeds, appears to remain fairly constant. The cases of those who have been denied exit permits, including those regarded by Soviet authorities as dissidents, are very few in proportion to the number permitted to leave.

Mr. Long: Is the help they receive in Israel when they get there sufficient so that none are staying in Russia because they feel they won't get adequate help if they arrive in Israel?

Mr. Kellogg: Well, the policy of the Israeli Government is to accept and absorb any refugee that can get out of a foreign country and arrive in Israel.

Mr. Long: I know that is the general policy. There is often a difference between policy and the way it is carried out. Is it carried out in such a way that there isn't a feeling among lots of Jews in the Soviet Union that they had better not leave because they will have a pretty tough time when they arrive in Israel? Especially since the war, I understand life is very hard in Israel.

Mr. Kellogg: Curiously enough, the numbers who were able to leave increased during the war instead of decreasing. I have no tangible evidence that there are those who fear to leave Russia and go to Israel.

Mr. Long: Has there been any reverse travel?

Mr. Kellogg: Very small numbers.

Mr. Passman: Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Passman: Back on the record.

If the gentleman will yield, it is my understanding that these refugees had been clearing through Austria until eight or nine months ago, and that now they have to clear through another nation. Is that correct?

Mr. Kellogg: No, sir. What you are referring to, I believe, is the fact that the refugee center in Austria was closed down.⁴⁵ That center is no longer in operation. But the flow still continues through Austria.

Mr. Long: If there is a reverse outflow of people who migrated to Israel, I wonder if you could either tell us or supply for the record information on what the reasons are that many of them are giving for going back? Is it because they are not getting adequate help from our program? Is more money needed to deal with this refugee program in Israel?

Mr. Kellogg: Well, I think it would always be welcomed because it is an enormous program and costing—

Mr. Passman: I understand it costs \$40,000 per refugee or per family.

Mr. Kellogg: It is very close to that.

Mr. Passman. Is it per person?

Mr. Kellogg: No, per family. The largest single cost is an apartment which runs around \$20,000.

Mr. Passman: And schools for them.

Mr. Kellogg: Of course, schools, and apartment houses and things of that kind, and absorption centers and vocational and language training.

Mr. Passman. Are they able to get jobs?

Mr. Kellogg: I don't think there is any serious unemployment in Israel at the present time.

80

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Sweden of Prime Minister Jallud of Libya (excerpts)⁴⁶

Stockholm, March 6, 1974

Major Abd al-Salam Ahmad Jallud, member of the Revolutionary Command Council and Prime Minister in the Libyan Arab Republic paid a visit to Sweden in the period Safar 10, 1394 AH, corresponding to March 4, 1974 AD, to Safar 12, corresponding to March 6.

⁴⁵ See docs. 123–127 and 271 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

⁴⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Fajr al-Jadid* (Tripoli), March 7, 1974.

Major Abd al-Salam Ahmad Jallud held talks with representatives of the Social Democratic Party and with representatives of the Swedish Trade Federation.

During the discussions between the two Prime Ministers opinions were exchanged on a number of subjects. As regards the situation in the Arab region the two sides affirmed the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and also the principle of the unacceptability of annexation of territory by force.

81

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Syria of Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR⁴⁷

Damascus, March 7, 1974

At the invitation of the leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party and the Syrian Government, A. A. Gromyko, Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, was on an official friendly visit to the Syrian Arab Republic from February 27 to March 1, and from March 4 to March 7, 1974.

The visit was marked by an atmosphere of friendship and respect, in keeping with the friendly relations existing between the two countries.

In the course of the visit, A. A. Gromyko was received by President Hafez Assad of the Syrian Arab Republic. He also met with Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Ayoubi, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdel Halim Khaddam, and other Syrian leaders.

Negotiations were held in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding and touched upon questions of bilateral relations and urgent international issues of interest to both Sides. Special attention was given to the Middle East problem.

In the course of negotiations both Sides ex-

⁴⁷ English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 11 (March 16, 1974), pp. 4–5.

pressed satisfaction with the development of bilateral relations between the two countries. They reaffirmed their resolution to develop and strengthen the relations of friendship and co-operation existing between them and based on the principles of respect for national sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs, and on the community of goals in the struggle against imperialism, Zionism, and colonialism.

The Soviet Side reaffirmed the invariability of the Soviet Union's principled course of all-out development and consolidation of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation with Syria in the political, economic and cultural fields, and of aid in strengthening her defence capacity.

During the discussion of urgent international issues, both Sides devoted special attention to the latest events in the Middle East after the hostilities last October, reaffirmed their invariable principled stand, stressing that the establishment of a durable and just peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved without the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories and ensurance of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The Sides discussed the steps being taken at present in the interests of attaining a just and durable peace in the Middle East. They again reaffirmed their invariable position that any agreement on disengagement of forces must be regarded as an initial step towards the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories, with a fixed timetable of withdrawal dates, as a component of the general Middle East settlement.

The sides affirmed that ignoring or slighting the basic principles pointed out above involves the danger of a new eruption and can bring about a threat to peace and security in the Middle East and throughout the world.

The Sides affirmed the importance of the Soviet Union's participation in the efforts aimed at establishing in the Middle East a peace based on justice, at all stages and in all areas of the settlement.

The Sides express their conviction that the Syrian Arab Republic retains the legitimate inalienable right to employ all effective means in liberating its occupied territories.

The Soviet Side highly appraised the staunch-

ness of the Armed Forces of the Syrian Arab Republic as well as the solidarity among Arab countries which was revealed during the October hostilities. The Soviet Side expressed the view that this solidarity made a positive contribution towards strengthening the Arab countries' positions. The Soviet Side also confirmed the importance of the further consolidation of this solidarity and the necessity of curbing imperialist manoeuvres aimed at splitting the unity of the Arab peoples.

The Sides declare their determination to rebuff any attempts to undermine Soviet-Syrian friendship and will not allow anyone to hamper the further consolidation of Soviet-Syrian relations, or to damage them.

The Syrian Side expressed its gratitude for the support and assistance rendered by the Soviet Union to the Syrian Arab Republic in all spheres, stressing the importance of continuing such support.

The Soviet and Syrian Sides stated the usefulness of regular contacts at all levels for exchange of views and consultations on questions of bilateral relations and on the most important, urgent international issues of interest to the Soviet Union and the Syrian Arab Republic.

While examining urgent international problems, both Sides reaffirmed their invariable support of the peoples' struggle against colonialism and imperialism, for the elimination of colonial exploitation and all forms of racial discrimination.

The Sides reaffirmed their support of the proposal on the convocation of a special session of the UN General Assembly, put forward by the Algerian People's Democratic Republic.

The Sides consider that the exchange of opinion on a wide range of questions which took place during the visit was an important positive step in the development of relations of friendship and close cooperation between the two countries, for the benefit of the Soviet and Syrian peoples.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, on behalf of the Soviet Government, invited Abdel Halim Khaddam, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic, to come to the Soviet Union on an official visit. The invitation was accepted with gratitude. The time of the visit will be established later.

Basic Principles of the new Israel government's programme, submitted to the Knesset for approval (excerpts)⁴⁸

Jerusalem, March 10, 1974

CHAPTER 'A'—CENTRAL OBJECTIVES

The principal target of the Government of Israel during the coming four years is to work for the attainment of permanent peace with each of the neighbouring states. The efforts of the Government shall be directed towards the utilization of all the possibilities and prospects involved in the peace conference which opened in Geneva.

The Government will persevere in the strengthening of all arms of the Israel Defence Forces, insofar as is required to ensure its strength and capacity to defend the State and overcome its aggressors. The necessary lessons will be drawn from the experience of the Yom Kippur War, ensuring their application in the deployment of the IDF and in the defence establishment in general. Within the IDF, the forging of internal solidarity will continue. It will remain above all party considerations, and its qualities as an army of the people will continue to be fostered.

1. Decisions of the Government and the Knesset

The principal tasks of the Government and its actions on questions of foreign policy and defence will be based fundamentally on Chapters "A" and "E" of the Basic Principles of the outgoing Government and on the decisions on principle adopted by the Government and the Seventh and Eighth Knessets, including:

The Government's decisions, approved by the Knesset on August 4, 1970, concerning the cease-fire; the Government's decision of October 22, 1973 to accede to the Security Council resolution on the cease-fire; the Government's decision of November 11, 1973 on the Six-Point Agreement with Egypt; the Government's decision of December 17, 1973 agreeing to participate in the Geneva Conference; the Government's decision of January 22, 1974 to sign the agreement on disengagement and separation of forces on the Egyptian front.^{48a}

2. Jerusalem

The Government will take steps for the continued building and development of Jerusalem, eternal Capital of Israel. The pace of populating the city will be increased, infrastructure investments assured, and industrial development continued. In the building and development of the Capital, Jerusalem's special character, its historic sites and its scenic grandeur will be preserved. Rehabilitation of the Old City's Jewish Quarter will be completed. The holy places of all faiths will be preserved.

In the Capital of Israel, the rights of all residents will be observed, without distinction of religion or nationality, and the religious status of the holy places of Islam and Christianity will be safeguarded in the peace settlements.

3. Settlement on the land

Steps will be taken for the continuation of settlement on the land in accordance with resolutions to be adopted by the Government of Israel.

4. Agreements on the road to peace

The Government of Israel will strictly maintain and observe the cease-fire agreements on a basis of reciprocity.

5. Policy in Administered Areas

The Government will continue to pursue a policy aimed at ensuring security and the maintenance of law and order while showing due respect and understanding for the population. The open-bridges policy will be continued; independent activity on the part of the population will be encouraged in the fields of administration, education, culture and religion and in fostering democratic patterns in public and municipal life.

6. Countering terrorist activity

The Government will endeavour to safeguard the citizens, residents and representatives of Israel, and to protect them against terrorist activity. It will maintain Israel's right to act against the

⁴⁸ Excerpted from the partial text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, March 11, 1974, p. 5.

^{48a} See doc. 173 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*, docs.

160, 188 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973* and doc. 52 above.

terrorist organizations, their bases and their collaborators, with a view to preventing and frustrating their activities. The Government of Israel will continue to hold any state which identifies itself with the terrorist organizations and affords them bases of operation, fighting equipment and political support responsible for their dastardly deeds.

7. *Activity in the international arena*

In the international arena the Government will act to strengthen Israel's standing among the nations of the world.

CHAPTER 'B'—THE CONSTITUTION

The Government will act towards the enactment of a democratic constitution guaranteeing man's basic freedoms and rights in Israel, based on the existing basic laws and those to be adopted by the Eighth Knesset.

These laws will assure full and absolute equality of rights and obligations for all residents of Israel, regardless of sex, community, status, nationality and creed.

Freedom of conscience and religion will be maintained.

CHAPTER 'C'—ISRAEL AND THE DIASPORA

The Government of Israel will joint its efforts with the Zionist Movement and other Jewish organizations to deepen the unity of the Jewish people, and foster the ties of the people in the Diaspora to its historic homeland.

CHAPTER 'D'—IMMIGRATION AND ABSORPTION

The Government will foster immigration and do all in its power to ensure the proper absorption of the immigrants in Israel.

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CHAPTER 'G'—RELIGION IN THE STATE

National unity and the orderly progress of national life demand attention, mutual toleration and freedom of religion and conscience. The Government will prevent all religious and anti-religious coercion from whatever quarter, will provide communal religious needs through the

State's resources, will guarantee religious freedom to all the non-Jewish communities and supply their religious requirements at the expense of the State, and will guarantee religious education to all children whose parents so desire. The Government will preserve the status quo in the State in religious matters.

CHAPTER 'H'—THE MINORITIES

1. The policy of the Government of Israel will be aimed at the complete integration of the minorities in Israel into all spheres of life in the State while respecting their religious and cultural individuality.

2. Educational, health, development, welfare and all other services provided by the State and the local authorities will be placed at the disposal of the entire population, without discrimination on the basis of creed or race.

3. The Government will continue with the process of giving municipal status to minority villages.

4. Workers belonging to the minorities will be guaranteed equal pay to that of Jewish workers for equal work.

6. Arabs will be guaranteed education in Arabic, as well as the study of the Arabic language. Israeli citizens belonging to the minorities will continue to be guaranteed the right to use Arabic in State institutions.

8. [Sic] Special efforts will be made to absorb intellectuals from the minorities in the public services and various public institutions, with a view to involving them in national and public responsibility.

9. The Government will encourage the setting up of joint Jewish-Arab enterprises, and will support the development of various types of cooperation, in town and village, amongst the minorities.

10. The Government of Israel will continue to demand the recognition of the right of Israel's Moslem citizens to fulfil the duty of the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Speech by Israel Prime Minister Meir to the Knesset affirming that the policies of the former government will be continued (excerpts)⁴⁹

Jerusalem, March 10, 1974

Before opening my statement in the Knesset today, I cannot refrain from calling to mind that the day after tomorrow the full list of all those who fell and are reported missing in the Yom Kippur War will be published on behalf of the Israel Defence Forces. This precious and sorrowful list comprises the best of our blood and our vigour. It is, as the poet says, "the ransom for our lives." Members of the Knesset,

On December 15, 1969, when I presented the 15th Government to the Knesset I said, *inter alia*:

"Our primary objective is to maintain the deterrent power of the Israel Defence Forces, which constitutes the guarantee of our security for the prevention of total war. We shall spare no political effort nor material sacrifice to guarantee that our soldiers will continue to possess the necessary means of warfare and deterrence."

I then went on to say:

"We are determined not to weaken in the struggle for peace. We are capable of enduring the struggle until the Arab leaders and their supporters recognize that threats of war, aggression on the cease-fire lines, acts of terrorism, and international pressure will not succeed in restoring the position that existed before June 1967. This recognition is the key to true peace."

In retrospect, I may point out with satisfaction that we have spared no political or material effort to ensure the growing strength of the Israel Defence Forces, and that we have never ceased to do all in our power for the attainment of peace with the neighbouring states. Neither threats of war nor actual aggression have succeeded in returning us to the state of affairs that existed before June 1967.

I should add the following:

The maintenance of the strength and power of the Israel Defence Forces, which is the guarantee of our security, was not enough, in itself, to prevent total war. The war broke out on both fronts on

the initiative of Egypt and Syria. The rulers of these countries misjudged the strength of the Israel Defence Forces.

I cannot state with certainty that they hoped to achieve a decisive victory, but they were ready to pay a high price for their ambitions. Despite the difficult conditions the Israel Defence Forces proved their superiority and were victorious; nevertheless, we must conclude that, although we must rely on the deterrent power of the Israel Defence Forces, we must rely in the main on their ability to win the victory should we face any additional aggressive adventure on the part of rulers of the neighbouring countries. It is with this in our minds that we must build up the strength of the Israel Defence Forces.

As a result of the experience we have acquired in the past four years, we feel strengthened in our conviction of the rightness of our stand against a return to the conditions prevailing before June 1967, just as we feel strengthened in our conviction of the vital necessity of peace while striving for a fair agreement. Accordingly, no less than in the past, and perhaps even more than in the past, we shall devote our efforts and our resources to ensuring that our army should possess the necessary means of deterrence, fighting and decision; no less than hitherto, and perhaps even more than ever before, we shall not flag in our struggle for peace. In the future, as in the past, the conditions for the attainment of peace continue to be our ability to defend ourselves and to overcome our aggressors, and the conduct of a clear-cut policy preferring peace to new victories.

Members of the Knesset,

This government which the Knesset is requested to invest with its confidence has arisen on the foundation of a clear-cut policy, regarding action for the attainment of peace with each of the neighbouring states as its primary aim. This peace should assure Israel of defensible borders, of unhampered development; it should be a peace that sets an end to wars, enables all the states in our region to devote their resources to construction, creative activity and welfare. In order to attain this objective, the government's endeavours will be directed towards making the most of all the possibilities and prospects involved in the peace conference initiated at Geneva.

Israel will continue to reject the demand for a withdrawal to the lines of June 4, 1967, which were

⁴⁹ Excerpted from the partial text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, March 11, 1974, p. 5.

never recognized boundaries and are not defensible borders. We shall strive for a stable peace and against borders that involve temptations and conditions making for new wars.

As in the past, we shall be ready for agreed arrangements with each of the Arab states, with a view to stabilizing the cease-fire and paving the way to the advancement of peace.

Members of the Knesset,

The 15th government of the State of Israel was supported by 102 Knesset members, but in 1970 the Gahal faction left the government because of its opposition to the peace initiative of the United States government. The approval of this initiative by the government of Israel made possible the cease-fire and the continued strengthening of the IDF. The Likud faction opposed Israel's acceptance of the Security Council resolution of October 22, 1973 regarding the cease-fire. They objected to the government's decision of December 17, 1973 on Israel's participation in the Geneva Peace Conference and opposed the signing of the agreement for the separation of forces on the Egyptian front. These facts influenced our considerations as to the formation of the government required in the coming four years.

In this period the country needs a government whose policy is guided by the striving for peace, a government which has the capacity both to decide and to act in the international sphere. At this time it is preferable for Israel to have a government which does not include representatives of parties whose declared positions and election platform are so incompatible with the policy expressed in the basic principles which I will present to you.

We are now in the midst of efforts to find a political solution to the problems in dispute between the Arab countries and ourselves. The outgoing government—in line with the aims of previous governments—has recently made a series of vital decisions in this direction: It agreed to a cease-fire with Egypt and Syria, signed the six-point agreement with Egypt (on November 11, 1973), carried out the exchange of prisoners agreement with Egypt (during the week from November 15–22), accepted the invitation to participate in the Geneva Conference (which opened on December 21, 1973), signed the separation of forces agreement with Egypt (on January 18, 1974) and expressed its willingness to enter into negotiations on a separation of forces agree-

ment with Syria.

I am convinced that these decisions were necessary in view of the conditions. They were designed to pave the way to peace and to test whether the road is open on the Arab side. Security Council Resolution 338, which I have mentioned, led to the convening of the Geneva Peace Conference. . . .

The separation of forces agreement on the Egyptian front must be regarded as an achievement directly connected with the Conference. Even if the negotiations move from place to place, the Geneva Conference remains the base which makes possible the discussions held in other places as well. We will continue to participate in the Conference with a view to exhausting the positive possibilities which it involves.

The final stage in the execution of the separation of forces agreement with Egypt has just been completed. The IDF forces are deployed along the new lines agreed upon. Since the day the agreement was signed, the cease-fire has been scrupulously observed on the ground, at sea and in the air. The thinning-out of forces has also been executed in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the agreement.

In the document signed by the representatives of both sides, it was stated that the agreement represents the first step towards a final, just and lasting peace. We are all aware that Egypt is still a long way from Israel's vision of peace, but it is of positive significance that even according to the Egyptian version this was the first step towards peace, even if the road is long, even if there are many ups and downs on the way.

The government of Israel also defined its position regarding the way in which we must proceed on the Syrian front. We stated that we would be prepared to discuss a separation of forces agreement with Syria after the Syrian government transmitted a list of our prisoners and permitted visits by the Red Cross.⁵⁰ We were all relieved on February 27 when the American Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, brought with him the list of our prisoners and the news of the decision to allow visits by the Red Cross. The first visit to our prisoners has already taken place. From this platform I wish to express our gratitude to the Secretary of State for his unceasing efforts to achieve this goal. Obviously we have not yet

⁵⁰ See doc. 72 above.

achieved all our goals. We will not rest or be silent until all our prisoners are returned to Israel. We are prepared at all times to reach an agreement for the liberation of all our prisoners and the return of the 386 Syrian and other prisoners who fell into our hands on the northern front. I must point out again that in accordance with the Geneva Convention we expect the immediate return of our wounded prisoners. This is perhaps the place to note that on the Egyptian front all the prisoners were set free some two months before the separation of forces agreement was signed. We hope that the exchange of prisoners on the Syrian front will also soon become possible, in accordance with the positive Egyptian precedent.

We also offer our support and encouragement to the Red Cross, which is trying to ensure proper treatment of our prisoners until their release according to the Geneva Convention.

On March 1, we authorized the American Secretary of State to transmit our general ideas regarding disengagement to the Syrians. We authorized him to inform the Syrians that we are prepared to present detailed ideas within two weeks after the establishment of the new government. We are prepared to send a senior and authorized representative to Washington for this purpose.

Members of the Knesset,

In my statement to the nation on March 8, I said that, according to reliable information in our possession, there were preparations in Syria for aggressive military action. Even today I cannot assure you that we are confident that the Syrian Government has abandoned its preparations for an offensive. The danger still exists and our forces are deployed and prepared as far as is required. The state of preparedness, of course, imposes a burden on the reserves.

We are also prepared to discuss with the Jordanian government the problems between us. We are interested at any time to conduct peace negotiations with Jordan.

We are striving towards a peace settlement between ourselves and Jordan which would be based on the existence of two independent states—Israel, with united Jerusalem as her capital, and an Arab state to the east of Israel. In the neighbouring Jordanian-Palestinian State the identity of the Palestinian and Jordanian Arabs could find expression in peace and good-neighbourly relations between Israel. Israel rejects the establish-

ment of an additional separate Arab state west of the Jordan.

In the course of discussions on the formation of the Government, the question arose as to how the Government should behave if, after negotiations with Jordan, the hour of decision should arrive. My reply on this subject is clear: The Government will conduct negotiations with Jordan and will adopt decisions at each stage of the negotiations, but no peace agreement will be concluded with Jordan if it includes a territorial concession in regard to parts of Judea and Samaria before we ask the people in new elections, should one of the parties participating in the coalition so demand. Members of the Knesset,

On December 16, 1973, before the Government of Israel decided in favour of Israel's participation at the Geneva Conference, I was authorized by the Government to make it clear to external factors that, in our view, this Conference is designed for the conduct of negotiations between those countries directly concerned with the issue of peace in the Middle East—Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon—which border on Israel. As and when the need arises to invite any additional factor, such an invitation would be contingent—like any other proposal within the framework of the conference—on the prior consent of all the participating states. I was authorized to make it clear that Israel is opposed to the invitation of representatives of the terrorist organizations as participants or as observers, for the Government of Israel will not conduct negotiations with terrorist organizations whose declared objective is the destruction of the State of Israel.

Members of the Knesset,

The Government which the eighth Knesset is requested to invest with its confidence has come into being after the Yom Kippur War. This war must leave its mark on our concepts, our actions and our way of life in every sphere. It would be most disturbing were we to hasten back to the routine of yesterday. The lessons learned from the experience, the circumstances and the outcome of this war must be reflected in the actions of the Government, its departments and ministries.

The Israel Defence Forces are currently carrying out their own detailed investigations and inquiries. The process of drawing conclusions within the IDF is being energetically pursued and will be

expressed in the operative plans of all its branches and sections.

From the Defence budget for 1974/75, which was submitted in the Cabinet by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan and Chief of Staff David Elazar, we can clearly discern a series of conclusions adopted as a result of the experience gained in the Yom Kippur War. These lessons concern the organization of the Israel Defence Forces and everything required to strengthen their armament.

The principal matters have also been submitted to the Finance Committee and the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. I feel sure that what we have learned from our experience in the Yom Kippur War will reenforce the power of the IDF to meet any future test.

As the members of the Knesset are aware, the Government resolved on November 18, 1973, upon the establishment of a judicial Enquiry Commission and approached the President of the Supreme Court on this matter. This Commission, which is headed by the President of the Supreme Court, Dr. Agranat, began its work on November 23. Interrogation of witnesses began on November 27. The Commission is diligently carrying out its work of investigation and we await its findings and conclusions. After studying the Agranat Commission's report the new Government will need to take decisions after careful consideration with the utmost responsibility, and without hesitation.

However, we must draw conclusions, not only in the sphere of defence, but in the overall organization of our society and in the government's programme of work. The capacity of Israeli society to learn what changes and improvements are required in methods of work, in the scale of priorities and in our way of life in general is one of the crucial tests which we must face during this period.

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Among Soviet Jewry, cut off from our people, there has been a national awakening, the principal expression of which has been the desire to come and settle in Israel. During the past four years, the wall that enclosed Soviet Jewry for 50 years has been breached. Our struggle for the right to aliya has been one of the major factors in the breaching of this wall.

The Soviet authorities saw fit to respond, if only partially, to the cry of the Jews seeking aliya

and the pressure of world public opinion. We have been privileged to welcome tens of thousands of families to Israel.

This response by the Soviet Union would undoubtedly have entitled it to esteem but for the incessant efforts to intimidate Jews and deter them from trying to settle in Israel. There have been restrictions, persecutions, arrests and show trials. Dozens of prisoners for Zion's sake still languish in prison. During the last six months new trials have been staged, accusing Jews desiring to immigrate of criminal offences.

But despite all these measures of intimidation there are no grounds for the Soviet leaders' allegation that the Jews have no wish to immigrate. In the months following the Yom Kippur War the number of Jews asking for requisitions from Israel exceeds the number of those who obtained exit visas. During the last few months the number of refusals to university graduates increased. The special limitations applying to the granting of immigration visas to Jews from densely populated areas still remain in force.

The Government of Israel calls upon the Soviet authorities to desist from their system of restrictions and persecution, to free the prisoners and, in particular, to grant all those Jews who so desire the right to come to Israel, regardless of their profession or geographical location. The Jews in the Soviet Union who are fighting for the right to aliya are entitled to every encouragement, and the Government of Israel will spare no political effort in aiding them in their struggle to come to Israel. . . .

Members of the Knesset,

Those few of our brethren who have remained in Iraq and in Syria are cut off from us and their lives are in jeopardy. It is the supreme duty of the government to try to save each and every one of them. In the last few days we have been shocked to hear of the dastardly murder of four Jewish women. . . I am sure I am giving expression to the anger and loathing felt by the whole House at this despicable murder, as well as our anxious concern for the fate of the remnants of Syrian Jewry. It is our duty to work for their rescue.

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Interview statements by CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev commenting on the Middle East peace-seeking roles of the USSR and the EEC⁵¹

Moscow, March 11, 1974

Q. (Europe-1 Radio) If we exclude the trip that your Foreign Minister, A. A. Gromyko, made to Damascus and Cairo, one gets the impression that the Soviet Union is in some measure keeping aloof from the settlement of the Near East problem.

A. This is only an impression. Not for a minute have we left the Near East outside the sphere of our attention, and we have never stopped and never will stop defending the just demands of the Arab states. I repeat, what you said is only a superficial impression.

Q. (Agence France-Presse) Do you believe, Mr. General Secretary, that the European Nine can play a certain role at the Geneva conference on the Near East?

A. It is hard for me to say what the Nine think on this question. Therefore, I cannot give you an answer to a question that the Nine themselves have not answered.

However, I might add, in our opinion, every state should be interested in establishing in the Near East a just peace for all the states of this region. We consider it desirable that every state, including the Nine Western European countries, should in one way or another make a positive contribution to the resolution of this important question since our entire planet needs peace.

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Statement by UK Foreign Secretary Callaghan outlining the new Labour government's Middle East policy⁵²

London, March 19, 1974

However we get on in this connection—and we shall do our best to make it succeed—I think that there is common agreement that the largest immediate threat to peace lies perhaps not in Europe but in the Middle East. By a fortunate coincidence, in the week before the election was called, I was able to visit the Middle East and have conversations with both Mrs. Meir and President Sadat.

My talks with President Sadat convinced me that there is a possibility of achieving a situation in the area perhaps short of absolute peace but giving the region an era of stability unknown in more than a generation. Despite what is happening at the moment, I still believe that to be true, because the will is present.

Likewise, my talks with Mrs. Meir left me in no doubt that there is an overwhelming desire for a secure peace in her country, too. But we should be clear that it is Israel which runs the greater risks in the search for peace.

I wish to pay a sincere tribute to the herculean efforts of Dr. Kissinger, whose tireless work has done so much to bring about the present situation of even modified optimism.

Our own policy is that we stand ready to play any rôle that would be constructive in peace-keeping or in the negotiations, but we do not wish to push ourselves forward. I discussed this with both leaders with whom I talked. There is no occasion for Britain to push herself forward unless there is a genuine desire on behalf of the main protagonists for our participation. Then we should consider it very seriously.

We believe that the earliest possible just and lasting solution will come through the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 242. Such a settlement will have to take account of the fundamental principles of that resolution—Israel's withdrawal and the right of every State in the area

⁵¹ Secretary Brezhnev was interviewed by the French press prior to a meeting with Pompidou in Pitsunda. *Pravda* (Moscow), March 11, 1974, pp. 1-2; excerpted from the English translation, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXVI, 10 (April 3, 1974), pp. 5-6. Translation copyright 1974 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at The Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission.

⁵² Made in a speech to the House of Commons; text supplied, on request, by the British Embassy in Beirut.

to live in peace and security. We also believe that there will be no permanent peace unless a settlement provides for a "personality" for the Palestinian people—a word which I choose deliberately for reasons which may not be immediately clear but I believe it to be the best word in the present circumstances.

The other problem resulting from the Middle East conflict—namely, the energy crisis—also needs urgent treatment. When Dr. Kissinger came to London three months ago, the Prime Minister and I had the opportunity of talking to him, and we both welcomed his ideas for cooperation between energy producers and consumers, and we believe that the Washington Energy Conference was a useful and timely initiative.

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Press conference statements by US President Nixon reviewing US Middle East policy after the lifting of the oil embargo⁵³

Houston, March 19, 1974

Q. Mr. President, our Middle East policy seems to point three ways—support for Israel, keeping access to Arab oil and containing the Soviet influence, which seems to be touchy at best. But now with the Arab oil embargo lifted and with Egypt seeming to lead the way in that regard, what does that do to U.S.-Middle East policy and especially should push come to shove regarding Israel?

A. I realize that many of those who support Israel and its independence, as I have since that state came into existence, wonder about the policy of the United States which is now one designed not only to be a friend of Israel but to be a friend of Israel's neighbors.

And I would only suggest that in terms of the future of Israel, it is much better to have the United States a friend of Israel's neighbors and thereby able to influence and perhaps restrain their policies rather than an enemy or with no communication.

And so therefore our policy is designed to accomplish these things:

One, we will continue to support the independence and the integrity of the State of Israel.

Two, we will continue to try to seek not only renewed relations with Egypt but with other countries with which those relations have been broken, as you know in the past, growing out of the June, 1967, war.

But let me make one thing very clear. Being a friend of one of Israel's neighbors does not make us an enemy of Israel.

In the long-term interests of Israel and in the long-term interest of all the countries in the Mideast, it is vital that the United States play a constructive and positive role. For example, the progress on the Syrian disengagement, which will be even more difficult from the disengagement on the Israeli front—Israeli-Egyptian front—is a news item which I think came over the ticker just a few moments ago.

This is a positive move. We have a long way to go. But in the long term we have to realize that a United States role in the Mideast must be one that works with all the countries in the area that are willing to work with us.

The other point that I should make that I know perhaps is not included in your question but is implicit in many questions that are asked in this field: Why is it that we follow this attitude in the Mideast and at a time when the Soviet Union seems to be following, some claim or allege, an obstructionist attitude in the Mideast.

Let me say there cannot be permanent peace in the Mideast unless the United States is for it and plays a role to get it. But also there cannot be permanent peace in the Mideast if the Soviet Union is against it.

As far as the Soviet Union and United States are concerned, our interests are not always the same in the Mideast. In my meetings with Mr. Brezhnev two years ago, also this year, and I trust also later in the year, the problem of peace in the Mideast will be high on the agenda.

We will not always agree. But it is to the interest not only of the countries in the Mideast but of the Soviet Union and the United States to work out a permanent settlement, because it is one of those flash points in the world far more important to the interest of the United States and the Soviet Union than a place like Vietnam.

⁵³ Excerpted from the partial transcript, *New York Times*, March 20, 1974, p. 28. Copyright 1974 by The New York Times Company; reprinted by permission.

And we cannot again, if we can avoid it, run the risk of a confrontation between the two superpowers in that area of the world.

So, I believe our policy is working toward permanent peace with Israel, with her neighbors and working with the Soviet Union where the Soviet Union is willing to work with us, is in the best interests of everybody concerned.

Q. I'd like to follow up that question, Mr. President. In your Chicago meeting with reporters on the Middle East, you said that if the oil embargo lifting had indications that it might be conditional and they might reimpose it, the United States would not be pressured and any implications of pressure would have a counteraffect on the peace negotiations. My question goes to the fact that, according to the news reports, the embargo is lifted on a conditional basis of a review in June. Because of this, will you recommend that Dr. Kissinger break off his efforts in the negotiations between Syria and Israel until there is a firm and final lifting of the embargo?

A. No, I will not, and I will not for this reason, that what the decision was, as I understand, Mr. Jarrell, was that the Arab countries would meet again in June to review the situation. It was not a decision with a condition.

Now, as far as our policy in the Mideast is concerned, we seek a permanent peace as an end in itself. Whatever happens to the oil embargo, peace in the Mideast would be in our interest and in the interests of the whole world.

As far as the oil embargo is concerned, it is in the interest of those countries that imposed it as well as the United States that it be lifted. The two should go parallel. Inevitably, what happens in one area affects the other, and I am confident that the progress we are going to continue to make on the peace front in the Mideast will be very helpful in seeing to it that an oil embargo is not reimposed.

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Statement on the Middle East and Palestine issued by the Coordinating Bureau of the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries⁵⁴

Algiers, March 21, 1974

1) The non-aligned countries hail the heroic struggle waged by the people of Syria, Egypt and the people of Palestine in October 1973 to liberate its land and restore its rights and sovereignty. They consider this struggle an indivisible part of the struggle of the States and peoples of the Third World against colonialism, racism and imperialist domination.

2) The non-aligned countries consider the cause of the Arab territories occupied since 1967 as the cause of all non-aligned countries. Hence they pledge to intensify their efforts in all fields to uphold this cause and adopt all necessary measures to terminate the Israeli occupation and liquidate the consequences of aggression, on the basis that the continuation of such aggression constitutes a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the principles and objectives of non-alignment and poses a grave menace to world peace and security.

3) The non-aligned countries note with concern that Israel has not drawn the lessons it should have drawn from the October war. Though the October War had destroyed the military Zionist arrogance, Israel's leaders still continue to pursue a policy of aggression, annexation of territory, and deprivation of the Arab people of its fundamental rights and sovereignty over its territory. No doubt Israel's intransigence derives from the considerable aid extended to it by the imperialist camp in all fields particularly in the military, economic and political spheres.

4) The non-aligned countries take note with grave concern of the information contained in reports submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations by the Special Committee To Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, composed of Sri Lanka, Somalia and Yugoslavia.⁵⁵ These reports contain irrefutable evidence that Israel is grossly violating the Fourth

⁵⁴ English text as published in *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXV, 576 (April 5, 1974), pp. 20-21.

⁵⁵ Doc. 7 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

Geneva Convention of 1949, the Hague Rules and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and declare that all measures taken by Israel to change the geographic, demographic and economic structure of the Arab occupied territories are null and void, and should under no circumstances be recognized.

5) The non-aligned countries, which firmly believe in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, reaffirm their commitment to the endeavour to establish just peace in the Middle East. Such peace can neither be just nor durable if not established on the following two indispensable fundamental prerequisites:

a—Unconditional withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Arab territories since June 1967.

b—Restoration of the Palestine people's national rights, foremost among which is the right to return to its homeland and exercise its right to self-determination.

6) The non-aligned countries underline the importance of their active participation in all the efforts exerted to solve major international problems. In that respect they are determined to assume fully their role in the efforts aimed at establishing just and durable peace in the Middle East. They also stress the constructive part they can play in the Security Council, in the General Assembly of the United Nations and in other international Organizations and bodies. They stress the need for a continuing role of the United Nations in all the efforts directed towards a just and durable peace in the Middle East based on UN resolutions.

7) The non-aligned countries regard the situation in the Middle East as warranting grave concern because of the continued Zionist imperialist manoeuvres to safeguard the Israeli occupation and compensate its aggression. Therefore, they consider the pretext of "secure borders" which Israel propagates as an overt attempt to delude world public opinion and distract attention from the Israeli policy of annexation and expansion.

Moreover Israel's distorted interpretation of "troop disengagement" is merely a means to prolong occupation, create a *fait accompli* in the occupied Arab territories and return to the State of no war—no peace.

The disengagement of forces would be of no avail if it is not organically linked with the total Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab

territories, and commitment to the restoration of the Arab Palestinian people's national rights.

8) Noting that the raising of the rank of diplomatic representation between Israel and South Africa constitutes a new irrefutable evidence of the common identity and ideological collusion between the racist regimes of Tel-Aviv and Pretoria,

9) Since peace is still remote because of Israel's intransigence, defiance of the International will, persistent aggression, forcible annexation of lands and displacing the Arab inhabitants, the Non-Aligned countries are called upon to assume their responsibilities in full, particularly with regard to the adoption of the following practical measures:

A—Non-Aligned countries which have not as yet severed their diplomatic relations with Israel should do so immediately in implementation of the resolution adopted by the Fourth Summit Conference.

As the non-aligned countries express their appreciation to all states which broke off their relations with Israel, they praise this constructive step which played an effective role in isolating Israel and revealing its aggressive nature.

B—Non-aligned countries are requested not only to boycott Israel diplomatically but also economically and culturally and in the field of maritime and air transport.

C—Exploration of the prospect of depriving Israel of membership in the United Nations and its specialized agencies and barring it from participation in international conferences if it does not withdraw from all the occupied Arab territories in a short period of time and recognize the Palestine people's rights.

D—Non-aligned countries should try to convince by all means those powers which support Israel politically, militarily, economically and otherwise to cease forthwith this aid and support.

E—Ensuring global recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people and its struggle, and considering it a fundamental party in all the efforts exerted to establish just peace.

10) Non-aligned countries are called upon to expose the racist expansionist nature of the Zionist ideology as well as its practices to dismantle national communities by disseminating the seeds of sedition, racism and overt interference in the

internal affairs of states. They should also pledge to condemn at the United Nations and at other international Organizations Zionism as an ideology based on racial superiority similar to Nazism and to the apartheid policy pursued by the White Minority regime in South Africa.

11) In solidarity with the African peoples and countries, all non-aligned, oil-producing countries call for the continuation of the embargo imposed on oil exports to Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia, and ensuring that oil is not smuggled to these countries by any means.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Iraq of Defence Minister Grechko of the USSR⁵⁶

Baghdad, March 26, 1974

Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Defence Minister, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko paid an official friendly visit to the Iraqi Republic from March 23 to 26, at the invitation of General Secretary of the Regional Leadership of the Baath Party, President of the Iraqi Republic and Defence Minister, Marshal Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr.

During the talks between Marshal A. A. Grechko and President Marshal A. H. al-Bakr and Deputy General Secretary of the Regional Leadership of the Baath Party and Vice-President of the Revolutionary Command Council of the Iraqi Republic Saddam Hussein, which proceeded in a friendly atmosphere, questions relating to the state and further development of Soviet-Iraqi cooperation in the military and other fields were comprehensively discussed, and urgent international problems of interest to both Sides, including the state of affairs in the Middle East, were touched upon.

Present at the talks were: from the Soviet Side—Chief of the Main Headquarters of the Navy of the USSR, Admiral of the Fleet N. D. Sergeyev and the Soviet Union's Ambassador to the Iraqi Republic A. A. Barkovsky;

from the Iraqi Side: Member of the Regional

Leadership of the Baath Party and Member of the Revolutionary Command Council T. al-Jazrawi and Chief of Staff General-Colonel A. J. Shenshal.

The Sides noted with satisfaction that the friendly relations existing between the two countries bear a stable character and are determined by the basic interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Republic. These relations continue to develop and strengthen in full accord with the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The Sides expressed satisfaction at the state of cooperation in the military sphere.

During his visit Marshal A. A. Grechko had the opportunity to acquaint himself with the progressive socio-economic and political measures being carried out in Iraq for the good of the people and to strengthen the national unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country.

During the exchange of opinions on urgent international problems the Sides paid special attention to the latest events in the Middle East. They reaffirmed that a just and lasting peace in this area cannot be established without the liberation of all the occupied Arab territories and without ensuring the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The Sides resolutely condemned the continuing intrigues of the forces of imperialism and reaction in this area, and expressed full support for the struggle of the peoples of the world for their freedom and independence.

The exchange of views that took place during the visit on a wide range of questions was, in the view of the Sides, an important positive step in developing friendly and close cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Republic, their peoples and armed forces.

On behalf of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Soviet Government, Marshal A. A. Grechko confirmed the earlier conveyed invitation to President of the Iraqi Republic Marshal A. H. al-Bakr to pay a friendly visit to the Soviet Union in 1974.

Marshal A. A. Grechko expressed deep gratitude to the Iraqi leaders for the hospitality and warm reception accorded him and the persons accompanying him and invited a military delegation of the Iraqi armed forces to visit the USSR. This invitation was accepted with gratitude.

⁵⁶ English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 14 (April 6, 1974), pp. 5-6.

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Communiqué issued by the fourth conference of the Pan African Youth Movement on African solidarity with the Arab cause (excerpt)⁵⁷

Benghazi, March 27, 1974

The unified attitude adopted by African leaders towards Zionist colonialism in occupied Palestine, an attitude which was expressed through the severing of relations with the Zionist state, reflects the profound aspiration of popular masses in Africa who have always realised that the colonialist regimes of Pretoria, Salisbury and Lisbon are linked to the racist regime in Tel Aviv.

This historic decision has opened up new horizons for constructive discussion on the intimate relations between Africa and the Arab nations.

African people and youth must vigorously support the Palestinian people and the Arab peoples who are waging a just struggle for national liberation. This support must continue until their sovereignty and territorial integrity are restored and until the occupied territories are returned.

The conference supports the heroic struggle of the Arabs in Syria, Egypt and Palestine, a struggle that reached the climax in the October War when the myth of the invincibility of Zionist troops was shattered.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of US Secretary of State Kissinger (excerpts)⁵⁸

Moscow, March 28, 1974

In accordance with the previously reached understanding, Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State of the United States and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, visited Moscow from 24 to 28 March. He had discussions

⁵⁷ English text as published in *Free Palestine* (London), VII, 5 (May, 1974), p. 5.

⁵⁸ Excerpted from the English text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXX, 1817 (April 22, 1974), pp. 417, 418.

with Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

In discussing international problems, particular attention was paid to the state of affairs regarding a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. It was agreed that, taking into account their special role at the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, the sides would make efforts to promote the solution of the key questions of the Middle East settlement.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Yugoslavia of President Sadat of Egypt (excerpts)⁵⁹

Belgrade, March 30, 1974

At the invitation of Josip Broz Tito, President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Anwar el Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt paid a working, fraternal visit to Yugoslavia. The time of the visit was March 28–30, 1974.

The two Presidents agreed that the Middle East crisis continues to burden international affairs, stressing the need for a quick, thorough-going, lasting, and equitable solution on the basis of immediate Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territory occupied in 1967 and afterward and the restoration of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian Arabs and their right to self-determination. These conditions were stressed as the only basis for guaranteeing the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and security of all countries and peoples in the region. The two Presidents stress the necessity of blocking further Israeli attempts to evade the UN resolutions in order to hold on to all or part of occupied Arab territories.

President Tito tendered recognition to the heroism, courage, and resolution of Egyptian fighting

⁵⁹ Excerpted from the English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), XXV, 577 (April 20, 1974), p. 16.

men in the last year's "October War". In the spirit of Egyptian-Yugoslav understanding and friendship President Sadat informed President Tito in detail about the Middle East situation and Egyptian efforts to find a peaceful solution.

The two Presidents believe the agreement on military disengagement in the Suez can contribute to the cause of peace only if it represents the first step toward a thorough resolution of the Middle East crisis on the basis and in the spirit of the UN resolutions, particularly Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The two Presidents believe that all interested groups should participate in all efforts to resolve the Middle East crisis.

They particularly stress that the Palestine Liberation Organization, the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arabs, should share fully in all efforts to resolve the Middle East crisis. Accordingly the two Presidents believe that the Geneva Conference should provide for the full and immediate implementation of all relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions under United Nations supervision.

President Tito emphasized that the peoples and government of Yugoslavia would continue to extend all possible support to Egypt and other Arab countries and peoples in their legitimate liberation struggle to force Israel to withdraw fully and unconditionally from all Arab territories occupied in June, 1967 and afterward. President Sadat expressed his great and sincere thanks to the peoples and government of Yugoslavia for their constant and unselfish support of Egypt.

The two Presidents emphasize that efforts to solve the Middle East problem by peaceful means do not limit the inalienable right of the Arab peoples and countries to use all means to fight for the liberation of their occupied territories.

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Interim report of the Israel Commission of Inquiry into the October war—the "Agranat report"⁶⁰

April 2, 1974

CHAPTER 1: PREFACE

1. On November 18, 1973, the Cabinet adopted the following resolution:

Resolved:

A) That the following matters, namely:

1. The information, in the days preceding the Yom Kippur War, concerning the enemy's moves and his intentions to open war, as well as the assessments and the decisions of the duly authorized military and civilian bodies with regard to the aforementioned information;

2. The Israel Defence Forces' deployment for battle in general, its preparedness in the days preceding the Yom Kippur War and its actions up to the containment of the enemy; "Are of vital public importance at this time requiring clarification."

B) That an Inquiry Commission shall be set up to investigate the aforementioned matters and report to the Cabinet.

C) To determine, after consultation with the President of the Supreme Court, that the Commission shall be composed of five members.

D) To determine that the matters which are the subject of the investigation and the Commission's deliberations require secrecy, as laid down in section 23 of the Inquiry Commissions Law, 1968, excluding paragraphs (1) and (6) therein, and to request the approval of the Knesset Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee for this determination.

E) To apprise the President of the Supreme Court of this resolution.

Following on this resolution, the President of the Supreme Court, by virtue of the powers vested in him under para. 4 (a) of the Inquiry Commissions Law 1968, appointed the Chairman and members of the Commission as follows: Dr. Shimon Agranat, President of the Supreme Court, Chairman; Mr. Moshe Landau, Supreme Court Justice, member; Dr. Yitzhak Nebenzahl, State Comptroller, member; Lieut.-Gen. (Res.) N.B. Yigael Yadin, Professor at the Hebrew University, member; Lieut.-Gen. (Res.) Haim Laskov, IDF Ombudsman, member.

⁶⁰ English text as published by the government of Israel; archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies.

2. After deciding on its procedure, the Commission on November 25, 1973 started to hear evidence and up till now it has held 140 meetings and heard 58 witnesses. In addition, much evidence was submitted to the Commission in writing. At this juncture, the Commission has concluded the hearing of testimony and the receipt of other evidence on some of the subjects included in its terms of reference which are, in the following order: The information, in the days preceding the Yom Kippur War, on the enemy's measures and on his intentions to start war; the assessment of that information; the preparedness of the IDF in the days preceding the war, up to the launching of the enemy attack; the decisions of the military and civilian authorities, taken on the basis of this information and its evaluation. This partial report relates to these subjects only. In it the Commission does not discuss subjects relating to the general preparedness of the IDF (including matters of order and discipline, training and fighting doctrine, equipment and munitions, emergency stores and their operation, methods of mobilization and transporting troops to the front, analysis of the location, function and objectives of the strongholds and outposts and their functioning in practice) nor the conduct of military operations until the point of the containment of the enemy advance, even though the Commission has already heard a great deal of testimony on these additional subjects as well. In particular, we would like to stress already at this point that we are not yet discussing the painful problem of the stationing of the force at the Suez Canal strongholds: This force, though it fought with devotion and made its contribution to the containment of the enemy, was in fact insufficiently co-ordinated and trained. We shall be dealing with this theme when we come to analyse the entire complex of problems relating to the functions and purposes of the strongholds and outposts and their actual operation, since these problems are closely interwoven.

It emerges therefore that, chronologically, the Commission in this report deals with the two intermediate chapters (the information and its evaluation; the state of alert) and leaves for a later report the other two subjects (the deployment that preceded the state of alert, and the battles up to the containment of the enemy, which began with the ending of the period of alert). However, it should already be stated now that when we

come to discuss these additional subjects, we shall be quite unable to consider them from all aspects because of their enormous scope. We shall, therefore, concentrate on selected aspects of the questions as a whole, which seem to us of particular importance.

3. In the presentation of the partial report, in accordance with the authority given to the Commission under clause 19 (a) of the law, we have not ignored two considerations in favour of presenting a single report to include all our findings and recommendations regarding all the subjects detailed in the terms of reference of the Commission. Those considerations are: a) these subjects, particularly the preparedness and deployment of the IDF, are interconnected to a greater or lesser degree; b) in regard to the evaluation of the behaviour of the holders of various offices, it would have been preferable not to split up the consideration according to the various subjects. On the other hand, however, the Commission realized that, because of the large quantity of testimony submitted to it, its deliberations had already gone on for a long time and a considerable period would elapse before it could complete its work. The public is entitled to learn as soon as possible of the findings and recommendations on those subjects on which the Commission has concluded its deliberations, and it is desirable that the Government may be able to act in accordance on them without delay.

Furthermore, this partial report does not even contain all that the Commission has to say on the subjects of the information and its assessment and the state of alert of the IDF, because the Commission realizes that it would be preferable to publish as soon as possible its main conclusions and recommendations on the institutional level and with regard to the holders of certain posts and offices. It has found it possible to do so because, after lengthy and full consultation between its members, it has already reached an opinion on such conclusions and recommendations, but the formulation of its detailed reasoning is likely to continue for some time. The Commission accordingly found it advisable to publish these conclusions and recommendations first immediately, while the full reasoning will be given in a further partial report.

This report contains a general, very brief, description of facts, insofar as such a description

is needed for an understanding of the conclusions. In view of its contents, this report may be published, whereas the further report, which contains a detailed description of the facts and a complete exposition of the Commission's conclusions reached by the Commission, will contain many secret facts, which in all probability will rule out publication in full.

4. *The Character and Procedure of the Commission*

An analysis of the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 1968 (hereafter the Law) shows that the Commission has a quasi-judicial character. Furthermore, the fact that, in accordance with article 4 (a) of the Law, the composition of the Commission is determined by the President of the Supreme Court indicates there is no link between the Commission and the Government, and that it is not a "Government Commission of Inquiry." In other words, by introducing this special arrangement, the Legislature intended to accord such a Commission of Inquiry absolute independence and to ensure that it should be independent in arriving at its findings and recommendations, and should have the confidence of the public.

5. In its resolution, the Cabinet decided that "the matters which are the subject of the investigation and the commission's deliberations require secrecy, as laid down in section 23 of the inquiry commissions law, 1968, excluding paragraphs (1) and (6) therein," and this finding was approved by the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee in its resolution of November 19, 1973. Accordingly, the Commission took care to hold its deliberations *in camera* and to preserve meticulous secrecy regarding the evidence presented to it, bearing in mind that secrecy itself is indivisible. Generally it is better for a commission of inquiry into "matters of vital public importance at the time and requiring clarification" (in the terms of Para. 1 of the law) to hold its deliberations openly, and indeed the principle of public hearings is laid down in detail in para. 18 (a). Nevertheless, in the same paragraph the Legislature also accorded the commission of inquiry itself the right "to hold deliberations wholly or partly *in camera* if it finds this necessary in order to preserve the security of the State." In our case, the decision on complete secrecy, taken by the Government in advance in accordance with para. 23 of the Law, was an absolute necessity, since the investigation showed

that the material presented as testimony includes a large amount of facts and information of a most sensitive security nature, which must not be published and thus become known to the enemy, with the grave harm for the State which would be involved.

6. *The Commission's Use of Para. 15 of the Law*

We hesitated over the correct interpretation of para. 15 of the Law and feel it necessary to preface a few words of explanation of the interpretation of this paragraph that we adopted.

This paragraph states:

"a) If a Commission of Inquiry finds that a certain individual is liable to be harmed by the inquiry or its results, the Chairman of the Commission shall inform him in what respect he is liable to be harmed and shall place at his disposal, in such manner as he sees fit, the testimony concerning the said damage and which is in the possession of the Commission or of anyone who has been assigned the task of gathering material under paragraph 13.

"b) A person who has been informed under sub-para. (a) is entitled to appear before the Commission, either in person or through an attorney, in order to present his case and cross-question witnesses even if they have already testified before the Commission and the Commission is authorized to permit him to submit proofs provided they are in connection with the said damage."

In our view, the purpose of this clause is to prevent an individual from being harmed as a result of testimony presented to the Commission without his knowledge in such a way that he is denied the opportunity to react to it. In view of this aim, we did not apply clause 15 when the evidence of an individual led to the drawing of conclusions to his detriment (in the nature of a confession) or where such a conclusion emerged from a document to which he was a party or from minutes or the record of deliberations in which he took part. But we drew no conclusions from any documents to the detriment of any witness without his being given the opportunity to make his own statement on the contents of the document. *On the other hand*, when it emerged from the testimony of another witness or from documents submitted by another witness that evidence had been presented which was detrimental to a certain individual without his knowledge, we applied para-

graph 15 with regard to such testimony, and informed the person concerned of his right to cross-examine witnesses who had already testified or to submit further evidence—with the help of an attorney, if he so desire.

We are convinced that the interpretation we have given to paragraph 15 is in keeping with the requirements of justice and has ensured a fair hearing for any person who has appeared before us and is mentioned to his detriment in this report. We are also convinced that any broader interpretation of this clause would have stultified the inquiry entirely, by irreparably complicating its procedures.

7. The members of the Commission themselves questioned the witnesses who were invited by it and appeared before it, and they all testified by solemn affirmation. In addition to the testimony and other evidence heard by the Commission directly, it also, under the powers vested in it by para. 13 of the Law, assigned to six senior army reserve officers the task of collecting complementary factual material on certain aspects of the readiness and deployment of the IDF during the war, and its operations until the containment of the enemy. This material was gathered by taking evidence, not under affirmation, from army personnel who agreed to testify before the collectors of material, and by obtaining documents and other exhibits. The Commission deemed it necessary to seek the aid of the collectors of material because of the large scope of the factual details touching on the said subjects and because of the many applications in writing that reached the Commission from army personnel, pointing out various flaws and defects that they had encountered in connection with the arrangements for their mobilization, the state of equipment, the quality of the weapons at their disposal, etc. Those appointed to gather material as aforesaid were:

Maj.-Gen (Res.) Joseph Avidar

Maj.-Gen. (Res.) Moshe Goren

Brig.-Gen (Res.) Shimon Gilboa

Col. (Res.) Yisrael Carmi

Col. (Res.) Yehoshua Nevo

Col. (Res.) Moshe Tamir

The above have now in fact completed their task. Even though the major part of the very large amount of material they gathered pertains to the subjects which the Commission has not yet begun to discuss, we would like to take this oppor-

tunity to thank the reserve officers who gathered the material for their willingness to carry out the tasks assigned to them, and express our appreciation for the devoted and skilful manner in which they carried out their task.

8. Consideration of the causes of the errors and mistakes, which it was essential to hold in order to clarify the truth and draw the necessary conclusions regarding the future, should not detract from the recognition of the decisive achievement of the IDF, which overcame a surprise enemy offensive on two fronts and through its soldiers' great devotion and readiness for sacrifice, repelled the attack and overcame the enemy.

CHAPTER 2: THE PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE SUBJECTS OF INFORMATION, ITS EVALUATION AND THE READINESS OF THE IDF

9. In our criticism of the evaluations of the Intelligence Branch at GHQ and other bodies, we exercised extreme caution not to be drawn into "wisdom after the event," and tried to view matters in the light of the situation as it was at the time the evaluations were made and the decisions taken.

10. The opening of the war by Egypt and Syria on Yom Kippur, October 6, 1973, at approximately 14.00 hours, took the Israel Defence Forces by surprise in that until the early morning hours of that day the IDF's Supreme Command and the political leadership did not evaluate that total war was about to commence—and on the morning of that day, when it was already clear to them that the war would break out, the Supreme Command mistakenly assumed that it would break out only at 18.00 hours. Responsibility for these mistaken evaluations should be placed primarily on the Director of Military Intelligence [DMI] and on his Principal Assistant in charge of the Intelligence Branch's Research Department, which is the only body in the country engaged in intelligence research. They failed by providing the IDF with totally insufficient warning: It was only at about 4.30 a.m. on Yom Kippur that the DMI, on the strength of fresh intelligence he had received, notified that the enemy would open war at 18.00 hours on both fronts. This brief warning did not allow for mobilization of the reserves in an orderly fashion, and involved the hasty mobilization of the land forces, contrary to the regular time-tables and mobilization proce-

dures. The additional error of four hours, between 18.00 and 14.00, further reduced the interval between the call-up of the reserves and the opening of fire by the enemy. This second error caused further disruptions in the readiness of the regular forces at the fronts and their correct deployment, particularly on the Canal front.

11. There were three reasons for the failure of the authorities responsible for evaluation: Firstly, their obdurate adherence to what was known as "the conception," according to which a) Egypt would not launch war against Israel before she had first ensured sufficient air power to attack Israel in depth, and in particular Israel's principal airfields, so as to paralyse the Israeli air force, and b) that Syria would only launch an all-out attack on Israel simultaneously with Egypt. We learned, on grounds to be detailed in our further partial report, that the first and decisive part of this conception, which may well have been correct at one time, was not adequately reconsidered in view of the pressure of the changing political circumstances, and, in particular, on the basis of further information that reached the Director of Military Intelligence concerning the build-up of enemy strength with additional armaments systems. This "conception" had, therefore, in practice become obsolete. Secondly, the Director of Military Intelligence assured the IDF that he would be able to give advance warning of any enemy intention to launch all-out war in good time to allow for the orderly call-up of the reserves. This undertaking was assumed as the firm foundation for the defence plans of the IDF. We find there were no grounds for giving the IDF such an absolute undertaking.

Thirdly, in the days preceding the Yom Kippur War, the Intelligence Branch (Research) had received numerous warning reports, supplied to it by the information-gathering department of the Intelligence Branch and by other information-gathering authorities in the country. The Research Division of the Intelligence and the Director of Military Intelligence did not correctly evaluate the warnings contained in these reports, owing to their doctrinaire adherence to the "conception" and the fact that they were prepared to explain the enemy deployment along the front lines, which was without precedent in the size of the forces and in their orientation towards the fronts.

on the assumption that all this testified only to a defensive deployment in Syria and the holding of a multi-arm "exercise" in Egypt, similar to exercises held there in the past.

For this reason the Director of Military Intelligence also displayed exaggerated caution in the circumstances by failing to take additional measures that were at his disposal and which might have revealed important complementary information. The enemy thus succeeded in misleading the IDF and taking them by surprise under the guise of an exercise supposedly taking place in Egypt. Only on the morning of Friday, October 5, did the confidence of the Intelligence Branch in the correctness of its evaluation begin to be shaken, and then only when particularly clear reports were received which it would have been hard to reconcile with the assumption that the enemy build-up was no more than a defence system and an "exercise." And yet the correct conclusion was still not drawn, and the summary of the evaluation of the Intelligence Branch continued to be: "Low probability" and even "Lower than low" probability of the enemy launching a war. Only early in the morning of Saturday, Yom Kippur, after further ambiguous reports were received, did the Director of Military Intelligence come to the conclusion that war would break out the same day.

12. In the evaluation of the information on the enemy's moves and his intention to launch a war made by holders of other positions, the decisive influence is evident of the Director of Military Intelligence and the Research Division of the Intelligence Branch, resulting from the fact that they were the only centre for the evaluation of military intelligence in the country, and that they were in control of the total body of intelligence information that had accumulated in their possession from the information-gathering authorities of the Intelligence Branch itself, from the secret intelligence services and from other information-gathering authorities, while the Intelligence Branch disseminated this information, as compiled data, to other authorities, with its own evaluation as "intelligence," and it decided who should get the raw material and what material should be disseminated.

13. The mistakes of the Intelligence Branch were not the only mistakes disrupting the IDF's moves at the beginning of the war. In addition,

there were errors in the working of the state of readiness during the days preceding the war. There was an unjustified delay in the mobilization of the reserves. It is our opinion that, on the basis of the data in his possession, the Chief of Staff should already have recommended partial mobilization of the land forces at the beginning of the week preceding the war, to maintain the right proportions between the enemy forces, which were at full alert and prepared for action against us, and our own forces. At the very latest, he should have recommended—in view of reports received—extensive mobilization on the morning of Friday, October 5, even assuming that the enemy's intentions were still not clear at that time.

Secondly, we have found that, in total reliance on the Intelligence Branch's assurance that it could always give the IDF sufficient warning for orderly mobilization of the reserves, no defence plan properly worked out in detail was prepared for the eventuality that the regular forces would have to check, on their own, an all-out attack by the enemy on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts simultaneously—with the IDF being caught by surprise as they were.

Thirdly, even after receipt of the warning on Saturday morning, the regular armoured forces on the Canal front were not optimally deployed in time, under the circumstances created, in accordance with the plan that existed for the defensive deployment of the regular forces. Furthermore, no clear directive was given that morning to the GOC Southern Command and from him also to the lower echelons, as to how they were to prepare for the attack, and lack of clarity prevailed in issuing operational orders and ensuring their implementation.

14. (a) At the meeting of the IDF General Staff on September 24, 1973, the GOC Northern Command, Maj-Gen. Yitzhak Hofi, expressed concern at the limitations involved in receiving sufficient warning in view of the dangerous situation on the Golan Heights following increased Syrian deployment by means of an effective anti-aircraft missile alignment. The Minister of Defence was impressed by the GOC Northern Command's concern, particularly in view of the threat to the Golan Heights settlements posed by the Syrian deployment. On September 26, the eve of Rosh Hashana, he visited the area in

order to gain a first-hand impression of the situation, and also issued a warning to the Syrians. A certain reinforcement of armoured and artillery deployment on the Golan Heights was decided upon.

(b) On the Minister of Defence's initiative, the Prime Minister decided to convene, following her return from her trip to Strasbourg and Vienna on September 30 to October 2, a military-political consultation on October 3, with the participation of Ministers Allon, Galili and Dayan—as well as the Chief of Staff and Brig.-Gen. Arye Shalev, the DMI's assistant (research), who was filling in for the DMI who was indisposed that day. At this meeting views were exchanged on the situation along the frontiers, particularly on the Golan Heights. Brig.-Gen. Shalev gave an intelligence report which concluded with the assessment that “the possibility of an Egyptian-Syrian war does not seem likely to me, since there has been no change in their assessment of the state of forces in Sinai so that they could go to war.” None of those present disagreed with this assessment. At the end of this consultation the Prime Minister decided to submit the subject of the situation along the borders for discussion in the Cabinet following Yom Kippur, at the regular Cabinet meeting scheduled for Sunday, October 7.

On the morning of Friday, October 5, following receipt of further disturbing reports and after a meeting between the Defence Minister and the Chief of Staff, a further consultation was held at the Prime Minister's, with the participation of the Defence Minister, the Chief of Staff and the DMI. The Chief of Staff informed the meeting that on Yom Kippur there would be an extremely high state of alert throughout the IDF, especially in the Air Force and the Armour, and that the tank forces on both fronts would be reinforced. At the end of this consultation the Prime Minister decided to convene for that day a meeting of the Ministers who were then in Tel Aviv. Held towards noon, the meeting was attended by Ministers Bar-Lev, Dayan, Hillel, Chasani, Peres and Galili, as well as the Chief of Staff and the DMI. The latter's evaluation was still that we were not facing total war, and the Chief of Staff supported this evaluation, while expressing the opinion that there was no proof that the enemy did not intend to attack. He reiterated that he had declared a maximum alert within the regular forces, but

that “the mobilization of reserves and additional measures are being held back until there are further indications.”

At the end of this meeting the Prime Minister announced that the security situation would be placed on the agenda of the Cabinet session scheduled for Sunday, October 7, and, should it be necessary to mobilize reserves before then, the Ministers present authorized the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence to decide upon mobilization of reserves. The Prime Minister also instructed the Government Secretary to ascertain the whereabouts of the Ministers on the following day, in order to make it possible to summon them on Yom Kippur in case of need.

15. Early on Saturday morning, the further information was received which raised the opening of total war by the enemy to a degree of near-certainty. The C-o-S consulted with his senior aides, and gave further preparatory orders in anticipation of mobilization of the reserves. In a discussion between the Defence Minister and the C-o-S, the latter recommended mobilization of the entire reserves to prepare for large-scale counter-attacks, after containment of the enemy. The Defence Minister, on the other hand, favoured mobilization of the maximal force which, in the opinion of the C-o-S, sufficed for defensive purposes. A delay of about two hours occurred in a mobilization of the size agreed to by the Defence Minister that morning in the discussion between him and the C-o-S, because the C-o-S awaited the Premier's decision on the full mobilization of the reserves.

At 09.05 the Premier immediately approved mobilization of the defensive force, and at 09.25 she decided in favour of total mobilization as recommended by the C-o-S. At the same discussion at the Prime Minister's, it was decided for political reasons not to deliver a preventive blow, as proposed by the C-o-S. The Prime Minister then conferred with the US Ambassador, in order to explain the situation to the US Government. After this meeting a Cabinet session, beginning at 12 noon, was held. The Cabinet Ministers voiced no opposition to the decision not to launch a preventive attack on the enemy.

CHAPTER 3: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL

16. According to the Basic Law: the Govern-

ment, para. 29: “The Government is authorized to carry out on behalf of the State, in accordance with any law, any act whose implementation is not lawfully entrusted to any other authority.” This implies that the Government is also entrusted with the management of State security affairs insofar as no other authority is empowered to act in this sphere by any other law: such as the authority of the Minister of Defence regarding laws whose implementation is specifically entrusted to him.

In accordance with para. 27 of the same law, the Government is entitled to act by means of Cabinet committees, permanent, temporary, or for specified issues, and, in accordance with para. 31 (a) “authority entrusted to the Government by law may be transferred by the Government to one of the Ministers.”

This means that the general authority of the Government in accordance with the aforementioned section 29, to carry out on behalf of the State, subject to any law, any act which is not entrusted to any other authority, is also within the category of the Government's authority which may be transferred to one of the Ministers in accordance with para. 31 (a).

17. We have learned from the evidence before us that there is a lack of clear definition as to the division of authority, duties and responsibilities concerning security matters amongst the three authorities dealing with these matters: the Government and the Prime Minister; the Minister of Defence; and the Chief of Staff, who heads the IDF; and in the determination of the relationship between the political leadership and the IDF High Command. Particularly vital is such a clear definition of authority in cases wherein the initiative lies in the hands of the enemy. Furthermore, we have found no explicit authority in the law for the practice whereby the Chief of Staff is appointed by the Government on the recommendation of the Minister of Defence. The unclarity in all these respects is evidently of historic origin—dating back to the time when the late David Ben-Gurion served both as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, and his strong personality affected the lack of definition on this important subject. One thing, however, is clear from the constitutional aspect: It has never been decided that the Minister of Defence is a “Super Chief of Staff” who is required to guide the Chief

of Staff in the latter's area of responsibility on operational matters, or a kind of supreme commander of the IDF by virtue of his being Minister of Defence. The inadequate definition of powers prevailing in the present situation in the field of security, the vital importance of which is unsurpassed, hampers the effectiveness of the work, detracts from the focusing of legal responsibility, and causes uncertainty and frustration amongst the public.

We have not considered it our duty to enter in depth into the question of coordination of authority between the three aforementioned systems and will be content, therefore, with pointing out the need for the Government and the Knesset to consider this problem with a view to finding a solution. We assume that rigid definitions, providing in advance for any situation that may arise, cannot be achieved, but even definitions of a somewhat broad legal nature are preferable to no definition whatsoever.

18. It is particularly necessary to clarify who is authorized to order operations to be carried out in situations likely to arise in the face of a sudden threat, or in cases where speed is essential, such as the activation of regular forces, mobilization of supplementary reserves or any other form of mobilization, when there is no time to convene the Cabinet—as was the case early in the morning of Yom Kippur.

Government Procedures on Security Matters

19. We have learned that in the course of time there has been a malfunctioning in the performance of the duties that the Government has to carry out in top-level discussions and decisions on security affairs. This malfunctioning is connected with the disappearance of the Cabinet Committee on Security Affairs in its original format, limited in the number of its members. Ever since the formation of a broad coalition in 1967, this Committee has been expanded in order to ensure the representation of all parties in the coalition and even the factions within the parties. In the final outcome, 17 out of the Cabinet's 24 members participated in the Cabinet Committee. Under these circumstances, the special Committee had in fact ceased to exist, the entire Cabinet becoming the "Cabinet Committee on Security Affairs"—and this only in order to ensure, in this manner, top secrecy in its deliberations.

20. The adoption of correct decisions on matters of supreme importance depends on the receipt of current information and the receipt of full additional information on the specific issue under discussion. According to testimony submitted to us, there is a serious problem of leakage of information from Cabinet sessions. This has, on occasion, prevented the submission of full information to the Cabinet. In the opinion of the Commission, this phenomenon must be overcome by the formation of a Cabinet Committee for Security Affairs, with a really small number of members—and this consideration must, in our opinion, be a decisive one in the formation of such a committee—and by meticulous observance of the law and the Cabinet regulations designed to ensure secrecy in discussions on security matters. Thus there would no longer be any excuse for transferring the focus of discussions on a security or political-security matter from the Cabinet or its Committee to bodies established on an *ad hoc* basis and not authorized by the Cabinet. The Prime Minister is of course entitled to consult, at any time and as she sees fit, other Ministers and holders of relevant posts on matters for which they are responsible, so long as the authority of the Cabinet to discuss matters and take decisions is not affected.

21. We also believe that in time of war, it is appropriate that the Cabinet should authorize the Prime Minister to form a small ministerial team of no more than five members, headed by the Prime Minister, and responsible for taking decisions on urgent matters connected with the management of the war. This is also necessary in order to enable the remaining Ministers to continue to devote their full attention, even in times of war, to the affairs of their own ministries, so that these will not be neglected, particularly in times of emergency. The Deputy Prime Minister, or another Minister, could conduct regular Cabinet sessions in which other matters requiring a Cabinet decision at such a time may be dealt with. Naturally, basic issues, long-range issues, and issues of special importance will continue to be reserved for discussion and decision by the full Cabinet.

22. Intelligence Community—Intelligence Evaluation

a) As noted above, the factual situation on the eve of the Yom Kippur War—and over a period of many years before then—was that only one body in the intelligence community, namely, the

General Staff's Intelligence Branch, engaged in intelligence evaluation, research and evaluation of reports. This intelligence evaluation was, thus, the only one submitted to the Chief of Staff, the Defence Minister, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. This system of evaluation in the intelligence community had grave reflections on the evaluation of the intelligence information by the governmental authorities on the eve of the war.

It should be noted that a similar situation existed in part during the tenure of the late David Ben-Gurion in the early 'sixties. Dissatisfied with the lack of clarity in matters relating to subordination and the evaluation functions of the bodies in the intelligence community, Ben-Gurion appointed in the first half of 1963 a committee of two (Yigael Yadin and Ze'ev Sharef) to define the subordination and tasks of these bodies. This committee was appointed by Ben-Gurion on the eve of his retirement to Sdeh Boker, out of concern, *inter alia*, that this situation—which, by virtue of his serving simultaneously as both Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, generally functioned satisfactorily—might deteriorate.

b) On July 31, 1963, the Committee submitted its report to the Prime Minister, the late Levi Eshkol. The Committee's report was based on four basic assumptions (para. 5 of the report), which in turn were based on the primary assumption that the functions of Prime Minister and Minister of Defence do not necessarily have to be concentrated in the hands of one person. The first and last basic assumptions, which concern our subject matter, are quoted hereunder in full:

“(a) The Prime Minister must be in possession of a complete picture of all the activities of the State's secret services, namely: their current work plans, planning for future activities, difficulties and limitations, and so forth. . . .

“(b) It is essential for the Prime Minister to be in possession of evaluations on political, security and other subjects—balanced and based on different viewpoints and not stemming specifically from one channel.”

(c) In order to accomplish the aforementioned aims, the committee submitted a number of principal recommendations, relating to both “research and evaluations” (paras. 14–15 of the report) and the tools with which the Prime Minister should be equipped for controlling these issues (paras. 18–20):

“14. The committee accordingly recommends the examination of the possibility of strengthening the Foreign Ministry's Research Department so that it should be capable of presenting independent political evaluations, both on Middle Eastern issues and on other political subjects, as required.

“15. By strengthening the Research Department, a certain balance would be created for the security and political evaluations, which are presently made almost solely by the Intelligence Branch's Research Department.”

The committee also observed that “the continued existence of an intelligence agency (‘Israel's Secret Intelligence Service’), in possession of secret information-gathering instruments, facilitates to some extent, the formation of an evaluation, although limited in value.”

“18. On the strength of the basic assumptions and our recommendations for organizing the service, the committee regards as a matter of vital importance the appointment of a special adviser to the Prime Minister on intelligence matters. This special adviser must be a person of high calibre, who would devote all his time to the task and would be subordinate only to the Prime Minister.

“19. The function of the adviser would be to assist the Prime Minister in keeping in touch with the activities carried out and planned by the various secret services.

“20. His powers would be:

“(a) He would participate regularly in the Heads of Services' committee.

“(b) He would participate regularly in all meetings of the Prime Minister with any of the Heads of Services, or in any discussion of the Prime Minister on secret activities, or in a political and security discussion related to secret activity.

“(c) He would be entitled to demand information from every Service, either directly through the Head of Service, or by direct contact with departments and units of the Service (via the Head of Service, of course).

“(d) On the initiative or with the approval of the Prime Minister, he would be entitled to investigate the methods of operation of an entire Service or a unit thereof, and to review evaluations submitted to the Prime Minister—both by talks with the submitters of evaluations, and by the receipt of raw material where necessary.”

It is to be regretted that these two principal

recommendations were not implemented in practice or systematically. The then Prime Minister hesitated to appoint a special adviser on intelligence matters both because of the difficulty of finding the right appointee and the "natural" lack of enthusiasm of the Heads of Services; and because it appeared that the holder of such an office would not be fully employed.

The gist of the committee's recommendations was presented by the Prime Minister to the Knesset Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday, September 11, 1963 (Protocol No. 37) and Monday, October 7, 1963 (Protocol No. 39). It should be noted that the discussion in the Committee did not go into the subject thoroughly, and was held without the report having been submitted to the members in the original. Some members of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee (not divided along party lines) shared the Prime Minister's hesitation to appoint a special adviser on intelligence (bearing in mind the then sensitive issue of the Chief of the Secret Service), while other members (again irrespective of party divisions) thought the recommendations should be considered.

The Foreign Ministry's Research Department was not sufficiently strengthened in line with the functions proposed for it in the aforementioned report. The reasons (budgetary in the main) which the present Commission heard from the Foreign Minister to account for the non-strengthening—in fact, depletion—of the Research Department did not convince the Commission.

(d) We have reached the conclusion that the state of affairs which existed up to the Yom Kippur War—which prevented independent political, strategic, operational and tactical intelligence evaluations because of their concentration in one organization and under one authority on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the absence of a special adviser to the Prime Minister on intelligence to allow for independent evaluation—played a major role in the inability to arrive at a true intelligence picture from all aspects.

Accordingly, the Commission recommends the immediate adoption of the following measures:

1. To appoint a special adviser to the Prime Minister on intelligence (not a regular army man, although, of course, he could be an officer in the reserves), his functions and powers to be as designated in the report of the committee submitted

to the Prime Minister in 1963. Acting in concert with this adviser there must be a small but high-level team which would enable the Prime Minister (and through her the entire Cabinet) to effect an independent political-strategic intelligence evaluation on the basis of all the material in the possession of the various information-gathering services. At the same time, it should be made absolutely clear that this adviser must not be allowed to be a buffer between the intelligence community's Heads of Services and the Prime Minister. The Commission is aware of the fact that by virtue of his functions as defined above, the adviser on intelligence is likely to come into contact with officers of the Intelligence Branch contrary to all rules of military practice; on the other hand, it is convinced that this is essential for the efficient fulfilment of his functions.

2. To strengthen the Foreign Ministry's Research Department by its organization as an independent body within the framework of the Foreign Ministry, one of its principal aims being the carrying out of an independent political-strategic intelligence evaluation, mainly on the basis of the special material at its disposal; to reinforce the department with suitable staff, qualitatively and quantitatively.

3. To lay down clear rules for dissemination and feed-back—both to the various research bodies and to the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister—of the raw intelligence material collected by the information-gathering bodies inside and outside the Intelligence Branch, regardless of whether it is their primary or secondary task.

4. To effect substantial and fundamental changes in the structure of the Intelligence Branch and the Intelligence Corps themselves—ensuring that the centre of gravity of research and evaluation should be in the spheres of military, strategic, operational and tactical intelligence (including reorganization of Field Intelligence and its appropriate representation at General Staff level), giving suitable expression and even encouragement to the expression of various and conflicting views among the Research Department's staff in Intelligence Branch evaluations disseminated to the various bodies, appointing suitable staff, including civilians, to the Research Department in accordance with optimal routes of advancement and suitable rotation within and outside the Department, and ensuring regular control of

intelligence evaluations.

5. An evaluation unit for the material collected by the Secret Intelligence Service should be set up within the Service.

All the aforementioned recommendations, without exception, are designed to ensure pluralism in the various types of intelligence evaluation, as well as to provide the Prime Minister with the requisite tools to ensure the efficient functioning of the entire intelligence community for the provision of warning, and analysis of their intelligence evaluations.

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS ABOUT OFFICE-HOLDERS

23. *The Director of Military Intelligence, Major-General Eliyahu Ze'ira*, testified before us very frankly and showed himself to be an officer of outstanding intellectual ability, enjoying great authority over his subordinates and highly regarded by his superiors in the IDF and the higher political echelons. He had served in his position for only a year before the outbreak of the war, and was confronted with patterns of thought which were determined in the Intelligence Branch's research before his appointment. But he adopted the "conception," which, through its rigidity, deadened the necessary openness and the willingness always to contend anew with the information which flowed into the Intelligence Branch, and he even played his part in strengthening it. He displayed a prominent tendency to take unqualified decisions as an officer stemming from great self-confidence and readiness to act as final arbiter in Intelligence matters in Israel. For example, at the meeting of the Knesset's Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee on May 18, 1973, he said:

"The Chief of Staff must decide, and his decisions must be clear. The best assistance that the Director of Military Intelligence can render the Chief of Staff—if it is objectively possible—is to give him as clear and sharp an evaluation as is possible. It is true that the clearer and sharper the evaluation then, if it is mistaken, it is a clear and sharp mistake—but that is a risk the Director of Military Intelligence takes."

Thus, in his testimony before us, he answered a question posed by a member of the Commission why he did not consult the Chief of Staff regarding a most important operational decision which he took on his own responsibility in a matter in which his superiors were misled into thinking that the

matter under consideration had been taken into account in the course of the Director of Military Intelligence's evaluations:

"During most of my years in the IDF I was not a staff officer but a field commander, and insofar as possible my character does not lead me to pass on responsibility upwards. For in the kind of process you... describe... it is like saying: Here is a complex situation, you decide. So I didn't feel like doing that. In general I very very seldom do things like that. Things which fall within my sphere of responsibility I don't usually bring up to my superiors and tell them: Although it's my responsibility, I am passing on the responsibility to you; you decide."

Our opinion is that in the light of his serious failure Major-General Ze'ira can no longer continue to serve in his position as Director of Military Intelligence.

24. In the hands of *Brigadier-General Arye Shalev*, as assistant to the Director of Military Intelligence in charge of research, was concentrated the subject of research and evaluation in the Intelligence Branch—that subject in which the Intelligence Branch failed so grievously. He had served in this capacity, previously under the title of Head of the Research Department, for a long time, since September-October 1967. He played an important part in moulding methods of research, analysis, evaluation and preparation of the information for distribution from this department in recent years. According to his testimony before us his approach to the "conception" was flexible: he was prepared to assess its fundamental validity from time to time. But from the documents produced by his department and from statements made by him during various discussions, it is clear that his evaluations never deviated from the framework of the "conception." He bears heavy responsibility for the most grievous mistake of the department he headed and we therefore believe that he cannot continue to serve in the Intelligence Branch.

25. *Lt.-Colonel Yona Bendman*, the head of the Egyptian Section in the Research Department of the Intelligence Branch, co-ordinated the activities of the Section, which was the focus of the misleading errors in evaluation and in the failure to warn of the Egyptian enemy's intentions—those intentions which stood at the centre of the "conception." With him the belief in the "conception"

reached its zenith. Prominent proof to this effect we find in the intelligence precis produced in co-operation with his section on October 5, at 13.15. This precis contains a long list of signs testifying to the Egyptians' offensive preparations. But at the end of the chapter on Egypt appears paragraph 40, which was drafted by Lt.-Colonel Bendman:

"Though the actual taking up of emergency positions on the Canal appears to contain indications testifying to an offensive initiative, according to our best evaluation no change has occurred in the Egyptian assessment of the balance of power between their forces and the IDF. Therefore, the probability that the Egyptians intend to resume hostilities is low."

This sentence was an important factor in strengthening the mistaken view of the decision-makers on both the military and political levels on that fateful day. And so he explains in his testimony before us:

"...The first version of this precis I wrote without para. 40, and I felt before writing it that I must add it... I felt that if I didn't write para. 40, I was not doing my duty. In other words, it was not enough, I was not asked only to point out the facts: I must give an evaluation of the information. My evaluation was that from a purely military viewpoint there were all the signs that you could wish for indicating offensive intentions; from the viewpoint of intentions, my evaluation remained, that they did not regard themselves as capable of launching an attack. They attacked 24 hours later, but that is another matter."

It is our opinion that Lt.-Colonel Bendman should not be employed in a position involving intelligence evaluation.

26. *Lt.-Colonel David Gedaliah* was Intelligence Officer of Southern Command from 1971 until March 1974, having been moved on the latter date to another position in the Intelligence Corps. On October 1, 1973 an officer under his command, Lieutenant Benjamin Siman-Tov, presented him with a report entitled: "Movement in the Egyptian Army—the Possibility of the Resumption of Hostilities, October 1, 1973," when the Command was already on a footing of special alert. The report presents, sums up and analyses the information regarding the Egyptian deployment and the enemy's preparedness. On October 3, Lt. Siman-

Tov presented a further report entitled: "Situation Report in the Egyptian Army, summarizing September 13—October 2, 1973," which was fundamentally an expanded and more detailed version of the report presented on October 1.

In these documents, the junior officer pointed out a number of important facts, which are not compatible with the interpretation of the Egyptian deployment and preparedness as a mere exercise, and therefore asserted that these facts substantiated the evaluation that the exercise was nothing but camouflage for actual operations planned by the Egyptians.

According to Lt.-Colonel Gedaliah, the summary of the situation in the documents was also meant for distribution in his Command's Intelligence Department, for the units and posts in the Command, and for Intelligence Branch at General H.Q.

A scrutiny of the documents shows that instead of raising doubts as to the evaluation of the Egyptian deployment and preparedness as an exercise, as there was reason to do in light of the content of the documents, and submitting these to the GOC Command and the Intelligence Branch, Lt.-Colonel Gedaliah erased the penetrating questions, which could have raised doubts as to the evaluation of the Egyptian deployment and preparedness as an exercise. Lt.-Colonel Gedaliah explained to the Commission that the evaluation of the junior officer stood in contradiction to the Intelligence Branch's evaluation that an exercise was taking place in Egypt—an evaluation which was accepted by him and by the GOC Southern Command. To the question of why he did not accept the evaluation of the junior officer he replied: "It stems from the final evaluation that the Egyptians wouldn't begin a war and from our being convinced that it was only an exercise." Thus he directed his thinking into a vicious circle. He did not, therefore, do his obligations as an Intelligence officer to relate to every piece of information and to every evaluation without prejudice, and did not bring this evaluation and that of the Intelligence Branch into written confrontation in a distributed document. The documents were not distributed, without Lt.-Colonel Gedaliah being able to offer an explanation for this. Lt.-Colonel Gedaliah's behaviour here seems particularly grave because the results of the aerial photography of the 4th of the month (the examination of which went on all night),

which attested to the reinforcement of the Egyptian deployment in a threatening and warning manner, should have been given special meaning in the light of Lt. Siman-Tov's evaluation.

It is our opinion that Lt.-Colonel Gedaliah did not fulfil his duties as an Intelligence officer on the key front, in the days when it was particularly crucial that the Egyptian enemy's intentions be assessed. Therefore, he should not be employed any longer in Intelligence functions.

27. If there are any other officers in the Intelligence Branch, among those who did not appear before us as witnesses, who contributed to the incorrect evaluation, those in authority should decide which further personal changes should be made in the ranks of the Intelligence Branch.

28. *The Chief of Staff's Responsibility:* We have reached the conclusion that the Chief of Staff, Lt.-General David Elazar, bears personal responsibility for what happened on the eve of the war with regard to both evaluation of the situation and the question of the IDF's preparedness. We state this with particular regret as it involves a soldier who has served the State with devotion and distinction for many years and has splendid achievements to his credit during and before the Six Day War. We were also burdened by the fact that in this partial report we do not yet deal with the issue of the fighting from the beginning of the war until the containment of the enemy... and it is common knowledge that, despite the grave crisis in the initial stages of the fighting, the Chief of Staff guided the IDF through the holding battles up to the enemy's gates. However, even should it eventually emerge that in these further stages the Chief of Staff personally performed magnificently, this would not suffice to erase the imprint of the initial mistakes.

We have given particular consideration to the following things—and we stress that we would not, according to each of them, have reached the conclusion arrived at, but it is their cumulative weight that has forced us to it.

In the matter of information, the Chief of Staff had an evaluation of his own, more stringent than that of the Intelligence Branch, in the previous period of tension during May 1973. The "victory" of the Intelligence Branch, however, when this state of alert passed without incident as evaluated by the Intelligence, seemingly reduced the Chief of Staff's alertness in the days preceding the

Yom Kippur War in such a manner as prevented him from making a real effort to reach a commander's evaluation of his own. The means for this were in his possession—*inter alia* in the form of important information which was sent to his office (a summary of military-technical intelligence), but which, apparently, was not correctly evaluated by him. During the period of tension in the week preceding the war, he did not even visit the fronts, in order to get a personal feeling of what was happening there, to receive a firsthand impression from the threatening signs discovered by the observations which had been made to elicit information from the commanders in the field and to consult them. To the Chief of Staff's credit it should be recalled that he demanded the mobilization of the whole body of reserves on Saturday morning. But in the existing conditions he should already have recommended a partial mobilization of the reserves on October 1, when the Egyptian "exercise" began, and at the latest on October 5. We did not accept his explanation that on that day he did more than enough by declaring the highest state of alert in the regular army, including the Air Force (the cancellation of leaves, duty rosters of officers at command posts etc.), and putting the reserve mobilization system in a state of alert.

We also found that the IDF possessed no prepared, detailed plan in the event of an all-out, surprise enemy attack, based on a realistic evaluation of the enemy's forces, deployment and intentions as against the IDF's forces and plans. The Chief of Staff was over-confident that we would always receive warning in sufficient time for the mobilization of the reserves, be it even shorter than that planned. To these assumptions was added an exaggerated confidence in the IDF's ability to repulse under all circumstances a general offensive by the enemy on both fronts by the regular forces alone, and in the IDF's ability, when fully mobilized, to deploy for defence and to move over rapidly to large-scale counter-attack as a condition for the effective defence of the country. In this spirit, the Chief of Staff, during the hours before the outbreak of the fighting, dealt with the planning of counter-attacks, instead of concentrating first of all on breaking the surprise impetus of the expected attack and stopping the enemy, by adjusting the plans to the situation that had been created and instructing the GOC's accord-

ingly. In the dangerous situation created that morning, the Chief of Staff should have examined the deployment of the forces in the field in detail with the GOC's Command and seen to the best possible deployment as early as possible after receiving the warning, and thus allowed the GOC's enough time for the execution of his directives. In addition he did not take into account the possibility that the enemy attack would commence and unfold gradually on a "count-down" method during the daylight hours. Instead of this, the Chief of Staff summoned the GOC's for a consultation in the morning, and again in the afternoon, and was content to receive operatively unclear information from the GOC Southern Command. Thus our forces were denied that measure of alertness and deployment which they could have achieved in the difficult circumstances that had been created. The result was that when the war broke out, the armoured force in the south was caught inadequately deployed, neither in accordance with the existing defence plan nor in accordance with any clear improvised plan, and so the enemy gained initial advantage. Similarly, it must be noted that the GOC's had not yet returned to their command-posts from their second meeting with the Chief of Staff. We are also of the opinion that under the pressing circumstances prevailing on Saturday morning, the Chief of Staff should, by means of G (Operations) Branch, have made sure that his intentions would be translated into clear operative commands. We have found that these procedures were not sufficiently supervised, and so a lack of clarity, which could have been avoided, was created.

In the light of what has been stated above we regard it as our duty to recommend the termination of Lt.-General David Elazar's appointment as Chief of Staff.

29. *The Responsibility of GOC Southern Command:*

Major-General Shmuel Gonen, who served in the period under consideration as GOC Southern Command, distinguished himself as an excellent fighter, and as an armoured commander (7th Brigade) in the Six Day War. Since that time his rise was rapid, first as a divisional commander and afterwards as Chief of Training Command, until on June 15, 1973 he was appointed to the extremely important post of GOC Southern Command. As an inexperienced Major-General, he was still in the process of getting organized and adjusted

in his new position until the outbreak of the war. But even taking this into consideration, we have reached the opinion that on the day of the war's commencement, and on the preceding days, he did not properly fulfil his duties, and that he bears a major part of the responsibility for the dangerous situation in which our forces were caught in the South on Yom Kippur, when the Egyptian enemy attacked. As with the Chief of Staff, our remark that the total picture may change when we deal with the containment battles, also applies to him. But what we have found as to his acts and mistakes in relation to [his] evaluation of the situation and the preparedness of his Command in the days preceding the war, and particularly on the day the war broke out, are sufficient to necessitate the severe conclusion we have reached regarding him.

Much information about observations conducted of the other side of the Canal by the soldiers in the strongpoints and from aerial photographs reached his command-post, containing data about the enemy's preparedness and deployment, information which should have generated great anxiety in the Commander with regard to the enemy's intentions. He last reconnoitred the Canal front (the Southern sector) on October 2. On October 4, when an extremely important photographing mission was executed, he was outside the area of his Command on a private visit. During the whole of the week until Saturday he accepted as correct the Intelligence Branch's evaluation: an Egyptian exercise, low probability of enemy-initiated war. Despite the threat contained in the Egyptian deployment, he did not demand that the Chief of Staff should reinforce the mobilized regular force under his command, and man it in a manner suitable to the emergency situation, although even these forces were inadequate without reinforcement by adding reserves. But his major failure was on the day of the war's outbreak: he left the armoured forces under his command, which according to the Command's defence plan should have been deployed two-thirds forward, next to the Canal, and one third in the rear, in converse deployment. The GOC told us that he ordered the correct deployment for two hours before the assumed hour of attack, in other words (for) 16.00. Be that as it may, however, the operational documents of that day contain no such order, and it is a fact that up to 13.55, when the enemy opened

fire along the whole front, the force from the rear, which should have deployed along the front, had still not begun to move forward. Moreover, according to the Command's orders the forward force was not deployed next to the Canal in time, and when the firing started, part of it was situated at a distance from its final deployment line. When our armour began advancing, it was met by an enemy infantry ambush, which had already taken up positions between our tanks and the Canal line, and had seized the ramps on the eastern side of the Canal which controlled the waterway and its other side. Antitank and artillery fire poured down on our armour, and so its operations were disrupted and it was severely mauled.

Major-General Gonen explained to us the unfortunate order not to deploy the armour properly in due time as stemming from the fear of making the enemy nervous, which could have caused a deterioration in the situation even unto an unpremeditated opening of fire. From his testimony it is unclear from what source he drew this limitation. He further asserted that he feared the launching of a concentrated artillery barrage on our tanks, if these were deployed too early at their starting positions. These fears did not on any count justify, to our minds, the delay in the optimal deployment, because Major-General Gonen failed to convince us that it was not possible to find a tactical solution for the problem, such as the deployment of his tank force in alternative or waiting positions in the proximity of the starting positions. The lack of proper deployment of the armoured force, according to the agreed plan, must therefore be seen as a *grave error* on the part of Major-General Gonen, because he did not do his best to prepare his best forces to break the surprise momentum of the enemy's forces, in the situation our forces confronted with the opening of fire on the Canal front.

At this stage we are not proffering a final recommendation as to Major-General Gonen's capacity to fulfil functions in the IDF, but we recommend that he does not fulfil an active function until the Commission completes its investigation regarding the containment stages of the war.

30. *Personal Responsibility at the Government Level*

In determining the responsibility of the Ministers for acts of commission or omission in which they played a personal part it is our duty to stress that we deemed ourselves free to draw conclusions on the

basis of our findings only so far as direct responsibility is concerned. We did not consider it to be our task to express an opinion as to the implications of their parliamentary responsibility. It is true that in Israel, as in England from where we have taken this principle, it is accepted that a member of the Cabinet is responsible to the Knesset for all the administrative acts of the staff of his ministry, even if he did not know of them in advance and even if he was not a party to them. But while it is clear that this principle obliges him to report to the members of the Knesset concerning these actions (including mistakes and failures), to answer questions and to defend these actions or state what he has done in order to correct them, yet even the experience gained in England shows that no hard-and-fast rules have been laid down as to the cases in which he must resign from his ministerial office: this depends on the circumstances of each individual case. The main reason for this is that the question of the possible resignation of a member of the Government in cases of this kind is a purely political one and hence we believe that we should not deal with this matter. See: S.E. Finer (1956) 34 *Public Administration* 377; S.A. de Smith, *Constitutional and Administrative Law* (second edition), 170–171; R.K. Alderman and J.A. Cross, *The Tactics of Resignation* 4; Ivor Jennings, *The British Constitution* (fifth edition), 153–154; A. Rubinstein, *The Constitutional Law of the State of Israel* (Hebrew), 207–208.

Furthermore, we should point out that we did not deem it necessary to consider yet another question that might be asked: namely, whether the special qualifications or personal experience of any minister—in this case Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan, who had such qualifications and experience by virtue of having himself served as Chief of the General Staff—can or should lead that minister, within the domain of his responsibility, to arrive at a conclusion different or opposed to what is unanimously presented to him by his professional experts. It seems to us that a question of this type also falls outside the scope of the Inquiry Commission, since correct governmental procedure requires the application of uniform criteria in determining the personal responsibility of any public office holder rather than a set of criteria tailored to the character traits of one individual or another who holds the post.

31. (1) With regard to the question of the

Defence Minister's direct personal responsibility, we must point out that in this partial report we are considering only the subjects of the information and the state of readiness and the Defence Minister's part therein.

(2) The main problem that arises is whether the Defence Minister was negligent in the fulfilment of his duty in matters falling within the domain of his responsibility. In this matter we took into account the following points:

(a) In evaluating intelligence information he does not dispose of any "evaluating apparatus" of his own but draws upon the evaluation provided by GHQ. As for the Golan Heights, when the GOC issued a warning at the GHQ meeting in the presence of the Defence Minister, the latter showed great concern and took the following steps: he visited the Golan Heights in order to acquaint himself with the situation in the settlements, he called for reinforcements to be sent to the area and both demanded and received an evaluation of the situation by the Chief of the General Staff on October 3 in preparation for the discussion at the Prime Minister's. As for the Egyptian front, he relied upon the evaluation of the GHQ, which was not contradicted by any member of the General Staff (the Deputy Chief of Staff, Major-General Tal, had already on September 30 expressed his serious reservations to the Chief of Staff and to the Director of Military Intelligence concerning Military Intelligence's soothing assessment, especially as regards the Syrian front; however, he did not request the Chief of Staff's permission to bring these reservations to the Minister of Defence's attention, and he did not do so: as he claimed, in view of the proper standards of behaviour towards a superior officer).

The Defence Minister was also influenced by the successful assessment of the Intelligence Branch in April-May 1973 in regard to its ability to provide advance warning of war after he himself had taken exception to its assessment. Although the Intelligence Branch assessment in April-May was vindicated by the facts, the Defence Minister was right in issuing the following guidelines to the General Staff on May 21, 1973:

"... I speak now as a representative of the Cabinet and also on the basis of information. We, the Cabinet, say to the General Staff: Gentlemen, please prepare for war, those who are threatening

to launch a war being Egypt and Syria." He prefaced this instruction by stating that "a renewal of war should be taken into account in the second half of this summer."

(b) His confidence in the Intelligence Branch's assessment of "defensive deployment in Syria, multi-arm exercise in Egypt" increased after the Director of Military Intelligence replied in answer to his question on the morning of October 5 that he was using every possible source of intelligence and warning (this reply perhaps stemmed from a misunderstanding on the part of the Director of Military Intelligence but it was objectively misleading).

(c) As for the state of preparedness on the part of the IDF on the Egyptian front, the Defence Minister felt confident, having been told that a regular army armoured force was in place according to plans. So far as he knew from the General Staff discussions, this regular army force, including the Air Force, was sufficient to stop even a massive enemy crossing pending the mobilization of the reserves. Operational details on the deployment of this force were not within his province but that of the Chief of Staff.

(d) No request or proposal was submitted to him for the mobilization of the reserves before October 6, as described above, or for the replacement of the reserves in the Canal strongholds.

(e) On the morning of Saturday, October 6, the Defence Minister agreed to the mobilization of everything required for defensive action in accordance with the Chief of Staff's assessment. The Chief of Staff requested this additional reserve force with a view to counter-attacks, but the Defence Minister wished to delay the mobilization of this additional force so that no friendly country might possibly accuse Israel of causing a conflagration by escalation, since this might have harmed Israel in the matter of essential supplies. This was a clear-cut political argument which one may or may not agree with—but it certainly cannot be dismissed as not being legitimate. At any rate, when the Prime Minister decided on the full mobilization of the reserves the Defence Minister did not continue to insist upon his opinion.

(f) The problem which particularly engaged us was whether the Defence Minister should have been required to arrive at an assessment different from that of the DMI and the Chief of Staff on Friday October 5, and thereafter taken such steps

as full or partial mobilization of the reserves. On that morning the Defence Minister already suspected that the Egyptian exercise might be a camouflage for an attack. Accordingly, should the Minister not have taken a more serious view of a possible co-ordination between the Syrian front (which was causing great concern) and the Egyptian front? The following day, Yom Kippur, was in any case critical as a day of total standstill. He had already foreseen the danger of war in the second part of 1973 in the spring of that year.

On the other hand, the Director of Military Intelligence and the Chief of Staff considered the likelihood of an enemy attack to be still low on the same day. Even after the ominous reports received in the morning, an additional indication was due to come through after a few hours from another source, as the Director of Military Intelligence informed the Defence Minister (in fact, through no fault of the DMI, it only arrived in the early morning of the next day). Meanwhile the Minister was entitled to rely on the strength of the regular army, including the Air Force, to hold the enemy, as well as on the statement made to him by the Chief of Staff that the state of alert in the regular forces (cancellation of leaves on both fronts and in the Air Force, together with additional precautionary measures) declared by the Chief of Staff was fully adequate to meet the situation on that day.

We should point out here that we questioned both the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister as to whether their decisions regarding the mobilization of the reserves were influenced by the fact that the elections for the Knesset were due to be held at the end of that month. They both vigorously denied this on their word of honour and we believe that it did not occur to them to place party considerations above their national duty in this vital matter.

(3) We have carefully considered these matters and reached the conclusion that, by the criterion of reasonable conduct required of the bearer of the post of Minister of Defence, the Minister was not obliged to order additional or different precautionary measures [to] those recommended to him by the General Staff of the IDF, according to the joint assessment and the advice of the Director of Military Intelligence and the Chief of Staff.

32. With respect to the Prime Minister, what

we have stated above (para. 30) as regards personal responsibility at Cabinet level likewise holds good. Accordingly, we had to consider two principal questions:

(a) What intelligence and what assessments were submitted to the Prime Minister and what were her actions in this context?

(b) Should she have convened the entire Government in order to discuss and arrive at a decision regarding this situation in the days preceding the war?

It would have been right and proper for the Prime Minister to provide information regarding the situation on the borders at the extraordinary Cabinet session that took place on Thursday, October 4, when she reported on the results of her trip abroad; moreover, she should not have spared the Ministers not present in Tel Aviv on Friday, October 5 (the eve of Yom Kippur) the trouble involved. At the same time, this Commission is convinced that the Prime Minister's actions during the critical days before the outbreak of the war testify to an approach fitting the gravity of the responsibility with which she was charged. Immediately after her return, as stated above, she convened the Deputy Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, Minister-without-Portfolio Galili, the Chief of Staff and Brig.-Gen. Shalev for consultations mainly concerning the situation on the Golan Heights. At the end of this consultation, she decided, on the basis of the assessment of the situation presented to her, to place the subject of the border situation on the agenda for the forthcoming weekly session of the Cabinet scheduled for Sunday, October 7. On Friday, October 5 she decided, on the basis of ominous reports reaching her that day, to convene all the Ministers who were in Tel Aviv at the time. At this meeting, the Ministers present authorized the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister to decide on the mobilization of reserves, should the need for this arise during Yom Kippur. The Government Secretary was also asked to be able to locate all the Ministers in order that the Government could be convened whenever the urgent need for this arose.

It is greatly to the Prime Minister's credit that, under the circumstances, during the emergency of Saturday morning, she made proper use of the authority vested in her to make decisions. She decided wisely, with common sense and speedily

in favour of the full mobilization of the reserves, despite weighty political considerations, thereby performing a most important service for the defence of the State.

Conclusion

33. In concluding this partial report, the Commission considers itself bound to reiterate that, despite the fact that it has not yet concluded the hearing of testimony on every matter relating to the conduct of the war up to conclusion of the containment stage, it is already in possession of much evidence clearly attesting that in the Yom Kippur War, the IDF was confronted by one of the most difficult challenges which could possibly confront any army—and emerged victorious. Despite the difficult initial position from which the IDF started out in the war, and despite the errors committed at this stage—partly detailed above, and partly to be detailed in the reasoning on this report—not only did it succeed in mobilizing the reserves at unprecedented speed, with all their complex formations, but at the same time it also blocked the massive invasion of enemy armies which had planned and trained for this onslaught over many years and, in the opening stages, had enjoyed the benefit of surprise. The IDF's success was secured at the cost of heavy and irreplaceable casualties, and thanks to the supreme heroism of all ranks, the endless powers of improvisation of its commanders, and the stability and strength of its basic organizational structure. These facts reinforce the Commission in its opinion that not only does the IDF possess the capacity to absorb criticism and draw the painful conclusions implied, but that it will thereby increase and enhance its strength.

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Letter from Israel Chief of Staff Elazar to the Cabinet disagreeing with the unfavourable findings of the Agranat Commission of Enquiry⁶¹

Jerusalem, April 2, 1974

Madame Prime Minister: I have just read for the first time the report of the [investigating]

committee. I am convinced that a wrong was done to me. I do not agree with a number of the committee's rulings which are not in my favour. I shall here give some examples. The committee ruled that according to information which the Chief of Staff had in his possession he should have recommended a partial call-up of the reserve units of the land forces at the beginning of the week preceding the war in order to establish the right balance between the enemy forces, who were in a full state of alert and who were prepared against us, and our forces. I state that during my service as a Chief of Staff, and before that, the IDF has never had the right balance between the prepared enemy forces and our forces for a number of basic reasons which are known to all responsible elements. Among these reasons was our reliance on Intelligence warning. This time, there was no such warning and the committee rules that I was not to blame for that.

I reject the committee's ruling that no proper defence plan was prepared for the eventuality that the regular army would have to halt by itself a general enemy attack on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts at one and the same time. The truth is that there was such a plan in the Northern and Southern Commands. The plan was known and trained for, even in the lower ranks.

I reject the ruling that on that morning no clear directions were given to the Southern Area Commander. The truth is that in addition to the operational plan that was prepared in advance, I gave directions to the area commanders on the morning of 6th October and I even invited them to a meeting at noon to make sure of their readiness for the fighting. The committee itself does not say anything about the directions which were given to the Northern Area Commander, despite the fact that they were given to the two area commanders in the same way.

It is not the duty of the Chief of Staff and it is not within his ability to go into minor tactical details. I testify that during my service as Northern Area Commander in 1967, I submitted general plans to the then Chief of Staff, but I did not receive detailed directions either for defence or for attack.

I reject the committee's ruling that the difference

⁶¹ Broadcast by Israel radio in Hebrew; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/

4568/A/5-6; reprinted by permission. For the Agranat committee report see document 92 above.

between me and the Defence Minister on the morning of 6th October 1973 was concerned with the forces needed for defence as though I requested additional forces only for a counter-attack. My demand for the mobilization of the entire reserves emanated from a general concept regarding the need for forces for war when counter-attacks are an organic part of a useful defence plan.

My request proves that I did not have excessive confidence in the IDF's ability to stand up against a general enemy attack on two fronts with the regular forces alone. This is an unfounded claim. I never said or thought so. I said the opposite. I do not know what the committee bases this assumption on. My request to mobilize reserves on a larger scale was approved by the Prime Minister and proved to be justified and decisive in the course of war. Had it not been adopted, there would undoubtedly have been a disaster at least in the Northern Area Command.

There is no truth in the claim that the Chief of Staff waited for the Prime Minister's decision about mobilizing all the reserves. The Defence Minister did not approve my mobilization of reserves that morning. The approval for the mobilization was given afterwards during a discussion with the Prime Minister and on the basis of my proposal.

I reject the basic approach adopted by the committee regarding the authority of the Defence Minister and the Chief of Staff. This incorrect approach has misled the committee.

According to the standing authority, the Defence Minister is the operative authority above the Chief of Staff, and all operational plans and questions were brought to him for approval before the war. Only during the war itself did the Defence Minister cease in practice to constitute an operational authority.

I do not accept the committee's ruling that the Chief of Staff did not make a genuine effort to evaluate [word indistinct] on his own. According to information that I had in my possession, I could not reach an evaluation different from that of the Intelligence branch. Only through the investigating committee did I learn of Intelligence information of warning value that I did not know about. Had I known of that, perhaps I would have made a different evaluation, as happened in April and May 1973.

I reject the committee's ruling that I engaged

in planning counter-attacks instead of concentration on [word indistinct] the warning. I acted in the two spheres and it was my duty to lead the IDF a number of stages forward. I did so throughout the war.

Why does the committee believe that I should have reached the conclusion that reserves should be mobilized on 5th October 1973 when the Defence Minister was unable to reach the same conclusion, although both of us had the same information and when no one in the General Staff thought of or suggested mobilizing the reserves, this can only be explained by saying that the committee did not treat both of us equally?

[The Chief of Staff ended his letter by saying that he did not see any possibility of continuing his duties and that his duties should be carried out until further notice by the Chief of the General Staff Maj-Gen. Yizhaq Hofi.]

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Communiqué issued on the occasion of a meeting of Scandinavian foreign ministers (excerpt)⁶²

Copenhagen, April 5, 1974

The Foreign Ministers found that the most recent developments in the Middle East—in spite of the fact that the situation remains extremely serious and fraught with danger—hold out prospects for an overall solution in conformity with Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). The Ministers noted with satisfaction the agreement reached between Egypt and Israel on the disengagement of troops. They stated that the Nordic countries fully endorse the international efforts that are being made to bring about further accords which may lead to a just and lasting peace. In this connection the legitimate rights of the Palestinians should also be taken into account.

The Foreign Minister of Denmark for his part further referred to the Declaration of November

⁶² Excerpted from the unofficial English translation, *UD-informasjon* (Oslo), no. 21 (April 17, 1974). The meeting was attended by the foreign ministers of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

6, 1973, adopted by the Nine Member States of the European Community.⁶³

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Speech by General Secretary Brezhnev of the CPSU delivered at a dinner in honour of visiting President Assad of Syria⁶⁴

Moscow, April 11, 1974

Dear friend Hafez Assad,
Dear Syrian friends,
Comrades,

We cordially welcome in Moscow the General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, President of the Syrian Arab Republic, the outstanding political leader of the Arab world, Comrade Hafez Assad, and the Party and Government delegation of friendly Syria he heads.

The Syrian people and their leaders are deeply respected in the Soviet Union. It is not for the first time that we meet with our friend, Comrade Hafez Assad, and these meetings are invariably held in an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding. We attach great importance to the relations of friendship and comradeship now existing, and we regard regular contacts between the Soviet and Syrian leaders as an important manifestation of our growing friendship.

Independent Syria is youthful, it is slightly over a quarter of a century old. Over all these years the Republic has had to wage a persistent struggle for the consolidation of its sovereignty, against intrigues of imperialism and reaction. And all this time the Soviet Union has been siding with you, our Syrian friends, not in words, but in deeds. It was on your side at the dawn of Syrian independence; and when imperialists tried to impose on Syria the noose of economic blockade; and in June 1967; and, finally, during the October events of last year. Our country is on your side today too, when the struggle is being waged for the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples, and for a just political settlement in the Middle East.

Together with you, the Soviet people are heartened by the successes and achievements of Syria, by the progressive social and economic transformations which were made under the leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party. The Soviet Union does justice to the activities of the National Progressive Front, which show the growing unity of anti-imperialist forces and the enhancement of its role in the country's social and political life.

As Syria's independence strengthened, our co-operation developed too, and Soviet-Syrian friendship grew. Is this accidental? Certainly not. This is determined by the very nature of our relations, by the foundation on which they are built. The socialist countries, where social and national oppression has been eliminated forever, and the young states, which have taken the road of independence and progressive orientation, are united by the community of goals in the crucial problems of present-day international life. We are united by the struggle against imperialism, and by the adherence to the ideals of social progress.

Soviet-Syrian cooperation now has a wide, all-round nature. It is developing along state, Party and social lines, and encompasses the political and economic fields.

The giant project on the Euphrates is a good symbol of cooperation between the Soviet and Syrian peoples. Syria's industry is being built on the banks of this river that was the source of one of the most ancient civilizations. A hydropower project that has a great national significance is being constructed there. And we are glad that this task, which is of historic importance for the Syrian people, is being solved in cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Soviet-Syrian cooperation has spread to the field of defence, too. The importance of this for Syria, which has to protect itself against aggression, is quite obvious.

Even at the beginning of this century, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin hailed the awakening of the peoples enslaved by imperialism. He foresaw the time when these peoples would be participating actively in deciding the destinies of entire mankind. We live at exactly such a time. The growing influence of the developing countries, and their greater activity in world affairs is one of the typical features of present-day international relations. This process has been obviously gathering momentum over the

⁶³ Doc. 184 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

⁶⁴ English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 16 (April 20, 1974), pp. 4-5.

recent years, and is undoubtedly promoted by the overall relaxation of tensions. Following Lenin's behests, the Soviet Union has invariably supported, and will continue to support the liberation struggle of the peoples.

Dear friends,

Our meeting takes place at an important moment. The courageous struggle of the Arab peoples, the concerted actions of the Arab countries, the firm support from the socialist states, and from all the peaceful forces have all led to the weakening of the positions of the aggressor. The myth about the invincibility of the Israeli army has been dispelled. The Arab peoples proved that they would never put up with the occupation of their lands.

We all know about the decisions of the Security Council which opened the way for settling the conflict in its very essence. The authoritative international forum, the Geneva Conference, was set up for the first time. A durable and just settlement can and must be worked for within its framework.

Yet, it cannot be overlooked that the situation is still fraught with the danger of an explosion. And it cannot be otherwise until the main causes of tensions are removed, until the occupation of the Arab lands is ended, until the consequences of Israeli aggression are liquidated and reliable guarantees of security for all the countries in the Middle East are ensured.

This should be realized by all. The danger lies in the fact that against the background of a certain decrease of tensions, the aggressor state and her patrons may again try to avoid a radical, all-encompassing solution of the problem. It is not accidental, I should say, that "ersatz plans" for the Middle East settlement were launched of late. This actually means replacing the overall settlement with "partial" agreements of various kinds.

As to the Soviet Union's position, it is clear and consistent. Our policy invariably was and will be aimed against aggression, in support of the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples. We are for a just peace in the Middle East, which means the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from all the lands occupied in 1967 and later, the ensurance of security and sovereignty of all the states of the area, and respect for the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. We fully share with Syria the

view that any agreement on troop disengagement must be regarded as part and parcel of the overall Middle East settlement, as a step to the complete withdrawal of the Israeli troops from all the occupied Arab lands.

This course stems from our principled position which we consistently take, also at the talks with the United States of America, coordinating our actions in Middle East affairs with our Arab friends. We appreciate that you share with us the view on the importance of the Soviet Union's participation in the efforts aimed at establishing a durable peace in the Middle East, at all the stages and in all fields of settlement.

We highly appreciate the policy of the Syrian leadership headed by the General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, President Hafez Assad, aimed at the strengthening of friendship between Syria and the Soviet Union, at the development of contacts between the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party and the CPSU. As to the Soviet Union, you can always rely on it: it always did, and will continue to do everything to strengthen the fraternal links with the Syrian people, to support Syria's struggle for the consolidation of its independence and social progress.

We are convinced that our friendship has good prospects. The existing comprehensive cooperation between the Soviet Union and Syria is a solid base for its further development and deepening.

Dear Syrian friends, our first conversation has again confirmed that Syria and the Soviet Union are united by a community of approach towards the most important problems of our time, and that the bonds of Soviet-Syrian friendship and cooperation will continue strengthening in the interests of the peoples of both countries, for the sake of universal peace. We are glad that the Syrian Party and Government delegation, Comrade Hafez Assad, will visit a number of areas of our country, will meet Soviet people and will learn more about our life. You can be sure that you will be received everywhere as good friends, and comrades-in-arms.

Allow me to propose a toast to the health of our friend Hafez Assad and all our Syrian friends, to the success of the Syrian people, to friendship and all-round cooperation between our countries!

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Joint statement issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of President Assad of Syria⁶⁵**Moscow, April 13, 1974**

From April 11 to 16, 1974, a Syrian Party and Government delegation led by Hafez Assad, General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (ASRP), President of the Syrian Arab Republic, was on an official friendly visit in the Soviet Union. During the visit the President of Syria and his delegation had talks with L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, N. V. Podgorny, Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, A. N. Kosygin, Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and other leaders of the CPSU and Soviet state.

The fundamental and constructive exchange of views held in an atmosphere of sincerity and understanding reaffirmed with fresh force the desire of both Sides for the further strengthening and utmost development of the relations of friendship and mutual confidence existing between the Soviet Union and Syria, and between the CPSU and ASRP. The community of positions of both Sides on the most important problems of current international affairs, their solidarity in the struggle for freedom, independence and social progress of peoples, and for a lasting peace, was reaffirmed.

In recent years Soviet-Syrian cooperation has acquired a broad and comprehensive character. It is developing along state, Party and public lines, and encompasses political, economic and cultural spheres. It also covers the area of defence, whose importance for Syria in the circumstances of the continued Israeli aggression is a matter of common knowledge.

The Soviet Union and the Syrian Arab Republic are confident that the unbreakable friendship and fraternal cooperation of the Soviet and Syrian peoples meet the vital interests of both countries, and serve the cause of stronger peace and international security.

The Sides note with satisfaction the great

importance for the successful fulfilment of the plans of the Syrian Arab Republic in the development and consolidation of its economic independence, and the improvement of the well-being of the Syrian people, of broad Soviet-Syrian cooperation in the construction of large-scale industrial enterprises and projects, specifically in the field of energetics, oil production, railroad transport and irrigation. The Euphrates hydropower complex is a most important project of Soviet-Syrian collaboration.

Attributing great importance to the high standard of Soviet-Syrian cooperation, the participants in the talks favoured the improvement of the already tested forms of that cooperation, and the search for new ways leading to its further progress. With these aims in view the Sides agreed to sign another Agreement on the further development of economic and technological cooperation, and a Protocol on trade for 1974. The Sides discussed and outlined steps for further strengthening the defence capacity of the Syrian Arab Republic.

The confidence was also expressed that the further deepening of Soviet-Syrian contacts in culture, science, education, art, radio, television, tourism and sport would be facilitated by the Plan for cultural and scientific cooperation between the two countries in 1974–1975, signed in Moscow during the visit.

Striving toward the development of favourable conditions for acquainting both countries with each other's achievements in different areas, the Sides will promote broader cooperation between the CPSU and the ASRP, between state bodies, and also trade-union, youth, women's and other mass organizations. In this connection the Parties to the talks express satisfaction with the signed Plan for inter-Party relations between the CPSU and the ASRP for 1974.

Considering the great importance of close political cooperation, and the coordination of actions by the Soviet Union and Syria on the international scene, the Sides are fully resolved to continue regular consultations with each other at various levels, on pressing international problems and on questions of the further development of Soviet-Syrian relations. Particularly important are the now traditional personal contacts between the leaders of both countries, specifically during the sustained tension in the Middle East, as a consequence of the continued Israeli aggression.

⁶⁵ English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 16 (April 20, 1974), pp. 1–3.

The Sides paid specific attention to the recent developments in the Middle East.

President Hafez Assad informed Soviet leaders about the measures taken by the Syrian Arab Republic and its Armed Forces during the hostilities last October.

The Soviet Side highly appraised the staunchness of the Syrian Armed Forces, the courage of the Syrian people and its unity with its leadership, which greatly facilitated the strengthening of the positions of the Syrian Arab Republic in the Arab World, and on the international scene, and its struggle for the return of the occupied Arab lands.

The Syrian Side highly appraised the diversified support of the Soviet Union which helped the Syrian Arab Republic to withstand Israeli aggression.

The measures being taken for achieving a strong and just peace in the Middle East were discussed. The Sides devoted specific attention to the tense situation on the Syrian front—a result of incessant aggressive actions by Israel, which is challenging the decisions of the United Nations and international public opinion, as it strives to perpetuate its occupation of Arab lands.

The Sides stress again with full determination that peace and quiet in the Middle East may be achieved only by the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab lands, and by securing the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

It was stressed in the discussion of the ways of solving the Middle East conflict that the current partial measures fail to cover the main, key elements of the settlement, that any agreement on troop disengagement should be a component of the general solution of the Middle East problem, a step toward the radical and all-inclusive solution, whose central point should be the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab lands, and the ensurance of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The Sides again emphasized the importance of the participation of the Soviet Union at all stages and in all areas of the settlement directed toward the establishment of a fair and firm peace in the Middle East.

The Sides noted that the explosive situation existing now on the Syrian front confirms more than ever before that ignoring the above-mentioned main principles, or slighting them might

lead to a further worsening of the already dangerous situation in that area.

During Israel's continued aggression the Sides reaffirmed the importance of consolidating the defence capacity of the Syrian Arab Republic and its lawful, inalienable right to use all effective means for liberating its occupied territories.

On behalf of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet state and the entire Soviet people, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee confirmed that the Soviet Union will continue to give comprehensive support to the righteous cause of the Arab peoples.

The recently continuing alteration in the alignment of forces in favour of peace, socialism and national liberation is increasingly and favourably influencing the entire international situation, and facilitating detente in the world.

Resolutely denouncing the attempts of aggressive and reactionary elements to render more difficult the relations among states and to aggravate the international situation, the Soviet Union and the Syrian Arab Republic solemnly declare that they will continue making the necessary efforts to oppose this policy of aggressive forces which is dangerous for the cause of peace and freedom of peoples, to liquidate the hotbeds of international tension, to render ever more stable the process of international detente, and to make it irreversible.

The Parties to the talks noted that the current international detente meets the interests of all states, which thus are able to use their constructive efforts for economic progress, and the improvement of their peoples' well-being in conditions of peace and security. They reaffirmed the necessity of spreading detente to all the areas which are dangerous to peace.

The Soviet Union and the Syrian Arab Republic point out the important part played in world politics in recent years by the non-alignment movement. They declare their high appraisal of the anti-imperialist orientation of the policy of the nonaligned countries, their desire to facilitate international detente and to strengthen peace. Both Sides point out with satisfaction that this trend found its expression in the decisions of the Fourth Conference of Heads of State and Government of Nonaligned Countries in Algiers. They firmly and consistently uphold the right of the peoples to dispose of their natural resources, exercise their sovereign rights and implement

progressive socio-economic reforms. In this connection they express the hope that the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly which is now being held in New York on problems of raw materials and economic development will facilitate the establishment of equal economic relations among all states.

The situation shaping up in the world favours the consolidation of friendly relations between the countries of socialism and the young states, which promotes successful progress of these states along the road of freedom, independence and progressive reforms.

The Sides will continue to advocate consistently and unswervingly the full and final liquidation of colonialism, in execution of the UN General Assembly's Declaration on the Granting of Independence to the Colonial Countries and Peoples, and to struggle against imperialism, Zionism and apartheid. The Sides declared their complete solidarity with the struggle of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, for their freedom and national independence, and their support for the people of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau who continue to courageously struggle for the complete liberation of their Motherland.

The Soviet Union and Syria reaffirm their solidarity with the struggle of the Vietnamese people for the implementation of their national aspirations. They fully support the statements of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam with demands for the strict observance of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam by all the signatories, the ensurance of a strong and just peace, and the achievement of national conciliation in South Vietnam. The Sides declare again their support for the struggle of the people of Cambodia for freedom and independence. They welcome the establishment of the Provisional Government of National Unity and the National Political Consultative Council of Laos.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Syrian Arab Republic are fully resolved to further strengthen the bonds of friendship which unite them, to develop in every way broad co-operation in all fields, being guided by the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference in each other's internal

affairs, and complete equality. They firmly declare their determination to give a resolute rebuff to any attempts at undermining or damaging Soviet-Syrian friendship, and will do everything to ensure its further progress and consolidation.

The visit of the General Secretary of the ASRP, President of the Syrian Arab Republic H. Assad to the USSR, and the Soviet-Syrian talks comprise an important contribution to the further development of friendly relations and diversified cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Syrian Arab Republic, for the benefit of the peoples of both countries, and the cause of peace, freedom and progress.

L. BREZHNEV,
General Secretary
of the Central
Committee of the
Communist Party
of the Soviet Union

HAFAZ ASSAD,
General Secretary
of the Arab
Socialist Renaissance
Party, President
of the Syrian Arab
Republic

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Speech by former USSR Ambassador to Egypt Vinogradov describing the Soviet role during the October war (excerpt)⁶⁶

Mid-April, 1974

On October 4, the President informed me of Egypt's decision that the only course open to her was war. Of course, the President did not specify what day he had chosen, merely saying that the choice had been made. He asked me to inform the Soviet command of the situation and the decisions, and of Egypt's immediate requirements.

I transmitted the President's message to Moscow and asked for an answer. The answer, when it came, was to the effect that the decision to make war was an Egyptian decision, and that the USSR would fulfil all its obligations and would support Arab rights by all means...military, political and economic.

On October 6, after the Egyptian forces had succeeded in storming the Canal, had taken

⁶⁶ Arabic text, *al-Safir* (Beirut), April 16, 1974; partial English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), III, 4 (Summer, 1974), pp. 161-163.

possession of Bar-Lev positions and hoisted the Egyptian flag on the east bank, my meeting with the President was extremely warm and happy.

During this meeting I told the President of the message I had received from Moscow, to the effect that President Hafez Assad had informed the Soviet command some days before the start of the fighting that Syria and Egypt were on the point of embarking on a military confrontation with Israel to achieve clearly defined military objectives. Syria also wanted the USSR to take rapid action to obtain a United Nations resolution on a cease-fire within forty-eight hours of the start of the fighting, as the situation would then be favourable to the Arabs.

I said to President Sadat that Moscow wanted to know his view on Syria's request. President Sadat asked me to inform the Soviet leaders that it was too early to think of such a thing and that he would get in touch with President Assad to convince him of this.

The next day I received another message from Moscow to the effect that Syria had repeated her request, that she believed that the military situation and the liberation of the Bar-Lev line were favourable to the Arabs' objectives. She wanted a cease-fire, and I was asked by the Soviet command about President Sadat's views on this new request. When I conveyed this message to President Sadat, he restated his original attitude and said that he would persuade President Assad to drop his request. The military situation on both fronts was excellent at the time; [Sadat and I] talked at length about the victories won by the Arabs, the efficiency of Soviet arms and the friendship between our two countries.

By October 9, the Israelis were concentrating on the Syrian front as a result of its proximity to Israeli territory and the direct threat it constituted to Israeli depth, and the attack on the Egyptian front had not been followed up. The situation on the Syrian front had consequently started to develop in a way unfavourable to the Arab forces. Syria asked the USSR to intervene to secure an immediate cease-fire and the Soviet leaders again asked President Sadat for his views on this. The President did not approve of the Syrian request, saying that the situation would improve in Syria when the Iraqi forces had come in and the attack on the Egyptian front had been developed. The Soviet leaders asked him what

immediate objective the war was intended to achieve: was it the total liberation of the occupied Arab territories? The President replied that the goal was the accomplishment of a specific action to change the balance of military and political power in the Arabs' favour, to destroy the theory of Israeli security, and to unblock the crisis.

I informed the President of the Soviet command's view that this goal had already been achieved, and that it was logical to ask for a cease-fire at this stage, before Israel recovered from the shock of the surprise defeat—unless other and wider objectives were intended. The President replied that he wanted to exploit the immense military success achieved on the Egyptian front to develop the attack and to advance to recover the passes.

On the morning of October 10 the Soviet command gave its approval and stated that if Egypt wanted to develop the attack so as to recover the passes, this should be done immediately without delay.

It was still possible to take advantage of the successes of October 6 and to exploit the strategic surprise that had been won, though this might not be possible for much longer as Soviet reconnaissance had observed a huge Israeli concentration preparing to go into action on the Egyptian front. President Sadat added that he preferred to wait in the then occupied positions and to draw in the Israeli forces for attack, so as to hunt them down in the open desert before advancing to recover the passes. The development of the Egyptian attack did not start until October 14.

On October 16, after President Sadat's speech to the Popular Assembly,⁶⁷ Comrade Kosygin arrived in Cairo at 5 o'clock, and met with President Sadat several times, when all aspects of the situation were studied. The Israeli penetration of the Egyptian forces east of the Canal had already taken place and Israeli forces had started to infiltrate west of the Canal, so it was agreed between President Sadat and Comrade Kosygin that the USSR should start making contacts to obtain a cease-fire. It was estimated that these contacts would take long enough to enable Egypt to eliminate the Israeli penetration and infiltration, and to enable Syria to mount a counter-attack in Golan, so that by the time there was a cease-fire

⁶⁷ Doc. 292 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

the situation might be 100 per cent favourable to the Arabs.

The talks were held in a very friendly atmosphere. I remember that President Sadat spoke to the Soviet Premier about the Mig-17 that had shot down two Phantoms in one engagement, saying that the Mig-17 had proved its superiority to the Phantom. Comrade Kosygin replied: 'No, Mr. President, the Phantom is technically more advanced than the Mig-17; it was the courage of the Egyptian pilot who was flying it that made the Mig-17 superior to the Phantom.' Kosygin then returned to Moscow and sent for Kissinger, and efforts to secure a cease-fire started.

At dawn on October 20—at 3 a.m. to be precise—President Sadat contacted me and asked me to send Brezhnev an urgent message on the situation and to ask him to intervene to obtain an immediate cease-fire. (As I learned later, Syria did not want a cease-fire at that time, as it was about to mount a major counter-attack.)

I contacted Moscow, and the chef de bureau informed me that Comrade Brezhnev had gone to bed only an hour before and that he could not wake him. I told him to wake him on my responsibility, and informed Comrade Brezhnev of the situation as President Sadat had described it. Comrade Brezhnev reassured me, and the Soviet leaders immediately declared the partial mobilization of the Soviet forces, and the calling up of seven Soviet military divisions, which were placed on immediate alert to travel and fight on the Egyptian front. In fact, the vanguard actually arrived in Cairo.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of President Assad of Syria (excerpts)⁶⁸

Moscow, April 16, 1974

Hafez Assad, General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (ASRP) and President of the Syrian Arab Republic, head of the Party and Government delegation, paid an official friendly visit to the Soviet Union from April 11 to

16, 1974, at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Soviet Government. In an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding negotiations took place on a wide range of questions between H. Assad, General Secretary of the ASRP and President of the SAR, and L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, N. V. Podgorny, Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and A. N. Kosygin, Member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

President Hafez Assad informed the Soviet leaders of the achievements scored by the Syrian Arab Republic in the fulfilment of the ASRP congresses' decisions on economic development, the implementation of progressive socio-economic transformations and the furtherance of the unity and cohesion of all the progressive and patriotic forces of the country in the difficult conditions of continuing Israeli aggression.

In their turn, the Soviet leaders informed President H. Assad of the progress of communist construction in the USSR and the foreign-policy activities of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government, which are consistently carrying out the Peace Programme advanced by the 24th CPSU Congress.

Participants in the negotiations had a thorough and constructive exchange of opinion on questions connected with the further strengthening of friendly Soviet-Syrian relations and the prospects for developing them, as well as on topical international problems of mutual interest.

During the exchange of opinion on the international situation special attention was devoted to the Middle East situation.

L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and H. Assad, General Secretary of the ASRP and President of the SAR, signed a Joint Soviet-Syrian Statement.

The following agreements were signed during the visit:

1. The Plan of Party ties between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party in 1974;

2. The Plan of cultural and scientific cooperation in 1974-75;

⁶⁸ Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 18 (May 4, 1974), pp. 4-5.

3. The Agreement on the further development of economic and technical cooperation;

4. The Protocol on commodity exchange in 1974.

During their stay in the Soviet Union President H. Assad and the persons accompanying him visited, besides Moscow, Volgograd and Tashkent. The distinguished Syrian visitors had the opportunity to acquaint themselves with the life of the Soviet people and their economic, scientific and cultural achievements. H. Assad made a statement on Moscow Television and spoke before the working people of Volgograd.

Everywhere the head of the Syrian Arab Republic and his party were accorded a cordial welcome both by officials and the public at large, which testifies to the Soviet people's feelings of friendship and respect for the Syrian people.

H. Assad expressed sincere gratitude to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Soviet Government and the entire Soviet people for the cordial and friendly welcome accorded him and the members of the Syrian Party and Government delegation.

99

Statement calling for a durable and just peace issued by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact⁶⁹

Warsaw, April 18, 1974

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Rumania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, represented at the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member-States, state that the Middle East remains a dangerous breeding ground of international tension. Israel, using the support of external imperialist forces, continues to pursue the aggressive policy, stubbornly refuses to implement the UN resolutions, to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories, and grossly flouts

the legitimate national rights of Arab peoples.

The outburst of hostilities in October 1973 has shown once again the explosiveness of the situation in that area. It has also shown that there is a constant threat there to universal peace. The principled importance of friendship and cooperation between Arab states and socialist countries has been reaffirmed during these events.

The participants in the Meeting note the significance of the peace conference on the Middle East in Geneva, the need of participation in it of all the states directly concerned and also representatives of the Arab people of Palestine. The participants in the Meeting believe that further continuation of the Conference's work should lead, above all, to the solution of the key problems of a Middle East settlement—withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab lands, ensuring the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine in keeping with its national aspirations, guaranteeing security, integrity and sovereignty to all states of the area.

The states participating in the Meeting are ready to invigorate their activities to promote a political settlement of the conflict and are urging all states to contribute to establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Regarding the agreement on disengagement of troops as the first, preliminary step towards a general settlement of the Middle East problem, the participants in the Meeting hold that this must be followed without fail by other steps aimed at implementing all the provisions of the UN Security Council resolutions dated November 22, 1967, and October 22, 1973. The presence of the UN emergency force is making a positive contribution to the maintenance of peace in the area.

The socialist states participating in the Meeting firmly and invariably support the Arab peoples' struggle against the imperialist policy of aggression, for a just and lasting peace, for ensuring their free development, social and economic progress. The attainment of these important goals of social development is inseparably linked with the struggle against those forces which seek to push the Arab peoples off the progressive path, and to make them again dependent on imperialist forces politically and economically.

For the Arab countries, the socialist states are their true friends which have been and remain together with them both at a time of peaceful

⁶⁹ English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 18 (May 4, 1974), p. 2.

construction and at a time of danger for their freedom and independence. The policy of socialist states with relation to the countries of the Arab world is consistent and principled, it is based on profound understanding of their national aspirations and problems of social-economic development, it is not subject to transient considerations.

The states, participants in the Meeting, intend to continue developing the relations of friendship and cooperation with Arab countries on the basis of community of aims in the struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism, for peace, freedom of peoples and social progress.

100

Television interview statements by Chancellor Brandt of West Germany discounting the possibility of West German participation in Middle East peace keeping forces and stressing the political nature of the Palestine problem⁷⁰

Cairo, April 22, 1974

Q. There is now talk of a peace settlement at Geneva. Israel is stressing a guaranteed peace, a secure peace. How will such a peace be guaranteed according to your interlocutors and the Arabs?

A. Initially there are indications in this regard. Crucial is the participation of the two super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The question of how the United Nations comes into the picture will have to be investigated in detail, as well as the question of whether and in what form others can cooperate as guarantors. As a member state in the European Community we have already stated that we will consider such participation as guarantor.

Q. President Sadat told former Federal Minister Schröder, when he was here with the Foreign Relations Committee [of the Federal Parliament], that one might welcome also German troops who could be stationed on the border between Israel and the Arab states together

with European, American and Soviet troops.

A. With all due respect to the Egyptian president and recognizing the trust expressed in such a suggestion, I think we can be more useful in other ways. I do not exclude the possibility that we could be represented in such an operation by, say, military doctors and Red Cross nurses, but otherwise participation by the Bundeswehr in this region seems to me, out of historical and other considerations, to be not quite convincing.

Q. Chancellor, you yourself have spoken of the rights of the Palestinians. The Egyptian president did it last night in his dinner speech and did so again today at his press conference. In which way do you think the Federal Republic of Germany can intercede so that the Palestinians are assured of their—of certain rights?

A. Now, that is a complex question. Previously, we principally stressed the humanitarian side of the problem and did in fact concern ourselves with special programmes for the refugees in the camps—I well remember my own efforts as foreign minister. And not only the programmes being executed by international organizations but also those which we have additionally commenced since 1968. Now the political problem is increasingly intruding. This concerns, of course, partly the Palestinians where they live today, those of the West Bank of Jordan where we do not know the future political structure of the area, this area and the Gaza Strip. And then there is the problem of those who want to return. But on that you know better than I do that the opinions of those involved differ greatly. We would do well to listen well and then limit ourselves to the statement of basics. This we have reached together with our European friends: The Palestinian problem today is no longer exclusively a humanitarian problem but also a political one, i.e. a problem of the political structure of the territories in which the Palestinians live or to which they wish to return.

⁷⁰ Interview conducted for Zweites deutsches Fernsehen; excerpted and translated from the German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 50 (April 26, 1974), p. 492.

101

Statement to the press by Chancellor Brandt of West Germany regarding his talks with President Sadat of Egypt⁷¹

Cairo, April 23, 1974

My concentrated, frank and friendly conversations with President Sadat and the negotiations of our two delegations, which will be continued early this evening, have brought about widespread agreement concerning the future development of our relations.

Firstly, we agree to painstakingly prepare the dialogue between the European Community and the Arab states and to direct it continually in such a way that the cooperation between the two regions in the coming years can contribute in its turn to ensure peace in the Middle East.

Secondly, we also agree not only to normalize further the relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Egypt but also to furnish proof of them and to give them a new quality. The programme of construction and development which we envisage will very soon be initiated through the cooperation of the two governments.

Ladies and gentlemen, right after my short visit this morning to a dead city by a dead canal, once an artery of the world's economy, right after this visit I feel the urgency for the return of peace to this region so that life may come back.

In our conversations, the Middle East problem, so acute for this country, and the efforts for its solution naturally played an important role. The attitude of the Federal Government to this question is determined by the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council in November 1967 and October 1973. Towards the end of last year my government participated in the joint decisions of the state of the European Community, decisions in which the attitude of our community of states is defined. Part of this is that we are prepared to provide political guarantees for a hopefully soon-to-be-found solution to the conflict.

In this connection it should be affirmed that the fate of the Palestinians is not only a humanitarian but also a political problem. A just peace

settlement must assure all the peoples of this region, including the Palestinian population, a secure existence and future. I would add that the European Community has already expressed its understanding as regards this problem.

The realistic policy which has been adopted, especially by President Sadat, in connection with the efforts towards a settlement of the conflict has brought a lasting solution significantly closer. The opportunities for cooperation with and in this region have never been so great as now. I hope advantage will be taken of them.

102

Memorandum from US President Nixon cancelling \$1,000 million dollar debt owed by Israel for military equipment⁷²

Washington, April 23, 1974

(Presidential Determination No. 74-17)

EMERGENCY SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR ISRAEL

*Memorandum for the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense*

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D.C., April 23, 1974.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Public Law 93-199, the Emergency Security Assistance Act of 1973 (hereinafter "the Act"), and by Public Law 93-240, the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act, 1974 (hereinafter "the Appropriation Act"), I hereby:

A. Determine (1) that it is important to our national interest that Israel receive assistance under the Act exceeding \$1,500,000,000 and (2) that obligations in excess of \$1,700,000,000 of the funds appropriated by the first paragraph in Title IV of the Appropriations Act will be in the national interest;

B. Release Israel from its contractual liability to the extent of \$1,000,000,000 to pay for defense articles and defense services purchased under the Foreign Military Sales Act (82 Stat. 1320, Public Law 90-629), as amended, during the period

⁷¹ Translated from the German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 50 (April 26, 1974), pp. 492-493.

⁷² Text as inserted by Rep. Rarick (Dem.), *Congressional Record* (daily), May 14, 1974, p. E 2982.

beginning October 6, 1973, and ending March 31, 1974; and

C. Determine that foreign military sales credits extended to Israel under the Act shall be in amounts not to exceed \$1,200,000,000 (less amounts necessary for payment by the United States of its share of expenses of United Nations activities in the Middle East as authorized by law) repayable as to principal over a period of twenty years following a two year grace period after initial disbursement and at a rate of interest of three percent per annum, with all other terms and conditions to be in accordance with those applicable to credits extended for foreign countries under the above-cited Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended.

This memorandum shall be published in the *FEDERAL REGISTER*.

RICHARD NIXON.

103

Message from US President Nixon to the Congress requesting funds for foreign assistance for the fiscal year 1975 (excerpt)⁷³

Washington, April 24, 1974

The hope for a lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute is stronger today than at any time in the previous quarter century. American diplomatic initiatives have helped create the conditions necessary for an end to conflict and violence. While our diplomatic efforts must and will continue, there is already much that can be done to supplement and consolidate what has been achieved so far. I am therefore requesting a Special Assistance program for the Middle East, and have asked the Congress to provide the following:

—For Israel: \$50 million in security supporting assistance and \$300 million in military credit sales. Israel's continued ability to defend herself reduces the prospect of new conflict in the Middle East, and we must continue to assist her in maintaining that ability.

—For Egypt: \$250 million in supporting assis-

tance. These funds would be used for the tasks which come with peace: clearing the Suez Canal, repairing the damage in adjacent areas, and restoring Egyptian trade.

—For Jordan: \$100 million in military assistance grants, \$77.5 million in security supporting assistance, and \$30 million in military credit sales. Jordan has been a moderating force in the Arab world and these funds will enable her to maintain a position of moderation and independence which will be crucial to a permanent settlement in the area.

—For a Special Requirements Fund: \$100 million. This fund will be used for new needs that may arise as the outlines of a peaceful settlement take shape, including provision for peace-keeping forces, refugee aid or settlement, and development projects.

All of this aid will contribute to the confidence these nations must have in the United States and in their own security if they are to have the base from which to negotiate a lasting settlement. It will strengthen moderate forces in an area where only moderation can form the basis for a settlement acceptable to all.

104

Joint statement issued after the meeting between US Secretary of State Kissinger and Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR⁷⁴

Geneva, April 29, 1974

Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Kissinger met on Sunday, April 28 and Monday, April 29 in Geneva for a full review of questions of mutual interest to the United States and the Soviet Union. The discussions were conducted in a friendly and constructive spirit. Both sides expressed their determination to pursue the political course that has been firmly established in their relations, and which has found expression in the results of earlier Soviet-American meetings at the highest level for the benefit of their peoples and peace in the world.

In the course of their meetings the Minister

⁷³ Part relevant to the Middle East excerpted from the text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXX, 1820 (May 13, 1974), pp. 527-528.

⁷⁴ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXX, 1826 (June 24, 1974), p. 677.

and the Secretary exchanged views on various questions relating to the preparations for the forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union of President Nixon. It was agreed that a great deal has been accomplished in the preparations for the visit. The two sides expressed the conviction that a number of agreements designed to broaden co-operation between the United States and the Soviet Union, to further reduce the danger of war and strengthen international peace will be prepared for conclusion at the Summit meetings.

In particular, there was also a review of the negotiations on limitation of strategic arms and the two sides agreed to pursue their efforts toward agreement.

The Minister and the Secretary exchanged views on the current status of the negotiations of a Middle East settlement and on the next phase of these negotiations. The two sides agreed to exercise their influence toward a positive outcome and to remain in close touch with each other so as to strive to coordinate their efforts for a peaceful settlement in the area. Both sides expressed themselves in favor of the resumption of the work of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East at an early date.

They also reviewed the work of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The two sides reaffirmed their positions in favor of its successful conclusion as soon as possible.

Both sides consider the talks to have been valuable and welcomed the fact that discussions of this kind have become a regular practice of U.S.-Soviet relations.

105

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Syria of Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR⁷⁵

Damascus, May 7, 1974

At the invitation of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, Andrey Gromyko, CPSU Politburo member and Soviet Foreign Minister, paid an official visit to Damascus from 5th to 7th May, 1974.

The President of the Syrian Arab Republic and Secretary General of the Socialist Arab Ba'ith Party, Hafiz al-Asad, received Andrey Gromyko. Gromyko also met Socialist Arab Ba'ith Party Command member Mahmud al-Ayyubi, the Prime Minister, and Command member Abd al-Halim Khaddam, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

During the talks held in Damascus within the framework of continuous consultations and in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and friendship the two sides affirmed the importance of continuing the implementation of the joint statement signed in Moscow by Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Hafiz al-Asad, Socialist Arab Ba'ith Party Secretary General and President of the Syrian Arab Republic, during the latter's recent visit to the Soviet Union, as well as the other Soviet-Syrian statements.

An exchange of views on the Middle East situation took place. The two sides pointed out in particular that a just and permanent peace in the area must be based on complete Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since the June 1967 aggression and the guarantee of the legitimate, national rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

Surveying the issue of the disengagement of forces on the Syrian front, Andrey Gromyko declared the Soviet Union's firm support for the Syrian position. The two sides reaffirmed that the disengagement of forces must be considered a step towards achieving the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories and towards reaching a comprehensive and just solution of the Middle East problem.

⁷⁵ Broadcast by Damascus radio in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/4595/A/1-2*; reprinted by permission.

106

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Saudi Arabia of Foreign and Defence Minister Ahmad of Pakistan (excerpts)⁷⁶

Riyad, May 11, 1974

His Excellency Mr. Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan paid an official visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 15 to 17 Rabi-us-Sani 1394 (7 to 9 May 1974) at the invitation of His Excellency Mr. Omar Sakkaf, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

Both the parties reviewed the international situation in general and the problems of the Middle East in particular and they assured of their full support for the struggle of Arab people against their enemy Israel and their support to the rights of the people of Palestine and asked the international community to give importance to the collective demand of 700 million Muslims in the world as contained in the Declaration of Lahore⁷⁷ issued by the Second Islamic Conference for the restoration of Arab sovereignty on the holy city of Jerusalem.

107

Statement by USSR Prime Minister Kosygin concerning steps for a Middle East settlement made during a dinner in honour of visiting Prime Minister Jallud of Libya (excerpt)⁷⁸

Moscow, May 14, 1974

I would like to stress once again that the Soviet Union's policy on Middle East affairs, our policy of giving every support to the struggle of the Arab peoples against Israel's aggression, against im-

perialism, Zionism and reaction, is inseparable from our fundamental principles.

The firmness of our views determines the consistent nature of the positions of our Communist Party and the Soviet government on the Middle East problem. The essence of this position is well known. The Soviet Union condemns the policy of aggression which is being pursued by Israel with the support of external imperialist forces, and believes that there can be no lasting and just peace in the Middle East without the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and later, and without ensuring the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. Any agreements on the disengagement of armed forces must be regarded as preliminary steps towards an overall settlement and must be followed up with other measures to implement the well-known resolutions of the U.N. Security Council.

We place emphasis on this aspect of the matter, because it has recently become apparent that the aggressor and his protectors want to substitute some half measures, which only create a semblance of détente in the Middle East, for an overall Middle East settlement.

Recently, at the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member-Countries, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries proclaimed their firm and invariable support for the struggle of the Arab peoples for a just and lasting peace and for ensuring their free development and their social and economic progress.⁷⁹ This once again confirms the great importance of friendship and cooperation between the Arab states and the socialist countries.

We hope that the development of Soviet-Libyan relations will also serve the interests of the joint struggle of the Arab peoples for the removal of the consequences of Israeli aggression, and their unity in this struggle on an anti-imperialist basis.

⁷⁶ Excerpted from the English text, *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), XXVII, 2 (1974), pp. 141, 142.

⁷⁷ Doc. 67 above.

⁷⁸ Excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5738 (May 21, 1974), p. 179.

⁷⁹ Doc. 99 above.

108

Statement by Chancellor Schmidt of West Germany confirming the continuation of existing policy towards the Middle East⁸⁰**Bonn, May 17, 1974**

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We have an unchanged vital interest in a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East. I here reaffirm the policy of my predecessor in this office. Just as before we support the peace efforts in this region and intend to cooperate with our partners in the search for peace.

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109

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Prime Minister Jallud of Libya (excerpts)⁸¹**Moscow, May 20, 1974**

Major Abdel Salam Ahmed Jalloud, Member of the Revolutionary Command Council, Prime Minister of the Libyan Arab Republic, stayed in the Soviet Union on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government from May 14 to 20, 1974.

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There was an extensive exchange of opinion on current international problems, with special attention being given to questions relating to the situation in the Middle East. The two Sides strongly condemned Israel, Zionism and the imperialist forces supporting them, forces which continue to constantly aggravate the situation in the Middle East and threaten world peace and security. They again insist on the complete and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and on the ensurance of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. They are convinced that without observing these conditions it is impossible

⁸⁰ Made in a speech to the Bundestag presenting the new government's policy; excerpted and translated from the German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 60 (May 18, 1974), p. 597.

⁸¹ Excerpted from the English text, *Moscow News*, supplement to no. 22 (June 1, 1974), pp. 3-5.

to achieve a radical and all-embracing settlement of the situation in the area.

The two Sides stated that they regard the Palestinian resistance movement as an integral part of the national-liberation movement of the Arab peoples and will continue to give it every assistance.

It was stressed unanimously during the exchange of opinions that the strengthening of the unity of action by the Arabs on the basis of social progress and democracy is of great importance in the struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

The Soviet Side expressed its firm determination to continue rendering every support to the Arab peoples fighting for stronger national independence and for economic and social progress.

The two Sides stressed the importance of Arab-Soviet friendship and the friendship of Arabs with the states of the socialist community and called for strengthening and deepening this friendship on the basis of mutual respect. They will work to strengthen this friendship in all fields, as a very important factor in the liberation struggle against imperialism and colonialism.

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110

Communiqué issued after the meeting of the Council of Ministers of CENTO (excerpts)⁸²**Washington, May 22, 1974**

The Council of Ministers of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) held its 21st session in Washington on May 21 and 22, 1974.

The delegations were led by:

1. H.E. Mr. Abbas Ali Khalatbary, Minister for Foreign Affairs, *Iran*
2. H.E. Mr. Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, *Pakistan*
3. H.E. Mr. Melih Esenbel, Ambassador of Turkey to the United States, *Turkey*
4. The Rt. Hon. James Callaghan, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, *United Kingdom*
5. The Hon. Kenneth Rush, Acting Secretary of State, *United States*

⁸² Excerpted from the English text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXX, 1824 (June 10, 1974), pp. 639, 640.

6. Having reviewed the situation in the Middle East, the Ministers agreed that the prolonged conflict in the area has constituted a grave threat to world peace. They welcomed the steps taken so far towards attainment of a just, honourable and durable peace in the area and expressed the hope that all parties concerned would persevere in these efforts. They expressed their appreciation for the efforts of the Secretary of State Kissinger. The Ministers reaffirmed their support for the Security Council Resolution 242, of 22 November 1967.

111

Address by US Secretary of State Kissinger made at a lunch in honour of Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria⁸³

Damascus, May 23, 1974

Mr. Minister, Mr. Defense Minister, distinguished guests: I consider this occasion a rather momentous event. Six months ago if anyone had predicted that an American Secretary of State would meet at this residence of American Ambassadors with such a distinguished group of Syrians, he would have been considered a dreamer. Yet we meet here today not only in our official capacities but, having worked together for peace in the Middle East, with increasing confidence and friendship. When I first met the Foreign Minister, his natural affection for anything American nevertheless had to give way to some suspicion engendered by six years of isolation. I believe that we have now recognized that closer relations between Syria and the United States are in the interest of both countries and that hostility serves neither of our people.

There is an overriding need to bring a just and permanent peace to the Middle East, and the United States has engaged itself in that effort. As an important first step in that effort, we have in the last four weeks, all of us around this table, worked to bring about a disengagement between Syrian and Israeli forces. It has been a difficult negotiation eased somewhat by the natural con-

ciliativeness of both sides. It has been difficult, but we have persevered because all of us around this table recognize that the first step is always the hardest.

There has been enough suffering in the Middle East, and it is time that the peoples of the Middle East began to devote their talents to peaceful pursuits. It is my judgment that we have made great progress in this negotiation and, even if we should for some reason not complete it on this trip, we will surely bring it to a conclusion in the near future. But we will continue to persevere in the next few days, and I want to pay tribute to the constructive and positive spirit that has been displayed by the Syrian side. It is this spirit which will help us move forward toward peace in the Middle East and toward improved relations between our two countries. The personal associations my colleagues and I have formed in the weeks past will be deepened in the months to come.

112

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Syria of Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR⁸⁴

Damascus, May 29, 1974

In response to an invitation from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and Soviet Minister, Andrey Gromyko, paid a cordial and official visit to Damascus from 27th to 29th May 1974. The visit took place in a warm and cordial atmosphere that is commensurate with the relations of friendship existing between the two countries and peoples.

Andrey Gromyko was received by: Hafiz al-Asad, Secretary General of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and President of the Syrian Arab Republic; the Prime Minister, Mahmud al-Ayyubi; and the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Abd al-Halim Khaddam. Talks took place between the two sides that centred in particular on the current efforts to find a just

⁸³ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXX, 1826 (June 24, 1974), pp. 688-689.

⁸⁴ Broadcast on Damascus radio in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4613/A/3-4; reprinted by permission.

solution to the Middle East problem and on the matter of the separation of forces on the Syrian front as a first step and an indivisible part of the comprehensive solution. It has again been confirmed as a result of these talks that the two countries have identical views and positions regarding all these questions. The two sides also reaffirmed that a just solution to the Middle East problem cannot be achieved except on the basis of Israel's complete withdrawal from all occupied Arab territory and the ensuring of the national and legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people. The two sides consider that as soon as an agreement is reached on the separation of forces on the Syrian front and its clauses are implemented, the necessary measures must be immediately initiated to arrive at the overall and just solution which will ensure the implementation of the UN resolutions.

The Syrian side reaffirmed its declaration that the Soviet Union must participate in all the stages and developments in the solution for the establishment of the just and durable peace in the Middle East.

The Soviet side reaffirmed the firmness of the principled course that the Soviet Union is following and which is aimed at the overall support of the Syrian Arab Republic in its struggle for the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression.

The Soviet Union and the Syrian Arab Republic affirm the strong relations between them and the solid friendship between the two peoples of the two countries and declare that they will not allow any quarter to undermine these relations and the friendship that has been achieved as a result of the major, continuous efforts exerted by both sides.

113

Announcement by US President Nixon of the Syria-Israel disengagement agreement⁸⁵

Washington, May 29, 1974

Ladies and gentlemen, I have an announcement that will also be made today in Jerusalem and in Damascus. The announcement reads as follows:

"The discussions conducted by United States Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger with

Syria and Israel have led to an agreement on the disengagement of Syrian and Israeli forces. The agreement will be signed by Syrian and Israeli military representatives in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Geneva Conference on Friday (this Friday) May 31."

Just a word about the significance of this development. It is obviously a major diplomatic achievement, and Secretary Kissinger deserves enormous credit for the work that he has done, along with members of his team, in keeping this negotiation going and finally reaching an agreement when at many times over the past few weeks it seemed that the negotiations would break down.

Also, credit goes to the governments concerned, who had great differences which had to be resolved. I have sent messages of congratulations to Prime Minister Meir of Israel and also to President Asad of Syria, congratulating them with regard to the statesmanship that they have shown in resolving differences that seemed totally without any prospect of resolution a month or so ago—and even, as a matter of fact, several times over the past month.

This particular agreement, together with the agreement that was reached earlier on disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces, now paves the way for progress in Geneva, and of course with the various governments involved, toward our objective—and, we trust, their objective as well—of achieving a permanent peace settlement for the entire Mideast area.

However, we should have in mind that despite the fact that these two agreements have now been signed, or have been reached, that there are many difficulties ahead before a permanent settlement is reached. However, what was a major roadblock to any permanent settlement has now been removed—and, I think, the most difficult roadblock, the roadblock being the differences that had long existed between Israel and Syria.

As far as the United States is concerned, we shall continue with our diplomatic initiatives, working with all governments in the area toward achieving the goal of a permanent settlement, a permanent peace, and I can only say that based on the success in reaching this agreement in which the differences were so great that the prospects for reaching agreement on a permanent basis, I think, now are better than they have been at any time over the past 25 years.

Thank you.

⁸⁵ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXX, 1826 (June 24, 1974), p. 679.

114

Statement to the Knesset by Israel Prime Minister Meir presenting the disengagement agreement with Syria⁸⁶

Jerusalem, May 30, 1974

The agreement comprises the following: a mutual undertaking to observe the cease fire strictly on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military activity, the armies being separated by a demilitarized zone in which there are no military forces. In this zone there will be United Nations forces and the principal military forces will withdraw from each other on both sides of the demilitarized zone. On each side an area will be designated in which the obligation to reduce forces and arms will apply, and arms—long-range artillery and missiles—will be kept at a specified distance. The United Nations will supervise the implementation of the agreement, the disengagement area and the reduction of forces. The United Nations force will be recruited from countries that are not permanent members of the Security Council. Israel will relinquish the bulge area that she occupied during the Yom Kippur war, and there will be a Syrian civilian administration in the demilitarized zone. After the signing and before the stages of implementation start there will be an exchange of prisoners and the bodies of the dead will be returned.

As regards terrorist activity, the United States has informed us of its attitude to the first paragraph of the agreement, which is: "Any raids carried out by armed groups or individuals across the lines will be an infringement of the cease fire, and in the exercise of her right to defend herself Israel may take action to prevent such activities by all means at her disposal. The United States will not regard such actions on the part of Israel as infringing the cease fire and will give her political support". I assume that the United States would not have told us this unless there was something to justify it, and I make this statement of the United States' view for publication.

⁸⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, *Knesset Records*, 8th Knesset, 1st session, May 28–30, 1974, p. 1460.

Members of the Knesset, the government will submit to the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee further clarifications on the subject of preventing acts of terrorism and on other subjects.

The document we are going to sign says: "This agreement is not a peace agreement, but it is a step towards a just and permanent peace". The agreement is all open and above-board and will be published. We have not entered into any secret undertakings on territorial or any other matters.

In everything connected with the agreed disengagement line, we have acted on the advice of Chief of Staff General Mordechai Gur. We have made a point of safeguarding our military line, the security of all our settlements in the Golan Heights and of continuing to strengthen more firmly, establish and develop these.

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Agreement between Syria and Israel on disengagement of forces⁸⁷

Geneva, May 31, 1974

A. Israel and Syria will scrupulously observe the cease-fire on land, sea and air and will refrain from all military actions against each other, from the time of the signing of this document, in implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 338 dated 22 October 1973.

B. The military forces of Israel and Syria will be separated in accordance with the following principles:

1. All Israeli military forces will be west of the line designated as Line A on the Map attached hereto, except in the Quneitra area, where they will be west of Line A-1.

2. All territory east of Line A will be under Syrian administration, and Syrian civilians will return to this territory.

3. The area between Line A and the line designated as Line B on the attached Map will be an

⁸⁷ Text of agreement and protocol as transmitted by the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council on May 30; UN doc. S/11302/Add. 1, Annexes A and B. The agreement was signed by Major-General Herzl Shafir for Israel and Lieutenant-General Adnan Wahid Tayara for Syria with Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, the Commander of the UN Emergency Force, as witness. See also doc. 8 above.

area of separation. In this area will be stationed the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force established in accordance with the accompanying protocol.

4. All Syrian military forces will be east of the line designated as Line B on the attached Map.

5. There will be two equal areas of limitation in armament and forces, one west of Line A and one east of Line B as agreed upon.

6. Air forces of the two sides will be permitted to operate up to their respective lines without interference from the other side.

C. In the area between Line A and Line A-1 on the attached Map there shall be no military forces.

D. This Agreement and the attached Map will be signed by the military representatives of Israel and Syria in Geneva not later than 31 May 1974, in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference under the aegis of the United Nations, after that group has been joined by a Syrian military representative, and with the participation of representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union. The precise delineation of a detailed Map and a plan for the implementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked out by military representatives of Israel and Syria in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group who will agree on the stages of this process. The Military Working Group described above will start their work for this purpose in Geneva under the aegis of the United Nations within 24 hours after the signing of this Agreement. They will complete this task within five days. Disengagement will begin within 24 hours after the completion of the task of the Military Working Group. The process of disengagement will be completed not later than 20 days after it begins.

E. The provisions of paragraphs A, B and C shall be inspected by personnel of the United Nations comprising the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force under this Agreement.

F. Within 24 hours after the signing of this Agreement in Geneva all wounded prisoners of war which each side holds of the other as certified by the ICRC will be repatriated. The morning after the completion of the task of the Military Working Group, all remaining prisoners of war will be repatriated.

G. The bodies of all dead soldiers held by either side will be returned for burial in their respective

countries within 10 days after the signing of this Agreement.

H. This Agreement is not a Peace Agreement. It is a step towards a just and durable peace on the basis of Security Council resolution 338 dated 22 October 1973.

*Protocol to agreement on disengagement between
Israeli and Syrian forces concerning the United
Nations Disengagement Observer Force*

Israel and Syria agree that:

The function of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) under the agreement will be to use its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and to see that it is scrupulously observed. It will supervise the agreement and protocol thereto with regard to the areas of separation and limitation. In carrying out its mission, it will comply with generally applicable Syrian laws and regulations and will not hamper the functioning of local civil administration. It will enjoy freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for its mission. It will be mobile and provided with personal weapons of a defensive character and shall use such weapons only in self-defence. The number of the UNDOF shall be about 1,250, who will be selected by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in consultation with the parties from members of the United Nations who are not permanent members of the Security Council.

The UNDOF will be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council.

The UNDOF shall carry out inspections under the agreement, and report thereon to the parties, on a regular basis, not less often than once every 15 days, and, in addition, when requested by either party. It shall mark on the ground the respective lines shown on the map attached to the agreement.

Israel and Syria will support a resolution of the United Nations Security Council which will provide for the UNDOF contemplated by the agreement. The initial authorization will be for six months subject to renewal by further resolution of the Security Council.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Algeria of Defence Minister Grechko of the USSR (excerpts)⁸⁸

Algiers, June 2, 1974

At the invitation of President Houari Boumedienne, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence in the Popular Democratic Republic of Algeria, Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei Grechko, member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and Minister of Defence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics paid a friendly visit to Algeria May 27–31, 1974.

The two sides expressed their special concern over the Middle East situation and reaffirmed that a just and lasting peace in this region can only be established through the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories and the restoration to the Palestinian Arab people of its legitimate rights. The two sides denounced imperialist and Zionist manoeuvres in this region and expressed their full support for the struggle of the Arab peoples for freedom and independence. The Algerian side expressed its great esteem for the active solidarity shown by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries with the Arab countries.

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Speech to the Knesset by Israel Prime Minister Rabin outlining the new government's policies (excerpts)⁸⁹

Jerusalem, June 3, 1974

On Friday May 31, 1974, a disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel was signed

⁸⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Shaab* (Algiers), June 3, 1974.

⁸⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, *Maariv* (Tel Aviv), June 4, 1974; at the end of the session Rabin's government won a vote of confidence by 61 to 51 votes with 5 abstentions.

in Geneva,⁹⁰ and immediately afterwards, the fighting stopped on the Syrian front. An Israeli military delegation is now conducting negotiations with a Syrian military delegation on the implementation of a programme for the disengagement of forces. I hope and believe that the Israeli and Syrian military delegations will complete their work before next Friday.

The disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel is another stage in the changeover from war to peace in our area. Israel is completely satisfied with the implementation of the disengagement agreement with Egypt, and we all hope that the agreement with Syria will be implemented in the same way.

The disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and Syria are not peace agreements, and we must not see them against the background of the results of the Yom Kippur war only; we must take a more comprehensive view of them. More than 26 years have passed since we obtained independence, for the third time in the long history of our people, and we must see these agreements against the background of the historical struggle of the Jewish people to establish and consolidate the state of Israel.

The Zionist aspiration to build a sovereign Jewish state living at peace with its neighbours is still, in fact, in the process of being achieved, a process not yet completed. There are two aspects to the struggle to realize Zionist aspirations: the first is the establishment of an independent state and the defence of its very existence and of the freedom of the people who live in it, and the second is the building of the Jewish people and society on the basis of the values and the historical heritage of our people, and the realization of the aspiration to ingather the diaspora of Israel.

We shall not realize the aspiration for the sake of which we established a state unless we pour into it the peculiar characteristics of our people and our movement of resurgence. It is not sufficient to establish a large and strong security system. The object of our military strength is to defend the continuing national effort to build a society, a

⁹⁰ Doc. 115 above.

civilization and an economy, and to fuse the immigrants and sons of various civilizations into a single people, in the full sense of the word. Therefore, in addition to developing the Israeli army and the security system as a fundamental condition for the safeguarding of our very existence, material resources and intellectual effort must be devoted to meeting all requirements for the building of our society, both in theory and in practice, and for the establishment of a progressive and unified national human grouping. In addition to this: the vital link with world Jewry must continue and Israel must be made a real spiritual centre for the Jewish people of the diaspora.

Thus our life in the future will be faced with the following tasks:

a) Safeguarding Israel's security and developing the strength and capability of the Israeli army, along with an urgent and constant striving for peace.

b) Building a just, free and independent modern society living an active social life rich in culture within the framework of a firmly established democratic regime and through the expenditure of efforts to ensure that the rising generation has a greater share in taking important decisions and in bearing responsibility.

c) Ensuring social welfare through special efforts by one and all to ensure the advance of these classes that are still living in straitened circumstances.

d) Increasing immigration and ensuring more effective absorption, in an effort to induce hundreds of thousands of Jews to immigrate to the country, and making every effort to strengthen the links with world Jewry.

e) Making intense efforts to consolidate and develop the economy.

f) Consolidating our political prestige and strengthening our relations with all countries in the world, headed by the United States.

Maintaining the strength and capability of the Israeli army is the guarantee of our security. Although we have been unable to deter our enemies from making wars, the Israeli army has demonstrated its ability to defeat its attackers on the field of battle. The Israeli army has always been the people's army, expressing and reflecting more than anything else the will and strength of

the independent Jewish entity in our state.

In the Yom Kippur war the Israeli army passed through one of the severest trials in its history and, in spite of difficulties at the start, held up the surprise attack by the Egyptians and Syrians while the reserve was being called up, and carried the war into the enemy's territory. It was only because of intervention by political quarters outside the area that the Israeli army did not win a total victory.

The war did not end on October 24, 1973. A war of attrition continued in the south and the north, only ending when the disengagement agreements were concluded. Since the war ended the Israeli army has started to learn the lessons and to increase its capability with advanced modern equipment, both of the kind that were in our possession and various modern types. The Israeli army is fully prepared to confront the new military situation.

The state and the people are proud of the Israeli army and confident of its strength. The government will do everything in its power to develop the army and to increase the quantity and quality of its armaments by providing it with modern equipment so that it may be prepared at all critical times and continue to be a model and an example to Jewish youth in the country and throughout the world.

The government's policy has always been and will continue to be directed by efforts for peace. Twenty-six years of war have done nothing to change our awareness, which makes peace with our neighbours the main objective of our policy. In the future, too, we shall be on the alert for any possibility, any glimmer of a possibility of progress towards peace. Our policy is clear: we prefer peace to new military victories, a stable, just and honourable peace, but not peace on any terms.

The Six-Day War gave Israel one of the greatest victories in Jewish history, but even this victory did not result in the desired peace. By this victory Israel obtained the best defence lines known to the Jewish state at any time in its history. But we did not become drunk with victory. The government of Israel was ready to come to a peace agreement with its neighbours, through readiness for territorial settlements, but this readiness met with no response. In no circumstances will the government of Israel allow itself to be forced by threats of war, international pressure or acts of terrorism, to return to the situation and the cir-

cumstances that prevailed before the Six Day War. All our efforts—from the end of the 1967 Six-Day War to the 1973 Yom Kippur war—to advance towards peace were in vain.

Our neighbours have placed two obstacles in the way of peace:

a) By demanding an Israeli undertaking of total withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, lines as a precondition for any negotiation.

b) By opposing any direct negotiations between the parties at any stage of the negotiations.

The Yom Kippur war has led to a change in this attitude of our neighbours, and it was this change alone that made it possible to reach the disengagement agreements.

Israel will continue to strive for real peace. Real peace is not a peace between diplomatic representatives only, but peace between peoples, a peace that is daily expressed by open frontiers through which mutual contacts can be established in all fields of life.

The question is: Can such a peace be obtained by an immediate change-over from war to peace? I should like to hope and believe that it really is possible to reach this goal.

Israel will spare no effort to attain this goal. All the same, we must be vigilant and see the difficult situation as it really is. Therefore we must also seek to advance towards peace by stages, to advance towards peace through partial agreements that ensure peace and quiet as regards military activities, by a cease fire and by a reduction of forces which will reduce the danger of clashes and surprise attacks. We must strive for settlements that lead to a situation where we can put the intentions of every Arab country to the test: are they directed towards peace or not?

In 1971 the government of Israel decided to explore the possibility of a partial settlement with Egypt, subject to a limited withdrawal, and in continuation of that trend the disengagement agreements with Egypt and Syria that have now been achieved must be regarded as being to some extent part of the overall concept of an advance towards peace by stages. And in fact, it is clearly stated in both of the disengagement agreements that it is a stage towards achieving a just and permanent peace in the Middle East.

Now that the agreements have been signed the question is: What next? Where do we go from here? It will be the new government's policy, in

the first place, to see how the agreements are implemented. First and foremost we must see how the military part of the agreements is implemented—that part which deals with strict maintenance of the cease fire on land, sea and air, and with the reduction of forces by Syria, as happened on the Egyptian front. But we must also see to what extent Egypt actually carries out her intentions of rebuilding and repopulating the Suez Canal towns and opening the Canal to international shipping. We must follow the steps taken by Syria and see if she returns the villagers to the villages of the Bulge and Quncitra, so that they once more become peaceable civilian villages living in peace alongside our settlements in the Golan Heights. Only when we are sure that Egypt and Syria intend to observe the disengagement agreements fully will there be a greater possibility of continuing to negotiate for peace.

It has been established during the years since the birth of the state of Israel that the key to the question of whether there is to be war or an advance towards peace lies in the Arab countries' policy vis-à-vis Israel. This depends, first and foremost, on the attitude of Egypt, the principal country in the Arab world. There has been no war between the Arab countries and Israel in which Egypt was not directly involved, and no war has ended without Egypt deciding to stop it. This is what happened during the War of Independence, in the Qadesh Campaign, and in the Six Day War, and this is what happened in the Yom Kippur war and what has happened since then.

If Egypt had not agreed to the ceasefire, signed the Six Point Agreement, sent representatives to the Geneva conference, and signed the disengagement agreement, we should never have reached a disengagement agreement with Syria. Therefore the next stage on the road to peace must be between Egypt and Israel.

Israel's agreement to take part in the Geneva peace conference was based on the assumption that, at that conference, the foundations would be laid for a settlement between Israel and each of her neighbours. The problems in dispute between Israel and each of her neighbours are different, so that each settlement must be established on a double basis and on the basis of commitment to clear mutual undertakings between Egypt and Israel, between Syria and Israel, between Jordan and Israel and between Lebanon and Israel.

There is no place for any other quarter to be a party to the peace negotiations.

As regards relations between Egypt and Israel, two possibilities can be observed: the first is a changeover from a situation of disengagement to a contractual peace to end war for ever and to make a real peace between our two peoples and two states. The second is an advance towards another stage on the road to peace, in which Egypt terminates the state of war.

As for Syria, once the disengagement agreement is achieved and implemented in spirit and in letter, there will be no need for a transitional period. And once further progress has been achieved in the settlement with Egypt, the question will be: Is Syria really prepared to sign a peace treaty with Israel? The leaders of the neighbouring countries must realize that Israel has to have defensible frontiers and that Israel will never, even within the framework of a peace treaty, return to the June 4, 1967, lines. These lines are not defensible frontiers and constitute a temptation to aggression against us, as has been proved in the past.

We shall also be prepared to discuss with Jordan the problems between us and her. We are anxious to conduct negotiations with Jordan about peace. We seek a peace treaty with Jordan on the basis of there being two independent states—Israel, with its capital a united Jerusalem, and an Arab state east of Israel.

And in the neighbouring Jordanian-Palestinian state the independent identity of the Palestinian and Jordanian Arabs will be able to express itself through peace and good neighbourly relations with Israel. Israel rejects the establishment of another separate Arab state west of the River Jordan.

In the course of the discussions on the formation of the government that has now resigned, the question was asked: How will the government behave if the moment of decision comes after negotiations with Jordan? The answer was clear: The government will negotiate with Jordan and make decisions at every stage of the negotiations. But no peace treaty will be signed with Jordan if it involves making territorial concessions in Judaea and Samaria before the people's wishes are consulted in new elections. The new government is committed to this too. In this connection I must point out that the new government will continue

to follow the policy of its predecessor vis-à-vis the Geneva conference and these who take part in it. The goal of this conference has been defined as the conduct of negotiations between the countries directly concerned with the problem of peace in the Middle East—Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon—which have common frontiers with Israel. If it is proposed to invite any other quarter such a proposal—like any other proposal made within the framework of the conference—will require the prior approval of all the countries that agreed to take part in the conference. Israel cannot agree to representatives of the sabotage and terrorist organizations being invited to attend as representatives or observers, and the Israeli government will not negotiate with the terrorist organizations whose declared objective is to destroy the state of Israel.

As for Lebanon, there is no dispute between us and Lebanon over the territorial problem, and it would be easy to make peace with her. But most regrettably the Lebanese government is still not prepared to make peace with us. What is more, Lebanon has become one of the principal bases for the activities of the sabotage and terrorist organizations which perform criminal acts of killing. It is the duty and responsibility of the Lebanese government to prevent the hostile acts that are planned in and carried out from its territory; if it does not do so, Lebanon will have to bear the full responsibility for the consequences of terrorist activity emanating from its territory.

The Palestinian terrorist organizations have recently stepped up their activity: penetration, sabotage, attempts to seize hostages, criminal acts of killing. The declared goal of these organizations is to liquidate the state of Israel and to undermine the good relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel. They are striving to create an atmosphere of fear and terror. But the saboteurs and their leaders should realize that this goal will never be achieved, and that the Israeli army is strong and intrepid. The Israeli army will take systematic and bold action against the sabotage organizations dealing with them wherever and whenever necessary.

I am confident that, in spite of the damage and injuries they have sustained and the difficulties of the struggle, the inhabitants of the northern frontiers will continue the building and development of their settlements and their progress.

The tragic incidents in Kiryat Shmona and Maalot have shown that the inhabitants of these settlements have more than anyone else to bear not only the burden of security problems but also the burden of social and economic problems. We shall make persistent efforts to solve the social and economic problems in these places, so as to reinforce their capacity for endurance, because despite their geographical distance from the centre of the country they are close to all of us.

The recent incidents in the north of the country and the attempts to strike by the saboteurs, require that the government be on the alert and continue to develop good neighbourly relations between Jews, Arabs and Druzes.

The Yom Kippur war, the energy crisis and the severance of diplomatic relations with a number of countries have given rise to a feeling of political isolation in the country. We must make every effort to renew the friendship that has been impaired, to strengthen our relations with our allies and to seek friends and allies once more.

The cease fire in the area and the disengagement agreements also increase the possibilities of strengthening Israel's network of relations at the international level.

In recent years Israel's friendly relations with the President, the leaders and the people of the United States have been strengthened and consolidated. The relations between us are based not only on values that are deep-rooted in the United States and on the democracy to which the two peoples adhere so firmly but also on common interests. These friendly relations have resulted in the military, economic and political strengthening of Israel, and the United States' readiness to assist Israel was conspicuous in the Yom Kippur war.

Now that the disengagement agreements with Egypt and Syria have been concluded, there are grounds to believe that the United States will increase its effective help to Israel. The friendly relations between us and America and the common interests of our countries have not prevented us in the past, nor will they prevent us in the future, from firmly insisting on maintaining and developing attitudes vital to Israel's existence, even if these attitudes are not acceptable to the United States.

In the last two wars the USSR has performed a negative role from the point of view of keeping

the peace: by the part it played in supplying our enemies with quantities of arms, and by the type of arms supplied, Soviet military aid provided our enemies with a great military capability. Now we are living in the age of *détente*, and if the great powers really want to bring about *détente* in the Middle East too, the USSR will have to change its attitude to Israel, stop encouraging the extremists in the Arab countries to be hostile, refrain from every step that assists military escalation and recognize Israel's right to defensible frontiers.

Political changes are now taking place in certain European countries, and we hope that these changes will open the door to improved Israeli relations with the countries of that continent. Our economic relations with Europe are very important, involving mutual benefits, and the achievement of increased collaboration between us and the European countries in general and the European Common Market in particular will be one of the most important tasks of the new government.

The Yom Kippur war and the energy crisis have had a bad effect on the African countries' relations with us. Africa needs many resources if it is to deal with its problems, and this need has given rise to the delusion that Arab financing will solve its problems. We must not allow the tendency to feel disappointed and isolated to get the better of us. We are living in a world of very rapidly changing trends, and the African and Asian countries and the countries of Latin America will recognize how valuable is the collaboration that Israel can offer them in developing their countries. There is a firm basis for friendship between us: common interest that our peoples and countries have in safeguarding their right to exist and to live without exploitation and domination, and on a basis of mutual freedom.

The right of every Jew to immigrate to Israel is a basic principle in the existence of the state of Israel. This right was laid down in the Charter of Independence and given legal effect in the Law of Return. The immigration of Jews to the country is the right of every Jew, and the state's loftiest duty is to encourage the absorption of every Jew who comes to the country. We will not tire of the struggle to free the prisoners of Zion and to ensure the emigration of the Jews of the USSR, and we shall call on the peoples of the world to stand by our brothers in the USSR in their

struggle to emigrate. We shall do all we can to ensure the safety of our brother Jews in Syria and to rescue them.

The Jewish people in the diaspora has always been the most loyal and courageous ally of the state of Israel, and the government will do all it can to strengthen the link between the diaspora and the country. We shall also do all we can to give the Jews of the diaspora a profounder insight into the realities of the state and we shall seek ways of making them join us in thinking about the fateful problems that require solution, and the government will encourage immigration to the country by all possible means and will do all it can to improve absorption measures.

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Statement by US Secretary of State Kissinger explaining the US government's proposed foreign assistance budget relating to the Middle East⁹¹

Washington, June 3, 1974

A substantial portion of this program, \$2.3 billion or just about half, is directed to the Middle East and Indochina. This emphasis reflects our past involvements and continuing interests and our hopes for peace in both areas.

Let me turn first to the Middle East.

The program before you is vital to preserving the momentum toward peace that has developed there over the past 6 months.

It has three basic purposes: First, to provide Israel with the assistance needed to maintain its security and consequently to maintain confidence in its own strength and in our support to persevere in the negotiations;

Second, it would give tangible expression to our new and fruitful relations with various Arab countries and encourage those which are seriously prepared to work for peace; and

Third, to encourage the peaceful development of the area, reducing the incentives to violence and deepening the interest of all the peoples in cooperation.

For the region as a whole, we are requesting \$817 million in new authority to support programs of \$908 million.

For Israel we are asking \$350 million in grants and credits: \$300 million in foreign military credit sales to enable it to purchase vitally needed military equipment from the United States, and \$50 million in supporting assistance to help sustain an economy strained by the costs of war. In addition, we are planning a separate Public Law 480 program.

For Jordan we are asking \$207.5 million in grants and credits. This consists of \$77.5 million in supporting assistance, \$100 million in military assistance, and \$30 million in military credit sales. Jordan has been a moderating influence in the Middle East. Our assistance is needed to strengthen its ability to continue on this course.

For Egypt we are asking \$250 million in economic assistance; \$20 million of this will help reopen the Suez Canal; \$80 million will finance commodity imports which will stimulate agricultural and industrial production. The remaining \$150 million is destined to support the rebuilding of Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez City and to rehabilitate areas bordering the Canal. These funds should help generate a multilateral effort in support of reconstruction, which we hope will be led by the World Bank. Egypt has made a critical contribution to the progress that has been made toward Middle Eastern peace.

Our assistance program will help deepen its commitment, and show that the United States is responsive to a nation which has made a bold decision to move in that direction.

Finally we are asking for a \$100 million "Special Requirements Fund" to be able to seize opportunities to reinforce the peace process as we get further into negotiations. We would consult closely with Congress on the use of this money.

⁹¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies of the House Committee on Appropriations; excerpted from US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1975, Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations*, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, 1974, Part II, p. 3.

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Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger commenting on the role of the USSR in the Middle East, discussing continuing action against "terrorism", US relations and attitudes towards the Arab states and the Palestinians, and future negotiations⁹²

Washington, June 6, 1974

Q. Mr Secretary, I won't disappoint you about the Middle East. I am wondering what role you foresee for the Soviet Union in the Middle East, assuming that the peace conference is successful and the situation is stabilized. The reason I ask is that about 3½ years ago you were quoted as saying that your objective ultimately was to expel Russia from the Middle East. And I am wondering whether that is still your objective, and if so whether you are on the brink of achieving it.

A. As I remember that quotation, which was for background at the time—[Laughter.]

Q. It was subsequently printed though, as I recall, and attributed to you.

A. That is correct. And I believe we were talking about expelling Soviet troops from Egypt. Obviously the Soviet Union is a major power with global interests. Obviously the Middle East is an area of great concern to the Soviet Union. Therefore we have no intention, indeed we have no capability, of expelling Soviet influence from the Middle East.

We do not believe that the influence of a country in the Middle East is directly related to who conducts a particular negotiation. As we know, as we go into the next phase of negotiations in the Middle East, which will certainly involve the Geneva forum in some manner, the Soviet Union participates in that as the cochairman of the Geneva Conference. And in any event, whatever the Soviet role in a particular negotiation, there is no American intention of expelling the Soviet Union from the Middle East.

Q. Mr. Secretary, going to the Syrian disengagement agreement, did you make any promises to either side of economic aid or military aid as an inducement to enter into the agreement; and secondly, why should the

United States get involved in large-scale economic aid for Arab countries when a number of the oil-rich Arab countries are having trouble finding places to invest their money?

A. Every assurance that we have given to either side will be submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, as was the case in the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement.

With respect to economic aid, there was some misunderstanding of what I said in my testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee the other day. I did not mean to say that \$100 million was earmarked for Syria. What I intended to say was that in our request to the Congress there is a fund for special requirements, of \$100 million. Syria, together with other countries, would be eligible for support from that fund in the context of the implementation of the agreement and for purposes of economic reconstruction. This is not a commitment by the United States. And for that matter, Syria has not asked for it.

We have told Syria—indeed, we have said so publicly—that Syria would be eligible for support if the Congress approves that special requirements fund. And we have also pointed out to the Congress that before we appropriated any funds, or before we made any funds available from these special requirements, we would consult with the appropriate Members of Congress.

The relationship between economic aid and what oil-producing countries may want to give is of course a complicated issue. The United States will support reconstruction when we believe it serves our national interest and the cause of peace in the area. We believe that it will serve these objectives if Arab countries pursuing a moderate course can see that the United States takes an interest in their welfare and in their development. And in those conditions we will be prepared to consider requests from Syria as we have already submitted requests for Egypt.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us why an arrangement was made so that Mrs. [Golda] Meir could read parts of a private American assurance publicly to the Israeli Knesset concerning, I believe, the issue of terrorism?^{92a} And this particular assurance, while it might

⁹² Excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXX, 1826 (June 24, 1974), pp. 700, 702-703, 705-707, 708, 709.

^{92a} See doc. 114 above.

have been given to appropriate Members of the Congress, has still not been shared with the American public. Could you tell us what, if any, arrangements were made concerning the American relationship to terrorism?

A. Just a minute. I think you didn't state the situation correctly.

What Mrs. Meir read to the Knesset is the entire American assurance with respect to terrorism, and there is no other part to that assurance. And we chose this method because—as you know, having been there—it was an issue of very deep concern to the Israeli public and because Mrs. Meir felt that she had to explain why she accepted a slightly different wording in the agreement with Syria than she had in the case of Egypt.

Obviously, the Members of Congress are aware of a public statement by the United States; and in my briefings before the committees, I believe I made this clear.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations have carefully compiled a list of 170 Palestinian terrorists, of which all have been either released—at least, rather, a hundred of those have been released or never put to trial. And this harks back to the statement you made at a press conference here last December, that the ones that murdered 16 in Rome would be severely punished. Now I'm just wondering, first of all, were they—have they been severely punished? And what makes you think they ever will be?

A. If I said they would be severely punished—I don't remember saying that—but if I said it, it must have been an expression of a hope, because it is certainly outside of our control, what the Italian courts will do to terrorists.

We are of course strongly opposed to terrorism in all points, and we hope—we are convinced that it cannot be stamped out unless the governments in whose jurisdiction terrorism takes place are prepared to take appropriate measures. So our position has not changed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the next stage of the peace talks in the Middle East, which you have mentioned—you said there would be movement toward Geneva—could you tell us: One, were any assurances given to the Syrians on further Israeli withdrawals following the disengagement? And two, what the U.S. position is on a role for the Palestinians as a separate delegation in the peace conference?

A. The issue of the Palestinians has not yet come to us. Our present position is that the delegations

at the Geneva Peace Conference were established at the opening session.

As to what will happen in the next stage of the negotiations, the full record is contained in the published agreement, the last paragraph of which states that this disengagement agreement is not considered by either party as a final peace agreement, but as a step toward fulfilment of Resolution 338. This is the full record. There is no other record.

Q. *Nothing beyond that—*

A. There is no other record.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you get any assurances that the governments involved are prepared to stamp out terrorism?

A. We have stated our view, which is that the movement of terrorists—that armed attacks across the cease-fire line would be inconsistent with the cease-fire.

The position of the government toward terrorism has been repeatedly stated in public. It is a very complicated issue, and I have stated that our assurances with respect to it are contained in the document that Mrs. Meir has read.

Q. Mr. Secretary, about the President's trip. There have been some misgivings expressed about the President going to the Middle East at this time, so soon after your disengagement agreement. Could you tell us what are the compelling reasons for that trip at this time?

A. Our interests in the Middle East are composed, first, of making progress on the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations and, second, to establish a new relationship between the United States and the countries in the area.

The success of the two disengagement negotiations has created conditions in which the long-term relationship between the United States and these Arab countries, as well as Israel, can be put on a new basis. It involves the judgment of all of the leaders in the area that this would be a most opportune time for the President to symbolize the American commitment to this new relationship, to inaugurate it through conversations with leaders whom he has not had an opportunity, in some cases, to meet—and in all cases, not to meet for a considerable period of time.

And it was the combination of these factors that induced the President to go on this trip.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us, in connection with the forthcoming peace negotiations, what commitments or promises you have made to the Governments of Egypt and Syria to bring about the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories?

A. The only commitment that the United States has made is that it would maintain its efforts to bring about a just and permanent peace in the area. It has made no commitments as to any specific terms that might be negotiated. But we remain committed to making an effort to bring about a just and permanent peace.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you see the relation now between the United States and Israel in view of the new relationship between the United States and a few Arab states like Syria and Egypt?

A. Before the recent negotiations that have taken place in the Middle East, the Middle East was polarized between countries supported by the Soviet Union and Israel supported by the United States. This relationship had the advantage of simplicity. It also had the potential for explosion. And it was one of the factors that contributed to the outbreak of the October war and to the dangerous escalation which some of the diplomacy surrounding it involved.

We believe that the security of Israel, to which we remain committed, can best be assured in the context of a peace settlement in the Middle East and that this peace settlement, in turn, can be best produced if the United States is trusted by both parties. The U.S. friendship for Israel has not been diminished and will not be diminished as a result of its unceasing friendship for several of the Arab countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the disengagement, what commitments has the United States made to assure, by surveillance or other means, that both sides abide by the agreement of the separation of forces?

A. The military provisions of the agreement have been, by request of the parties, kept on a classified basis. It is no secret that the United States has participated in some surveillance on the Egyptian-Israeli agreement, and it is safe to assume that similar measures will be taken in the case of the Syrian-Israeli agreement. And the precise details will be submitted to the appropriate congressional committee.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow an earlier question on the Palestinian delegation, would the United States oppose a separate seating for a Palestinian delegation at Geneva, since you said they are constituted already?

A. That issue has not yet arisen.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, has there been any contact between this country and the Palestinians?

A. There has been no contact between this country and the Palestinians.

Yes, Barry [Barry Schweid, Associated Press].

Q. Further down the road, will you be retiring from the field of shuttle diplomacy? And what is the next participating stage of disengagement: stage 2 Egypt, or stage 1 Jordan?

Q. Question please, the question again.

A: The question is will I be retiring from the field of shuttle diplomacy?

I certainly believe that the role that I played in the first two disengagement negotiations should not become the normal pattern of negotiations in the Middle East, whatever sorrow my presence here may bring to some of my associates. But that does not exclude that at some particularly critical point, at the request of the parties, I may not be prepared to help out. But as the normal pattern, I do not believe that I should be involved in the sort of activity that led to the Syrian disengagement as the regular pattern of negotiations.

What the next stage of the diplomacy will be I think we can see more clearly after we have had an opportunity to consult more fully with the parties in the area and after they have had more of an opportunity to consult among each other.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you expect the new leaders of Israel to come soon to Washington to consult with you on the next stages?

A. We have invited the new leaders of Israel to come to Washington. And the date of their visit is really for them to determine. They will always be welcome here.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask two questions related to what you have already said.

One is that you said some progress was being made, in response to a question about your meeting yesterday with the Senators. Some progress—in which direction is it? From the Soviet Government, on the end of harassment or easing of restrictions, or from the Senators,

toward seeing the viewpoint of the administration? That's A.

B—may I go on? Because I haven't had much of a chance to talk with you in the last five weeks. [Laughter.] With relation to the terrorism assurances that Israel has received, has the Syrian Government given you any assurance?—which I'm not clear about. Two, why hasn't the United States undertaken a similar action, but with regard to Lebanon, where perhaps 99.99 percent of the terrorists come from?

A. With respect to the first question, it was the consensus of all the participants at the breakfast yesterday morning that it would not serve the objectives that we all want if we engaged in a detailed public discussion of every aspect of the emigration question. Therefore we would prefer to wait until some of the issues are further clarified and have achieved enough of a definition so that they're suitable for public discussion.

With respect to the issue of terrorism, we obviously had discussions on that subject with Syria. It would be totally contrary to any purpose that anybody may wish to achieve with respect to this to force a public disclosure of the content of these discussions—which were entirely bilateral and reflected statements of American views on the subject.

With respect to other acts of terrorism from other territories, the United States has always stated its view that it regrets acts of terrorism from wherever they originate.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the responsibilities of the United States if the Israeli-Syrian agreement were to start coming apart? And don't some of the things that you've already talked about make the United States, in effect, the guarantor of that agreement?

A. The United States is not a guarantor of the agreement. Obviously the United States, having played a central role in negotiating it, will, in normal conditions, be asked by the parties to interpret this or that clause of the agreement. But the United States has undertaken no commitment to guarantee the agreement and does not consider itself a guarantor of the agreement.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USA of Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia (excerpt)⁹³

Washington, June 8, 1974

Following the joint announcement of April 5, 1974, in which Saudi Arabia and the United States expressed their readiness to expand cooperation in the fields of economics, technology, and industry, and in the supply of the Kingdom's requirements for defensive purposes, His Royal Highness Prince Fahd bin Abd al Aziz, Second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, accepted an invitation to visit the United States on June 5–8 to discuss these matters with President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger.

His Royal Highness was accompanied by a number of high Saudi officials. Prince Fahd met with President Nixon on June 6, and he and his colleagues also had meetings with Secretary of State Kissinger, Secretary of the Treasury Simon, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Secretary of Commerce Dent, and other high government officials.

The visit provided an opportunity for the two sides to agree on specific steps to strengthen relations in a variety of areas. Major attention was focussed on Saudi Arabia's economic and social development plans and defense requirements as well as on the ways in which the United States could be helpful in the realization of Saudi aspirations. There was a broad review of global problems of peace and security and, in this context, the situation in the Arabian Peninsula was examined. It was recognized that responsibility for maintaining security and promoting orderly development in this area belonged to the states of the region and that close cooperation among them is needed for their security. The United States expressed its continuing support for cooperative measures.

The visit also provided an opportunity to review the current status of U.S. efforts currently underway to work towards a just and lasting solution in the Middle East in accordance with UN principles and resolutions. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the progress made and expressed their hope for continuing early progress in this regard. The U.S. side reaffirmed its intention to continue

⁹³ Excerpted from the English text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXI, 1827 (July 1, 1974), p. 10.

its efforts looking toward a just and durable peace in the Middle East and noted the constructive support it has received from the Kingdom in these efforts.

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Joint statement of Principles of Relations and Cooperation between Egypt and the United States (excerpt)⁹⁴

Cairo, June 14, 1974

The President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Muhammed Anwar el-Sadat, and the President of the United States of America, Richard Nixon,

—Having held wide-ranging discussions on matters of mutual interest to their two countries,

—Being actually aware of the continuing need to build a structure of peace in the world and to that end and to promote a just and durable peace in the Middle East, and,

—Being guided by a desire to seize the historic opportunity before them to strengthen relations between their countries on the broadest basis in ways that will contribute to the well-being of the area as a whole and will not be directed against any of its states or peoples or against any other state,

Have agreed that the following principles should govern relations between Egypt and the United States.

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF BILATERAL RELATIONS

Relations between nations, whatever their economic or political systems, should be based on the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, including the right of each state to existence, independence, and sovereignty; the right of each state freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems; non-intervention in each other's internal affairs; and respect for territorial integrity and political independence.

Nations should approach each other in the spirit of equality respecting their national life and the pursuit of happiness.

The United States and Egypt consider that their relationship reflects these convictions.

Peace and progress in the Middle East are essential if global peace is to be assured. A just and durable peace based on full implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, should take into due account the legitimate interest of all the peoples in the Mid East, including the Palestinian people, and the right to existence of all states in the area. Peace can be achieved only through a process of continuing negotiation as called for by United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973, within the framework of the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference.

In recognition of these principles, the Governments of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the United States of America set themselves to these tasks:

They will intensify consultations at all levels, including further consultations between their Presidents, and they will strengthen their bilateral cooperation whenever a common or parallel effort will enhance the cause of peace in the world.

They will continue their active cooperation and their energetic pursuit of peace in the Middle East.

They will encourage increased contacts between members of all branches of their two governments—executive, legislative and judicial—for the purpose of promoting better mutual understanding of each other's institutions, purposes and objectives.

They are determined to develop their bilateral relations in a spirit of esteem, respect and mutual advantage. In the past year, they have moved from estrangement to a constructive working relationship. This year, from that base, they are moving to a relationship of friendship and broad cooperation.

They view economic development and commercial relations as an essential element in the strengthening of their bilateral relations and will actively promote them. To this end, they will facilitate cooperative and joint ventures among appropriate governmental and private institutions and will encourage increased trade between the two countries.

They consider encouragement of exchanges and joint research in the scientific and technical field as an important mutual aim and will take appropriate concrete steps for this purpose.

⁹⁴ Excerpted from the English text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXI, 1829 (July 15, 1974), p. 92.

They will deepen cultural ties through exchanges of scholars, students, and other representatives of the cultures of both countries.

They will make special efforts to increase tourism in both directions, and to amplify person-to-person contact among their citizens.

They will take measures to improve air and maritime communications between them.

They will seek to establish a broad range of working relationships and will look particularly to their respective Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors and to the Joint Commission on Cooperation, as well as to other officials and organizations, and private individuals and groups as appropriate, to implement the various aspects of the above principles.

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Resolution of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government condemning Israel and expressing support for the PLO⁹⁵

Mogadishu, mid-June, 1974

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity meeting in its eleventh ordinary session in Mogadishu from 12–15 June 1974,

Having heard the statement of the Vice President of the Arab Republic of Egypt,

Recalling all the previous resolutions of the Organization of African Unity relating to the Middle East which reaffirm that the complete withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Arab territories and the application of the national rights of the Palestinian people are preconditions for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

Gravely concerned over the continued manoeuvres of Israel, over her stubbornness in refusing to withdraw from all the occupied Arab territories and over her failure to recognize the legitimate and fundamental rights of the Palestinian people despite the troop disengagement agreements on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts,

1. *Takes note* of the statement of the head of the

delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt;

2. *Reaffirms* all the resolutions of the OAU including the latest resolution no. 332⁹⁶ regarding the continued adherence of the African states members of the OAU to their current attitude to Israel until a settlement of the problem is achieved;

3. *Affirms* that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East must rest on the following fundamental principles:

(a) the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied territories to the lines of June 4, 1967;

(b) the liberation of the Arab city of Jerusalem;

(c) the exercise by the Palestinian people of the right to self-determination and the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations relating to the Palestine question;

4. *Declares* its full support and backing by all means for the Arab Republic of Egypt, a founder member of the OAU, and the other Arab states in their just national struggle;

5. *Congratulates* President Anwar Sadat and the people and armed forces of Egypt as well as the other Arab states for their great victories in the October war and for the subsequent steps which create an encouraging atmosphere and precede a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

6. *Declares* its full support for the struggle of the Palestine Liberation Organization in its capacity as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and for its heroic struggle against Zionism and racialism and urges the member states to extend aid and support to this organization in its just national struggle;

7. *Calls on* the General Secretary of the Organization of African Unity to follow closely developments in the Middle East and to report to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in its twelfth session;

8. *Decides* to retain the question of the Middle East on the agenda of the OAU until the problem is settled.

⁹⁵ Translated from the Arabic text as published in *al-Ahram* (Cairo), June 15, 1974; Malawi expressed reservations about the resolution in its entirety.

⁹⁶ Adopted by the OAU Council of Ministers, doc. 197 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

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Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger reviewing the Middle East situation at the end of US President Nixon's visit⁹⁷

Jerusalem, June 17, 1974

Q. Can you give us an overview of what you think has happened in the Arab countries and Israel in terms of what is the situation now, as you see it?

A. I think, to understand the situation now, one has to consider it in the perspective of what has occurred in the six or seven months since the initiative—which the President's trip culminated—began. When this initiative began, the Middle East was polarized between the Arab world on the one side and Israel on the other, with the Arab world backed by the Soviet Union [and] Israel backed by the United States. As a result, every conflict in the Middle East had the insoluble quality of a superpower confrontation, and the U.S. role was seen as that of simply representing one of the sides in a dispute which had been festering for 25 years.

Last November, there began a diplomatic turn in which the United States, without giving up its traditional friendship and support for Israel, at the same time began to move into a position where it could be helpful to all of the parties in the process of negotiation and where in turn the other countries in the Middle East began to reconsider their one-sided reliance on only one of the countries.

This process leading to disengagement negotiations culminated in the Presidential trip, which has to be seen on many levels—on the one level, as a symbolic affirmation of a dramatic reversal in the whole historic evolution of this area, at the same time as enabling the United States to begin a relationship with all of the countries in the area not based on the exigencies of a particular crisis but based on the long-term prosperity and progress of the area. The President's visit and conversation in all of these countries has served to crystallize and to put into a focus this direction of the relationship between the United States and all of the countries in the area.

And thirdly, it has enabled the President to engage in preliminary conversations, not about the tactics of how peace should be made but about the general direction of the peace efforts. I therefore think that the Middle East policy, if we can stay on this course—and we all recognize that this is a very tricky and complicated area—could mark one of the turning points in the postwar diplomatic history.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in your opinion and that of the United States, how can the Palestinians effectively and constructively be brought into this whole negotiating process that has just been described?

A. Of course, the most efficient way for the Palestinians to be brought into the process is through a Jordanian negotiation, in which there is the historical background and for which Israel has always declared its readiness in principle. As for other steps that might be taken, I think it is premature to speculate at this point when there are other issues, such as borders and territory, that require more urgent consideration.

Q. There is a feeling here in one's conversations with Israelis that there is a mood which presumes that the Arab strategy right now is to consolidate their position preparatory to the long-range design of continuing an offensive to liquidate the State of Israel. On the basis of your talks with the Arabs to date, what reassurance, if any, can you give the Israeli populace that this is or is not in the long-range design or scheme of the Arab neighbors that surround them?

A. People who have lived for 25 years with the threat of extinction, whose neighbors for its entire history have not recognized its existence, needless to say live with a premonition of catastrophe that is not true of almost any other state. Therefore the sense of catastrophe, partly as a result of Jewish history, partly as a result of Israel's history, has to be deep in the souls of everybody here; and we, as Americans, have to understand it.

On the other hand, it is our conviction that for the first time in the existence of Israel, the Arab states, even the more radical ones like Syria, are talking about a continuing State of Israel and that some of the Arab states seem to have made a rather crucial decision to seek to work out modalities of coexistence with the State of Israel.

Now, this is an entirely new experience for

⁹⁷ Excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXI, 1829 (July 15, 1974), pp. 125, 126–127.

Israel, and it is also difficult, and a painful adjustment, for Israel to see that the polarization that had been characteristic of the area through most of the history of Israel, with the United States totally on one side and the Soviet Union totally on the other, is also changing to a more complex relationship.

In my experience, one of the more moving aspects of the disengagement negotiations has been to see the transformation of that fear into a sense of security which has developed through the process that the President initiated last October. And I believe that as a result of this trip and of the events that will follow this trip, Israel will understand that its long-term security is more surely guaranteed by what is now going on and in fact it is the only way to assure it.

This doesn't mean, however, that as one goes through particular phases there may not be elements of uncertainty and even elements of pain. But we will face them with a sense of partnership and understanding that has been characteristic of our previous efforts.

Q. Can you comment on reports this morning that you are also about to sign an agreement whereby Israel will be given assistance in the direction of a nuclear power plant?

A. Well, it is of course difficult for me to comment on things that will be in a joint statement, but it is reasonable to assume that we are prepared to make agreement with Israel that we have also made with Egypt.

Q. You say we are?

A. In principle.

Q. You mean on the nuclear plants?

A. Why don't you wait until we—I don't think I should answer any more questions on what may or may not be in a communique that may or may not be published.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you stated that it would be most desirable if Jordan would be the spokesman for the Palestinians. However, both Syria and Egypt made it abundantly clear they regard the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), possibly some of the branches, as a legitimate spokesman for the Palestinians. Does the United States intend to deal with the PLO, and would it recognize them as the legitimate spokesmen of the Palestinians if Egypt and Syria insisted on this?

A. No. What I said was that this is one, and perhaps the most efficient, way of doing it. We consider the question now premature. We will not make our decision based primarily on what this or that other state in the area may recommend.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Israel of President Nixon of the USA (excerpts)⁹⁸

Jerusalem, June 17, 1974

The President of the United States, Richard Nixon, visited Israel June 16–17, 1974. This is the first visit ever to have been paid by an American President to the State of Israel. It symbolizes the unique relationship, the common heritage and the close and historic ties that have long existed between the United States and Israel.

President Nixon and Prime Minister Rabin held extensive and cordial talks on matters of mutual interest to the United States and Israel and reviewed the excellent relations between their two countries. They discussed in a spirit of mutual understanding the efforts of both countries to achieve a just and lasting peace which will provide security for all States in the area and the need to build a structure of peace in the world. United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and members of the Israeli Cabinet participated in these talks.

Prime Minister Rabin expressed Israel's appreciation for the outstanding and effective role of the United States in the quest for peace under the leadership of President Nixon assisted by the tireless efforts of Secretary Kissinger and indicated Israel's intention to participate in further negotiations with a view to achieving peace treaties with its neighbors which will permit each State to pursue its legitimate rights in dignity and security.

President Nixon and Prime Minister Rabin agreed that peace and progress in the Middle East are essential if global peace is to be assured.

⁹⁸ Excerpted from *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXI, 1829 (July 15, 1974), pp. 110–111, 112.

Peace will be achieved through a process of continuing negotiations between the parties concerned as called for by U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed on the necessity to work energetically to promote peace between Israel and the Arab States. They agreed that States living in peace should conduct their relationship in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and the U.N. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States which provides that every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands including mercenaries for incursion into the territory of another State. They condemned acts of violence and terror causing the loss of innocent human lives.

The President and the Prime Minister expressed their great pleasure in the intimate cooperation which characterizes the warm relationship between their two countries and peoples. They agreed to do everything possible to broaden and deepen still further that relationship in order to serve the interests of both countries and to further the cause of peace.

President Nixon reiterated the commitment of the United States to the long-term security of Israel and to the principle that each State has the right to exist within secure borders and to pursue its own legitimate interests in peace.

Prime Minister Rabin expressed his appreciation for the U.S. military supplies to Israel during the October War and thereafter. The President affirmed the continuing and long-term nature of the military supply relationship between the two countries, and reiterated his view that the strengthening of Israel's ability to defend itself is essential in order to prevent further hostilities and to maintain conditions conducive to progress towards peace. An Israeli Defence Ministry delegation will soon come to Washington in order to work out the concrete details relating to long-term military supplies.

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The President and the Prime Minister discussed the plight of Jewish minorities in various countries in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Prime Minister thanked the

President for his efforts in support of the right of free emigration for all peoples without harassment, including members of Jewish minorities. The President affirmed that the United States would continue to give active support to these principles in all feasible ways.

The President was particularly pleased at the opportunity to meet with former Prime Minister Golda Meir, whose courage, statesmanship, patience and wisdom he greatly admires. The President expressed his satisfaction at the constructive cooperation between Israel and the United States under Prime Minister Meir's leadership which had led to the conclusion of the agreements between Egypt and Israel and between Israel and Syria respectively on the disengagement of their military forces.

In departing, President and Mrs. Nixon expressed their deep appreciation of the warm reception accorded to them in Israel and their admiration for the achievements of the Israeli people. They were deeply impressed by the manner in which the overwhelming problems of integrating many hundreds of thousands of immigrants of many various backgrounds and cultures were being successfully overcome. Convinced of the determination of this valiant people to live in peace, the President gave them renewed assurance of the support of the people of the United States.

The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the cordiality of Israel's reception of the President reflected the long friendship between Israel and the United States and pledged their continued energies to nurture and strengthen that friendship. To this end, the President invited Prime Minister Rabin to pay an early visit to Washington.

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Jordan of President Nixon of the USA⁹⁹

Amman, June 18, 1974

On the invitation of His Majesty King Hussein, President Richard Nixon paid the first visit of a President of the United States of America to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on June 17 and 18, 1974.

During this visit President Nixon and His Majesty King Hussein discussed the full range of common interests which have long bound Jordan and the United States in continued close friendship and cooperation.

The United States reaffirmed its continued active support for the strength and progress of Jordan. The President explained to His Majesty in detail the proposal he has submitted to the Congress of the United States for a substantial increase in American military and economic assistance for Jordan in the coming 12 months. The President expressed his gratification over the efforts which Jordan is making under its development plan to expand the Jordanian economy, to give significant new impetus to the development of Jordan's mineral and other resources and production, and to raise the standard of living for all its people.

The President expressed admiration for His Majesty's wise leadership and stated his view that effective and steady development would make a substantial contribution to peace and stability in the Middle East. The President promised a special effort by the United States Government to provide support in a variety of ways for Jordan's development efforts and in this regard welcomed the recent visit to Washington of His Royal Highness Crown Prince Hassan.

His Majesty emphasized the importance of maintaining Jordan's military strength if economic progress and development are to be assured.

His Majesty expressed the view that resources invested in maintaining the security and stability of the Kingdom are related to its economic growth, for without order and peace it is unrealistic to expect to marshal the energies and investment needed for economic progress. The President

agreed with His Majesty and promised, in co-operation with the Congress, to play a strong role in maintaining Jordan's military strength.

His Majesty and the President agreed that they will continue to give U.S.-Jordanian relations their personal attention. In this context, it was agreed that a joint Jordanian-U.S. Commission will be established at a high level to oversee and review on a regular basis the various areas of cooperation between Jordan and the United States in the fields of economic development, trade and investment, military assistance and supply, and scientific, social and cultural affairs.

His Majesty and the President have long agreed on the importance of moving toward peace in the Middle East. The President discussed the steps which have been taken in this regard since His Majesty's visit to Washington in March of this year. His Majesty expressed Jordan's support for the very significant diplomatic efforts which the United States has made to help bring peace to the Middle East. His Majesty and the President discussed the strategy of future efforts to achieve peace, and the President promised the active support of the United States for agreement between Jordan and Israel on concrete steps toward the just and durable peace called for in United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973.

The President has invited His Majesty to pay a visit to Washington at an early date. The purpose of the visit will be to hold further talks on the strategy of future efforts to achieve peace in accord with the objectives of United Nations Security Council Resolution 338. Further discussions of the details of the establishment of the Joint Commission will also be held. His Majesty has accepted the invitation and the date of the visit will be announced shortly.

The President expressed his gratitude and that of Mrs. Nixon for the warm hospitality extended by His Majesty, by Her Majesty Queen Alia and by the Jordanian people.

⁹⁹ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXI, 1829 (July 15, 1974), pp. 118-119.

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Communiqué issued after a meeting of the NATO Council of Ministers (excerpts)¹⁰⁰**Ottawa, June 19, 1974**

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Ottawa on 18 and 19 June 1974.

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8 Ministers reviewed developments in the Middle East since their last meeting. They welcomed the recent progress achieved, in particular the disengagement of Syrian and Israeli forces.¹⁰¹ They affirmed the support of their governments for the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and for all endeavours directed towards a just and lasting settlement bringing peace to the area; they also welcomed the contributions made by Allied governments to UN peace-keeping activities. Ministers took note of the report by the Council in Permanent Session on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions. They invited the Council in Permanent Session to continue to keep the situation under review and to report further.

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Resolution of the Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers regarding Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict^{101a}**Kuala Lumpur, June 25, 1974**

1. Concerning the Middle East and the Palestine question the Conference decided to extend complete and active support to the confrontation states and to the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle to regain by all possible means all their occupied lands.

[The Conference decided to] act in all fields with the purpose of coercing Israel to withdraw immediately and without conditions from all the Arab territories occupied since June 5, 1967.

The Arab countries engage to take all the necessary steps to achieve such withdrawal. [The Conference] determines that any political settlement of the Middle East crisis depends on the complete and immediate withdrawal by Israel to the borders of June 4, 1967, and the full guarantee of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and that this is considered an essential condition without which a settlement cannot be concluded.

The Conference calls on all states to support the Palestinian people by all means in the struggle which it is conducting against Zionist racist colonialism with the aim of regaining its national rights. The Conference considers the return of these rights an essential condition for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

The Conference calls on the United Nations Organization actively to enforce its resolutions regarding the Palestine question and the national rights of the Palestinian people which amount to return to their homeland and achievement of the right to self-determination.

2. *Jerusalem*: The Conference declares the deep attachment of Muslims to the Holy City of Jerusalem and the firm desire of their governments to work for its liberation and return it to Arab sovereignty and their absolute refusal to consider Jerusalem a subject for bargaining or compromise of any kind.

3. *Lebanon*: The Conference condemns the repeated Israeli attacks against Lebanese territory and against the Palestinian people in Lebanon and commends the resistance of the Lebanese people and the terrible sacrifices which this people is making.

The Conference calls on the member states to adopt a positive attitude so that decisions to impose measures against Israel may be adopted at the coming session of the United Nations General Assembly.

4. *The occupied Arab territories*: The Conference criticizes Israel's violations of human rights in the occupied Arab territories and her refusal to abide by the 1949 Geneva Convention relating to the protection of civilians in time of war as well as her policies aimed at Judaizing the occupied territories and its cultural character. The Conference considers such acts and measures to be war crimes and a provocation to all humanity.

¹⁰⁰ Excerpted from the English text, *Survey of Current Affairs* (London), IV, 7 (July, 1974), pp. 255, 256.

¹⁰¹ Doc. 115 above.

^{101a} Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text as published in *al-Dustur* (Amman), June 26, 1974. The Conference took place June 21–25, 1974.

The Conference considers all the measures taken by Israel in the occupied Arab territories with the aim of changing their demographic, geographical, social, cultural and economic character, including the measures aimed at annexing and Judaizing the Holy City of Jerusalem, to be invalid and void and recognition of them or their effects to be impossible.

The Conference condemns all those states which give Israel military or economic assistance or add to her human potential and demands that they cease such aid immediately.

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Statement accusing Israel of raising tension by her actions against Lebanon, issued by the Soviet news agency Tass¹⁰²

Moscow, late June, 1974

The Israeli military continue stepping up tension in the Middle East. This is illustrated by the current concentration of Israeli troops on the border with Lebanon, by the expansion of the scale of criminal piratic attacks on the territory of that country.

Peaceful Lebanese towns and villages, Palestinian refugee camps located in the territory of the Lebanon are subjected to barbarous aerial bombardment and to having Israeli aircraft flying over them. The Israeli Navy in breach of all norms of international law systematically intrudes into the territorial waters of the Lebanese Republic. In recent days Israeli artillery has been shelling the areas of Ayta al-Chaap and Al-Nakkura. Israeli pirates destroyed by bombing the Palestinian refugee camp in Nabatiye, scattered "children's toys" with explosive devices in various areas, copying the ways of nazi criminals of the times of the second world war.

It is the peaceful population in the Lebanon and the Palestinians—children, women and old people—who have fallen victims to these atrocities which openly trample underfoot the Security Council ceasefire decisions.

Totally absurd are the attempts of the Israeli leadership to justify these villainous actions by alleging they are being taken as retaliation for

the actions of the Palestinians. The entire world is well aware that none other but Israel has for many years pursued the aggressive policies of violence and villainy in relation to its Arab neighbours.

Nor can the fact be overlooked that the escalation of the armed Israeli actions against the Lebanon is taking place at the moment when better than earlier possibilities for attaining agreement on the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East have begun to take shape. It must be clear to Israel's ruling circles and government that there can be no peace in the area without liberating from the Israeli invaders all of the Arab territories occupied since 1967 and ensuring the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The Soviet public condemns resolutely the barbaric acts perpetrated by the brazen Israeli military against Lebanon and demands their immediate end.

TASS is authorized to state that total responsibility for the deliberate buildup of tensions in the Middle East, which puts into jeopardy the peace and security of all nations in this region, is placed entirely on the Israeli leadership and Israeli government.

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Message from President Nguyen Huu Tho of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam to PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat expressing support for the Palestine revolution¹⁰³

Late June, 1974

Mr. Yasir Arafat,

Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, leader of the forces of the Palestine revolution;

On the occasion of the Day of World Solidarity with the Palestine revolution it gives me pleasure in the name of the Vietnamese people, of the National Liberation Front, of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and on my own behalf to convey to you, to the Executive

¹⁰² English text, *Moscow News*, no. 26 (June 29, 1974), p. 7.

¹⁰³ Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), June 27, 1974, p. 1.

Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to the nationalist armed forces and to the Palestinian people our warm greetings. We strongly believe that under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, with courageous struggle your people will regain its fundamental national rights. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of [South] Vietnam will strive to strengthen its fighting solidarity and firmly supports the Palestinian people until complete victory.

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Resolution of the Zionist Organization of America against "Arab terrorist organizations"¹⁰⁴

New York, late June, 1974

The ZOA voices its outrage at the recent atrocities perpetrated by Arab terrorist organizations who have made Jewish women and children the target of their cowardly but murderous assaults.

The ZOA further deplores the attitude of the governments of Great Britain, West Germany, Italy, Cyprus, Greece and the Sudan, who have freed terrorists apprehended in the act of committing murder within their territories. The exemption from punishment uniquely afforded to Arab terrorists by these countries has given the terrorist organizations a free hand to destroy property and take life with impunity throughout the world.

The ZOA notes that Arab terrorists continue to receive enthusiastic encouragement and open support from both the Arab states and the Soviet Union. With the aid of these countries Arab terrorists have converted Lebanon into their headquarters, establishing there numerous armed camps and military bases from which they dispatch their assassins to kill and maim whoever they can in Israel, to kidnap ambassadors and other officials of even major powers, to wreak havoc in international travel, and to hold major business corporations to demands for ransom. In this

connection, we express our dismay over the recent failure of the U.S. to veto an anti-Israel resolution of the U.N. Security Council, after Israel had retaliated against the indiscriminate murders committed by Arab terrorists at Kiryat Shemonah.

The ZOA notes with regret that American attempts to elicit international cooperation designed to put an end to the source of Arab terrorism have come to naught. We declare that a concerted, determined, unilateral effort by the United States is now required. We further declare that the Lebanese government must be held accountable for criminal activity emanating from its territory. We therefore urge the government of the United States to demand of the Lebanese government that it act forcefully and successfully to liquidate the terrorist bases on its territory, and that if Lebanon refuses to accept this obligation, to demand that a United Nations force be established to undertake this task.

The ZOA further notes in this connection, that the Palestinian refugee camps administered by the United Nations Relief & Works Agency (UNRWA) have come totally under terrorist domination. Since the United States provides 60% of the budget for UNRWA, it has the legal, political, and moral duty to insist that UNRWA takes whatever measures necessary to free these camps from terrorist control. We call upon the government of the United States to raise this issue at the United Nations and to insist that a UN police force be stationed in the UNRWA camps to deny their use to the terrorists as recruitment and training centers, administrative headquarters, arsenals, and armed bases.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of US President Nixon (excerpts)¹⁰⁵

Moscow, July 3, 1974

In accordance with the agreement to hold regular Soviet-U.S. meetings at the highest level and at the invitation, extended during the visit of general

¹⁰⁴ Resolution adopted at the 77th Annual Convention of the ZOA held June 27-30; text as inserted by Representative Bingham (Dem.), *Congressional Record* (daily), August 8, 1974, pp. E 5361-5362.

¹⁰⁵ Excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5744 (July 9, 1974), pp. 249, 250.

secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union L. I. Brezhnev to the USA in June 1973, the President of the United States of America and Mrs. Richard Nixon paid an official visit to the Soviet Union from June 27 to July 3, 1974.

Both sides believe that the removal of the danger of war and tension in the Middle East is a task of paramount importance and urgency and, therefore, the only alternative is the achievement, on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 338, of a just and lasting peace settlement in which should be taken into account the legitimate interests of all peoples in the Middle East, including the Palestinian people, and the right to existence of all states in the area.

As co-chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, the USSR and the USA consider it important that the conference resume its work as soon as possible, with the question of other participants from the Middle East area to be discussed at the conference. Both sides see the main purpose of the Geneva Peace Conference, the achievement of which they will promote in every way, as the establishment of just and stable peace in the Middle East.

They agreed that the USSR and the USA will continue to remain in close touch with a view to co-ordinating the efforts of both countries toward a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

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Letter from General Secretary Brezhnev of the CPSU to President Franjeh of Lebanon denouncing Israel's attacks on Lebanon¹⁰⁶

Moscow, July 8, 1974

His Excellency Mr. Sulayman Franjeh,
President of the Republic of Lebanon.
Your Excellency,

I have read with extreme attention your letter in which you express your deep concern at the piratical actions being perpetrated by the Israeli

military bands against the Lebanese and Palestinian people. I wish to say to you quite frankly that the latest armed provocations carried out by Israel arouse the displeasure and anger of the Soviet Union.

The responsibility for this aggression and persistence in heightening the tension in the Middle East rests fully with the Israeli government.

Everyone knows that it is Israel herself who for many years has been following a policy of violence and aggression against her neighbours, a policy which, as you pointed out in your letter, forces the Palestinian people and the rest of the Arab peoples to resist in defence of their legitimate rights.

The Israeli armed provocations against Lebanon come at a time when there are some glimmers of hope of arriving at an agreement establishing a lasting peace in the Middle East. It is quite obvious that no peace is possible in the region so long as Israel does not refrain from her attempts to use violence to realize her expansionist goals, so long as she does not evacuate all the Arab territories occupied in 1967, and so long as a guarantee of their legitimate national rights has not been secured for the Palestinian Arab people. So all who desire peace must not spare any effort in realizing the legitimate demands of the Arab peoples.

This principle guides the moves of the Soviet Union as regards the situation in the Middle East. We stressed this stand in our talks with President Nixon during his last visit to Moscow. Now, as in the past, we emphasize the necessity of finding a constructive solution to the Palestinian question in the general framework of the efforts aimed at achieving a solution in the Middle East. We firmly emphasize the search for a solution commensurate with the rights of the Palestinians within the efforts aimed at restoring the situation in the Middle East to its regular condition and eliminating the cause of the dangerous military tension in the region.

You may be assured, Your Excellency, that the Soviet Union will support, as it has in the past, the struggle of the Arab peoples to establish a just and durable peace in the Middle East based on the evacuation of the Israeli armies from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the preservation of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to

¹⁰⁶ Translated from the Arabic text as published in *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), July 13, 1974.

Your Excellency my best wishes for your health and for progress and prosperity for the friendly Lebanese people.

[Signed:] Leonid Brezhnev

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Proclamation of the National Convention of the Communist Party of Israel (RAKAH)¹⁰⁷

Haifa, July 13, 1974

To the workers,
the youth,
women and mothers,
to all inhabitants of Israel—Jews and Arabs
Sisters and brothers!

Fateful times have come to Israel. On one hand there exists the historic hopeful opportunity of peace, for removing the nightmare of war for once and all. On the other hand, there is the horrible threat of a new war, even more pernicious than all preceding ones.

Who is to blame for the continuation of the danger of war even after carrying out of the separation of forces agreements with Egypt and Syria?

The Israeli government is to blame for this, the Rabin-Peres government, which continues the fallacious political and military concepts of the Meir-Dayan government, which led to the October 1973 war with all its attendant disasters.

It is possible to achieve just and stable peace between Israel and the Arab states by way of loyally and fully implementing the Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, which have the consent of the neighbouring Arab states—Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Among the Palestinian Liberation Organization realistic tendencies are gaining more and more preponderance, and a prospect exists that its representatives will take part in the Geneva Conference, together with the delegations of the Arab states and of the State of Israel.

The Israeli government continues to plant the most dangerous mines on the path of peace, by demanding annexation of Arab territories occupied in June 1967 and by denying the national rights

of the Palestinian Arab People, while relying on arms and money from Washington and serving the predatory objectives of the American arms and oil magnates.

The danger of a new war exists, not because anyone menaces the existence of Israel or her security, but because the ruling circles in Israel aim to bring destruction upon the Palestinian Arab people and strive for territorial expansions.

The National Convention of the Communist Party of Israel calls all persons of national responsibility to an energetic united struggle for changing the official Israeli policy, for the speedy convocation and success of the Geneva Conference, in order to establish peace by means of implementing Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and respecting the rights of all the peoples and states in the Middle East.

The conclusions of the third Soviet-American summit conference which convened in Moscow, demonstrated again that the Washington rulers, on whom the Israeli government leans, are incapable of changing the course of history in our region, the advance of the cause of peace and consolidation of the peoples' independence.

It is the supreme and urgent task of every person of conscience in Israel to struggle for putting an end to the government's sabotage of the peace efforts, for preventing a new war and for assisting in the establishment of just and stable peace.

Do not let thousands of more young people fall!
Do not let thousands of more people to become widows, orphans and bereaved parents!

Our Communist Party of Israel will work with all its power for intensifying the struggle for changing the official policy, for preventing war and for establishing peace; it will work to the best of its ability for establishing a wide peace front, irrespective of ideological and political differences, for saving our peoples from the horrors of a new war, so that our children should not know sanguinary war, for peace.

The National Convention expresses its energetic protest against the barbarian bombing air raids upon refugee camps and villages in Lebanon, against the aggressive acts against Lebanon, against the piratic action of sinking dozens of fishing boats in Lebanese ports.

The National Convention expresses its energetic protest against the arbitrary political detentions and the torture of communists and other Pales-

¹⁰⁷ English text, Communist Party of Israel (RAKAH), *Information Bulletin* (Haifa), no. 7 (July 1974), pp. 59–62.

tinian leaders in the occupied territories and demands their immediate release.

The Convention condemns the government's policy intended, by means of violence and terror, to liquidate the national existence of the Palestinian Arab people. Without the just solution of the Palestinian problem, without Israel's recognizing the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, their right to self-determination, their right to establish—if they wish so—a sovereign independent state in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since the June 1967 war, and which must be evacuated by the latter; without a just solution of the refugee problem in accordance with the UNO resolutions, the longed-for and just peace, which Israel and the Arab people need so badly, will not be achieved. On the basis of mutually respecting the rights of all the peoples and states in the region, including the State of Israel and the Palestinian Arab people, peace will be established.

Israel's security cannot be built on a policy of oppression and annexation, not on armament race, but on a just and stable peace.

The new armament race initiated by the Israeli government, with the encouragement of the billionaires of the military-industrial establishment of USA—who aspire to gain superprofits—has led to a new assault on [the] part of the government and the capitalists on the wages and standard of living of the working people. Price hikes of dozens of percent in the course of a few months, the additional pernicious tax burden on the workers and popular masses, alongside with the enrichment of a small group of capitalists, enjoying war profits, the speculation in land and banking transactions, are the fruits of the general policy of the government, which is intended against peace and the interests of the workers, for the benefit of the capitalists in Israel and the American monopolies.

The National Convention of the Communist Party of Israel calls upon the working class and the toiling masses to struggle against the new inflictions included in the new economic plan of the government, and for curbing the rises in prices and taxes for an appropriate addition to the wages for the defence of the standard of living.

The National Convention expresses its energetic protest against the intensified campaign of persecutions by the Rabin-Peres-Allon government

against leaders and activists of our Communist Party of Israel amongst the Arab population, by renewing restriction orders and denying the freedom of movement, misusing the British colonialist regulations of 1945 which are still valid in the State of Israel.

The policy pursued by the Rabin government has been revealed in front of all as a policy acting against peace, democracy and the toilers' rights.

It is a vital necessity for the Israeli people, to struggle for a change of the government's policy, to rebuff the assault of the extreme rightwing Likud to seize the power, and to bring about a new alignment of forces in Israel, which will lead to a new policy, of peace, democracy and social progress.

The National Convention of the Communist Party of Israel condemns the acts of murder and oppression of the fascist military clique ruling in Chile, demands the immediate release of the general secretary of the Communist Party of Chile, Luis Corvalan, and of all the democrats imprisoned in Chile, and wishes the Chilean people success in their struggle to restore the legitimate democratic regime.

The National Convention of the Communist Party of Israel expresses its energetic protest against the persecution of the democratic forces by the military clique which has seized power in Uruguay. The Convention demands the immediate release of the first secretary of the Communist Party of Uruguay, comrade Rodney Arismendi and all the imprisoned democrats, and expresses solidarity with the struggle of the Uruguayan people for restoring the democratic freedoms.

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Letter from Pope Paul VI to President Nolan of the Pontifical Mission for Palestine on the occasion of the Mission's twenty-fifth anniversary¹⁰⁸

Vatican City, July 16, 1974

To Our Beloved Son

John G. Nolan

President of the Pontifical Mission for Palestine

The Pontifical Mission for Palestine, established with admirable foresight and in a spirit of charity by our Predecessor of venerable memory Pius XII, has recently celebrated the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of its foundation.

We desire to take this occasion to direct to you, its diligent President, to your collaborators and to all those who have offered and continue to offer their contribution to this work a word of gratitude and appreciation for the activity conducted during these years on behalf of the peoples of Palestine, in the name of the charity of Christ.

We have followed with personal interest this activity in the various forms which it has taken to meet the grave and multiple needs of the refugees, often in coordination with the activity which other organizations, including those which are not Catholic, have commendably carried out.

The work of the Mission for Palestine has been one of the clearest signs of the Holy See's concern for the welfare of the Palestinians, who are particularly dear to us because they are people of the Holy Land, because they include followers of Christ and because they have been and still are being so tragically tried.

We express again our heartfelt sharing in their sufferings and our support for their legitimate aspirations. May our paternal solicitude bring comfort and encouragement, especially to the refugees, who for years have been living under inhuman conditions.

Unfortunately such a state of affairs has produced in many Palestinians a sense of frustration and, in some, such anguish and desperation as to move them to acts of violent protest which with sorrow we have been constrained strenuously to deplore.

It seems to us, nevertheless, that this is the moment for all Palestinians to look to the future

with a constructive, likeminded and responsible attitude, as the hope becomes ever stronger that their particular problems will be discussed and that a solution to them will be found during the current general negotiations for peace in the Middle East.

Our Mission for Palestine is thus about to be faced with a compelling task. In addition to continuing its assistance, without distinction of nationality or religion, to those who have suffered or are suffering in any way as a result of the repeated conflicts which have devastated that region, the Mission will have to expect, in the situation which is now evolving, to contribute to projects of aid, of rehabilitation and of development for the population of Palestine. In order that this task may be carried out, it will be necessary to promote in the Catholic world an effective collaboration between all the relief organizations concerned with Palestine.

We therefore exhort you and your collaborators to become the voice of those who are suffering, and to urge Christians to be generous witnesses of charity towards their Palestinian brethren of the Holy Land—as we have already indicated in our Exhortation *Nobis in Animo*—and to intensify their efforts for the worthy cause of assistance and development.

As an expression of our sentiments of gratitude and in pledge of abundant divine graces, we willingly impart to you and to all those who in any way collaborate with this work of the Mission for Palestine our paternal Apostolic blessing.

From the Vatican, July 16, 1974

[signed:] Paulus P P. VI

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Statement issued by Israel's Cabinet insisting that Jordan represent the Palestinians in negotiations¹⁰⁹

Jerusalem, July 21, 1974

Israel will continue to strive for peace agreements with the Arab states within defensible borders to be achieved through negotiation without prior conditions.

¹⁰⁸ From a photocopy of the original letter.

¹⁰⁹ Text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, July 22, 1974, p. 1.

The Government will work towards negotiations for a peace agreement with Jordan.

The peace will be founded on the existence of two independent states only—Israel with united Jerusalem as her capital and a Jordanian-Palestinian Arab state east of Israel within borders to be determined in negotiations between Israel and Jordan. This state will provide for expression of identity of the Jordanians and the Palestinians, in peace and good-neighbourliness with Israel.

The Cabinet endorses the Prime Minister's statement of June 3, 1974, in the Knesset, that the Government of Israel will not conduct negotiations with terrorist organizations whose aim is the destruction of the State of Israel.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs reported on the latest events in Cyprus.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the PLO (excerpt)¹¹⁰

Moscow, August 4, 1974

The Palestine Liberation Organization's delegation commended Soviet efforts to promote peace and to reduce international tension. The delegation also praised the policy of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet government which aims at providing assistance to the people's struggle for their freedom, independence and legitimate rights.

The delegation expressed its deep appreciation for the steady support and aid which the Soviet Union always offers to the Arab national liberation movement, including the Palestinian resistance movement.

The delegation confirmed the necessity of continuing the strengthening of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, and the struggle against the aggressive attempts of imperialism, Zionism and reaction to stop the progress of the people of the Arab world toward national independence, and economic and social development.

Both sides noted with deep contentment the importance of the resolutions made at the Arab Summit in Algeria in November 1973, and the Islamic Summit in Lahore in February 1974.¹¹¹ These resolutions acknowledged the recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people.

The Soviet side confirmed that the Soviet Union's position in supporting the struggle of the Arab peoples for the complete liberation of the Arab lands occupied in 1967 is an unalterable position.

The definite conditions for the establishment of the only just peace in the area are: the urgent return to the natural situation in the Middle East, the eradication of the traces of aggression, the forced withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories, and the attainment of the legal national rights of the Palestinian Arab people in accordance with the United Nations Charter and resolutions. These conditions agree with the interests of all countries and peoples.

The Soviet side affirmed the support of the Soviet Union for the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Geneva Conference on the condition of equal rights for all the participating sides.

The participants in these talks expressed their satisfaction with, during the recent stage, the promotion of the unity of the Palestinian resistance movement, the increase of its cooperation with the other national forces opposing imperialism in the Arab countries, and the struggle for the achievement of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people.

The Soviets agreed during the discussions, upon the request of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to the establishment of a representative office for the organization in Moscow.

¹¹⁰ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), August 4, 1974, pp. 12-13.

¹¹¹ Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973* and docs. 65 and 66 above.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to France of Foreign Minister Fahmy of Egypt (excerpts)¹¹²

Paris, August 7, 1974

At the invitation of Mr. Jean Sauvagnargues, Foreign Minister of the French government, Mr. Ismail Fahmy, Foreign Minister of the government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, paid an official visit to Paris on August 5-7, 1974.

1. In the Intergovernmental Commission as well as in the preparatory and accompanying meetings Mr. Ismail Fahmy and Mr. Sauvagnargues noted the convergence of their views on the major problems of international politics.

The two ministers recalled the principles contained in the successive resolutions of the United Nations which imply, with a view to a peaceful and lasting settlement of the problems of the Middle East, the evacuation of the occupied territories, recognition of the right of all states in the region to exist, and respect for the rights of the Palestinian people.

Mr. Ismail Fahmy pointed out to Mr. Sauvagnargues that Egypt firmly supports the principle of independent representation of the Palestinian people at the Geneva conference through the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The two ministers noted that the disengagements on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts constitute an important step towards facilitating a peace settlement.

The Egyptian minister requested the French minister in his capacity as current president of the European Community to inform his European partners of the contents of their political talks.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to East Germany of Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the PLO (excerpts)¹¹³

East Berlin, August 8, 1974

At the invitation of the SED Central Committee a delegation of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization headed by its Chairman, Yasser Arafat, visited the GDR from 6 to 8 August 1974.

Yasser Arafat reported on the situation in the Middle East and on the complicated struggle waged by the Arab people of Palestine under the leadership of the PLO for the implementation of its national rights. He explained the decisions taken by the 12th Meeting of the Palestinian National Council. He emphasized that the Arab people of Palestine, who has firmly rallied around the PLO within and outside the occupied territories, has succeeded in strengthening its unity and the unity of its leadership. The Arab people of Palestine will defend the achievements obtained in the course of the revolutionary struggle under tremendous sacrifices, and counter all attempts to disregard its national rights.

He [Gerhard Grüneberg of the SED delegation] gave detailed information on the SED's contribution within the framework of the coordinated foreign policy of the community of socialist states towards implementing the peace programme adopted at the XXIVth CPSU Congress. He corroborated that, in conformity with the relevant decisions taken at the Conference of Heads of Arab States in Algiers (November 1973), at the Conference of the Islamic States in Lahore (February 1974) and at the Summit Conference of the Organization of African Unity in Mogadiscio (June 1974),¹¹⁴ the GDR considers the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine. He hailed the positive results of, and the decisions adopted by the 12th Palestinian

¹¹² Excerpted and translated from the French text supplied, on request, by the French embassy in Beirut.

¹¹³ Excerpted from the English text, *Foreign Affairs Bulletin* (East Berlin), XIV, 24 (August 21, 1974), pp. 179-180.

¹¹⁴ Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973* and docs. 65, 66 and 122 above.

National Congress.

The SED affirmed that it will continue to support the PLO's just struggle for safeguarding the right of the Arab people of Palestine to self-determination as laid down in the UN Charter and the relevant UN resolutions. The SED declared that without the safeguarding of the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine there can be no just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

The SED and the PLO paid tribute to the great significance of the political, moral and material support given by the Soviet Union to the just struggle of the Arab peoples. They hold the view that the Soviet Union has made a decisive contribution towards bringing about a lasting and just peace in the Middle East.

Both sides condemn all forms of hostility against the Soviet Union and all countries belonging to the community of socialist states, forms employed by imperialism and its allies in an attempt to defame the policy pursued by the Soviet Union and to drive a wedge between the socialist countries and the forces of the national liberation movement in the Middle East.

The SED delegation expressed its opinion that the continuation of the Middle East Peace Conference in Geneva with all directly interested states and the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine participating on an equal footing, may, at present, render a decisive contribution towards achieving the complete withdrawal of Israel from all territories which were occupied in 1967, and towards implementing the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. Both sides emphasized that it is imperative that the Soviet Union should participate in all activities geared to the establishment of a really just and lasting peace in the Middle East. They also condemned emphatically the various attempts by imperialism to stem the progress in the process of international détente and the advance of the forces of socialism and national liberation in the world by resorting to violence and aggression.

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Speech by newly-appointed US President Ford to the US Congress (excerpts)¹¹⁵

Washington, August 12, 1974

Let there be no doubt or misunderstanding anywhere. There are no opportunities to exploit, should anyone so desire. There will be no change of course, no relaxation of vigilance, no abandonment of the helm of our ship of state as the watch changes. We stand by our commitments and will live up to our responsibilities, in our formal alliances, in our friendships and in our improving relations with any potential adversaries.

On this, Americans are united and strong. Under my term of leadership I hope we will become more united. I am certain we will remain strong.

A strong defense is the surest way to peace. Strength makes detente attainable. Weakness invites war, as my generation knows from four bitter experiences.

Just as America's will for peace is second to none, so will America's strength be second to none.

We cannot rely on the forbearance of others to protect this nation. The power and diversity of the armed forces, the resolve of our fellow-citizens, the flexibility in our command to navigate international waters that remain troubled—all are essential to our security.

I shall continue to insist on civilian control of our superb military establishment. The Constitution plainly requires the President to be the Commander-in-Chief, and I will be.

Our job will not be easy. In promising continuity, I cannot promise simplicity. The problems and challenges of the world remain complex and difficult. But we have set out upon a path of reason and fairness, and we will continue on it.

As guideposts on that path, I can offer the following:

— To the nations of the Middle East, I pledge continuity in our vigorous efforts to advance the process which has brought hopes of peace to that region after 25 long years as a hotbed of war. We

¹¹⁵ Excerpted from the text published by the US embassy in Beirut on August 13, 1974.

shall carry out our promise to promote continuing negotiation among all parties for a complete, just and lasting settlement.

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Statement on Jerusalem issued by the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches¹¹⁶

West Berlin, mid-August, 1974

The Central Committee affirms that in order to reach a satisfactory position regarding Jerusalem the following facts should be taken into account:

1. Jerusalem is a Holy City for three monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The tendency to minimize Jerusalem's importance for any of these three religions should be avoided.

2. Its importance for Christianity is reflected in the following statement of the Executive Committee of the WCC at Bad Saarow (February 1974): "Christian Holy Places in Jerusalem and neighbouring areas belong to the greatest extent to member churches of the WCC specifically the Eastern Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox Churches and are also of concern to other Christians".

But the question of Jerusalem is not only a matter of protection of the Holy Places, it is organically linked with living faiths and communities of people in the Holy City.

Any proposed solution as to the future of the Holy Places in Jerusalem should take into account the legitimate rights of the Churches most directly concerned.

3. Any solution on Jerusalem should take into account the rights and needs of the indigenous people of the Holy City.

4. We are of the opinion that matters related to jurisdiction over Jerusalem will only find their lasting solution within the context of the settlement of the conflict in its totality.

The Central Committee recommends that the above should be worked out with Member Churches, initially those churches most directly

concerned and in consultation with the Roman Catholic Church. These issues should also become subjects for dialogue with Jewish and Muslim participants.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the US of King Hussein of Jordan (excerpts)¹¹⁷

Washington, August 18, 1974

His Majesty King Hussein I of Jordan paid a visit to Washington August 15–18, at the invitation of the President. The President and His Majesty conferred at the White House and the President hosted a dinner in honor of His Majesty and Queen Alia. The President expressed his pleasure that His Majesty was the first Head of State to visit Washington in the new administration. His Majesty also conferred with the Secretaries of State and Defense and met with members of Congress. His Majesty was accompanied by the Prime Minister of Jordan, Mr. Zaid Rifai.

The talks were held in the atmosphere of friendship and understanding traditional in relations between the United States and Jordan. The President and His Majesty pledged that the two countries will continue to work closely together for the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The President stressed the continuity of United States' policy in this regard as in all other aspects of American foreign policy and affirmed his commitment that the United States would continue its determined efforts to help bring a peace settlement in the Middle East. The discussions between His Majesty and the President and Secretary of State were a constructive contribution to the consultations now underway looking toward the next stage in negotiations for a just and durable peace in the Middle East. It was agreed that these consultations will continue with a view to addressing at an appropriately early date the issues of particular concern to Jordan, including a Jordanian-Israeli disengagement agreement.

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¹¹⁶ *The Church and the Jewish People Newsletter* (Geneva), no. 3 (September, 1974), pp. 2–3.

¹¹⁷ *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXI, 1837 (September 9, 1974), pp. 361–362.

Finally, the President and His Majesty agreed that they would remain in close contact with each other with a view to giving their full support to the efforts being made to achieve peace in the Middle East and to the further strengthening of the ties between their two countries.

His Majesty expressed the hope that the President would be able to visit Jordan at some future date. The President said he would be happy to do so.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the US of Foreign Minister Fahmy of Egypt (excerpt)¹¹⁸

Washington, August 19, 1974

His Excellency Ismail Fahmy, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, made an official visit to Washington, August 12–19, at the invitation of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The Foreign Minister met with President Ford and Secretary Kissinger for a wide-ranging and productive exchange of views. He also led a high-level delegation to meetings of the United States-Egyptian Joint Cooperation Commission.

Foreign Minister Fahmy was the guest of honor at a small working luncheon with President Ford on August 14. The Foreign Minister also attended the Joint Session of Congress August 12 and heard in person President Ford's commitment to the continuity of United States foreign policy, and specifically his commitment that the United States Government would continue determined efforts to help bring about a peace settlement in the Middle East.

The discussions the Foreign Minister held with President Ford and Secretary Kissinger were a constructive contribution to the consultations now underway looking toward the next stage in negotiations for a just and durable peace in the Middle East—a peace which they agree should take into due account the legitimate interests of all the peoples in the Middle East, including the

Palestinian people, and the right to existence of all states in the area. They agreed that the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East should resume its work as soon as possible, building on the progress achieved, with the question of other participants from the Middle East area to be discussed at the Conference.

The President declared that he was dedicated to strengthening in all ways the relationship of growing friendship and trust between Egypt and the United States. In this connection, the President reaffirmed to the Foreign Minister that he was looking forward with pleasure to the visit of President Anwar al-Sadat later this year.

During the week, the Foreign Minister consulted with members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives led by Chairman Morgan, and with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee led by Senator Fulbright. While noting that further legislative action is required, the Foreign Minister expressed his gratification that during this past week the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had included in its report to the Senate an authorization for \$250 million aid for Egypt. He discussed evolving United States-Egyptian relations with journalists and businessmen.

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Press interview statement by Defence Minister Peres of Israel outlining his attitude to the PLO (excerpts)¹¹⁹

Late August, 1974

Of the three parties to negotiations (Jordanian, local or terrorist) I think that Israel should only worry about the first two. From a geographical point of view what used to be called Palestine consisted of 140 thousand square kilometres, of which 110 thousand square kilometres lie to the east of the River Jordan and are now called Jordan. In fact three quarters of Palestine is in the hands of Jordan. Whether the population there want to

¹¹⁸ Excerpted from the English text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXI, 1838 (September 16, 1974), p. 381.

¹¹⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew text, *Davar* (Tel Aviv), August 23, 1974.

call themselves Jordanians or Palestinians is their affair. Outside this area there are 800 thousand Palestinians, and a million and a half live in Israel, and we are definitely ready to reach a settlement with them. But the terrorist organization will soon give rise to the following problems:

1. It is not large, but it is tough. All six organizations comprise about twelve thousand Arabs; their strength is in their arms, not in their numbers, and they can use them against both Jewish and Arab civilians. If you let these twelve thousand armed men get control of the Arabs you will make it impossible to solve the Palestine problem.

2. Though these twelve thousand Arabs do not necessarily represent even Judaea and Samaria or the Gaza area, they claim to represent more than that—Haifa, Tel Aviv and other areas. Their aim is not the recovery of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza only, although there are some who are prepared to make a start with that. They also have designs on the coastal plain, Galilee and the Negev. Moreover, assuming that we recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization, we should soon find, in spite of recognition of and agreement with Arafat, a problem arising—a problem with Jibril, Hawatma or Habash. Things will not end with Arafat; they begin with him.

Any one who thinks that he can start a discussion, carry it on in an orderly manner and break it off at a certain point is deceiving himself. I am therefore in favour of negotiations with Jordan. I support negotiations with Jordan and dialogue with the inhabitants of the territories.

What is wrong with expressing our readiness to negotiate with Palestinians who recognize the existence of the state? I do not mean Arafat in particular, unless he recognizes Israel's right to survive and is ready to negotiate and to abandon the Palestine Charter. The moment we agree to meet Palestinians who recognize the state of Israel it will in fact mean negotiating with Arafat, and it will not be long before foreign—French, for example—delegates come along and say: So the field of difference has narrowed. Come along and let us discuss the subject of the date of the negotiations: Should they start after or before Arafat recognizes you? Would it not be better for you to start talks without pre-conditions? Then the result would be that, instead of discussing the

principle, we should proceed to discuss what form the negotiations should take and when they were to take place. Then we should be starting on a political course from which I do not know how we could extricate ourselves.

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Communiqué issued after a meeting of the Council of Ministers of France announcing a revision in the policy of arms sales to the Middle East¹²⁰

Paris, August 28, 1974

As was announced by the communiqué of 7 August, the Government has reexamined France's attitude on sales of military equipment to the States of the Near East.

The Government has decided that such sales to those States could henceforth be authorized after examination of each case individually.

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Press conference statement by US President Ford refusing to move the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem¹²¹

Washington, August 28, 1974

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Q. Mr. President, my question applies to a 1972 statement in which you said that an impediment to a regional peace settlement is an impediment to preserve the fiction that Jerusalem is not the capital of Israel. My question, sir, is would you, now that you set foreign policy, request that the Embassy be shifted from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem along with 17 other national Embassies?

A. Under the current circumstances and the importance of getting a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, I think that particular proposal ought to stand aside. We must come up with some

¹²⁰ English translation issued by the French embassy in London and supplied, on request, by the French embassy in Beirut.

¹²¹ Excerpted from the partial transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXI, 1838 (September 16, 1974), pp. 378–379.

answers between Israel and the Arab nations in order to achieve a peace that is both fair and durable.

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Charge sheet indicting Greek Catholic Archbishop Capucci of Jerusalem for alleged arms smuggling and consorting with Fatah (excerpt)¹²²

Jerusalem, September 3, 1974

INFORMATION

FIRST COUNT

A. *Facts*

1. The accused is a resident of Jerusalem. As the holder of high office in the Greek-Catholic Church and community, he frequently travelled to Lebanon, and by virtue of his status he was permitted to cross the border freely, without himself or his car undergoing a security check at the Israeli border. On these trips, the accused himself drove his car forth and back between Jerusalem and Beirut.

2. (A) At or about the end of April, 1974, during one of his frequent visits to Lebanon, at the house of his family in Beirut, the accused met with two foreign agents known as Abu Jihad and Abu Firas, who belong to the leadership of the Fatah organization. The Fatah organization is an unlawful organization as defined in Regulation 84 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945.

(B) The said Abu Jihad is the right-hand man of Yasser Arafat: he is the commander of the military arm of the Fatah organization and the head of the Black September organization. Abu Firas is one of the senior directors of the operational activities of the Fatah in Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem.

(C) The accused's contact with the aforesaid agents had no reasonable explanation within the meaning of Section 24 of the Penal Law (State Security, Foreign Relations and Official Secrets) 5717-1957, and was maintained for the purposes set out hereunder.

3. At a meeting between the two agents and the accused, Abu Firas asked the latter to help his organization by transferring arms and sabotage material for it from Beirut to Jerusalem.

4. The accused acceded to this request: he agreed to transfer suitcases full of arms and sabotage material to Israel in his car and to take them to a secret place, as Abu Firas might direct. As agreed between them, the accused was to receive from Abu Firas three suitcases containing arms and sabotage material and to deposit them, at a time exactly fixed by Abu Firas, in the children's toilet of the building of the Ecole des Freres at Beit Hanina near Jerusalem.

5. On the day following the aforesaid conversation, when the accused was about to leave Beirut for Jerusalem, Abu Firas brought him three suitcases full of arms and sabotage material, including tens of demolition blocks, clocks with detonators, grenades and sub-machineguns, as well as three Katyusha rockets with their launchers. The accused accepted the suitcases and placed them in the boot of his car, a Mercedes with the licence number 83-201. In this car, the accused transferred the suitcases containing the arms and sabotage material from Beirut to Jerusalem.

6. Close upon the time fixed by Abu Firas for the deposit of the suitcases containing the arms at the Ecole des Freres in Beit Hanina, the accused asked the school principal, under some pretext invented by him for the purpose, to see to it that no one, not even the watchman supposed to be present, remained in the school building on the evening fixed for the deposit of the suitcases. The principal complied and the accused thus ensured that he was able to accomplish his mission in secret.

7. A few days after arriving in Israel, on May 7, 1974, at 19.30 hours—the day and hour fixed by Abu Firas—the accused took the aforesaid three suitcases to the school, deposited them there in accordance with the directives he had received, and then left. Close upon 22.00 hours that night, the accused returned to the said school to check whether the suitcases had been picked up according to plan and found that they had already been removed from their hiding-place.

8. Some time after depositing the suitcases as described above, the accused again visited Beirut, and during this visit he rang up Abu Firas and reported that he had accomplished his mission.

¹²² Excerpted from the text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, September 14, 1974, p. 3.

9. The aforesaid arms and sabotage material brought to Israel by the accused without lawful authority, as described above, reached their destination and were used for sabotage activities in Jerusalem.

B. *Provisions of Law Applicable:*

1. Maintenance of contact with foreign agent, an offence under Section 24 (A) of the Penal Law (State Security, Foreign Relations and Official Secrets), 5717-1957.

2. Carriage and possession of illegal weapons—Section 66a (B) of the Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936.

3. Performance of a service for an unlawful association—Regulation 85 (C) of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945.

SECOND COUNT

A. *Facts*

1. Shortly after transferring the suitcases with the arms as described in the first count, in or about May, 1974, while again in Beirut, the accused received from Abu Firas, for transfer to Israel, a suitcase containing about 150 detonators, as well as five activating mechanisms.

2. The accused maintained the aforesaid contact with Abu Firas, who is a foreign agent, without having a reasonable explanation, within the meaning of Section 24 of the State Security Law, for doing so.

3. At Abu Firas' request, the accused transferred the said consignment to Jerusalem in his Mercedes car.

4. The accused kept the said consignment, brought by him from Lebanon without lawful authority, in his possession for about three months, at first at his house in Jerusalem and afterwards at the offices of the Patriarchate near Jaffa Gate, Jerusalem.

5. On August 10, 1974, after being arrested, the accused surrendered the said consignment of explosives to one of his interrogators.

B. *Provisions of Law Applicable:*

1. Maintenance of contact with foreign agent, an offence under Section 24 (A) of the Penal Law (State Security, Foreign Relations and Official Secrets), 5717-1957.

2. Carriage and possession of illegal weapons—Section 66a (B) of the Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936.

3. Performance of a service for an unlawful association—Regulation 85 (C) of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945.

THIRD COUNT

A. *Facts*

1. On July 21, 1974, the accused once more travelled from Jerusalem to Beirut in his car. On arriving at his family's house in Beirut, he was told that Abu Firas had asked that he ring him up immediately upon his arrival in the city.

2. The accused rang up Abu Firas in accordance with his request, at a number which the latter had given him on one of his earlier visits to Beirut, and arranged with him that he, Abu Firas, would come to the accused's house that evening.

3. As arranged, Abu Jihad and Abu Firas—mentioned in the first count—appeared at the accused's house and asked him to transfer arms and sabotage material once more to Israel for the Fatah organization. The accused expressed to them his fears regarding the transfer of arms in a suitcase, as requested by them, because of the risk of an inspection at the Israeli frontier. He arranged for another meeting with them for the following night to discuss the matter.

4. On the day following the meeting described in paragraph 3, Abu Jihad and Abu Firas again came to the accused's house in Beirut. Abu Firas told the accused that he had found a method of so stowing away the arms in the car that they would not be discovered even if the car was searched. He asked him to drive the car to Jerusalem, where a liaison man would contact him to take delivery of the arms. The liaison man would identify himself by a password and the accused was to introduce himself as Al-Haj, a code name given him by Abu Firas.

The accused would then give him his car and the liaison man would remove the arms from it and return it to the accused.

The accused undertook to act in accordance with these instructions.

5. As agreed, Abu Firas appeared at the accused's house the following morning and fetched the accused's Mercedes.

A day later he returned the car to the accused, loaded with arms and sabotage material intended for the perpetration of acts of violence in Israel. On handing it over, Abu Firas told the accused that it contained all the arms and sabotage material

he was to deliver to the liaison man in Jerusalem.

6. The accused maintained the aforesaid contact with two foreign agents without having a reasonable explanation, within the meaning of Section 24 of the State Security Law, for doing so.

7. On July 25, 1974, the accused returned from Beirut to Jerusalem in his car, carrying with him, without lawful authority, the whole consignment of arms and sabotage material which the Fatah members had loaded on to it, and from that date he waited for the liaison man of the organization to come and take delivery of the consignment, as agreed upon with Abu Firas.

8. On August 8, 1974, the accused was apprehended driving his Mercedes, in which, without lawful authority, he was carrying the aforesaid consignment of arms and sabotage material. A search of the car revealed arms and material, as follows:

(A) In the left-hand front door

1. Two Browning pistols and two loaded magazines.

2. Two Kalachnikov rifles.

3. Five loaded Kalachnikov rifle magazines.

4. A nylon bag containing 9-mm. rounds.

(B) In the right-hand front door

1. Seven loaded Kalachnikov rifle magazines.

2. Two parcels of electric detonators wrapped in plastic, each containing 100 detonators, inscribed in Arabic. Total: 200 detonators.

(C) In the fan-case below the windscreen-wipers

Two nylon bags containing reddish-brown plastic explosive, weight 4 kilogrammes.

(D) Under the right-hand front mudguard

1. Five American defence-offence grenades.

2. Eight loaded Kalachnikov rifle magazines.

3. Fifteen sticks of American plastic tetn, half a kilogramme per stick. Total: seven-and-a-half kilogrammes.

4. Five parcels of reddish-brown plastic tetn.

Total: 10 kilogrammes.

(E) Under the left-hand front mudguard

1. Two Kalachnikov rifles.

2. Eleven sticks of American plastic tetn, half a kilogramme per stick. Total: five-and-a-half kilogrammes.

3. Three parcels of reddish-brown plastic tetn. Total: 6 kilogrammes.

(F) Under the back seat (left)

1. Two hundred ordinary detonators.

2. Three kilogrammes of brown plastic explosive.

3. Thirty-six sticks of American tetn, half a kilogramme per stick. Total: 18 kilogrammes.

4. Fifty activating and delay mechanisms.

(G) Under the back seat (right)

1. Forty-two sticks of American tetn, half a kilogramme per stick. Total: 21 kilogrammes.

2. Five American defence-offence grenades.

3. Four kilogrammes of brown plastic explosive.

4. Four sticks of American plastic tetn, half a kilogramme per stick. Total: 2 kilogrammes.

5. Four kilogrammes of brown plastic explosive.

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Declaration adopted by the Coordinating Committee of the Group of Non-Aligned Countries at the UN condemning Israel's destruction of Quneitra¹²³

New York, September 12, 1974

At the meeting it held in New York on 12 September 1974, the Co-ordinating Committee of the non-aligned countries heard a statement on Quneitra by the Permanent Representative of Syria, Ambassador Haissam Kelani. The Permanent Representative of Syria drew attention to the fact that, during the term of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces signed in Geneva on 31 May 1974, the Israeli forces committed criminal acts as they withdrew from the Syrian territory they had been occupying by destroying Syrian villages, and in particular the town of Quneitra and the village of Rafid, using for that purpose explosives and bulldozers. He also submitted a report on the destruction and pillaging of buildings, sites and monuments of archaeological, cultural, religious and historical interest carried out by the Israeli occupation authorities in the liberated area of Syria.

The representatives of the non-aligned countries consider that these acts perpetrated by the Israeli forces, without any reason or justification, constitute a flagrant violation of international law,

¹²³ Text as submitted to the UN Secretary-General by the Permanent UN Representative of Algeria, UN doc. S/11508, p. 2.

humanitarian principles, the values of civilization and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, as well as a total violation of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict adopted at The Hague, on 14 May 1954, and ratified by numerous parties, including Syria and Israel.

Moreover, international law views the acts committed by Israel as war crimes. Under the terms of the Charter of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity are considered to be war crimes.

The representatives of the non-aligned countries, therefore, firmly condemn the Israeli occupation authorities for these acts of barbarism, which are contrary to international law, international Conventions, and the values of civilization.

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Statement by Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping of China accusing the superpowers of preventing a Middle East settlement¹²⁴

Peking, September 17, 1974

The Middle East war last October was an event of far-reaching significance in the struggle of the Third World against imperialism and hegemonism. Fighting with common hatred against the enemy and using oil as a weapon, the Arab countries dealt a heavy blow at Zionism and hegemonism, and set a good example in the struggle of the Third World and the people of the whole world in defence of their national rights and interests against exploitation and plunder by imperialism, and particularly the superpowers. Of course, the superpowers which are predatory by nature, will definitely not be reconciled to defeat. In the new circumstances they are intensifying their plunder of the Third World and stepping up their mutual contention for hegemony. This is the main obstacle to a settlement of the Middle East question and

the source of continued turmoil and unrest in the region. At present, attention should be called to the fact that one of the superpowers prompted by its hegemonic and expansionist ambitions is using unscrupulous divisive tactics in a desperate attempt to undermine the militant solidarity of the Arab countries. Moreover, by means of what it euphemistically calls "military aid" or "economic aid," it is reaping fabulous profits and seeking to take others by the neck and coerce them into submission. All its vicious actions of sham support and real control have given the Arab people a lesson by negative example and resulted in further exposing itself. We are convinced that the great and increasingly awakening Arab people, the Palestinian people included, will always see through the various schemes of the superpowers and wage a tit-for-tat struggle against them. So long as they constantly exert themselves, work in concert and fight shoulder to shoulder, the great Arab people are bound to achieve new and still greater victories in their struggle against imperialism, Zionism and hegemonism.

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Communiqué issued by the Preparatory Parliamentary Conference for Euro-Arab Cooperation announcing resolutions passed by the Conference relating to the Middle East conflict (excerpt)¹²⁵

Damascus, September 17, 1974

The Preparatory Parliamentary Conference for Euro-Arab Cooperation held in Damascus between 12th and 17th September 1974 and attended by:

A) On the Arab side, parliamentary delegations representing the Parliaments of: Jordan, Bahrain, Tunisia, Sudan, Syria, Palestine, Kuwait, Lebanon, Egypt, Mauritania, P.D.R. of Yemen.

B) On the European side, Parliamentarians from: Holland, The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Ireland, The United Kingdom, Belgium, France and Luxembourg.

¹²⁴ Excerpted from the partial English text of a speech given at a dinner in honour of visiting President Daddah of Mauritania, *Peking Review*, XVII, 38 (September 20, 1974), p. 6.

¹²⁵ Excerpted from the English text as published in *Arab Palestinian Resistance* (Damascus), VI, 9-10 (September-October 1974), pp. 59-60.

Inspired in all its endeavours by the necessity for joint action by the two sides in promoting dialogue and cooperation between European and Arab Parliamentarians and for seeking ways and means of exchanging cooperation between European peoples and the Arab Nation, as a whole,

The Conference has reached the following resolutions:

1. In the Political Field
2. In the Economic Field
3. In the Cultural Field

I. In the Political Field:

The Conference:

1. Urges the implementation of the United Nations resolutions related to the Palestine Question and the Middle East problem.

2. Calls for recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people.

3. Urges that Europe
a) assume her proper important role in bringing about a just and durable peace in the Middle East, and

b) that steps subsequent to the European Economic Community's Declaration of November 6, 1973 be taken in the same spirit.¹²⁶

4. Supports that the Palestine Question be placed on the agenda of the 29th session of the United Nations General Assembly.

5. Urges all members-of-Parliaments in Europe and the world to exert all necessary efforts towards securing the desired success for the Geneva Peace Conference.

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Speech by Chancellor Kreisky of Austria made at a dinner in honour of visiting Prime Minister Ayyubi of Syria (excerpt)¹²⁷

Vienna, September 18, 1974

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The circumstance that the Arab states control a large proportion of the reserves of oil indicates clearly that this part of our earth can enable its people to participate in a development in standards

of living which they could not have imagined a few decades ago. But such a development towards a higher material civilization will only come about if peace is allowed to reign in the region. Without peace there will be no development of civilization or culture, neither for society nor for the individual.

War brings no solutions, only new problems. As it always turns out, war is not the father of all things.

Austria will therefore always stand for a peaceful solution of the Middle East conflict and do everything in its power to promote détente.

The European peoples particularly feel themselves more closely attached to this part of the world than any other, since we regard it as one of the most important sources of our spiritual life; not least because there was the cradle of three great faiths which, apart from their religious significance, also were the foundation of our European conceptions of law and morals and thus were basic for the coexistence of the peoples.

Thousands of Arab students have received their education in Austria over the last twenty-five years, and Austria has in this way contributed much to good relations. We have already had, and will also in the next few days have, exhaustive talks regarding the improvement of our scientific and cultural relations, talks which I hope will be fruitful for both sides.

But however much we want good relations I cannot let this opportunity pass without clearly stressing that we can only consider them if they are not at the expense of relations to other states. To be frank, Austria has the same good relations with the states of the Arab world as with Israel, and that for several reasons—out of considerations of principle as well as of particulars.

Thousands of people of Austrian origin have found their new home there, hundreds of thousands could only save themselves from persecution by seeking refuge there. Ultimately also because a modern community has arisen there. Not to recognize that would be incompatible with our modern civilization.

I feel bound to make these points because I assume, Mr. Prime Minister, that you will state your attitude on this question. Permit me therefore to state my opinion.

The openness with which we speak our minds will not prevent us from developing our mutual

¹²⁶ Doc. 184 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹²⁷ Excerpted and translated from the German text supplied, on request, by the Austrian embassy in Beirut.

relations, and we in Austria are convinced that the problems existing in the Middle East can only really be solved with peaceful methods.

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Speech by Herut party leader Begin of Israel criticizing Israeli foreign and domestic policy¹²⁸

Tel Aviv, September 29, 1974

On the threshold of the new year, our nation stands at the crossroads. The alternative is: either to maintain the historic achievements of the Six Day War and secure the country's future for generations to come, or to squander those achievements, undermine the foundations of national security and put the country and the people in permanent danger even in this generation; either to sustain our right to Eretz Israel, or to invite an invader into the liberated land and consequently bringing enemy forces within the immediate vicinity of our population centres; either to uphold two recognized political principles: that a state of war ends with a peace treaty, and that without peace, there can be no withdrawal whatsoever, or to waive those principles and enter into interim arrangements that mean Israeli withdrawals without peace.

In order to choose with open eyes between these two alternatives, we must ask a question and answer it: What are the designs of the enemy at this point? The answer was given very recently by an authoritative source. The Egyptian dictator stated to his own people and to the Americans: "The liberation of Sinai and the Golan Heights will not solve the problem and will not bring peace. It will be solved by restoring the rights of the Palestinian people." That is what Sadat said in Cairo. While he addressed himself over the NBC network to American public opinion he said: "I shall not agree to non-belligerency, even if Israel withdraws from Sinai:" to which he added in a positive vein: "I shall sign a peace agreement together with my friends the Syrians, Jordanians and

Palestinians."

Let us look more closely at this double answer. Liberating Sinai and the Golan Heights—what does that mean, coming from Sadat? It means that the settlements in the Northern valleys, including Tiberias, will be within the range of the guns which the Communist super-Power has so generously supplied to the Syrians, and that the settlements in the Negev will also be within the range of enemy fire. And in spite—or perhaps because—of that, Sadat announces in advance that there will be no peace for Israel.

Second: he will sign a peace agreement together with the Syrians, the Jordanians and the Palestinians. What do the Syrians want? The Golan Heights, and more than that; for does Assad not refer to Israel as "Southern Syria?" What do the Jordanians want? We have heard that from Hussein: Judea and Samaria, East Jerusalem, perhaps also Gaza and a corridor to connect them; for those are the parts of Eretz Israel which, he claims, will be under his rule.

What the Egyptians want, Sadat has told us himself. What do the so-called Palestinians want? That has been answered in writing. The document is called the "Palestinian Charter," and with regard to us its main clause says: "The establishment of the Jewish State is null and void."

Now we know. In the positive version, Sadat has told the Americans that he is prepared to sign a peace agreement; with whom? Not with the State of Israel, but with a Jewish State that exists no longer.

Asked about his plans for the Palestinians, the Egyptian ruler refused to reply several times. Usually, he said he had proposals, but was not yet prepared to talk about them. This time he has been explicit. It was he himself who announced that the roof organization of the murderers of Kiryat Shmonah, Shamir and Ma'alot, must represent the Arabs in Eretz Israel.

What they have to say about the State of Israel that was established in 1948—that its establishment is null and void—we have read. In other words: While Heykal, a few weeks ago, explained that the rights of the Palestinians would be restored either in the form of a "secular State," meaning the absolute elimination of the State of Israel, or in the form of a State according to the Bernadotte Plan—and we all remember what that means—Sadat went even farther in the two statements we

¹²⁸ Made at the eleventh Herut National Council session; published as an advertisement by Ne'eman Eretz-Yisrael, *The Jerusalem Post*, October 15, 1974, p. 4.

have quoted here, by identifying himself absolutely with the Charter of the so-called Palestinians and therefore calling for the complete elimination of the Jewish State. Those are the enemy's aspirations.

If an Israeli Government can stand up and declare, in the face of these clear political facts, that it is possible, in return for territorial concessions, to get the Arab rulers to agree that, while most of the areas which had come under Israeli rule in the Six Day War will be handed over to the Arabs, part of them will remain in Israel's hands—as I said, with Arab approval—if a Government would stand up in Israel and claim this, it would assume a grave responsibility, or be totally irresponsible. That would be knowingly misleading the people of Israel. History has taught us that every people pays a price for accepting the political lies which it is offered. We shall uphold the truth among our people. It is our duty to save it and denounce the deceit to which it is being exposed, particularly these last few months.

The way in which our people is being misled also has repercussions abroad. Our information effort would gain a powerful impact and our national policy would have a strong effect if we come to friendly nations and tell them the truth: that the Arab rulers want no peace of any description with Israel, that they seek to destroy it, and that they no longer even conceal that ambition: by their absolute identification with the murder organizations and their Charter, they tell us so in so many words. Their statements, their threats, are worse than those which preceded Munich. They tell us explicitly: Even if you withdraw completely, you shall not have peace; on the contrary, we shall continue to try and destroy your State. That is what they tell us in advance.

If we make that clear, friendly nations will understand why we cannot be asked to give up our security, to allow enemy forces near our population centres, to make it easier for the enemy to try and destroy our country.

But friendly nations are being told that the Government of Israel is prepared to concede very much and only asks the Arabs to agree to leave Israel something after the Six Day War. Those nations are getting tired and will say—in effect, they are saying it already: “The Arabs are not prepared to accept your demands, so concede a

little more; the difference is no longer very great, even according to your own plans, of which we know.” That is why misleading our people knocks the foundations out from under our diplomatic and information efforts amongst friendly nations.

That is the background against which we must see the political retreat of the last year, which also has very serious implications. There was an agreed policy which was accepted by nearly the whole nation, with the exception of Rakah; in effect it said that after all the wars that had been waged against us, after all the sacrifices, we would this time, after the Six Day War, demand true peace, expressed in peace treaties in which the parties acknowledge that the state of war is terminated, and in which borders are defined; and failing peace treaties, the situation as established at the time of the cease-fire would be maintained in full.

That policy has broken down. Instead of peace treaties, the Prime Minister and his colleagues call for interim arrangements. And while the Prime Minister has told the Administration in Washington that we are ready either for overall peace agreements or for interim arrangements, he should have realized that the moment the little word “or” passed his lips, the first part of his statement vanished.

What remains, are interim arrangements that do not require peace, that disconnect any step backwards by Israel from peace. All they mean, is further withdrawals, in stages, without peace. For the leading principle of “peace treaties and no withdrawal without them” has been given up, and without that principle, the Government's policy leads, and cannot but lead, to giving up both territory and peace.

Instead of the demand for peace, we suddenly hear about “non-belligerency.” That is a vague concept that is open to many interpretations, but let me tell you how this nebulous idea came into the world.

Long before the Yom Kippur War, there was a proposal for a partial settlement along the Suez Canal. At that time, the Government still insisted that not a single Egyptian soldier should cross the Canal, and that there could at most be a civilian administration East of Suez. At that time, the Government said: “But the one condition of such a settlement that cannot be waived is an Egyptian declaration of non-belligerency.”

After the Yom Kippur War, there was talk, in

connection with the disengagement agreement, of our making the agreement conditional on an Egyptian declaration of non-belligerency. Then again that condition was dropped.

Today, non-belligerency is already being demanded in connection with a further withdrawal in Sinai—and I can tell you that it is not a question of a few kilometres, but of quite a deep withdrawal. However, Sadat says: Not only will I not agree to non-belligerency after a further withdrawal, even if it is a deep one, in Sinai; even if you pull out from the whole peninsula, we will not agree to non-belligerency. Non-belligerency can be considered only if you return to the lines of the 4th of June, 1967, in all sectors and the agreement must include the Palestinians.

It is the same old political rule again: one concession leads to another. The concession is noted, and the new demands, after the concession, are still to come.

In view of these developments, the leaders of the Alignment should ask themselves two questions: why have all their forecasts about the fateful question of war or peace between us and the Arab States proved so completely wrong? For they have: between '47 and '49, between '49 and '56, between '57 and '67, between '67 and '73, and since the signing of the disengagement agreements on both fronts, to this very day.

Why has every promise of the Alignment that the past war would be the last one and that from there on we would go in the direction of peace, been followed by another war? Why were we told only a few months ago, after the disengagement agreements, that Egypt would become introvert and concern itself no longer with all-Arab problems, and that we could very soon have a peace agreement—and nothing remains of all those promises but a sad memory?

This has been going on for a long time—for more than a quarter of a century; and since 1970 and the commitment to withdrawal and the renewed partition of Western Eretz Israel, another four years have passed. The answer is simple: in policy, as in logic, the conclusions will be correct only if the premise is true. But if the premise is unfounded, all the conclusions will be absurd.

Now the true premise is that those who have not acknowledged the right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel, do not want to acknowledge the right of our people to part of the Land of

Israel. That premise remains as true today as it was in 1947 and 1948: we have heard so only yesterday in Cairo, and only last week on NBC.

The second question they must ask themselves is: What has happened since the commitment to a withdrawal, to far-reaching territorial concessions, even to giving up the heartland of the country and of the nation, Judea and Samaria? What has happened in the international sphere?

The large majority of African States have broken off diplomatic relations with us; Western Europe has turned its back on us, and part of the countries of Latin America, including the two principal countries, are beginning to follow suit. We have come to the point where the United Nations Organization is about to grant official recognition to the murder organization which we have lately started to refer to as the PLO.

The very use of that name is a gross moral and spiritual capitulation: Palestinian Liberation Organization! And it is we, the Jews, who are saying that. Liberation from what? From whom? Palestine—that means, no Land of Israel. We should have called this murderers' organization all along by its right name ARNO—Arab Nazi Organization. For that is its right name. Their ambition is to destroy a State and annihilate a people, and their acts are consistent with that design. That is why the civilian population is the target of choice of their attacks and men, women and children are murdered with malice aforethought.

What has Arafat said? "Peace with Israel means the destruction of Israel." And what did King Hassan of Morocco tell us? The ARNO people—in colloquial Hebrew we call them the PLO people—told him that they will disembowel every Jew and every pregnant Jewish woman, "so as to kill the child in her womb." The King of Morocco was shocked.

But we have come to the point where the United Nations are about to recognize ARNO, the Arab Nazi Organization, and to allow them to speak from their rostrum. All this: the estrangement of Africa, Western Europe and Latin America, the recognition of the ARNO by the UN—when, under which Government, did this happen?

If we were running the country's affairs, or if the breakdown of July 1970 had not happened and the National Unity Government would still exist and we would be part of it, on the basis of the policy in force before the breakdown, we would now be

told that that is what comes from being "stubborn": and that if we had been willing to announce concessions, all this would not have happened to us in the outside world. But the fact is that all that has happened in the international sphere, has happened under a Government that is prepared to surrender Judea and Samaria to the Arabs.

Those who are in charge of the nation's affairs, must ask themselves these two questions: Why have all their forecasts about war and peace in the last twenty-six years and in the last four years proved wrong, and why has everything that has gone wrong for us in international relations gone wrong under their administration, while they were preaching the policy of concessions that endanger the future of the nation and undermine the foundations of its security?

The conclusion is that one should not say that all this has come about in spite of the policy of retreats, but on the contrary, because of that policy, as I have already explained. If you are already prepared to concede so much, what matters a strip of land here and a strip of land there? Give that up, too, and you will have an agreement, as you yourselves say.

Our alternative policy, against that, gave the country a protective political perimeter: a peace treaty, direct negotiation for the signing of a peace treaty, as is the rule among nations. Why should Israel be the exception, the only exception? Do the people of Israel, after so many wars, not deserve true peace? Those are the two principles that are accepted among all nations, and we ourselves should accept the view that what applies to all nations, does not apply to the Jews, certainly in so crucial a question as war or peace?

Moreover, as the Arab rulers themselves say, even with a total withdrawal we will not have peace, but, as they tell us explicitly, we will have to agree to remove ourselves from the scene. How can one expect us to commit such folly? Who has the right to demand of us that we make it easy for them to try and carry out such a plan?

While we are talking about these great issues, we must reject two negative statements that have been made recently by the Prime Minister and his colleagues. The one is: We are isolated, and it cannot be helped and in order to make a virtue out of this unfortunate necessity, the Prime Minister reminded us: "The people shall dwell alone."

Why pick that particular verse from Balaam's

words? Balaam also made other important statements; for instance: "How goodly are thy tents, O Jacob, and thy tabernacles, O Israel!" Or —another leading principle in the history of man—"Blessed is he that blesseth thee, and cursed is he that curses thee."

"Dwell alone" politically? We may question even what the tendency is in a spiritual sense. Micah prophesied: "And many nations shall come, and say, Come, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, and to the house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths; for the Law shall go forth from Zion, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem." Though from the spiritual viewpoint we should perhaps remember that it was Micah who also said: "For all people will walk every one in the name of his god, and we will walk in the name of the Lord our God for ever and ever."

But, as everyone will agree, what has that to do with policy? Why must the people of Israel be isolated politically? We have enemies, and that means that we need friends, and if possible, allies.

Now, more than ever, we have an opportunity of gaining or regaining friends. Something has happened in the world, which has been thrown into shock by Pan-Arabic imperialism. As we have warned in the past, Pan-Arabic imperialism is no less of a danger to humanity than Pan-German imperialism, or than what was and under its ideological camouflage remains Pan-Slavic imperialism.

These days it is being demonstrated to the whole free world what dangers it must expect from Pan-Arabism or from Pan-Arabic imperialism. Insensate territorial expansion, oppression of all minorities, and it is no mere chance that Heykal has lately been speaking again of a land link between Egypt and the Arab East. We are at Sharm-esh-Sheikh, and he is speaking about Eilat.

From the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic shores—twenty States want yet another little country the only one of the Jewish people. And what have they done now? By means of their Pan-Arabist oil policy, led by Sadat, they undermine the very foundations of the existence of the entire world, upset its economy and its currency system, threaten its freedom and even its honour; a handful of sheikhs in the sands of whose desert domains oil wells have been found, dictate, or try to dictate, to great, free nations.

I can testify that even more than half a year ago, when the Arab oil embargo was in force, there was strong anger in Europe against the Arabs, and that goes also for America. I was at a conference of members of 11 European parliaments; we have followed the press; we have heard what the media had to say. The characteristic and important point is that no one said that it was because of Israel, and all the powerful wave of wrath was directed against the boycotters.

Every free country suffers from increasingly fast galloping inflation and economic instability. On the other hand, the very poorest among the nations must surrender the last of their resources to get oil. In view of these clear facts, this is a unique opportunity for Israel to go out and gain friendship and understanding on a basis of common interests in the whole free world.

Add to that a beginning awareness of the true meaning of the so-called *détente* between the USSR and the USA. In fact, let us take a look at the result of this *détente* in terms of the real interests of the free world and particularly of the USA.

America had paid the Arab States billions of dollars for oil. Russia sells arms to the Arab States for billions of dollars. In other words, Russia obtains billions of American dollars, and meanwhile stands by and looks at the economy of the democratic countries being destroyed by its allies. Is that *détente*? Is that how the future of the free world is to be assured? This is a unique opportunity for Israel by addressing its information effort also to the basics of international politics, to be not a problem, but a factor, to regain understanding, friendship and support.

There is no justification at all for the argument that our international isolation is a must. On the contrary, we must not be isolated, we must not fatalistically allow others to isolate us. We have enemies; we need friends and allies. Just now, Israel has an opportunity of gaining them because of a development which did not exist only a few years ago.

Another negative statement which we must reject and replace by a positive one: We are being told these last few days that our armed forces will no longer deter aggression, but decide the outcome of war if it breaks out. We must on no account agree to this turn for the worse.

First of all, of course, I must question the wisdom of making such a statement where the enemy can

hear it: The IDF can no longer deter you from attacking. Is such loose talk necessary?

But what is more important than all the talk are the actual facts. We are convinced that our armed forces can continue to deter aggression. Again, we must not fatalistically accept the idea that wars are inevitable. If the elected political authority takes the right decisions, and consequently our armed forces are ready, alert and deployed in the right places, they can be a deterrent factor and thus prevent wars.

The proof is what happened on Yom Kippur: Our enemies were afraid to attack us, so they did all they could to mislead us. They did not attack until they were absolutely sure that our army was not mobilized and stood far from the front; and then it was of course no deterrent. When seven divisions attack a few hundred men on the Southern front, then they will of course cross the Canal; and they celebrate that crossing to this very day. But if our forces had been where they should have been, there would have been no Canal crossing but a crushing victory and our people would have peace, if not in name then at least in fact, for many years, perhaps for this whole generation.

Or, if the army had been ready, the war might not have broken out at all, and any war that can be postponed, can be postponed for a long time.

There is your proof that the IDF can be a deterrent, that is to say, prevent bloody attacks, if the conditions are right. That is why we must continue to build it up, and why we must tell our enemies what a deterrent means: that if they attack, they will be roundly defeated. That must of course be backed up by facts, not by words: a mighty army like we have built up, but ready, alert, watchful and deployed where it needs to be when there is need, while maintaining the strategic depth without which the very existence of the State is liable to be in continuous danger, because of the range of the new weapons which our enemies have been given.

No fatalism, not in policy and not in the army, but thought directed at gaining friends and support and preventing the enemy's attacks: that is the right way.

Now, my friends, in this part of my speech I would like to put a few ideas and proposals to you. Just as I have tried in its first part to give an answer to the question, in which direction we should act, I shall try in its second part to indicate what we

should do.

a) We continue to be in favour of establishing a Government of national unity. To us, the decisive argument is that the nation is in danger, and at such times, a free people unites. As we see it, a National Coalition can be established in spite of the profound differences of opinion, on the basis of the one single principle of non-compulsion: No one is to be compelled to accept principles or to give up his principles.

No more of that. I think there is nothing we need to add to this simple statement. The Alignment refuses to establish a National Coalition. As long as it persists in that refusal, for reasons we know only too well, we have nothing to add to what we have said about the need and the possibility of establishing a National Coalition.

We represent a powerful segment of the people. Only ten months ago, we won the confidence of 473 thousand free men and women citizens. 42% of all Israel's soldiers voted for us. We did not water down any of our principles when we went to the people and asked them for their confidence. We came with a clear platform, with historical, political, moral, social and economic principles.

The first principle we presented was: The right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is inalienable, and is one with our people's right and aspiration to security and peace. Any proposal resulting in the renewed partition of Western Eretz Israel must be rejected. The sovereignty of the State in the liberated areas of the country should be implemented also by law. That is what we said, and for this principle we received the confidence of hundreds of thousands of citizens, one third of the nation.

There is no justification, no reason, why the representatives of such an electorate should beg "admittance." Three times national coalition governments have been formed and we know how they have been formed: in mutual respect and with the desire to work together. Only on such a basis can a National Coalition be established in Israel.

Second, I want to ask this Council to authorize the representatives of Herut on the Likud Executive to introduce there the following proposal: That Likud calls upon the people, in the near future, to sign a citizens' petition to the Knesset about Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria.

I think that the text of such a petition could be more or less as follows: (of course, this is only a draft that will be put up for discussion and can be amended or changed): "To the Knesset:—We, the undersigned citizens of Israel, having regard to our people's right to Eretz Israel, to security, to settlement and to peace, call upon the Knesset to assure that Judea and Samaria will be under Israel's sovereignty, an inseparable part of the State."

I am able to tell the Council that preliminary discussions with spokesmen of the components of Likud have shown that there is general agreement on their part to endorse this proposal.

These are no ordinary times. We must go to the people, we must appeal to every citizen of Israel: "This is your concern: act." Let us all act together. For this action we will all have to do our share, to volunteer. The preparations will take some time. If, as I hope, the Likud Executive will approve the proposal, we shall act on two levels: wherever people gather, and also from house to house.

Let the people have its say! This is where our fate is at stake: Judea and Samaria, the ancient heartland of the nation, the cradle of our culture and the foundation of our security. There are grounds for believing that, contrary to the demoralization which is being instilled amongst the people when they are told that a people can invite an invader, a conqueror into its liberated country after having defeated him and chased him out, that contrary to this official demoralization, the cause of Judea and Samaria is deeply felt in all ranks of the people, that hundreds of thousands will respond to our appeal. Let the people have its say.

Let us all volunteer and do the job, as we know how to do it in times when our fate is at stake: with dedication. Thus we shall help our people to assure its future.

We propose that the Knesset send a delegation to the US Congress. It should consist of members of the entire House, supporters and opponents of the Government. That also will be a demonstration of national unity, under the existing circumstances.

This delegation would have two assignments: To demand more weapons for Israel's defence and to demand the separation of the supply of such weapons from any pressure or so-called persuasion in favour of political concessions. I must say that,

not officially, of course, but in practice, there is today some hint of a connection between the two. First of all, about weapons for defence: Yes, the US Government has agreed to supply us a certain quantity of modern defensive weapons, and we must acknowledge that, and if the Minister of Defence, the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister have made efforts to secure these essential supplies, we shall acknowledge their services.

But it is our duty to say that what has been secured, is not enough in terms of the balance of forces.

In the Yom Kippur War, it was proved that we can no longer permit ourselves to rely on quality vis-à-vis quantity, for two reasons: Our enemies have been given arms of high quality. I shall never forget what an officer in Sinai told us when we visited him there: "We have seen weapons of a higher quality than ours in the hands of the Egyptians." And when it comes to fire power, it has been proved that there is a point where a certain quantity turns into a new quality.

Since Washington promised to supply a certain quantity of defensive weapons, there have been changes that need to be taken into account. The USSR not only intensifies the supply of land, air and sea weapons to Syria, but is also about to resume arms supplies to Egypt. And the modern arms for our enemies come not only from Russia, but also from the West and even from the United States of America.

Sadat has not only admitted that Libya put Mirages from France at his disposal, but also that King Feisal of Saudi Arabia has given him weapons of extraordinary importance. Saudi Arabia does not receive even a single weapon from Russia: Its weaponry comes in the first place from the USA. That also goes for Kuwait, and also for Jordan, and so forth. Even in view of the latest changes, it is our duty to say that what we are about to receive in the next few months, is no longer enough. We will have to have far more than has been promised us. We must not have to rely on another airlift. Those deterring or decisive weapons should be here.

I want to tell you that this proposal of ours has a good chance. We have some experience in these things. I cannot give you all the particulars, but there is one thing I can reveal: in three spheres of land arms, we suggested placing orders in the USA; the Government did not agree at first;

they endorsed our proposals in course of time, and we have received those weapons.

Outside those three spheres, there is an item which we proposed to order and of which we were told at the time that there was no chance of obtaining it, and therefore there was no sense to ask for it. Finally, we asked for it and got it.

That is a valuable, meaningful experience. On the strength of it, we now propose this idea of an all-party Knesset delegation that, as is customary these days, will go to the US Congress, present the situation in its true light, and ask already now for an increase of supplies that are vital for our defence and for preventing enemy attacks.

In this matter, we have the fullest right to appeal to Israel's friends in the USA, Jews and non-Jews, and ask them to perform the civic act citizens of their great democratic country are accustomed to perform: to appeal to their President, day after day, in letters and telegrams and in other ways and to ask him for arms for Israel. Israel, they should explain, is an ally of the free world and has proved that with deeds, not with words, particularly in the last seven years; Israel is being threatened every day with another war, unless she capitulates the Munich way or worse. More tools for Israel's defence. And the same appeal should also say: No connection whatsoever between those tools of defence and any pressure on Israel to give in to demands of its enemies which would endanger its security and future.

If US Jewry stand up—and they are ready to do so—to make their influence felt directly—as is nowadays customary everywhere in the democratic world—if US Jewry stand up and sound this appeal day after day, and if they are joined by our non-Jewish friends all over the country, there are reasons for believing that Dr. Kissinger will not exactly try any longer to link limited supplies of weapons that are vital for defence with the demand: "You must withdraw without peace treaties. You must make interim arrangements."

That is also a proposal which has a good chance of success, and we are presenting it to our people at home and in the Diaspora, and particularly to the Jews in the USA.

We are in duty bound to resume the campaign for saving the Jews of Syria. I must say that in that respect, too, there has been some misleading. Before the signing of the disengagement agreement and the withdrawal in the North, we were

told that even before the signing, there would be a demand for the release of the Syrian Jews. We did not insist on it. After the agreement was signed, those who had told us that the question of the Syrian Jews would be pursued with great determination, did not keep their word. We were told that Assad had said that the Jews who live in Syria are doing very well. A word to the wise...

It is our duty as Jews and as human beings to resume the campaign for saving our brethren who live in the ghetto and are humiliated in every possible way, and continue it until they reach a safe haven.

Within the next few days, we shall see if there will be an agreement, between Senator Jackson and the Administration, and as a result some sixty thousand Jews will come from the USSR, as we are told. The numbers needed are far larger. There are many who want to come to Israel. But if the persecutions of Jews who want to come to Israel stop and the Zion prisoners are released, then we must make ourselves ready to receive those sixty thousand.

I will point out an interesting fact. Mr. Sapir foresees an aliya of a hundred thousand every single year. Remarkable, I still remember him reading out the forecast of seven years ago, with an average aliya of only 15 to 20 thousand for the next thirty years, which would be just too bad, what with the demographic problem?

But if the latest forecast of the Chairman of the Jewish Agency proves right, then in six to seven years' time the demographic problem in Judea and Samaria will be solved. If the agreement in question does not materialize though, it will doubtless be necessary to resume the public campaign for the return to Zion from the Soviet Union, for the release of the Zion prisoners, and for a halt to the persecution of those who want to go to Israel, in full strength.

Settlement, of a truly pioneering nature—everywhere in Eretz Israel, in town and country. Then we will no longer have to read newspaper headlines about alerts of the IDF—to prevent settlement in Judea and Samaria.

Those are our main proposals for what has to be done on the national plane today.

Within the nation, we represent the unshaken belief in the justice of the cause of the Jewish people, which has returned to Eretz Israel and will continue to return to it. We also represent the

saving grace of tenacity in days of trial, when we were few and Jewish suffering was immeasurable, and have given proof of that. We have stood up, few against many, weak against strong, and thanks to that tenacity, as we have learned it from Zeev Jabotinsky, our people has gone out from slavery to freedom, the great turning point in history has come, and we have become independent again.

In the name of these values, and the powerful strength which they can impart, we are about to go to our people to raise its spirits, strengthen its faith, tell it that we look to a better future, that here is no reason whatsoever for pessimism, for a black outlook—there are grounds for concern, for seeking new roads, but our people is now immensely powerful. If it acts here in Israel, if it activates the Jews in the Diaspora and particularly in the USA, it has every prospect of better times.

There are three points on which we must insist in particular: our right to Eretz Israel, our right to national security, our right to peace on the same terms as all other peoples, in the form of cessation of state of war embodied in peace treaties, without which there can be no withdrawal of any kind.

Let us take our stand on these three rights, and if we also convince our people to act in this spirit for those just aims, we shall with God's help yet see better, and even great days of achievement, of return to Zion, of doing justice and we shall hand over a secure, good, beautiful Eretz Israel—to our children.

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Message from USSR President Podgorny to President Boumedienne of Algeria regarding the Soviet position toward the Palestine issue¹²⁹

Moscow, October 4, 1974

We, my colleagues at the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and I, have studied carefully and with interest your cable addressed to us on 13th September about the Palestine issue. We share your view about the importance of this issue

¹²⁹ Broadcast on Algiers radio in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4722/A/1; reprinted by permission.

within the general framework of the Middle East problem. Based on the principle of safeguarding the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and with the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Arab territory which was occupied illegally in 1967, the Soviet Union considers this as an essential condition for establishing a just peace in the Middle East. We consider the Palestine issue as part of a Middle East settlement and a political issue which affects the future of a people fighting for the realization of their legitimate national rights, including the right to self-determination and to lay down the structure of their own state.

The Soviet Union proposes a solution to the Palestine issue that ensures the Palestinians' own interests and at the same time contributes to the liquidation of the causes of the war and restores the situation in the Middle East to normal.

The UN General Assembly's current session should discuss the Palestine issue with this aim in mind. The participation of representatives of the Palestinian people whether in the study of this issue or in preparation of UN resolutions aimed at realizing the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, is emphasized. In accordance with our above mentioned political principle, the Soviet delegation to the 29th session of the UN General Assembly has been instructed to support the rights of the Palestinian Arab people and their just struggle for national liberation. The Soviet Union always supports the struggle of the Arab peoples and the Palestinian Arab people against imperialist aggression and for establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which responds to the interests of all states and peoples of the area.

My friend, M. President, please accept cordial wishes for health and success from all the comrades at the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and from me personally.

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Statement by General Secretary Brezhnev of the CPSU warning of the dangers in the current Middle East situation and calling for a speedy resumption of the Geneva conference¹³⁰

Kishinev, Moldavia, October 11, 1974

Exactly one year ago, the aggressive policy of Israeli leaders and their stubborn refusal to withdraw from the Arab territories they had seized led to war breaking out in that area—a war the development of which could quite possibly have put world peace in jeopardy.

The rebuff which Israel received at that time, the growing unity of the Arab countries, the support for their just cause from the Soviet Union, from other socialist states, from dozens of countries in Asia and Africa and from the general public throughout the world—all these might seem to be a good lesson for those persons in Tel Aviv who are fond of aggressive policies.

Our proposals, made jointly with the USA and approved by the United Nations Security Council, helped to achieve a ceasefire. On the order of the day there appeared the task of achieving an immediate—as was clearly stated in the Security Council resolution—political settlement of the conflict. This task was to be accomplished by the Geneva peace conference.

It turned out in practice, however, that the work of this conference was replaced by group talks on the disengagement of the armed forces of the belligerents on particular fronts. As an initial measure that disengagement was useful, but it did not to any degree take the place of a real settlement and, as everybody can now see, it has not resolved the main issue—a complete settlement.

Now the Israeli invaders are continuing to keep the territories occupied by them and are gradually settling those territories. And the leaders of the Israeli government, relying, as can be seen, on the support of their traditional foreign patrons, are evading in every possible way a resumption of the

¹³⁰ Excerpted from the partial English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5757 (October 15, 1974), p. 377; made in a speech during celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Moldavian SSR.

conference in Geneva on a peaceful settlement, and in order to drive home their point, so to speak, are declaring for the whole world to hear that Israel will not consider returning to the frontiers of 1967.

The Arab states are rightly indignant at such a state of affairs. It is natural that the Soviet Union, as hitherto, entirely supports their just cause. Our wide and steadily-developing friendly co-operation with Syria, Egypt and Iraq, and with the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, is an important factor which operates in favour of the elimination of the consequences of the aggression, in favour of the attainment of a just peace. We highly appreciate our contacts with Arab leaders. In present conditions such contacts are especially necessary and useful. This, in particular, was also reaffirmed by our recent talks with the President of Syria, Hafez Assad.

Finally, it is necessary that the resolutions of the United Nations organisation be implemented, that the liberation of the territories seized by the Israelis be ensured, and that the legitimate interests of the Arab people of Palestine be met and their right to their national home be satisfied. This should be done without further delay if we want a lasting peace to come about in the Middle East.

To postpone a solution of these matters, to prolong the present situation which is of benefit only to the Israeli invaders, means sitting on a powder keg which may explode at any moment.

That is why the USSR resolutely comes out for an effective resumption of the Geneva peace conference at the earliest possible date, with all the parties concerned, including the Palestinians, taking part. A lasting and just peace should finally be established in the Middle East. This will be of benefit to the security of all the states of the area, including Israel. And we are convinced: such a peace will be established, for this is the will of the peoples, for this is demanded by the interests of universal security!

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Rumania of Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the PLO (excerpts)¹³¹

Bucharest, October 12, 1974

At this meeting [between Arafat and President Ceausescu] many questions of mutual interest were reviewed, and the two sides voiced their satisfaction with this new meeting which is an expression of the excellent relations between the Rumanian Communist Party and the Palestine Liberation Organization and of their desire for mutual co-operation for the purpose of reaching a solution which will realize the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people.

The two sides commended the opening of a permanent office of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Bucharest and Mr. Arafat expressed his gratitude for Rumania's support for the activity of this office.

The General Secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party expressed the complete solidarity of the Rumanian Communist Party and the Rumanian people with the Palestinian people's aspirations to organize an independent life commensurate with its legitimate rights.

President Nicolae Ceausescu warmly commended the international political and diplomatic activity of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its leadership towards achieving a just solution in accordance with the vital interests of the Palestinian people.

The two sides affirmed that an invitation to a delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization to take part in the debates of the United Nations will be a step on the road towards a solution just to the Palestinian people and recognition of the role of the forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization as sole representative of this people in the realization of its legitimate legal and national rights by political means.

Yasir Arafat, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, expressed his gratitude for the important role

¹³¹ Excerpted and translated from the partial Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), October 14, 1974, pp. 1-3.

played by the Socialist Republic of Rumania and President Nicolae Ceausescu in the evolution of the Palestine cause at this new stage and for the active support given towards the inclusion of the cause of the Palestinian people in the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly.

The two sides agreed that the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East requires the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories and the assurance of the right of the Palestinian people to organize their own lives freely and independently in accordance with their national aspirations.

The Rumanian Communist Party supports the political programme of the Palestine Liberation Organization regarding the establishment of a future Palestinian state.

Yasir Arafat and the Rumanian President decided to maintain continuous contacts and to have bilateral consultations regarding the problems of the Middle East whenever necessary.

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Statement issued after a meeting between Foreign Minister Fahmy of Egypt and General Secretary Brezhnev of the CPSU¹³²

Moscow, October 15, 1974

On October 15, 1974, comrade Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union accompanied by member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Party and Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Andrei Gromyko received Mr. Ismail Fahmy, Foreign Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt, who is currently visiting Moscow. Mr. Ismail Fahmy handed Leonid Brezhnev a letter from President Anwar Sadat expressing the desire of the Egyptian leadership for continued progress in the Soviet-Egyptian relationship of friendship. During the conversation the Soviet Union and Egypt resolutely affirmed the necessity of developing the relationship of friendship and full cooperation between them on the firm foundation of the Soviet-Egypt-

tian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of May 27, 1971.¹³³ Leonid Brezhnev reaffirmed the constancy of the principled Soviet line of lending full support to the struggle of the Arab peoples against imperialism and for the abolition of the traces of Israeli aggression and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Mr. Ismail Fahmy, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, speaking on behalf of the Arab Republic of Egypt and of President Anwar Sadat personally, expressed his gratitude to the Soviet Union for its comprehensive aid and support for Egypt in the strengthening of its national economy and the reinforcement of its defence capacity in its struggle against Israel's imperialist aggression and for the liberation of the occupied Arab territories.

In accordance with this conviction of the parties the coming meeting at summit level between the Soviet and Egyptian leaders will be a most important step in the development and deepening of Soviet-Egyptian relations.

During the conversation a comprehensive discussion took place regarding the questions which could become the basis for future agreements. It was agreed during the meeting that the meeting between Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and President Anwar Sadat of the Arab Republic of Egypt should take place in January 1975.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Hungary of Executive Committee Chairman Arafat of the PLO¹³¹

Budapest, October 15, 1974

A delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization headed by Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, paid a visit to Hungary in the period October 12-14, 1974.

The Palestinian delegation visited the Foreign Ministry and conducted discussions with Deputy Foreign Minister Robert Jara.

¹³² Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 16, 1974.

¹³³ Doc. 125 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

¹³⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), October 15, 1974, p. 8.

During the visit views were exchanged in a spirit of mutual understanding regarding developments in the Middle East question and the Arab peoples' struggle against imperialism and particularly the Palestinian Arab people's struggle which is being conducted for national self-determination under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Arab Palestinian people.

The PLO delegation expressed its appreciation for the Hungarian people's firm stand in favour of the cause of the peoples struggling for national liberation and social progress. The delegation expressed its gratitude for the solidarity of the Hungarian people and for its support for the just cause of the Arab peoples, among them the Arab Palestinian people.

The PLO is eager to rely on the support of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in the struggle it is conducting against the Israeli aggression and imperialist and Zionist manoeuvres with the aim of restoring the national legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

This support has a large role to play in the realization of the aims of the Arab national liberation movement.

The delegation condemned the imperialist efforts and the reactionary manoeuvres aimed at upsetting the cooperation and friendship existing between the progressive Arab forces and socialist countries.

The Hungarian side expressed its belief in the necessity of the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the occupied territories and the reestablishment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people as an essential condition for the solution of the Middle East crisis.

The Hungarian side supports the international efforts aimed at a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East crisis and the convening of the Geneva conference at the earliest opportunity.

It also expressed its support for the political programme of the Palestine Liberation Organization, adopted by the Palestine National Council at its 12th session, to establish an independent national Palestinian authority and self-determination for the Palestinian people in accordance with the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations.¹³⁵

They welcomed the initiative of the Arab countries regarding the necessity of debating the Palestine question in the United Nations General Assembly session as a separate agenda item, and they demanded that the Palestine Liberation Organization be invited to take part in this debate.

With the strengthening of its internal unity and the extension of its cooperation with the Arab progressive forces the PLO can fully rely on the continual support of world progressive forces, including the help and aid of the Hungarian people.

The representatives of the Hungarian Solidarity Committee and of the Palestine Liberation Organization agreed to continue to develop the cooperation and relations of friendship existing between them through the PLO's opening of a representative office in Hungary.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Foreign Minister Fahmy of Egypt (excerpt)¹³⁶

Moscow, October 18, 1974

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During the meetings and conversations which were conducted by the government delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt a detailed exchange of views took place regarding the question of Palestine. It was agreed that the achievement of the final and complete political settlement, which must be reached at the Geneva conference to establish a firm and just peace in the Middle East, can only come about with the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people and especially its right to establish a national entity.

In this connection the two sides believe that representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization should participate in an independent capacity and with equal rights with the other participants in the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, the resumption of which at the earliest possible moment both parties are working for.

¹³⁵ Doc. 246 below.

¹³⁶ Translated from the partial Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 19, 1974.

The two sides expressed their satisfaction with the resolution¹³⁷ adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in its twenty-ninth session inviting the Palestine Liberation Organization in its capacity as the representative of the Palestinian people to participate in the General Assembly's debate on the question of Palestine.

The two sides consider this resolution to be international recognition of great significance reflecting the political importance which the Palestine question has attained.

The two sides expressed their confidence that the present session of the General Assembly will adopt a constructive resolution which will contribute to guaranteeing legitimate Palestinian rights in coordinated efforts aimed at establishing a just and firm peace in the Middle East.

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Letter from US Secretary of State Kissinger to US Senator Jackson stipulating the new criteria and practices which will govern future emigration from the USSR¹³⁸

Washington, October 18, 1974

Dear Senator Jackson:

I am writing to you, as the sponsor of the Jackson Amendment, in regard to the Trade Bill (H.R. 10710) which is currently before the Senate and in whose early passage the Administration is deeply interested. As you know, Title IV of that bill, as it emerged from the House, is not acceptable to the Administration. At the same time, the Administration respects the objectives with regard to emigration from the USSR that are sought by means of the stipulations in Title IV, even if it cannot accept the means employed. It respects in particular your own leadership in this field.

To advance the purposes we share both with regard to passage of the trade bill and to emigration from the USSR, and on the basis of discussions that have been conducted with Soviet representatives, I should like on behalf of the

Administration to inform you that we have been assured that the following criteria and practices will henceforth govern emigration from the USSR.

First, punitive actions against individuals seeking to emigrate from the USSR would be violations of Soviet laws and regulations and will therefore not be permitted by the Government of the USSR. In particular, this applies to various kinds of intimidation or reprisal, such as, for example, the firing of a person from his job, his demotion to tasks beneath his professional qualifications, and his subjection to public or other kinds of recrimination.

Second, no unreasonable or unlawful impediments will be placed in the way of persons desiring to make application for emigration, such as interference with travel or communications necessary to complete an application, the withholding of necessary documentation and other obstacles including kinds frequently employed in the past.

Third, applications for emigration will be processed in order of receipt, including those previously filed, and on a non-discriminatory basis as regards the place of residence, race, religion, national origin and professional status of the applicant. Concerning professional status, we are informed that there are limitations on emigration under Soviet law in the case of individuals holding certain security clearances, but that such individuals who desire to emigrate will be informed of the date on which they may expect to become eligible for emigration.

Fourth, hardship cases will be processed sympathetically and expeditiously; persons imprisoned who, prior to imprisonment, expressed an interest in emigrating, will be given prompt consideration for emigration upon their release; and sympathetic consideration may be given to the early release of such persons.

Fifth, the collection of the so-called emigration tax on emigrants which was suspended last year will remain suspended.

Sixth, with respect to all the foregoing points, we will be in a position to bring to the attention of the Soviet leadership indications that we may have that these criteria and practices are not being applied. Our representations, which would include, but not necessarily be limited to, the precise matters enumerated in the foregoing points, will receive sympathetic consideration and response.

Finally, it will be our assumption that with the

¹³⁷ Doc. 20 above.

¹³⁸ Text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, October 20, 1974, p. 4.

application of the criteria, practices and procedures set forth in this letter, the rate of emigration from the USSR would begin to rise promptly from the 1973 level and would continue to rise to correspond to the number of applicants.

I understand that you and your associates, in addition, have certain understandings incorporated in a letter dated today respecting the foregoing criteria and practices which will henceforth govern emigration from the USSR which you wish the President to accept as appropriate guidelines to determine whether the purposes sought through Title IV of the Trade Bill and further specified in our exchange of correspondence in regard to the emigration practices of non-market economy countries are being fulfilled. You have submitted this letter to me and I wish to advise you on behalf of the President that the understandings in your letter will be among the considerations to be applied by the President in exercising the authority provided for in section¹³⁹ Title IV of the trade bill.

I believe that the contents of this letter represent a good basis, consistent with our shared purposes, for proceeding with an acceptable formulation of Title IV of the trade bill, including procedures for periodic review, so that normal trading relations may go forward for the mutual benefit of the U.S. and the USSR.

Best regards,
Henry A. Kissinger

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Letter from US Senator Jackson (Dem.) to US Secretary of State Kissinger in response to the latter's letter of October 18¹⁴⁰

Washington, October 19, 1974

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for your letter of October 18 which I have now had an opportunity to review. Subject to the further understandings and interpretations outlined in this letter, I agree that we have achieved

a suitable basis upon which to modify Title IV by incorporating within it a provision that would enable the President to waive subsections designated (A) and (B) in Sec. 402 of Title IV as passed by the House in circumstances that would substantially promote the objectives of Title IV.

It is our understanding that the punitive actions, intimidation or reprisals that will not be permitted by the Government of the USSR include the use of punitive conscription against persons seeking to emigrate, or members of their families, and the bringing of criminal actions against persons in circumstances that suggest a relationship between their desire to emigrate and the criminal prosecution against them.

Second, we understand that among the unreasonable impediments that will no longer be placed in the way of persons seeking to emigrate is the requirement that adult applicants receive the permission of their parents or other relatives.

Third, we understand that the special regulations to be applied to persons who have had access to genuinely sensitive classified information will not constitute an unreasonable impediment to emigration. In this connection we would expect such persons to become eligible for emigration within three years of the date on which they last were exposed to sensitive and classified information.

Fourth, we understand that the actual number of emigrants would rise promptly from the 1973 level and would continue to rise to correspond to the number of applicants, and may therefore exceed 60,000 per annum. We would consider a benchmark—a minimum standard of initial compliance—to be the issuance of visas at the rate of 60,000 per annum, and we understand that the President proposes to use the same benchmark as the minimum standard of initial compliance.

Until such time as the actual number of emigrants corresponds to the number of applicants, the benchmark figure will not include categories of persons whose emigration has been the subject of discussion between Soviet officials and other European governments.

In agreeing to provide discretionary authority to waive the provisions of subsections designated (A) and (B) in Sec. 402 of Title IV as passed by the House, we share your anticipation of good faith in the implementation of the assurances contained in your letter of October 18 and the understandings conveyed by this letter. In par-

¹³⁹ Statutory language authorizing the President to waive the restrictions in Title IV of the trade bill under certain conditions will be added as a new (and as yet undesignated) subsection [original note].

¹⁴⁰ Text as published in *The Jerusalem Post*, October 20, 1974, p. 4.

ticular, with respect to paragraphs three and four of your letter we wish it to be understood that the enumeration of types of punitive action and unreasonable impediments is not and cannot be considered comprehensive or complete, and that nothing in this exchange of correspondence shall be construed as permitting types of punitive action or unreasonable impediments not enumerated therein.

Finally, in order adequately to verify compliance with the standard set forth in these letters, we understand that communication by telephone, telegraph and post will be permitted.

Sincerely, yours,
Henry M. Jackson

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Press conference statements by Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues of France discussing his meeting with PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat and restating France's attitude to the Palestine question¹⁴¹

Beirut, October 21, 1974

Dominique Baudis (TF-1): Mr. Minister, during the talks you had with Mr. Yasir Arafat this morning, did you use the credit France enjoys with the PLO to ask him to suspend certain spectacular military operations?

A. I told Mr. Arafat in a general way that PLO action should be exerted on the political level. This means, of course, the renunciation by the organization of terrorist action.

Hugo Anson (Reuter): Mr. Minister, did you tell Mr. Arafat that the more the Palestinians put forward moderate demands at the United Nations the more France will support them.

A. Yes.

Xavier Baron (AFP): Mr. Minister, in a few weeks the General Assembly of the United Nations will hold a debate on the Palestinian question, and you just recalled, last week, the position France took some years ago. There are many resolutions voted on at the United Nations which speak of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Could you tell us concerning France concretely, what this formula consists of? Is it a question of the

right to return and to compensation, as I believe the 1948 resolution expresses it, or is it a question of the right to dispose of a national sovereign territory, or of something else?

A. I do not think it would be useful for anyone, especially not for the cause we aim to serve, that is to say, a progressive settlement taking into account the interests of all, that I should define in some kind of juridical and too precise a manner the position of the French government in the matter. But let us say, however, that we have regarding this subject two tendencies which are clear and simple: The first is that the rights of the Palestinian people must be taken into consideration, which means without doubt the recognition of the right to self-determination. To say more would drag us into controversies or useless difficulties at this stage. I refer at this point to the second principle which is that of the right of every state in the area to live within secure and recognized borders. And if you add to that what I said just now concerning the fact that the Palestinian problem should be examined within the framework of international reality, that is to say of the known positions of the big states in the world, for example, concerning the state of Israel, positions which are well-known and which are not necessary to be restated, I think this answers your question.

Diane Willman (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation): Would you tell us the outcome of your meeting this morning with Yasir Arafat?¹⁴²

A. Well, the outcome is the better new relation of the both sides, the respected positions and encouragement of the both sides to future progress of relation.

No outcome was to be expected. It was just a *prise de contact*. We have to make acquaintance and well to establish a good work of relationship.

Willman: Have you agreed to strengthen relations and ties between the French government and Palestine Liberation Organization.

A. No, the question of ties did not arise, and was not put.

¹⁴¹ Excerpted and translated from the French text supplied, on request, by the French embassy in Beirut.

¹⁴² This and the following question were put in English, and Sauvagnargues answered both in English.

Hugo Anson: Mr. Minister, did you tell Mr. Arafat that a condition of France's support for the rights of the Palestinian people is that they do not put in doubt, in danger, the territorial security of Lebanon?

A. I did not, because in my opinion, the question does not come up.

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Press conference statements by President Giscard d'Estaing of France defining France's attitude and potential contribution to a Middle East settlement¹⁴³

Paris, October 24, 1974

Q. On this subject, may I put a further question from a more specific angle. In view of the considerable feeling aroused in Israel, as in Jewish circles in other countries, following the latest diplomatic moves of French policy, are you now able to reassure Israeli public opinion in order that a fruitful dialogue may be established between France and Israel?

A. I should like France's position to be fully understood by all, and I think that once it is properly understood it will not arouse emotional reactions that are in my view quite unjustified, as I shall try to explain.

I have not been asked about the vote of our delegation to UNO concerning the P.L.O.'s participation in the debate on Palestine. I should have liked to have heard this question.

Concerning the Near East situation, what is basically France's objective? It is to help bring about—it does not depend primarily on us—the possibility of a lasting peace in that region. Today, I for my part am convinced that a resumption of hostilities there would be a world catastrophe. I mean by this that all the work of pacification that has been undertaken since last year—reflected in a certain détente in relations between certain countries of that zone, which have been able to open negotiations and start upon a certain withdrawal—would be jeopardized once and for all, or at any rate for a very long time, if hostilities were resumed in that part of the world.

I also believe that if hostilities were resumed, we would find the conditions, both human and material, transformed. We would suddenly discover how considerable were the resources, not only in men, but also the financial and economic resources of all kinds, at the disposal of the Arab countries of that zone, and the resumption of hostilities would probably lead the countries in question to change their objective and to aim, not merely to recover a number of territories, but then perhaps—probably as a long-term objective—at the suppression and elimination of their adversary.

I therefore earnestly think that the conditions of a lasting peace must be sought in that region of the world.

In my talks with persons who have passed through Paris since June, I was very struck to see that sometimes the efforts undertaken, in particular by the United States Secretary of State, have been very positive in that zone. For all these efforts, there was no precise appreciation of the reality of the Palestinian problem.

In fact, this Palestinian problem, as far as the appreciation of it is concerned, is relatively recent.

It was possible to imagine for a time that the Palestinians, expelled from their homeland or having left it, would be absorbed into other communities or would disperse. This is in fact why the problem of the Palestinians was handled as a problem of refugees until 1967. Even in the famous United Nations Resolution no. 242, the Palestinians are referred to as refugees. And then, in the last few years, the world woke up to the fact that this was not the way things were evolving, that the Palestinians had not settled down elsewhere, had not been assimilated by other countries, but that they were an entity, a reality, a people. And, incidentally, France is not the only one to say so, since, as you know, the United States President, for instance, has used the expression "Palestinian people", and I have even read that the Israeli Prime Minister recently spoke of the Palestinian identity.

What is France doing in this respect? France is saying that if we want a lasting peaceful solution in the Near East, the Palestinian problem must be tackled. In saying so, she is only a few months or years ahead of what will become an obvious fact. For if all the other problems were tackled but not that one, there would be no chance of a lasting peace in the Near East. So what are we saying

¹⁴³ Excerpted from the English translation issued by the French embassy in London and supplied, on request, by the French embassy in Beirut.

about this problem? Firstly that it must be tackled. Once this necessity is established, if those concerned want to make their viewpoint known, they must quite obviously be enabled to do so. And the United Nations vote, which was interpreted as a vote of recognition, is no such thing: it is a vote of sheer common sense. If the United Nations hold a debate on the Palestinian question, it is normal, absolutely normal, that the representatives of the Palestinian people should have their say. And I note, in fact—I would say with regret—that, on such a subject, the existence of a very small minority apparently opposed to it and which thus drives itself into a position of defeat is probably a bad thing. For, after all, it is normal that those concerned should have their say, even if others can then have theirs too.

Then the French Foreign Minister, who naturally works in very close liaison with me, went to the Lebanon in the framework of a round of visits he has to make, including visits to the Lebanon, Jordan, and then the State of Israel. On this occasion, the leader of the P.L.O. asked to be received by him. It was normal that the French Foreign Minister should receive him before the United Nations debate, in order to find out what would be the case argued by his Organization.

I now come to our attitude on the root of the problem. The root of the problem is the consideration that there can be no lasting peace in the Near East without a just settlement of the Palestinian question. Once the international community recognizes the existence of a Palestinian people, what is the natural aspiration of a people? It is to have a homeland. What should that homeland be? What should be the relations of that homeland—how should it fit in—with the existing States of the region, some of which in fact, as you know, at present have large numbers of Palestinians amongst their populations. This is a matter for negotiation, and I should not like to take a stand on it. Our position is that this problem must be tackled and that this negotiation must be launched.

Be launched with what end in view? Precisely in order that the content of Resolution 242 may materialize, may be implemented, in other words that every State in that part of the world may at long last live there within secure and recognized frontiers. I must tell you that our Foreign Minister, in his conversation with Mr. Arafat, indicated that this would be France's attitude and that

France would stand up for the right of the countries of that region, therefore in particular the State of Israel, to have secure and recognized frontiers. I even consider that if the international community succeeded in bringing about the conditions of a lasting peace in that part of the world by settling all the problems at issue, such a peace would have to be widely underwritten and Europe could play a certain part in this respect. Europe does not, as you know, have the military means of extending such a guarantee, but it does have certain resources, certain economic possibilities, certain sales capacities concerning in particular (...) equipment and also military equipment; and the policy of Europe in this respect might conceivably be conducted in common, after a settlement, in such a way as to make its contribution to the protection of the secure and recognized frontiers that would at long last have been accepted in the region.

Let me add that this is what the French Foreign Minister will say next week in Israel, and I am convinced that France's position will be seen in its true light by his interlocutors.

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Television interview statements by Prime Minister Rabin of Israel commenting on the Likud petition to annex the West Bank and on the possibility of a partial settlement with territorial concessions¹⁴⁴

October 25, 1974

Q. Mr. Rabin, you have defined this [Likud petition on annexation of Judaea and Samaria] as an explicit political act. Such a political act usually occurs in a certain situation. Can it not be said that it has actually happened in a state of vacuum when the Government's policy on the subject of settlements is neither clear nor sufficiently defined, lacking practical application in the field. Is this not the very situation which actually forced this political act?

A. I'd say that the contrary is true. The Government's policy is clear. We say that we are

¹⁴⁴ Broadcast on Israel television in Hebrew; partial English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4740/A/1-2; reprinted by permission.

ready to negotiate for peace without preconditions. We are ready to meet any country to discuss terms of peace with it. We are not ready to withdraw to the lines of 1967. The aim must be peace. Jerusalem must be unified. But they cannot be told: Come and sign a waiver covering every inch—and in advance. I think, therefore, that the Government's policy is a correct policy, a call for negotiations, a call for peace, without preconditions. A resolution of the kind included in the petition is, in my view, tantamount to closing the road towards peace. I don't want to say that if we carry out the present policy we shall certainly achieve peace. But at least I'll be able to tell myself—or the government will be able to tell the nation—that we have exhausted every prospect and that if we have reached the threshold of war, this happened because the other side was not ready for peace and not because we stipulated preliminary conditions that the other side was unable to accept.

Q. Mr. Rabin, my previous question referred [interrupted by Rabin]

A. Perhaps I should add: I know that the future of Judaea and Samaria is a matter which affects every one of us. Each one is divided in his feelings. Therefore the Government's policy says in no uncertain terms that no agreement will be signed without the people deciding first. But until an agreement is reached, the Government's policy is to be open for dialogue.

Q. My previous question referred to the internal implications of this act and not its external implications. I had in mind the claim being made by the supporters of settlements in Judaea and Samaria that the Government is not doing enough in this sphere, and in fact, that it is not implementing its own decisions in this respect.

A. First of all, Government decisions, as expressed in the policy guidelines of the first Government set up by Mrs. Meir after the Yom Kippur war, stipulate that the Government will work for settlement only in conformity with Government decisions. I think that the Government is working according to its policy and according to what is needed. We are establishing settlements and strengthening existing settlements in the Golan Heights and in the Jordan Valley and among the settlements and quarters in the Jerusalem area and the settlements in the Rafah approaches. I will say with all sincerity that the fate of the State of

Israel—and its borders—will be determined primarily as a result of its military strength; its ability to adhere to a policy of peace, but from a position of strength, and its economic strength.

Q. Does this formula [on a coalition with Mafdal] also cover the possibility of achieving a partial settlement in which there will be certain territorial concessions? This is a possibility which could happen.

A. I think that since the Government has promised to accept the people's decision on everything pertaining to territorial concessions, this will be valid in every case. As from today there has been no Government decision to discuss a partial settlement with Jordan, and, thus, this is not relevant at this moment. But if the reference is to territorial concessions, I assume, at least I believe, that no territorial concessions will be made in any framework without an approach being made first to the people for a decision in a democratic way through elections.

Q. That is to say—this will, in fact, apply in the case of a partial settlement if it requires territorial concessions. This is the way I understand it.

A. You are right.

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Message sent by Prime Minister Chou En-lai of China to the Arab summit conference in Rabat¹⁴⁵

Peking, October 26, 1974

In the Middle East war of October last year the Arab people in their tens of millions, with common hatred against the enemy, gave play to the great height of their militant unity and dealt heavy blows at Israeli Zionism and at the superpowers which tried to fish in troubled waters. In the past year the situation in the Middle East has developed in a direction more and more favourable to the Arab people and the people of the Third World and unfavourable to Zionism and big-power hegemonism. I am sure that the convening of the present Arab Summit Conference will further strengthen the militant unity of the great Arab

¹⁴⁵ English translation, *USSR and Third World* (London), IV, 7 and 8 (September 9–November 24, 1974), p. 461.

people and help promote the just struggle of the Arab and Palestinian people for the recovery of lost territories and the restoration of national rights. I wish the conference success.

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Message from President Podgorny and Prime Minister Kosygin of the USSR to the Arab Summit Conference (excerpt)¹⁴⁶

Moscow, October 26, 1974

We shall continue to do all in our power to ensure that a genuinely just settlement in the Middle East is achieved in the interests of the peoples of the area and all peace-loving people.

The questions concerning the elimination of the aftermath of the Israeli aggression and to the establishment of a lasting and just peace in the Middle East which will be discussed by your conference are of great importance not only for the destinies of the area, but also for the entire international situation.

The interests of strengthening peace and security in the Middle East require the liberation of all the Arab territories seized in 1967 and the ensurance of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. Without this, there can be no just and lasting peace in the area.

The Soviet Union is in favour of the urgent resumption of the Geneva peace conference, which is the most suitable form for the consideration of the Middle East problem in all its aspects.

Your conference is regarded in the Soviet Union as an important step in the cause of strengthening the anti-imperialist solidarity of the Arab peoples.

We are confident that the success of the just struggle of the Arab peoples to eliminate the aftermath of the Israeli aggression and to ensure the inalienable rights of the Arabs to control their own destiny and their own national resources will largely depend on the actions of the Arab countries being concerted.

The Soviet Union will continue to support this just cause of the Arabs.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of US Secretary of State Kissinger (excerpts)¹⁴⁷

Moscow, October 27, 1974

As previously agreed, Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State of the United States of America and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, visited Moscow from October 23 to October 27.

He had discussions with Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

The two sides continue to be concerned over the situation in the Middle East. They reaffirmed their determination to make efforts to find solutions to the key questions of a just and lasting settlement in the area. The two sides agreed that the early reconvening of the Geneva Conference should play a useful role in finding such a settlement.

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Statement by Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues of France affirming support for Israel's continued existence while noting his disagreement with Israel's Middle East policy¹⁴⁸

Tel Aviv, October 31, 1974

In one of the most beautiful of your holy books, Ecclesiastes, it is written, "There is a time for everything, there is a time for all things under heaven"; we believe that the time has come in

¹⁴⁷ Excerpted from the English text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXI, 1848 (November 25, 1974), pp. 703, 704.

¹⁴⁸ Made in a speech at a dinner given in his honour by Foreign Minister Allon of Israel; excerpted and translated from the French text supplied, on request, by the French embassy in Beirut.

¹⁴⁶ Partial English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5759 (October 29, 1974), p. 398.

the Middle East for the establishment of agreement and that a fruitful area of cooperation should be opened up between all peoples in the region.

We are well aware that the Israeli people also desire this.

However, it must be admitted that, since 1967, our conceptions of the ways and means in view for reaching a just and lasting settlement as required by the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 have diverged. French diplomacy believed that recourse to the possibilities proposed by the international organization—and more especially the Security Council—was necessary and that the security of Israel depended basically not on conquered territories but on the execution of United Nations decisions and on the application at the same time of a combination of peace undertakings and guarantees. You judged otherwise. I have had the opportunity to explain to the General Assembly of the United Nations the broad lines of our Middle East policy. I shall not return to this, except to underline that it is strangely misinterpreting French policy to see in it I know not what persistence in incomprehension. This is not the time for accusation and suspicion, but the time for clear-sightedness and for taking into consideration all the elements under discussion—and I stress *all* the elements. The settlement, founded on right and justice, which should take place, should be total; it should confirm the right of all states in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. On the existence of the state of Israel and its security, which constitutes one of the principles of its Middle East policy, my country, as you know, holds views which are perfectly clear and distinct. I have also had the opportunity to underline this in the course of my talks with various Arab interlocutors, in particular at one recent meeting. Today, more than ever, we hope that Israel and its neighbours find the grounds for entente which will allow them to devote themselves in harmony to the common tasks of peace and development.

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Political resolutions adopted by the 24th Congress of Israel's United Workers' Party (Mapam)¹⁴⁹

November 2, 1974

The State of Israel should act on the basis of a realization that time is short. In present circumstances a positive view should be taken of interim settlements, on condition that the policy-makers establish the goal they are aiming at to ensure Israel's sovereignty within secure, recognized and agreed frontiers.

a) Israel takes a positive view of a political settlement based on the existence of two independent sovereign states—Israel on the one hand and an Arab state on the other—in which neighbouring state the Palestinian Arab people will enjoy self-determination. At the same time Israel will respect the decisions of the Palestinians and the Jordanians as regards the self-determination, sovereignty and independence of either people outside the frontiers of Israel, on condition that relations with Israel are based on agreements ensuring peace and good neighbourly relations. The Mapam Party will submit its peace proposal and will continue to struggle within the institutions of the state to ensure that it is implemented.

Although opportunities have been missed, Israel should still encourage every desire of the Arabs of the territories for organization. At the same time Israel should announce that she is prepared to negotiate with any Palestinian quarter that recognizes the existence and sovereignty of the state of Israel and desists from all terrorist, sabotage or destructive activity against it.

b) Israel's isolation in the international field was recently demonstrated by the resolution adopted by the overwhelming majority of the United Nations General Assembly to allow representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization to attend the General Assembly debate on the Palestine problem, in spite of the organization's purely terrorist character and its declared aim of liquidating Israel, a member state of the United Nations.

¹⁴⁹ Translated from the Hebrew text, *Al-Hamishmar* (Tel Aviv), November 3, 1974; the congress took place October 30–November 2.

c) By granting the Palestine Liberation Organization the status of sole representative the Rabat Arab summit conference made the political and security situation of our area even more obscure and unstable. Every attempt to ignore Israel's right to exist as a sovereign Jewish state will be firmly and resolutely rejected by Israel, by world Jewry and by public opinion that is in favour of understanding and peace between peoples.

The government of Israel will closely follow the developments arising from the Rabat conference so as to be prepared for every danger and also for every constructive proposal.

d) In spite of Israel's readiness to strive for and even initiate peaceful settlements with the Arab countries, efforts must continue to increase the strength and capacity of the Israeli army and to improve and develop its equipment. Therefore the Israeli army must be prepared for every trial in the face of the rapidly increasing strength of the Arab countries and of the fact that they are being provided with modern lethal weapons. Moreover, if it is to learn the lessons taught by the Yom Kippur war and the previous period, it must derive its capacity for renewal and rejuvenation from the best sources—pioneer values and the glorious heritage of the people's army.

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Statement by US Senator Fulbright (Dem.) surveying the Middle East situation and calling for US initiative towards peace¹⁵⁰

Fulton, Missouri, November 2, 1974

Turning now to the Middle East, I believe that the current situation is shaped by two central facts: One is the volatility of the Arab-Israel conflict, the high probability of another, greater war if the central issue of the occupied territories is not soon resolved. The second fact—which for domestic political reasons we are exceedingly reluctant to acknowledge—is the close relationship between the Arab-Israeli conflict and the price and availability of oil.

The danger of a fifth Arab-Israel war is acute, and if such a war comes, it will almost certainly be

more violent and more protracted than the previous wars. In the year of truce since the October war of 1973 both sides have rearmed heavily. The consensus of military experts is that the strategic balance is shifting to the Arab side, not only because of Soviet supplies but also because of the greatly improved training and technical competence of the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces. Egypt, and perhaps Syria, are now armed with Russian surface-to-surface "Scud" missiles, which would enable them to attack Israeli cities as well as Israel's vulnerable oil storage facilities. Israel, for her part, is generally assumed to have acquired nuclear weapons, and if Mr. Joseph Alsop—whose Israeli connections are excellent—is to be believed, Israel is prepared to use those weapons if her cities are attacked. In Mr. Alsop's view, Israeli warnings already issued amount to a veiled but unmistakable threat of nuclear war.¹⁵¹

The alternative to war—and the only alternative—is a general settlement. It is no derogation from Secretary Kissinger's great achievements to note that the disengagement agreements of the past year and the limited Israeli pullbacks in Sinai and the Golan Heights were no more than preliminary accomplishments. The difficult issues remain—especially Jerusalem and the West Bank. Unless they are resolved, there will almost certainly be war—a war that would devastate Israel, quite possibly provoke a Soviet-American confrontation, and most certainly bring on a new, ruinous oil boycott. This prospective crisis, let me emphasize, is not a remote or hypothetical one; it is closer to being a clear and present danger.

It cannot be permitted, and it is up to the United States, not alone but in collaboration with the Soviet Union and the United Nations, to prevent it. Israel, it appears, is stalling, and with nothing concrete in mind except to get all the arms and money she can get from the United States so as to try to hold off the inevitable. The Israeli leaders might have made good use of time gained since last year's truce to prepare for the necessary accommodations. They might have been telling their people, as Israel's first and wisest leader, David Ben-Gurion, tried to tell them in 1971, that peace is Israel's "great necessity," and "to get it"—Mr. Ben-Gurion said—"we must return to

¹⁵⁰ Excerpted from a speech made at Westminster College; text supplied, on request, by Senator Fulbright.

¹⁵¹ Joseph Alsop, "An Israeli Threat," *The Washington Post*, October 7, 1974.

the borders before 1967." "As for security," Mr. Ben-Gurion added, "militarily defensible borders, while desirable, cannot by themselves guarantee our future. Real peace with our Arab neighbors—mutual trust and friendship—that is the only true security."

The shift of the balance of power gives added force to Mr. Ben-Gurion's prescient words. This shift is more than a matter of improved weapons and fighting skills on the Arab side. The rise of the Arabs is based upon two powerful and growing forces: money and nationalism—the enormous wealth which is accruing to the oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf, and the surging national feeling of the Arab peoples, especially the embittered, tenacious nationalism of the Palestinians. The brief, spectacular ascendancy of the Israelis in the Middle East has been based primarily on human assets which cannot be expanded—discipline, energy, bravery, and competence. Impressive as these human assets are, they do not and cannot overweigh the fact that Israel is a small country with modest natural resources and heavy liabilities—with no oil except that of the occupied Sinai fields, with an economy burdened by military costs and inflation, an economy so dependent on the United States as to make Israel—however little we or the Israelis may care to admit it—a client state of the United States.

What is taking place in the Middle East is a long-term historical unweighting of the scales of power, comparable, say, to the inexorable displacement of France by Germany as the paramount power of Europe in the nineteenth century. The difference in the Middle East is that it is all happening much faster. The friends of Israel in the United States do her no service by refusing to recognize these facts of power and change. Myopia among the Israelis, with their siege mentality, is perhaps understandable. It is much less so among Israel's supporters in the United States, who, by underwriting intransigence, are encouraging Israel on a course which must lead toward her destruction—and just possibly ours as well.

Israel, I am convinced, can and should survive as a peaceful, prosperous society—but within the essential borders of 1967 as called for by the Security Council's Resolution 242 of November 1967. That resolution calls as well for a settlement "guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the

area...." This provision, as I have suggested in the past, can be implemented to great power guarantees contracted through the United Nations Security Council, and in addition, by an explicit, binding American treaty guarantee of Israel.

That much we owe them, but no more. We do not owe them our support of their continued occupation of Arab lands, including old Jerusalem and the Palestinian West Bank. The Palestinian people have as much right to a homeland as do the Jewish people. We Americans—who have always professed adherence to the principle of self-determination—should be the first to appreciate that. But when the United Nations General Assembly voted on October 14 of this year, by 105 to 4 with 20 abstentions, to allow the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the Assembly debate on Palestine, the United States was in the minority of four—with Israel, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic.

So completely have the majority of our officeholders fallen under Israeli domination that they not only deny the legitimacy of Palestinian national feeling; but such otherwise fair-minded individuals as the two current candidates for Senator from New York engage in heated debate as to which one more passionately opposes a Palestinian state. We have nearly allowed our detente with the Soviet Union to go on the rocks in order to obtain an agreement on large-scale Jewish emigration—a matter of limited relevance to the basic issue of human rights in the Soviet Union, and of no relevance at all to the vital interests of the United States. Senator Jackson further obfuscates the matter with invocations of Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." Note that the Article refers not only to the right to leave but also to the right to return. Is the right of the Palestinians to return to homes from which they were expelled any less fundamental than the right of Soviet Jews to make new homes in a new land?

Within the broader question of the West Bank there is a special importance about Jerusalem. It is here especially that the Arab-Israel conflict converges with the question of the price and availability of oil. Let me explain why:

The oil countries, united in OPEC, appear to be on a kind of power "trip," and their lack of restraint

is widely, and properly, condemned. Those most insistent on repeated price increases, however, have not been the Arab states, but two of the principal non-Arab producers, Iran and Venezuela. The largest oil exporter, Saudi Arabia, has shown a keen awareness of the dangerous disruptions threatened by the four-fold increase in the price of oil, and Saudi officials have made known—both publicly and privately in unmistakable terms—their strong desire to lower prices and to work out long term supply arrangements for the industrial nations, especially the United States. The Saudis are motivated by strong feelings of friendship and also of reliance upon the United States. Greatly fearing communism and Soviet and Chinese influence in the Arabian peninsula, Saudi Arabia looks to the United States as its mainstay against communism in the Middle East.

But the Saudis are caught in a dilemma. It is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for them to accommodate the United States while the United States provides the money and arms which enable Israel to occupy Arab lands. Further—and this is the heart of the matter—King Faisal feels a special responsibility—indeed a stewardship—for the holy places of Islam. Saudi Arabia is the most orthodox of Muslim societies: the holy city of Mecca is within its territory, and the Kingdom uses the Koran as its Constitution. Second only to Mecca in sanctity to Muslims is Jerusalem, where the Dome of the Rock is located, scarcely a hundred yards from the Wailing Wall, which is Judaism's holiest site, and within a half-mile of the Christian shrine, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

As a city sacred to three religions, Jerusalem warrants a special status. Under the original United Nations partition plan of 1947—to which the United States subscribed, and which, to my knowledge, it has never repudiated—Jerusalem was to be a "corpus separatum under a special international regime." After Israel annexed the old city of Jerusalem in 1967, the United Nations General Assembly condemned the action, on July 4, 1967, by a vote of 99 to 0, and then condemned it again on two subsequent occasions.

In a world without effective international law, sovereign nations are often required to choose between justice and self-interest. A fair solution for Jerusalem, however, as indeed of the Arab-Israel conflict as a whole, requires no such choice,

although uncritical supporters of Israeli policy have insisted that it does. The choice for the United States, they say, is one between Israeli democracy and Arab oil, between high morality—as they would have it—and the crassest greed. In fact, the withdrawal of Israel to her approximate borders of 1967 and the internationalization of Jerusalem would be wholly consistent with the principle of the self-determination of peoples, an international principle to which we have always professed to subscribe and one which is also central to the United Nations Charter.

An Arab-Israeli settlement will not put an end to the energy crisis. Nor could it be counted upon to bring about an immediate substantial reduction of oil prices. It would, however, eliminate the major irritant in relations between the United States and the Arab states—especially Saudi Arabia—and in so doing create a much improved environment for negotiations on oil supply and prices. A settlement making just provision for the old city of Jerusalem and for the other occupied territories would greatly increase the political influence of Saudi Arabia, and therefore its weight as a force for moderation within OPEC. Saudi Arabia would be liberated, in effect, to do what King Faisal and his ministers want very much to do: co-operate to keep the West, and especially the United States on which Saudi Arabia relies, prosperous and strong.

Such an approach would not constitute a "sellout" of Israel. Quite the contrary, it calls upon Israel to do nothing more than she ought to do anyway, even if there were not a drop of oil in the Middle East. Indeed it would be to Israel's advantage—probably her salvation—because there can be no lasting security for that small, beleaguered community without a settlement, and there can be no settlement without withdrawal. For the United States the occasion—if we rise to it—is one of those rare and happy ones in which justice and self-interest coincide.

Unfortunately, neither the Israelis nor their uncritical supporters in our Congress and in our media have appreciated what is at stake, and the enormous distortion of American interests in our present course. Endlessly pressing the United States for money and arms—and invariably getting all and more than she asks—Israel makes bad use of a good friend. Unlike the Saudis, the Israelis seem not to recognize that if the United

States is gravely weakened, they themselves can hardly hope to survive.

For these reasons it has become incumbent upon the United States—working with the Soviet Union through the United Nations—to take the decisive lead in bringing the quarter century of crisis in the Middle East to a prompt and equitable solution. The general outlines of such a solution are clear and even obvious: explicit acknowledgement of Israel's right to exist by the Arabs, including the Palestinians; Israeli withdrawal to the approximate borders of 1967, with United Nations forces patrolling demilitarized zones on both sides of Israel's borders; self-determination for the Palestinian people of the West Bank, either as an independent state or in some form of confederation with Jordan, according to their own wishes; a special status for the old city of Jerusalem, providing equal and uninhibited access for members of all faiths; and a general great power guarantee of the settlement and its terms, under the auspices of the United Nations, reinforced by a direct American treaty guarantee of Israel's independence and territory. On the basis of unofficial soundings, there is reason to believe that the Soviet Union would be prepared to join in such a settlement, including the guarantee of Israel.

A solution in the Middle East is the key to a resolution of the mounting world economic and political crisis. Although it cannot be predicted with certainty, there is good reason to believe that Israel's withdrawal from old Jerusalem and the West Bank will lead to a significant lowering of oil prices, giving the West and others the time they so desperately need to adjust to the new world energy situation. There is even better reason to believe that the failure to achieve a solution will bring a new war, a new oil boycott, and possible consequences therefrom ranging from another Great Depression to Armageddon itself.

To state the matter with simple candor: The United States has done as much for Israel as one nation can do for another—we, and we alone, have made it possible for Israel to exist as a state. Surely it is not too much to ask in return that Israel give up East Jerusalem and the West Bank, as the necessary means of breaking a chain of events which threatens us all with ruin.

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US Presidential determination permitting the sale of wheat and rice to Syria as being consonant with the national interests of the US¹⁵²

Washington, November 4, 1974

Presidential Determination No. 75-7

Finding and Determination—Syria

Memorandum for the Secretary of State;
the Secretary of Agriculture

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington, November 4, 1974.

Pursuant to the authority vested in me under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (hereinafter "the Act"), I hereby:

(a) Find, pursuant to Section 103 (d) (3) of the Act, that the making of an agreement with the Government of Syria for the sale, under Title I of the Act, of 75 thousand metric tons of wheat and 25 thousand metric tons of rice is in the national interest of the United States; and

(b) Determine and certify, pursuant to Section 410 of the Act and Section 620 (e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, that, in the event it may be applicable, it is in the national interest of the United States to waive the prohibitions contained in those sections against assistance under Title I of the Act for the sale to Syria of 75 thousand metric tons of wheat and 25 thousand metric tons of rice.

[signed:] Gerald R. Ford

Statement of Reasons That Sales under Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as Amended (Pub. L. 480), to Syria are in the National Interest.

Syria is a key to our efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Our success will depend in part on Syrian confidence in our intention to develop a broad and constructive bilateral relationship with that country. A program for concessional sales of agricultural commodities to Syria will constitute a tangible demonstration of our intended role in that regard.

In response to current Syrian needs, it is proposed to export to that country 75 thousand metric

¹⁵² *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXII, 1854 (January 6, 1975), p. 24.

tons of wheat and 25 thousand metric tons of rice financed under Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (Pub. L. 480). This amount is based on Syria's needs for not more than one fiscal year.

In order to enter into an agreement with the Government of Syria for such a sale under Title I, it is necessary that the President find and determine that such sales would be in the national interest of the United States. Section 103(d)(3) of Pub. L. 480 prohibits the sale of agricultural commodities under Title I of the Act to any nation which sells or furnishes or permits ships or aircraft under its registry to transport to or from Cuba or North Vietnam any equipment, materials, or commodities (so long as those countries are governed by Communist regimes). However, if such activities are limited to the furnishing, selling, or selling and transporting to Cuba medical supplies, non-strategic agricultural or food commodities, sales agreements may be made if the President finds they are in the national interest of the United States.

Although Syria has been trading with Cuba in recent years, our information indicates that it has not traded with North Vietnam. Syrian ships or aircraft have not called at Cuba or North Vietnam. The best information available indicates that current Syrian trade with Cuba is limited to non-strategic agricultural commodities within the meaning of Section 103(d)(3).

Section 410 applies to assistance under Title I of Pub. L. 480 the prohibitions contained in Section 620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, relating to naturalization [sic] or expropriation of property owned by Americans; the prohibitions of Section 620(e), however, may be waived by the President if he determines and certifies that such a waiver is important to the national interest of the United States. There are several potential claims involving property rights and interests of Americans in Syria which might make Section 410 applicable to Syria, and these will be the subject of separate negotiations with Syria.

The considerations noted above, however, make the proposed sale important to the national interest of the United States notwithstanding the the prohibitions contained in Sections 103(d)(3) and 410 of Pub. L. 480.

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**Statement by US Senator Jackson (Dem.)
condemning PLO participation at the UN¹⁵³**

New York, November 4, 1974

The UN General Assembly, retreating from every principle the United Nations was created to uphold, has voted to allow the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in UN debate as the "representative of the Palestinian people."

The crimes against humanity which have become the bloody hallmarks of the PLO deserve the strongest possible rebuke from the international community.

We cannot be silent while the PLO is permitted to terrorize its way into the United Nations.

This irresponsible decision deals a blow to the delicate ongoing negotiations in the Middle East, and dims the already pale prospects for achieving progress toward peace. It encourages terrorists and would-be terrorists in every corner of the world who seek "recognition" through kidnapping, hijacking, and murder. And it threatens to deliver the Palestinian Arabs into the hands of a group of criminals bankrolled by callous Arab governments.

There is no question that any genuine and stable peace in the Middle East must include a just and humanitarian resolution of the legitimate claims of the Palestinian Arabs. They themselves must have a voice in working out their future.

Thousands of Palestinian Arabs on the West Bank have shown their determination to keep borders open and to maintain friendly relations with their neighbors, both Arabs and Jews. I can imagine no greater insult to the Palestinian Arabs, no greater slap at their hopes to lead decent normal lives, than to have foisted upon them by the UN a murderous band which represents no one but itself, is responsible to no one but itself, and has no program other than bloodshed and brutality.

The PLO has never gained grass-roots support among the Palestinian Arabs. It is significant that Palestinian Arabs who have opted for co-operation with Israelis—or even simple coexistence—make up a high proportion of PLO victims.

¹⁵³ Made at a public rally at the UN building; text supplied, on request, by Senator Jackson.

The people of Israel have offered the world community an outstanding example of high morale and steadfast resistance to PLO terror. It is the United Nations which has succumbed.

The dangerous UN precedent poisons the atmosphere for constructive peace negotiations. Capitulation to terrorist blackmail can only lead to more terror and violence.

If the United States is to play a positive role in promoting peace in the Middle East, our government must persist in rejecting any cowardly embrace of the PLO.

We need a new beginning in the Middle East, and an organization born of terror and sustained only by terror has no place in it.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of Foreign Minister Kimura of Japan (excerpts)¹⁵⁴

Cairo, November 9, 1974

1. At the invitation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt Mr. Ismail Fahmy, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan Mr. Toshio Kimura visited the Arab Republic of Egypt from 7 to 9 November, 1974.

3. The two Foreign Ministers agreed that the realization of a just and durable peace in the Middle East through the prompt and complete implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 was essential to world peace.

In this connection, Foreign Minister Fahmy explained the position of the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt that in order to bring about a just and durable peace in the Middle East, it was indispensable to obtain the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied in the 1967 war as well as the full restoration of the national rights of the Palestinians. In this regard, he expressed the firm will of the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt to continue to seek a peaceful solution of the Middle East problem.

Foreign Minister Kimura expressed his understanding to this Egyptian position and reaffirmed the principles of the Japanese Government as stated in its statement issued on November 22, 1973,¹⁵⁵ which were as follows:

(a) The inadmissibility of acquisition and occupation of any territories by use of force;

(b) The withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied in the 1967 war;

(c) The respect for the integrity and security of territories of all countries in the area and the need of guarantees to that end; and

(d) The recognition of and respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the charter of the United Nations in bringing about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Foreign Minister Kimura stated that the Government of Japan pays high tribute to the strenuous efforts made by President Sadat to achieve a just and durable peace in the Middle East and expressed the hope that such efforts should bear fruit in the earliest possible future.

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Statement by Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping of China welcoming recent developments in the Middle East¹⁵⁶

Peking, November 11, 1974

The situation in the Middle East is most heartening. During the Middle East war of October last year, the Arab armymen and civilians and the Palestinian people rose in a courageous fight and brought about an excellent situation. The Arab countries and peoples used oil as a weapon to deal a heavy blow at Zionism and big-power hegemonism. This had a very far-reaching significance and effect in advancing the just struggles waged bravely by the Third World peoples to defend their state sovereignty and national resources. The 7th Arab Summit Conference held

¹⁵⁵ Doc. 200 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹⁵⁶ Excerpted from the partial English text of a speech given at a dinner in honour of visiting President Rubayyi Ali of South Yemen, *Peking Review*, XVII, 47 (November 22, 1974), p. 6.

¹⁵⁴ Excerpted from the English text supplied, on request, by the Japanese embassy, Beirut.

in Rabat recently once again demonstrated the Arab countries' firm will and determination to unite as one and fight shoulder to shoulder against their enemy. We warmly hail the important achievements of this conference. The Arab nation is a great nation with a glorious tradition of struggle. The hundred million Arab people including the Palestinian people, uniting themselves and waging an unrelenting struggle for the recovery of lost territories and national rights, will eventually be victorious.

The further the two superpowers decline, the more frenziedly they will contend with each other for world hegemony and the more they will intensify their aggression and plunder against other countries, the Third World in particular. The superpower that flaunts the signboard of "socialism" and says one thing but does another is particularly despicable and vicious. The fundamental cause of the intranquillity in the world, in the Middle East and in the Indian Ocean is the fierce contention between the superpowers and their scheming and trouble-making. The superpowers are the biggest international exploiters and oppressors of today and the source of a new world war. The so-called "detente" they are playing up is meant to deceive people and cover up their aggressive nature and the truth of their war preparations. We must not relax our vigilance.

The Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly stand by the Palestinian and other Arab peoples and resolutely support them in their just struggle for the recovery of lost territories and national rights. We are convinced that, although the road of their struggle will be tortuous, the Arab people including the Palestinian people, who have been tested and tempered in wars, will surely surmount all difficulties and obstacles and win new and still greater victories.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Libya of Foreign Minister Soares of Portugal (excerpts)¹⁵⁷

Tripoli, November 12, 1974

At the invitation of the Libyan Arab Republic Dr. Mario Soares, Foreign Minister of Portugal, paid an official visit to the Libyan Arab Republic accompanied by a high-level delegation in the period from Shawwal 25, 1394 AH, corresponding to November 9, 1974 AD, to Shawwal 28, 1394 AH, corresponding to November 12, 1974 AD.

The Libyan Arab delegation stressed that the Palestinian problem was that of the Palestinian people which had been ejected from its homes and expelled from its land and that peace in the area of the Middle East will not prevail before this problem is solved by the return of the Palestinian people to its homeland.

The Portuguese delegation expressed its support of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people and its right to self-determination under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

In this connection the Libyan Arab side expressed its appreciation for the recent Portuguese stand in the United Nations and its support of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Syria of Prime Minister Strougal of Czechoslovakia (excerpts)¹⁵⁸

Damascus, November 14, 1974

In response to the invitation of the Prime Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic, Mr. Mahmud Ayyubi, Mr. Lubomir Strougal, Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia, at the

¹⁵⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Fajr al-Jadid* (Tripoli), November 13, 1974.

¹⁵⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Damascus), November 15, 1974.

head of a government delegation paid an official friendly visit to the Syrian Arab Republic November 11–14, 1974.

The two prime ministers studied with deep concern the tense situation prevailing in the Middle East due to Israel's persistent implementation of an aggressive expansionist policy aimed at frustrating the international efforts and moves towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region. They expressed their conviction that this policy which Israel stubbornly follows may lead to a complete explosion in the Middle East which in turn will threaten international security and peace.

The two sides declared the firm and basic stand of their two countries that the achievement of a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East is only possible through the complete withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied territories and guarantee of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people including the right to self-determination in its territory and homeland. They expressed their conviction that the disengagement agreements can only be considered a first step towards a just and lasting solution which must be followed by unceasing action to implement Security Council Resolution 338 calling for the complete withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Arab territories and the restoration of its national rights to the Palestinian Arab people within the framework of the Geneva Middle East peace conference.

The two sides expressed their deep concern at Israel's continued violation of international agreements and her violation of human rights. They especially condemn Israel's audacity in completely destroying the town of Quneitra in a premeditated and planned fashion before she was compelled to withdraw.

The Syrian Arab and Czechoslovak sides attached great importance to the resolutions of the recent Arab summit conference in Rabat. They declared that these resolutions support the efforts aimed at finding a just and lasting solution to the Middle East problem. They expressed their satisfaction with the resolution inviting the Palestine Liberation Organization to take part in the debate on the Palestine question in the UN General Assembly in its capacity as the sole legitimate

representative of the Palestinian people. They expressed their hope that the UN General Assembly in its current twenty-ninth session would adopt a constructive resolution recognizing the national existence of the Palestinian people and affirming its right to self-determination in its national territory.

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Press conference statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger expressing optimism despite the current tension in the Middle East and commenting on the role of the PLO in any negotiations¹⁵⁹

Washington, November 15, 1974

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to the difficulties that may arise, before you get into the questions on the trip I would like to ask what your assessment is of the possibility of an outbreak of warfare in the Middle East now, in view of a spate of reports yesterday and today from the area about possible preemptive Israeli attacks, the unloading of huge amounts of Soviet armaments in Syria, the visits to the Golan Heights and that. Could you give us your opinion?

A. Obviously, we have seen these reports, and we are checking into them on an urgent basis. We cannot believe that any of the parties in the Middle East would resort to war under these circumstances.

We cannot believe that any major power would deliberately encourage war in a situation as serious and as potentially explosive as that in the Middle East. The United States would certainly oppose any idea that the problems of the Middle East can be solved by military action and will use its influence with all parties to prevent this from arising. It expects that all other countries that are in a position to do so would exercise a similar restraining influence.

So, we think that these reports are probably—if they are not exaggerated as to the facts, we do not believe that military actions are imminent.

¹⁵⁹ Excerpted from the transcript, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXI, 1850 (December 9, 1974), pp. 781–782, 783–784.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think it is inevitable that Israel is going to have to deal with Mr. Arafat and the PLO in subsequent negotiations now that a certain amount of recognition in stature has been given the organization by Rabat and by the General Assembly and, if so, under what conditions would it be possible for Israel to do this?

A. As you know, I expressed the view of the administration, which has not changed, that the proper negotiation, or the best negotiation for the future of the West Bank, was between Jordan and Israel,¹⁶⁰ and the United States had used its influence to bring about such a negotiation.

As to any other parties that might negotiate, this is entirely a decision for Israel and for any of the other parties that may be involved, and it is not a matter on which the United States will give advice as to the conditions in which such negotiations may be appropriate, if indeed it is appropriate.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your appraisal of the Arab and of the Israeli reactions to the fact that more than a month elapsed before General Brown apologized for his remarks at Duke and he was only mildly reprimanded by the President?

A. I frankly have no view as to what the Arab or Israeli reaction to this is. It is my understanding that the President expressed his opposition to the views as expressed by General Brown, and this certainly reflects the view of the administration.

We don't consider this a subject of foreign policy decisions, because, clearly, the administration's view has been repeatedly enunciated and has been in no way affected by any remarks that were made by any military leader.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said a moment ago that you couldn't believe—or words to that effect—that any

major power would deliberately encourage war in the Middle East?

A. That is correct.

Q. I assume you might mean the Soviet Union. I would like to ask whether you have any information or evidence to indicate that the Soviet Union might be encouraging war?

A. We have no evidence that the Soviet Union is encouraging war, and as I have said, we are using all our influence with both parties, and we are certainly calling to the attention of all other countries the importance of restraint in the Middle East.

Q. Is the Soviet Union using its influence in a positive direction, in your opinion, sir?

A. This recent flareup has only come to our attention in the last few hours, and it isn't clear to us yet what it means. I would warn against overexaggerating the imminence of any conflict there. But we are certainly calling it to the attention of the Soviet Union.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us a more thorough view of your current appraisal of the Middle East situation as the President and you are about to depart for a considerable period of time? Do you have any special anxiety that there will be a hiatus here during this period, when we are now at a stage of seeing considerable reports of imminent action? What is your basic view of the hazard here?

A. The President and I met with Secretary Schlesinger this morning, and we reviewed contingencies which might arise and mechanisms of how to deal with them if they should arise. I repeat, this is a normal precaution. We do not expect the contingencies to arise. We do not believe that prior to a meeting between the General Secretary [Leonid I. Brezhnev] and the President the Soviet Union would be encouraging military action in the Middle East, and we cannot believe that any of the parties in the Middle East would be so reckless as to engage in military action.

So, while we recognize that certain military precautions have been taken by both sides, and while there is always a risk that precautions could get out of hand, we do not think a war is likely. If it should occur, we have made contingency plans for dealing with it. Communications are of course very rapid, and we would deal with it on that basis.

¹⁶⁰ At a press conference on October 29, 1974, President Ford had said: "We of course feel that there must be movement toward settlement of the problems between Israel and Egypt on the one hand, between Israel and Jordan or the PLO on the other, and the problems between Israel and Syria in the other category" (*Department of State Bulletin*, LXXI, 1848 (November 25, 1974), p. 738). That the US attitude to the PLO had changed was denied on several occasions, among others by President Ford himself on November 14 (*Department of State Bulletin*, LXXI, 1850 (December 9, 1974), p. 789) and by Under Secretary of State Sisco on November 18 in an interview with the US Information Service. See also doc. 178 below.

Q. Mr. Secretary, also on the Middle East, does the United States detect any change or moderation in the statements made by Mr. Arafat representing the Palestinians? Does that make any difference as far as the United States is concerned? And also, what are your plans on traveling to the Middle East?

A. With respect to the speech itself, our reading of it is that it called for a state which really did not include the existence of Israel and therefore was dealing with a successor state, and we do not consider this a particularly moderate position.

With respect to my own plans, I have no plans now to go to the Middle East. This could change, but as I pointed out before, we think that this is now a period for quiet diplomacy, and I do not expect to return to the Middle East in the near future.

Q. Before, I noticed you used the past tense in referring to our preference—"was"—for negotiations between Israel and Jordan. Do you think in the current situation there is a live possibility of negotiating with Jordan?

A. It is my understanding that King Hussein has accepted the decisions of the Rabat summit to the effect that the PLO should be the principal negotiator on the West Bank,¹⁶¹ and this explains my reference to the past.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the Syrian Government indicated to you, as far as you know, its attitude toward an extension of the U.N. presence on the Golan Heights? And whether it has or hasn't, how much of any importance do you attach to its attitude toward that question that will soon be coming up?

A. The Syrian Government has not given us a formal answer as to the extension of UNDOF [United Nations Disengagement Observer Force] on the Golan Heights, and to the best of my knowledge, I do not believe that they have given a formal answer to anybody. They have, however, indicated on a number of occasions grave doubts about the extension of UNDOF, and if one were to quote the statements that they have made, one could construe them as an indication that they probably will not agree to the extension.

It is our view that failure to extend UNDOF would cast doubts on the viability of agreements that may be made in that area, and we therefore believe that the extension of UNDOF is important for the continuation of the negotiating process

and especially for negotiating prospects that may exist between Syria and Israel, and the failure to extend it would undoubtedly contribute to the tension in the area.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, without disclosing your contingency plans, we have been reading about alleged NSC [National Security Council] memos and so forth, foreseeing a possibility that the United States might go in this time if there was another Arab-Israeli conflict. Do you foresee any possibility?

A. Do I personally foresee any possibility?

Q. Yes, of the United States going into the Middle East war.

A. First of all, I don't foresee a Middle East war. Secondly, I don't confirm that there are any NSC contingency plans for the United States to go into an Arab-Israeli war. The U.S. attitude will be what it has been in previous wars, and our attitude is basically to avoid a conflict and to bring it to the most rapid conclusion possible if there should be one. But we believe there is every possibility of avoiding a conflict now, and therefore there is no sense speculating on what we might do.

But it is clear that the U.S. intentions, unless there should be other outside intervention, would be to confine its role to what it has been.

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Statement by Chairman Oftedal of the Foreign Policy Committee of Norway's Parliament stressing the necessity of a Middle East settlement acceptable to the Palestinians¹⁶²

Oslo, November 19, 1974

Norway will never—I repeat never—be able to support a Middle East policy which would entail the destruction of the state of Israel. But on the other hand the state of Israel can hardly be secure in the long term except in the context of a lasting

¹⁶¹ Doc. 308 below.

¹⁶² Statement made in the Norwegian Parliament; translated from the Norwegian text supplied, on request, by the Norwegian consulate in Beirut.

peace settlement. In my limited insight and judgment such a solution must also imply the acceptance of certain other realities in the Middle East. Israel's Arab neighbour states also have the right to guaranteed and secure borders. Equally, a solution must be found which can be accepted by those who have probably suffered most under the Middle East conflict these 25 years, namely the Palestinians.

It is not our business to dictate the solution of the profound problems in the tragic Middle East conflict. I stand by what I said in the foreign policy debate on November 20 last year, namely that any solution which could find acceptance among the directly involved parties, and which preferably also the powers would take responsibility for, would naturally be welcomed by us. But based on political realities we must, I think, also recognize that a peace settlement which does not do justice to all sides—to Israel and the neighbouring Arab states as well as to the Arab Palestinians—is doomed from the start. I certainly can see it no other way.

At an earlier stage, for example before the six day war or during Ambassador Jarring's peace efforts the following years, there might perhaps have been a theoretical possibility of Israel and the neighbouring Arab states finding a solution over the heads of the Palestinians. But even if such opportunities existed—which I personally doubt—I regard them today as having been lost. For every year that passes the Palestinian Arabs are emerging as a steadily more independent and powerful factor on the Arab side. However much the established Arab states may have desired it I do not think they would have been able to impose a particular solution on the Palestinians. I do not deny that the arrival of the Palestinians on the international political stage has further complicated the already difficult Middle East situation. But so far as I can judge the realities—whether I like them or not—I am unable to see any peaceful solution without the participation of the Palestinians. And I cannot see how such a solution could be just.

Norway's Middle East policy was formulated by then Prime Minister Borten in the UN four years ago. It says that conquest of territory by force is unacceptable, that all states in the area have the right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders, and that a just solution must be found for the Palestinian Arabs. Under four

successive governments the Borten doctrine has been the guide for Norway's neutral but all the same active and defined Middle East policy. Parliament could have intervened at any time and made the government follow a different course. That has never happened. I am convinced that it is in accordance with Borten's three-point policy that Norway—with important reservations—voted to give the PLO the opportunity to put forward the Palestinians' point of view during the Palestine debate this autumn.

This implies no approval of the terrorist activities of the Palestinian organizations, least of all those directed against innocent outsiders. I admit that the situation is difficult with the PLO refusing to accept Israel's existence while Israel in turn refuses to have anything to do with the PLO. But now that the PLO has been recognized by all the Arab countries, silent resignation in the face of the extreme attitudes of the parties can hardly lead to any other conclusion than that the Middle East conflict is insoluble, that a peaceful settlement is unattainable and that continued warfare is unavoidable. However, I would hope and believe that no responsible forces in the world would be satisfied with such mortally dangerous fatalism and defeatism.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to China of President Rubayyi Ali of South Yemen (excerpts)¹⁶³

Peking, November 20, 1974

His Excellency Salem Robaya Ali, Chairman of the Presidential Council of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, paid an official visit to the People's Republic of China from November 10 to 18, 1974 at the invitation of the Government of the People's Republic of China.

Both sides warmly praise the important victory won by the Arab and Palestinian people in the Fourth Middle East War against the Israeli aggressor. Uniting as one and using the oil weapon,

¹⁶³ Excerpted from the English text. *Peking Review*, XVII, 48 (November 29, 1974), pp. 10, 11.

the Arab countries have dealt a heavy blow at Zionism and imperialism. This struggle has a far-reaching significance and influence. Both sides warmly hail the important achievements of the 7th Arab Summit Conference held in Rabat.¹⁶⁴ They reiterate that the Israeli aggressor must withdraw from all occupied Arab territories and that the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people must be restored.

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Television interview statements by US Under-Secretary of State Sisco reacting to the growing recognition of the PLO¹⁶⁵

Washington, November 20, 1974

Valeriani. Mr. Sisco, you said on Monday in an interview to be published outside the country that the United States now regards the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the umbrella organization for all Palestinians. Now, that seems to go further than you've ever gone before.

Sisco. Dick, I think that was an unfortunate way to put it. Actually, what I was trying to reflect was that the Arabs consider the PLO as the umbrella organization. Now, let me make very clear that our policy is as stated by the President and the Secretary of State. We've accorded no recognition of any kind; our position remains unchanged.

I think some people have read something into that—I was really trying to state a fact as conceived by the Arabs, that the Arabs do conceive of the PLO as the umbrella organization.

Valeriani. You seem to be preparing the groundwork for bringing the PLO into the negotiations.

Sisco. No, I don't think that's the case, Dick. Again, I've got to underscore that our position remains unchanged. Let's look, for example, at the General Assembly for the moment. We had a major speech that was made by Arafat quite recently.¹⁶⁶ I found no openings in that speech.

As the Secretary of State said in his press conference last Friday, he hardly saw that as a moderate approach.¹⁶⁷ There was no, for example, explicit or implicit implication of giving up terrorism as a matter of policy. The proposal for a secular state would really have the effect of negating the existence of the State of Israel as we know it. So that, I think, in terms of that particular speech, I saw no opening.

Valeriani. But doesn't the decision by the Arab summit meeting in Rabat to allow the PLO to negotiate for all Palestinians in effect throw the negotiating process into deadlock?

Sisco. No, I don't think that we're at an impasse or at a deadlock. I'd be the first to admit that Rabat, I think, has been complicating to our effort. But, Dick, you were on this recent trip with the Secretary of State. The thing that struck me from this recent trip was that both sides were at great pains to emphasize that the doors of diplomacy remained open. Note, for example, the strong endorsement of the continuation of the Secretary's mission that came out of Cairo—likewise, in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.

I think the doors remain open, and I think that what we can expect over the coming weeks is a period of quiet diplomacy, largely within the confines of diplomatic channels; but our efforts are going to continue, and they're going to continue primarily because both sides want our efforts to continue.

¹⁶⁴ See doc. 308 below.

¹⁶⁵ Excerpted from the interview conducted by Richard Valeriani and Barbara Walters for NBC's "Today" show; *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXI, 1850 (December 9, 1974), p. 790.

¹⁶⁶ Doc. 9 above.

¹⁶⁷ Doc. 175 above.

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Statements by US Vice-Presidential nominee Rockefeller suggesting that the decision to negotiate with the PLO is Israel's¹⁶⁸

Washington, November 21, 1974

Q. All right. Next, what are your feelings about the current situation in the Middle East, and would you as President, without a mutual agreement with Israel, recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as the spokesman for the Palestinian people?

A. Again, it is like, if you will forgive me, the analogy of the oil depletion allowance. This is as somebody referred to in connection with me the tip of the iceberg. This problem is just part of the total, very complex problem. We cannot deal with problems with simplified headlines, or a half a minute on television, and have the American people understand the complexity. This is what I admire so about Henry Kissinger. He is working tediously with all of the elements involved.

Now, this situation has now come to a point where other possible solutions that might have taken place earlier were passed up, and now this has come to the confrontation which many people feared, which is should this organization be recognized. This is a very serious problem. It involves—

Q. What is your answer? What would your answer be?

A. As to what my position would be?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. I would have to talk with the Israelis about

how they feel and what are the possibilities of getting some solution. One of the problems, forgive me, Mr. Congressman, is that those of us who are in positions elected, or have importance and take positions on some issues, we can affect other people's opinions and their lives and make it very difficult to negotiate.

I might answer your question now, I don't know what the answer is.

Q. Governor, I think it has appeared very clearly in the press that the present leadership of the State of Israel does not recognize or would not recognize or would not deal with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

A. Not yet.

Q. And so I am asking you, if you had to face this question at this time, what would your answer be?

A. My answer would be I would sit down with the leaders of the Israeli Government and I would say, all right, here is the reality and how are we going to deal with it? If you will forgive me, sir, this happens to be their problem. This is not our problem. This is their problem. They live over there. These people were on their land, and they took the land.

Now, we have got problems. Do not misunderstand me. But, we cannot solve everybody's problems, and by making a pronouncement in this room as to what you would do or what I would do may not solve a problem. It may only exacerbate that problem and may make it more difficult for the countries involved to solve it. Therefore, I think I have a tremendous responsibility to use restraint.

Q. Governor, I think your position and my position are somewhat different. I think it is more our problem than you think it is.

A. Excuse me. If I might just comment on that. It is our problem in that it affects us, but we do not have the power to settle it.

¹⁶⁸ Statements made in response to questions by Representative Joshua Eilberg (Dem.), during confirmation hearings before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives; excerpted from the preliminary transcript, pp. 137-140. In response to pressure from the American Jewish Congress Rockefeller issued the following "correction" on November 30 (*New York Times*, December 1, 1974, p. 1):

In no portion of my reply did I intend to modify in any way the position of the President or the Secretary of State regarding the P.L.O., or to urge the State of Israel to negotiate with the P.L.O., an organization that has called for the elimination of the Jewish state.

Neither did I, in my statement, in any way intend to weaken the enduring commitment of the United States for a strong and independent Israel, which is, and has been, a cardinal principle of United States foreign policy—a policy which I have consistently and actively supported since the State of Israel was founded over a quarter of a century ago.

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Statement by Americans for Justice in the Middle East calling for US recognition of the PLO¹⁶⁹

Beirut, November 22, 1974

A durable peace in the Middle East depends on recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to lead a normal life in their homeland. Any attempt to end the Arab-Israeli conflict will fail if it does not provide a just solution to the problem of Palestinian statelessness. For as long as the Palestinian diaspora continues, stability in the area cannot be achieved and no peace is possible. Recent events in the Middle East emphasize the urgency of finding a solution.

As Americans engaged in educational, religious, and professional service and long-familiar with the problems of the Middle East, we are firmly convinced that this is a most opportune time for ending the conflict in this part of the world. The Palestinian people now have a widely-recognized representative, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which can speak on their behalf. Recognition of this organization will accord it the status that will enable these Palestinian representatives to act effectively and responsibly to help create a just peace for Israeli and Arab alike. The Palestine Liberation Organization deserves this recognition because:

1. It represents the widest spectrum of popular opinion among Palestinians.

2. It is the channel through which the Arab states, and now most other nations, have chosen to deal with the Palestinians.

3. It has assumed the political and social leadership of the Palestinians in their struggle for justice.

As Americans, we feel strongly that the United States should recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization. The reasons are clear: as a major power, the United States cannot ignore the Palestine Liberation leadership, which is widely accepted as an essential participant in the Middle East peace moves. Failure to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization critically limits

the ability of the United States as an even-handed mediator in the conflict between Arab and Israeli. Officially it has been the policy of the US to promote negotiation and dialogue between the combatants. In order to promote dialogue which can lead to peace between Arab and Israeli, the US, as the one power which can bring them together, must be in a position to deal with the Palestinians. This means recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

As Americans in the Middle East, we are compelled to speak out and state unequivocally that peace is possible. Ignoring the Palestinians has plunged the Middle East into four wars since 1948. There must not be a fifth.

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Statement by the Executive Committee of the Socialist party of France commenting on the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly and UNESCO regarding Palestinian national rights and Israel (excerpt)¹⁷⁰

Paris, November 23, 1974

A lasting peace will not be established in practice either by the disappearance of the state of Israel, which has the right to secure and recognized boundaries, or by refusing the Palestinians a country. The Socialist Party condemns manifestations of intolerance such as the one to which UNESCO inadmissibly subscribed and that which appeared in the resolution of November 23 of the United Nations Assembly, which resulted in encouraging the risks of confrontation between Israel and the Arab countries. The Socialist Party, on the basis of its links of friendship uniting it with the Israeli Labour Party, asks this party to neglect no opportunity of reaching through negotiation with all interested parties and in particular the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people a settlement which is satisfactory to all involved parties on the basis of resolution 242 of the United Nations.

¹⁶⁹ English text published as an advertisement in the *New York Times*, November 22, 1974. Americans for Justice in the Middle East (AJME) is a volunteer group established in 1967 with the bulk of its membership in the United States and the Arab World.

¹⁷⁰ Excerpted and translated from the partial French text, *Le Monde* (Paris), November 26, 1974, p. 4.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR by US President Ford (excerpts)¹⁷¹**Vladivostok, November 24, 1974**

In accordance with the previously announced agreement, a working meeting between the general secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union L. I. Brezhnev and the President of the United States of America Gerald R. Ford took place in the area of Vladivostok on November 23 and 24, 1974.

In the course of the exchange of views on the Middle East both sides expressed their concern with regard to the dangerous situation in that region. They reaffirmed their intention to make every effort to promote a solution of the key issues of a just and lasting peace in that area on the basis of the United Nations Resolution 338, with due account taken of the legitimate interests of all peoples of the area, including the Palestinian people, and respect for the right of all the states of the area to independent existence.

The sides believe that the Geneva conference should play an important part in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and should resume its work as soon as possible.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Syria of Prime Minister Sindermann of East Germany (excerpts)¹⁷²**Damascus, November 24, 1974**

The member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, Horst Sindermann, stayed in the SAR for an official friendship visit from 21 to 24 November 1974 at the invitation of the member of the National

and Regional Leadership of the Arab Socialist Baath Party and Chairman of the SAR Council of Ministers, Mahmoud al Ayyoubi.

Mahmoud al Ayyoubi informed Horst Sindermann about the difficult situation resulting from the persistent Israeli aggression, and about the SAR people's determination to overcome it. He listed the political, economic and social successes that have been scored in the process of fulfilling the decisions taken by the Conferences of the ASBP. Mahmoud al Ayyoubi explained the efforts the Syrian people and its leadership are making in the fulfilment of the economic plans in order to achieve further economic and social progress and strengthen the SAR's defence potential.

Horst Sindermann expressed the appreciation the people and the Government of the GDR have for the consistent resistance the SAR is putting up against the Israeli aggression. He appreciated the successes the Syrian people has scored under the leadership of its President, Hafez al Assad, in democratizing social life, in economic developments, in boosting the defence potential and in the struggle against the Israeli aggression, particularly after the Corrective Movement of 16 November 1970.

Horst Sindermann and Mahmoud al Ayyoubi discussed the tense situation in the Middle East and on the Syrian front in particular. They state that Israel's provocations, build-up of troops and renewed preparations for war against the SAR on the Golan front are creating a dangerous situation which threatens peace and security in this area and in the whole world.

Both sides declare that this dangerous policy is aimed at frustrating the efforts that are being made for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict on the basis of resolution 338 and other United Nations decisions. They set forth that the arrangement on the disengagement of troops, and other partial solutions, will remain limited in scope, and become ineffective, if talks do not take place shortly within the framework of the Geneva Middle East Conference between all the parties concerned in order to push through the fulfilment of resolution 338 and other UN decisions. The two major demands consist in the complete withdrawal of the Israeli troops from

¹⁷¹ Excerpted from the English text, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5763 (November 26, 1974), pp. 441, 442.

¹⁷² Excerpted from the English text, *Foreign Affairs Bulletin* (East Berlin), XIV, 34 (November 29, 1974), pp. 259-260.

all occupied Arab territories and in the guaranteeing of the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine.

The GDR and the SAR rate the decisions of the VIIth Summit Conference of the Arab Heads of State¹⁷³ highly, and stress that they constitute a positive and effective contribution to supporting the efforts being made for a just and lasting solution of the Middle East conflict.

Both sides express their gratification at the success the cause of the Arab people of Palestine has scored at the international level. They declare their conviction that the decisions UNO carried with regard to the Palestine problem by a great majority constitute an important stage along the road to solving the Middle East conflict and pushing through the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine. Both sides are of the opinion that international measures are required which make Israel fulfil the UN decisions and respect the will of the world public.

Horst Sindermann appreciated the SAR's principled policy of strengthening the solidarity of the Arab states and expanding and consolidating their cooperation with the states of the socialist community and other friendly countries in order to repel the Israeli aggression and Zionist ambitions.

Mahmoud al Ayyoubi said he valued the help and support the GDR had given the SAR so that she might resist the Israeli aggression and liberate all her occupied territories.

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Statement by General Secretary Brezhnev of the CPSU warning of the dangers of the Middle East situation and restating USSR support for the Arabs¹⁷⁴

Ulan Bator, November 26, 1974

The task of settling the Middle East conflict and the establishment of a lasting and just peace

in that important area has, without doubt, a direct bearing on ensuring the security of the Asian countries.

Meanwhile, far from improving, the situation in the Middle East is becoming ever more explosive. Contributing to this is the brazen, provocative policy of Israel, which is openly sabotaging a peaceful settlement, with obvious support from outside. The Soviet Union's point of view is well known: the only reliable road to lasting peace in the Middle East is the complete liberation of all Arab territories occupied in 1967, the implementation of the legitimate right of the Arab people of Palestine to create their own statehood and to self-determination, as well as reliable and authoritative guarantees of the security and independence of all the countries now drawn into the sphere of conflict.

All this can and must be achieved in the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference which was specially set up for this purpose by U.N. decision. Together with friendly Arab states, we come out for the earliest possible resumption of its work. We regard the decisions of the recent conference of the leaders of Arab countries in Rabat as very constructive and as strengthening the unity of the Arab world and the positions of the Arabs of Palestine.

To all whom it concerns, we state once again with the utmost clarity: the Soviet Union has been, is and will continue to be vitally interested in the earliest possible lasting and just peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

We shall work for this in contact and interaction with the fraternal socialist countries and with our Arab friends—with Egypt, Syria and Iraq, with the leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, with Algeria and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and in contact and interaction with other states displaying a sincere desire to make their contribution to the attainment of this goal, which is of such exceptional importance for universal peace.

¹⁷³ Doc. 308 below.

¹⁷⁴ Excerpted from the English text of a speech celebrating the 50th anniversary of the proclamation of the Mongolian People's Republic, *Soviet News* (London), no. 5764 (December 3, 1974), p. 457.

Reported press interview with Prime Minister Rabin of Israel warning of a difficult period for Israel while the US and Europe depend on Arab oil and stressing the need to encourage Egypt-US links (excerpts)¹⁷⁵

Tel Aviv, late November, 1974

Twenty-seven years ago we were fortunate and we had what Rabin calls an "opening in the sky" from a historical point of view. This was at a time when the USA and USSR (affected by the world-wide guilt over the holocaust) were working to put an end to British colonialism in this area. It was a unique combination of self-interest and bad conscience which created an international constellation making possible the creation of Israel. Only by understanding the influence which this international constellation had on achieving our national goal, can we understand the difficulties we are facing today as a result of another international constellation which is most uncomfortable for the state of Israel. Rabin does not use the word "serious", his emphasis is on "uncomfortable".

Israel must gain time

This constellation was created as a result of three factors:

—The conflicting interests of the big powers concerning the Middle East which remain serious despite détente. In Rabin's opinion this was the only subject upon which there was disagreement in Vladivostok.

—The decline of Europe because of its economic reliance on oil. Historians, Rabin says, will write in the future that the effect of the Yom Kippur war on the Free World in the political, economic and social fields, was disproportionate to the size of the military battle which took place in this area.

—The rise of Arab power in the world due to their oil and its returns. The purchase of 15% of the Daimler-Benz company is only a fragment of the whole picture. Mr. Rabin estimates that Arab investment in Europe and the US has risen to a total of 27 billion dollars.

This is the international situation and in Rabin's opinion we must realize that we do not have the power to change it. Therefore we must think how to extricate ourselves from this unfortunate constellation.

How do we do this? In Rabin's opinion it is possible to gain time, and this should be Israel's main aim. This could be a seven-year period which Mr. Rabin refers to as "seven lean years". Why this length of time and not another? Because this is the length of time the Free World needs to be able to give up its dependence on Arab oil. England and Scandinavia will become independent in six years; the US will decrease its reliance in 4–5 years. Israel not only needs to get through this period safely, but must also adapt its life style in accordance with the international situation. It needs to complete Jewish immigration from the USSR and adapt Israel's economic and life style to the needs of the new situation.

What particular steps should the government take in order to get safely through the lean years? Rabin says: "Since the Yom Kippur war there have been two political trends in our area, on the one hand the Syrian-Russian plan which aims at preventing overall settlement and separate negotiations for interim settlements, thus blocking US interests and gradually increasing Soviet control in the area. On the other hand, the American-Israeli-Jordanian-Egyptian trend believes that it is possible to advance towards peace through interim agreements thereby decreasing Soviet influence in the area. In the first round the second trend was successful, but at the Rabat summit the Syrian-Soviet line took ascendancy. Neutralizing Jordan has weakened Egypt's ability to follow the course it had chosen."

In Rabin's opinion our immediate interests lie in preventing Egypt from coming once more under Soviet influence. It is a fact that now it is no longer in the Syrian-Russian sphere of influence, Egypt has had its military supplies limited by the Soviet Union. As a result of this, the Egyptian war machine is weakened. Suppose we had adopted the hard line suggested by some Likud members, would not that have brought about a new joint Syrian-Egyptian war?

Syria will renew the war in 1975

It is clear to Rabin that Sadat is finding the

¹⁷⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Hebrew report of the interview conducted by Yoel Marcus, *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), December 3, 1974.

continuation of the stalemate difficult. He understands that by inviting Mr. Brezhnev to Cairo, Sadat wanted to hint to the Americans that, should there be no progress, he might change camps. We should prevent Sadat from switching to the Soviet camp from the American camp, believes Rabin. What do we gain from this? If war breaks out we shall be in a better situation from the point of view of timing, from the point of view of the size of the war and from the point of view of our relations with the US.

Although Mr. Rabin refused openly to state his expectations about the possibility of war, I understood from our conversation that the renewal of war by Syria in 1975 is a real possibility. In any case, Syria intends to use the military option. The question is, how will Syria go to war? Will Egypt join Syria in the preparation, the aim and in enthusiasm, or will she be unwillingly pushed into war, perhaps unprepared? If Syria initiates a war which Egypt is unenthusiastic about, we will have the possibility of fighting on only one front, at least during the first days which is the critical phase.

The question is, what price is Israel prepared to pay in order to keep Egypt out of the Russian camp. Rabin calls this an uncomfortable dilemma. We have six weeks to decide how, for a reasonable price, to make Egypt adhere to her current position.

"What is 'a reasonable price'?", I asked Rabin. Rabin's answer: "Another interim settlement with Egypt." Rabin thinks that tension between Israel and the US might be intensified concerning the form of the settlement. During the coming two years President Ford wants to be successful in the economic sphere. This means improving relations with the Arab states which are vital to him, under pressure from Europe, which is afraid of another oil embargo. We must tread warily in our relations with the US for the coming year. If we can get safely through 1975 to the beginning of 1976 then we can say that we have gained not only one year but two.

Optimism and caution about relations with the US

We must be very careful not to destroy our relations with the US. Mr. Rabin was outraged against those demanding the mobilization of American Jewry for certain aims. General Brown was one of those who were most sympathetic to Israel. If we continue to behave and talk in a way that has now become outdated his statement will

not be an isolated phenomenon. People here still do not understand the effect of changing the financing of parties in the US on "Jewish power". We should not forget that Jews are only 3% of the population. If non-Jews in the US find the image of Jewish power too strong and Jews find it too weak, we must be careful not to reverse this image. In spite of this, Mr. Rabin is optimistic about the US. He believes that we shall get further arms supplies, even if we have to struggle for them. What we get will be financed by the Americans. But we must also be cautious.

"I would not say that I am against a military solution."

What price are we prepared to pay? We shall be asked to reach another military settlement with Egypt. In this way Egypt seeks to circumvent the Rabat summit resolutions. This is not to say that the settlement will not have a political meaning. But such a meaning will be hidden, revealed to the Americans, not to us. How far were the Egyptians true to their commitments made to the Americans in the disengagement agreement? Rabin emphasizes that they carried out all the terms of the agreement. Concerning the Suez Canal, there was no commitment that it would be opened before another settlement was achieved. Our dilemma, Rabin says, is: do we stand by the principle of political talks only? Do we reject military settlement with its covert political associations? If we believe that we must gain a period of a few years, I would not say that I am against a military solution.

From Rabin's remarks I understood that the government will not reject in advance Egypt's demand for another round of talks on the military level, on condition that its practical meaning will be political. In this case, Rabin explains, the military position of Israel must not be basically changed. This means that:

1. Egypt shall not advance into the territory from which Israel is going to withdraw.

2. The passes in Sinai will remain under our control so that we can make minor territorial concessions in the south and in the north, but not in the centre.

3. The fulfilment of stage B will not, in any case, begin before the renewal of the UN force's mandate. This is in order to guarantee that no withdrawal will take place should we discover that Egypt and Syria do not intend to renew the mandate of the UN force.

4. We shall not agree to a renewal of the UN mandate for a six month period only, but for a longer period.

Mr. Rabin no longer speaks about a declaration of non-belligerency. He seems to feel that such a direct and public commitment is unrealistic in the present situation. But if political progress is achieved Egypt will be less interested in going to war.

Mr. Rabin is not worried by the PLO. It is an instrument in the inter-Arab struggle which is taking place under the shadow of the big powers. The PLO would not exist if certain Arab states decided that it was no longer serving their interests. We must prove that we have nothing to discuss with the PLO and that we do not intend to talk with it. Such an attitude might, during the coming year, bring Hussein back as a partner in a positive process of progress in negotiations.

Mr. Rabin is cautious in prophesying the future, and he is not ready to say what our chances of success are in pulling through the seven lean years. He speaks only of what we have to do: to recover, absorb immigrants, change our life style and struggle wisely in a difficult political situation. If we can make the seven years in peace, we can break out into the open. The main difficulty that the Prime Minister did not touch on is, of course, the fact that the other side also knows how critical those seven years are.

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Speech by Israel Defence Minister Peres to a closed meeting of Israeli military leaders stressing that any negotiations will take place from a position of Israeli strength (excerpts)¹⁷⁶

Early December, 1974

The extremism of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which has been endorsed by the United Nations, has trumped very many hands in the Arab world, and I should add that it has trumped just as many in Israel, in the military field in particular. It seems that after the Yom

Kippur War the Arabs got hold of the idea that Israel is actually either dying or collapsing, a weak creature having lost her military strength, her ability to hold together and her desire to defend herself, immersed in bitterness and distress. In fact Israel was compared to Jericho inasmuch as a few strong blasts of the trumpet could subdue and bring her to the brink of destruction.

I know of no other single factor that has done more to save the Middle East from war and Israel from disaster than the extraordinary achievements of the Israeli army, its general staff, its commanders and its reserve formations in all fields: remobilization, training, fortifications, manoeuvres, its new spirit and the ending of the sterile controversy affecting the standing armies in the eyes of its enemies. This, as much as any of the other difficulties, real or imaginary, that we have encountered, is what trumped the hands.

The two superpowers are playing a part in the present confrontation in the Middle East in all economic fields, essentially those of arms, money and political support. In this the Americans differ from the Russians on two aspects: the Russians are providing arms and support continuously, to an extent and at a speed America cannot hope to match. Secondly, the Russians are dealing with one party only, while the Americans are dealing with at least two parties. Both the Americans and the Russians want what they do not yet have and not only hold on to what they already have.

The principal key is Egypt. Since the Americans cannot, in fact, give Egypt what Russia gives her, they cannot give her what she needs. America is unable to supply Egypt with quantities of arms comparable to those supplied by the Russians (although the latter are not supplying arms at present) nor can it provide Egypt with the money to rebuild the Egyptian economy.

What America can offer Egypt, in my view, is what Kissinger is offering: not money or arms to replace the Russians, but to put her in a position where she no longer needs them. In fact what America is saying to Egypt is: We can help you to reach a situation in which you will no longer need to spend billions of dollars on arms, you will be able to save these billions and spend them on internal development and on consolidating Egypt's

¹⁷⁶ Excerpted and translated from the partial Hebrew text as published in *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), December 6, 1974.

international standing through, of course, an attempt to reach an agreement with Israel and, to a great extent, at the expense of Israel.

I admit that if we negotiate this winter it will not only be because we want to come to an agreement with Egypt, but because we want to maintain our close relations with the United States.

The claim that time is not on Israel's side is untrue and is very dangerous, for any one who says this is in fact suggesting that Israel should build the whole of her history on a military basis, that this is the basis of her existence as a state and that she must go to war continually. I believe that this is not true as regards the crux of the matter. Israel in 1974 is much stronger than she has ever been before. I cannot accept all this pessimism to the effect that we are marking time and that time is against us, so we must have negotiations because they are preferable to war and because, in the present situation in the Middle East, we are positively interested in maintaining a system of firm relations with the United States from which we have so much to ask.

To build our military strength we shall want not only arms but also money. With the Russians pouring such quantities of arms and money into the Arab world, we need help. I do not say that this forces us to accept what America dictates, but it certainly means that we must take account of it. It is better to tell the truth—we shall negotiate with Egypt to relieve the tension and because she is an important Arab country and also because, in America's view today, the Middle East means negotiations. While America is pursuing the course of peace, Russia, to my great regret, is following the course of stirring up the conflict. Therefore taking America into account does not conflict with our principal objective.

I hope that, as a result of these negotiations, we shall reach other settlements, but it is important that I should repeat that I cannot foresee, either in the winter or in the summer, this year or next, any event worth mentioning at either the military or the political level, that will put an end to Israel's difficulties and requirements. It is better to say to the people and the army: Gentlemen, let us prepare ourselves for a long, hard road; let our objective be understanding and peace, but at the same time let us ensure that we are able to hold out

in the face of the military threat, that we are not frightened of it and do not bow to it and that, if necessary, we can hold out and win. All this will take a long time, taking into consideration the great powers and the other difficulties. But today—and I have no doubt of this—we are better prepared than ever before, both psychologically and materially to pass through this stage, and I have no doubt that we shall come out of it stronger.

What is happening in Israel can best be described as a nationwide cultural revolution, even in the economic field and certainly in the military field. People have started to come to themselves and to seek the awareness and strength that has accumulated within them. In 1948 we had no state, we had no army, no Jewish people, and let us never forget that today we do have all of them.

We must certainly pursue a balanced policy of negotiations, a courageous policy characterized by military capability.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Iraq of Prime Minister Chirac of France (excerpts)¹⁷⁷

Baghdad, December 2, 1974

At the invitation of Mr. Saddam Hussein, Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council of the Republic of Iraq, Mr. Jacques Chirac, Prime Minister of the Republic of France, paid an official friendly visit to Iraq in the period November 30—December 2, 1974.

The two sides affirmed the importance of settling world problems by peaceful means in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, international law and treaties. The Iraqi side explained to the French side its deep concern in the critical conditions in the region and in the Gulf. Concerning especially the Middle East problem the two sides affirmed their opinions regarding this matter and declared their agreement on the necessity of the withdrawal of the Israeli forces

¹⁷⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), December 3, 1974.

from all the occupied territories to establish a just and lasting peace guaranteeing respect for the rights of the Palestinian people. In this connection the Iraqi side expressed its appreciation of the French position towards the Palestine question and towards all Arab problems.

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Statement by Prime Minister Moro of Italy outlining his government's attitude to the Middle East crisis¹⁷⁸

Rome, December 2, 1974

Tensions persist in the Middle East and have recently increased, in spite of the progress made, thanks to the activities of the American Secretary of State, in establishing a framework for negotiation within the United Nations system and in reaching agreement for military disengagement.

Thus, a new decisive effort is necessary to overcome the differing positions: firstly, a courageous contribution is needed from the parties directly involved, who must be convinced that it is in their real interests and to the advantage of all peoples in the area that a just peace be established through negotiation.

The object of this negotiation must be the application in its entirety of resolution 242. The decision of the Security Council lays down the principles for a settlement of the conflict, being able to assure all the countries in the area of the possibility of living peacefully alongside one another within secure and recognized borders. The recognition and certitude of being able to live within secure borders, must, in our opinion, be of value to the Arab states as much as it is to Israel, whose political and territorial integrity cannot be discussed.

The application of the principle of the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force constitutes a fundamental condition for peace.

The security of all the states in the area must be found not in military equilibrium, which is never

enough, but in political assent and in the conviction that coexistence between them is not only necessary but possible.

The other essential aspect of the Middle East crisis concerns the Palestinian people, which must not, in the end, be denied the possibility of deciding its own destiny. I have already had the occasion in 1970 to maintain that here it is a question of a problem of a political nature, it being given that one must recognize the Palestinians' right to a country. From this is derived the importance of the debate on the Palestine question in the United Nations; if it is inspired by justice and realism, indications useful for peace negotiations could ensue from it.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Yugoslavia of PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat (excerpts)¹⁷⁹

Belgrade, December 3, 1974

At the invitation of Džemal Bijedić, President of the Federal Executive Council, Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, paid an official visit to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from November 30 to December 3, 1974, at the head of a PLO delegation.

During the visit, President of the SFRY Josip Broz Tito received Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO Yasser Arafat. On this occasion a wide-ranging exchange of views was carried out concerning the current international situation, particularly developments in the Middle East situation and ways of settling the crisis in this region. Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO Yasser Arafat informed the President of the SFRY about the most recent developments in the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine to realize their legitimate national rights and conveyed the gratitude of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian people for the consistent support of the SFRY for the restoration of these rights.

¹⁷⁸ Made in a speech to the two chambers of the Italian parliament; translated from the partial French translation supplied, on request, by the Italian embassy in Beirut.

¹⁷⁹ Excerpted from the English text, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), no. 593 (December 20, 1974), pp. 15-16.

The talks took place in an atmosphere of friendship, trust and solidarity which has characterized the development of mutual relations.

During the discussion of the Middle East situation, the two sides noted that there was a constant threat to peace in the region and further afield because of the continued occupation of Arab territories and Israel's refusal to recognize the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine and also because of its threats and aggressive actions.

It was specially emphasized in the talks that the basic prerequisite for a lasting, just and comprehensive settlement of the Middle East crisis was Israel's withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and the restoration of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including the right to create their own state. Every delay in settling the Middle East crisis on these principles or attempt to impose a settlement without the participation of the Palestinian people would make the situation even more critical and would lead to a further escalation of the conflict.

The two sides expressed satisfaction over the decisions of the Seventh Conference of heads of state of Arab countries in Rabat¹⁸⁰ to recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate spokesman for the Arab people of Palestine, over the result of the 105-country vote to invite the PLO to participate in the UN General Assembly debate and the Assembly resolution on the Palestine question, including recognition of the observer status for the PLO in the United Nations. The two sides consider these resolutions to represent a new magnitude in the settlement of the Palestine question which requires all involved to adapt to these realities.

It was noted in the talks that the policy of non-alignment was playing an important role in supporting the just struggle of the Palestinian people and other Arab peoples. The unity and joint action of the non-aligned have become indispensable in present-day international relations and continued efforts to implement the decisions of the Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Algiers. Both sides also expressed the conviction that the international solidarity of the non-aligned countries, socialist countries, and progressive and

democratic forces in the entire world has made a decisive contribution to changing the present inequitable system of international political and economic relations and to solving international problems on the basis of the realization of the legitimate aspirations of peoples for freedom and independence.

Emphasizing the need for continued all-round moral and material support to the peoples and liberation movements which are still fighting for the liberation and independence of their countries, the two sides declared their willingness to help secure assistance for the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam for the consistent enforcement of the Paris accords on Vietnam and the establishment of peace in this region. They also reaffirmed their support for efforts to settle the Cyprus problem in line with the UN General Assembly resolution on safeguarding the independence, sovereignty and integrity of the non-aligned Republic of Cyprus.

The two sides were particularly pleased with the successes of the African peoples in their struggle against all forms of colonialism, and they sharply condemned the policy of racial discrimination and apartheid pursued by the racist regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia; they also declared their willingness to give all-round support for the struggle of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America against all forms of exploitation and domination.

Both sides stressed their resolve to continue promoting all-round cooperation and strengthening the ties of friendship and solidarity between the Yugoslav peoples and the Arab people of Palestine, and between the Palestine Liberation Organization and socio-political organizations and organs of the SFRY.

The government and peoples of non-aligned and socialist Yugoslavia, to the best of their ability and together with other non-aligned peace-loving countries, will make every effort to help bring about the restoration of the legitimate national rights of the Arab people of Palestine, basing their actions on the principles and consistent policy of the SFRY to provide support for the right of every nation to be free and independent and to decide on its own fate.

¹⁸⁰ Doc. 308 below.

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Press interview statements by Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran affirming his full support for the Arab cause¹⁸¹

Tehran, December 5, 1974

Q. It seems, sir, that the possibility of peace in the Middle East has started to dwindle from day to day. If tension returns to the Middle East and Arab-Israeli differences increase where will Iran stand?

A. The same stand as we have always taken: amity with our Arab friends.

Q. But it is evident that the Iranian attitude to the Arab-Israeli conflict has changed. Initially it was one of lack of interest, then at times it was positively inclined to Israel, then it came to favour the Arab point of view, then lately there has been enthusiasm for the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Iranian delegate to the United Nations has placed the blame for the present tense situation on the obduracy of Israel and her persistent disregarding of United Nations resolutions. Could your Majesty explain to us the reasons for Iran's attitude in the past and the reasons for Iran's present attitude?

A. I do not know when Iran's attitude was positive towards Israel—I do not recall anything like that. Since 1947 Iran has favoured all the resolutions adopted by the United Nations. There have been periods when we have not had friendly relations with certain Arab states; that is possible. But especially since 1967, after Israel occupied parts of Arab territory by war, we have followed a course allowing of no argument or compromise against the occupation of the territory of others by force. Israel has become an occupation power and in the Middle East this is a dangerous precedent which cannot be accepted. Our stand developed when the situation changed. We supported the Arab point of view because the Arabs fell victim to foreign occupation. Events have proven to the Arabs not only that Iran's policy was in support of their legitimate rights but also that the policy of some Arab states hostile to Iran was mistaken and without any justification whatsoever. When these states changed their policy they met from us full readiness to cooperate in all fields. A friendly attitude will inevitably be met by one more friendly.

This has been reflected in our attitude to the resolutions adopted by the Arab summit conferences. The resolution which recognizes the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people was natural and logical because it is the right of the Palestinians to be represented by a Palestinian organization.

Q. Although you supported the Jordanian point of view.

A. When my brother and friend King Hussein accepts that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people it is natural that I should also accept it. We are with, not against the logic of things. If we have been supporting the Arab stand clearly and forcefully it is because the Arab cause is a just cause.

Q. Jerusalem, sir. Jerusalem is just as much an Islamic responsibility as it is an Arab one. Israel is persistent in judaizing Jerusalem despite all the resolutions of the United Nations. As one of the most important Islamic leaders in the world what do you suggest or what do you intend to do to save the Holy City?

A. We will never accept a change in the status of Jerusalem. Iran presented a draft resolution in the Security Council in 1967 regarding Jerusalem. The US and all the Latin American states were prepared to vote for that resolution, but the inflexibility of one or two Arab states destroyed that draft in November 1967. If the Security Council had voted for that resolution our position now would have been better. The Arab states which at that time voted against now realize their mistake. We would have spared ourselves the feelings of distress at such a missed opportunity.

Q. The important thing is that Israel refuses to implement even those resolutions which the United Nations have voted for.

A. There is only one way about it. Either Israel accepts to implement the resolutions of the United Nations or resort must be made to war.

Q. Will a war involve the Islamic countries as well?

A. Naturally, it will be our war as well this time; we have no choice.¹⁸² Israel faces one of two

¹⁸¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text of the interview conducted by Salim Wazzi, *al-Hawadith* (Beirut), December 13, 1974, pp. 20-21.

¹⁸² The Iranian government later denied that the Shah had said this (*International Herald Tribune* (Paris), December 19, 1974). In a subsequent interview in *al-Ahram* (Cairo) December 27, 1974, the Shah said: "It seems to me that it has been misinterpreted. There is no mention of Iran participating in the fighting."

alternative solutions. Either she accepts to implement the resolutions of the United Nations through the Geneva conference or in other ways, or there is war.

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Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the Executive Committee of the National Council of Churches in the USA¹⁸³

New York, early December, 1974

An Affirmation of Hope for Peace in the Middle East

The Executive Committee of the National Council of Churches, meeting in New York during the second week in Advent 1974, observes with grave concern the recent developments affecting the life and destiny of the peoples of the Middle East. At the crisis deepens, we note the following disquieting developments:

a) increasing acceptance of the idea of an inevitable Mid-East war during the coming months;

b) acknowledgement of nuclear capability in the Middle East, and veiled threats of its use in future hostilities;

c) an escalating arms race;

d) continuation of attacks and reprisals in the on-going hostilities between Israel and the Palestinians.

The love of Christ constrains us to speak from the depth of our Christian conscience. We call upon the Arab nations, Israel, and the Palestinians to renounce their use of violence, and to engage actively in negotiation to achieve an equitable and lasting peace. In the crucial months ahead, when the balance between war and peace is so delicate, we feel strongly that movement toward meaningful negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians could provide a constructive alternative to war.

We call upon Israel and the Palestinians to recognize mutually the right of the other party to the same self-determination which each desires for itself. We affirm the right of Israel to exist

as a free nation within secure borders. We equally affirm the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and a national entity.

We urge our own government and the government of the Soviet Union to serve as partners on the path of peace, maintaining a posture from which they can carry on meaningful dialogue with Israel and the Arab states. Furthermore, we call upon the United States to develop more open contacts with the leadership of the Palestinians including the Palestine Liberation Organization, as a means of furthering prospects for peace.

As evidence of our deep concern, we ask our General Secretary to convene a forum, in which all Middle East concerns of the NCC and member communions may be discussed within a total strategy, to work toward the objectives mentioned above.

As we celebrate the coming of the Prince of Peace, we invite our member Churches and all Christians to pray for a just peace in the Middle East, so that the hope of Advent may become a reality for that troubled part of the world.

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Sentence passed by the Jerusalem District Court on Greek Catholic Archbishop Capucci of Jerusalem¹⁸⁴

December 9, 1974

The accused is an Archbishop, a distinguished and honoured status within the framework of the church, but, as has been pointed out by the distinguished Judge, Mr. Chaim Cohen, within the framework of the accused's appeal before him—in regard to the order to detain him until the end of the proceedings—‘the status of a man is first and foremost binding upon himself’.

This principle was violated by the accused atrociously, when he exploited his status in order to perpetrate the offences under which he stands convicted. Arms and sabotage materials, by their very nature and character, are not becoming the

¹⁸³ *The Church and the Jewish People Newsletter* (Geneva), no. 1/1975 (March, 1975), pp. 3-4.

¹⁸⁴ Included in UN doc. A/9989, Letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, December 18, 1974. Part of the charge sheet is doc. 146 above.

role of a minister of religion symbolizing the fear of God, the purity of nature and the love of mankind.

The accused also abused the hospitality he enjoyed in the State of Israel, when the Foreign Ministry responded to the request of the Vatican and granted him the freedom of movement from Israel and backwards without hindrance. This trust—which was also based on his high ecclesiastical status—he also abused, when he smuggled from Lebanon to Israel various tools of destruction as the agent of the terrorist organizations “el-Fatah” and “Black September”, knowing that they were intended for saboteurs who are trying to undermine the order of life in the State and to cause bloodshed and damage to property.

The accused overdid himself when, from the dock, he voiced his false contention that the charges brought against him are a result of a malicious frame-up.

The charges proved in the proceedings comprise, in our opinion, a grave danger to the security of the State, and the State Attorney justly emphasized that the large quantity of arms and sabotage materials found in the accused’s vehicle could have cost many victims and great damage to property.

Even if we were to believe that the acts were perpetrated because of an ideological background, the Israeli law cannot detract from the gravity of the perpetrations. But the truth is that the accused’s conviction in principles, preferring them to his own good and freedom, is not sincere. He apologizes, in his admissions, for his deeds, giving as an excuse the pressure brought upon him by Abu Firas. He also co-operated, during 10 days, with Israeli security officers to discover the identity of a man for whom the arms were intended. Acting, as instructed by security officers, he most probably did not think of his loyalty to the rights of the Palestinian nation but was guided by his anxiety for his own good and freedom.

Considering his clean past, his admission to the police, his co-operation during investigation, the punishment for each offence and all the circumstances of the incident, we find that the proper punishment is as follows:

1. As to the three offences under section 24 (A) of the Law of the Security of the State: within the framework of the first and second counts—12

years’ imprisonment each, and within the framework of the second count—five years’ imprisonment.

2. As to offences under section 66 (A) and (B) of the Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936, and the rendering of service to an unlawful association under regulation 85 of Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, we bring into consideration the suggestion made by the State Attorney and regard them as one act, although from a purely legal aspect.

In our opinion, this is not so. For each of these three acts the accused is sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment.

All the above periods of imprisonment will be concurrent so that the accused will be imprisoned for a total period of 12 years, beginning 8 August 1974, the date of his arrest.

The accused may appeal against this judgement within 45 days as from today.

Delivered in the presence of the accused, his lawyers Shehade and Mughrabi, State Attorney G. Bach and his Senior Assistant Mrs. Benish, this day 9 December 1974, 17.30 hours.

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Letter to US President Ford from US Senators deploring recent UN decisions regarding the PLO and calling for renewed commitment to Israel's security¹⁸⁵

Washington, December 9, 1974

Dear Mr. President:

In writing to you about recent developments in the Middle East, we wish to reaffirm the commitment to the survival and integrity of the State of Israel that has been the bipartisan basis of American policy over 26 years and under five administrations.

We believe that the prominence of the Palestine Liberation Organization at the Rabat conference and at the United Nations General Assembly poses a direct threat to American foreign policy which must be met vigorously and promptly. Mr. Arafat's own statements from the rostrum of the United Nations strip away any illusions about the values and mentality which dominate the PLO. His espousal of terrorism and his repeated calls for the destruction of Israel as a Jewish homeland must be resolutely opposed by the United States in order to make progress toward a genuine peace in the Middle East.

We are deeply disturbed by the United Nations vote to give recognition to the PLO and by the spectacle of western cynicism, apathy and disunity. The action of the General Assembly to limit Israel's right to reply is a serious departure from

the original principles of the United Nations. Moreover, the decision by UNESCO to withhold assistance to Israel is a shameful example of the transformation of that international humanitarian organization into a political weapon.

These recent events dramatize the need for the United States to take the lead in organizing our friends and allies to resist political and economic blackmail in the future. We do not believe that a policy of appeasement will be any more successful now than it proved to be in Europe in the 1930's because we confront an appetite which grows on what it is fed.

We therefore urge you to initiate a comprehensive and coordinated diplomatic response that will unite our friends and allies in meeting these new challenges to peace in the Middle East.

We urge that you reiterate our nation's longstanding commitment to Israel's security by a policy of continued military supplies and diplomatic and economic support. In doing so, you will be acting in the best interests of the United States and with the support of the Congress and the American people.

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Communiqué issued after a meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council (excerpts)¹⁸⁶

Brussels, December 13, 1974

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Brussels on 12th and 13th December, 1974. At the close of the year which marked the 25th Anniversary of the Alliance, Ministers noted with satisfaction that member countries remain firmly committed to the Alliance and that this had found solemn expression in the Ottawa Declaration.

8. Ministers expressed their concern about the situation in the Middle East which could have dangerous consequences for world peace and thus for the security of the members of the Alliance. They reaffirmed the overriding importance they

¹⁸⁵ Text supplied by Middle East Research and Information Project, Washington D.C. The letter was signed by 71 Senators (44 Democrats, 27 Republicans): Allen (Dem.), Baker (Rep.), Bayh (Dem.), Beall (Rep.), Bentsen (Dem.), Biden (Dem.), Brock (Rep.), Brooke (Rep.), Buckley (Dem.), Burdick (Dem.), Byrd, R.C. (Dem.), Cannon (Dem.), Case (Rep.), Chiles (Dem.), Church (Dem.), Clark (Dem.), Cook (Rep.), Cotton (Rep.), Cranston (Dem.), Dole (Rep.), Domenici (Rep.), Domenick (Rep.), Eagleton (Dem.), Fong (Rep.), Gravel (Dem.), Gurney (Rep.), Hart (Dem.), Hartke (Dem.), Haskell (Dem.), Hruska (Rep.), Huddleston (Dem.), Humphrey (Dem.), Inouye (Dem.), Jackson (Dem.), Javits (Rep.), Kennedy (Dem.), McGee (Dem.), McGovern (Dem.), McIntyre (Dem.), Magnuson (Dem.), Mathias (Rep.), Metcalf (Dem.), Metzenbaum (Dem.), Mondale (Dem.), Montoya (Dem.), Muskie (Dem.), Nelson (Dem.), Nunn (Dem.), Packwood (Rep.), Pastore (Dem.), Pearson (Rep.), Pell (Dem.), Percy (Rep.), Proxmire (Dem.), Randolph (Dem.), Ribicoff (Dem.), Roth (Rep.), Schweiker (Rep.), Scott, H. (Rep.), Sparkman (Dem.), Stafford (Rep.), Stevens (Rep.), Stevenson (Dem.), Symington (Dem.), Taft (Rep.), Talmadge (Dem.), Thurmond (Rep.), Tower (Rep.), Tunney (Dem.), Weicker (Rep.), Williams (Dem.).

¹⁸⁶ Excerpted from the English text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXII, 1854 (January 6, 1975), pp. 5-6, 7.

attach to fresh progress towards a just and lasting peace in this area. They likewise welcomed the contributions which Allied Governments continue to make to United Nations peace-keeping activities. Ministers noted the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared by the Permanent Council on their instructions. They found the instability in the area disquieting, warranting special vigilance on the part of the Allies. They invited the Permanent Council to continue consultations on this subject and to report further.

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Press interview statements by Minister of State Wischniewski of West Germany calling for recognition of the PLO as a political factor¹⁸⁷

Bonn, December 18, 1974

Q. What does the government say to Gerhard Schröder's¹⁸⁸ meeting with PLO chief Arafat?

A. As Minister of State, no comment; but personally I fully understand the attitude of the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. The PLO is a political factor of great importance for the solution of the Middle East conflict.

Q. Can the meeting also be justified to Israel?

A. It is also in Israel's interest if the possibility is exploited to tell Mr. Arafat that the Federal Republic stands by the existence and security of the state of Israel. Mr. Schröder, who has enough experience in foreign policy, is bound to have stated his opinion clearly with Israel in mind.

Q. If you were only a member of parliament would you have acted in the same way as Mr. Schröder?

A. I met Mr. Arafat in 1970 after the airplane hijacking. Yes, I would have done exactly as Mr. Schröder and spoken with him.

Q. And when will the Federal Republic recognize the PLO?

¹⁸⁷ Translated from the German text, *Bild* (Hamburg), December 19, 1974, p. 2.

¹⁸⁸ Gerhard Schröder, Chairman of the Federal Parliament's Foreign Relations Committee and Foreign Minister in the last CDU government, was on a visit to the Middle East at this time.

A. In the first place recognition is only accorded to states, but a Palestinian state seems quite possible to me. Then this question will naturally arise, although only in consultation with the EEC member states.

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Press interview statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger reviewing the results of détente with the USSR on Jewish emigration and the Middle East and discussing the current state of negotiations¹⁸⁹

Washington, December 18, 1974

Q. The Soviets have issued a statement that they are not going to make any guarantees about Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. Does this statement and its possible impact on the trade bill concern you?

A. Yes, it concerns me. Certainly there is no one in Washington who has not heard me warn about this for years. Without saying anything, without making any claims for it, we managed to increase Jewish emigration from 400 a year in 1968 to 35,000 before any of this debate started. We had managed to intercede quietly in behalf of a list of hardship cases, of which more than half were dealt with successfully. We never claimed a success; we never took credit for it. We never said this was a result of détente. We just encouraged it to happen. We have warned constantly not to make this an issue of state-to-state relations, because we were afraid it would lead to a formal confrontation and defeat the objective of promoting emigration. Despite our deep misgivings, we acquiesced when statements were made by some which implied that the Soviet Union had yielded to pressure, because we thought it was the result that was important, and we wanted to avoid a domestic debate that might have jeopardized the trade bill.

The issue of Jewish emigration is, above all, a human problem. There is no legal agreement we can make with the Soviet Union that we can

¹⁸⁹ Interview conducted by Kenneth Auchinloss, Edward Klein and Bruce van Voorst; excerpted from the text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXII, 1856 (January 20, 1975), pp. 58-59; the interview was conducted for *Newsweek*, December 30, 1974.

enforce. Whether the Soviet Union permits emigration depends on the importance they attach to their relationship with the United States and therefore on the whole context of the East-West relationship.

If we can maintain a Soviet commitment to détente, and if we can make clear that this is related to the emigration question, existing understandings will have a chance. But what we have had is, first, excessive claims. And now the Export-Import Bank bill has been encumbered with amendments that, to all practical purposes, virtually prevent loans of any substantial size to the Soviet Union.

Loans are more important to the Soviet Union than most-favored-nation status, and in this respect the Soviets are worse off now, after three years of détente and even after increased Jewish emigration, than they were to begin with. We cannot simply keep saying that the Soviets must pay something for détente, and then not provide anything from our side to give them an interest in its continuance.

Q. Do you see any signs that détente has led Moscow to play a more positive role in the Mideast?

A. The Middle East is a very complicated issue for them and for us. I do not believe evidence supports the proposition that the Soviet Union produced the 1973 war. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has not been prepared to risk its relationship to some of the Arab states for the sake of Middle East tranquillity. What this proves is that détente does not mean that the Soviet Union and we have become collaborators, but that we are partly rivals, partly ideologically incompatible, and partly edging toward cooperation. The Middle East has been an area where cooperation has been far from satisfactory.

Q. Will détente help in the next round in the Mideast?

A. Generally, yes, if all parties proceed with circumspection. Some of the participants in the Middle East conflict did not want an extremely active Soviet role. This was one inhibiting feature. The second is that a cooperative effort with the Soviet Union depends on the actual positions the Soviet Union takes. If the Soviet Union takes positions which are identical with one of the parties, then we are better off dealing with those parties directly.

Q. What would be the necessary condition before the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel could sit down together and talk?

A. It is impossible for the United States to recommend negotiation with the PLO until the PLO accepts the existence of Israel as a legitimate state. As long as the PLO proposals envisage, in one form or another, the destruction of Israel, we don't see much hope for negotiation with the PLO.

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Recommendation of the US Senate Committee on Appropriations that \$10 million be appropriated for "Palestine refugee assistance"¹⁹⁰

Washington, December 18, 1974

The Committee recommends that the sum of \$10,000,000 be appropriated for the purpose of providing refugee assistance to Palestinian refugees.

Refugees from Palestine now number over one and one-half million. Unlike many other refugees who have fled from their homelands in search of safety, the Palestinians have found no refuge.

Palestinians in exile continue in their search of peace and safety. Over the past 26 years, they have been caught up in the rivalries of nations in the Middle East. Too frequently have they been the pawns in the international political process. Three times they have seen their homes, schools and hospitals destroyed by the contending armies of the Middle East states.

Often neglected, seemingly in the backwaters of international concern, the Palestinian refugees have known no peace and have had little reason to hope. Their camps have become the focal point of seething discontent.

Now, however, the United States has the opportunity to encourage the emergence of new realities in the Middle East. In addition to the inadequate programs presently under consideration for rendering assistance to governments of the

¹⁹⁰ Excerpted from US Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *Further Continuing Appropriations, 1975*, report 1405 to accompany H.J. Res. 1178. 93rd Congress, 2nd session, 1974, pp. 4-5.

area, we feel there must be more tangible evidence of concern for the plight of the Palestinian refugees. The modest amount the Committee has recommended will be instrumental in convincing the Palestinians that they are not a forgotten people. It will advance the cause of peace in the Middle East.

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Television interview statements by President Giscard d'Estaing of France claiming a convergence of international opinion regarding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict¹⁹¹

Paris, December 20, 1974

André Fontaine: Has the Middle East question taken up a large part of the meeting of the Nine?

Giscard d'Estaing: At the meeting of the Nine we spoke of it. I spoke of it a great deal with Mr. Brezhnev and I spoke of it a great deal with Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger. Unfortunately, we probably do not have the time to speak of it this evening.

It is a subject on which I believe that at present there is a convergence of analyses on the part of a large number of countries in the world and one is in a situation close to knowing what solution should be applied. There is simply difficulty or inability to apply it, but the situation is not one in which there is divergence of analysis. The Soviet and French analysis of the Middle East situation is the same and with the American leaders our views on the final result are very close.

Jean Daniel: On this subject you could shed some interesting light. Do France's contacts with the PLO's Yasir Arafat—I saw his assistants in Beirut—seem to you to be able to allow a conclusion in the sense of a European-Arab dialogue which would not exclude, would not bring about the disappearance of the structure of the state of Israel and could make way for peace? Could France contribute to this?

A. France can contribute on the diplomatic level, France cannot contribute on the internal

level of the problems. It is certain that there are currently internal problems in the state of Israel concerning choice of policy or orientation, and we cannot contribute to the solution of these problems...

Daniel: The same exists within the Palestine resistance.

A. Without a doubt the same exists in the Palestine resistance, and there are problems concerning the internal policy of the United States on the same subject. The position we have taken and which seemed surprising and even shocking...

Daniel: It was surprising on the part of your government!

A. Why?

Daniel: It seemed surprising!

A. You want to say that you were agreeably surprised, isn't that it?

Daniel: As for as I'm concerned, I would have been satisfied if it were accompanied by an act of mediation between Israel and Palestine. I also think that this must take place. Why was it surprising. One can say it without polemics: let us take, for example, our interior minister, who has established, if I may say so, a record! He was for "Algérie française" and made a triumphal trip to Algeria. He was pro-Israeli and made contacts with the PLO in Paris! He was anti-communist and had a triumphant reception in Warsaw! This is very good, this is the law of politics, but I mean that this is why I am surprised. You must not be astonished when you surprise people, even for a good motive.

A. I will speak frankly. I have personally looked at this problem of the Middle East very closely from the time of my election to the presidency, for it's a problem in which we are very concerned emotionally, politically...

Georges Suffert: The whole world is involved.

A. Yes, but we are involved as much as those who are most involved. We have been present in that part of the world, a part of the French population is emotionally affected by it. We are involved and I have, since the beginning of this study, become aware that there was an aspect which had not been treated at all—the Palestinian problem, and that the fact of not treating it was making all the rest have no significance. For there was no agreement possible while the existence of one of three problems was ignored: there is the

¹⁹¹ Excerpted and translated from the French text supplied, on request, by the French embassy in Beirut.

Palestinian problem, the problem of the occupied Arab territories and the problem of Israeli security. All three must be dealt with, but to intend to deal with two only was quite unrealistic, and that is what we said. Initially this surprised and even shocked a certain sector of opinion, but I must say that currently, on the global level, the Soviets think as we do, most Europeans—in fact half the Europeans—think as we do, a large number of Arab countries think as we do, and, in the end, it is around this line of thought that, when the opportunity arises, an initiative must be taken.

Fontaine: When you speak of an initiative are you thinking of a French or a European initiative?

One of my principles, in the matter of foreign policy, is that one must not look for success. One must solve problems, not look for effect, that's no use at all. The problem must be solved. If a French initiative is more effective than any other, then it must be a French initiative. If, at a given time, a concerted joint initiative is best, it must be a concerted initiative. One must aim for a result in this problem. I repeat, I was surprised to see, in my conversations with Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko, and in my conversations with President Ford and Mr. Kissinger, that our analyses were very close.

Suffert: But in this period, the game of the two main actors remains a kind of incredible overarming around this little Golan frontier, and one can ask oneself if there is not a kind of hypocrisy from a certain aspect in what one or the other of them are saying concerning their behaviour; they are scattering matches and the means to light them.

Daniel: The matches are also often French.

A. Not on that frontier. But let us return to our summits.

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Press interview statements by US Secretary of State Kissinger discussing the Arab-Israel conflict in the context of Arab oil and financial policies and the possibility of US military action to secure oil supplies¹⁹²

Washington, December 23, 1974

Q. But all along it has seemed that the Saudis have taken the lead in saying they want to get the price of oil down and that has never happened. In fact, the joke is we can't take another cut in oil prices from the Saudis because we can't afford it.

A. I think that's true. I have always assessed the Saudi statements in the context of their positioning themselves in a general constellation of forces. In my opinion, they will not take the lead. But they will not oppose it.

Q. Who is likely to take the lead—or what producer nations?

A. It is my opinion that a reduction in prices cannot come from Iran alone, though its voice is important, given the powerful personality of the Shah.

Among the Arab countries, Algeria is important, Kuwait could be important; Syria, even though it's not an OPEC country, has a moral influence for political reasons. But it will not come, in my view, from Saudi Arabia.

Q. Do you think something could happen in the Arab-Israeli situation that could result in a reduction in oil prices?

A. Not really, I think that if the situation deteriorates there could be a reduction in supply. I don't believe it is wise for us to try to sell the Israeli concessions for a reduction in oil prices, because this would create the basis for pressures in the opposite direction during a stalemate. Everytime the OPEC countries want something from us politically, they could threaten to raise the prices again.

Q. So there's nothing tied to the Jerusalem problem or the refugee problem that would have anything to do with the price of oil?

A. No, it has never been raised.

¹⁹² Excerpted from the text, *Business Week* (New York), January 13, 1975, p. 69.

Q. Do you know if the Arabs are using their petrodollars to force a favorable resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict?

A. I don't think they've done it up to now. If we don't have consumer solidarity, that may happen eventually.

Q. There was some concern last month about the British pound.

A. I've seen these reports. They were denied. It is certainly an option they have. And that is one reason we are so determined to create institutions of financial solidarity; because if you have these institutions, then that sort of pressure will not be possible. The producers could not take on one currency then.

Q. Is it possible that we may have to engage in an emergency financial bail-out of Italy or Britain before the financial facility is in place?

A. Very possibly, in this sense, the proposed facility merely institutionalizes what will have to happen anyway, because if present trends continue, there will have to be a bail-out sooner or later. But it makes a lot of difference whether you bail somebody out in an emergency, and therefore enhance the sense of vulnerability and create conditions for a new emergency. Or whether having perceived the emergency, you can convey to the public that there is a structure that makes it possible to master your fate and to deal with difficulties institutionally.

Q. How do you rate the chances for another Arab-Israeli war in the spring?

A. In the absence of a political settlement, there is always the danger of another Arab-Israeli war. On the other hand, war is talked about much too loosely. Both sides lost grievously in the last war. Neither side really won. I think the readiness of either side to go to war is often exaggerated. I also believe that there is some possibility of political progress before the spring.

Q. Then you don't anticipate the possibility of another oil embargo soon?

A. Not unless there is a war.

Q. Well, what about after the spring?

A. I don't anticipate an oil embargo in the absence of war. I am not even sure of an oil embargo in the event of a war. It would now be a much more serious decision than it was the last

time. We're now engaged in rather delicate negotiations, and these still show promise, so why speculate about their failure while they're still in train?

Q. The Shah of Iran has indicated that in the next war he would be on the side of the Arabs.¹⁹³ Does this represent to you a shifting of forces over there?

A. I would have to analyze exactly what he said. In the past, the Shah maintained a rather neutral position. What he means by being on the side of the Arabs I would have to understand a little better. But obviously the trends in the Moslem world are in the direction of greater solidarity.

Q. Have the Israelis indicated to you a willingness to give back the oil lands in the Sinai they captured in the 1967 war?

A. I don't want to go into the details of any specific ideas the Israelis may have suggested, but they have indicated their willingness to make some further territorial withdrawals.

Q. One of the things we also hear from businessmen is that in the long run the only answer to the oil cartel is some sort of military action. Have you considered military action on oil?

A. Military action on oil prices?

Q. Yes.

A. A very dangerous course. We should have learned from Vietnam that it is easier to get into a war than to get out of it. I am not saying that there's no circumstance where we would not use force. But it is one thing to use it in the case of a dispute over price, it's another where there's some actual strangulation of the industrialized world.

Q. Do you worry about what the Soviets would do in the Middle East if there were any military action against the cartel?

A. I don't think this is a good thing to speculate about. Any President who would resort to military action in the Middle East without worrying what the Soviets would do would have to be reckless. The question is to what extent he would let himself be deterred by it. But you cannot say you would not consider what the Soviets would do. I want to make clear, however, that the use of force would be considered only in the gravest emergency.

¹⁹³ See doc. 190 above.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of Foreign Minister Fahmy of Egypt¹⁹⁴

Moscow, December 31, 1974

During a visit to Moscow of Isma'il Fahmi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Muhammad Abd al-Ghani al-Jamsi, War Minister, at the invitation of the Soviet leadership, issues of bilateral Soviet-Egyptian relations and the present international situation were examined. Special attention was given to the situation in the Middle East, including the question of the resumption of the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East. The Soviet Union and Egypt are firmly in favour of the Geneva conference resuming its work at an early date with the participation of all the interested sides, including the Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative of the Arab people of Palestine, and they will exert every effort in this direction. The sides believe that the conference is a suitable venue for examining all the aspects of a Middle East settlement and adopting appropriate decisions leading to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in that area. They are unanimous that the early resumption of the conference will be of positive importance in attaining these objectives. The talks, which passed in an atmosphere characteristic of the firm friendship between the two states and peoples, produced positive results.

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Section of the Annual Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross relating to the Middle East conflict in 1974¹⁹⁵

Geneva, 1974

MIDDLE EAST

For the seventh successive year, the ICRC rendered assistance to the civilian and military victims of the conflict between Israel and the

Arab countries. It sought to protect and assist prisoners of war, civilian internees and detainees and the civilian populations. To that end, it maintained delegations in Israel and the occupied territories, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. A number of humanitarian problems resulting from the October 1973 war having been settled, the number of its delegates in the field, which had risen to twenty-eight (plus six technicians from Geneva) on account of the conflict, was gradually reduced to nineteen by the end of 1974. These delegates are assisted in their daily tasks by a large staff of locally-recruited persons.

Generally speaking, apart from the question of prisoners of war, the October 1973 war did not have a major impact on the work of the ICRC delegates in the field, whether in Israel or in the neighbouring Arab countries.

A table summarizing the relief action conducted by the ICRC in the Middle East is given on page 62 of this Report.

CONFLICT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES

It will be recalled that the ICRC, having received numerous complaints of violations of the Geneva Conventions from the Parties to the conflict, had proposed, in identical notes to the three Governments concerned dated 12 December 1973, that joint commissions of enquiry should be set up in accordance with Article 52 of the First, Article 53 of the Second, Article 132 of the Third and Article 149 of the Fourth Conventions, in order that light might be objectively shed on the facts and further violations prevented.

On 11 March 1974, the Egyptian Government accepted the principle of the creation of a commission of enquiry but demanded, *inter alia*, that it should consist of neutral members, possibly designated by the ICRC, and that its activities should cover alleged violations committed since the war of 1967.

On 2 August, the Israeli Government in its turn signified its approval of the principle involved, but wished to restrict the field of activity of the commissions of enquiry to complaints made by the belligerents concerning allegations of violations of the Third Convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war.

¹⁹⁴ Broadcast by Moscow radio in Russian; English translation, *USSR and Third World* (London), V, 1 (November 25, 1974-January 5, 1975), p. 17.

¹⁹⁵ Excerpted from International Committee of the Red Cross, *Annual Report 1974* (Geneva, 1975), pp. 18-30.

No reply to the ICRC proposal was received from the Syrian Government.

Action on behalf of the wounded and sick

The evacuation of 1,636 wounded and sick from Suez Hospital to Cairo was completed on 23 January. Up to that date, 20 tons of relief supplies had been convoyed to Suez by ICRC delegates, who also visited the population of the town, encircled by Israeli forces, several times.

The ICRC continued to render assistance to prisoners of war held in Israel, the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. Its delegates visited them on several occasions and were given the opportunity to speak with them without witnesses.

Action on behalf of prisoners of war

In the course of those visits, the ICRC delegates brought books, games, food and cigarettes to the prisoners of war, dealt with their individual problems and needs and took charge of the forwarding of family mail.

ISRAEL

At the beginning of 1974, there were in Israel altogether 501 Arab prisoners of war, of whom 386 were Syrians, 99 Egyptians, 10 Iraqis and 6 Moroccans.

The delegates of the ICRC carried out 18 visits to these Syrian, Egyptian, Iraqi and Moroccan prisoners of war in their various places of detention. Reports on these visits were transmitted by the ICRC to the prisoners' own governments and to the Detaining Power.

Further captures of seven Syrians were made on 5 February, 8 April, 30 April and 9 May, while on 22 April a Syrian prisoner of war was released in the Golan Heights territory temporarily occupied after the October 1973 conflict. On the eve of the repatriation operations, at the beginning of June, there were thus altogether 392 Syrian prisoners of war in Israel.

SYRIA

In Syria, ICRC delegates visited the 68 Israeli prisoners of war, interned since the beginning of the October 1973 war, for the first time on 1 March 1974. On the previous day the ICRC had been notified by the Syrian authorities of the number and identity of the prisoners. In all, three visits were

made by the delegates to the able-bodied prisoners of war, and four to those in hospital. The ICRC delegates spoke with the prisoners without witnesses, but the Syrian authorities did not allow a medical delegate to visit the wounded. Reports on these visits were sent to the Syrian and Israeli authorities.

LEBANON

In Lebanon, two Israeli prisoners of war, captured on 8 April 1974, were detained until 8 June. A delegate of the ICRC visited them four times, and his reports were transmitted to the Israeli and Lebanese authorities.

REPATRIATIONS

Four repatriation operations, one at Kilometre 101 on the Cairo-Suez road and the other three on the road from El Qantara to Baluza in Sinai, carried out between 25 January and 25 February under the auspices of the ICRC, enabled 99 Egyptian prisoners of war captured after 22 November 1973 (when the earlier repatriations of Egyptian and Israeli prisoners of war had been concluded) to return to their country.

Later, in accordance with requests from the Syrian and Israeli authorities, the ICRC organized the repatriation in two stages of the wounded and able-bodied Syrian and Israeli prisoners of war. Three aircraft were used for these operations: a Boeing 747 B, a Fokker Friendship F-27 and a DC-6.

On 1 June, thirty-eight wounded prisoners of war were repatriated to their respective countries on board two aircraft, which took off simultaneously from Tel Aviv and Damascus. One brought twenty-five Syrian and one Moroccan prisoners of war back to Syria, while the other flew twelve Israeli prisoners of war back to Israel. Each group of wounded was escorted on the flight by an ICRC team consisting of a doctor, a nurse and a delegate.

On 6 June, the second phase of the operation was completed by the ICRC with the repatriation of 438 able-bodied prisoners of war by means of three aircraft.

Two aircraft took off from Tel Aviv for Damascus, one with 345 and the other with thirty-seven passengers, a total of 382 prisoners of war (367 Syrians, 10 Iraqis and five Moroccans). At the same moment a third aircraft left Damascus for Israel with fifty-six Israeli prisoners of war. Each

aircraft carried a delegate and a doctor.

A Syrian prisoner of war was captured later, on 16 August. He was twice visited by ICRC delegates and released on 2 October at Quneitra under ICRC auspices.

Search for mortal remains

Early in 1974, ICRC delegates took part in some of the many search operations conducted between the cease-fire lines separating the Israeli and Egyptian forces for the remains of Israeli soldiers killed in action during the October 1973 war.

In addition, during the first three months of 1974, repatriations of mortal remains were carried out under ICRC auspices on four separate occasions. Eighty-two bodies of soldiers killed in action were returned to Israel, and 112 to Egypt, in the course of these operations conducted between the cease-fire lines in Sinai.

A similar operation took place on 6 June, at Tel-Shams, close to the cease-fire lines between Syrian and Israeli forces, when sixteen bodies were returned to Israel and eight to Syria. On that occasion, the Israeli authorities handed over to the Syrian authorities, through the ICRC, a list containing the names of 309 Arab soldiers whose bodies had been identified and buried alongside 470 non-identified Arab soldiers in a cemetery, laid out by the Israeli authorities east of Quneitra in the stretch of territory since handed back to Syria.

On 27 October, the mortal remains of another Israeli soldier were brought back from Syria under the auspices of the ICRC.

Fourth Convention

ICRC action in occupied territories: No change having occurred in the position of principle taken by the Israeli authorities, consisting as will be recalled in leaving open the question of the applicability of the Fourth Convention of 1949 in occupied territories, the ICRC continued to exercise its activities on a pragmatic basis.

In consequence, the ICRC, while maintaining its own position with regard to the applicability of the Fourth Convention, endeavoured to ensure, as circumstances permitted, the fullest possible application of the Convention's provisions. In various fields the Israeli authorities granted facilities to the ICRC delegates which allowed them, as in the past, to take useful action in favour of the

victims of the conflict.

In certain cases, however, the ICRC came up against the position of principle adopted by Israel and could not obtain satisfaction.

CIVILIAN DETAINEES AND INTERNEES

ICRC delegates continued to carry out visits to some 2,700 Arab civilians from occupied territories and Arab countries, imprisoned in fourteen places of detention in Israel and in the occupied territories. The delegates visited the six prisons in the occupied territories once a month and the eight prisons in Israel every other month. The visits were the subject of reports which the ICRC sent to the Detaining Power and to the prisoners' own governments.

Although the Israeli authorities, in line with their position in the matter of the applicability of the Fourth Convention, did not consider themselves bound by the provisions of the Convention respecting notifications, they had agreed in 1973 to communicate as a general rule to the ICRC delegation, after eighteen days from their arrest by the army or the police, the names of subjects of an Arab country or an occupied territory. Such notifications may not for the present be transmitted to the governments of the countries of origin and are intended solely for the use of the ICRC and for the families of detainees.

ICRC delegates were allowed to visit security cases, at the end of the period of investigation, whether held in preventive custody, sentenced or administratively interned, as well as common law cases. As customary, they could speak with detainees without witnesses.

The delegates approached the Israeli authorities regarding various matters connected with detention conditions.

In the medical field, they distributed gifts such as dentures, artificial limbs, spectacles, etc.

They recommended the creation of additional workshops and the active development of secondary classes in places of detention and they continued to provide manuals, copy-books and pens for this purpose.

The Israeli authorities for their part complied to a large extent with the ICRC's recommendations.

The ICRC delegates continued their monthly distribution of parcels to those detainees who had received no family visits: in 1974 a total of 6,508 parcels were so distributed. This figure does

not include 2,431 parcels of fresh fruit distributed among all detainees from November onward.

As had been done in the past, the ICRC made transport arrangements to enable families to visit their relatives in prison. It organized and to a large extent paid for 620 voyages by bus and 188 by taxi for 29,375 relatives of detainees.

At the talks between Egyptians and Israelis at Kilometre 101, it had been agreed that a relatively high number of civilian detainees, whose homes were in the Nile Valley and Sinai, would be released, under ICRC auspices and repatriated to Egypt. These detainees were to have the option of taking their families and personal belongings with them. Each detainee, before deciding whether or not to accept the offer to go to the Nile Valley, was given the opportunity to speak in private with an ICRC delegate and to meet members of his family. In all, 168 detainees were released in this way, in the course of six operations carried out between 4 March and 1 July, twenty-five of them taking their families back with them. At the time of the first operation, two Israeli civilians imprisoned in Egypt were repatriated.

Three Syrian Druze civilians living in the occupied part of the Golan, who had been captured on 6 August by a Palestinian armed group and taken to Syria, were allowed to return to their homes in occupied territory under ICRC auspices.

In addition, ICRC delegates made arrangements to remove to neighbouring Arab countries a number of civilian detainees who had expressed of their own free will, in the presence of the delegates only, their desire to proceed to those countries.

It should be mentioned that although no cases occurred in 1974 that fell under the Fourth Convention, the head of the ICRC delegation asked to visit some Palestinian detainees. The Jordanian Government did not see its way to agree to that request.

REUNITING OF FAMILIES

The ICRC delegates continued their efforts to secure that members of families separated by the 1967 war might be reunited.

Arab Republic of Egypt and Gaza-Sinai: The family-reuniting operations, which had been temporarily suspended as a result of the October 1973 conflict, were resumed on 20 March. From that time they no longer took place on the Suez Canal but in the centre of the buffer zone and with the

co-operation of the United Nations Emergency Force.

Altogether, nineteen family-reuniting operations were arranged under ICRC auspices, permitting 111 persons coming from Egypt to rejoin their families in the occupied territories of Sinai and the Gaza Strip, and 330 persons from the occupied territories to be reunited with their families in Egypt.

In the course of those operations, a number of persons, authorized to visit relatives on one side or the other, also crossed the cease-fire lines for that purpose. Thus, 1,866 persons went from Sinai and the Gaza strip to Egypt and back again to the occupied territories, while 2,271 persons travelled and returned in the opposite directions.

Lebanon and occupied territories: In 1974 the ICRC made arrangements for the transfer, via Beirut, of eighteen persons from the Gaza Strip who wished to be reunited with their families settled in an Arab country which did not have a common frontier with Israel.

Syria and the Golan Heights: In 1974 two operations were arranged near Quneitra, under ICRC auspices, enabling thirty persons to be reunited with their families in occupied territory in the Golan heights.

Jordan and the occupied West Bank: As in previous years, the ICRC's action was confined to endorsing, on humanitarian grounds affecting specific families, applications which the competent Israeli authorities had not approved under the normal procedure—a procedure that covers the large majority of cases involving the reuniting of families in the occupied territories of the West Bank. Authorizations were granted to twelve out of the sixty-six cases submitted.

In view of this low result, renewed approaches were made by the ICRC to endeavour to increase the number of approvals; but the proportion of successful cases remained low considering the precarious situation of the families concerned.

STUDENT TRAVEL

Arab Republic of Egypt and Gaza-Sinai: Palestinian students and students from Sinai, registered with Egyptian universities and numbering 3,518, were authorized to join their families in Gaza and Sinai for the summer vacation or on completion of their studies. From 16 July to 5 August, in thirteen operations carried out under the auspices of the

ICRC through the United Nations buffer zone, they moved from Egypt to the occupied territories.

From 2 September onwards, the movement started in the opposite direction for students wishing to continue their studies and for new students. A total of 4,324 students were moved to Egypt in a series of thirteen operations lasting until 17 December.

It may be noted that compared with the previous year, there was an increase of approximately 35 per cent in the number of students who crossed the cease-fire lines between Israel and Egypt under ICRC auspices.

Algeria and the Gaza Strip: When the Algerian Government, just after the October 1973 conflict, offered scholarships to sixty Palestinian students from the Gaza Strip to enable them to attend university courses at Algiers, the ICRC made arrangements for the students selected by the Gaza Education Department to proceed via Amman and Cairo. The fifty-two students who had accepted Algeria's invitation travelled under ICRC auspices in two groups, thirty going on 6 March and twenty-two on 11 March.

For the summer vacation, forty-seven of these students returned to Gaza, joining groups of their fellows studying in Egypt for the trips in both directions.

Lebanon and the Gaza Strip: Notwithstanding ICRC approaches, fifty-six new students from Gaza, registered with various institutes of higher education in Beirut, did not obtain authorization from the Lebanese Government to go to Lebanon. Only a small number holding Jordanian passports were able to reach Beirut through Jordan.

Syria and the Gaza Strip: Arrangements were made by the ICRC for Palestinian students from Gaza, registered at Damascus University, to join their families for the summer vacation. The first operation took place on 15 July under ICRC auspices near Quneitra, enabling 85 students to reach their homes in Gaza. Five others who did not get through with that group had to proceed through Jordan and to cross Allenby Bridge in a second operation organized by the ICRC on 26 July.

On 19 August, eighty-seven of those students crossed the ceasefire lines between the Syrian and Israeli forces, under ICRC auspices, to return to Damascus.

NEW TERRITORIES TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR

Territory west of the Suez Canal: Delegates of the ICRC made five visits to the territory occupied by the Israeli army west of the Suez Canal, as a result of the October 1973 war, before it was handed back, in several stages, between 25 January and 21 February 1974, to Egypt. In the course of those visits, they examined to what extent the living conditions of the civilians who had stayed behind conformed with the Fourth Convention's provisions. A medical delegate speaking fluent Arabic took part in one of the visits. The findings of the delegates were recorded in detailed reports, the substance of which was communicated to the Powers concerned.

ICRC delegates also visited on two occasions the Norwegian, Czech, Bulgarian and Polish crews of the fourteen ships blocked in the Great Bitter Lake since 1967, in order to verify that they lacked nothing.

Golan Heights: It was only in March 1974 that the delegates of the ICRC were authorized to enter the territory newly occupied by Israeli troops on the Golan Heights as a result of the October 1973 war and later returned to Syria, between 14 and 15 June 1974. Permission for the delegates to enter this territory had been withheld by the Israeli authorities until such time as the Syrian authorities had granted authorization to the ICRC to visit the Israeli prisoners of war held in Syria.

The ICRC delegates visited this territory four times and met the civilian population, mostly of Druze allegiance, who had remained on the spot.

OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THE FOURTH CONVENTION

In the occupied territories, the ICRC's mission is to carry out a thorough and continuing appraisal of the situation of the civilian populations in the light of the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention. In every case where the protection and rights of civilians under the Convention are not assured or respected, the ICRC delegation endeavours to obtain that the Israeli authorities will remedy the situation so created.

In this context, the main problems encountered by the ICRC for which no satisfactory solutions have yet been found are those connected with expulsions and the destruction of dwellings ordered by the Israeli authorities under the heading of

repressive measures, in violation of Articles 49, 33 and 53 of the Fourth Convention.

While no person has been expelled, to the knowledge of the ICRC, from the occupied territories of Gaza and Sinai, it is known on the other hand that twelve West Bank Palestinians were compelled to leave their homes and seek refuge in an Arab country.

On 12 March, two inhabitants of the village of Halhoul in the district of Hebron were removed across the border to Jordan.

A similar measure was taken on 21 November against four schoolteachers in Ramallah and one in Jericho.

These persons were visited by an ICRC delegate in Jordan.

In addition, on 4 November, five persons were expelled and sent to Lebanon.

In each of these cases the ICRC delegation in Israel and the occupied territories approached the Israeli authorities, requesting that the persons expelled might be allowed to return to their families in the occupied territories.

The situation of the victims whose homes were destroyed by the Israeli army in the occupied territories was often aggravated by the arrest of one or more members of the family concerned, and such cases continued to be a source of concern for the ICRC, which holds that such destructions are contrary to the provisions of Articles 33 and 53 of the Fourth Convention.

In 1974, the ICRC delegates in Gaza were notified of 50 such cases, involving nearly 300 persons. In West Bank territory, thirty houses were destroyed and six bricked up, affecting more than 150 persons.

On several occasions, the delegation communicated its viewpoint to the Israeli authorities as to the principle of carrying out the destruction of houses and the deep concern it felt about such acts, and requested that steps should be taken to find homes for the victims.

In each case, the delegates made every effort to obtain that the Israeli Ministry of Social Welfare should either provide material aid for the homeless without delay, or should authorize the ICRC to supply them with tents and blankets immediately. In the majority of cases, the victims received in this way emergency relief allowing them to face the situation.

MEDICAL AND HEALTH SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN SINAI AND THE GAZA STRIP

From 3 March to 6 June, a medical delegate of the ICRC made a thorough survey of the medical and health situation of the population in Sinai and the Gaza Strip.

This mission was a sequel to two similar medical surveys conducted by the ICRC in 1971 and 1972.

The medical delegate first went to the Gaza Strip, where he visited six hospitals, all of which, except the last-mentioned, were under Israeli administration. The hospitals visited were the El Shifa, Nasr and Eye Hospitals at Gaza, the hospital at Khan Yunis, the Tuberculosis Hospital at El Breij and the Baptist Hospital at Gaza. He also made a round of the 16 dispensaries in service throughout the Gaza Strip and visited the Red Crescent and the Blood Bank.

In Sinai, the medical delegate went first to El Arish Hospital, the central clinic and the dental clinic. He then visited in turn nearly all the inhabited areas of the peninsula from north to south and saw how each of the three mobile clinics, and the fifteen or so infirmaries set up in various places, were operating.

The medical delegate's mission consisted in particular in making a survey of the measures adopted by the Occupying Power's health services to counter the shortage of medical and paramedical personnel and to remedy the deterioration, due to age, of equipment, medical facilities and hospital buildings.

The ICRC approached the Occupying Power with a view to the early solution of certain urgent problems and so that all necessary steps might be taken for improving the situation in line with the medical delegate's suggestions. As in the past, the latter's findings and recommendations, concerning in particular the improvement and modernization of certain hospitals, the development of the medical and public health infrastructure, the creation of infirmaries and the shortage of medical and nursing personnel, were incorporated in a report which was transmitted by the ICRC to the two Governments concerned.

After having studied the report, the Israeli Government communicated its views to the ICRC and informed it of the various improvements it intended to carry out. It was also agreed that a further visit by the ICRC would take place in 1975.

ACTION FOR HANDICAPPED PERSONS

In October 1974, the German Red Cross in the Federal Republic of Germany contributed a further sum to "Magen David Adom" to provide aid for the handicapped. This enabled the ICRC in Israel to resume, in co-operation with "Magen David Adom", its action for the handicapped in the occupied territories, which had been suspended for some months due to lack of funds. Thirty-two cases were examined, as a result of which it was hoped to fit the patients with artificial limbs towards the beginning of 1975.

RELIEF SUPPLIES

In 1974, within the framework of its relief programmes, the ICRC supervised the distribution by the Israeli Ministry of Social Welfare and various other bodies of gifts in kind which it had received from the European Economic Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Arab Republic of Egypt.

On the West Bank of the Jordan two thousand

tons of flour, a gift from the EEC, and 20 tons of powdered milk, a gift from the Swiss Confederation, were distributed by the Ministry of Social Welfare, the Lutheran World Federation and the Catholic Relief Service. Towards the end of the year there arrived a further gift from the Swiss Confederation, consisting of 860 tons of flour, to be distributed in 1975.

A gift of 175 tons of relief supplies from the Arab Republic of Egypt was forwarded by sea via Cyprus to Ashdod and delivered to the ICRC. The consignment comprised 60 tons of rice, 48 tons of sugar, 30 tons of lentils, 30 tons of peas and 38,000 metres of cloth. Distribution to the inhabitants of North and Central Sinai was carried out in August, October and November by CARE, in cooperation with the Israeli Ministry of Social Welfare, and under the supervision of the ICRC.

A consignment of 940 tons of flour, a gift from the Swiss Confederation intended for the population of the Gaza Strip and Sinai, arrived at the end of the year at Ashdod and is to be distributed in 1975.

Arab World

Press interview statements by Kuwait Oil Minister Atiqi denying that the recent decision to increase oil production is a retreat¹

Early January, 1974

Q. Let us go back one week. There is the view that the measures adopted by the Arab countries for easing the restrictions on oil production and exports is a retreat from the original decision which stipulated the withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories as a condition for resuming production and exports in the normal manner.

A. There is no retreat here. Our attitude towards Holland and America remains the same. We know that America is working for a solution and there is no doubt that some European countries are also pulling their weight. When we took the decision to lower production the intention was not to punish the world or threaten its economy, which would rebound on all of us, but we wanted to make the world sympathize with our problem. This operation achieved the desired results and we believe that the balance has now changed a great deal. However we are still on the battlefield.

Q. Do you believe that the oil measures adopted during the October war lacked a precise definition of the role demanded of the boycotted countries or of those countries whose share of Arab oil we reduced?

A. It is not possible to define a specific role in itself, except that all the countries are members of the UN and they all have a certain power they can exercise within it to put pressure on the enemy and his supporters. The least they could do is to apply the sanctions provided for in the UN Charter in the same way that we Arabs apply them to Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal in accordance with the UN resolutions on these countries' continued racial segregation.

Q. Now that the principle of no retreat on the production cutbacks before full withdrawal has been broken, what will be the fate of the remaining reduction?

A. The decision has not been broken fundamentally. The decision stated that we would reduce production by 5 percent at least and escalate each month by 5 percent. If we followed the decision as it was taken the reduction would basically be 15 percent after November and December. But in order to apply maximum pressure, most of us went to 15 percent initially. We are bound by the terms of the resolution we have adopted, so long as no developments occur which make it in our interest to change our strategy.

Press interview statements by Information Minister Saddiqni of Syria discussing Syria's position toward peace negotiations²

Early January, 1974

Q. Now that two months have passed since the ceasefire, how is the economic and political situation in Syria? Have the losses arising from the war been replaced or not? Is Syria satisfied with the Arab aid she is receiving?

A. Every effort is now being made to replace the economic losses resulting from the war of liberation last October. However, the economic losses sustained by Syria were comparatively large—although we are not thereby claiming that the Syrian Arab Region bore the burden of the battle or a major part of that burden. It has never been the battle of the Syrian Arab Region alone, but an Arab battle. This gives us confidence that all the Arab regions will promptly supply us with economic aid and material support so that we may be better able to replace our economic losses and better able to hold out in the face of the enemy. Material aid arrived from certain Arab brothers during the battle, and we still realize that our Arab brothers are always ready to support the Syrian Arab Region with all their resources.

As for the military situation, it is good. We can state that, generally speaking, our armed forces have full defensive capacity to hold out in the

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), January 4, 1974; excerpted from the English translation, *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), XVII, 12 (January 11, 1974), p. 4. Oil production had been raised on December 25, 1973; cf. doc. 345 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

² *Al-Balagh* (Beirut), January 14, 1974; partial English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), III, 3 (Spring, 1974), pp. 193-195.

face of any treacherous attack by the enemy, and can inflict grave losses on him at any time.

Q. Why did Syria not go to Geneva?

A. The attitude of the Syrian Arab Region on this matter has been made clear on several occasions, but there is no harm in repeating it. If we want to be precise we must say, first of all, that we did not go to Geneva because we felt that the meetings there were not going to tackle the essence of the problem, and would consequently not be about to lead to the establishment of a just peace. We have no objection to such a peace, however. Indeed, we regard it as a goal towards which to strive.

Q. But what is a just peace?

A. Our concept of a just peace is entirely incompatible with the Israeli or the American concept of peace, which is fundamentally based on usurpation, expansion, aggression and consecration of *faits accomplis*. This is a concept that we absolutely reject.

We are struggling for legitimate, unequivocal and self-evident rights about which there can be no argument. These rights are embodied in two basic points—the liberation of the land, and the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people. We felt that the Geneva meetings, in their present form, would not lead to the achievement of our legitimate goals, and might, indeed, be of service to the American-Israeli manoeuvres aimed at achieving a disengagement of forces intended once again to freeze the situation. The basic aim of these manoeuvres is to split Arab solidarity and isolate Egypt from the rest of the Arabs.

Arab solidarity is one of the principal weapons of the Arab nation in its current political battle against all the forces that are hostile to it, to its cause, its unity, its liberation and its progress. We are confident that the awareness evidenced by our Arab people in the glorious battle of October will ensure the frustration of Israeli-American manoeuvres aimed at paralyzing this new Arab weapon embodied in the solidarity of the Arabs against their enemies.

Q. The Israeli commentator Dan Margalit said in Haaretz on December 21, 1973 that: "During the dialogue with Kissinger in Jerusalem an emphatic cable arrived from Nixon urging Israel not to evade attending the Conference. Kissinger made contacts with Sadat and

Gromyko and came out with the following partial solution: Syria would not take part in the Conference, the Palestinians would not be mentioned in the invitation, and the Security Council resolution calling for withdrawal to the October 22 lines would be dropped. It was on this basis that Israel agreed to attend the Conference." What is your view of this?

A. There are two comments I can make on this: firstly, concerning the Syrian decision not to attend the Conference, this stand is a purely subjective, internal and Arab one, resulting from our analysis of the objective political circumstances attendant on the Geneva meetings. On this point, what the Israeli commentator says is nonsense. Secondly, it seems to me that *Haaretz* publishes such false reports to cover Israel's veiled desire to go to Geneva—but without committing herself to anything—and that these manoeuvres enjoy the political and military support of the United States of America with the object of making abortive the splendid victories achieved by the glorious battle of October.

Haaretz, which more than once called the October battle "the earthquake," knows as well as anyone that the Zionist enemy is no longer capable of confronting the Arab nation when it stands together as one man and when it is supported by world public opinion. Therefore this Zionist entity will not be able to hang onto the October 22 lines nor to a single inch of the occupied Arab territories. But the Zionist enemy hopes, through manoeuvres, procrastination and delays, to split the unified Arab attitude and make a gap which will enable it to continue its aggressive and expansionist policy.

Q. What would Syria's attitude be if the efforts to achieve the disengagement of the Egyptian and Israeli forces were successful?

A. We regard the Golan front and the Sinai front as one single front on which the battle began at one single moment. They are under a single military command, and one cannot be separated from the other. The disengagement of forces can only be an acceptable objective if it is regarded as one step in total withdrawal.

Q. Press sources in Kuwait have mentioned Kuwaiti mediation between Syria and Egypt, adding that this mediation was successful. Is this true?

A. There has been no mediation, and there can be absolutely no question of mediation between

Syria and Egypt. There are constant and continuous contacts between them. Moreover, official government sources in Kuwait have unequivocally denied these reports.

Q. Why does Israel insist on the question of the prisoners of war so strongly? And why does Syria set such store by it?

A. It is my belief that the Zionist enemy's insistence on this subject, and the way he pursues his poisonous propaganda campaign throughout the world and publishes lies on the subject, proves that, contrary to all his claims, he does not want peace. He wants to put the cart before the horse, and find a solution for a peripheral problem before dealing with the core of the matter. Which shows that he does not want to deal with the core of the matter at all. He is only interested in this ancillary problem, and when it is solved according to his wishes he will be able to think that he can restore the situation that existed before October 6. Moreover, in his efforts to conceal his serious human losses in the October war the Zionist enemy has given too low a figure for his killed, and to do this he has had to increase the published figure for the missing to many times the true one. But in this game the Zionist leaders have been hoisted with their own petard, for it has given rise to considerable alarm and perplexity among those members of the population whom the authorities have induced to believe that their sons may not be missing, but prisoners of war.

It is this, as I believe, that has led the Zionist leaders to launch an insensate campaign of lies throughout the whole world to the effect that Syria has killed the prisoners of war; it is an unconcealed and shameless manoeuvre.

We now believe that the world has recognized that Syria is enforcing the Geneva Conventions and treating the prisoners of war in her hands in conformity with them and that Israel, which only takes notice of those Conventions which suit her, has constantly infringed these Conventions—in more ways than one.

Israel infringed the Geneva Conventions when she expelled the peaceable civilian inhabitants from the occupied Arab territories in a deliberate and organized manner. Israel infringed these Conventions when she bombed residential quarters in Syrian towns, and schools, hospitals and cultural centres, and when she threw her delayed-action

bombs in the streets to kill children. Israel infringed the Geneva Conventions when she employed the Syrian prisoners of war in her hands in military operations, driving some of them in front of attacking units to discover Syrian minefields. Israel infringed the Geneva Conventions when she used the bodies of Syrian combatants who had fallen on the field of battle for the purpose of carrying out surgical operations on her wounded.

The Geneva Conventions are an integrated whole, and Israel cannot pick out those that suit her purposes and refuse to comply with those clear and unambiguous provisions that do not suit her.

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Press interview statements by President Boumedienne of Algeria commenting on Arab measures to secure the rights of the Palestinians (excerpts)³

Algiers, early January, 1974

[In reply to two questions on the Geneva conference and the problem of the Arab East and on the attitude of the world to what is happening to the Palestinian people:]

A. It is strange that so many people in the world have fallen into the trap of Zionist thinking to the extent that some people really believe that if Israel returned the occupied territories she would be making a concession. We think that those who talk about the Geneva conference, disengagement, whether or not Syria is to attend the conference, and Sinai and the Golan, have fallen into the trap of Zionist propaganda. They disregard the crux of the problem, which is that there can be no real peace before a just solution to the problem is reached.

The real problem is the flagrant injustice that has been done to the Palestinian people since 1948.

The real problem is this foreign body that has been implanted within the Arab world and which the Arab body has always refused and will always refuse to accept.

³ Interview granted to the Japanese daily *Asahi Shimbun*; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Shaab* (Algiers), January 15, 1974.

There is no difference between a racist expansionist state like Israel and a racist state like South Africa. Africa has realized this, as has the Third World which was previously influenced by the Western press operating under Zionist influence.

It is absolutely illogical that a Russian Zionist who left his home and settled in Israel two months ago would have rights in a land owned by a Palestinian for decades.

The silence of the world to the Israeli occupation of the land of Palestine and the eviction of its people by terrorism and mass murder provokes our condemnation. It makes us ask how Zionist propaganda can have secured the silence of the world in the face of this tragedy and this flagrant injustice from which the Palestinian people are suffering, when it is the same world that opposed the American presence in Vietnam—for the two problems are identical.

If we accept the logic of force it means that we agree to the world being under the tutelage of the great powers. It means we allow them to divide up the world into their spheres of influence. This we do not accept.

Unfortunately although there are people in the world today who realize what is happening, they are not courageous enough to expose what is concealed.

Some people say that the Arabs are responsible for the fall of the yen or the rise of the dollar, or for the unfavourable balance of payments in such and such a country. They feign ignorance of the party that is really responsible for the main problem that has forced us to remind the world of our existence and of our role in world civilization.

For how can we be expected to worry about the interests of those who have disregarded our interests—indeed our legitimate rights?

I know that Japan's policy—doubtless because of a situation that was a consequence of the second world war—has been pro-American. But how can you expect us to worry about your interests when you have adopted a pro-Israel attitude?

[On the recent war, which was a continuation of the Arabs' rejection of Israeli settler colonialism, and in reply to a question about the result of this war and who won it:]

A. I can say that from the strategic point of view Israel did not win this war, because had she won she would have been able to impose her will on the Arab world. This did not happen, because

there are two factors that it is quite impossible for Israel to control: the geographical factor of distance and the human factor of population figures.

Israel may win a few kilometres here and there, but (I said in 1967) the entry of Zionist forces into Damascus or Cairo would not frighten us and she could never win the war.

This also shows the contradiction in which people conditioned by Zionist propaganda become involved when they talk about the need to ensure Israel's security and yet at the same time talk about Israeli tanks being on their way to occupy Cairo or Damascus. America threatens to intervene if Israel's security is endangered, and safeguards her frontiers and existence.

It is the Arabs' security that has always been threatened by Israel which has always engaged in aggressions against the Arabs.

It is political short-sightedness that has characterized world reactions to the constant Israeli threat to peace that is so astonishing and so reprehensible.

The obvious fact that has been established by events is that Zionism does not want peace, but in fact fears and avoids it because she believes that continuing tension serves her interests and protects her expansionist ambitions.

[On the Arabs' use of the oil weapon:]

A. The Arabs have acted positively and wisely, and thereby affirmed their existence to those who have always underrated it and neglected their real interests in the Arab world.

If the great powers can threaten to use nuclear armaments, and if the United States can use economic weapons against the communist world by forbidding the export of so-called strategic materials—and even impose an economic blockade on a small country like Cuba—surely there is all the more reason for those who are in the right to use what weapons they have to defend themselves and protect their rights.

Those who neglect our interests have no right to ask us to protect their interests. When they support aggression against us they have no right to ask special privileges from us.

In the past Europe played the role of devil's advocate and neglected its real interests. If there are people today who complain because they cannot spend their Sundays out-of-town or because the

temperature of their rooms is two degrees lower, let them remember those who have been evicted from their homes and have been living in tents, summer and winter, for more than a quarter of a century.

The manoeuvres we are witnessing at present are in fact a conspiracy to maintain the American companies' control over the sources of energy and to prevent the establishment of direct relations between the producing countries and the consuming countries. So why should you be pro-American when America is not supplying you with oil, while she is in fact diverting to herself quantities of oil intended for Europe, to make the crisis there more acute.

The Arabs have acted with the intelligence of a man who knows his own capacity. We are ready for any constructive dialogue based on good intentions and respect for mutual interests.

A statement by a Japanese official showing understanding of the Arab struggle, along with our understanding of Japan's situation, was sufficient for your country to obtain special treatment.⁴

The Japanese are a great people and they are a great economic force. We believe that we have made it easier for you to appreciate where your real interests lie.

We are prepared to open all doors to you for the achievement of long-term agreements but we are not prepared to make efforts on behalf of those who shut their eyes to our problems and even shut their eyes to their own interests.

An example is Holland, whose Foreign Minister behaved improperly towards the Arab ambassadors who asked to meet him. Holland has been more Zionist than Israel herself, in spite of the thousands of tons of oil, most of it Arab oil, which give life to the arteries of Rotterdam, and Arab wealth bringing prosperity to the west.

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Political report issued by the Eighth Regional Conference of the Baath Party in Iraq on the Palestine question (excerpts)⁵

Baghdad, January 12, 1974

The Palestine Problem

The Baath Party, ever since its foundation and throughout all stages of its struggle, has regarded the Palestine problem as central to Arab struggle, a problem that is totally linked, and at the profoundest and most important level, with the struggle of the Arab nation for liberation, unity and the building of socialism.

Ever since 1948 when, with the escalation of Zionist ambitions the Zionist entity was established in part of the territory of Palestine, the Palestine problem has been the first and foremost Arab problem, on which most of the policies, events and changes in the Arab East have centred and because of which they have occurred.

After the defeat of June 5, 1967 and "Israel's" occupation of the whole of Palestine and important parts of the territory of the Egyptian and Syrian regions, the importance of this problem as regards all aspects of Arab life increased, and it became clear how great, wide-scale and unprecedented a danger the Zionist presence and its alliance with imperialism were to the existence of the Arab nation and the future of its struggle for liberation, unity and socialism.

After this defeat it was natural that the Baath Party should be almost totally preoccupied with the Palestine problem, the challenges and dangers it gave rise to, and the preparations and struggle it made obligatory for the confrontation of the Zionist and imperialist enemy, and that it should devote the greater part of its attention to them.

However, the period between the June defeat and the outbreak of the revolution in the Iraqi region on July 17–30, 1968—a little more than a year after the defeat—was not long enough, especially as the Party was in an extremely difficult and complicated situation, for it to draw up a realistic and integrated theoretical, political and organizational programme for the confrontation of

⁵ Iraq's President Bakr broadcast the text of this report in three instalments on March 5, 6 and 7; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), March 8, 1974.

⁴ See doc. 200 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

the new stage. And this was in spite of the fact that the Ninth National Congress held in March 1968⁶—halfway between the defeat and the outbreak of the revolution in Iraq—had in fact laid down the correct general guidelines in this respect.

The Baath Party's view of the Palestine problem, which it has stated throughout its advance, is a radical one based on unwavering principles. Moreover, the struggle it was engaged in had so far been negative, and the February apostasy had given rise to a climate of disunity and material and moral threat. There was also the fact that the Party was not directly participating in the Palestine resistance, and this had given rise to negative political, organizational and psychological effects. All this led the Party to adopt the most revolutionary, radical and comprehensive slogans and programmes in relation to the tasks of the new stage, and the requirements of the confrontation of imperialist and Zionist aggression.

Most of these slogans and programmes were correct in principle. Among them were rejection of surrender solutions of all kinds, condemnation of the Arab regimes responsible for the defeat and a call for long-term struggle by all available means and in various forms. However, and this is a fact of the greatest importance which we must recognize and realize, there was in fact a very great distance between these slogans and programmes and their practical requirements on the one hand and, on the other, the Party's intrinsic ability, at that stage, to perform a decisive leadership role in the Arab revolutionary movement as regards meeting these practical requirements and ensuring that these slogans and programmes were implemented. At that stage, as a result of its situation, which we have discussed in detail, the Party occupied only a limited position in the Arab arena, everywhere surrounded by hostile attempts to cast doubt on it, to disparage it and to obscure its aims.

When the Baath Party came to power in the Iraqi region after the revolution of July 17, brilliant light suddenly shone on the revolution and on the Party's organizations, everywhere and from many quarters, and they were allotted immense responsibilities. It was now the Party's duty—through the government it led in Iraq and through its organizations in the Arab regions—to

ensure the implementation of its declared slogans and programmes, to perform duties immediately, and to adopt numerous wide-scale political, military, ideological and organizational attitudes of the greatest delicacy and complication.

This pressing demand came from many quarters with divergent objectives and motives. It came from the Party itself, which regarded the Palestine problem as the central problem in its struggle. It now had a regime that it led, so that it was obliged to subject all its energies and resources to this problem. The demand also came from the masses, who saw that the Party had once again taken the stage of events and therefore rightly called on it to implement its slogans and programmes. It also came from the Palestine resistance which was seeking help on all sides, and many sections of which had relations with the Party which were negative and far from close. The enemies of the Party and those who cast doubts on it also joined in the demand, in the hope of embarrassing it and making it appear impotent, frivolous and insincere.

In this tumultuous atmosphere—and we must remember that the revolution itself was in its first stages, and surrounded by hostility and boycott in the Arab arena, not to mention other factors—the Party suddenly found itself in the thick of things. However, it had not been given either sufficient opportunity, nor did it possess the intellectual and political resources then required to establish a precise balance between its slogans and programmes and its promises deriving from its principles and long-term strategy, on the one hand, and its intrinsic capacity and that of the revolution and its effective ability to ensure achievement and implementation, on the other.

The Party and the revolution made two main mistakes in the performance of their national tasks vis-à-vis the Palestine problem and the difficulties and crises that confronted them in the period between the outbreak of the revolution and the events of September 1970. These mistakes were as follows: The Party had adopted slogans and programmes and harboured aspirations deriving from its principles and its long-term revolutionary national strategy. It had also entered into major commitments. Moreover, new levels of thinking and action were required by the new stage following the June defeat and the major challenges and the intricate, extremely delicate

⁶ Thus in the Arabic; the congress was in fact held in January 1968, cf. doc. 281 in *International Documents on Palestine 1968*.

and important problems it gave rise to. All those problems were much too big for the unaided abilities of the Party and the commitments it had entered into, not only before but also after its assumption of power in the Iraqi region. The second mistake lay in the shortcomings and mistakes committed in the field of understanding and defining the dialectical relationship between the "regional" tasks that confront the Party when it comes to power in any region, and the immediately "national" tasks.

The bitter situation in which the Party found itself during the events of September 1970 was the natural result of the series of mistakes and defective ideas in which it had previously become involved.

Before these incidents, for reasons and circumstances already discussed, the Party had plunged headlong into that area of the national arena that was concerned with the Palestine problem. In this it went far beyond its intrinsic capacity at that stage, before it had completed and settled, at the level of the Iraqi region, many of the basic regional tasks that were directly connected with its ability to perform its national tasks. These included consolidating the revolutionary government, ensuring that the situation and the concomitant circumstances were preponderantly in its favour, and solving the Kurdish problem in such a way that it had a completely free hand in disposing of Iraq's military resources. It also entered over-hastily into major commitments in the light of only one aspect of the problem, its temporary positive psychological effects, without taking into careful account its other aspects, the possibility of events developing in such a way that it would be compelled to make practical moves appropriate to them.

At this stage Iraq had more than fifty thousand men in the eastern arena (Syria and Jordan) and was taking part in all official Arab political and military activities related to the problem of confronting the enemy. The Party was adopting very inflexible attitudes to the established regimes, the various sectors of the resistance and the problems that had to be solved, without sufficient consideration of the consequences of such attitudes or of available resources. In a word, the Party and the revolution had put themselves in the very thick of the melee in the area.

The Jordanian authorities then proceeded to liquidate the resistance on a scale and with a

savagery hitherto unprecedented. This was the acid test of all previous policies, attitudes and commitments, and the Party and the revolution, which were already in the thick of things found themselves incapable of acting on a scale commensurate with the immensity of the conspiracy and with the magnitude of the slogans they had raised and the promises that had been made in their name.

This grave and delicate situation gave rise to mutually contradictory sentiments and attitudes within the Party. Some comrades hastened to demand that all the resources of the Party and the revolution should be thrown into the battle regardless of the consequences. They based their demand on the assumption that revolutionary daring of this kind would make the Party and the revolution stronger and place them in the vanguard of the masses for the sake of which it would be worth risking the fall of the revolutionary authority. These comrades neglected many realistic military and political considerations. They also greatly underestimated the essential importance of the Party's maintaining a revolutionary base that could be used both as a rear base for the regrouping of forces in case of retreat and for the mobilization of resources for initiative in case of advance.

At the same time, frightened by the dangers arising from this situation, and as a direct reaction against the first trend, there were some who advocated that the Party should withdraw within the framework of the region and protect the revolution in this way, regardless of losses in the national arena.

The events of September 1970 threw their heavy shadow over the subsequent stage. They were exploited by the regimes and by political circles hostile to the revolution in the most odious manner and on a very wide scale. Each, in conformity with its principles and objectives, launched against the Party and the revolution intensive and wide-ranging campaigns of defamation and accusations which greatly injured their reputation in the ranks of the Arab masses and in Arab and foreign political circles. For a long time the Party was faced with a difficult situation. It was isolated and unable to take positive action among the Arab masses, while its relations with certain circles in the Palestine resistance became critical.

However, the steadfastness and vitality of the Party and the revolution enabled them to regain

their breath. Having surmounted this difficult stage they embarked on positive activity at the Arab level, and returned to the stage of events as an increasingly effective force playing a vanguard role.

During the three years between the events of September and the war of October 6, 1973 many facts about the Arab situation became clear. The revelation that many of the demands had been delusive showed that the Party had been right in the principles it maintained and in the fundamental conclusions it had reached on many issues.

At the same time the increasing achievements of the great revolution for liberation and democracy, such as the nationalization of oil, the establishment of the Front and the Party's success in elaborating an unimpeachable formula, based on principles, for alliance with the USSR and the progressive forces of the world were starting to show that the revolutionary experience of the Iraqi Region was capable of providing a firm base for and constituting a model for Arab struggle that inspired optimism and merited imitation. This placed the Party in new advance positions in the Arab revolutionary movement.

At the same time the wise and flexible policies, uninfluenced by the tumult of verbal contests, that were pursued in the years following the September incidents created a positive atmosphere around the Party and the revolution at the level of relations both with the masses and with certain Arab regimes. This meant that it was in a better position to make its ideas heard on Arab issues than had been the case in the past. Indeed, numerous progressive Arab circles came to accord the greatest importance to the Party's views and analysis of events, and to regard it as laying down their main guidelines.

The initiative taken by the Party in making direct contact with Syria and Egypt in 1972, when it submitted to them the proposal for union in combat and proposed that problems related to relations with them should be dealt with quietly and soberly as opposed to the noise that had accompanied such dealings in the past, was a very important factor in the achievement of these results. Moreover, the slogans and programmes proposed by the Party in the field of the use of oil as a weapon in the battle, especially after the successful battle of nationalization, also played

such an important role that they became fundamental Arab slogans.

In the October 1973 war Iraq played a decisive role by rapid and extensive military participation, by striking at American and Dutch interests⁷ and by leading an extensive campaign of popular mobilization in the Arab homeland, and after the war it rejected the ceasefire and the new liquidation solutions. All this placed the Baath Party and its revolution in this region in an outstanding position—that of the vanguard leadership of the front of Arab struggle against imperialist influence, Zionist usurpation, reactionary conspiracy and the slackness of the middle-of-the-road regimes.

The attempts that are now being made to isolate and contain the Baath Party and the revolution of July 17 are fundamentally different from those that were made during the period between the revolution and the September incidents. They are now being made with a view to belittling as far as possible the effective revolutionary role the Party and the revolution are playing in the Arab arena—whereby they are arousing the sympathy and support of the masses and the revolutionary forces throughout the Arab homeland.

The following are the principal considerations on which the Party's foreign policy and its relations and activities at the international level are based:

1. The requirements of the Arab liberation struggle and of the principal Arab problems, headed by the problems of Palestine and of the Arab Gulf.

2. The necessity to protect the revolution in the the Iraqi Region, as being a base of the Arab revolutionary movement which is striving to achieve that movement's aims of unity, freedom and socialism.

3. The belief that the Arab revolutionary movement is part of the world revolutionary movement, and that the two must be allied in their struggle against imperialism, aggression, usurpation and racial discrimination, and to ensure freedom, peace and progress in the world. At the same time the most strenuous efforts must be made to maintain the independence of the Arab revolutionary

⁷ Iraq nationalized US oil interests in the Basra Petroleum Company at the outbreak of the war, doc. 278 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*; Dutch interests in the company were nationalized on October 21, 1973.

movement and its distinctive characteristics.

4. The belief that good and normal relations must be established in all fields between the Arab people and the peoples and states of the world, in accord with their national interests and requirements and in harmony with our principles as regards brotherhood and cooperation between peoples.

It is in the light of these basic considerations that activity has been initiated in the international field and relations established with the countries of the world during the last few years.

Relations with the USSR and the Socialist Countries

Relations with the socialist countries and the USSR in particular occupy a prominent advance position in our foreign relations, especially since the signing of the Iraqi-Soviet treaty on April 9, 1972.⁸ These relations are connected in one way or another with the four principal considerations determining our foreign policy, which have been set out as above.

The all-Arab character of the Baath Party and the comprehensive and radical nature of its revolutionary tasks, which transcend the regional framework to embrace the whole national arena with a view to achieving the goals of unity, freedom and socialism, demand a long struggle that will be fraught with immense difficulties and dangers. The performance of these tasks is the duty, first and foremost, of the Party, the people and all regional and national forces, and depends on their intrinsic resources and their capacity for sacrifice, steadfastness and heroism. However, both the fact that our struggle is essentially directed against international forces with enormous political, military and economic resources—world imperialism along with Zionism, and its entity in our occupied territory—as well as against their local allies, and the circumstances and balances of power of the present era, give our struggle to achieve the three strategic goals of unity, freedom and socialism, international dimension in addition to its purely national character. For all these reasons it is not only right but very necessary that we should ally ourselves, in our struggle against these enemies, with international forces, possessing political, military and economic resources whose principles,

goals and interests are close to ours, on condition that the distinctive character, independence and free will of our Arab revolution are maintained.

In spite of differences, or failure to agree, between us and them on a number of issues, the USSR and the socialist countries are the closest to us of the powerful and progressive countries as regards principles, objectives and interests. Moreover the experience of human struggle has confirmed, beyond any shadow of doubt, that the revolutions of peoples for freedom and progress lie within a single framework, that of the world revolutionary movement, although each of them has its own peculiar characteristics. Therefore, our Arab revolution, which is part of this comprehensive world revolution, must inevitably lie within the same framework as its greatest forces, the USSR and the socialist countries. It is natural that the parties to these two revolutions should be in alliance. On this basis the slogan adopted by the Baath Party and the revolution of July 17, of strategic alliance with the USSR and the socialist countries, is correct both in theory and practice, and is in accord with the Party's principles and objectives and with its national tasks of achieving unity, freedom and socialism. It is also in accord with the interests and aspirations of the Arab nation and its struggle for liberation and progress.

Cooperation in the fields of military and economic development between Iraq and the liberated Arab countries on the one hand, and the USSR and the socialist countries on the other, is of special importance. Our country and the liberated Arab countries are arming for the confrontation of imperialist and Zionist aggression and for the liberation of our territory. It is therefore natural that the greatest efforts in this field should be directed to the USSR and the socialist countries. Moreover, our Arab people's struggle for economic liberation and comprehensive development is totally incompatible with the interests and policies of imperialism. This means that cooperation with the USSR and the socialist countries in this vital field is necessary, natural and entirely in harmony with the aspirations of our people to development and progress. The experience of Arab struggle in the last two decades, starting with the breaking of the arms monopoly in the mid-fifties and ending with the war of October 1973, has proved how right and necessary it was to follow this course.

⁸ Doc. 72 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

The determination on our part and that of the USSR and the socialist countries to cooperate in the above fields rests on two foundations—principles and interests. There is general agreement of principles between the Arab revolutionary movement, of which we are a part, and the USSR and the socialist countries. The two parties also have a common interest in establishing cooperation with each other.

Relations with the Western Countries and Japan

The struggle in which the Baath Party and the popular masses are engaged is fundamentally a direct and violent conflict with the imperialist countries, because it is these countries that prevent the realization of our national aspirations to unity, freedom and socialism.

It is the imperialist countries that have occupied our territories and controlled their destinies, either directly or indirectly. It is they that have erected the barriers of fragmentation between them, persecuted and humiliated our people and threatened their very existence. It is they that have exploited our wealth in the most odious manner and spread poverty and backwardness in our countries. It is they that established the Zionist entity in our territory and provided it with arms, money and political and moral support so that it might devote itself to aggression against us and the usurpation of our territories.

Therefore the distinguishing feature of our relations with these countries is struggle against their imperialist policies in all fields, and by all available ways and means, with a view to liquidating imperialist influence in all its forms, political, military and economic, and eliminating its effects once and for all. There follow the main guidelines that determine our relations with these countries:

1. By imperialist countries we mean at the present juncture the United States, first and foremost, and every country that cooperates with it in its policies of aggression against us.

2. The conflict between us and these countries, in particular the United States, is a violent and long-term conflict which can only be resolved by fundamental changes taking place in their policies and their attitudes to us and to our basic problems. It is incumbent on us to study any change that takes place in the policies of any of these countries in a precise and scientific manner and to adopt

an appropriate attitude to it.

3. The struggle against the imperialist countries assumes a variety of forms, including political, ideological and information struggle; this is permanent and constant. The struggle against them also sometimes takes the form of armed struggle of all kinds, while a central position is occupied by economic struggle to liquidate the exploiting interests of these countries and to achieve our economic independence. We must employ all these means, in conformity with circumstances, stages and available resources, to hasten the complete and final liquidation of the imperialist positions.

4. International relations are a purely realistic problem and emotions must be kept out of them. Our hostility to the imperialist countries and our struggle against them must not prevent us from dealing with them in fields that are compatible with our national interests and are not in conflict with our principles.

5. The Western capitalist world is not exclusively composed of hostile imperialist countries. There are some countries that have comparatively good attitudes to the Arab countries. There are also other countries with which we have no quarrel that prevents the establishment of normal relations with them. Our independent attitude, our national interests, the requirements of the present period, and our belief in the necessity to establish normal relations with all countries and peoples in the world, prompt us to establish good relations in all possible fields with the above Western countries. Most, if not all of them are advanced in the fields of science, industry and culture, education and other fields which we require if we are to accelerate our national renaissance. Nor does cooperation with them restrict our independence or our national struggle. On the contrary, it sometimes helps by strengthening our international positions in the confrontation of our imperialist and Zionist enemies.

In cooperating with these countries we must pay due regard to certain problems: although the policy of each is different from that of the others, and although certain aspects of their policies differ from American policies, especially as regards some aspects of the Arab problem, all these countries have relations and interests that are interlocked

with those of the United States and other imperialist countries. Moreover, Zionist influence in these countries has an important effect in political, economic and social circles. Therefore the situation of each of these countries must be studied individually; every case of cooperation must be carefully studied and the necessary controls must be established so that we may prevent the infiltration of Zionist influence and imperialist and Zionist machination through the field of cooperation with these countries. At the same time we must bear in mind the possibility of the policies of a number of the Western countries becoming disengaged from that of the United States, or, at least their links with it growing weaker as a result of the increasingly insistent demand that Europe should be independent and unify its interests. This is also a result of the increasing demand for energy, in particular oil, and America's plans to control this energy, especially in the Middle East, not only to meet America's present and future requirements, but to take advantage of the situation so as to maintain Europe's subjection to her. We must turn the resulting conflict, whether it is covert or overt, to the advantage of our national struggle.

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Report on the October war adopted by the Eighth Regional Conference of the Baath Party in Iraq (excerpts)⁹

Baghdad, January 12, 1974

In the afternoon of October 6, 1973 the war broke out on the western and northern fronts. Here it is to be observed that we have on many occasions stated that we heard the news of the outbreak of war through broadcasts. At the official level this is true: the Egyptian and Syrian governments did not inform us of the war, but we did receive unofficial reports from our own sources. All the information we received and all the conclusions we reached indicated that the regimes' aim in declaring war was to activate the situation in the

area by a violent convulsion so as to facilitate the implementation of the peaceful solution. And this was in accord with our previous expectations.

As soon as war was declared a joint meeting of the National and Regional Commands of the Baath Party and the Revolutionary Command Council was held. Another joint meeting was held on the morning of the next day (October 7). At these two meetings it was decided:

1. To nationalize America's share in the Basra Petroleum Company and thereby spark off the political oil battle against American imperialism in accordance with the views of the Party and the Revolution on the use of oil as a weapon in the national battle of the Arab nation.¹⁰

2. To send air forces to the northern front without delay.

3. To send immediately as many of our land military units as possible to the northern front.

4. To establish diplomatic relations with Iran and to call on her to solve the problems between us and her by peaceful means and through negotiations, with a view to safeguarding our eastern front.¹¹

On October 6 and 7 meetings of the Higher Committee of the Iraqi and All-Arab Progressive Front were held for the same purpose and the committee supported these decisions.

These decisions were taken on the basis of the following considerations, which the Regional Command of the Baath Party submitted to the Eighth Regional Conference at its extraordinary session held for this purpose on October 8, 1973. Both they and the decisions of the Command obtained unanimous approval:

1. That our appraisal of the motives for the war and its objectives should not be allowed to stand in the way of our playing a vanguard role in it and participating in it to the full. Whatever these motives and objectives, the masses would regard the war, especially when it flared up, as a battle against the usurping enemy, and therefore expect our Party and our revolution to participate in it at a level and to an extent commensurate with our principles, our slogans and our national responsibilities.

2. The Baath Party and the revolutionary authorities of the Iraqi Region could only expose

⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), June 13, 1974.

¹⁰ Doc. 278 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹¹ Doc. 279 in *ibid*.

the regimes' procrastination and their readiness to bargain during and after the battle against a background of effective vanguard participation in the battle. Otherwise the Party and the Revolution would lose their ability to direct and mobilize the masses in conformity with the basic trends of the Arab revolution in the struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction. That is to say, they would no longer be able to play an effective vanguard role in the Arab arena and would allow the reins of leadership to fall into the hands of the effete reactionary regimes.

3. There was no guarantee that the plans drawn up by the regimes would be implemented or that the war would lead to the results they anticipated. In any major operation of this kind unexpected consequences of the greatest importance may emerge. Extensive and effective participation in the war by the Party and the revolution would provide an excellent opportunity for guiding the battle in the course of radical struggle. It would also make it possible to achieve results other than those desired by the regimes, that is to say, a situation more favourable to the adoption of the method of the war of liberation and to the pursuit of the fundamental goals of the Arab revolutionary movement.

4. The regimes' attempts to isolate the Iraqi Region from all effective participation in the events of the area and, in particular, from participation in this military conflict, were part of an evil conspiracy with the ultimate aim of overthrowing the revolution. Thus if the Iraqi Region did not play an effective part in the battle the revolution would, as we have seen, no longer be able to play its effective vanguard role in the Arab arena and would be dangerously isolated and exposed to accusations. This would provide the renegade forces both at home and abroad with pretexts to conspire against the revolutionary regime led by the Baath Party in this region.

Moreover, the Iraqi Region's failure to take part in the battle would provide the regimes with extensive cover for their attempts to reach a settlement and to liquidate the problem. This would enable them to lay the responsibility on us, on the pretext that by not fighting we had made victory impossible. From this important aspect effective participation in the battle was an incursive revolutionary method of defending the revolution and strengthening its positions and its vanguard

role at both the regional and national levels. It was also one of the best ways of refuting the pretexts of those who advocated solutions involving surrender and liquidation.

5. The outbreak of the active war with the Zionist enemy had provided the conditions anticipated by the report of the Regional Command in October-November 1972. It was thus possible for us to send significant military units outside the frontiers of the region. While the battle against the Zionist enemy was at its height the Iranian government would not dare to launch a military aggression against Iraq for important reasons: the sentiments of the Muslim Iranian people and the Iranian government's desire not to become isolated from the Arab countries, and the fact that the USSR, which was linked to Iraq by a treaty of friendship and cooperation, was Iran's neighbour.

At the same time the climate of active war against Israel constituted a psychological barrier to the attempts by suspect forces in the Kurdish movement to stir up extensive disturbances in the north of the region.

The developments that took place during the war, as well as its consequences, both expected and unexpected, confirmed that the calculations on which the Command based the above decisions were correct. They also confirmed the decisive historical necessity for these decisions.

The Command's direct and bold supervision of all aspects of these decisions, military, political and economic, even to the minutest details, and the magnificent initiative evinced by our forces in the operation of rapid movement to the front and of immediate engagement of the enemy's forces as soon as they arrived on the line of fire, and in all the military operations they carried out, meant that Iraq's participation had decisive historical consequences.

The plan of battle drawn up by the Egyptian and Syrian regimes which was based on the elements of surprise and blitzkrieg would, without Iraqi participation, have led to certain military disaster after 5 or 6 days of fighting.

After having invaded areas of territory in the Golan Heights in the first and second days of the battle, the Syrian forces found themselves—and this was something completely unanticipated by their command—surrounded by a network of anti-armour ground-to-ground-missile defences, in addition to the enemy's armoured forces; this

inflicted huge casualties on the Syrian armoured forces.

Having got over the impact of the first strike and mobilized his reserves, the enemy launched a counter-attack against the Syrian forces forcing them to withdraw until the enemy reached the outskirts of Damascus, and the whole front was in danger of collapsing. In view of the fact that the Egyptian and Syrian regimes intended the war to be a tactical one, the occupation of Damascus would have been a military and political disaster for them and for the official Arab attitude, which rejected the idea of a long-term war, in which the occupation of territory and towns is not decisively important from the strategic point of view.

At the moment when Damascus was threatened with imminent occupation and when official circles and a large section of the people were making preparations to leave the city, at the official instructions of the Syrian government, as Syrian officials have admitted, the vanguard of the Iraqi armoured forces arrived, and by their heroic courage succeeded in pushing the enemy back. The Iraqi forces also succeeded by the magnificent fighting qualities they displayed as they poured in in ever increasing numbers—to which qualities friends and enemies alike have borne witness—in stabilizing the northern front in the face of extensive and hysterical attacks by the enemy in which immense military capacities were deployed. Once the Iraqi forces on the front reached their full strength, they were completely prepared to start a comprehensive attack on the front to liberate the Golan. Zero hour for this attack was 3 a.m. on October 23. However, the Syrian government requested that the attack be postponed and then on October 24 announced its approval of the ceasefire.

The decisive role played by the Iraqi Region at the military and political levels after the nationalization of America's and later Holland's shares in the Basra Petroleum Company, the magnificent fighting qualities displayed by the Arab forces on the western and northern fronts, and the immense mass enthusiasm for the battle that swept through the length and breadth of the Arab homeland, created a situation entirely different from that planned for by the regimes, which had prepared for a "war of activation."

American interests in the area were seriously threatened and the reactionary and middle of

the road regimes were forced to adopt what, at least superficially, appeared to be uncompromising attitudes. The situation in the Arab arena seemed to herald a rebirth, baptized in blood, of the Arab revolutionary movement and the cause of Arab unity.

Frightened by this dangerous development, numerous quarters got together to encircle this violent revolutionary current by seeking a ceasefire and a return to bargaining with the Zionist enemy and American imperialism.

The quarters that had built the plan of battle on the basis of "activation" and then moved on to bargaining desired the ceasefire, which was in their interests. At the same time they wanted to appear to the masses as having fought and won a victory, if only a partial one. This was also in the interests of American imperialism and reaction, who were afraid of these revolutionary developments in the Arab situation. The other, middle-of-the-road regimes wanted to clear themselves of national responsibility and to escape the heavy burdens that would be imposed on them if the war continued.

Reference must be made to the question of the breakthrough made on the western front. This breakthrough led to the creation of a sort of "equilibrium" in the new military and political situation, which had been entirely in the Arabs' favour throughout the first ten days of the war. It also weakened the position of the regimes even within the framework of efforts to reach a "peaceful solution". This led the enemy to refuse to withdraw to the October 22 lines on the Egyptian front before sitting down at the negotiations table with the Arabs concerned, in spite of all the concessions offered to him and to American imperialism by the Egyptian government. Thus in spite of the effect of the war on the situation in the area, no action has been taken on the issue that the regimes regarded as fundamental—withdrawal from all the territory occupied in 1967 and recognition of the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine—nor has there been any serious discussion of it.

Available military information and studies of the balances of forces on the western front during the war show that this breakthrough operation cannot be excused for purely military reasons. There are numerous implications of grave political significance.

1. The Egyptian military plan consisted of one page only—to cross the canal and take up positions

on a narrow strip on its east bank. That is to say, the Egyptian command had not planned for the possibility of an advance eastwards, nor for the possibility of an exceptional reaction on the part of the enemy which in fact did take place in the form of the breakthrough operation. This possibility reveals the superficial and ultimately disastrous aspect of the tactical view of the battle on which the regimes based their calculations.

2. The superb fighting qualities displayed by the Arab forces in the first ten days of the war suffered a psychological setback following President Sadat's speech on October 16¹² which weakened their fighting capacity and, consequently, made it easier for the enemy to achieve the breakthrough.

3. This breakthrough was a carefully planned conspiracy in which certain influential quarters in the Egyptian government took part.

The conclusion to be drawn from the ceasefire operation, the attitude to the issue of the Zionist breakthrough and the crossing to the west bank of the Suez Canal, is that the regimes which had prepared the "war of activation" intended to do no more than "activate" the issue and that, fundamentally, they were prepared to accept any possible military or political withdrawal for the sake of reaching a settlement.

This conclusion has been borne out by the events that have occurred and by the attitudes adopted by the Egyptian and Syrian regimes since the ceasefire. These regimes urgently required "Arab" cover for the attitudes they adopted with the aim of accepting fundamental concessions for the sake of reaching a settlement of the problem of the occupation. They obtained this cover through the summit conference held in Algiers on November 26, 1973,¹³ and various subsequent Arab meetings and conferences.

Statement by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization condemning the disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel¹⁴

Beirut, January 19, 1974

The bilateral partial settlement concluded on January 18, 1974, with the Zionist enemy is a grave step threatening the future of the occupied Arab territories and the Palestinian cause with liquidation, because this solution will lead to the strengthening of the positions of Israel and American imperialism by removing the Arab fronts from the field of the conflict one after another.

The Executive Committee, while condemning bilateral partial solutions, affirms that it will continue to struggle to prevent the Hashimite authorities from reaching any surrenderist settlement that would lead to the division of Palestinian territories between them and the Zionist enemy and to the comprehensive liquidation of the Palestinian cause.

The Executive Committee calls on the Arab countries to realize how dangerous these settlements are and to have nothing to do with them. It also calls for support for the national position on the Syrian front and for solidarity with the Palestine revolution in rejecting the American-Zionist liquidation solution and in affirming the right of the Palestinian people to pursue their struggle for the liberation of their country and for self-determination in their own land.

The Executive Committee will call on the Central Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization to hold an emergency session to study the new situation that has arisen as a result of the latest developments.

¹² Doc. 292 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹³ Docs. 331-333 in *ibid*.

¹⁴ Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), January 19, 1974, p. 2; for the text of the agreement see doc. 50 above.

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Press conference statements by President Sadat of Egypt discussing the disengagement agreement with Israel and relations with Syria¹⁵

Kuwait, January 20, 1974

Q. Could Your Excellency tell us about your visit to Syria and your meeting with officials there?

A. My visit to Syria was quite natural because we are one country and one front. It is nothing new; my visits to Syria and President Hafiz's visits to Cairo are supposed to be a regular thing. Actually, it was arranged that we would meet here in January with our brother Abu Salim [Amir of Kuwait]. However, after the latest developments, I began this tour to visit my brothers the Arab kings and presidents.

Q. Could Your Excellency tell us about the reasons for the visit of certain Egyptian envoys to certain Arab countries at present?

A. It is natural that whenever an event takes place it would be good for us to explain it to our brothers. It should be clear to our Arab nation that one of the most admirable gains we have achieved in the 6th October battle is the new Arab unity and the new Arab understanding stemming from conviction and from the participation by all of us in our cause. This in fact requires that from time to time whenever an event takes place or something happens we should contact our brothers, either by meeting them personally or by sending envoys to them so that everything will be clear to everyone in our march.

Q. Your Excellency, following the disengagement agreement between Egypt and the Israeli enemy, what would Egypt's attitude be if Israel should provoke Syria?

A. As I said, Egypt and Syria are a single country within the Federation and Egypt and Syria are a single front under one commander in chief. There is, therefore, no reason for such a question. Anything that happens to Syria will happen to Egypt and anything that happens to Egypt will happen to Syria; the country is one and the front is one

under the commander in chief. I take this opportunity to say this because regrettably I observe that some doubts are still being cast, something which is unnecessary since 6th October. I hope that we will rise to the level of the action carried out by the Syrian soldier in the Golan Heights and the Egyptian soldier in Sinai. I ask our brothers the writers to rise to this level because after 6th October the whole Arab nation has completely changed. There is no room for casting doubts because this would only serve our enemies; it will never serve our cause. Now everything is being studied between us in complete fraternity, frankness, understanding and responsibility.

Q. Mr. President, is the disengagement agreement a political or a military agreement, and what about this agreement?

A. I am really surprised. This is why I say that we and the journalists should rise to the level of the events in the Golan Heights and in Sinai on and after 6th October. The agreement is basically the second of the six points and that point calls for the return of the Israeli forces to the 22nd October positions within the framework of agreement on disengagement. The main thing is the return of the Israeli forces to the 22nd October line, which, as we all know, they went beyond and should return to. There are two Security Council resolutions in this respect, No. 338 and No. 339. In addition to these resolutions there is a guarantee by the two super-Powers regarding this line. When we began discussions on the return to the 22nd October line, it was clear that the Israelis realized that this was a predicament for them. In fact, militarily it was a predicament. Then the discussion turned to disengagement. The agreement is purely military. It was signed by the chiefs of staff. We should not treat it with such interpretations or doubts as have been or will be done. This has prompted me to say that our nation should fear God and that those who write should rise to the level of responsibility appropriate to the events of 6th October and afterwards.

Q. Mr. President, what is your visualization of the steps following the disengagement agreement?

A. As I said in Aswan, I and the US Secretary of State openly declared our commitment to the immediate and unquestionable step of disengagement on the Syrian Front.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President.

¹⁵ Broadcast by Kuwait radio in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4506/A/1-2; reprinted by permission. For the text of the agreement see doc. 50 above. President Sadat was on a tour of Arab countries starting on January 18 with Saudi Arabia; he then visited Syria, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Algeria and Morocco returning to Egypt on January 23.

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Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Saqqaf of Saudi Arabia reiterating that a relaxation of the oil embargo of the US depends on the achievement of Arab aims¹⁶

Early February, 1974

Q. What is the position of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia now that the disengagement agreement (between Egypt and Israel) has been signed and the Israelis have begun withdrawing to East of Suez?

A. I believe that the attitude of Saudi Arabia is clear. Efforts now being made are necessary if we are to liberate our territory in accordance with the decisions of the Arab Summit Conference in Algeria.¹⁷ We are still standing by our demand for a total settlement which, in brief, can be stated as follows: First, the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and secondly, guarantees of the rights of our Palestinian brothers and particularly their right to self-determination.

Q. How do you assess present relations between Egypt and Syria following the conclusion of the disengagement agreement and what effect has this step had on cooperation between them?

A. We are fully aware of the goodwill existing between the two parties and there is not a single sincere Arab who believes otherwise. The information available to me confirms that things are going well between the two countries. This should be clear because their aims are unified, and whatever rumors and statements are circulating to the contrary are unwarranted.

Q. What are your expectations from the Geneva conference if it is held?

A. What is important at the Geneva conference is the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, i.e. complete Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967. But there are certain points and questions which we must raise in this connection. Is the Israeli enemy prepared to effect complete withdrawal? Is he prepared to concede the rights of the Palestinian people? Experience with the enemy has taught us that his

aim in the area is to pursue expansion with a view to consolidating the foundations of a racist state such as those now existing in Rhodesia and South Africa. However, the difference between the two situations is that whereas in these latter countries the minority succeeded in dominating the majority, it did not drive the majority out of the country nor did it confiscate its properties and funds as the Israelis did with the people of Palestine. The Israeli enemy resorts to procrastination and deception to gain time. We believed, and still believe, that unless the US takes decisive action to compel Israel to carry out the commitments it has accepted, the Israelis will resort to procrastination and evasiveness.

Q. Will the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia press on with its cooperation with the Western European countries, and particularly France, and lessen cooperation with the US?

A. It is superfluous for me to say that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an independent country and is its own master, and determines its international postures in the light of its own interests and those of fellow Arabs as well as of the higher Arab interest. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is now striving to establish good relations with all the friendly states of the world. Cooperation with Europe is nothing new, but the continuation of a previous policy. This does not necessarily mean the weakening of relations with the US, because we wish to make the American people the friends of the Arabs. It is our hope that the US will renounce the policy of backing Israel so that friendship can be established between us and the American people.

Q. It has been reported that when President Anwar al-Sadat visited Saudi Arabia, he proposed the relaxation of the oil embargo on the US.¹⁸

A. The fact is that President Sadat visited Saudi Arabia and met with King Faisal. As for the latter part of your question, this was discussed by the Arab oil ministers on a previous occasion and was the subject of resolutions issued by them. With regard to the US, Arab oil shipments to it will be resumed when it demonstrates that it is not taking a pro-Israeli position. The aim of the

¹⁶ *Al-Anwar* (Beirut), February 3, 1974; partial English translation, *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), XVII, 16 (February 8, 1974), pp. iii-v.

¹⁷ Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹⁸ President Sadat of Egypt arrived in Saudi Arabia on January 18, 1974, on the first stage of a tour of Arab countries, cf. doc. 208 above.

embargo is not to penalize anyone but to alert the world to the Middle East question and to endow it with sufficient importance so as to make possible the evacuation of the enemy forces now occupying our land and holy places. There is no doubt that the oil weapon is fulfilling the role expected of it, and this weapon will remain at the ready in Arab hands to be used against certain states if friendly relations with them lapse.

Q. How do you view the present US policy towards the Middle East?

A. I am fully convinced that the US has begun, for the first time since the aggression of 1967, to work seriously for a settlement of problems which the Arabs have with their Israeli enemy. There is ample evidence of this in the movements of the US Secretary of State in the area and his achievement of some success.

Q. In what way can Palestinian rights be guaranteed?

A. The case of the Palestinian people is a just one, and it is their views on it that matter first and foremost. As I said earlier in this interview, the guaranteeing of the rights of the Palestinian people is one of the basic Arab conditions for establishing peace in the Middle East.

Q. What would be the solution if Israel refuses to withdraw completely from the territories occupied in 1967?

A. No doubt this is a question on everybody's mind. Our experience with Israel has taught us that it does not honor its commitments. Before the 6 October war we were stressing that our only weapon is force supported by faith in God and exemplified by unity of coordinated Arab action. This was our rationale in the past and this is what it will continue to be if Israel refuses to withdraw from Arab territories. This is the contingency we are guarding against.

Q. And the question of Jerusalem?

A. His Majesty King Faisal and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have a very special position on Jerusalem. I do not believe that any Muslim or Arab could accept anything less than the King's demand in regard to this matter. Jerusalem was the original direction of prayer and contains our holy sites, and there can be no overall settlement of the problem unless Jerusalem is restored to Arab hands.

Q. What is your view of rumors of a possible US military intervention, the aim of which would be to occupy the oilfields in the event the embargo continues?

A. I believe that this question has often been raised. I do not believe that in the present day world anyone would be capable of such foolhardiness. Yet, in spite of this, the Kingdom has taken all the necessary precautions and is prepared for any contingency.

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Press interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt reviewing US rearmament of Israel during the October war and disengagement efforts on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts (excerpts)¹⁹

Early February, 1974

Sadat: Do you know why America did not consign arms to Israel in the first four days of the war? Why American diplomacy made no serious move to stop the fighting from the first day?

On the first day of the fighting, Golda Meir contacted President Nixon and informed him of the Egyptian-Syrian attack. She told him that she had one request to make; it was that America should give her two days before taking any decision on a cease-fire, because "this is the chance we have been waiting for. It was the Arabs who started the attack this time, and in the course of two days the Israeli army is capable of smashing Egyptian and Syrian military strength once and for all... which will prepare the way for ending the state of tension in the area. Just give us two days."

America acceded to Golda Meir's request.

Two days later the Bar-Lev Line had fallen and our forces were gaining a foothold on the east bank. Similarly, the Syrian forces had started liberating Golan and gaining control of the Heights.

Meir contacted Nixon again and asked for two more days, as the first two had been spent in calling up the reserves, and now the counter-attack was about to start. "Give us two more days."

On the fifth day Meir was contacting the American President and screaming for help, saying: "We have lost 400 tanks in one battle in Sinai."

¹⁹ Interview conducted by Said Freiha, *al-Anwar* (Beirut), February 6, 1974; partial English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), III. 3 (Spring, 1974), pp. 195-197.

Help us by sending supplies at once." Here Kissinger took the receiver and told Golda Meir that America would send Israel what she needed as quickly as she could. But this could do no good; the picture had changed and Israeli supremacy had come to an end.

Thus American supplies began to pour in and Kissinger launched his campaign for peace.

Q. We do have unbounded confidence in you, but some people are asking in all sincerity what is going to happen when the Egyptian forces on the east bank have been reduced, when the Canal has been reopened and the oil embargo has been eased? What is going to happen then? That is to say, what means of exerting pressure will Egypt have left if Israel doublecrosses and America breaks her promises?

A. The important thing is the will of the Arab nation. It is the one safeguard. Before October 6 we had no other safeguard. Talk of war aroused ridicule; no one believed that we should fight and cross. Nor did anyone believe that this nation would give expression to its unity in the way it did. No one imagined that the oil weapon would be used in the battle, and with such success. How were all these forces released? By the Arab will—and this will still exists. We shall be able to surmount all obstacles and face all eventualities. If it is intended to doublecross and break promises, the Arab will is capable of creating new surprises.

Does the reduction of forces on the east bank of the Canal constitute an obstacle in the way of the Arab will? How could it? Did we have forces on the east bank before October 6? Were there not United Nations observer posts? Was there not the Bar-Lev Line and the water barrier? We are in a stronger position today, and better able to force them to respect our will for peace.

[*Questioned about the agreement on disengagement of forces on the Egyptian front,*²⁰ *Sadat commented:*] We do not accept half-solutions. I did not reject the state of no peace and no war so as to accept a new state of half war and half peace. Maintaining the engagement of our forces is half war and half peace, and I don't accept it. If we seriously want peace we must continue our attempts to make peace to the end. If not we shall ensure that there is a state of total war, to its full extent and with all the consequences this involves.

Half-solutions destroy energies, smash the will of the nation and are a reflection of inability to face facts. I am not afraid of facts and I do not conceal them from my people. I am confident of their ability to understand, and of their ability to respond and sacrifice when necessary.

Q. What about disengagement on the Syrian front?

A. What links us to Syria is our unity of blood, a unity that holds out in the face of all attempts against it. We shall never forget President Assad's stand and the great role he played in the Ramadan War. Our viewpoints are in full agreement. And we have had numerous meetings at all stages. . . . But there are special considerations in Syria that have to be taken into account.

Q. We have heard of Jordanian efforts to bring about a disengagement.

A. Why, are they engaged?

Q. What about the Palestinian state?

A. We are in complete understanding with the Palestinian resistance. Palestine is for the people of Palestine and for those who have fought for the liberation of Palestine, and imposed the Palestine problem on world policy, and made the conscience of the world aware of it.

Q. And Jerusalem, Your Excellency?

A. There is not a single Arab who will agree to the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre being given up. They are our holy places, our history and our national honour.

Q. The Egyptians have experienced the glories of the military crossing, which proved to them that all they had suffered and borne had not been in vain. What are you promising them now?

A. An evolution towards hope. Our first concern is economic reconstruction, what we might call economic opening up. Arab and foreign capital is invading us, but we must study, plan and select what will achieve economic prosperity, development and Arab integration.

²⁰ Doc. 50 above.

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Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Fahmy of Egypt discussing the Palestinian role in the Geneva conference²¹

Cairo, February 9, 1974

Q. Resolution 242 mentions a just settlement of the refugee problem but it does not mention the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. This being the case what point is there in attending the Geneva conference?

A. Although resolution 242 talks of the problem as a problem of refugees, it is indisputable that there is now awareness and understanding of the Palestine problem as being a problem not of refugees but of a people with national rights who must be allowed to exercise their legitimate right to self-determination. This is the attitude of Egypt and the Arab countries, as was made clear by the resolutions of the Algiers conference,²² and as was expressed both in letter and in spirit in the statement I made in Geneva.²³ Egypt is happy to observe that a change has taken place in world public opinion, even in the case of the super-powers, for the problem cannot be merely a refugee problem; it is above all else a political problem. On this basis Egypt's attitude is that the Palestine problem is not and cannot be a problem of refugees.

Q. What does Egypt regard as being the practical method of implementing the resolutions of the Algiers summit conference? And would the establishment of a Palestinian provisional government, regardless of the Geneva conference, be of service to the Palestine cause at this stage?

A. The answer to this question must be decided on by the Palestinians themselves: whatever they choose we shall accept. But clearly the time has come for the Palestinians to prepare themselves to take part in the Geneva conference independently so that they may join us in the defence of their legitimate rights.

Q. Do you intend to form an Egyptian-Syrian-Palestinian tripartite committee to meet the requirements of the coming stage? And if so at what level?

A. We are in contact with Syria, and also with the Palestinians. Last week I received a large number of our Palestinian brothers and I shall be receiving another large number of them tomorrow. Of course we shall welcome any proposal that renders this coordination better organized by giving it a tripartite form, as you suggested.

Q. What will happen to the Geneva conference if the Palestinians do not take part in it? And what effect would such participation have on the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?

A. The Geneva conference will succeed if the Israelis adopt a positive course and do not once more resort to prevarication. Since October 6 they have realized that the present is the best time to reach an agreement that will achieve peace in the Middle East by ensuring their evacuation of the occupied territories and meeting the national aspirations of the Palestinian people. It will not be easy to achieve this; it will need time and intensive efforts. But as long as our goal and our line are clear, and as long as we do not abandon this goal because of secondary problems, it will be possible for the Arab countries and the Palestinians represented at the Geneva conference to unify their efforts for the achievement of this goal.

Q. What will happen if the Palestinians do not take part in the Geneva conference?

A. It is understood that the Palestinians will take part in the Geneva conference at a subsequent stage; understanding on this was reached before the start of the conference.

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Communiqué issued on the occasion of the meeting of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and Presidents Sadat of Egypt, Assad of Syria and Boumedienne of Algeria²⁴

Algiers, February 14, 1974

Within the framework of joint Arab action, the foundations of which were laid by the Arab summit conference held in Algeria in November 1973, and in the light of the Arab nation's belief in the unity of its destiny and the need for it to be united in

²¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), February 10, 1974.

²² Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

²³ Doc. 342 in *ibid*.

²⁴ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), February 15, 1974.

its efforts on behalf of its cause, a meeting was held in the city of Algiers from Muharram 20–21, 1304 AH (February 13–14, 1974 AD) between His Majesty Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia, and Their Excellencies President Muhammad Anwar Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, President Hafiz Assad, President of the Syrian Arab Republic, and President Houari Boumedienne, President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the Algerian Popular Democratic Republic.

The four leaders reaffirmed the resolutions of the Algiers summit conference²⁵ which stipulate the following:

—Full withdrawal by the Zionist enemy from the Arab territories occupied in 1967.

—The safeguarding of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people in their territory and their homeland.

The meetings of the four leaders were held in an atmosphere of constructive cooperation inspired by higher Arab interests. They agreed unanimously on the matters they discussed.

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Speech by Speaker Asaad of Lebanon's Chamber of Deputies reviewing the question of the Palestinian presence in South Lebanon (excerpts)²⁶

South Lebanon, February 17, 1974

The first fact which must be emphasized is that the sons of the southern border villages in particular and the sons of the south in general are the ones who have been and still are paying the tax of blood since the beginning of the ordeal. The cost of facing the challenge is paid in chaste blood, deserted and destroyed property and lost security. The sons of the south go to bed with the sound of bombs and guns and wake up to the sound of planes. Elsewhere in towns, clubs, meetings and demonstrations and from the minarets the Arab cause and the Palestine cause are on every tongue....

The continuation of this situation at this stage

is not only useless for the cause but represents a stab to the very heart of the cause, the cause of each one of us. It merely serves the interests of the Zionist enemy. Why? Because the difference is great between the situation following the June war and the situation following the October war. The roles have been reversed and the picture has changed....

In the face of the present reality of international unanimity in support of Arab rights, Israel should have yielded and recognized our legitimate rights. A cease-fire followed, preparatory to the Geneva conference.... When Israel goes to these negotiations, it will not go of its own free will but under pressure and coercion. Therefore, Israel does not stop looking for an excuse for it to try to change the picture and distort it. The best example of this is the condition which Israel laid down for troop disengagement in Syria—that Syria should first hand over a list of Israeli prisoners....

We all know that Israel has ambitions regarding our land and our waters. It is lying in wait to achieve these ambitions. That is why it is exploiting fida'i actions from Lebanon. The question is: if the continuation of this situation does not serve the Lebanese, Palestinian or Arab cause at this stage, then what is the excuse for giving the enemy this justification? One might say that if fida'i action stops from Lebanon, Israel will resort to another excuse to continue shelling Lebanese border villages. This is sensible. But the answer to it is: why should we not block Israel's way and deny it the excuse and leave it to find another excuse....

If it is said that the Palestinians have not yet accepted the peace negotiations, our reply is that they have not yet rejected them either. We say to our brother fida'iyyin in this respect: if you feel that the conditions laid down detract from your rights and you therefore feel unsure about the results, then it is more proper for you to declare your rejection of these conditions before you move from the Lebanese borders to strike at Israel.... The Arabs will certainly ensure that the rights of the Palestinian people are safeguarded.... We are prepared to have a dialogue about these questions.... We shall be prepared to offer more and more once we know and feel confident that this will serve the Palestinian cause.

While I address this appeal to my brother Palestinians, I address you, sons of the south, to ask you to persist in seeing that we always preserve

²⁵ Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

²⁶ Made during a tour of South Lebanon villages and broadcast by Beirut radio on February 18 in Arabic; partial English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4531/A/1–2; reprinted by permission.

the ties of cordiality and love and fraternity between us and the fida'iyyin wherever they are. They and we have one cause. We do not want our relations with each other to be based on some document or agreement, whether it is called the Cairo agreement or any other name. Our relations must always be governed by the law of love and fraternity....

Some might say that the Arabs have not yet decided to resume the peace negotiations and consequently what harm can there be in keeping the situation as it is now until the matter is settled one way or another? Our answer...is...why should we accept the continuation of this situation when it does not serve the cause—indeed it poses a threat to it? Furthermore, the situation might continue for a considerable time. We also say: if the resumption of negotiations has not yet been decided, the resumption of war has not yet been decided either....

The Arabs should collectively decide either to resume the negotiations or to resume the war.... We must state our position now before anything happens. In the case of war, we here in Lebanon will not accept that we should continue to be subject to aggression or that we should continue to allow our dignity and sanctities to suffer. Whether Lebanon is classified as a supporting state or a front-line state, Israel will not cease to strike at it and aggress against it. For this reason, we insist, in the case of a resumption of the war, that a joint Arab plan should be drawn up in the light of unified planning under one Arab command. The Lebanese army with its present number and arms cannot provide the necessary protection and defence.

War against Israel is a joint Arab responsibility. The Arabs must bear this responsibility collectively. The Arabs must accept their responsibilities towards Lebanon now and in the present stage through which Lebanon is passing. We do not address this to you as much as we address it, in your name, to the official Arab authorities as well as to the Lebanese authorities—both rulers and authorities.

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Speech by President Qadhafi of Libya made before Egypt's National Assembly²⁷

Cairo, February 19, 1974

In the name of God, the Compassionate and the Merciful, please let us read the Alfatihah [opening chapter of Koran] for the souls of the martyrs. Mr. President, friends and brother members of the People's Assembly in the Arab Republic of Egypt, at the moment when we pray for the repose of our dutiful martyrs, we also feel dignified and proud because we have been able—amid difficult international circumstances—to write glorious pages in the history of the Arab nation.

I told His Excellency the President in the aftermath of the Ramadan battles that the storming and crossing of the Canal by the valiant Egyptian Army had honoured the Arab nation before it had honoured Egypt. I have previously asserted at several meetings with the Egyptian armed forces and at popular rallies in Libya and outside it that Egypt is always the citadel of the struggle, and it is always the first strike force (Arabic: quwwat as-sidam) of the Arab nation.

This is a heavy duty which destiny has placed on Egypt's shoulders and which Egypt has borne, generation after generation and throughout the successive annals of the history of the Arab nation. What happened in Ramadan and what will happen in the future was and will be a confirmation of my unshakable belief—namely, that Egypt is always the bastion that at all times throws back the raids of aggression against the countries of the Arab nation and against the domain of Islam.

This has not been mere praise, but it is a historic fact that I believe in. It is my belief in this fact that makes me during all, [that is] during some periods to talk to Egypt without others—even if this talk is hard in some instances. However, the motive behind this talk is the belief that Egypt is always the bastion that must not fall, because if Egypt falls, Arabdom falls. If the Arabs weaken, Islam weakens.

Therefore, we always devoted our attention to ensuring that Egypt should remain a steadfast bastion against the enemies. Egypt has always

²⁷ Broadcast by Cairo radio in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4531/A/4-6; reprinted by permission.

lived up to good expectations—that is, the expectations of Egypt. Egypt has never let the Arab nation down even during difficult circumstances, even in the difficult conditions we have experienced and continue to experience.

Since the emergence of the 1st September revolution, I have persistently called on the Arab nation to give what it has and place it behind Egypt. The call for the pan-Arabism of the battle surged from the Libyan Arab Republic, and this call echoed from all corners of the Arab nation. It is our right at this moment while we honour the heroes to salute the courageous stand of the Arab nation, because it is considered that the call for the pan-Arabism of the battle has succeeded, because at the decisive moments through which Egypt has lived the Arab nation gave what it was able to give. Although this was not adequate, this has, nevertheless, been what several Arab countries have been able to give.

Thus, it is our right today to greet the soldiers of the Arab nation who turned the pan-Arabism of the battle into reality during the Ramadan war. We should have a stronger belief in the unity of our nation, in its ability to be generous, and a stronger belief that at the decisive moment it can trample on the borders and smash the barriers that separate its sons. I say these words with complete honesty. I do not want to change any of the facts I believe in because when I saw specific political attitudes I frankly and clearly voiced my opinion from my own viewpoint concerning them, particularly the attitudes concerning which I was unable to [interrupts himself]—we could not reach a direct understanding to ascertain their magnitude.

When matters reach the point where they really affect the unity and destiny of the Arab nation, then the 1st September revolution is capable of containing and overcoming the errors. This is what is happening now. Those who have believed that Egypt might keep away from Libya or Libya keep away from Egypt were ploughing the sea [i.e. engaging in fruitless efforts]. Those who evaluate the real unity between our two peoples by comparing it with transient political positions are judging matters superficially.

At this hour in which we are celebrating the honouring of the heroes, it pleases me to convey to you the greetings of the armed forces in Libya, whose soldiers are still encamped with their

brothers here on the Egyptian land. There are also hundreds of the Egyptian armed forces who are silently and faithfully working for building and raising the combat effectiveness of the Libyan forces. I also convey to you the greetings of the Libyan people who strongly believe that they are an extension of the Egyptian people and that the Egyptian people are an extension of them and that the Libyan and Egyptian land are one stretch and that their destiny, despite all events, is a joint one and our future is one.

This is the fact to which we must devote our efforts, so that it may not be harmed. At this hour I strongly condemn those who might think of discrediting (Arabic: at-tatawul) the great Egyptian people or their valiant armed forces. We in Libya, in the Revolution Command Council, and in the armed forces themselves condemn any quarter which seeks to discredit the honour of the Egyptian armed forces or the steadfastness of the great Egyptian people.

The Libyan Arab Republic urgently calls upon the Arab nation, as it previously called upon it concerning the pan-Arabism of the battle, to stand behind the great Egyptian people so that they can tend their honourable wounds, and to help them in reconstruction. The Libyan people are called upon more than others to take part in the internal building in Egypt, as they had taken part with them in the decisive moments in the Ramadan [October] battles with everything they possessed without publicity or fanfare.

It pleases me, in the name of the Revolution Command Council and the Libyan armed forces, to announce that they have decided to grant the Order of Courage to the heroes we are honouring today. This is the precious medal that has been granted only to the free men who detonated the 1st September 1969 revolution.

We will once again repeat that those who have been judging the transient political attitudes as the principle on which to build their conclusions are deluded. They are judging matters superficially. It is a great honour for me to be with you today, together with the Libyan Chief of Staff, Lt-Col. Abu Bakr Yunis. I say it is a great honour for the Libyan Arab Republic to be present today because it is an affirmation of what I have said, and, if Libya and its armed forces were not present on such a day as this, then who is more worthy than they to be present on this immortal day.

[Words indistinct] to give the President the chance to speak I ask him and you that an opportunity be given to us again, and I hope in the not too distant future, in a closed session which is not broadcast over the radio. At this closed session—at this closed session I will read what is written down on paper. Long live the unity of the two peoples and of the Arab nation. Long live the Egyptian people and their heroic army: Peace be with you!

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Statement by President Qadhafi of Libya to the Islamic Summit Conference regretting the failure to implement previous Conference resolutions²⁸

Lahore, February 22, 1974

I am sorry to say that I have observed that previous conferences have not respected their own recommendations; I am afraid that this conference may not respect its recommendations in the future, so that our meeting and the efforts being made by Pakistan and by all of you, who have taken the trouble to come so far, will have been in vain.

At the conference of the foreign ministers of the Islamic countries held in Benghazi in Safar 1393 AH a number of resolutions and recommendations were adopted,²⁹ including recommendations on the subject we are dealing with at present, but what happened? I think that nothing happened.

This is the difference between us and our enemy. Our enemy decides, plans and carries out his plans, while we decide and plan and do not carry out our plans: "Act, and God, His Apostle and the believers shall see your action."³⁰

Why does the Quran tell us this? Why does it say "Act," and not "Wait."

Resolution No. 1 adopted at that conference called on the Islamic countries to open offices in all Islamic cities and capitals for the registration of volunteers to fight for the liberation of Palestine. Has this been done? Had it been done the Muslims

would have taken part in the holy Ramadan war and you might have liberated Jerusalem which we are now discussing.

This is a pact and a covenant stipulated by the Quran, but even those who did give help gave it too late; had it arrived in time it would have changed many things. Shall we then recall and implement what we have decided? All I can do outside my country is to make a new appeal for the implementation of this resolution.

Another resolution obliged the Islamic countries to adopt a positive and decisive attitude to the countries that allow their citizens to emigrate to Palestine.

We should have treated this seriously, but I am sorry to say we have been slack about it. The voice of the Libyan Arab Republic is the only one to have been raised against the countries that allow these floods of emigrants.

What have you done about this covenant, this promise, this pact?

Can we face up to our new decisions? Can we abide by them?

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Speech by Greek Orthodox Patriarch Elias IV of Antioch concerning Palestinian rights to Jerusalem made at the Islamic Summit Conference (excerpt)³¹

Lahore, February 23, 1974

This splendour which crowns Jerusalem and which we so ardently desire, derives from the sanctity of the Word that resided in it and went forth from it. But at the same time it derives from the continued presence of the Arab people who have lived in it, and some of whom were evicted from it a quarter of a century ago.

This people is still pulsating with life and struggling to return. If anyone has the right to return it is they, because by doing so they will have rejoined their native land and settled in their home. They are a people entrusted with a great civilization and a message promising the welfare of mankind.

²⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Fajr al-Jadid* (Tripoli), February 23, 1974.

²⁹ Doc. 74 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

³⁰ Koran, IX, 105.

³¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), February 24, 1974.

The enduring heritage of the Palestinians is but a call to Jerusalem which its people will recover and dwell in, for it is human beings, not stones, that give life to a place. The Palestinian essence of Jerusalem—its “Palestinianism”—is indeed of world significance, for its message is that men, whatever their faiths and creeds, should come together in dialogue, knowledge and truth.

The Holy Places will lose all significance if the believers of the country do not actually live around them, without this living presence they are mere ruins, for the believers have lived and prayed there uninterruptedly for two thousand years. These Holy Places were the scene of that meeting so full of noble significance, when the Caliph Umar met the Patriarch of Jerusalem in esteem and affection. And in the Holy War that we are now waging together, Muslims and Christians are united within the fold of Arabism. For Zionism came with its racist exclusiveness and military arrogance and evicted the inhabitants, overturning all established standards in the Arab East, violating the united heritage of Jerusalem in flagrant disregard of its historical features—a heritage which fills our hearts with joy and serenity. We, like you, want Jerusalem to be a citadel of pure spirituality in which all human rights are defended as we make our pilgrimage to God and establish the future civilization of all mankind on the foundations not of the desire for exploitation but of brotherhood and the protection of rights that ensure that there will be fruitful cooperation between the peoples of the world.

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Statements by General Secretary Hawatma of the PDFLP defending the establishment of a Palestinian national authority in territories liberated from Israeli occupation³²

Beirut, February 24, 1974

We know that American imperialism seeks a settlement of surrender and liquidation to the detriment of the rights of the people of Palestine,

a settlement that would, once again, expose our people to the dangers of dispersal and subjection, caught between Zionism, expansionism and subjection to the Hashimites. Imperialism believes that the interests of the Palestinian people are best served within the framework of Zionist expansion, with Israel not returning to the borders of June 4, 1967, and that they are best served by dissolving the Palestinian people once more in the proposed united kingdom and in places of their exile in the Arab countries and abroad. Imperialism further presents schemes for dissolution, resettlement and relocation in the countries of the region. Our position with regard to these schemes is clear.

Yes, we are Arabs but we are, at the same time, Palestinians. Just as every Arab people has a full right to an independent national existence, so the Palestinian people too has a full right to an independent national existence and to fight all schemes which agree with American imperialist schemes, for these latter seek to obliterate our national existence and refuse to grant it prior recognition.

Knowing all this, we still find opportunistic currents of thought which at times counsel wisdom and at others call upon us to remain within the framework of nationalist unity, such as took place with the regime of King Hussein. We also find leftist opportunist Palestinian opinions attempting to obscure their true positions, which do not in the least lead to a clash with imperialism, Zionism and Arab and Hashimite reaction, by putting forth bombastic slogans (“The whole of Palestine at once”, “Palestinian territories liberated from occupation are to go to the regime of King Hussein”). Our answer to these currents of thought is: They shall not succeed in directing the attention of the revolution from its objectives at this stage. Our people, our revolutionary bases and all the vanguard of the revolution know well that they must submit a pragmatic programme which puts the Palestinian people as a whole, the revolution as a whole and the movement for Arab national liberation against the American-Israeli-Hashimite solution of surrender and liquidation, together with any other solution presented by any Arab country which ignores our people’s national and historic rights at this stage.

The Palestinian opportunist forces, both of the right and of the left, which are again attempting to dissipate the energies of our people and destroy its independent national existence in preparation

³² Made in a speech delivered on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of the PDFLP; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hurriya* (Beirut), March 4, 1974.

for placing our people in a situation similar to the one obtaining between 1948 and 1967—these forces shall not succeed in their schemes and shall not divert us to take up a stand whose end is already well known to us. These currents are in essence currents of surrender because they succumb to the present balance of forces. Despite their revolutionary phraseology, these currents of opinion are willing to surrender to imperialist-Zionist-reactionary schemes. Their point of view can be stated as follows: How can we create a national authority on our Palestinian territories in the shadow of the present balance of power? The other alternative to this logic is to surrender to imperialist solutions and offer our occupied Palestinian territories again to the regime of King Hussein. We are violently opposed to this and we maintain the following: We are fighting to end occupation and to stand effectively against imperialist solutions. We are fighting for our people's right to establish its national authority on its own land after the occupation has been ended. We also maintain that the logic of events in the world today demands that we inflict more defeats upon imperialism and racist regimes, whether in Palestine, Rhodesia or South Africa. And while these regimes came into existence at a certain historical stage, our own age is witnessing the end of that stage. We are entering upon a new age whose basic feature is further defeats for imperialism, local reaction and racist regimes. To inflict further defeats upon these regimes, we must follow a correct international policy which enables our people to become self-reliant and stand on its own land. This is a necessary step if the struggle is to continue on the long path ahead, the path of a long popular war of liberation. We know the road well and shall not allow these opportunistic currents, both of the left and the right, both in the Palestinian and in the Arab fields, to lead us astray by endangering the rights of our people and making us surrender.

These opportunistic forces do not have a leg to stand on. At times they claim that a national authority would not have the means necessary for economic subsistence and would not be able to survive on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. To these opportunists we answer that we are not at the stage of searching for a homeland. Over there is our homeland, even if it is a desert with nothing but thorn and sand. There is our homeland, whether it has the economic means of survival

or not, although we should bear in mind that the economic potentialities of Palestinian territories occupied after 1967 are greater and more promising than those of many African and Asian countries, for example, Democratic Yemen. If we adopt this lunatic theory, half of Africa and the greater part of Asia would have been bound to fight to keep imperialism in their countries until such time as their economic means of subsistence would have allowed them to become independent.

We are now at a historic cross-roads. Let us beware of falling into the same errors. We must struggle decisively and in all clarity in order to propose a national programme and fight for its victory by means of armed struggle, of mass struggle and of all other forms of organized struggle. This programme must be pragmatic and must mobilize all our people and all forces of the revolution, pitting them against the solutions of surrender and liquidation proposed by the US, the Zionists and Arab and Hashimite reaction. It must enable our people to frustrate any Arab policies based on concessions or on weakening the Palestinian and Arab fronts in the common struggle. While warning against falling into error, we must also warn against attempts to deceive our Palestinian masses in Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere. For there are some who claim that if the masses in the occupied territories succeed in gaining their right to self-determination and establishing a national authority, the masses in Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere would have nothing left because they are the masses who belong to lands usurped in 1948. Those who propagate such false opinions fail to realize that deceit never goes very far. The struggle for the right to self-determination, for wresting the occupied territories from occupation and for establishing a national authority therein are gains won by all the Palestinians who belong to a single people. This national authority would make it possible for our masses in Lebanon and Syria to consolidate, organize and fortify the struggle to return to their homeland and further to wage a long war of national liberation until the imperialist, Zionist entity is finally defeated, no matter how long this takes.

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Speech by King Hasan of Morocco made on the anniversary of his accession reviewing Morocco's contribution in the October war (excerpt)³³

Fez, March 3, 1974

A little before this time last year, my beloved people, we feared that the Zionists would start a murderous war against our Syrian brothers and that Syria would be exposed to a violent surprise attack. In obedience to the call of our sacred duty to stand by and support her, we addressed an appeal to our armed forces asking them to inform us of which members would like to volunteer and join their brothers on the field of sacrifice and martyrdom. We were both proud and delighted when we heard how many of them had volunteered. However, it was impossible to accede to the wishes of all who volunteered with such enthusiasm, so we accepted some of them only and formed them into an expeditionary force which we lost no time in sending to Syria fully equipped with arms and ammunition to occupy positions on the front line on the Golan Heights. The day the fighting broke out this force was prepared and on the alert; they were not surprised by the ferocity of the attacks. However, the battle was fought on two fronts at once, in Sinai as well as the Golan. We regarded it as our duty to take part in the all-out battle of honour on both fronts at once so that our effective presence might be seen as a factor of support, reinforcement and participation in winning victory in the territory of two Arab countries. As soon as the Egyptian armed forces effected their amazing crossing of the Canal we hastened to send a detachment of our armed forces to join their Egyptian counterparts. They were to fight with them just as the first detachment fought alongside their Syrian brothers in the ferocious battles that were crowned with such glorious victories.

It gives us great pleasure and pride to recall the unremitting and praiseworthy efforts made by the Moroccans to ensure that our soldiers reached the Egyptian battle front. Troops and equipment were transported with the required speed and in

satisfactory conditions. Civilians and military men cooperated in organizing the airlift between Morocco and Egypt, whereby Moroccans, both military and civilian, played their part in the armed conflict between right and wrong.

Just as our country hastened to stand by and support our brothers in critical and dangerous circumstances, so we are resolved to continue to support, aid, and assist them in whatever course they choose to follow in ensuring that the truth prevails and that falsehood is overthrown. We hope that our brother Arabs will recover all the territories they have lost and that our Palestinian brothers will obtain their demands and their established legitimate rights as soon as possible.

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Press interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt discussing the new situation created by the Middle East war³⁴

Burj al-Arab, Egypt, mid-March, 1974

Q. What leads you to believe that the shift in U.S. policy in the Middle East represents a fundamental change?

A. If you compare what happened in June, 1967, and in October, 1973, you cannot escape the conclusion that there has been a fundamental change in U.S. policy. Your guarantee to Israel on maintaining the balance of power remained the same. In 1973, you even threw all your military weight openly on the side of Israel. In 1967, however, the U.S. prevented the Security Council, for the first time in its history, from ordering withdrawal along with the cease-fire. The U.S. twisted arms, threatened and did its level best to inflame further what already was the most dangerous situation in the world. Not so in 1973. Though the U.S. heavily supplied Israel with the most sophisticated weapons and military equipment, it very quickly understood the implications of the Oct. 6 war. This was the turning point which led the United States to take a new look at the Middle

³³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Anba* (Rabat), March 4-5, 1974.

³⁴ Interview conducted by Arnaud de Borchgrave, *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), March 18, 1974. Copyright International Herald Tribune 1974.

East and to embark, as a result of that, on a policy of working toward peace based on justice for the region.

My talks with Dr. Kissinger convinced me that he rejects the simplistic notion of some of your strategists who see—or saw—Israel as the American gendarme in this part of the world. The whole equation has changed. Oct. 6 has changed many things in the world. It has even forced a drastic rethinking on relations between the “have” and the “have-not” countries throughout the world.

Q. To what degree do you feel that the Mideast—and the chances for a lasting settlement—would be affected by President Nixon's impeachment?

A. It would be a real tragedy for our area and for the world if he were impeached because, as I told you, it is the first time that we see in the Middle East, which holds vast American interests, a new approach to the solution of our problems. This is the doing of the Nixon administration. Make no mistake about it. Look at what the Johnson administration did by comparison.

Yes, it would indeed be a terrible tragedy if the American people lost sight of the global picture for the sake of narrow domestic political considerations.

Q. Do you now have the feeling that Israeli policy is also beginning to change?

A. If we witness a successful disengagement on the Syrian front, as I think we will, then you can say there is a new look in Israel. It is not disengagement in itself that is important, but what it signifies. The significance, quite simply put, is that expansion has come to an end. The theory of secure borders through acquisition of others' land has proved a failure.

Q. What, in your judgment, is a settlement that everyone can live with?

A. It's quite clear. Evacuation of the territories occupied in 1967, along with a solution of the Palestinian problem that is based on the legitimate national rights of the Palestinians. That will mean a final end to the state of belligerency that has poisoned the area for 26 years. And that, in turn, will mean that a new era of peace will become possible.

Q. Many Israelis concede that the October war has profoundly changed the Mideast situation and tilted the balance in favor of a lasting settlement. But they still

ask me what is President Sadat's vision of a lasting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Before they take real risks on complete withdrawal, they want to know how you envisage Israel's role in a new era of peace?

A. First of all, let me state as categorically as possible that I vehemently reject the way of thinking that says that, in fulfilling complete withdrawal, there will be a risk for Israel. I can assure you there won't be. To say that there is a risk is a reflection of the June, 1967, mentality. If the Israelis continue to think that withdrawal entails a risk, then we shall be back in the vicious circle that was created by the Johnson administration. What I think is this: there must be new thinking in Israel as a result of Oct. 6, as there is new thinking in the Arab world. The end of the state of belligerency is the achievement we should all think of—and work toward. Let us concentrate on our pending problems—the ways and the means and the international guarantees necessary to insure a permanent and honorable peace.

Q. Some key Israelis say they would be willing to take a risk on returning all of Sinai if Egypt were prepared to establish normal relations with Israel and agree to demilitarize most of Sinai. Is this possible in the future?

A. I am a man of peace. But the Israelis must not be so ambitious as to think there is instant peace. It is an evolutionary process at the end of which you have normal relations. There are several confidence-building measures along the way to normalcy. How can relations become normal instantly after all the bloodshed, turmoil and bitterness of the past generation? Ending the state of belligerency will be an achievement in itself. But first the Israelis must take a new look. The question is whether they are ready in Geneva to relinquish the old theory of security, of Ben Gurion and the pioneers, that has proved illusory and a failure. I want to make peace, real peace.

Q. You have asked the Israelis to take a chance on peace, which must include respect for the legitimate national rights of the Palestinians, when the Palestinians themselves cannot seem to agree on what this means. Isn't this a little risky?

A. Palestine is the core of the whole problem. And I'm a man who believes that nothing is impossible. I think we should go ahead and tackle the core despite all the difficulties and obstacles. And at the end I'm quite sure the Palestinians will assume their responsibilities.

Q. Hardly a day goes by without an Arab leader referring to the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. But no one defines them because they say it's up to the Palestinians to do so. Doesn't anyone have any ideas on the subject? What are your own, for example?

A. I have my ideas, of course, but they are only mine. They are not Palestinian. Let's give them an opportunity to express themselves at Geneva. It won't be as difficult as many people think.

Q. Many moderate Israelis still suspect that the Arabs, long-term, want to dismantle the state of Israel as it existed prior to the 1967 war. What can you do or say to prove to them this is not so?

A. I pledge real and honorable peace. If I were interested in dismantling the Israeli state, why didn't I use my ground-to-ground missiles during the war? I can tell you something only a few Egyptians knew up until now. My long-range missiles were targeted against three main cities in Israel.

And why didn't I give the order to launch an all-out attack against their pocket on the west bank of the [Suez] canal? A simple order from me and we could have eliminated that pocket in very short order. We had rockets zeroed in on every one of their 400 tanks which, at night, were dug into static positions. In a few seconds, they would have lost about half their tank force on the west bank—allowing for misses. We also had 800 of our own tanks around their pocket ready to roll over the rest of the Israeli force.

But wars are a serious business. You don't start or restart them the way you start a student demonstration. Some 3,000 tanks were lost in the October war on both sides. That's much bigger than anything that happened in World War II. We had made our point to the Israelis in October—collapsing all their pet theories. There was no more point to more war. Peace is now the way, a peace based on justice, under which all states in the area can thrive and prosper. My attitude is crystal clear and I will discuss this openly in Geneva. This is the best way to convince the Israelis we are sincere.

Q. Are you convinced in your own heart and mind that Israel and its Arab neighbors can live side by side in peace?

A. The future will decide this because it will be a reciprocal process. The wise attitude is to begin from the proper point of departure—meaning that no one should take what does not belong to him,

under any pretext. Once it is returned, it will be like someone returning stolen goods and making honorable amends.

Q. How long do you give yourself to reach the next phase of Israeli withdrawal across Sinai?

A. I would hope tomorrow morning. But being a realistic man, I realize it will take some time. Probably a few more months.

Q. What sort of timetable do you envisage for an overall settlement? How long for Sinai and Golan? How long for the creation of a Palestinian state?

A. An overall settlement cannot be reached with Egypt only. There will be no separate peace. Egypt, Syria and the Palestinians will move forward in the negotiation together along parallel lines. With new thinking on all sides, you will see that events can be telescoped, and it won't take as long as you think.

Q. Isn't it better in the next stage to negotiate an overall Sinai settlement rather than a phase-by-phase arrangement, which each time may create a new crisis?

A. That would be the wise way to proceed. But not Egypt alone. The other parties must also be included. Disengagement, which was negotiated separately on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, was a purely military issue. When it comes to political issues, the three parts are inseparable.

Q. Is the reopening of the Suez Canal to international traffic contingent on an overall Sinai settlement—or is it now a routine procedure, once the canal has been cleared?

A. My purpose is to create a new atmosphere for peace in the Mideast. I told Secretary [William] Rogers so in 1971. Had he understood what I was talking about, the United States and Egypt could have restored full diplomatic relations long ago. Reopening the canal is purely an Egyptian decision. Our aim is to ease all the difficulties for our friends in Africa, Asia and Western Europe, so that everyone can share in the prosperity that an open canal will bring.

Q. But is there a link between the resumption of navigation and a Sinai settlement?

A. Why do you Americans always have to link everything?

Q. You have relinquished your means of direct military pressure on the Israelis—which was engagement on the west bank of the canal—and agreed to sharply reduce your own forces and weaponry on the east bank. If you

don't obtain further Israeli withdrawals, what will be the situation?

A. Draw your own conclusions from my attitude in the last three years. I am not threatening anyone, but the other side must realize it cannot stay in our country—unless, of course, they are thinking of another war.

Q. Kissinger describes you privately as the only statesman with vision in the Mideast—and he included Israeli leaders in that assessment. What do you think of him?

A. First let me say there are many men of vision in the Middle East. I am not the only one. Kissinger is a man of his word. I trust him completely. He is the first U.S. official who has dealt with our problems who has proved himself to be a man of integrity—direct, frank, and farsighted. We have suffered a lot with American officials in the last two decades, beginning with [John Foster] Dulles and ending with Rogers. Kissinger, under the guidance of President Nixon,—and you cannot separate the two—has revolutionized the thrust of U.S. policy in our area, and before that in the rest of the world. What Nixon and Kissinger did with China and the U.S.S.R. was unthinkable a few years back. They are now doing the unthinkable in the Mideast. Kissinger is a strategist and a man of vision, imagination and, perhaps most important of all, trust.

Q. What were the key factors in your decision to set Oct. 6 as D-Day? Is it true that the Nixon-Brezhnev decision in the spring of 1973 to put the Mideast problem in cold storage and the subsequent Israeli Labor party platform, and its annexationist program, tipped the balance in favor of war?

A. Partly correct. But also bear in mind other factors. In the summit communiqué of the year before, there was a reference to “military relaxation.” And that, automatically, meant that no-war-no-peace would continue indefinitely, and that was intolerable to us.

No strategist in America or Israel guessed correctly why I asked Soviet military advisers to leave in July, 1972. Everyone thought that I had abandoned war as a way of breaking the deadlock. They all said that, without the Soviet advisers, I could not go to war. Well, with the Russian military out of the country, I was making sure that no one could claim that what we did in the future was inspired by the Soviets. If Arab victory there

was to be, it had to be clearly Arab. A victory that the world would describe as a non-Arab victory would clearly have defeated my overall strategic objective.

After the war broke out, the Israeli propaganda machine said that it had been aided and abetted and planned by the Soviets. This was an attempt to keep the Mideast polarized between Israel and the United States on one side and Egypt and the Soviet Union on the other. It didn't work, and that polarization has now come to an end.

Q. What is your vision of Egypt and the Middle East five years from now?

A. A durable, just and honorable peace in our area. And with everything the Arabs now have, you will see prosperity that defies the imagination. I also see the Arab unity forged on Oct. 6 continuing and growing. And all this will mean that our area will enjoy the best of relations with the big powers and the rest of the world.

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Press interview statements by Oil Minister Yamani of Saudi Arabia warning that the oil embargo against the US, if lifted, can be reimposed³⁵

Mid-March, 1974

Q. I would like to know your point of view with regard to the positive aspects of the use of the oil weapon in the service of the Arab cause?

A. I believe that the oil weapon has caused a fundamental change in the strategies of international politics with regard to the Middle East. It has made the Western world take stock of its real interests which lie in our part of the world, and which overshadow the Zionist financial, political and propaganda presence in Western circles. For example, European nations cannot exist without Arab oil, and the flexibility of the Arab oil weapon made it impossible for Zionist forces to encourage a Western confrontation with the Arabs. Therefore, the oil weapon has produced its desired effect—that is, it has stimulated a political change towards the Arabs. We, as Arabs,

³⁵ *Al-Akhbar* (Cairo), March 14, 1974; English translation, *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), XVII, 21 (March 15, 1974), pp. 10–11.

should move towards those who move towards us and cooperate with those who cooperate with us. In other words, we pursue a policy of the "stick and carrot" or more clearly a policy of "threats and promises." For any move in our interest from the West we, as Arabs, are prepared to make a similar move. These continuous changes in our policy are evidence of our political flexibility.

Furthermore, we have prevented Zionism from mobilizing the Western states against the Arabs in its attempt to create a confrontation. The question then, is not one of pressure by the US. Saudi Arabia's oil production was supposed to have reached 10 million b/d in 1974. If we were to hold production at the 8.5 million b/d level, the world would feel the shortage and this would be evidence of the continued deployment of the oil weapon. And the truth is that we have not opened the tap to the full for the tap is still in place. If we agree to the resumption of oil supplies to the US, this would not mean that the use of the oil weapon is at an end. The oil weapon is still in our hands and the world will always be aware of it and will always be mindful of its interests in future.

I would like at this point to clarify a fact. The aim of the oil weapon was not intended as a punishment, but to recover our territories and restore the lawful rights of the Palestinian people. If we intended punishment we would have had to apply painful punitive measures against states, but what happened was that we applied "a pinch" to some states to make them aware of our interests. Thus, since the Arabs' aim was to win over friends and isolate Israel from its friends, it was not appropriate to use the oil weapon except within the limits which would lead to the realization of this objective.

Q. And what about America?

A. There has been a real change in US policy towards the Arab problem for the first time in 25 years. We either encourage such change and show our appreciation of its importance, or else we nip it in the bud. There is nothing that Israel would like more than to put paid to this change. America must feel that its plans are appreciated and we must therefore make a move.

Q. Does this mean that the decision to resume the flow of oil to the US is incorporated in the report which you will submit to the conference today?

A. If it is decided to lift the oil embargo against the US, this will be completely in line with our

previous actions. When we first decided to reduce output on a monthly basis and later to raise it with respect to Japan and most European countries, we did so in response to political moves in our favor.

There are now clear political moves on the part of the US, which is the only country with the means to put pressure on Israel. Therefore if we act today as we did previously, this should not be regarded as submission to certain pressures. Rather it would be a continuation of the policy of movement and flexibility. And this policy does not mean moving in one direction only, but in two opposite directions. For if the need arises to reimpose the embargo or reduce output again, the Arabs will do it. This is a fact known to the West and to the US in particular, and should also be known to the Arab World. Possession of a weapon does not necessarily imply using it, and not using it does not imply losing it. We shall not bend to any pressures but shall act in accordance with higher Arab interests, and Arab policy with respect to oil is, to repeat, one of threats and promises.

Q. Does your report provide for new positions to be adopted at Tripoli, apart from the resumption of the oil flow to the US?

A. During our first tour, we prepared a report on the change in attitude of some countries towards our cause and requested an increase in the levels of production and the granting of preferential treatment to certain European countries like Belgium and to Japan. During our second tour, we discerned a significant and basic change in the attitude of West Germany towards the Arab cause. My colleague Belaid Abdesselam, the Algerian Minister of Industry and Energy, and I have received a letter from the German Foreign Minister clearly defining Germany's new policy—which, by right, may be regarded as a basic change towards the Arab cause—and calling for an end to Israeli occupation of all Arab territories occupied since 1967. He also emphasized in his letter that the problem of the Palestinian people is not one of refugees only and that the solution of this problem should be effected within a political framework which restores to these people their legitimate rights. We should therefore take a decision at the conference with respect to Germany, which corresponds to the basic change in that country's attitude towards our cause, and likewise with respect to the US. There should be a change in our

position to match the change in its position towards our cause.

Q. And how about Holland?

A. No we shall not move one step towards it because it has not moved towards us.

Q. And Denmark?

A. Like Holland. We shall not move, nor lift the embargo against them. They will both be subjected to the same production restrictions.

Q. How about the extent of Saudi-Egyptian cooperation?

A. Unlimited cooperation.

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Press statement by PDFLP General Secretary Hawatma analyzing the Palestine question³⁶

Beirut, March 14, 1974³⁷

The PDFLP is a leftist organization and our approach to all problems is based on a leftist and class view. From that basis, then, I want to stress precisely that we know that the solution to the Palestinian and Israeli question will require an entire historical period, exactly as the birth of Israel was the product of a long, historical period.

The creation of Israel resulted from a long period of collaboration by the Zionists with imperialism at a time when the entire Middle East was under the hegemony of imperialism and feudal Arab regimes. And prior to that dual control system, the whole region was under the yoke of the backward Ottoman regime.

Ultimately, the result of this domination was the birth of Israel and the hegemony of colonialism in the area. But following World War II, an international counterforce brought the beginnings of defeat for imperialism as the socialist bloc grew in strength, together with the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic and the national liberation movements.

In the Middle East, following the creation of Israel, we witnessed a chain of events, directed towards moving away from colonialism and towards making gains for Arab national liberation movements. These developments have brought about a confrontation between the Arab national liberation movements and the state of Israel with its imperialist allies.

This confrontation can take various forms, sometimes interrupted by ceasefires or temporary solutions. The confrontation will also be affected by the development of the Arab movements and internal Israeli movements. But we believe that the solution of the Israel-Palestine problem and the Israeli-Arab problem can only come when the vestiges of the past historical period have disappeared.

The transformation of the Middle East region into a democratic and progressive region will surely take place and this transformation opens the possibility of a peaceful solution to the problems. But the prospects for this possibility will be affected by developments inside Israel. Regretfully, we see that, until now, these developments are very small and so we believe that the possibility of a real peace is still far in the future.

Any real solution to the Middle East problem must be based on the elimination of the expansionist and aggressive lines in Israel coupled with the recognition of national Palestinian rights. Until now, however, the major currents in Israel are in contradiction with these two points. We must note, for example, that the results of the October War in Israel are in opposition to these two points, as is very clear in the programs of both the Likud and the Maarach.

Golda Meir's communique to the Knesset, designed to get support for her cabinet also demonstrated opposition to these two key points. She reaffirmed her government's refusal to return to the pre-1967 borders, assured the Israelis she refuses to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people to have an independent government in Gaza and the West Bank and also announced her refusal to sit with representatives of the Palestinian people at Geneva.

The Meir position very clearly demonstrates the expansionist and aggressive nature of the principal political force in Israel and thus makes the entire situation much more complex. In addition, it makes the whole Middle East the target for more

³⁶ Statement made to Paul Jacobs and published in Hebrew, *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), March 22, 1974; English translation, *New Outlook* (Tel Aviv), XVII, 3 (March-April, 1974), pp. 65-67.

³⁷ The information in the dateline is from a statement by Hawatma to Lucien George, *Le Nouvel Observateur* (Paris), March 25-31, 1974, p. 34.

suffering rather than offering hope for a real solution.

We note, too, that a majority of the Israelis have moved to the right, supported by the right-wing and the center-right which seek to push the Israeli people even further to the right. But we also know that the Israeli right and center right-wings are not the only forces in Israel and in the area.

International pressures must be taken into account. Thus, the actual situation may impose on Israel the need to lessen its expansionist and aggressive tendencies but, because this shift is not the result of a political and intellectual change in Israel, the situation becomes complicated again.

The starting point towards a real solution is the starting of changes within Israel and further democratic and progressive developments more antagonistic to imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction. But we do not foresee a quick solution; we know that achieving real peace will take a long time. But we also know that certainly an essential factor to help in arriving at a real solution will be the acquisition by the Palestinians of some of their national rights, at a later stage.

Heading the list of those rights are the rights of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza to form a national independent state and that of the Palestinian refugees to return to the homes taken from them in the past period. This was approved by the UN in its resolution (194) in 1948.

The implementation of these rights will open the way to a democratic dialogue between democratic and progressive Palestinians and their Israeli counterparts, allowing both forces to search for a radical democratic solution to the problem. But we see the Israeli government, in alliance with the Jordanian regime and the United States, refusing to acknowledge the rights of the Palestinian people and thus not even helping bring about a partial solution, much less a long range one.

For ourselves, in the Palestine Liberation Organization, we stress that the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and the return of the refugees would represent big steps towards a democratic solution to the problem in the future. But when the forces of the right in Israel refuse to discuss these points they gamble with the future of the Israeli people. Personalities like Ben-Aharon and Eliav, who are Zionists, plus people of the Zionist left and democratic anti-Zionists in Israel

serve the interests of the Israeli future 1000 times more than do Meir, Dayan, etc. This is so because Meir and company follow a policy that contradicts the historical current in the Middle East and the world. Meir, Dayan and the Israelis who support them have based their position on maintaining a military power superiority in the region at a time when the future of the region will not allow such a superiority to exist. These people have taken a road which leads them against the historical currents in the area. Unfortunately, Meir still thinks with the same mentality as was held by those in the closed, isolated ghettos who believed that building a fortress equipped with military power could assure their survival.

The October War was an example of this type of false reasoning. We do not maintain that the Arabs won a big victory in that war but we do state that the October war proved Israel's reliance on military force cannot succeed in preserving its future.

Developments in the modern world do not serve the interests of the right-wing tendencies in Israel. Today, worldwide pressure is mounting against imperialism and racist states like South Africa, Rhodesia and Israel. But we know, very well, that the Palestinian problem is very complex, much more complex than that of Vietnam or of Rhodesia and South Africa. The complexity of the Middle East problem derives from such reasons as the troubled history of the area, the development of capitalism in the 19th and 20th centuries, the effect of that capitalism upon the Jewish people, the conflict between European and Jewish capitalism, and the nature of the Israeli presence in Palestine, based, as it is, upon the uprooting of the Palestinian people and their expulsion from their native land. In Vietnam, Rhodesia and South Africa, the people remained on their land while the Palestinians are a people expelled from its homeland, deprived of their national identity, whose rights have been trampled upon by Israel, the United States and Jordan.

We say, very clearly, to the Israelis that we struggle for peaceful relations between Palestinians and Israelis. We believe, by all historical precedents, that living in peace means arriving at basic and democratic solutions to questions inside a united, democratic state where Palestinians and Israelis will live together with the same rights and responsibilities.

But we know that instituting this united, democratic state is impossible in this period. Therefore, we say that the study of the future relationships between Palestinians and Israelis can come only after the national oppression of the Palestinians, resulting from the loss of their national rights, has been lifted. Then, the Palestinian people will be in a position to study the future relations between themselves and the Israeli people. But now, the Palestinian people are uprooted and expelled and unable to carry on such discussion. For example, when the Vietnamese people were asked about their future relationships with the United States, they replied by saying that they could only discuss their future relations after they had their own rights.

The question of the Israeli state is a question for the future, which can be discussed with Israeli Zionists like Ben-Aharon and Eliav plus all the democratic and progressive forces opposed to Zionism and imperialism. At the present time, the possibilities of a fruitful dialogue between the Israeli people and the Palestinian people depend upon the establishment of an independent, national Palestinian state and the restoration of their rights to the Palestinian refugees. Without these steps being taken, no real peace will be possible.

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Communiqué issued after a meeting of Arab Oil Ministers announcing the lifting of the oil embargo against the US³⁸

Vienna, March 18, 1974

The Arab Oil Ministers held several meetings in Tripoli and Vienna during the period 13 to 18 March in the course of which they heard the report of Shaikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources of Saudi Arabia, and Mr. Belaid Abdesselam, the Algerian Minister of Industry and Energy, on the second part of their tour which covered Spain, Italy, West Germany and Japan.

The Ministers studied the political analyses presented by the two Ministers which were based

on the talks they had had with officials in the aforementioned countries.

The Ministers reassessed the results of the Arab oil measures in the light of their basic objective which is to draw world attention to the Arab question in order to create an atmosphere conducive to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 calling for total withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

The Ministers noted that the said measures had alerted world public opinion to the importance of the Arab world for the well-being of the world economy and consequently led to a recognition of the legitimate demands of the Arab nation. This in turn led to the gradual isolation of Israel and paved the way for the adoption of political positions clearly condemning Israel's expansionist policy. Among such positions were the substantial change in the attitude of the European Community, expressed in its statement issued on 6 November 1973,³⁹ and the even clearer and more just stands forthcoming from Belgium, Italy, West Germany and Japan. Then there were the signs which manifested themselves in many American circles urging, in varying degrees, the need for the adoption of a more even-handed US policy in the Middle East and vis-à-vis the Arab world.

From recent developments it became apparent to the Ministers that official American policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict has lately taken a new direction—one which, if reinforced, would lead to the adoption by the US of a position more consistent with principles of right and justice as regards the occupied Arab territories and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

The Arab Oil Ministers are aware that oil is a weapon that can be employed in a positive manner to yield more effective results than may be obtained from its use in a negative fashion. Therefore, they came out of their meetings with decisions for the employment of the oil weapon in a positive manner with a view to encouraging those countries which showed willingness and determination to strive for a just solution to the Arab question leading to the complete termination of the occupation and the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

³⁸ Issued in Arabic; English translation, *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), XVII, 22 (March 22, 1974), pp. 6–7. The meeting was attended by Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the United Arab Emirates.

³⁹ Doc. 184 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

Israel alone will have to bear the heavy responsibility if subsequent developments lead to the adoption of more stringent oil measures, in addition to the enlistment by the Arab nation of other resources for use in the battle of destiny.

Israel alone was responsible for the adverse effects suffered by those countries that were subjected to the embargo or the cutbacks in production, and remains responsible today for the maintenance of Arab oil production at a level which is below market requirements.

In the light of the aforementioned principles, objectives and facts, the Ministers decided upon the following at the conclusion of their meetings:

First: To treat Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany as friendly states and guarantee their oil needs.

Second: To lift the embargo on oil exports to the United States of America, it being understood that this decision, as well as all the other decisions, will be reviewed at a meeting to be held by the Arab Oil Ministers in Cairo on 1 June 1974.

The Ministers reaffirm their support for all the Arab states in their just battle, and for the Syrian Arab Republic which at the present juncture is endeavoring to pursue a course of action ultimately leading to the complete liberation of its territory and of all occupied Arab territories, foremost among them Jerusalem.

The Syrian Arab Republic did not give its assent to the decision to lift the embargo; and, for its part, the Libyan Arab Republic did not give its assent to the decision to lift the embargo and increase production.

For its part, Algeria makes it clear that the lifting of the embargo is provisional in nature and limited to the period expiring 1 June 1974.

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Message from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Syria to the Palestine resistance expressing its full support⁴⁰

Damascus, mid-March, 1974

Comrades, at the request of the Fourth Conference, the Central Committee of the Syrian Com-

munist Party sends you its sincerest regards and through you salutes the armed sectors of the Palestine revolution, the revolutionary vanguards of the Palestinian people who are struggling to liberate their usurped homeland, Palestine.

The tragedies that have befallen our Arab people at the hands of colonialism, Zionism and Arab reaction through more than half a century have not turned them aside, either before or since the usurpation of Palestine, from pursuing their struggle and offering sacrifices, generation after generation, on behalf of freedom.

Our people in Syria have shared in all the risings and revolutions sparked off by the Palestinian Arab people against British occupation and Zionist settlement and against the usurpation of Palestine. Especially since the disaster of 1948 they have been more than ever determined to embrace the Palestine cause and to struggle against the Zionist presence, which has become a colonialist striking force in the hands of imperialism for aggression against the Arab regions, for expansion at their expense, and for opposition to the Arab national liberation movement and Arab unity.

The course of armed struggle that you have pursued both before and since the June aggression is a continuation of the glorious revolutionary traditions of the Palestinian Arab people. In recent years, and especially in the shadow of defeat, this struggle has kindled the enthusiasm of the whole Arab people and kept the problem of Israeli aggression alive and before their eyes and those of all freedom-loving forces in the world.

The Palestine resistance has been the object of continuous conspiracies on the part of the reactionary forces. The reactionary ruling clique in Jordan has organized massacres to liquidate it, to silence the voice of the Palestinian Arab people and to put an end to the method of armed struggle so as to ensure the success of liquidation solutions.

Although it did not achieve its principal goal of liberating the territory occupied by the June aggression, the October war proved that the only language understood by Israel is the language of force. It made clear that our people must expect further battles if they are to seize the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people and to liberate the occupied territory.

In the present situation the conspiracies of American imperialism and Zionism to outflank the Arab national liberation movement are being

⁴⁰ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), March 23, 1974, p. 12.

stepped up. They are using more vicious and cunning methods and trying to divide the ranks of the Arab nationalist and progressive forces and the resistance so as to draw the Arabs into the pitfalls of surrender and liquidation of the cause in Israel's favour.

Since the Third Conference in 1969 our Party has not restricted itself only to expressions of solidarity with your intrepid struggle. It has played a part in commando action both by cooperating with the other Arab communist parties and by joining the resistance organizations and taking part in armed struggle in Jordan and South Lebanon.

This modest participation is an expression of our Party's links with the cause; it has had a profoundly positive influence on the minds of communists and strengthened their links with the Palestinian Arab people and their armed sectors and strengthened their faith in the justice of that people's cause.

Our pleasure is increased by the fact that the Fourth Conference, held in December 1973, reinforced the revolutionary sympathy displayed by the Third Conference. It developed it by according this cause the importance it deserves, and by stressing the need for continued participation in the struggle in which you are engaged.

In conclusion, permit us to express our profound conviction that the blood of tens of thousands of martyrs will not have been shed in vain and that all the conspiracies intended to assassinate the cause of the Palestinian Arab people will prove abortive. This just cause, the cause of the liberation of Palestine, will be crowned with victory thanks to the endurance and unity of the Palestinian revolutionaries and to the struggle of the whole Arab people.

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Press interview statements by General Secretary Muhsin of Saïqa dismissing the Geneva conference as a way to a settlement and criticizing Iraq's withdrawal of troops from the Golan front and the lifting of the oil embargo⁴¹

Early April, 1974

Muhsin: As for us, we are convinced that any solution that appears in the present state of the balance of forces and is in the framework of Security Council Resolution 242 could only be achieved at the expense of the interests of the Palestinian people. It is because of this that we are pessimistic concerning an eventual peace settlement in the region and hope it fails or at least is postponed while waiting for the establishment of a more favourable balance of forces. We would also hope to be able to regain what we consider to be the minimum rights of the Palestinian people which are recognized by UN resolutions.

Q. Do you think yourself capable of creating an obstacle to an eventual political solution?

A. The possibilities of preventing an eventual peace settlement in the Middle East remain numerous. For that it would be necessary that Arab forces work to reinforce the Syrian front which alone is in a position to continue to struggle until it obliges the enemy, the great powers and the international community to give clear and defined content to the expression "rights of the Palestinian people". And this content must be convincing, not only for certain Arab leaders or even certain among the Palestinian leadership, but equally for the large Palestinian masses.

It is only in this manner that one can prevent an eventual solution to the Middle East crisis, and the factions that reject this solution must turn their efforts in this direction, no longer contenting themselves with verbal protests.

There obviously remains the possibility of seeing the enemy torpedo all solutions. The future will show certain Arab leaders the error that they committed in turning to Kissinger. The promises of the latter have been revealed as false. That does not surprise us beyond measure, because how could

⁴¹ Translated from the partial French text, *L'Orient-Le Jour* (Beirut), April 3, 1974.

one imagine that the US is so easily going to abandon Israel?

Q. And if a political solution proves to be possible?

A. The real problem will begin as soon as the efforts deployed to prevent an eventual peace settlement fail and it appears that the US is really disposed to apply pressure on Israel obliging her to evacuate all occupied Arab territories. At this time, the solution will become a real fact, or more precisely, an inevitable catastrophe. It will be necessary, then, for us to prepare a programme to confront this catastrophe.

Q. What is your position with regard to the Geneva conference?

A. From all that we have said, it remains clear that the Palestinians must not participate in any manner in the Geneva conference which remains based on Security Council Resolution 242 and must even struggle to prevent any faction of the Palestinians from participation. Simultaneously, we must push all Arab forces, who proclaim their willingness to struggle to regain the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, to abide by their engagements and to refuse any solution which does not, in the worst case, admit the application of UN resolutions concerning the Palestine problem. We must equally try to obtain similar assurances on the part of friendly foreign countries, in particular the Soviet Union. If such Arab and international assurances are provided it would permit the dissipation of presently manifest fears. Because Security Council Resolution 242 can only, in the best of cases, regulate the problem of territories occupied in June 1967. This settlement must not be made at the expense of the essentials of the Palestine question nor lead the Arab countries to end the state of war with Israel.

Q. What will the future of the West Bank be in case of Israeli withdrawal?

A. Concerning the West Bank of Jordan I feel that it must be removed from Jordanian sovereignty. This must be done by an Arab accord and by armed struggle against the Jordanian regime, and not in exchange for concessions made by Israel.

Q. Are you for or against the establishment of a national authority in the West Bank?

A. It is not possible to be against the establishment of a national authority. It is a question,

however, of determining the content and form to be accorded to this national authority. In our opinion such an authority can only be established by struggle and not by a course of concessions with antinational elements. Because, in exchange for concessions the gains that we achieve will be minimal and it would not be possible then to speak of national authority, no matter who headed it.

Q. What do you think of the changes in the Jordanian position?

A. In my opinion these changes are the result of the October War in which Jordan did not participate, convinced that it would result in a new defeat for the Arabs. Because of this, the Jordanians have lost their rights to the West Bank of Jordan. The fact that they retreated from their sovereignty over this part of Palestine is not due to their generosity, nor even to a modification in their conception of the Palestine problem. This change had been imposed on them by circumstances of the same nature that were imposed upon the US, obliging them to tone down their hostile position as regards the Arabs. The change in the American attitude is equally not due to a generous sentiment nor to an awareness of their errors as certain Arab leaders would like one to believe. All these changes are the result of a victorious war which upset all political realities.

Q. How do you judge the lifting of the embargo against the US?⁴²

A. The explanations given to justify the unconditional lifting of the oil embargo against the US are not convincing. This embargo represented the last political weapon possessed by the Arabs. They deviated from it with nothing in exchange when normally they should have discussed the means of increasing oil pressure on the US to oblige her to adopt a less aggressive political policy toward the Arabs and to make the American people aware of the fact that Israel is no longer the guarantor of their interests but, on the contrary, represents a threat to these interests. The Arab leaders should have conformed to the decisions adopted in the course of an Arab summit, they should have called another summit meeting and announced their willingness to cancel the embargo before realizing the short term objective that they themselves placed on the Arab nation.

⁴² Doc. 222 above.

Certain Arab leaders who pressed for lifting the embargo wanted it to be believed that this measure reinforced the position of the Arabs. Prominent Israelis were charged with getting rid of these illusions, implying that the lifting of the embargo was proof that the Arabs are not serious in the decisions they adopt and in their desire to pressure the US.

Q. What do you think of the Iraqi position?

A. The problem with the Iraqi regime is that it is always very quick to take erroneous decisions and very slow to become aware of these errors. I read recently in a report presented to the last congress of the Iraqi party that the leaders had made a self-critique for the attitude taken in the course of the events of September 1970 in Jordan. At that time, these leaders had decided to pull out the Iraqi troops stationed in Jordan. It took them more than three years to disclose their mistake. If they had not committed this mistake the Palestine resistance would probably not have been liquidated and the Jordanian front would have entered the October War.

The Iraqi regime has once again erred in pulling out its troops from the Syrian front which remains active until this moment. They should rather, if they wanted to create an obstacle to an eventual peace settlement, have reinforced their military presence on this front.

If Iraq does not modify its attitude, the rejectionist position that they have adopted will be void of content and will be incapable of preventing a political solution to the Middle East crisis. Iraq possesses very great possibilities materially and is in the process of playing a more important role in national questions than Mauritania. I hope it will quickly become aware of its responsibilities and will not wait for four years to make a new self-critique.

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Statement by President Sadat of Egypt reviewing the developments leading to the decision to go to war⁴³

Alexandria, April 3, 1974

I want to digress here a while to talk about the war decision. You recall that in 1971, I announced that this year must be the year of decision. You also recall that during the same year, 1971, only a few months had passed since I assumed my office. I made an initiative on 4th February 1971 after the termination of the second cease-fire, which was due to be ended on 5th February 1971, for the sake of peace.⁴⁴

The US Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, came in May 1971. You will also recall that he announced he had nothing to request from Egypt—nothing. After the announcement of the initiative in February, he announced in May that he had nothing to request from Egypt and that Egypt had fully done its part. At that time, we also answered Jarring's memorandum of 8th February 1971.

We waited. May and June passed. On 6th July 1971, I received notification from the US Secretary of State that the United States would intervene to achieve a peaceful solution in accordance with the initiative I had submitted. They asked some questions, including a question about the Egyptian-Soviet treaty which was concluded at that time, May 1971.⁴⁵

After the US Secretary of State had visited here, President Podgornyy came. We concluded the treaty in late May. They [the Americans] put questions, and I answered them. My answer has always been that all our decisions express our free will. Since 23rd July 1952, our will has been free to take whatever decision we see fit to take.

July passed without anything happening. August and September passed. On 11th October 1971 I went to the USSR. I had a long session

⁴³ Made in a speech to the students of the University of Alexandria and broadcast by Cairo radio in Arabic; excerpted from the partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4569/A/2-7; reprinted by permission.

⁴⁴ Doc. 274 in *International Documents on Palestine 1971*.

⁴⁵ Doc. 125 in *ibid*.

with the three Soviet leaders. As I have told you before, and as you heard at the [ASU] Central Committee, we reached agreement. We removed the clouds that existed in our relations with the USSR. We agreed in October 1971 on specific deals, and the arms were to arrive before the end of 1971.⁴⁶ They asked about the year of decision, why I held to this and why I insisted that the situation be reactivated militarily—because there was no other way.

I explained the matter to them very clearly and frankly and in a friendly manner. As I have said, we agreed on arms deals, and the arms were to arrive before the end of 1971.

Relations between ourselves and the United States at that time were not progressing well. On the contrary, their promises in May and July and their failure to fulfil all these promises prompted me to reveal the true American attitude to the people. I attacked them most violently.

This is because the attitude of the US Secretary of State at that time was indeed regrettable. He had reason to feel ashamed and I did shame him before our people, the Arab nation and the whole world.

In 1971, when the first shipments began to arrive, we were supposed to be able to make a decision on the battle on 8th December. I was in the Soviet Union in October. October passed and so did November. And then December came, but there was absolutely no information about the arrival of any shipments or anything. On 8th December the battle between India and Pakistan began. As we all know, the Soviet Union had commitments towards India. We entered December and then more than half of December had gone by—nothing had arrived. The understanding was that these shipments would arrive in October, November and December so that before the end of 1971 we could make a decision and begin operations.

At that time I notified the Soviet Union. About the middle of December I told them that there were only 15 days left before the end of the year and we did not yet even have the dates for the arrival of shipments or vessels. We had no information about them and they had not appeared. I had fixed the year as the year of decision, and therefore I asked if I could visit them in order to avert this situation and that we might solve it together. They fixed

a date for my visit—not in January 1972 but in February 1972. This was so that the whole of December and January might have passed, and so would February. As a matter of fact, I almost rejected this date. However, I always place the sublime interest of the cause and the country above personal considerations.

As you have seen, in the past three years, I have experienced and suffered a great deal. I learned [something about the background] afterwards. I went [to the Soviet Union] in February and, as I understood it, their purpose in delaying the date was to let me calm down or cool off a little. This was because I had fixed 1971 as the year of decision and they did not approve of it. Actually they did not approve of any action other than political or diplomatic action.

I went in February, and two months after February in the same year—that is in April. This time they had asked that I visit them and insisted on it because Nixon was going to visit them in May. The first summit conference in Moscow was in May 1972. I visited the Soviet Union again late in April. It was the fourth time. The first was in March 1971. The second was in October 1971. The third in February 1972, and the fourth in April 1972.

The core of the discussion between us was—and I always said it—that the issue would not be activated or solved without military action. The Soviet Union's view was against military action. The discussions used to finish up with the view that even in order to reach a peaceful solution, Israel must be made to feel that we are in a position to talk about a peaceful solution from a position of strength, not weakness. This was the result that we used to end up with, and they used to promise to supply us with arms, etc. etc.

I am not saying this to belittle the arms that we have received. I am continuing the explanation. The April 1972 meeting was held,⁴⁷ as I told you, and we agreed at that meeting that after the summit meeting between President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev in May, [the process of] consolidating Egypt's capability would begin quickly because we agreed that there would be nothing new in the US position in 1972 since it was an election year in the United States. We also agreed that after the elections, that is immediately

⁴⁶ Doc. 203 in *ibid.*

⁴⁷ Doc. 79 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972.*

after November, we had to be prepared. They agreed to this.

I returned from this visit, and in May the summit conference was held in Moscow. I waited for a notification, and after 14 days, I received a notification, including an analysis by the Soviet Union similar to what we had predicted, that is, that there was nothing new in the US position because the US position viewed Egypt and the Arabs as a motionless corpse and they only respect force. So if Egypt and the Arabs were a motionless corpse, why should they [the Americans] act or change their position? The Soviet analysis was the same as our predictions before the April visit, and it came after 14 days. I replied and said: All right, now that the analysis is the same as the one we agreed upon, the questions, as agreed upon with you, are the following:

There were seven clauses—this, that and the other thing. Therefore, as we agreed, these clauses were to have reached me by November. We would then be standing on solid ground after the US elections in November. If they spoke about a peaceful solution, we would be standing on solid ground and in a position to speak and say yes or no—we reject or we agree. Why should a solution be proposed to us when we are weak? The solution proposed would exactly reflect the extent of our strength.

My reply was sent to them and I said simply that my reply was on its way. A whole month passed during which I received no answer. We calculated in days the period between the Moscow visit, that is the meeting, and November so as not to lose a single day for the seven clauses that I had requested and that we had agreed upon. A whole month passed. The first 15 days passed before I received the analysis and one month before I received an answer. I was surprised by the answer I received. There was absolutely no mention of anything about the battle except in the last three lines of the answer.

Before that, there was the statement about the Moscow summit meeting between the two giants. The statement included the phrase military relaxation—military relaxation while Israel had complete superiority and we were short of several things. However, we were asked to embark on military relaxation. What did this mean? It meant that if such military relaxation took place in the area at a time when Israel was superior and we were at the level of our position at that

time, the question would not be solved. It would be a case of the stronger side dictating conditions to us. We would either accept or reject. Whether we accepted or not, they would say: We are staying where we are and that is all.

When I received the answer a month later and it included absolutely no mention of what we had agreed upon in April, I made my decisions regarding the Soviet experts, a decision that you learned about in the summer. As I said afterwards, the real aim of these decisions was also—strategic analysts should have been more aware than they were—because anyone who had studied my decisions even a little would have understood that I intended to enter a battle when I ousted the Soviet experts. The Soviet experts were not fighters. They would not enter the battle with me. In fact, they were banned from going near the Canal. All of them were here in the interior as experts on arms and other types of training. Some were manning SAM-3 missiles after the Abu Za'bal raid.

Our sons were already trained and ready to take over everything. In fact, when the Soviet experts left, our sons took over the SAM-3 emplacements in a matter of seconds. There was no vacuum at all that would have left a gap in our air defences. This never happened because our sons took over immediately.

Actually, my purpose, as I have said, was a pause with the friend on the one hand and, on the other, to tell everyone that I was entering the battle—a 100 per cent Egyptian battle. No one at all can claim that anyone has fought it for me. I do not even have experts for weapons training. That was among the reasons for my decision at that time.

The situation continued. Our brothers in the Soviet Union took a long time despite the fact that I sent the Prime Minister, who was Dr. Aziz Sidqi at that time. I sent him because before we proclaimed the decision [on the Soviet experts] we had to agree on a joint declaration in order to cover anything that the West might exploit. They refused and we declared it unilaterally. The issue was settled and the decision was implemented.

Relations remained frozen between us and the Soviet Union all during the summer. The decisions were taken in July. Relations remained frozen all during the summer until October came, when our brother, President Hafiz al-Asad, went to Moscow and intervened in the matter. Dr. Aziz

Sidqi left on 16th October and then returned. It was clearly apparent that relations had begun to move again. However, this was on the surface only. In fact and in essence, relations did not move at all.

It was necessary for the Soviet Union to take time to find out that I did not carry out the operation in agreement with the United States behind their backs. I allowed them to take enough time to find out that the matter was not a dagger in their back in agreement with the United States or others. Not at all. It was a national (watani) decision. It was a pause to tell them this procedure was unacceptable—a procedure which amounts to a kind of “wait a little, cool off a little, you cannot move until we want you to move”. We do not accept this. We do not accept this procedure. It is not according to our will, which has been free since 23rd July 1952. No one at all can direct us or impose any trusteeship on us.

In December 1972 three months were left before the expiration of an agreement between us and them over facilities in the Mediterranean. We gave them facilities in the Mediterranean, not bases. We do not give bases to anyone. Since 23rd July no one has had bases here with us. We are non-aligned. However, we have extended facilities to them. The agreement was to end in March 1973. Five years would have passed of the agreement, for it was concluded in 1968. The agreement stipulates that three months before its expiry the two sides will agree either to terminate or renew it. At that time, relations were disrupted—exactly as I have told you, and everything was at a stand-still.

I asked Field Marshal Isma'il to call the Russian General at the Embassy here and tell him that we had decided for our part, to extend the facilities for another period. This happened three months before the expiration of the agreement.

Nevertheless, I still say that the USSR stood by us in the dark moments of 1967. We are a grateful people. We do not forget past favours.

The Field Marshal called the General and told him about this. The facilities have remained ever since. Early in 1973, Field Marshal Isma'il and Hafiz Isma'il left for the USSR. The two of them concluded a deal. After February 1973 our relations began to be, or to become, normal. Some of [the arms included in] this deal began reaching us after Field Marshal Isma'il's return from the USSR.

As I have told you and as you have already heard from me, the decision on the battle was made last April, April 1973. As I have told you, some of the deal began reaching us after the Field Marshal's return in February. We were happy that our relations would return to normal. But the USSR persisted in the view that a military battle must be ruled out and that the question must await a peaceful solution.

The month of June came and with it the second summit conference between President Nixon and Brezhnev. The first meeting was held in Moscow in May 1972. As I have told you, that meeting resulted in military relaxation. This meant that everything must stop and that Israel would remain superior and that we would remain in our position. It was clear from the statement issued in June 1973 that the two super powers had taken another leap forward. They agreed that nothing should happen anywhere in the world. They agreed to abide by this. The only [trouble] spot left in the world was the Middle East. The Vietnam issue was decided. Nothing would happen there. So the Middle East was the only spot left. Nothing should happen here and everyone should await a peaceful solution. On reading the statement, we found that our issue had been put into cold storage pending a peaceful solution.

I am relating the story with all the relevant background. I paused here at the word “decision”. This was the Soviet Union's attitude. As for the US attitude, we all knew it. [To the United States], Egypt and the Arabs were only dead bodies, bodies that did not move and had no value.

The importance of the decision—first the decision on the battle, and second the order to fight—stems from this. The decision was 100 per cent Egyptian—100 per cent Egyptian free will. This is so because the two giants opposed any action. They twice announced this publicly to the world—in their statements in Moscow and then in Washington in 1972 and 1973.

There is an important policy that you, the future generation, should carry on with after the present generation, and that is that every decision made by the command here in Egypt should emanate from Egyptian soil and Egypt's interests, bear an Egyptian imprint and be in Egypt's interest. Everything related to the decision should be 100 per cent Egyptian even if it is against the will of the giants. What was significant about this decision was

that it expressed a 100 per cent free will come what may.

According to computer and modern technological calculations—in fact any calculation by a computer would have shown that Egypt would be foolish to move because it was 100 per cent certain to meet disaster. This is what they believed on the strength of material calculations. As regards emotional calculations and the psychological warfare that was launched in 1972, the world believed that the Arabs were corpses and that Israel had complete supremacy over them. The USA guaranteed Israel's complete supremacy over all the Arabs put together. But there is something that the computer cannot deal with, just as happened in Vietnam, it was the people's will the nobility of the people and the history and struggle of peoples.

It is for this reason that when I pause at the word decision, I feel proud and I will remain proud, not because the decision created the post 6th October world—militarily, politically and economically—and changed all the criteria, but rather because of one thing: that this decision was 100 per cent Egyptian and against the will of the two giants.

This is a lesson for you, for the next generation. The decisions come from here, from this soil, for the interest of Egypt alone—decisions based on values only we, the people of Egypt, feel. The two super powers said this was suicide. We say: No, this is faith, a heritage of 7,000 years, and of struggle. We reject humiliation, dismemberment, enslavement, and even the wishes of the two super powers.

This is all as far as the decision is concerned, and I implore God, praise be to Him, to guide you always so that the procession will remain the procession of the 23rd July revolution which I am now talking about. Under the guidance of the July revolution, our people have achieved national liberation, not only by expelling the British occupiers but by liberating the national will from all spheres of influence. Our people know the meaning of independent Egypt after more than 70 years of occupation. We have gained, at the highest cost, the freedom to define our foreign relations in accordance with our national interest as well as the freedom of decision-making in everything related to our affairs, foremost of which is the fighting decision itself.

The fruit of this independence is that we suc-

ceeded in winning over influential friends and in surrounding Egypt with a halo of compassion, amity and appreciation. We have won over the friendship of the group of the socialist states, particularly the Soviet Union, and Egypt has found its natural place among its sister African states which have stood by our side and broken off relations with Israel. Egypt has also assumed a pioneering role in the non-aligned movement and was supported by it; Egypt extended the hand of understanding and co-operation to all states willing to deal with us on an honourable basis.

The struggle for the freedom of the national will does not end with the departure of the occupier, but is a daily, exhausting and costly practice; its fruits, however, in the long run are much greater than anything some falsely believe could be gained by being under any [form of] subservience.

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Interview with Vice-Chairman Hussein of the Iraq Revolutionary Command Council explaining Iraq's role in post-October war Arab policies (excerpts)⁴⁸

Baghdad, April 8, 1974

What do we anticipate for Palestinian policy after the Geneva conference? And there is another question linked to this one. It is: What are you going to offer to the Palestine revolutionaries who do not accept this policy and its consequences?

The third question is also linked to this one. Those who ask it say that some Arab countries are saying: Let us allow the Palestinians to decide their own policy on Palestine.

In reply to this let us start at the centre and go outwards to the circumference. We do not say that the Palestinians should be allowed to make their own decision on the subject of Palestine, nor are we the sort of people who say: Let the Syrians decide the destiny of Syria, or let the Egyptians decide the destiny of Egypt. According to their public statements and according to the policy

⁴⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), April 10, 1974.

that they in fact pursued in the October war, the Syrians and Egyptians themselves did not say that they were going to decide their destiny by themselves. Similarly, in our own policy, as it was planned, programmed and implemented, there were clear indications of the same trend. When we sent our army to fight on the northern and western fronts, it did not fight in defence of Iraqi territory, but of Arab territory. When the Arab fights and sheds his precious blood it is natural that he should do so. This is not a question of international aid or aid through friendship which amounts to no more than giving a surplus that can easily be spared.

We went to the front as Arabs and fought as Arabs, and we fought with all our might. We threw our whole weight into the battle. On this basis, within the framework of our principles and our actual policy and the action linked to it, we are entitled to say: The Palestinians should not be allowed to decide on their own. They can decide on behalf of the Arab people, but it must be in the right way. This is what any responsible person would do as regards the question of sovereignty and the question of Arab territory. This is the cause that all the Arabs are defending and fighting for, for which the efforts of millions are being mobilized as a single people. It has been the Arabs' principal slogan before and since 1948. No one has the right to deal with this cause on behalf of the Arabs in the wrong way. Mention must also be made of the obligations involved in this, which are that we must exert our efforts whenever the opportunity arises, not in the way required by others but in the way that we ourselves hasten to place at the disposal of other members of our Arab people.

We shall never follow any other course. It is clear to our Palestinian brothers that we are ready to place at their disposal every possible aid within the limits of our resources. We will do this in a way that they, not we, deem appropriate, with a view to maintaining their right and helping them to ensure that they are in a strong position in their struggle to attain their final goals without having to withdraw, make concessions or bargain. We have not concealed this attitude, we have openly declared it. We know that we are paying an extraordinary price for it and we know that if we had decided to occupy ourselves exclusively with Iraqi affairs, colonialism would have accepted

a truce with us, but we did not do so. We know that if, when the firing ceased, we had remained silent or withdrawn our army and withdrawn within the frontiers of the Iraqi region, and had addressed ourselves exclusively to our own problems, colonialism would have done less than this against us—in the long run it would have accepted a temporary truce for the second phase.

As for these questions: Was oil used as a weapon in the battle in the right way? Was the use of oil as a weapon a substitute for the use of arms in battle? Is the divergence of viewpoints between Iraq and the Arab countries on the use of oil as a weapon going to lead to a division? Is the division going to last long?

For the sake of history we must establish the facts.

The first to raise the slogan of using oil as a weapon in the battle was Iraq and the Baath Party, and no one else in the world or in the Arab world. This is a historically accepted fact. We raised it before the war and on October 7 we put it into effect⁴⁹—even to the extent of embarrassing certain Arab countries. So it was the Iraqi Baath Party which was the first to raise this slogan and to implement it effectively in such a way that it achieved its goal. What is the essence of this slogan which we raise? We set it out in a memorandum to the Arab Defence and Foreign Ministers at a meeting held in Cairo several months before the October war, and you can examine these documents. Since that time we have raised it not in the form of words but, if I may use the expression, of legislation—legislation for this slogan. That is, we have translated this slogan into practical steps in legal form. At the time we said to our brother Arabs: We are an oil state so that you need not think that we are outbidding when we use this slogan. We are using it in a fraternal way and we understand its effectiveness. We were the first to implement it; and we in Iraq were the first to start on it.

We have oil and we are an oil state, and by raising this slogan we were telling the oil states that were in a position to do so to nationalize America's share and to threaten every country that adopted an attitude like America's with the nationalization of its share.

⁴⁹ Docs. 278 and 300 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

Nationalized oil must not be marketed in the same quarters but sold to other companies and countries in the world that can benefit from it and strengthen the position of Arab policy in their external relations. The Arab countries that are not in a position to nationalize should cut off America's oil supplies, and do the same in the case of any country that adopts America's attitude.

When the October 6 war broke out the Command took three interlinked and interconnected decisions. It decided to solve the problem with Iran by political means, to resume diplomatic relations and to declare our readiness to agree to a delegation coming to Iraq—or a delegation going from Iraq to Iran—to solve the problems within that framework.⁵⁰ We also decided to throw the Iraqi army into the Northern Front since on the Western Front we had only planes before the war—these took part in the war, as you know, on the Western Front.⁵¹ The third decision was to nationalize America's share because of her attitude to the issue of Arab struggle and to the issue of Palestine in particular. For the sake of history let me say that at the start not all the Arab countries wanted to take even the decisions they did in fact take. We sent envoys from the President to Arab countries. They said quite clearly that they could not follow this course. They said we will pay money, but we will not play with oil; that we refuse to do.

This is where the role of hard currency came in, where the role of the masses came in. This strong current made everyone seek the way to confront this current brought into existence by the circumstances of the war. In the evening of October 6 these decisions were taken and on October 7, it was announced that America's share had been nationalized because of her attitude. We do not want to outbid our Arab brothers—every one according to his circumstances and his abilities—but we do say that all the Arabs could have adopted a more inflexible attitude than they did, if sensitivities had been surmounted and if policies had been coordinated. Moreover, some of the Arab countries, even if they could not immediately resist imperialist policies, could have adopted better attitudes than they did, when we said: This is our policy. Let some cut off supplies from America and let others nationalize. Then the decision was

taken at the conference held in Kuwait to start reducing production by 5 percent, meaning 5 percent of total production, and then to raise this figure as the war continued.⁵² If the war had lasted two months many ideas and things would have changed in the Arab homeland. We are not in favour of a general interruption of supplies; why should we cut off supplies from the countries of Western Europe which are not hostile to us.

Do we want to make more enemies or less? We should make more friends and neutralize those whom we cannot make our friends. This is our policy. This is why we have always believed that a general interruption of supplies would have been a mistake at that time.

There are differences of opinion, but this does not prevent the coordination of Arab oil policy in the common interest. There is no rift; there is coordination between us and the Arab oil countries. They attend the conferences of OPEC and the Arab OAPEC when necessary and whenever circumstances require it—this is our oil policy in brief. It was we who raised the slogan of the use of oil as a weapon in the battle. As far as we are concerned there has been no alternative to the use of this weapon. We took three interlocked and interlinked decisions, all of which give a true picture of the policy pursued by this government. One was to send the army outside the frontiers of the region to take part in the fighting, one was to nationalize America's share and then subsequently to nationalize Holland's share.

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Speech by President Assad of Syria made at a dinner in his honour (excerpt)⁵³

Moscow, April 11, 1974

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The invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and

⁵² Document 293 in *ibid.*

⁵³ *Pravda* (Moscow), April 12, 1974; excerpted from the English translation, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXVI, 16 (May 15, 1974), pp. 3–4. Translation copyright 1974 by *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, published weekly at the Ohio State University by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; reprinted by permission of the Digest.

⁵⁰ Doc. 279 in *ibid.*

⁵¹ Doc. 287 in *ibid.*

the Soviet government has made it possible for us to meet once again the leaders of the Soviet Union and to exchange opinions with them on questions of interest to our countries. However, this visit is of even greater importance because it is our first visit to the Soviet Union since the October war of liberation, which in terms of its achievements and results was an outstanding event in the modern history of our people and has enormous importance for our Arab nation, our region and all the world.

The October war brought out a number of unfading truths that malicious propaganda had almost succeeded in destroying over a period of more than six years. During the October war, many illusions that the same malicious propaganda had tried to represent as facts and truths in various parts of the world were dispelled once and for all. During the October hostilities, our armed forces demonstrated their fighting efficiency and their ability to use modern weapons and displayed bravery in fighting the enemy. Our people demonstrated a firm resolve to achieve their goals and displayed limitless readiness for self-sacrifice in realizing these goals. In this connection we express gratitude to the Soviet Union.

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Statement by General Secretary Safadi of the Palestinian Higher Political Committee in Lebanon confirming the continued suspension of ground operations against Israel from the Lebanese border⁵⁴

Beirut, April 17, 1974

The Palestinian Higher Political Committee in Lebanon has held a series of meetings at which it studied the situation arising from the treacherous Israeli aggression against a number of Lebanese villages and the continuous bombardment to which peaceable civilian positions have been subjected.

The Political Committee reaffirmed the decisions already adopted by the Executive Committee regarding suspending border operations and avoiding densely populated border villages.

A number of positive initiatives were also taken with a view to thwarting the Zionist conspiracy aimed at impairing the unity of the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples.

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Statements by President Sadat of Egypt commenting on relations with the USSR and the USA⁵⁵

Cairo, April 18, 1974

In fact there is one more point before we come to the [working] paper. This point is our relations with the two super-powers.

First, our relations with the USSR as being our friend. As I have just told you, we have some remarks to make about this relationship. This is natural even between those who enter a war as allies. Such a thing, and more than that can happen between them. We are friends, mere friends. Misunderstanding may take place between us in the present stage. I don't know why there is misunderstanding at the present stage. At least I want to affirm to you and within hearing of our whole people that we here, on our part—and on the part of Egypt—are not trying to create misunderstanding. On the contrary, we are doing all we can to ensure that this friendship continues, and we never respond to any provocations or nervous actions from any quarter. We never respond to them. But I regret to say that a misunderstanding is being embodied or translated in front of me by inexplicable actions.

You have just heard me say that except for certain requests we have made to the USSR and which have not yet been responded to, our armed forces are again at full strength. But these requests include things that are basic and essential. For example, these requests—I am interpreting as a misunderstanding on their part. In my capacity as President of Egypt I sent four letters to Brezhnev in which I submitted these requests, during the last six months. I did not get any answer until two months ago, when the Soviet ambassador said

⁵⁴ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), April 18, 1974.

⁵⁵ Made in a speech at a joint meeting of the ASU Central Committee and the National Assembly; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), April 19, 1974.

that the requests were being studied. Then a month ago when the Soviet Foreign Minister visited us I got the same answer: these requests were being studied.

It is not reasonable that they should have been under study for six months when I know that these requests did not contain anything unusual or impossible at all. They were quite ordinary. They were under study for six months, and one of these six months was a critical month for me—it was November, the first month of the bulge. I don't know if this was something that still required study, but I ascribed it to misunderstanding. They also spoke to the effect that Egypt had given up socialism. But I want everyone to understand that we did not choose socialism to please anyone. What we chose and what we shall choose for ourselves is our own sole responsibility in accordance with the circumstances and the requirements of the stage we are passing through. We don't need anyone's comments on our socialism or our system.

All this is clear in the paper you have. Since July 23, 1952 we have had absolute free will. This will is one hundred percent Egyptian and, God willing, it will continue to be one hundred percent Egyptian.

I really regret this misunderstanding. Other reasons for it could be that our relations with the United States and the West have begun to improve. A lot has also been said about economic openness. I say again that these are entirely our own affairs, and we shall not accept even comment, because comment is in bad taste, an offence against good taste. I don't want to say another word, because I don't like to use these expressions. We are free, and I want to tell you that, as you have heard me say before, the ceasefire was guaranteed by the two super-powers. It is not in our interest to antagonize anyone, either the super-powers or the countries that are not super-powers. Our relations with everyone must be good, in Egypt's interests. We shall reply to anyone who is the first to be hostile to us, but we shall not be the first to be hostile to anyone. We are, in fact, at a stage of reconstituting our relations on the basis of our principles—a positive neutrality, between both camps in the world, which is clear and total. If some people do not accept this, surely it is not our fault.

I now come to our attitude to America. There has certainly been a change or transformation in

American policy. Perhaps it began when, as I have told you, in Aswan, Kissinger submitted an American proposal to us and to Israel at a time when America was one hundred percent aligned with Israel, or at best used to tell us to speak to Israel. It was one hundred percent aligned in Johnson's era—I am sorry to say that the Johnson era was a black period in America's history as well as in ours. We also lived those days here after black June. Johnson's era in America was a black one for the American people. Their important commentators have said this before now. A radical change has taken place. Instead of aligning itself one hundred percent with Israel, or, at best, telling us to talk to Israel, America did not. When Kissinger saw that things had come to a stop he went back to the American President and got him to agree that America should submit a proposal both to us and to Israel. I regard this as a radical change in America's attitude. That is why after the steps were taken which restored diplomatic relations between us, there was a development in relations and constant meetings between us.

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Press interview statements by President Qadhafi of Libya warning against the acceptance of partial solutions to the Palestine question⁵⁶

Mid-April, 1974

Qadhafi: We here in the Libyan Arab Republic do not accept the fragmentation of Palestinian soil. When I say this I am not indulging in impossible dreams of Palestine being made Arab once again. Peoples who want their land can fight until they expel the colonizer. This is borne out by the Arabs' own experience as well as elsewhere in the world; Algeria, for example, offered a million martyrs and fought until the land was liberated. So why should we not liberate the whole of Palestine and make it Arab once again?

The establishment of a Palestinian state, a state

⁵⁶ *Al-Dustur* (Beirut), April 19, 1974; partial English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), III, 4 (Summer, 1974), pp. 160–161.

between the sea and the river, and the fragmentation of the Palestinian entity would quite frankly be the beginning of the end of Palestinian existence in the territory of Palestine, and would destroy the fighting spirit and the morale of the revolutionary. The objective for which the revolution broke out in 1965 was a splendid one—the establishment of a secular democratic state in the territory of Palestine. But the establishment of a Palestinian state whose rulers are the leaders of the resistance or nationalist elements, would be a blow to Palestinian ideals. It would be the creation of an Arab Switzerland in Palestine which would be hostile to any revolutionary movement that might arise to liberate the territory occupied in 1948, and would provide a natural justification for the annihilation of the people established in that area.

If the objective in establishing a Palestinian state is to imitate the Vietnamese experience, then we must recognize that things are different as regards Palestine. The Vietcong operate from protected Vietnamese territory, whereas the Palestinians would operate from exposed territory with an area restricted by the sea and the river which if it was not destroyed by Israel would be destroyed by the regimes of the countries surrounding it.

I therefore think that, in spite of the advantages of establishing a Palestinian state, in that it would ingather the Palestinian entity in Palestinian territory, it also has grave and dangerous disadvantages.

Q. What do you think of the American proposal to be submitted to the Geneva Conference, for the establishment of a Palestinian state with Israel keeping Jerusalem?

A. It is not only a problem of Jerusalem; it is a bigger and more comprehensive problem than that. Is Jerusalem to be Arab or non-Arab, old or new Jerusalem? It is a problem of right and wrong, a question of struggle for survival, the problem of a people living in tents on United Nations aid, suffering real tragedy, regardless of religious and national values. Where did these people come from? They had their homes, their farms and their land, from which they were expelled. There are two sides to the problem: that of the tragedy and the loss of a civilization, and the bright side of hope to return to the land.

For example, the Jews who took the place of the Palestinians. Were they living in tents? Were they poor?

The Jews who emigrated to Israel and are still emigrating to Israel are the rich people of the world, bearing the nationalities of their home countries. Nor are they persecuted. The Palestinians have no nationality and no money, and belong only to Palestine, because they originally came from Palestine.

Therefore I think that it is not so much the problem of Jerusalem as the problem of the people, regardless of the religious reasons which have made the Jews fight to keep Palestine and the Arabs fight to keep Jerusalem.

The Jewish religion does not require its adherents to suffer hardship to return to the Promised Land. The Jew in France lives in safety and comfort, while the Jew in Palestine lives in hardship and can expect to be killed. Similarly, the Palestinian lives in tragedy, but religion does not require hardship for the sake of the land—indeed religion, reason and human values require that man should live without tragedy so that he may have a decent human life, and the Jew who lives in France or America or Russia must stay in the country he is living in, controlled by the three forces of reason, religion and human values so that he may not bring hardship to others.

The world must understand the problem from this aspect, the aspect of the right of the owners of the land to return to their land. But the Arabs, and especially the Muslims, want Jerusalem for prayer and worship, and by insisting on this aspect only they will lose their rights and their legality to return to the land as a whole.

Assuming that, through direct negotiations at Geneva, the Jews solve the problem of Jerusalem by returning the Holy Places of the Muslims and erect a barbed wire fence between the Islamic Holy Places and the Israeli farms and settlements outside them, what would the Arabs and Muslims do? Would this be enough? Are the Palestinian people fighting to return to Jerusalem to pray? It is not reasonable to pose the problem of Jerusalem exclusively from the point of view of the Holy Places and their retention, because as a Muslim I can pray wherever I happen to be, in any continent, even if I do not belong to it, but I can only belong to and live in my land.

The problem must be looked at in a sound manner, and there is only one solution, which is that the Palestinians should return to the whole of their land; if not, why the killing and bloodshed?

The Palestinian is not fighting so that he may pray, but so that he may live and continue to live in his land.

Q. What is your attitude to the Geneva Peace Conference?

A. A peace conference means direct negotiations, and we will have nothing to do with such negotiations because we act on the basis of the resolutions of the Khartoum Conference of 1967, which laid down three basic conditions: no peace; no recognition; no negotiations.⁵⁷ If direct negotiations were among Israel's conditions after the 1967 war for the peaceful solution of the Palestinian problem with the Arabs, the consequences of the Ramadan War have imposed these negotiations on the Arabs as a fundamental and direct condition which was accepted by Jordan and Egypt in 1973, but was rejected by the Arabs in 1948 in spite of their weakness, just as Egypt through Abdul Nasser rejected them in 1967.

In fact Israel has obliged the Arabs to negotiate and sit down at the same table with her. What will be left for the Arabs after the meeting of the Egyptian and Israeli Chiefs of Staff in Egyptian territory, or a meeting of the Egyptian and Israeli foreign ministers living in the same hotel?

Q. Could Israel ask for some other kind of direct negotiations which later on would not involve Hussein, Anwar [Sadat], and Golda Meir going to Geneva in the same plane?

A. All the meetings that have taken place between the Egyptians and the Israelis were direct negotiations, though the Arabs say that they were indirect. Of course the Israelis will ensure that these conferences fail and demand direct negotiations in Tel Aviv. The Arabs should say that the negotiations now in progress are direct negotiations with the proviso that they have accepted them to embarrass Israel, and if they get no results they can later declare war. This is why I think that the Arabs must bear in mind what is going on in this area so that they will not delude themselves later, as has always happened.

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Statement to the press by President Sadat of Egypt made in connection with the visit of Chancellor Brandt of West Germany⁵⁸

Cairo, April 22, 1974

The relations between the Arab people of Egypt and the German people have always been characterized by friendship, mutual respect and a desire for cooperation that would benefit both sides.

Therefore, it is only natural that our two countries remain eager to maintain their close cooperation in all fields which at the same time is an expression of international cooperation and the consolidation of world peace.

The new political and economic developments on the international scene make sound cooperation between the Arab and European countries indispensable.

If we, however, strive for closer relations between our two countries, as it corresponds to our hopes, then it is our duty to talk frankly with each other. This is a principle that I have always followed in carrying out the duty which was entrusted me by the Egyptian people.

At the same time I am convinced that openness is the best way to solidify and strengthen international relations.

As I already told the delegation of the Bundestag during its recent visit here, the policy of the Federal Republic during a certain period was not only content with huge financial subsidies to Israel under the pretext of reparations of crimes whose victims had nothing to do with the state of Israel. The Federal Republic went as far as to supply Israel secretly or openly with all sorts of weapons. This happened due to a certain feeling of guilt or under foreign pressure. In spite of all this, the Egyptian people did not hold the German people responsible for such a policy which stood in contradiction to all principles of justice, and therefore we were ready to continue to cherish our friendly relations with the German people.

During your visit here to Egypt you can form for yourselves an impression of the efforts of the Egyptian people to reconstruct the country.

⁵⁸ Made in German at a reception for the West German press corps; translated from the German text, *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung* (Bonn), no. 50 (April 26, 1974), p. 491.

⁵⁷ Doc. 412 in *International Documents on Palestine 1967*.

This reconstruction is geared towards finding, at the right time, the connection to development during the last three decades of our century, after the Egyptian people through its determination, persistence and readiness to sacrifice has overcome its defeat and had thrown off all chains that limited its freedom.

I hope that you agree with me, that the beginning of a true and impressive cooperation between our countries at this decisive time, is the best proof of the fact that all the mistakes of the past are finally overcome and that we shall begin a new chapter of solidarity and cooperation among all countries.

We are indeed very happy that Chancellor Willy Brandt is visiting Egypt. Our talks were constructive and were carried out in a very friendly atmosphere.

I hope that the Chancellor's visit will lead to a deepening of our relations and to fruitful co-operation between our two peoples.

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Statement by King Hussein of Jordan clarifying his attitude towards a PLO presence at the Geneva conference⁵⁹

Amman, May 1, 1974

I should make it clear that our demand for disengagement is only a start on the enforcement of the principle of full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territory. We insist that this disengagement should be linked to full withdrawal from the occupied territory. I do not think that anyone can deny that any area of land we deliver from occupation is a gain to all the Arabs. We have often said that if Israel wants peace she must give up the land and if she wants the land she will lose peace; it is impossible for her to have both.

This attitude of ours reflects our understanding of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 and 338 of October 1973. It was in the light of these resolutions that we went to the Geneva conference and made known our attitude: Arab sovereignty over occupied Arab Jerusalem must

be restored, the whole of the West Bank must be returned as part of the recovery of the other occupied Arab territories and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people must be ensured.

Brothers,

There is a point that has been much talked about recently—our attitude to the Palestine Liberation Organization. We have made it clear to all that we have recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization. We have made it clear to all that we have recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization ever since it was established in 1964. We believe that it was natural that its delegation should go to Geneva to discuss matters which are beyond our powers and responsibilities as defined within the framework of Security Council Resolution 242. The Organization's delegation will be able to demand the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine which have been laid down by United Nations resolutions throughout the course of the Palestine problem.

Similarly we have made it clear, and we now repeat, that while we welcome and indeed insist on full coordination between all the parties to the Geneva conference—the three Arab countries and the Palestine Liberation Organization—we strongly oppose any attempt whatsoever, Israeli or Arab, conscious or unconscious, to have the Palestinians represented at the Geneva conference by any party other than the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Let us play our roles in full awareness of our national responsibilities and bear those responsibilities honestly and courageously. We shall also respect the collective Arab will if it is the wish of the Arab countries and their leaders to create a new situation in which the Palestine Liberation Organization is made fully responsible for discussing, striving and working for the recovery of the occupied Arab territories, including the West Bank and Jerusalem, and the recovery of Palestinian rights, a situation that would lead to changed responsibilities and altered circumstances. If our brother Arabs take such a decision, we shall bow to their unanimous agreement and regard it as absolving us of our responsibilities. In that case we shall leave it to history alone to judge that decision. In any case, just as we have been true to our promise, and loyal to our cause, we shall continue to serve the nation and the homeland.

⁵⁹ Made in a Labour Day speech; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), May 2, 1974.

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Speech by President Sadat of Egypt commenting on the changes brought about by the October war, made on the occasion of Labour Day (excerpt)⁶⁰

Hilwan, May 1, 1974

Let us take a brief look at what I call the change in the American attitude, which certain rigid fanatics do not like: What precisely has changed America's attitude? Political speeches? Or political memoranda? Or articles by writers who compete with each other in extremism, or even the United Nations resolutions in which America, along with Israel, is isolated from the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world?

Certainly not. America obstructed every United Nations resolution, obstructed the four-power talks between Russia, America, England and France. America wrecked Jarring's mission and the Rogers plan she herself had proposed. None of these things have changed America's attitude. Two things have changed America's attitude:

The first is the battle itself and the success of our forces which we never expected. Having told America that she would eliminate our forces in 48 hours, after four days of fighting Israel asked America for help.

The second thing was that Arab solidarity had become an actual fact as regards both comradeship in arms and the use of the oil weapon. America simply discovered that the foundations of her absolute alignment with Israel and her complete disdain for the Arabs could not endure.

America discovered that Israel could be defeated by the Arabs. Indeed, America actually saw her being defeated and asking for help and unable to continue the battle but for the immense air lift that brought her arms and technicians directly to the front.

America discovered that oil, that primary strategic commodity, could constitute a weapon for use by the Arabs, whereas before she had depended on their being afraid or divided. She had thought that Israel would guard this oil for her, but she discovered that Israel was powerless to do this or to safeguard her presence in the area; Israel was

no longer a thick stick with which America could intimidate the Arabs.

All this changed America's attitude and this is a victory for the Arabs.

It should be a source of inspiration to them, not a source of disunity and confusion, as some people would like to represent the situation. I really do not know how to describe those who always talk and write with one aim in mind—to cast doubts on the ability of this nation and to belittle its victories.

They cast doubts on the October war, on the changes it brought to the situation and the understanding of it. When the oil weapon was first used, they disapproved. They do not like the change in the attitude of one of the two super powers brought about by our Arab efforts, seeing it as a retrograde step. If this is a misunderstanding it is a tragedy and if it arises from bad intentions it is a bigger tragedy. Anyone who ignores the fact that America safeguards Israel's security and that Russia also safeguards Israel's security and that the international community, as a whole, when it goes no further than the Security Council resolution, is safeguarding Israel's security—anyone who ignores this is hiding his head in the sand. From our historical responsibility to support the causes of this nation we are not prepared to comfort ourselves by hiding our heads in the sand. We are not following the course of struggle unguided. We are not content that our steps should be merely reactions; we study the elements of every situation and our moves are studied, but, with God's help, they always move forward.

Our hostility to America has never been a matter of principle, it is a question of contradictory and haphazard policies. Let me remind you of what our motto has been since the start of the revolution: We make peace with those who make peace with us and are hostile to those who are hostile to us. Moreover, America's changed attitude, as we have explained, does not mean that we enhance her status at the expense of principles or at the expense of anyone. We certainly do not want to give up our friendship with the USSR or to discredit it. We may disagree, but we disagree on the basis of our point of view, not in the interest of anyone else. In 1959, at the same time when we were at the height of our conflict with America over the Baghdad Pact and its consequences, we disagreed publicly and violently with the USSR.

⁶⁰ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 2, 1974.

One of the basic principles of our revolution from its very first day has been non-alignment, to refuse to enter spheres of influence and to keep the freedom of our national will. For the sake of this principle we have fought the most violent battles and we have refused to renounce this principle even while we were defeated or isolated.

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Press interview statements by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi (Abu Lutf) commenting on King Hussein of Jordan's statement clarifying his attitude to the PLO⁶¹

Early May, 1974

Q. What are the views of the resistance leadership on King Hussein's recent speech?⁶² And what are their views on agreement and coordination with Jordan in the coming stage?

A. King Hussein's speech amounts to a retreat on certain issues and a surrender on others. His statement that he recognizes the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people is an acceptance of the *fait accompli*; he had no choice in the matter. After his tour of Arab and Western countries King Hussein wants to give Arab public opinion the impression that he has achieved some success in his attempts to obtain disengagement on the Jordanian front. This is at variance with the facts. Similarly the King had no choice when he made this tactical withdrawal, for the Palestinian people have, by their armed struggle, imposed their political and military presence on the Arab area and on world public opinion; the achievements of the Palestinian people in their struggle have become very widely known and the great majority of the countries of the world have recognized them and their revolutionary struggle.

King Hussein was under the delusion that he could create a crisis in the Palestine revolution's Arab relations, when he raised the question of choosing between him and the Palestine revolution. But in fact the aim of the King's speech was to

obtain coordination between Jordan and the Liberation Organization. We insist that the Organization rejects coordination with King Hussein in any field after its long and bitter experience with him, because deceit is the predominant feature of his dealings in the Arab field. It was established after the September incidents that King Hussein was building up an army for purposes of oppression, not to defend the occupied territories or in an attempt to clash with Israel. The Palestine revolution is tired of the talk about coordination, because it involves acceptance of all the elements in the situation, both positive and negative, that have prevailed since the October war. The Palestinian people want it to be clearly understood that anyone who calls for coordination or considers it necessary should refer to history to see how King Hussein tore up the Cairo and Amman agreements with the resistance. Indeed our union with King Hussein in the West Bank was a failure, and brought our people on both sides of the river great misfortunes.

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Press interview statements by Prime Minister Rifai of Jordan outlining his government's attitude to a disengagement agreement with Israel and responsibility for liberating the West Bank⁶³

Amman, early May, 1974

Q. When is Kissinger's mission on the Jordanian-Israeli front going to start?

A. We have agreed with Dr. Kissinger and the Arab quarters concerned that, should a disengagement agreement on the Syrian front be reached, efforts will be concentrated on achieving a disengagement on the Jordanian front. When we say a disengagement on the Jordanian front we mean that Israel should withdraw all along the river from the north to the Dead Sea, and westward to a distance to be agreed on.

⁶¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), May 5, 1974.

⁶² See document 232 above.

⁶³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), May 12, 1974.

When we submitted the Jordanian disengagement proposal to Dr. Kissinger during his recent visit to the area, we were informed that he submitted the general outlines of our proposal to the Israeli government which, in turn, submitted a proposal to the effect that Israel was prepared to withdraw from the West Bank on the basis of Jordanian administration being restored in all the areas from which Israel withdrew, on condition that Jordan agreed to allow Israel to retain a series of military positions on the River Jordan and that discussion of the problem of Jerusalem should be postponed to a later date. We strongly rejected the Israeli proposal, insisting that Israel should withdraw westward from the River Jordan all along the line of confrontation, as in no event could Israel be allowed to establish military positions or civilian settlements in any part of the West Bank, nor could there be any bargaining over the future of Jerusalem, since full Arab sovereignty would have to be reestablished over the whole of Arab Jerusalem.

Q. If Israel withdraws from the Golan do you expect her to withdraw from the West Bank?

A. It is possible, but as long as Israel does not agree to withdraw from the Jordan Valley as a first step towards full withdrawal, Jordan is not prepared to discuss anything else.

Q. What does Jordan think of the reports of efforts to establish a Palestinian state?

A. The amount of talk there has been about a Palestinian state, a Palestinian government and a Palestinian national authority in exile perplexes me. Would it not be better if we agreed on how to liberate the territory rather than disagreeing about its future once it is liberated and while it is still occupied? They talk about a Palestinian state, but where would its frontiers be? How big would it be? What would the rights of the Palestinian people be? If the rights of the Palestinian people are to be restricted to establishing a state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip why did the Arab nation fight in June 1967? The West Bank and the Gaza Strip were liberated Arab territories, and if the Palestinian cause could be protected by establishing a Palestinian government or a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, things would be easy. But now Israel has occupied all the territory of Palestine and we in the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan are in confrontation with Israel

and with her occupation of part of the Kingdom—the West Bank. Egypt is in confrontation with Israel because she is occupying not only Sinai, which is Egyptian territory, but also the Gaza Strip, which was under Egyptian administration. Can the rights of the Palestinian people be ensured merely by an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip? Should Israel withdraw? And could the mere establishment of a Palestinian government in exile based in Beirut or any other Arab capital solve the problem of the Palestinian people? We believe that there should be co-ordination between the three countries whose territories are occupied—Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and the Liberation Organization, that the roles should be distributed and that we should agree where the role of each starts and ends.

On this basis we have agreed that a delegation representing the Liberation Organization should attend the Geneva conference, not to discuss the problem of Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank or the Gaza Strip—that is the responsibility of the countries that can legitimately demand such withdrawal—but to discuss the rights of the Palestinian people which transcend the June 5 lines. We therefore believe that Jordan's role and that of the Liberation Organization at any international meeting are complementary, if there is the good will. But we believe that to insist that the Liberation Organization alone has the right to speak on behalf of the Palestinians and to defend their rights, including Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, does no service to the Palestinian cause or the Palestinian people. On the contrary, we believe that it would perpetuate Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. As King Hussein said in his Labour Day speech:⁶⁴ If the Arab nation decides to make the Liberation Organization alone responsible for demanding Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank, as being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians, Jordan will accept the collective decision on condition that it is understood by all that Jordan will regard itself as absolved from playing any immediate role in attempts to reach a peaceful settlement.

Q. Does that mean that you will not attend the Geneva conference?

⁶⁴ Doc. 232 above.

4. Yes; in that case we shall not attend the Geneva conference. As for the future of the West Bank, in whatever way it is liberated, Jordan and King Hussein are committed to allowing the people of the West Bank their right to decide their future and the sort of government they want. It is self-evident that the future of the West Bank can only be decided by the people of the West Bank.

Jordan is not prepared to accept a new situation in which there is a Palestinian government or a national authority, or whatever extraordinary name it is given, while at the same time Jordan is responsible for the West Bank on the basis of its being part of occupied Jordanian territory. Either Jordan has occupied territory that it must try to liberate, or such occupied territory is Palestinian so that the responsibility for liberating it falls to the Liberation Organization, with the support of the Arab countries, when Jordan will be in the vanguard of those who provide such support.

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Political programme adopted by the PFLP-General Command defining the tasks of the Palestine revolution (excerpts)⁶⁵

Mid-May, 1974

In the light of these facts and this situation it follows that the Palestine and Arab national liberation movement is an integral part of the world revolutionary movement against colonialism and imperialism, which resists exploitation and repression, and that the three forces of this revolution—the socialist camp, the national liberation movement in the backward countries and the working class movement in the capitalist countries—together form the front of national and revolutionary struggle throughout the world.

However serious these withdrawals they do provide an atmosphere favourable to a state of

revolutionary upsurge throughout the Arab homeland. We therefore believe that the national tasks that have to be performed are the following:

1. The human forces in every Arab region must unite in a democratic, revolutionary strategic resistance alliance to carry out the national tasks. These forces must struggle to establish broad national fronts comprising all the forces and classes in whose class and political interests it is that they should struggle together to perform the tasks that confront them on the basis of a common programme of struggle.

2. All the revolutionary organizations in the Arab area must struggle to ensure that they come together in an Arab revolutionary front to lead the Arab national struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction and against class repression. They must work to establish a broad Arab national front ensuring the unity of all sections of the Arab national liberation movement, regardless of their ideological and class origins, to perform their common tasks, though the revolutionary forces constituting this alliance should maintain their political, ideological and organizational independence.

3. The broad Arab national front must engage in all forms of struggle, the most important of which is armed struggle, to liquidate the remaining pockets of colonialism in the Arab homeland and to eliminate and destroy the interests of imperialism in the regions of the Arab homeland and to evict colonialism from it.

4. This front must support and participate with the Palestinian people in their armed struggle against Zionism and its settler entity to ensure the elimination of all the institutions of that entity that make up the Israeli regime and to put an end to the state of Israel and to establish in its place a secular democratic state in which there is no religious discrimination.

5. The front must consolidate its relations with the socialist countries, with national liberation movements throughout the world and with the working class in the capitalist countries, and unify their efforts so that they may perform the tasks of the struggle against imperialism, Zionism and local reaction.

The Palestinian Situation

Although it has its own special tasks to perform, the Palestine revolution is part of the Arab liberation movement against colonialism, Zionism and

⁶⁵ Adopted at the 4th conference of the PFLP-General Command held from August 20–27, 1973; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Ila al-Amam* nos. 458–461 (Beirut), May 17, 24 and 31, and June 7, 1974, when it was made public for the first time.

Arab reaction, and part of the liberation movement in the Third World which imperialism is trying by all the means at its disposal to suppress and eliminate. The Palestine problem, which is the concern of the Palestine revolution, is one of the most complicated liberation problems in contemporary history. The people and the land of Palestine are being subjected to a settler colonialist aggression which is trying to wipe them off the political map of the world. This aggression has resulted in the eviction of a whole people and the crushing of their national aspirations; it amounts to an attempt to put an end to their existence as a people with a national, political and cultural entity and to curb their national aspirations, which are to establish their independent state and to self-determination by their own free will in their own territory. (This is a conspiracy unprecedented in history: Zionism began its practical application in 1948 and all the imperialist circles played a part in it. British imperialism played a part in it when it was the leader of imperialism and old colonialism, as, later, did American world imperialism and neo-colonialism.)

The struggle of the people of Palestine is not for the elimination of a traditional colonialist presence of the kind that has been known in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Their struggle is to defend their future which Zionism wants to be obscure, and their entity which is threatened with dissolution. They are a people who have been deprived of the material precondition of their existence—their land. Their links with economic life, with the preconditions of normal life and with productive activity have been cut; they have become a people of refugees, effectively cut off from the operation of social production and from participation in political life.

Palestine has been the homeland of the Palestinian people from ancient times. They have lived there continuously, built their own civilization and played an active part in creating human civilization. From ancient times Palestine has been subjected to invasions by covetous invaders who have come into collision with the resistance of our people. These occupiers and invaders have come and stayed and then departed, but Palestine remains the property of her people and the Zionist invasion is not the first to which Palestine has been subjected.

The Zionist Entity

The Zionist military entity which has assumed concrete form in the state of Israel, is the living embodiment of the Zionist movement; all its past theories, its practical activities, and its errors are embodied fully and in every detail in this recently established entity, which is the partner and outpost of world imperialism for the protection of the world monopolies of imperialism. Even before the establishment of the artificial entity Zionism itself was a partner in the imperialist monopolies in Palestine. This is why world Zionism, with its financial and economic institutions, has played the role of the planner, financial supporter and capitalist for the military establishment that rules Israel.

World Zionist monopoly, which is the principal master of the Zionist entity is one of the most insolent of world monopoly financial institutions. The Zionist establishment has numerous institutions—financial (the Zionist National Fund), economic (a series of factories and industrial establishments) and agricultural companies (a series of agricultural settlements). It has full control of all these economic establishments and to tighten its monopoly control it has established political structures (The World Zionist Congress), trades union structures (The Israeli Workers Trades Union—the Histadruth) and the information set-up which employs demagogic methods to delude the governments and peoples of the world and to win them over to the criminal viewpoints of Zionism. Zionism also does everything in its power to ensure that its information media mislead the Jews in occupied Palestine and all Jewish communities in the world, all of whom it regards as being Zionists, and tries by all means at its disposal to impose its policy on them. The Israeli educational system and all its curricula enshrine this Zionist policy and the curricula glorify Israel's criminal behaviour, chauvinism and hostility to other peoples.

All these data, facts, political, economic, financial and theoretical, serve to consolidate the aggressive Zionist settler presence.

Every day the military entity grows stronger, its power increases and Zionism continues to rely on it for the imposition of its presence on Arab territory, receiving increasing support from imperialism for the implementation of its plans to intimidate the Arab liberation movement and to

protect imperialist interests in the Arab area. Every day this entity continues to practise its criminal policy based on usurpation and expansion.

This entity practises the most odious forms of national, racial and religious persecution against the Arab inhabitants of the territories it occupies—it has expelled them from their land by arbitrary and unjust legislation, and evicted them from their homes of which they take possession. It also pursues a policy of coercion and class discrimination against the poor Oriental Jews who live in this entity.

An analysis of Zionism shows clearly that the state of Israel will remain an aggressive, racist Zionist state that is hostile to the Arab people and their aspirations to achieve their national unity and to build their independent homeland and their socialist state. In view of the dialectical link of the Palestinian liberation movement and the Arab liberation movement with the world liberation movement against imperialism and colonialism, and of the fact of Israel's hostility to this movement, the historical inevitability which is the basis of the contradictions of the world makes it clear that Israel's future is tending towards annihilation, not to continued life and progress. Furthermore, Israel will continue to be an aggressive racist state as long as world imperialism continues to flourish and to exercise its national coercion and class oppression of other peoples.

It is a fact of the Palestine revolution that the liberation struggle in which the Palestinian Arab people are engaged through their armed revolution is the just and legitimate struggle of a people whose land has been usurped, and the laws of conflict require that a people whose land has been usurped should resist the occupier with force of arms, and such just national resistance is one of the basic tasks of a national liberation movement, as it is understood in modern times.

1. In the history of the national revolution a central position is occupied by ideological guidelines and hence by a political programme. There can be no revolution without revolutionary theory and thus guidelines provide the revolution with a clear strategy which must accompany revolutionary theory in day to day revolutionary activities.

We are a revolution aimed at liberating the land and the individual; we are also part of the Arab

liberation movement and part of the world liberation movement against colonialism and imperialism, the main embodiment of which is Zionist imperialist settler colonialism in the territory of our homeland which is the centre of the imperialist attack and the centre of the challenge existing in this area of the world. We are therefore a revolution committed to the interests and the freedom of man, which is an indivisible whole in every part of the world. We are a revolution that pursues a leftist revolutionary line based on the ideology of the working class, on the theory of the oppressed and exploited peoples i.e. that they rid themselves of national oppression and social injustice, on the theoretical and scientific evidence of these peoples' national liberation, and on the building of their independent homeland and the laying of the firm foundations of their socialist state.

2. The building of the vanguard organization on the basis of the ideology of the working class and deciding the strategy of resistance to colonialism, imperialism and all their supporters in Arab territory through organized and aware armed violence and armed mass popular struggle escalating into a people's war of liberation that disclose new and highly developed features of the activities of our front (the Popular Front-General Command.) Armed struggle is one form of revolutionary struggle but it is not the only one. It is the highest stage of liberation struggle, and the strength and degree of organization of the mass organization is indicated by the strength and degree of awareness of the base. And the extent to which armed struggle is successful in the performance of its tasks depends on how far awareness and a common attitude to struggle take tangible form within the integrated framework of the base. This factor also determines its appropriate political framework.

3. Palestinian armed struggle operating through the armed Palestinian revolution is not an aggressive, chauvinist, racist movement directed against the Jews with the aim of annihilating them. It is a national democratic struggle aimed at eliminating the Zionist-imperialist entity with all its economic, political, intellectual and cultural institutions, as being an aggressive racist entity; at ensuring the return of the Palestinian Arab people to their land; at the total liberation of the territory of their homeland; at the achievement of their independence and national sovereignty and the establishment of their secular democratic

state in which all citizens, regardless of their religious beliefs, will enjoy the right to citizenship, uninfluenced by the racist and aggressive trends and expansionist tendencies of Zionism. This state will be an integral part of the progressive democratic entity peacefully coexisting with the forces of progress and liberation throughout the world.

4. The stage through which our national struggle is passing is one of democratic national liberation. Because the homeland has been usurped and occupied it is the duty of all national classes of the people to rise to the defence of their homeland and to expel the occupiers from their territory. This applies to the Palestine national liberation movement which is confronted with the occupation and usurpation of its homeland whose inhabitants have been expelled from it, while the aggressor continues to usurp the land and to evict its people.

The national character of this struggle is the basic essence of the liberation movement of the Palestinian people. To be precise, all the national classes—workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie—come together in an interim national alliance for the performance of the task of liberation.

The united national front, consisting of all the various national organizations regardless of their ideological independence on the basis of commitment to the total liberation of the national territory of Palestine and of struggle against imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction, under the leadership of the ideology of the working class and its vanguard party which is organizationally and ideologically distinct—this front must be based on a political programme and the relations between these various forces must assume the form of a front and based on democratic dialogue. Such a front is the assertion of struggle and the formula under whose banner the Palestinian Arab people are struggling to perform the tasks of national liberation.

5. Through the course it has followed in its advance the Palestine liberation movement has become an important front against imperialism, colonialism and Arab reaction. However, from the nature of its tasks, it is neither a substitute nor a base for the Arab liberation movement. It is in its advance position of confrontation, and the extent of its awareness and the nature of its activities determine the character of its vanguard and the nature of its relations. And it is the validity of these relations that constantly urges it towards its

goals.

The Palestine revolution performs its practical, mass and political tasks against an Arab background whose objective reality it cannot ignore; Arab reaction is in open alliance with imperialism and Zionism and consists of regimes that assist the implementation of the plans of Zionism in the Arab area and has been mobilized to assist in striking at and intimidating the national liberation movement.

The Palestine revolution and the Arab liberation movement of which it is an integral part and a strategic ally, together perform the political and social tasks of day to day struggle. This revolution can only perform its tasks in struggle through the Arab territory and, in particular, through the territory adjacent to occupied Palestine. It is essential that this territory should be friendly to the revolution, so that it may use it as a base of operations, take action in it and perform its tasks of struggle through it. This can be ensured by establishing socialist regimes around the occupied territory, which will participate with the Palestine revolution in its struggle, provide the strategic depth for the movement of the Palestine revolution and constitute its concept of Hanoi. In view of the geographical and political situation of the Arab countries surrounding Palestine, it is not sufficient that a socialist regime should be established in only one of the countries surrounding the occupied territory. It is essential that more than one socialist regime be established around the Palestine arena, so as to form a socialist camp that will provide the Palestine revolution with strategic action and political cover.

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An urgent interim requirement is serious action to organize the Front in the Jordanian arena as a step towards creating a Jordanian national front consisting of a coalition of all national political forces and organizations within the framework of a specific political programme, and effectively participating in it. Another urgent requirement is the establishment of an alliance in struggle with special and comradely daily tasks, between this front and the united Palestinian national front, to spark off national, class and political contradictions, to consolidate mass struggle and to escalate the struggles of the lower social layers (workers, peasants, poor refugees and small wage-

earners) in Jordanian society. There must also be insistent struggle to reinforce and develop the progressive achievements of these struggles with the aim of establishing a national democratic government and ending the stage of the non-national government whose interests and very existence depend on world imperialism and neo-colonialism.

7. Serious action to build a mass organization in the occupied territory and struggle to confront the chronic organizational crisis of the resistance movement and to lay the foundations of the unity of the masses of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the territory occupied in 1948. The masses must be organized, indoctrinated and armed to fight a common battle against the economic fusion which the occupation authorities are imposing and to frustrate their plans in economic fields; Arab workers must boycott the occupying enemy and not play any part in developing his economy, thereby strengthening his aggressive military machine, and consolidating his grip on our territory. Steps must be taken to urge the Arabs of the occupied territory to hold on to their land, to resist emigration and to combat the enemy's cultural campaigns through Arab nationalist indoctrination and education based on the concepts of struggle.

8. Struggle by all available means to maintain the independent political identity of the Palestinian Arab people and resolute resistance to the conspiracies of imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction aimed at distorting or containing the Palestinian Arab identity as a step towards the complete liquidation of the Palestine cause. Persistent adoption of radical national attitudes to our national cause and resolute resistance to the conspiracies and proposals put forward by colonialist circles with a view to liquidating the cause of our people, whether in the form of proposals for a Palestine state or a government in exile, or any other defeatist, opportunist and deviationist proposals.

9. Struggle to reach a formula for the meeting in struggle between the Palestine National Front and all the Arab progressive, revolutionary and democratic parties and forces within the framework of a joint common political programme aimed at bringing these forces together, so that they may engage in common struggle to realize the achievements of the national democratic revolution, to perform the tasks of the liberation of the Arab

nation and to perform the task of liberation and of resolving the contradiction between the Arab liberation movement and Zionism.

10. Struggle to safeguard the democratic rights of the Palestinian and Arab masses wherever they may be and to protect freedom of thought and belief. Action to ensure hostility to imperialism and all its economic and political interests in the Arab homeland through all forms of struggle—agitation and mass and armed struggle.

11. Efforts to establish the closest relations with the national movements in the countries of the Third World, the world revolutionary movement, the countries of the socialist camp and working class parties throughout the world.

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Speech by Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria made at a lunch hosted by US Secretary of State Kissinger⁶⁶

Damascus, May 23, 1974

Dr. Kissinger, Mrs. Kissinger, ladies and gentlemen: I thank the Secretary of State for the very fine words he uttered, which to me reflect the new relationship which has begun to be established between our two countries. I agree with the Secretary of State, especially what he said—namely, that six months ago no one would have believed that such a party would be given in such a place. The reason for that impression was that for a long time the relations between the two countries rested upon some inglorious pages of events, not because our people had any animosity toward the American people but because, as the Secretary knows, the American policy for that length of time had been fashioned in such a way as to indicate that it was not compatible with the responsibility of the U.S. Government as a great power and its responsibility toward peace and stability in other countries.

Up until the October war, Dr. Kissinger started his initiative toward peace and stability in this area. These efforts must be appreciated to the highest degree possible. It is not easy that the Secretary of State of the U.S. Government spent one whole month in the area looking for an outlet

⁶⁶ English text as published in *Department of State Bulletin*, LXX, 1826 (June 24, 1974), pp. 689–690.

for peace. These efforts will always be appreciated by us all. These efforts have been directly the result of the improvement of relations between our two countries. There is no doubt that we all look toward a just peace. The Secretary of State and his colleagues have no doubt felt the deep, genuine intentions of the Syrian side for peace. I am sure it has always been clear that our people wanted peace and feel that we must look toward it. That is why, in fact, the October war, when it broke out, was for the purpose of establishing a just peace, because it is impossible to have a lasting peace as long as there is occupation or the threat of occupation and because there can never be a just peace as long as there is the number of two million Palestinian refugees living in utter misery.

Our agreement, therefore—the American side and our side having agreed on the principle of the need for a just and permanent peace—has opened up the wide avenues leading to the objective of peace. The American Secretary should not be surprised when he hears that he is the first responsible American official from whose lips we hear the clear enunciation of the purpose of a just and permanent peace. That is why the general Arab-U.S. relations, the development thereof, the improvement thereof, will always remain inextricably linked with the efforts expended by Secretary of State Kissinger.

Finally, I would like to offer my thanks on behalf of my colleagues and myself for this lovely banquet. Permit me to offer the toast of friendship between us, the toast for the development of positive relationships between our two countries, a toast for the establishment of a just and permanent peace, and the toast honoring Dr. and Mrs. Kissinger and all of our friends.

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Press conference statements by Palestine National Front members Awwad and Qawas discussing their expulsion from the West Bank by the Israel military administration and the activities of the Front⁶⁷

Late May, 1974

Q. Where were you living when you were expelled from the occupied homeland?

A. We have always lived in the territories occupied in 1967. We never left them until we were forced to do so when the occupation authorities deported us on December 10, 1973 as part of the group of eight freedom fighters and leaders of the Palestinian National Front who were deported that day.

Q. What is this movement? Would you tell us about the Palestinian National Front in the occupied territory? Does it take part in armed operations against the occupation?

A. We are active in a variety of fields, including armed resistance. In this area the occupied territory has—especially since the October War—been the scene of widescale activity characterized by enterprise and courage in the operations carried out by the Palestinian fighters, and these operations have resulted in the positions of the occupiers being struck in the heart of the occupied territory. Activity has also encompassed wide-scale mass struggles, in which the various mass organizations have taken part, including the labour and professional unions, the students' federation and the women's federation, and a number of other national bodies. This mass movement amounts to a popular rising; it was the occasion for the deportation of the eight freedom fighters, since when there has been a wave of mass struggle throughout the whole of the occupied territories, such as sit-ins, marches, and strikes in which schoolboys and schoolgirls and women's organizations have taken part. There have also been protests by municipal councils, chambers of commerce, and professional and labour unions. This activity has continued throughout the last six months, in spite of repression and intimidation.

⁶⁷ Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), May 29, 1974; English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), III, 4, (Summer 1974), pp. 164–166. Arabi Awwad and Jiriy Qawas were expelled on December 10, 1973.

This escalating struggle has a clear political significance which emerged for the first time in an unmistakable form in the various fields of the October War, when our people declared that they were an integral part of the Arab people and asserted that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legal representative of the whole Palestinian people. This stand has been declared publicly; many of the organizations have backed it through resolutions published in the press, affirming that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legal representative of the Palestinian people and plays a leading role in all this mass political struggle, in directing this wave against the occupation and rallying people round the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian National Front.

The Palestinian National Front came into existence on August 15 last year,⁶⁸ and includes in its ranks several sections of the resistance, representatives of the professional and labour unions, patriotic personalities and the Jordanian Communist Party in the West Bank. The National Front came into existence as the culmination of numerous contacts between the various nationalist forces in the occupied territory and as a response to the resolution adopted by the Palestinian National Council held at the beginning of last year.

The National Front is based on objective foundations which are embodied in the convergence of all the various groups, classes and organizations of our people to resist occupation, and the close cohesion of these forces has been proved by the many different kinds of struggle that have been carried on in the occupied territory through the last seven years. There is, in fact, a really firm fusion of the various groups and organizations of our people.

The activity of the Palestinian National Front really got under way and its influence became significant after the October War, as a result of the nationalist resurgence initiated by the war. Increasing numbers of the masses in the occupied territory rallied round and set up organizations for themselves in all parts of the occupied territory, both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This explains the ferocious manner in which the occupiers have been attacking the Palestinian National Front recently, especially since its activity has

expanded with the first number of its own newspaper. This is called *Filastin*, and you have doubtless seen copies of the first issue.

Q. Where is the Palestinian National Front active? Are its activities restricted to the interior, has it any connection with the Palestine Liberation Organization, or does it only cover the areas occupied in 1948?

A. The Front is mainly active in the areas occupied in 1967—to be precise, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Q. What are the objectives of the Palestinian National Front?

A. The Palestinian National Front was established to organize the struggle of our Palestinian masses in the Palestinian territories that were occupied in 1967. This is no simple task; it requires great efforts. This is why the Front is not extending itself beyond its resources and capabilities. The programme of the Palestinian National Front, published on August 15, says that the Front concentrates on the realization of two principal objectives at the present stage: Firstly, the liberation of the occupied Arab territories and, secondly, the safeguarding of the legitimate rights of our Palestinian Arab people.

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Statement by Phalangist Party leader Gemayyel of Lebanon expressing concern over the possible consequences of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon⁶⁹

Beirut, May 29, 1974

I shall be as frank here as I was with the President, who undoubtedly shares our concern in this regard. Because of the conflict, the problem of Lebanon is greater than the problems of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. It is greater than all three problems combined. It is so because it is linked to the basic problem, which is the future of Palestine and its people. The disengagement of troops may solve all problems but it does not solve the problem of Lebanon because the essence of the

⁶⁹ Made in a speech reacting to the Syria-Israel disengagement; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Amal* (Beirut), May 30, 1974.

⁶⁸ Doc. 264 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

conflict has so far not been dealt with. For Lebanon embraces the whole Palestinian existence, monopolizing it to itself. How and why? This is not the issue now, but the question is whether the burden of the fight for the return is now to be the sole responsibility of Lebanon and the Palestinians. The troops disengagement agreement, a step we enthusiastically support, places this burden upon Lebanon. It is a great honour to us but it is also an honour that may cost us our future and our destiny. Lebanon cannot possibly cope with this task even if it were to devote itself and all its resources to it. The disaster is all the greater because it represents a constant drain on the health of this country without affecting Israel. We do not know whether the world expects a solution for the problem of Palestinian presence to come by way of Lebanon. I am convinced that the world will not bother any longer with Lebanon if Lebanon does not defend its existence by its own power. Did not the world forget the disaster of the Palestinian people in order to relieve itself of the problem of the Jewish people? The tragedy may recur in Lebanon and the conscience of the world would remain undisturbed. Naturally, it should be understood that we do not wish to raise an issue which should not at present be raised. Nor do we seek in any way to embarrass our Palestinian brothers while they live through one of the most delicate periods in their long tragedy. Even more, we are ready to share our goods with them and allow them to take the better part, so that this sharing might lessen their feelings of estrangement and injustice. This is not the issue nor does this disturb us. What does disturb us is the uncertainty of the future and of our destiny. We are disturbed that Lebanon should become solely responsible for the Palestine resistance and its activities and that it should alone bear the brunt and consequences of Israeli revenge. We are concerned that no end is in sight, at least in the foreseeable future, to a situation which was intended to be temporary and is about to become permanent. To be more precise, the Palestinian presence as it exists in Lebanon is a tremendous burden, even if it had been a merely normal presence. How much more so when this presence is a resistance movement and must remain so, or else it would dissolve into Lebanon. Both alternatives are a threat to Lebanon. It is a situation which any other Arab country could have tolerated with no harm to its health or its existence.

But for Lebanon it is a matter of life or death.

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Resolution adopted by the Extraordinary Session of the Fifth Regional Conference of the Baath Party of Syria approving the Golan disengagement agreement⁷⁰

Damascus, May 30, 1974

The Fifth Regional Conference, meeting in Damascus in extraordinary session on May 30, 1974, having heard the detailed review submitted by the Secretary General of the Party, of the stages of military and political struggle that the region has passed through since October 6, 1973, and of the stages of the Arab and international talks and contacts on the question of the disengagement of forces on the Syrian Arab front, and the proposed disengagement agreement,⁷¹ and in the light of the Conference's debates on this subject, resolves:

1. That the proposed disengagement agreement is an important step towards the achievement of the interim goals of Arab struggle, which are full withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and the safeguarding of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

2. This important step has been imposed by the sacrifices of our people, the heroic actions of our army and the blood shed by our martyrs in the victorious battles fought by our people in the October War of Liberation and in the continuation of this war on the Golan Heights and on Mount Hermon.

3. This important step constitutes a firm basis from which, when circumstances are more favourable, we shall be able to set out to continue our struggle in all fields for the achievement of the goals of our people and our nation. The Conference therefore unanimously resolves:

- a)* To approve the proposed disengagement agreement for the Syrian front.

- b)* The Conference records its pride in the role played by the Comrade Secretary General of the Party—as leader in this stage of the struggle at

⁷⁰ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), May 31, 1974.

⁷¹ Doc. 115 above.

both the military and the political levels—and its appreciation of the great efforts he has made to reach the important results which we have attained on the course of the march of our people and our party.

The Conference salutes our armed forces and our enduring people, and reverently salutes the memory of our heroic martyrs.

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Press interview statements by Foreign Minister Fahmy of Egypt outlining the principles of Egypt's foreign policy⁷²

Cairo, late May, 1974

Q. Obviously the period after October which has seen such radical changes in the international field requires that we have a clearly defined foreign policy. Could you provide the Egyptian reader with an overall picture of this policy?

A. To answer this question it is necessary to review the main lines and basic principles on which Egypt's foreign policy is based and the pivotal points round which it revolves.

Egypt's foreign policy was drawn up by the President of the Republic and, like any sensible foreign policy, it is neither spontaneous nor improvised; it is determined in the light of Egypt's national objectives.

Egypt's national objectives are basically Egyptian, aimed at ensuring Egypt's safety and security in the times we are living in; and connected with this, or rather part and parcel of this, is another element determining Egypt's national objectives: the safety and security of the Arab nation.

It may be asked why we say that there is an organic link between the national objectives of Egypt and those of the Arab nation.

The reply to this is that the security of Egypt and that of the Arab countries are one and indivisible. Thus unified Arab action is a strategic, not a tactical objective in Egypt's foreign policy, and in my view we must preserve that unlimited Arab energy which arose from the united Arab action which was witnessed to an extent unprecedented in history during and after the glorious battle of October.

The organic relationship between Egypt and the Arab world that I am referring to is not a mere slogan; it derives from a profound belief and an absolute conviction that the Egyptian people are responsible for their integration in the Arab nation, and the Egyptian people have explicitly recorded this in their most important constitutional document—the Egyptian Constitution. The second paragraph of Article I of the Constitution states that the Egyptian people are part of the Arab nation and that they seek to achieve its complete unity. This explicit declaration, with its unambiguous statement of definite commitment in the most precious document possessed by any state, cannot be regarded as a mere slogan, and experience has repeatedly proved that there can be no Arab world without Egypt and that there can be no Egypt without the Arab world.

This has been the basic philosophy of Egypt's foreign policy since the Ramadan 10 war. Why do I make special mention of this war? I do so because it was a radical turning point, not only at the level of the Arab world but also of the whole world, and since this war Egyptian foreign policy can no longer be what it used to be—a reaction to actions. It has become a policy of taking the initiative and it has a strategy of clear objectives and values.

Q. What then, are our national objectives in the present stage?

A. Egypt's national objectives have to be determined specifically, not exhaustively, for they in turn are subject to international variables. Therefore they cannot be rigid; they must be mobile and flexible. I would state these objectives as follows:

1. Egypt's safety, security and independence, safeguarding the future of her people, the defence of her frontiers and efforts to achieve the loftiest goal of the Arab nation—unity.

2. The safety and national security of the Arab countries in the widest sense, securing the interests of the Arab nation and ensuring that it plays a positive part in all political activity at the international level.

3. Safeguarding the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine.

4. Diversifying and intensifying Egypt's relations with the different countries of the world to an extent determined by Egypt's strategic position

⁷² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 31, 1974.

and her responsibilities, both in the Middle East area and as an African country.

5. Developing the principle which Egypt, along with a small number of leading countries, played a part in crystallizing—the principle of non-alignment—and developing this principle in such a way that it conforms and is in keeping with the age of détente, although it emerged in the age of the cold war. This is an extremely difficult formula to achieve and requires great efforts and special care and political understanding.

6. In keeping and in no way inconsistent with all the above—indeed complementing and supporting it—is the principle of dealing with all countries with confidence and without complexes. As the October Document pointed out, Egypt can today extend the lines of international co-operation in a variety of directions and benefit from all opportunities provided her by the new world situation on the basis of her strength and her roots in this sensitive part of the world.

7. All the above objectives culminate in a national objective that Egypt has always had in mind and will never turn away from—the determination not to be in anyone's sphere of influence.

Q. In spite of the violent shock caused in Israel by the October fighting, some Israeli leaderships still think within the framework of arms guaranteeing Israel's security.

A. First I should point out that military force is the only guarantee for the security of territories, but the piling up of armaments and the arms race do not in the long run provide an atmosphere favourable to permanent justice or even permanent security. The arms race is open to all, it is not the monopoly of one country such as Israel, and the international arms market is open to any one who has sufficient purchasing power. The Arab world, thank God, because of its manpower strength and its unlimited purchasing power, can flood its armies with arms and, as Ramadan 10 demonstrated, the Arab fighter is as good as the Israeli fighter; indeed, in attack he showed that he was better than the Israeli fighter.

Therefore if military training and Arab solidarity based on this immense strength and coordination, technical and technological preparation and the development of arms continue, in the long run Israel will not be able to keep up with all these resources if she depends on force and arms alone.

Let me be more frank: Egypt and the Arab countries have the scientists who can enable her to throw into the battle any kind of arms, whatever their power, and all this depends on how Israel behaves in the dangerous field of armaments.

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Communiqué issued by the conference of Arab Oil Ministers announcing no new decisions regarding the oil embargo⁷³

Cairo, June 1, 1974

The Arab Oil Ministers met in Cairo on Saturday, 1 June 1974, and reviewed the developments that have taken place in the Middle East since their meetings in Tripoli on 14 March and Vienna on 17 and 18 March.⁷⁴ In the course of their meeting, the Ministers did not find it necessary to take any new decision, and they agreed to meet again in Cairo on 10 July 1974.

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Statement by Assistant General Secretary Aisami of the Baath Party of Iraq denouncing the Syria-Israel disengagement agreement⁷⁵

Baghdad, June 3, 1974

The agreement on the disengagement of Syrian forces⁷⁶ from the forces of the Zionist enemy complements and resembles the disengagement agreement on the Sinai front. Together they constitute the first part of the so-called settlement it is hoped to arrange in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242 which was adopted after the defeat of June 1967.

This agreement has disclosed the reasons for the heating up of the Golan front after the ceasefire in the October war. It is also an expression of ignorance of the profound significance and national goals of the heroism and sacrifices offered by our

⁷³ English text as published in *Middle East Economic Survey* (Beirut), XVII, 33 (June 7, 1974), p. 3a.

⁷⁴ Doc. 222 above.

⁷⁵ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), June 4, 1974.

⁷⁶ Doc. 115 above.

Arab people and the Arab armies in the Golan, Sinai and occupied Palestine. It has removed the last of the masks which were used to conceal the truth in the period after the October war. However hard the imperialist, reactionary and surrenderist information media try to represent the settlement as being right and just they will never be able to conceal the fact that it is a conspiracy and a renunciation of the rights of the Palestinian people to recover all the usurped territory. Nor will they be able to conceal the fact that the settlement will impose peace with Israel, recognition of her secure frontiers and perpetuation of the present situation of fragmentation in the Arab homeland, reactionary domination and American control, and the destruction of the forces of the Arab revolution and the Palestine resistance movement.

Now that a clear distinction has been made on behalf of the masses, between the forces of surrender and endurance, the battle will grow fiercer and stronger and attempts will continue to lure sections of the resistance into participating in humiliating settlements.

The masses and their revolutionary forces must therefore arm themselves with greater vigilance, energy and solidarity to confront the perils of conspiracy against the Arab liberation movement in general and the Palestine cause in particular and to frustrate the schemes that are realizing the objectives of Zionism, imperialism and reaction.

244

Press interview statement by Foreign Minister Suwaidi of the United Arab Emirates outlining his country's attitude to the question of Palestine⁷⁷

Amman, early June, 1974

Q. Since the Palestine problem is the problem of every Arab, the United Arab Emirates must certainly have a position on it. What, then, is your view of the future of the Palestine problem? What do you think the Arab summit conference which is to be held in September will discuss and what will it achieve as regards the Palestine problem?

A. The attitude of the United Arab Emirates

to the Palestine problem is perfectly clear. Along with its brother Arabs—the peoples and governments of all the Arab countries—it has borne its responsibilities before, during and after the Ramadan war because of its belief that it is the problem of all Arabs, and that the Arabs, wherever they may be, have a great responsibility vis-à-vis this problem.

Our position is in no way different from that of all Arabs, especially those in the confrontation countries, for we believe that what has been done so far is a preliminary step which must be followed by total withdrawal from all the territories occupied in 1967, and that the Palestinian people must be given their legitimate rights in full.

This is our belief, this is our creed, and we stand beside our brothers in the confrontation countries and our Palestinian brethren.

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Message from the Palestine National Front in the Occupied Territory to PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat on the occasion of the twelfth session of the Palestine National Council (excerpt)⁷⁸

Early June, 1974

On this occasion we wish to inform your Honourable Assembly of the following:

1. The maintenance of the high morale which has enabled our people to confront the most violent repression and the most brutal terrorism is conditional on the action of the leaders of all sections of the Palestine resistance and on the members of the National Council agreeing unanimously on that national unity of all sections and combatants of the revolution. This unity will strengthen the confidence of our people in their national leadership in the Palestine Liberation Organization, which is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people wherever they may be and which alone expresses their national will. The masses of our people call on you to be

⁷⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), June 7, 1974.

⁷⁸ Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), June 8, 1974, p. 3

on the alert to resist the conspiracies that have been concocted by the enemies of our people in the hope of dividing the national ranks and impairing their unity, through which our people have won all the victories they have so far achieved at the Arab and international levels.

2. The present stage requires agreement on an interim programme of action affirming the authority of the revolution, as embodied in the Palestine Liberation Organization, over every inch of territory from which the Zionist presence is dislodged.

3. Our people affirm their rejection of the return of the subservient Jordanian regime to the West Bank. They therefore affirm that the soil of Palestine is the property of the Palestinian will which is legitimately and faithfully expressed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

4. We demand the exposure and condemnation of elements who are trying to pave the way for the return of the Jordanian regime to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip through tendentious suggestions to the effect that it is impossible for the various sections of the resistance to agree on a unified attitude.

They stress that the best way to uncover these subservient and misleading elements is the affirmation of unanimous national agreement on a unified programme of action that reflects the wishes of our people that the occupation should end and that the subservient Jordanian regime should not return.

5. Doubtless our exiled brothers will give you a true and lively picture of the situation, circumstances and struggle of our people and the dangers which threaten the Arab character of our national territory. We therefore request that decisions be taken to support the endurance of our people and the resources of the National Front so that it may meet its responsibilities to the struggle.

6. We call on you to make every effort to obtain Arab support for and commitment to the Palestinian programme of action, especially from Egypt and Syria, because of their geographical links with Palestinian territory and their direct influence on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

7. Every effort should be made to obtain international support and commitment from the world forces of liberation, especially the USSR, People's China and the other socialist countries.

8. The central command of the National Front assures you that our people are rallying round the Palestine Liberation Organization in ever in-

creasing numbers and that the Front will abide by the decisions of the National Council and the Executive Committee, in spite of the frenzied efforts that are being made to drive a wedge between our enduring and struggling people in the occupied areas and their triumphant revolution.

Revolution until victory.

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Political programme adopted by the twelfth session of the Palestine National Council⁷⁹

Cairo, June 8, 1974

Proceeding from the Palestine National Charter and the PLO's political programme which was approved during the 11th session held from 6th to 12th January 1973,⁸⁰ believing in the impossibility of the establishment of a durable and just peace in the region without the restoration to our Palestinian people of all their national rights, foremost in the light of the examination of the political circumstances which arose during the period between the Council's previous and current sessions, the Council resolves the following:

1. The affirmation of the PLO position regarding resolution 242 which obliterates the patriotic and national rights of our people and regards our people's cause as a refugee problem. Therefore, dealing with this resolution on this basis is rejected at any level of Arab and international negotiations including the Geneva conference.

2. The PLO will struggle by every means, the foremost of which is armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian land and to establish the people's national, independent and fighting sovereignty on every part of Palestinian land to be liberated. This requires the creation of further changes in the balance of power in favour of our people and their struggle.

3. The PLO will struggle against any scheme for the establishment of a Palestinian entity the price of which is recognition, conciliation, secure borders, renunciation of the national right, depriving our people of their right to return and their

⁷⁹ Translated from the Arabic text, *Filastin al-Thawra* (Beirut), June 12, 1974.

⁸⁰ Doc. 223 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

right to determine their destiny on their national soil.

4. Any liberation step that is achieved represents a step for continuing [the efforts] to achieve the PLO strategy for the establishment of the Palestinian democratic state stipulated in the resolutions of the previous national councils.

5. The PLO will struggle with the Jordanian forces to create a Jordanian-Palestinian national front whose aim is the establishment of a national democratic regime in Jordan, a regime that will coalesce with the Palestinian entity to be established as a result of the struggle.

6. The PLO strives to establish a unity of struggle between the two peoples and among all the Arab liberation movement forces that agree to this programme.

7. In the light of this programme the PLO will struggle to strengthen national unity and to elevate it to the point where it can carry out its duties and its patriotic and national tasks.

8. The Palestinian national authority, after its establishment, will struggle for the unity of the confrontation states for the sake of completing the liberation of all Palestinian soil and as a step on the road towards total Arab unity.

9. The PLO will struggle to strengthen its solidarity with the socialist countries and the world forces of liberation and progress in order to frustrate all the Zionist, reactionary and imperialist schemes.

10. In the light of this programme, the revolutionary leadership will work out the tactics that serve and lead to the achievement of these objectives.

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Political statement adopted by the twelfth session of the Palestine National Council (excerpt)⁸¹

Cairo, June 8, 1974

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Faced with these circumstances, our Palestinian people rallies around the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinians who, in turn, hold fast

to the National Charter, the Political Programme adopted at the eleventh session⁸² and to all resolutions of the National Council and the interim Political Programme adopted at this session. In this, our people are resolved to continue to fight, intensify the armed struggle, oppose Zionist occupation and frustrate the conspiracies of the reactionary royalist regime in Amman as set forth in the scheme for a United Arab Kingdom together with the imperialist schemes which support it. Our people likewise shall oppose any settlement which prejudices their rights and their cause and shall fight to preserve the gains of its revolution. The National Assembly believes that, in order to achieve these goals, the following points must be emphasized:

1. The unity of the means employed by the Palestine revolution by amplifying the various forms of Palestinian national unity and implementing all resolutions to this effect in the various fields: military, political, informational and financial. The object is to escalate the armed struggle, achieve unity among the Palestinians both inside and outside the homeland and consolidate the National Front inside the homeland so that it can express our people's struggle and provide a framework for that struggle. This is so especially since this front, as a base for the Palestine Liberation Organization inside the occupied homeland, performed an effective role in the period following the October war and this calls for giving it and all other popular organizations and institutions through which it functions, our strong backing.

2. Because the Palestinian national movement is a part of the Arab liberation movement, this requires that all efforts must be directed towards strengthening the ties which bind the Palestinian to the Arab struggle and achieving forms of joint action between them through the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution. In order to meet the demands of the historic period through which we are living, we must coordinate efforts with Arab national regimes and strive to make them shoulder their full responsibility as regards the cause of the people of Palestine. Here, one must point to the importance of Arab solidarity which was demonstrated during the October war and the necessity of maintaining this while adhering

⁸¹ Translated from the Arabic text, *Filastin al-Thawra* (Beirut), June 12, 1974.

⁸² Doc. 223 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

to the resolutions of the summit conference held in Algiers in November, 1973.⁸³

3. The stand adopted by the socialist countries and by other forces of liberty and progress in the world in favour of the cause of our people and their expressions of solidarity with us requires that we intensify our efforts to create a more solid alliance with these forces. In this regard, we must concentrate on widening the front of our friends.

4. The Lebanese arena, which the Palestine revolution is anxious to maintain strong and unified by consolidating the ties binding the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples, and whose security the Palestinian people believes should be preserved, needs the steady and strong support of all the Arab countries. The object is to enable Lebanon to withstand the attacks and expansionist designs of the enemy and to enable our brethren in South Lebanon and our people in the camps to resist the enemy's attacks and its attempts to undermine their resistance.

5. The reactionary royalist regime in Jordan together with its long history of enmity towards our people and our nation, refused to join the October war alongside the Arab nation and is now conspiring, in full coordination with Zionism and imperialism, to liquidate and obliterate the Palestinian national identity and to reestablish its tyranny over our people in the occupied territory at any cost. To face this possibility, we must intensify our efforts to isolate this regime and emphasise our rejection of the scheme for a United Arab Kingdom and the establishment of a national democratic regime in Jordan.

6. The Palestine National Council calls upon all peoples and governments of the world that love justice and peace as well as all forces of progress and freedom to fight the efforts of international Zionism to make more Jews of the world emigrate to occupied Palestine. This would strengthen the militarist settler institution and realize the Zionist dreams of aggression and expansion and contribute to the furtherance of the Zionist rejection of our people's national rights as well as the national existence of our people and our Arab nation.

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Recommendation by the twelfth session of the Palestine National Council to the PLO Executive Committee concerning the bases of Palestinian action in the international field⁸⁴

Cairo, June 8, 1974

The Palestine National Council, while refusing to have anything to do with resolution 242 and while resolving at the same time that the Palestinian people shall not be excluded from the international political moves aimed at rectifying the situation in our area by putting an end to the Israeli occupation of Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian territories;

And while resolving that the royalist regime in Jordan shall not be permitted to assume the right to represent the Palestinian people or to play any part in deciding the future of any part of Palestine;

1. Decides to take action to open up the international field by putting forward the cause of the people and the land of Palestine within a framework other than that of resolution 242.

2. Calls on the Command of the Organization to take action to this end on the following bases:

a) This action should be taken within a specific international framework or within a world framework.

b) The Palestine Liberation Organization shall take part in the conference as being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

c) This action should be based on the United Nations Charter which affirms the right of every people to equality and to self-determination. It also affirms that respect for this right is an essential condition for the establishment of peace in the world. Respect for the resolutions on the rights of the Palestinian people, which affirm their established right to equality and self-determination, as the exercise by our people of their full national rights, is also an essential precondition for the establishment of a just and permanent peace in the area.

d) Through this international political and diplomatic action the Command of the Organization should work to achieve the interim goal mentioned in points 2, 3 and 4 of the ten points.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), June 10, 1974.

⁸⁵ See document 246 above.

⁸³ Doc. 332 in *ibid.*

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Memorandum from the PFLP to the Palestine National Council presenting its interpretation of the ten point programme⁸⁶

Mid-June, 1974

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine's concern for a unified Palestinian attitude springs from a profound belief in the importance of the unity of the Palestinian arena, especially in this grave situation, and in the possibility of its remaining united for a longer period. This attitude was shared by the members of the National Council, but we, as you will have observed, have adhered to it even at moments when we perceived a lack of serious concern for this issue which is of such vital importance at the stage through which Palestinian action is at present passing. We may ask: Why did we take this attitude? And why were we so concerned for it? The basic question lies in concern for the very essence of the attitude, and from the debates of the Council it is clear that the essence of the attitude can be summed up in the following specific points, which are the basis of our interpretation of all current problems, and which, in the final analysis, are the essence of the attitude.

1. It is inevitable that Palestinian action should reject Security Council Resolution 242 because, however many and varied the formulations might be, it leads to the liquidation of our revolution and our cause.

2. Similarly, our refusal to take part in the Geneva conference is unambiguous and irreversible, so that our people's movement may not fall into the snare of settlements whose aim is to put an end to our armed struggle and to terminate our existence.

3. All this means that the revolution cannot be a party to negotiations leading to settlements and liquidation.

4. The national authority that we are all struggling to achieve is a genuine national authority which cannot be brought about by the measures now being taken, but by our armed struggle and our political struggle based on it.

5. The subservient Jordanian royalist regime is a principal party to the conspiracy and on this

basis, our rejection of the United Arab Kingdom project and of any coordination or arrangement with it, is clear and unambiguous and requires no explanation. Therefore the struggle to establish a democratic national regime in Jordan is one of the principal items of our interim programme.

This is how we understand and interpret the situation, and these are the elements of the unified Palestinian attitude we are striving and fighting to achieve, however great the hardships and efforts involved.

Therefore in the light of this understanding we declare our acceptance of the ten points established by the Political Committee and the paragraph added thereto.

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Speech by President Sadat of Egypt made at a dinner in honour of visiting US President Nixon⁸⁷

Cairo, June 12, 1974

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon, dear guests: It is a source of pleasure to welcome you here as the first American President to pay an official visit to my country. Your visit comes at the beginning of a new phase which will go down in history as one of your important achievements.

Your decision to visit Egypt during this tour has a multifaceted political significance. While indicating the opening of a new page in the history of US-Egyptian relations, it also reveals the change which has taken place in your personal strategy and in US strategy. For my part, and on behalf of the Egyptian people, I should like to reciprocate in kind and to assure you and the US people that we welcome this change with all its significance—political and psychological.

I hope you will agree with me that for the first time in contemporary history the Middle East faces a turning point in the sense that the political climate in our area has never been more suitable and prepared for the establishment of a permanent peace than it is now. However, this cannot be achieved unless we exert and mobilize all our efforts towards this aim.

⁸⁶ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), June 15, 1974, p.3. For the ten point program, see doc. 246 above.

⁸⁷ Broadcast live by Cairo radio in English; BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4625/A/3-5; reprinted by permission.

This area has been and continues to be of great strategic importance. It must therefore be an area in which stability and normal conditions prevail. The political and strategic sensitivity of this area is of a nature that makes it liable to be the spark which could trigger a world conflict. However, despite all this, we find that for one reason or another wars and tension have continued to prevail in the area for over 25 years.

This is not the place to narrate the history of the area and the reasons for the difficulties it is facing. It suffices to point out that the real reason is the aggression which was committed against an entire people—the Palestinian people. Since that time these people have been deprived by force of arms of their homeland, their properties, and all elements of life. They are now living either in tents or are outcasts suffering a life in the diaspora. The distressing conditions in which an entire generation of Palestinians was born and brought up are a living testimony to the failure of contemporary civilization, with all its enormous means for progress and its legal laws, to remedy the roots of this problem in a manner satisfactory to the parties concerned.

Mr. President, allow me to be frank with you so that there will be no room in the future for any wrong view of the course of events in our area. A political solution and respect for the national aspirations of the Palestinians constitute the essence of the whole problem. To say that it is not a complicated problem is an oversimplification of the matter. However, there is no other solution. No way leading towards lasting peace can be exclusive of a political solution of the Palestine issue. This does not mean, as the Israelis claim in order to justify their expansionist plans, the destruction of Israel. History proves that the Jews have lived with the Palestinians—Moslems and Christians—under the same roof. Furthermore, history shows, without leaving any room for doubt, that the Jews have lived for long centuries under Arab rule without any discrimination, whether in the Middle East, Africa or in Europe.

I intended to speak on the Palestine issue, because its solution is ineluctable in order to achieve a just and lasting peace.

The other pending problems are less colossal. Egypt has lived as a sovereign state within its present international borders throughout time. The Egyptian people have always repelled all invaders and defeated all attempts to invade

Egyptian territory by force. All such attempts have been met with the determination of the Egyptian people to defend the integrity of their land. Thus it is inevitable for a country like Egypt, whose people possess all these capabilities and energies, to retrieve its land either by peaceful means or by force.

As you may recall, we have devoted all our efforts inside and outside the United Nations since June 1967 to bringing about a peaceful solution—but in vain. Although world public opinion was fully aware of the facts and although rulers and responsible officials admitted from time to time that the continuation of the state of no peace no war was dangerous, Israel—for one reason or another—continued refusing to heed the voice of reason and logic. Instead, it sought to hide behind the mirage and the falsehood of its supremacy. Israel failed to realize that occupation by force was bound to be checked one day and that this area, like other areas, would have to be governed by the rule of law and that its people must live in peace under the laws accepted by international society.

Although history is full of lessons which prove that occupation by force cannot endure and is doomed to disappear, the Israeli leaders failed to absorb this vital and simple lesson. Then 6th October came and the Arab armies and peoples showed their readiness to exercise their sacred right and duty to liberate their land. The course of events in that period, be it during or after the military operations, could constitute an indicator to alert us all to work together to achieve a just and honourable peace.

The fundamental changes unleashed by 6th October include the change in US behaviour and the various steps taken since that historic day. Positive US action is a tangible political accomplishment of 6th October, and the new page that we are opening with your country testifies truly that the United States has a vital interest in having good relations with all the states of this sensitive and strategic area. For our part, let me affirm that I am satisfied with the speedy growth of our relations and I hope that this growth will be consolidated in the future in the interest of peace and stability. Let us work to establish friendship between our two peoples and let us agree on the essential conditions of a lasting peace to enable everyone to lead a dignified, civilised and proud life.

We here in Egypt are working with our other

Arab brothers for peace. We are mobilizing our efforts and resources for construction and not for destruction, for advancement and not for backwardness, for progress and not for stagnation.

Mr. President, let us work for an era which will let us enter history as people with creative ingenuity and vision. Let us crush the forces of evil together.

Saying this, I invite you to drink a toast in honour of President and Mrs. Nixon, wishing them health and success and the US people well-being and prosperity.

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Speech by President Sadat of Egypt made after the signing of the Egypt-US joint communiqué (excerpt)⁸⁸

Cairo, June 14, 1974

I want to recall for you the present situation as we see it. It is a situation which, in our estimate, has three aspects:

First, important though it was in changing the general atmosphere, the disengagement agreement was only the settlement of a military problem related to the way in which the Security Council ceasefire resolutions were to be implemented. Reaching this agreement opened the door for us to make certain efforts. We must not deceive ourselves about their extent, but these efforts, and the insistence on their success are the only alternative to the continuing tragedy of a renewed outbreak of war.

The second aspect is that we believe absolutely that the crux of the whole Middle East problem lies in the legitimate demands of the Palestinian people being fulfilled. As long as this is not done the chances of a real and just peace in the area are slight.

The third aspect is that we understand and welcome the new American attitude from the bottom of our hearts, and we shall be only too delighted if this new spirit and new policy continue.

We for our part—and I personally—have adopted a new attitude from the very first moment of

our armies' victory, and submitted to the world a sincere peace initiative. I am fully determined to continue with this policy, although our will alone is not sufficient to make this peace. All parties must be convinced that what happened on October 6 put an end once and for all to the delusion that peace can be achieved in the area by force of arms or the imposition of will. The establishment of peace in the area depends on the extent to which this conviction is held by all parties.

In conclusion I am very happy to report that our long talks—some of which were held within the framework of official meetings between President Nixon and myself, or between President Nixon, Dr. Kissinger, myself and Minister Ismail Fahmy, while others took place during the unofficial parts of this visit—have made us more hopeful that the peace efforts will be successful. We shall be all the more anxious to continue them from a position of joint cooperation and anxiety for Egyptian-American friendship based on mutual respect and practical cooperation.

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Speech by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia made at a dinner in honour of visiting US President Nixon (excerpt)⁸⁹

Jidda, June 14, 1974

Mr. President, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is fully aware of its responsibilities to the world. It realizes that it is a member of the international community, all of whose members must work together for their common good and happiness. At the same time, it cannot tolerate that any injustice be inflicted upon any member of that community particularly if that injustice is inflicted upon itself. Mr. President, the injustice and aggression done to the Arab people of Palestine is historically unprecedented, even in the dark ages. An entire people have been evicted from their homeland to make way for another people who replaced them. The Arab nation has appealed

⁸⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), June 15, 1974. For the Egypt-US joint communiqué, see doc. 121 above.

⁸⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Bilad* (Jidda), June 15, 1974.

to the conscience of the world for a quarter of a century to establish the truth and remove this injustice. But all appeals have been ignored. This has forced them to carry arms in defence of their rights, their homeland and the things they hold sacred. Mr. President, we seek a peace based on truth and justice because it is this kind of peace that can establish security and stability all over the world. We fully appreciate the step that has already been taken on the road to peace in accordance with your directions and thanks to the wise and decisive efforts made by your Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger. We hope that the USA will persevere in its efforts to establish a just and durable peace in the region so that the region can enjoy security and stability, the foundations of development and prosperity. Thus the USA would have fulfilled its duty as the most powerful country in the world. It is our view that there can be no real and durable peace in the region if Jerusalem is not liberated and reverts to Arab sovereignty and if all occupied territories are not liberated and the Arab people of Palestine recover their right to return to their homeland and decide their destiny. Mr. President, the step you have taken in visiting this region is a wise step and we appreciate you having done so, hoping that its consequences would further the well being and peace of this part of the world.

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Speech by President Assad of Syria made at a dinner in honour of visiting US President Nixon (excerpt)⁹⁰

Damascus, June 15, 1974

We welcome any honest endeavour to achieve a just peace and we wish you success in your efforts. I would state in all clarity that peace is a traditional disposition among the Arab nation and we have a genuine interest in it. We want stability in the shadow of real freedom which can ensure multifaceted progress and, in the end, lead to our people's recovery of its ability to perform its role in the

international community, for its own good and for the good of humanity. Our Arab nation has, for long periods of its history, struggled for peace. It has faced many difficulties. Many obstacles were placed in its path. It was exposed to pressures and threats aimed at denying it its freedom and will, and forcing it to abandon principles which it refuses to compromise. Our nation, home of the oldest human civilizations and of heavenly revelations whose history contributed so much to the enrichment of human culture, is a nation that has much to offer and bears a grudge towards none. It seeks only that its people should live in freedom on their own soil and rebuild their lives in all fields so that it can resume its generous gifts to mankind in conditions of peace. But it cannot do so while being threatened in its homeland and destiny, in the shadow of an incomplete liberty where parts of our homeland continue to be occupied and millions of our fellow nationals in Palestine and elsewhere are made homeless.

The people of Palestine have lived for the past twenty-six years as refugees denied of their rights which all international treaties have recognized and UN resolutions have affirmed, year after year since 1947. This has driven them to despair of human justice and of fair treatment from international organizations, for whenever they called for justice, the burden of aggression increased and the aggressors went further in denial of their rights to the point where they denied these rights completely as well as their very existence. It is as if the aggressors are pushing them deliberately towards a path they have not chosen to follow in order to remind the world of their existence and their cause. For without a real and just solution to this problem there can be no peace in this region. You can imagine the extent of our Arab people's disappointment in recent years when they saw how their sacrifices and their efforts to achieve justice and peace were met with closed doors and all attempts to obtain justice were frustrated. The peace that can survive and abide is a just peace which ends Israeli occupation, restores the land to its people, removes the injustice done to the Palestinian people and assures them of their legitimate national rights. In recent years, attempts have been made to impose a *fait accompli* which carries within it all the factors which can renew war and bloodshed and has no relation whatever to peace. We were bound to resist these attempts

⁹⁰ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Baath* (Damascus), June 16, 1974.

as we did in the October war and its sequel, the war in the Golan, where it was shown that a *fait accompli* based on occupation and aggression cannot last and that reliance on force to wrest gains from others, indeed from their very rights, is an insult to human values on the one hand, and a sign of a shortsightedness in vision and perception on the other. Another fact was confirmed by the progress of historic events, namely, that any victory not based on justice and truth—if it is proper to call it a victory—is merely a temporary and shaky victory which soon collapses at the first blast of a storm unleashed by the forces of goodness, truth and justice. Genuine peace is an urgent demand and a pressing need for peoples of the world. Genuine peace is one which is based upon ensuring the rights of peoples in a manner which would dissipate the feelings of injustice. And since world peace in our age is a noble goal for humanity, adopted by governments and fought for by all peoples it is almost superfluous to assert that world peace is almost impossible to achieve without establishing a just peace in a region which is one of the most important centres of gravity in the world.

Mr. President, we hope that your visit to the Syrian Arab Republic will mark a new phase in relations between our two countries, and one based on mutual respect, honest cooperation, adherence to the principles embodied in the UN Charter and our own conviction that the establishment of such relations serves the true interests of our two peoples. It is my view that the key to understanding and the basis of sound relations between any two countries are frankness and clarity. We shall be concerned to emphasize that our talks be frank and clear, hoping that we can arrive at certain common views concerning the topics of our discussions and at a common understanding of the prerequisites for a just peace in our region. This no doubt will help us to move steadily towards a peace which can assume the interests of the Arab peoples and of the peoples of the world. We are fully aware of your own personal role and of the role of American policy initiatives and their value and effect on a policy of international detente, and we appreciate your concern to establish sound and friendly relations in our region and your efforts to establish a just and durable peace therein. We realize that one facet of this new policy was the dispatch of your Secretary of State, Dr. Henry

Kissinger, to the region to contribute in achieving the first step on the road to a just and durable peace. We appreciate the considerable efforts being made in the negotiations for a disengagement of troops on the Syrian front. It is undoubtedly important for us to view what has already been accomplished as a prelude to a following stage where peace must be established upon its own genuine foundations. This is the great challenge for whose sake the efforts of all those who sincerely strive for peace must be directed.

Mr. President, you in the United States are about to celebrate the bicentennial of independence. Let us call to mind the sublime principles for whose sake you fought your war of independence, and chiefly the principle of liberty. I am pleased to mention the fact that there is a large number of US citizens of Syrian Arab descent who have been living in their new homeland as decent citizens, in all walks of life. This by itself is a sufficiently good reason for us to strengthen the friendship between our two peoples. Let us therefore strive to open a new phase in the history of relations between our two countries and in which we place our emphasis on liberty and justice, remove the causes of aggression and accomplish those measures which enjoy the support of our two peoples and are for the well being of everyone. Finally, ladies and gentlemen, I wish to stress the importance of this visit, to salute President and Mrs. Nixon, to wish them health and happiness and to send greetings to the American people to whom we wish continued success and progress.

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Press statement by President Assad of Syria announcing the resumption of diplomatic relations with the US⁹¹

Damascus, June 16, 1974

A good opportunity arose for us to welcome in Damascus the US President, Mr. Richard Nixon; his visit has accorded us the opportunity to exchange views on matters pertaining to our bilateral relations and the Middle East question.

⁹¹ Broadcast by Damascus radio in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4628/A/3; reprinted by permission.

The American people and the Syrian Arab people are brought together by many cultural and human values. It is only natural that US citizens of Syrian Arab origin should form one of the bridges of understanding which pave the way for the establishment of a new stage of relations between the American people and the Syrian Arab people based on common interests and respect by each side of the independence and sovereignty of the other side.

We welcome US participation in the Damascus international fair this year. We declare our readiness to participate in a dialogue for the improvement of friendship and co-operation between the peoples of the two countries and the establishment of a co-operative relationship in the educational and economic fields serving the interests of both sides.

The Syrian Arab Republic thanks President Nixon for the constructive efforts exerted by the United States for reaching the agreement on the disengagement of forces on the Golan Heights⁹² and declares its readiness to continue constructive, sincere co-operation with the US Government for the sake of laying down firm bases for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East area.

As we understand it, the agreement on the disengagement of forces constitutes a first step and an indivisible part of the just overall solution of the question—a solution which cannot exist without Israel's withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and the securing of the national rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with our understanding of UN Security Council Resolution 338 of 22nd October 1973—as we conveyed our understanding to the United Nations at that time.

We devote all efforts within our power for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in our area. We consider this peace a basic condition for the stability of international peace and security. We believe that peace in any area cannot be established if the people of that area have been robbed of their basic rights which are recognized by the UN Charter and resolutions.

President Nixon and I have agreed to intensify the dialogue and co-operation between our two countries for the sake of attaining a just durable peace in our area and the world. We have also decided to restore diplomatic relations between

our two countries on an ambassadorial level as of today.

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Statement by King Hussein of Jordan calling for full Israeli withdrawal, Palestinian self-determination, and Arab sovereignty over Arab Jerusalem, made during a dinner in honour of visiting US President Nixon⁹³

Amman, June 17, 1974

A second thought that I know has been presented to you in Cairo, Jidda, Damascus—and now in Amman—is the absolute unity of position of the four countries in firmly backing the implementation of the principles of Resolution 242 as the basis for any peaceful settlement. No nation, it is written into the United Nations Charter, shall acquire territory of another nation by armed force; and that principle, among others, is given specific interpretation in the 1967 resolution by calling for withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territory occupied in the war of 1967.

Only when Israel abides by the spirit of the United Nations Charter, and only when Israel obeys the letter of the Security Council resolution, can “secure and recognized” borders come into being. It should now be clear to Israel that security and territory are not synonymous, that true security rests on the recognition by her neighbors of her right to live in peace within those borders. So long as Israel continues to occupy Arab territory, there will neither be peace nor security in the Middle East.

Third, disengagement of forces can be arranged, truce lines can be drawn, and political settlement can be negotiated, but there can be no peace until the major issue in the conflict between Israel and the Arab world is resolved and resolved justly. That is the problem of Palestine. There can be no peace until the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people are recognized and restored. The Palestinian problem has never been a refugee problem, but one of the inherent rights of a people to return to their homeland and to determine their

⁹² Doc. 115 above.

⁹³ Excerpted from the English text, *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXI, 1829 (July 15, 1974), pp. 113–114.

own future. Once the occupied territory has been evacuated by the Israelis, only Palestinians can decide what its future is to be. They can choose continued union with Jordan, a new form of federation, or the creation of a separate state. The choice is theirs and theirs alone, and whatever their choice, it will enjoy our full acceptance and support.

And finally, Mr. President, I would now like to speak in the name of all Arabs, Moslems and Christians alike, these same thoughts I am sure you also have heard from President Sadat, His Majesty King Faisal, and from President Asad. I want to speak of the City of Jerusalem. The Arab world, and the world of Islam, stretching far beyond the Arab world into Africa and Far East Asia, will never allow the Arab City of Jerusalem to remain under the control of Israel. Arab sovereignty over the Holy City must be reinstated. This—the return of Arab sovereignty over the Arab City of Jerusalem—is the cornerstone for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Only thus can Jerusalem become the city of peace for all those who worship the One God: Moslems, Christians, and Jews.

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Statement by various Palestinian organizations attacking the visit of US President Nixon to the Middle East (excerpt)⁹⁴

Mid-June, 1974

Struggling masses of the Palestinian and Arab people,

The visit to the area by the leader of American imperialism at a time when the conflict between the Arab people and all their national and class enemies has reached its climax is intended to reinforce the surrenderist policy pursued by certain renegade Arab regimes. Their policy is to end the Arab-Zionist conflict with the aim of effacing the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people,

consolidating the Zionist entity and then destroying all the achievements of the Arab national liberation movement.

The visit is intended to bypass all the gains achieved by the blood and sacrifices of the soldiers and revolutionaries of the Arab nation in the October war and to employ these sacrifices in the service of the surrenderist plans aimed at destroying the fighting spirit in the ranks of our soldiers and extinguishing the firebrand of the Palestine revolution, which has kept the conflict with the enemy blazing for so many years.

The experience of peoples of the world who have struggled against their national and class enemies has proved without any possibility of doubt that the conflict with these enemies cannot be decided by relying on the good intentions and on the solutions they propose, which in fact are designed exclusively to protect their own interests at the expense of those of the struggling peoples. Therefore, armed struggle against them must continue until the peoples' aims of liberation, independence and progress are fully achieved.

Struggling masses,

Some of these surrenderist regimes have received the leader of American imperialism with every sign of honour and hospitality, as if he were an apostle of peace, but this will not efface from the minds of our people, the ugly picture of him as he really is—spattered with the blood of our sons in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. And those Arabs, whose hands are today stretched out to shake the hand of the criminal which is spattered with the blood of our people, are in fact engaged in bargaining over the lives of our devoted martyrs and squandering their mighty sacrifices. Our people will never forget this.

The attempts of certain reactionary and renegade regimes to obscure the facts of the conflict in the area mean one thing only: that the door is being opened for imperialist influence to re-establish its supremacy throughout the whole of the Arab arena and for the destruction of all the achievements and gains realized by the Arab liberation movement through the struggle and sacrifices of its masses throughout a quarter of a century, in solidarity with the forces of progress and liberation throughout the world, whose support for our struggle is now being so odiously misrepresented and calumniated.

The imperialist-Zionist presence in the area is

⁹⁴ Issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Arab Liberation Front, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and the Palestine Popular Struggle Front; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), June 22, 1974, p. 4.

an embodiment of the hostility to the ambitions of our people and their right to a free and decent life. This hostility between us and our enemies will continue, however hard the renegade regimes try to disguise it, until it is decided in favour of our people.

Masses of our struggling people,

To assert our rejection of all attempts to make the revolution a party to the proposed political settlement we must make it clear that we reject the United Nations resolutions, in particular resolution 242, which involves liquidation; we reject the Geneva conference in any form whatsoever and we reject all forms of negotiations with the enemy under the auspices of the existing balances of forces. We must make this clear by continuing and escalating the fight against the enemy, exposing the advocates of surrender in the Arab and Palestinian arena and the interim solutions they are promoting as being designed to serve the schemes of those who are enemies of our people and of their right to continue the revolution and to go on fighting.

In their determination to hold out, to liberate their land and to be victorious, our people insist that all suspect liquidation plans and solutions be frustrated by continued Arab combat and the escalation of Palestinian armed struggle.

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Statement issued by the fifth regional congress of the Baath Party of Syria (excerpts)⁹⁵

Damascus, June 20, 1974

Masses of our great Arab people, in view of the critical circumstances through which our Arab nation and its liberation movement are passing—particularly following the October war of liberation and the positive results it achieved, the events and developments that preceded, accompanied and followed it, especially the battles of the Golan and Mt. Hermon which forced the Zionist enemy to withdraw from part of the occupied territories as a step along the road to the complete with-

drawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from all the occupied Arab territories and the guaranteeing of the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people—the fifth regional congress of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party held an extraordinary session from 30th May to 13th June 1974 at the invitation of the Regional Command of the Party.

The congress came amid extremely critical circumstances which constitute an important and historic turning-point for the Arab nation and its liberation movement. The Arab nation has won one of its greatest victories in its historic struggle against the Zionist enemy and the imperialist forces that supported him for a quarter of a century. This congress gained its special importance from the critical circumstances under which it met and from the problems and tasks it discussed and the decisions it adopted in a spirit of serious democracy and high feeling of responsibility.

This congress was an important opportunity to review the march of the Party and the country during the previous stage and to specify the most important bases for action in the coming stage in the light of the beneficial lessons and the practical experience which the Party and the country has gained in various fields and at various levels. The congress completely grasped the circumstances through which we are passing. It proved once again the Party's adherence to the problems of our nation and people. By its rich discussions, which were characterized by a strong partisan spirit, the congress reflected the general satisfaction at the achievements accomplished and the victories won.

The positive results achieved through the practical activities of our Party and Revolution came in the wake of corrective movement of 16th November 1970, which was led by Comrade Hafiz al-Asad, Secretary General of the Party. These activities were based on a clear policy line. These positive results, which were achieved at the domestic, Arab and international levels and the epitome of which was the October war of liberation, came as proof of the correctness of the march of the Party and the Revolution and at the same time as proof of the correctness of the policy line which was defined by the corrective movement in the light of the Party's requirements and its phasal and long-term objectives as specifically laid down in the decisions of the 11th national congress and the fifth regional congress which were the firm and

⁹⁵ Broadcast on Damascus radio in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4634/A/1-2, 3-6; reprinted by permission.

strong bases for the achievements and victories that have been brought about. Experience, events and developments came to stress the correctness and importance of adhering to it [the Party's policy line] and the need to consolidate and deepen it. For this reason the congress stressed the continued pursuance of this clear, principled policy line, which is based on the following.

1. To consider the main conflict (tanaqud) at this stage as one between the Arab nation on one hand and the Zionist enemy and the imperialist forces supporting them on the other. Consequently, the basic aim of our struggle is one of complete liberation. The victories that have been achieved or will be achieved are merely links in the chain of victories that the Arab nation should achieve in order to eliminate the Zionist aggression and liberate all the Arab soil. This means that the main battle still continues and requires constant preparation and mobilization. We must be more and more prepared for the battle and the challenges we are facing.

2. Continuing the struggle in all fields and in various forms in an active and effective manner and within the framework of achieving the objectives of the phase and continuing to build our intrinsic power, militarily, economically and politically and to reconcile all forms of struggle, basing this on the continuity of the battle with the enemy.

3. Concentrating all efforts against the main enemy and avoiding side issues on the basis of the strategy of mobilizing Arab potentials and working to achieve every possible step towards unity.

Masses of our great people: In the light of its study of the current circumstances resulting from the war and its review and analysis of the recent stage and the results of the October war and the Golan and Mt. Hermon battles, the congress considered the disengagement of forces, which was one of the items on its agenda, a glorious victory for our people and nation that could not have been achieved but for the steadfastness of the country and its insistence on adhering to its solid principles. The congress unanimously approved this agreement, considering it another step towards achieving the phased objectives of the Arab struggle, which are complete [Israeli] withdrawal from the occupied Arab territory and guaranteeing the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people. The congress regarded this step as constituting a firm base from which we would move under better

and more suitable circumstances to continue our struggle in various fields.

In the light of its study and analysis of the nature of the circumstances through which we have been passing and the tasks we are facing and its definition of the most important bases for action in the coming stage, the congress has adopted appropriate resolutions and recommendations relating to the various domestic, Arab and international spheres.

1. The domestic sphere:

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2. The Arab sphere:

The congress reviewed the Arab political situation during the recent and current stages. Out of its belief that the main battle at this stage was that aimed at liberating all the Arab territories occupied in the aggression of June 1967 and guaranteeing the national rights of the Palestinian people; due to the emphasis it has placed on the correctness of the policy adopted by the Party and revolution after the eruption of the corrective movement under Comrade Hafiz al-Asad, Secretary General of the Party; and arising from its concern for learning the appropriate lessons from the October war and the battles of the Golan and Mt. Hermon and for the need to maintain, adhere to and develop the positive results achieved, the congress stressed the importance of and the need for taking every possible step to support the battle and to march along the course of Arab unity in implementation of the principles and aims of our Party, taking into consideration the need to observe the objective conditions of each country on the one hand and the requirements of the battle on the other.

The congress stressed that the importance of unity emanates from our principled belief in it. This is in addition to the needs of the battle and the nature of the challenges imposed on our nation which dictate that we march towards unity, because it constitutes the radical and comprehensive solution to our problems and a practical answer to the challenges imposed on us.

Within the framework of strengthening Arab solidarity and increasing its effectiveness, the congress stressed the importance of continuing the dialogue with the Arab countries in order to implement the resolutions of the Algiers Arab summit conference and to utilize Arab resources in the battle more effectively. The congress

stressed the strengthening of Arab solidarity, the mobilization of Arab resources, the transcending of peripheral issues which stood in the way of the battle, and the avoidance of side battles as the embodiment of its belief in the pan-Arabism of the battle and its desire to commit the whole Arab nation to the battle, because it was the Arab nation's foremost battle of destiny and because it was rightly regarded as the battle of existence and destiny.

Regarding the Palestine issue, the congress stressed that the just struggle being waged by the Palestinian Arab people was an important and basic part of the national struggle of the Arab nation. This struggle was basically aimed at guaranteeing and restoring the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people. The congress expressed its esteem and admiration for the great sacrifices that the Palestinian people had made inside and outside Palestine. The congress stressed that Syria would continue to support this struggle and place Syrian Arab resources at its disposal until the Palestinian Arab people's objectives were brought to realization. These objectives were the liberation of all their territory and the restoration of their rights. The congress stressed the importance of working and co-ordinating with the PLO in its capacity as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people.

Also in the Arab sphere, the congress stressed the importance of increasing the activities of the Party, the popular organizations and the trades unions in the Arab field for the sake of bringing about greater co-ordination, co-operation and joint action to serve the common cause—that of liberating our territories and achieving the national and social aims of our people.

3. *The international sphere:*

The congress noted with satisfaction the prominent position and pioneer role of our country in the peoples' liberation struggle. The congress expressed its great appreciation for the activities and efforts engaged in during the recent period to emphasize this role and expand world solidarity with the Arab Issue. Out of the desire of the Party and its revolution in Syria to expand and strengthen this solidarity and out of eagerness for the continuity of the battle and for the need to expand the front of the friends and all kinds of work to expose imperialist and Zionist plots, the congress stressed the need to continue to work to strengthen

and develop the existing relations of co-operation with the friendly socialist bloc countries, particularly the USSR, with the third world countries, the non-aligned states and liberation movements all over the world. The congress also stressed the importance of establishing new relations with the other states and peoples and their political forces in accordance with the development of their attitudes towards the Zionist aggression against the Arabs and of working to benefit from every available opportunity in the Western camp and in all countries which could serve to strengthen our just cause.

The congress noted with satisfaction the expansion of world support for the Arabs, the change which had taken and was taking place at the international level in favour of the Arab cause, and the increased isolation of Israel. The congress stressed the importance of increasing this solidarity and making it develop more and more to bring about increasing support for our just cause.

Within the framework of Arab-African relations of friendship and co-operation the congress stressed the importance of further developing these relations and achieving joint co-operation and struggle against Zionism, racism and imperialism. The congress also stressed the importance of working within the framework of the non-aligned states, particularly with the aim of implementing the resolutions of the fourth conference of the non-aligned states.

The congress also devoted great attention to the need to benefit from other international and regional conferences and various meetings by explaining and clarifying the nature of the Arab struggle and its just aims, increasing the isolation of Israel in further international circles, and explaining the dangers which Zionism and Israel with its expansionist aggressive policy posed to the cause of peoples' freedom, progress and the cause of security and peace in the world.

The congress stressed the support of the Party and the revolution for the struggles of struggling peoples and all world liberation movements for their freedom and independence and for the sake of strengthening world solidarity against imperialism, Zionism and all forms of oppression and aggression.

Masses of our great Arab people, the experiences of life and reality have confirmed the correctness of the policy adopted by our Party and country

since the eruption of the corrective movement under Comrade Hafiz al-Asad, Secretary General of the Party. This policy has proved its effectiveness and usefulness. It was the basis of the positive results achieved in the October war and the battles of the Golan and Mt. Hermon.

Through the firm, principled attitude they adopted, our Party and its revolution in Syria have been able to impose withdrawal from part of our occupied territories on the Zionist enemy. They have been able to confirm the ability and determination of our people to continue the struggle until victory. The conditions necessary for the continuity of the battle require, first of all, the continued consolidation and deepening of our line of policy. They also require that the components of strength on which we are building our struggle remain the basic guarantee in our hands to achieve all the phased and long term aims for which we are struggling.

This is why the congress stressed the need for continuing to work and exert the utmost efforts to strengthen the domestic front, to strengthen Arab solidarity, and to strengthen and expand world solidarity with the Arabs to consolidate and support the components of our strength so that our struggle front against the Zionist enemy should be stronger and larger and in order to impose our will, liberate our territories and retrieve our usurped rights.

Masses of our great Arab people, the October war of liberation and its extension, the Golan war, have promoted our struggle to a higher and more advanced level. One of the most important phenomena of our victories was the restoration of sovereignty over part of our occupied territories and the strengthening of the position of our struggle in the military, political, economic and morale fields. We would not have achieved these victories without sacrifices, without our country's steadfastness, our armed forces and their heroic fighting during the October war and on the Golan Heights and the peaks of Mt. Hermon, and without the principled, wise and courageous leadership of Comrade Hafiz al-Asad, Secretary General of the Party. These victories could not have been brought about without the sacrifices made by our people and our nation on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts.

These victories were the result of the sacrifices of our Party and our people and the heroism of our army, the Arab forces and the Palestine Resistance.

Experience has proved that there is no victory without sacrifice. The victory which has been won is only a link in the chain of victories that must be won by our Arab nation in order to fulfil its objectives of liberating all the territories occupied during the June 1967 aggression, guaranteeing the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, and continuing the joint, liberational and progressive march to construct a unified socialist Arab society.

Masses of our great Arab people, while announcing its satisfaction with the positive results achieved by the struggle of our people during the recent stage, the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, in its extraordinary fifth regional congress, stresses its unshakable belief in the continuation of its liberation march and its insistence on liberating our territories and restoring all our usurped rights. While renewing the pledge to continue the struggle, it can only record with pride and appreciation the effective and splendid leading role of the Comrade Secretary General of the Party during this stage of military and political struggle. It appreciates the great efforts he made in order to arrive at the important results that we have attained in the course of the march of our people and Party. At the same time, it greets our armed forces and our steadfast people. It greets with esteem and reverence the spirits of our heroic martyrs. It also greets the armed forces on the Egyptian front and the Arab armed forces which participated in the October war of liberation. Long live the struggle of our people. Victory to our just cause; immortality to our message.

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Press interview statements by President Assad of Syria discussing disengagement, Syrian relations with Jordan and the USSR and prospects for the US peace initiative⁹⁶

Early July, 1974

Q. Mr. President, disengagement of the forces on the Syrian front came six months late and started eighty-four days after the war of attrition.⁹⁷ To what extent was this

⁹⁶ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), July 5, 1974; partial English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), IV, 1 (Autumn, 1974), pp. 189-192.

⁹⁷ Doc. 115 above.

agreement commensurate with the Syrian requests?

A. In what concerns us, the disengagement of the forces is a first step towards the general Israeli withdrawal from Arab occupied land and the assurance of Palestinian rights. It may not be right for us to speak about the Syrian requests regarding their position. We had definite objectives that should have been realized by the forces' disengagement. We have struggled so that the agreement may comply with these objectives. This brought on the difficulty in the talks preceding the agreement. The Israelis tried to escape by all means from making the disengagement agreement a first step toward a just peace. They were trying to realize some military and political benefits. I think we have prevented them.

Some parts of our land have been liberated, about 650 square kilometres. We have broken the enemy's resistance on nonwithdrawal from any part of the Golan Heights occupied in the 1967 war. Syrian flags were raised upon the city of Qunaitra as a symbol of the insistence of Syria to restore every inch of her lands. We have defeated some attempts by the enemy to push us into taking an unfavourable position towards the Palestinian liberation movement.

We are not the ones who delayed the disengagement agreement for six months. Israel expected that we would not be able to pursue the war of attrition but soon realized that we are able to do so. Israel only had to take into consideration this reality while the talks were being carried on. Our stand in the disengagement talks was consistent with our acceptance of the cease-fire conditions. We had assured the Secretary-General of the UN, Kurt Waldheim, of our acceptance of the resolution on the basis of its being connected with Resolution 338 which stipulates complete Israeli withdrawal and the assurance of the Palestinian people's rights.

Q. Now that disengagement has been completed on both fronts as a first step toward a general Israeli withdrawal and an acknowledgement of the Palestinian people's rights, what are you anticipating for the future?

A. We shall go to the Geneva Conference and we shall try to make it a success if it seems that it will be an effective means to realize a just peace in the area. We have to be completely alert so as not to allow the Israeli enemy to turn Geneva into a means to gain time and diminish the achievements which were realized by Egypt and Syria in the October

War and the subsequent Golan battles—just as we shall never allow the reduction of the importance of the two conditions for peace: withdrawal and the assurance of the Palestinians' rights. We know the enemy's covetousness. This imposes on Egypt and Syria, in particular, supported by the Arab states, the continuous pursuit of the situation with increased alertness and preparation. If it proves necessary to go back to military action we will do so with the maximum mobilization of our nation's resources.

The October War has shaken the Zionist state and destroyed the legend of its invincible army. It has changed many conceptions in Israeli society. Nevertheless, the Israeli command is still holding to its previous position, as I mentioned earlier, to negate the achievements of the Ramadan War. But the solidarity of Egypt and Syria and their ties to the vast Arab solidarity have made it possible to deal with the situation.

Q. Do you see, Mr. President, that if the next step is the Geneva Conference, it is necessary that more than Arab consultations should take place on the level of the participating states—Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians—that a unified Arab position should be achieved?

A. There is an Arab understanding that the Geneva Conference will be held next September. The Arabs should not go to the Conference with varied expectations. They must go with a unified picture regarding the condition of a just and permanent peace in the area. There is total agreement between Syria and Egypt on this matter. We were in agreement before and after the war that no peace is possible without withdrawal and ensuring the rights of the Palestinians. We are also in agreement with Cairo that no peace is possible without the attendance of the Palestinians at the Conference. It is not possible to make resolutions about the Palestinian issue in the absence of its owners. What is considered at present for discussions between Cairo and Damascus are the methods of work inside the conference.

Q. On what basis would the reconciliation between Jordan and the resistance take place? Did the deliberations of your Minister of Foreign Affairs during his last visit to Amman, which was preceded by the trip of Talhouni to Damascus, have any relation to that?

A. Khaddam's last trip to Amman and our recent contacts with the resistance did not aim at making any reconciliation. We did not discuss this

matter but we all, as interested Arabs, are obliged to continue consultations. The important thing is to restrict the efforts of Jordan and the resistance now to taking back the occupied land and ensuring the rights of the Palestinian people.

Q. And the Palestinian entity?

A. The Arab summit conference in Algeria decided to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as the legal representative of the Palestinian people.⁹⁸ At the last Palestinian Congress in Cairo there was unanimity on establishing a Palestinian national authority.⁹⁹ This means our acceptance of the Palestinian entity and the importance of its existence. It was actually a great success that the Palestinian national effort emerged from the conference without divisions and even with great agreement of opinion. We should all support every step to strengthen the Palestinian united action because this unity makes the Palestinian resistance stronger. It also helps the Organization to express more effectively the Palestinian people's will. In my opinion, when the rights of the Palestinian people are set down for serious discussion within the Geneva Conference, the Palestinian leadership will find out the relative answers to all the various questions raised.

Q. Mr. President, do you think, in the light of your discussions with President Nixon in Damascus, that the American initiative to find a peaceful and just settlement in the Middle East will last? What are the positive factors that make us expect a progressive American position in the coming stages? What are the assurances that the danger of freezing this situation can be avoided?

A. The first assurance, or rather the only one, to realize a political solution which is congruent with our achievements in battle is our determination in Egypt and Syria, in particular. This is the basic support, as I said before, and it is a support of great potential if it is based on wide Arab solidarity. The enemy's interest requires him by nature to go back to the frozen situation because this will give him a greater opportunity to bargain, to take advantage of the situation and to try to diminish the results of the October War. But we in Cairo and Damascus know very well the way to confront this.

The American initiative was originally motivated

by the realities of the October War, which made the US aware of its previous inadequate position and hastened it to change the situation. We should say it has not yet attained the extent required and imposed by the serious efforts to promote a just peace. We must try all efforts to develop the American position. Such development is in accordance naturally with the interests of the American people, and is in contradiction with international Zionism. America is obliged to attempt international peace efforts. We have to deepen this obligation. We say our limits in the American situation are limits of potential and we possess a lot. . .

Q. What are the steps anticipated in the American-Syrian relationship after the restoration of diplomatic relations?¹⁰⁰ Are there probabilities behind the scenes of a trip to the United States for the Vice-Premier of Syria for Economic Affairs?

A. A high Syrian official will go to the United States shortly. His mission will be to continue the discussion about the situation in the Middle East. Discussions may include fields of cooperation but the discussions will centre at first on the expected developments in the original issue—the issue of occupation and the rights of the Palestinian people.

Q. Will efforts continue to support the Arab-Soviet consultations before the conference is held in Geneva? What is the probability of a visit by Brezhnev to the Middle East?

A. It is basic that the Soviets will contribute in efforts for a just peace in the Middle East. If our friendship with the Soviet Union is a viable truth, this will not keep us from earning other friendships in the world. What will prevent us from doing this as long as we have our principles and as long as we are able to protect our free will? As for Mr. Brezhnev's expected visit, Damascus has no definite information about it at present.

Q. But the strain which accompanied the expedition of arms to Cairo or to Damascus helps in a continuous way to create stumbling blocks put before this friendship. Only yesterday Nixon announced in the Soviet Union that the United States discounted \$500 million of compensation to Israel. Are we not part of a front participating in the confrontation of the enemy forces?

A. This is true, but there may be among friends

⁹⁸ Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

⁹⁹ Doc. 246 above.

¹⁰⁰ Doc. 254 above.

matters of difference and they are subject to discussion. We being friends does not mean that we have to agree on everything... Despite that, the Soviet Union is a friendly nation who sided with us and has long supported the Arab cause...

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Statement by the General Secretariat of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution supporting the decisions of the Palestine National Council (excerpts)¹⁰¹

Beirut, July 5, 1974

The General Secretariat of the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution held its ordinary session in Beirut on July 3 and 4, with the General Secretary, Kamal Junblat, in the chair, and in the presence of the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasir Arafat. Taking part in the meeting were the following members of the General Secretariat, representing the following organizations: The Arab Socialist Union of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Baath Party (Syria), the Baath Party (Iraq), the Algerian National Liberation Front, the Arab Socialist Union of the Libyan Arab Republic, the National Front of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf, the Progressive Democrats' Movement of Kuwait, the International Federation of Arab Workers, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Lebanese Progressive Parties and Forces represented in the Political Bureau of the Front.

In the light of the reports submitted by the General Secretary of the Front, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Head of the Executive Bureau of the Front, those present discussed recent political developments in view of the results of the activities of the Palestine National Council meeting in its twelfth session and the tasks of the Arab Participation Front at the level of support for the Palestine revolution at the present stage. In the course of these discussions the following viewpoints and attitudes were expressed:

In the light of the above the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution affirms the following:

1. Support for the ten points of the interim political programme¹⁰² approved by the Palestine National Council which constitute guidelines for action by the Palestine revolution on the basis of which, and through adherence to which, it will be able to protect and consolidate its unity, confront attacks on it, and perform the tasks in struggle required of it at the present stage. Support for the interim political programme is not restricted to a mere declaration of attitude; the Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution wishes to affirm its determination to support the struggle of the Palestine revolution with all the means at its disposal to ensure that this programme is implemented.

2. The Palestine national unity which was established by the Palestine National Assembly's unanimous agreement, at its twelfth session, on a unified attitude to policy and struggle, is the most effective weapon in the possession of the Palestine revolution for the frustration of conspiracies against it and for the achievement of its national objectives. It is indisputably a Palestinian national responsibility to reinforce this unity, it is also a national responsibility of all Arabs which they must discharge in total honesty. The maintenance of the independent Palestinian national will within the framework of the relationship, based on their common destiny, that binds the Palestine revolution to all the other sections of the Arab national liberation movement, is an important and principal factor in reinforcing and consolidating Palestinian national unity. The Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution will continue, as it has always done since its foundation, to work for the unity and national coherence of the Palestinian arena.

3. All Arab nationalist forces have a common historical responsibility for supporting the Palestine resistance movement and enabling it to frustrate the conspiracy to destroy the independent national existence of the Palestinian Arab people, and for keeping Palestinian rifles at the ready so that they may perform their glorious role in the struggle to achieve the objectives of the revolution to impose the implementation of its political programme and

¹⁰¹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut) July 5, 1974.

¹⁰² Doc. 246 above.

to repel the Zionist attack from the whole of the Arab homeland.

More is required than mere declarations of support; what the Palestine revolution needs and what Arab national duty prescribes is that the greatest possible amount of military, material and political support be provided to the resistance by supplying it with the arms required to escalate the struggle against the Zionist enemy and by supplying it with the funds necessary to meet the requirements of the revolution and to increase its freedom of movement at both the political level and the level of struggle in all Arab regions and on all Arab fronts, in particular in the countries in confrontation with Israel.

4. The role the Jordanian regime has been playing in striking at the independent national existence of the Palestinian Arab people as a prelude to concluding a deal with the Zionist enemy at the expense of the national rights of that people, calls for resolute moves on the part of the Arabs. They must insist on the implementation of the resolution adopted by the Algiers summit conference, which has the unanimous support of all the Arab masses, to the effect that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It is the joint responsibility of all Arabs to prevent the plans for coercion, which the Jordanian regime has in hand, from being implemented to meet the Zionist enemy's wish for the suppression of the Palestinian national existence and the destruction of [Palestinian] national rights. This responsibility is imposed by the most elementary considerations of support for the resistance movement and the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people for the liberation of their homeland and for self-determination in their own land.

5. The constant savage Zionist aggression against the Palestinian camps, South Lebanon and many other areas of Lebanon, is a principal link in the plan that Israel is implementing with the support of the United States against both the Palestinian and the Lebanese peoples.

Israel's aim is not only to escalate the war of annihilation against the Palestinians and the long-suffering Lebanese masses in the South, but also to exert pressure on Lebanon so as to ensure the right atmosphere for striking at Palestinian-Lebanese national unity. The splendid courage shown by the Lebanese and Palestinian masses must be met with something more than words of encourage-

ment and expressions of support. The Arab Front Participating in the Palestine Revolution will struggle with all its resources to ensure that all the Arab countries fulfil their responsibilities by responding as follows to Palestinian and Lebanese demands in this field:

They must provide the arms required to defend the camps and the resources required to protect them and build shelters in them. They must provide means of protecting Lebanese airspace and repelling Israeli aggressions, and issue a declaration of collective Arab determination to protect Lebanon in word and deed.

6. To confront the constant Zionist-imperialist attack the brunt of which is at present being borne by the Palestinian Arab people. There must be a resolute Arab attitude based on serious preparations to employ all the means and weapons in the possession of the Arab nation and, before all else, the oil weapon, to exert effective pressure on all forces in alliance with the Zionist enemy which provide him with all kinds of military and financial aid and political support.

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Press interview statement by President Bourguiba of Tunisia reviewing the situation after the October war¹⁰³

Tunis, early July, 1974

Q. The October war opened up new horizons for Arab action in the field of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestine problem, on the one hand, and in the field of Arab national unity, on the other. What real prospects do you think there are of action in these fields?

A. I believe that the October war restored to the Arabs their honour and dignity and put an end to the defeatist spirit that had dominated the area since the 1967 war. Probably its most important effect was that it changed the policy of America which has now come to understand the rights of the Palestinian people and to realize that the occupation of others' territory does not increase Israel's security, which must be based on peace and good neighbourly relations, on the restoration of the occupied territories and on

¹⁰³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), July 12, 1974.

reaching a peaceful solution, if Israel can overcome her superiority complex.

This is why the Egyptian, Syrian and Saudi peoples are welcoming Nixon's visit and pin on it their hopes of recovering the territory forcibly occupied by Israel and of gradually reaching a peaceful solution. But the talk about the rights of the people of Palestine should be more precise, because so far it has not been made clear what these rights are. I have already explained my point of view in the proposal I put forward [referring to his proposal that the 1947 United Nations partition resolution be adhered to].

As a matter of principle the Arabs have a right to all their territories, but by respecting international legality deriving from the United Nations resolution establishing the state of Israel and also the partition resolution, it is the Arabs themselves who have renounced part of their territory. Thus recognition of Israel must be within the limits of international legality, otherwise it will be unfair to the Arabs.

Insistence on international legality would embarrass Israel and her supporters, for they could not publicly state that they are opposed to international legality.

Obviously this situation would have repercussions in all the Arab countries, and here let me point out that solidarity with the Palestinian people must be based not on the fact that they are resisting Jews but on the fact that they are resisting colonialists—the state that seeks to ensure its security at the expense of its neighbours which is a kind of aggressive expansionism that is unacceptable.

As for cooperation and what form it should take, we ourselves have cooperated with all our resources and to the limits of our ability, and I think that the Arab countries have performed the same duty. This cooperation must be consolidated, especially before the Geneva conference and at the United Nations. I do not mean a total union, that is a fantasy; what I mean is that this aid and cooperation should continue.

Therefore it is important that there should be a mini-summit of the confrontation countries and the Palestinians before the major summit conference that is to meet in Rabat in September, and we who are not confrontation countries shall approve all the decisions of the mini-summit.

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Communiqué issued by the conference of Arab Oil Ministers announcing the lifting of the oil embargo against the Netherlands¹⁰⁴
Cairo, July 10, 1974

The Arab Oil Ministers met in Cairo on Jumada al-Thani 20, 1394 A.H., corresponding to July 10, 1974 A.D., and reviewed the question of the oil embargo imposed on Holland. As an expression of the concern felt by the Arab states in respect of a united European entity and in consideration of the relations which it is desired to establish between the Arab nation and the European Community the Arab Oil Ministers unanimously decided to lift the embargo against Holland.

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Political communiqué no. 1 issued by the PFLP rejecting current developments as being aimed at "liquidationist settlements" of the Palestine question (excerpts)¹⁰⁵

Mid-July, 1974

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In the light of the principle of national commitment and of belief in the right of the Palestinian and Arab masses to be informed of everything prejudicial to their cause, the Popular Front wishes to affirm to its brother strugglers, to its comrades in arms and to the Palestinian and Arab masses, that it will not for a moment hesitate to disclose, reveal and resist any deviation from any quarter or any attempt to delude people into dissenting from this true understanding of the unified Palestinian national attitude.

On this basis the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine declares to the Palestinian masses, both inside and outside the occupied territory, and to the Arab masses everywhere, the following facts:

First: Increasing efforts are being made by Arab and international quarters to exert pressure on the Palestine Liberation Organization to draw

¹⁰⁴ English translation, Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, *The Case for the Arab Oil Embargo* (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1975), p. 101.

¹⁰⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), July 20, 1974, p. 10.

it into the field of liquidationist settlements. These attempts include:

1. The call for coordination with the subservient Jordanian regime to be achieved through meetings of select Arab parties at which attempts will be made to reconcile the regime with the Organization as a first step towards luring the Organization to Geneva.

2. Attempts to persuade the Organization to take part in the Geneva conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338 which calls on the parties concerned to start implementing Security Council Resolution 242 with a view to recovering the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Second: Certain leaderships are displaying—and declaring both at official meetings and elsewhere—their readiness to respond to these attempts, although they conceal their intentions by making conditions for the sake of appearances. If this proves anything it proves that they agree to compromise and that they are prepared to participate in the settlement for the establishment of a suspect Palestinian state in part of the territory of Palestine and to accept the Israeli presence, using the term “national authority” for purposes of camouflage and to conceal their treason to the sacred cause.

Comrades,

Masses of our struggling people;

In view of the attempts to deviate from the Palestine National Pact and to disregard the political programme and the resolutions adopted by the Palestine National Council at its successive sessions, and of the attempts that are being made to misrepresent the situation, we call on you to exercise greater caution and vigilance and to frustrate the attempts being taken by certain leaderships to draw our struggle into such deviation.

Any Palestinian leadership or Palestinian quarter that takes part in the liquidationist Geneva conference or any other conference in the light of the present balance of forces will be regarded as recognizing the legality of the Zionist usurpation of our land.

Any Palestinian command that meets with King Hussein and his subservient regime in the name of coordination, cooperation and concern for the cause will be relinquishing the cause and exonerating the King and his regime of all the criminal actions they have taken and are still taking

against our Palestinian-Jordanian people. King Hussein has torn up all pacts and agreements and discarded all the undertakings he entered into in the presence of the heads of the Arab states.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine therefore wishes to declare that it regards any meeting of the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization with the subservient Jordanian regime as a clear deviation that conflicts with all the resolutions adopted by the National Council at its previous sessions.¹⁰⁶ It is impossible to remain silent about this and a resolute stand must be taken to prevent its happening.

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Statement by President Bakr of Iraq warning of efforts to minimize Arab gains and to liquidate the Palestine resistance¹⁰⁷

Baghdad, July 17, 1974

Then came the war of October 6, 1973, and in spite of our clearly expressed views on the situation and on the policies prevailing before the war, and in spite of our warnings against them on the grounds that they did not meet the principal conditions required for waging a victorious battle against the imperialist-Zionist alliance, we certainly believe that this glorious battle did achieve much that was positive and confirmed much of what we had anticipated as regards the ability of the Arab nation to confront the enemy and to win victory in spite of the circumstances attendant on the preparations for the war.

In spite of the circumstances attendant on the end of that war and the mistaken policies aimed at isolating us, as we explained in the report of the Regional Conference on the October War,¹⁰⁸ our unlimited participation in the war was both a national duty and a great honour. What is serious is that the positive achievements realized by the war and the immense sacrifices made by the

¹⁰⁶ Doc. 246 above.

¹⁰⁷ Made in a speech on the sixth anniversary of the July 17 revolution; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), July 18, 1974.

¹⁰⁸ Doc. 206 above.

nation have not been used to strengthen its positions in confrontation of the usurping enemy or to reinforce its demand for its usurped rights. On the contrary, they have been used as a pretext and a cover for many concessions to the Zionist enemy at the expense of the nation's historical rights nor was it only a matter of readiness to renounce the nation's historical rights to its territory. In an undisguised and dangerous move the doors have been thrown open for the forces of apostasy to fall upon the political and economic concepts, principles and gains achieved by the Arab liberation movement in its long struggle against colonialism and reaction. The doors have also been thrown open to the imperialist influence which was behind the aggression and the backwardness that the Arab nation has been subjected to. It is impossible to keep silent about these mistaken trends; while posing as realistic and flexible policies their real intention is to reach a so-called peaceful settlement, and irrefutable facts show that the Zionist enemy and American imperialism will not go as far as the framers of these policies fondly believe, despite all the concessions and renunciations that, so we believe, these policies really involve.

Where do they want to take the area? How many concessions do they want the nation to make through these mistaken policies and choices? The problems to be solved in the Arab arena today go far beyond jurisdiction and sovereignty. They go far beyond the jurisdiction or sovereignty of such and such an Arab government. It is a matter of nationalism and the battle fought by the nation for Palestine, Sinai and the Golan—a national battle in which the blood of all the Arabs was shed and the resources of all the Arabs deployed, and no one has the right to choose a course that endangers the nation's rights and its achievements in the field of liberation whatever justifications and excuses he produces.

In the sight of the nation and of history the Arab national leaderships must unify their efforts and their resources and make positive and effective moves to confront every attempt at desertion and every inclination to renounce the historical rights of the nation.

If anyone imagines that it is all over and that all that anyone can do is to raise the flag of surrender, we are still firmly confident that the Arab revolutionary movement, the national struggle and the nationalist Arab elements are still strong and

still capable of stemming the flood of apostasy and imperialist penetration. We are confident that they are still capable of correcting past errors and setting Arab efforts on the right course, the course of full liberation, the course of maintaining the national rights of every region and the national rights of the nation. And just as the responsible leaderships in the Arab nation must bear this huge responsibility, so the Arab popular forces must also reinforce their solidarity and their unity to confront the currents of apostasy and the conspiracies of imperialism.

We turn to our brothers in the Palestine resistance who are being forced into specific situations by various quarters and by different means aiming at suppressing them and obliging them to compromise on their rights in Palestine and accept solutions which only represent false hopes and pitfalls intended to liquidate the Palestine revolution and destroy the will of our Palestinian Arab people to struggle and resist; in fact, the final liquidation of the Palestine question.

The strugglers who took up arms and who in difficult times proved the ability of the Arab people to respond to challenges, should warn of the malicious conspiracy that aims at making them a bridge leading to liquidating their cause and the cause of this nation.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of King Hussein of Jordan (excerpts)¹⁰⁹

Alexandria, July 18, 1974

In response to the invitation of President Muhammad Anwar Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, H.R.H. King Hussein ibn Talal of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan paid a visit to the Arab Republic of Egypt in the period July 6–18, 1974.

The two parties agreed that there should be constant and systematic coordination between the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Syrian Arab

¹⁰⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), July 19, 1974.

Republic; the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization in such a manner as to ensure the mobilization of the greatest possible strength for the Arab position, to permit parallel action by the Arab confrontation forces and to ensure mutual Arab understanding before the resumption of the Geneva peace conference.

The two sides declared that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the legitimate representative of the Palestinians in the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan.

The two sides are in agreement that the Palestine Liberation Organization should be allowed to take part independently in the Geneva conference at the appropriate time in affirmation of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. The two sides also agreed that a disengagement agreement should be reached on the Jordanian front as a step towards a just peaceful solution.

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Communiqué issued by Fatah denouncing the joint communiqué between Egypt and Jordan¹¹⁰

Beirut, July 20, 1974

Masses of our struggling Palestinian people,
Masses of our glorious Arab nation;

The Palestine National Liberation Movement Fatah regards the Egyptian-Jordanian joint communiqué issued after King Hussein's visit to Cairo as gravely prejudicial to the Palestinian cause and people for the following reasons:

1. The Egyptian-Jordanian joint communiqué is a retreat from the resolutions of the Algiers Arab summit conference stipulating that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people wherever they may be.¹¹¹

2. By calling for disengagement between Jordan and Israel the Egyptian-Jordanian communiqué is really calling for the disengagement of the Palestinians from Palestinian territory so that it can

be handed over to King Hussein in implementation of Israeli-American conditions, regardless of the wishes of our people who absolutely and unanimously reject the return of the King to the West Bank, and in violation of the legitimate right of our people to self-determination and to establish their independent national authority.

3. The Egyptian-Jordanian joint communiqué is an astonishing response to the Hashimite-Zionist plan to divide our people and thereby put an end to its distinctive character and efface its national identity, which is the safeguard of its revolutionary advance and its armed struggle against Zionism, imperialism and subservient reaction.

4. The Egyptian-Jordanian joint communiqué involves acceptance of the liquidationist "United Arab Kingdom" plan which has been condemned by the masses of the Arab nation and rejected by all nationalist Arab forces and regimes.

5. The Egyptian-Jordanian joint communiqué is in every sense an attempt to plunder the gains and national achievements of the Ramadan war. It is also a blow aimed at the Arab solidarity which made its appearance during the October war and was embodied in the resolutions of the Arab summit conference held in Arab Algiers.

Masses of the Arab nation;

We are not alone in confronting the Zionist-imperialist-Hashimite plan to liquidate our cause and our revolution. The Arab masses and their national leaderships resolutely and obstinately stand by us and support us. Moreover the friendly socialist countries and all forces of liberation and progress in the world support our people's struggle for its right to self-determination and to establish its independent national authority as a revolutionary achievement by the Palestinian people and the Arab national movement on the road towards building its democratic state.

¹¹⁰ Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), July 20, 1974, p.2; for the joint communiqué see doc. 264 above.

¹¹¹ Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

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Statements by President Sadat of Egypt reviewing Egypt's position and stressing that the Palestinians must be represented by the PLO in negotiations¹¹²

Cairo, July 23, 1974

Firstly, I regret to record that some of our problems since October have come from people who are friends or brothers. We hope that the misunderstanding between us and the USSR will not last long. We for our part are anxious to end it and we believe that the day will come when they will realize that some of their interpretations of our policy were incorrect, as has happened more than once before. We are also sorry that it has become the sole task of certain of our Arab brothers to distort our attitude and to defame our policy, pursuing a policy of reminding us of the favour they did us by participation in the battle, which is contrary to all moral, national or unionist reasoning.

Secondly, we must watch the repercussions of international disagreement or détente on our cause very carefully, for the relations between the USSR and the United States and the group of Western European countries are complicated and are passing through decisive stages. Although these parties have their own problems, such as disarmament, European security and commercial and economic relations, the present stage, even in this field, is full of variables, and though they may seem remote to us they do have repercussions on the whole of the Arab region because of its strategic and economic importance and ultimately on the issue of peace or war in our area in particular. The nearest example is provided by the recent regrettable events in Cyprus whose position is sensitive as regards our nation and our area. Therefore we must always pay attention to these relations and do all we can to prevent them having repercussions on our cause, making sure that there is a firm hand on the helm to guide us through the ever-changing waves.

There is also the policy of openness which some people may regard as an impetuous drive to secure

the greatest possible number of sources of financing for the tasks of reconstruction and development. We, however, see it as a policy that requires precise calculations so that it may not upset the internal equilibrium of our progress or the external balance of our independence and our control of our resources. Today, you can see while we are preparing for the great stage of reconstruction, we are receiving loans and investments from Iran, the Western countries, the Arab countries and the non-aligned countries and at the same time we are trying to revive the old agreements with the countries of the Eastern bloc which the circumstances of the disaster had made it impossible to take advantage of.

Israel has been making constant efforts to frustrate the consequences of the October war both by obstruction and procrastination or by military adventures against Lebanon, which must not be allowed to continue unchecked, or indeed by using pressure by Zionist forces inside America which are still influential in many fields.

Then we are faced with the problem of unifying Arab ranks as much as possible and especially of coordination between the Arab parties that are nominated to attend the Geneva conference during those stages of the talks that will be arduous. We must struggle to secure the Palestinians' right to attend as a people who have a case and the right to self-determination. We must also consider the possibility of Lebanon attending the conference if the confrontation countries and Lebanon find that it is in higher Arab interests that she should do so.

One of the most important weapons we need with which to confront the coming political stage, whose dangers and perils we appreciate better than those with a passion for words, is to have Arab ranks as united as possible in support of the front working for solution and in support of the possibility of fighting.

Certainly the most complicated problem in this respect is the problem of relations between Jordan and the Palestinians and their legitimate representative the Liberation Organization. We know that this is a delicate and thorny problem and one that is also painful to all of us. But we here in Egypt, appreciating as we do the responsibility of our role, have always undertaken to stand up to the most complicated problems if they have to be confronted. Indeed I can say that we have always

¹¹² Made in a speech on the anniversary of the July revolution; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), July 24, 1974.

been hit by the first arrows shot especially by those who prefer to be spectators or those who want to pick the chestnuts out of the fire without burning their fingers. This is our responsibility and we bear it with all its consequences. Therefore, when we affirmed our absolute commitment to supporting the right of the Palestinian people to express their will through their sole legitimate organization, a commitment that we have demonstrated in practice by obtaining the greatest possible international support for it—at the same time we frankly stressed that one of the lines of our policy which is dictated by higher Arab interests is action to ensure coordination between the confrontation countries including Jordan. For without this coordination we shall lose the battle of the coming stage before it starts, and because the only alternative to such coordination is an Arab civil war which will comfort Israel and relieve her of the burden of confrontation. In the recent talks with His Majesty King Hussein we reached a stage which we sincerely believe to be fundamental and important.¹¹³

The Jordanian government has abandoned all the reservations it had insisted on at all Arab and international conferences concerning the Palestine Liberation Organization being the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Jordanian government has accepted our reasoning that the West Bank was entrusted to its custody just as Gaza was entrusted to the custody of Egypt until such time as its people decided what they wanted. It has recognized the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization to attend the Geneva conference independently, so that the Palestinians will be able to put their case there according to their own viewpoint. The door remains open for the four parties of the confrontation to meet on an equal footing to discuss the fields in which coordination is possible.

I want to say a few words in comment on these results to put things in their proper perspective.

We are not acting on behalf of the Palestinians or anyone else in deciding their affairs as some people with bad intentions are trying to make out; ultimately it is up to them to accept or refuse and in doing so they will be facing their historical responsibility to the full.

Nor do we insist on the adoption of identical

attitudes, consequently we cannot conceive of starting from identical positions. We are making every effort to reconcile divergent attitudes and to provide a common ground on which the parties can say to each other whatever they wish, because, as I said, we believe that every effort must be made in this field and that the only alternative to coordination is conflict and Israel's escaping from the coming confrontation at Geneva and being allowed to play on Arab conflicts, and here we believe that Arab higher interests and Palestinian higher interests must be regarded as higher and more important than even the most painful memories.

Those who think that the way ahead for our cause is easy and open are deluding themselves. We shall have to dig at it with our nails and engage in a violent political struggle for it, a struggle accompanied by all possible pressures. Israel has so far absolutely refused to agree to the Palestinians attending, employing all the means and resources at her disposal to that end, for she knows that the mere fact of their presence as a party at the Geneva conference implies recognition of them. Nothing could help her to persist in this attitude more than the absence of a coordinated Arab attitude.

It is a cruel battle, of which perhaps only some aspects appear to you on the surface. It is a battle that we have to fight—it is not a case of easy plunder being offered us. Above all we must not forget nor must others forget the basic fact, which is that the battle is still going on and that Israeli occupation is still defiling many Arab territories and that we must daily increase our combat capacity because a resumption of fighting is always the inevitable solution if the door is not really opened to peace and if all Arab rights are not restored within an acceptable period of time.

¹¹³ Doc. 264 above.

Statement issued by the PLO Executive Committee rejecting the Egypt-Jordan joint communiqué¹¹⁴

Beirut, July 24, 1974

The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization has studied the Egyptian-Jordanian communiqué and its dangerous consequences regarding the infringement of the national rights of the Palestinian people and has reached the following conclusions:

1. The Egyptian-Jordanian communiqué infringes the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, and to full sovereignty over the territory of their homeland, and violates the decision that they should be represented by one quarter only. This is totally inconsistent with the National Charter of the Palestine Liberation Organization and with the resolutions of the Palestine National Council. The Executive Committee therefore declares, in the name of the Palestinian people, wherever they may be, its rejection of this communiqué, inasmuch as it will lead to the infringement of the rights of the Palestinian people and their cause.

2. Inasmuch as it is an attempt to fragment the Palestinian people, this communiqué, in fact, serves the American-Zionist-Hashimite solution whose aim is to deprive our people of their rights, to divide up their homeland, to obliterate their independent national identity, to destroy their revolution and thereby push through the suspect liquidationist project for a United Arab Kingdom.

3. The Egyptian-Jordanian communiqué deviates from the unanimous Arab decision at both the official and popular levels to the effect that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It also conflicts with the resolutions of the Sixth Arab Summit Conference in Algeria,¹¹⁵ the Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore,¹¹⁶ the African Summit Conference in Somalia, the Conference of the Non-aligned Countries in Algeria,¹¹⁷ and with the attitudes of all the socialist and friendly

countries.

4. The idea behind calling for disengagement on the Jordanian front which was the scene of such collusion and treachery on the part of the Jordanian regime with the enemy in the glorious October war, is to decide how our homeland is to be divided up between the Jordanian regime and the Zionist enemy. The aim is to prevent the Palestine revolution from achieving the goals of our people at this stage by reviving their national entity and establishing their independent national authority as a step on the road of continued struggle for the liberation of the whole of Palestine and the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state.

5. The subservient Jordanian regime's claim to represent part of our people is intended to ensure the implementation of the settler colonialist conspiracy, and to prevent our people from continuing their struggle for return to their homeland and for self-determination.

6. The suggestion that the summit conference be postponed is an undisguised attempt to prevent continued Arab solidarity on the basis of the resolutions of the Algeria summit and to gain time to make it possible to implement suspect projects that would impose a new situation on the Palestinian people and our Arab nation. These dangerous developments make it essential that the Arab summit conference be held as soon as possible so as to maintain the unity of Arab ranks and to foil all attempts to destroy that unity.

7. Our Palestinian people who have affirmed their support for the Palestine Liberation Organization, both inside and outside the occupied homeland, in assertion of their unity—and the unity of their command—from their determination to be represented by one quarter only, and in defence of the gains they have achieved by their sacrifices and their armed struggle under the auspices of their revolution, will resist all the attempts to liquidate their national rights. They are sure that their struggle enjoys the firm and absolute support of all patriotic Arab forces and of all forces of liberation and progress throughout the world, headed by the USSR and all the socialist countries and friendly forces.

Thanks to their national endurance and armed struggle and to the support of their allies and friends, our people will succeed in overcoming all the obstacles placed in their path by the forces of imperialism and Zionism and the subservient Jordanian regime.

¹¹⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), July 24, 1974. For the text of the communiqué see doc. 264 above.

¹¹⁵ Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹¹⁶ Doc. 65 above.

¹¹⁷ Doc. 87 above.

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Memorandum from the West Bank mayors to the government of Israel protesting arbitrary Israeli measures against the population¹¹⁸

Late July, 1974

Since the end of the June 1967 war the Arab people of the occupied territories have been subjected to the arbitrary measures of the military government. These measures have taken a variety of forms, such as preventing the citizen from living on his land, depriving him of his right to live in his home or place of refuge and preventing him from living at peace in his country. Arab citizens are still strangers in their own country and hundreds of them have been cast into death and terror camps where the best that can be said for the treatment they receive is that it is inhumane. Barriers are erected between them and the life of civilized man when the only offence they have committed is to love their country and their homeland.

Throughout this period the municipal councils and the various popular bodies have called attention to the unfortunate consequences this policy may lead to, but in vain. They have also made it quite clear that the authorities' claims of coexistence are not worth the paper they are written on and that their claim that there is democracy is a myth that exists only in the imagination of the authorities.

We condemn the employment of Nazi methods in our country for the liquidation of our people; we condemn the suppression of human rights, and we call on all who still have a conscience to put an end to all these inhuman measures against our people and to suppress the death and terror camps whose very existence indicates the character of the regime that imposes such measures.

In the light of the above we, the undersigned mayors, repeat our demand for reconsideration of the inhuman treatment of detainees and insist that they no longer be deprived of the benefits of the Geneva Convention and the Declaration of Human Rights, in accordance with the spirit of all civilized peoples in modern times, who disavow any legal system that is not governed by humane and civilized values, justice and law.

[Signed:] Mayor of Anabta, Rafiq Hamd Allah;

Mayor of Arraba, Afif Hasan, Mayor of Jenin, Ahmad Kamal Saadi; Mayor of Tubas, Hashim Sulayman Salih; Mayor of Yaabad, Murawwih Anis; Mayor of Bethlehem, Elias Freij; Mayor of Bir Zeit, Ziyad Yaaqub; Mayor of Beit Sahur, Awad al-Hajj Jabr; Mayor of Halhul, Hijazi Muhammad Madiya; Mayor of Dura, Muhammad Musa Amr; Mayor of Yatta, Muhammad Shihada Abu Arram; Mayor of Jericho, Shafiq Bali; Mayor of Ramallah, Karim Khalaf; Mayor of Nablus, al-Hajj Maazuz Masri; Mayor of Bani Zaid, Fayiz Rimawi; Mayor of al-Bira, Ahmad Darwish; Mayor of Salwad, al-Hajj Musa Hamdan; Mayor of Deir Dibwan, Yusuf Ghannam; Mayor of Tulkarm, Hilmi Hannun; Mayor of Beitunia, Fakhri Isa; Mayor of Qalqilya, Mustafa Husain Nazzal.

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Memorandum issued by the PFLP, the Arab Liberation Front and the PFLP-GC to the Executive Committee of the PLO on the Egypt-Jordan joint communiqué (excerpt)¹¹⁹

Beirut, July 28, 1974

The issue of the Egypt-Jordan joint communiqué¹²⁰ is a clear indication of the sort of plans that have been made with regard to the Palestine problem and to the Palestine Liberation Organization, for the command of which we are all responsible at the present juncture. It is therefore the duty of all of us to define the most important of the basic problems that we must face with courage and without fear. By taking a courageous and scientific stand to these problems and dealing with them resolutely we can play an effective part in extracting our revolution from the vortex in which it has been confined since American imperialism started putting forward its proposals of conspiracy for the liquidation of the Palestine cause.

1. The Egypt-Jordan joint communiqué stresses the sterility and impotence of the attenuated policy that the Executive Committee has pursued at the level of its Arab relations in general and its

¹¹⁸ Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), July 29, 1974, p.3.

¹¹⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Ila al-Amam* (Beirut), August 16, 1974.

¹²⁰ Doc. 264 above.

relations with the Egyptian regime in particular.

The policy of keeping quiet about the slackness of the Egyptian regime and of cooperating with it has provided cover for its attitudes which have been condemned by the masses. It has prepared the way for the Palestine revolution being used as a cover to conceal the deviation of the surrenderist regimes from the Arab masses.

It is therefore the duty of the Executive Committee not only to condemn and lay bare the Egyptian-Jordanian regime and to reveal its objectives, but also to condemn all its own policies and erroneous practices which have culminated in the communiqué.

The only way to be sure of benefiting from an operation of reappraisal and reconsideration is to conduct a radical reappraisal of these policies and practices, to decide what lessons are to be learned and to acquaint the masses with the results. If the Executive Committee does not do this it means that it has no desire to escape from the framework of official policy in which it has confined itself and that it is not interested in reaching a unified national political formula.

2. Once we have recognized this tangible fact it is our duty, from our devotion to our revolution, from loyalty to the memory of our martyrs and from our commitment to the cause of our masses, to make a clear and definite distinction between the Organization's political line and the line of the surrenderist regimes, headed by the present regime in Arab Egypt. It is intolerable that the Organization's political line should be a mere appendage of the broken down political line followed by the Egyptian regime.

We believe that the Organization's continued subservience to the surrenderist policy will frustrate our revolution. We believe that it is a departure from the Palestine National Pact and a denial of the resolutions adopted by the Palestine National Council at its successive sessions. Against this we believe that the sound political line should confront the deviationist policies of all the surrenderist Arab regimes which revolve in the orbit of the liquidationist political settlement; it is impermissible that the Palestine Liberation Organization should become part of this policy.

3. As a consequence of this the Executive Committee should conduct a radical reappraisal of its Arab alliances so that the Palestine revolution may rely on the Arab masses and their revolu-

tionary vanguards and nationalist forces, and on the Arab regimes which constitute the political line of resistance to the schemes of imperialism, Zionism and reaction, or those regimes that are not involved in these conspiracies.

In this connection and in view of the course of events, we wish to affirm that the maintenance of the present relations between the Organization and the Egyptian regime at this stage will imperil our revolution and threaten our cause with liquidation. The Executive Committee must realize the danger of this and prevent it coming about, in spite of the fact that we are opposed to picking a quarrel with Egypt.

4. The Executive Committee's main efforts must be directed to enlightening the institutions of the Liberation Organization that enable it to build up intrinsic forces of the resistance, to organizing and mobilizing the movement of the masses and to laying sound foundations for the building of national unity and increasing the effectiveness of the revolution in all fields, military and political, both inside and outside the occupied territory.

The Executive Committee's principal efforts must be directed to these matters and not to attempts to cling to the regimes and to revolve in their orbits in the hope of winning their friendship and becoming involved in their policies.

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Statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Libya expressing support for the PLO's rejection of the Egypt-Jordan joint communiqué¹²¹

Tripoli, July 29, 1974

In reply to the request of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Arab presidents and kings to outline their position regarding the Egyptian-Jordanian statement,¹²² and realizing the critical stage through which the Arab nation is presently passing, and in our abidance with the national issues of the Arab

¹²¹ *Wafa* (Beirut), July 30, 1974; English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), IV, 1 (Autumn, 1974), pp. 194-195.

¹²² Doc. 264 above.

nation, particularly Palestine, the Libyan Arab Republic affirms the following:

1. It unconditionally supports the statement issued by the Palestine Liberation Organization which outlined the Organization's position regarding the Egyptian-Jordanian statement.

2. The Libyan Arab Republic sees the summit conferences as a comedy. They are called for, scheduled, postponed, their resolutions made, then rescinded at the whims of some in the manner that achieves their own objectives and instructions. This is a familiar pattern, for the "no's" of Khar-toum were misconstrued and the firm Arab determination was demolished.

At the same time, the Libyan Arab Republic warned that this constitutes a dangerous precedent which makes the summit meetings meaningless formalities.

3. The Libyan Arab Republic calls upon the Arab people, everywhere, their popular organizations, unions, syndicates, councils, and members to announce their support of the Palestine Liberation Organization and to assume their responsibilities courageously in this dangerous stage of our nation's struggle and in these difficult circumstances facing the Palestinian people.

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Speech by President Assad of Syria interpreting Israel's post-war policy (excerpts)¹²³

Damascus, July 30, 1974

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Brethren, by your daily contact with events and close pursuit of news and on the strength of your knowledge of the nature of our struggle with the enemy, you undoubtedly realize that this is a long drawn out struggle, that victory will go to whom-ever has the longer breath and the greater stamina.

We have only to analyze the actions, statements, and behaviour of the enemy and to observe what takes place at the centres of his strength to realize that the enemy we confront intends to protract

his aggression for as long as he can possibly extend the life span of his occupation. His long-term plan thus remains one of expansion in the Arab lands.

Although the enemy has retreated and made a partial withdrawal, he has done so involuntarily. He was compelled to do so by the October war—by the fact that it erupted simultaneously on two fronts—as well as by the heroism displayed by the Arab forces—the Syrian and the Egyptian. The enemy was about to collapse when the United States bailed him out by means of an assistance effort unprecedented in its volume and the speed with which it was delivered. When the fighting stopped and the enemy caught his breath, it looked to him as if the opportunity was propitious to resort to the old game of singling out the Arab countries and dealing with them separately. The result is well known to you—the enemy held tight to the land it occupied in the Golan, while Israeli rulers voiced recurrent and intransigent admissions that they would not withdraw one inch from Golan. This Israeli stance, as we all know, elicited a firm, decisive reply. Our armed forces, displaying heroism and valour, fought fiercely in the Golan war. . . . As a result, the enemy's intransigence was broken and he was compelled to take the first step towards withdrawal, but only after wreaking his black rancour on the town of Qunaytirah and committing outrageous acts of destruction.

Ever since the first day of the October war, we have said that we are seekers of peace with justice, that we are fighting for the sake of right, peace and justice. We proved with everything within our means that we truly sought peace with justice. We also declared, from the very first day of the October war, that we were not lovers of killing and destruction, but that we were defending ourselves from killing and destruction. We are not aggressors, never have been. We were, and still are, only warding off aggression. We do not wish death upon anyone, but we want to protect our people from death. The vigour of our adherence to and belief in peace is drawn from the vigour of our ability to fight for peace and to make sacrifices in the cause of peace. This very vigour has been a measure of the endurance of our people and of the heroism displayed by our forces in the October and Golan wars.

Today we loudly reaffirm that we are seekers of justice and peace, that our readiness to fight and to sacrifice for the sake of attaining peace and

¹²³ Assad's speech was given at the opening session of the fourth conference of the Federation of Arab Journalists at Damascus University. Broadcast on Damascus radio in Arabic; partial English translation, BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4666/A/3-5; reprinted by permission.

justice is indeed boundless. I wish to repeat what I have said on earlier occasions. The peace we seek is a just peace based on full liberation of the Arab lands occupied during the 1967 aggression and firm assurance of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people. These are the two bases on which peace can be achieved and security can prevail in the region. Without them there can be no peace or security.

When we speak about the rights of the Palestinian Arab people we ought to emphasize that the people of Palestine themselves as represented by the PLO, which we have all recognized and endeavoured to ensure that it takes its place in the Arab and international forums, have the first and foremost right to determine what these rights are.

I should like anyone who wishes to establish peace in this region to know that he must first and above all discuss the question of Palestinian rights with the PLO.

Brethren, today, as always, we reaffirm our adherence to the objective of peace and our determination to continue pursuing it. Israel, however, is talking today as it used to talk in the past, about the myth of secure and defensible borders. It is amassing arms, drawing up plans to build new settlements, and continuing its misleading propaganda campaign all over the world. If anything, this indicates that, while we are struggling for the sake of peace, Israel is stifling every chance for peace. Israel, which misrepresents everything, calls our determination to liberate our occupied land and our fidelity to the usurped rights of the Palestinian people inflexibility, recklessness and a tendency to engage in a new war. But how else can we describe Israel's obduracy, insistence on maintaining its occupation, and its denial of our rights except as expressions of a foolhardy and foolish policy designed to shut the door to peace and drag the region into a new war, thereby exposing world peace and security to grave dangers?

The battles of October and Golan are still fresh in the mind. The Israeli rulers fool nobody but themselves with this pattern of thinking, behaviour and speech. The nation which waged the battles of October and Golan will never permit the occupation of its lands and the usurpation of the rights of its sons.

It is not we who build strategy on provocation — real or verbal. At the same time, we cannot but

take cognizance of true facts and study them before we lay down plans for the achievement of our objectives, which are just, good and noble.

Brethren, in our long struggle with Zionism there is a weapon which can play a major role and can be most properly used. This is a weapon you hold, and the responsibility for its protection, preparation, and proper use lies with you. This is the weapon of information, of which the press is a fundamental and important element...

With certain exceptions, Arab information is a reflection of Arab policy. Consequently, many of the successes achieved by Zionist propaganda are ultimately due to the lack of unity among the Arabs. Zionist propaganda has always found such a state of dissension a rich source of material...

Information is an important weapon, but it is only one of several we have. Its success depends on the use of the remaining weapons. The role of Arab information, however, is not restricted to the function of presenting our case to the world and combating hostile propaganda. The role of Arab information is far more comprehensive. It is a means of instruction and education needed by the great majority of the masses of the Arab nation...

Thus we want information to be a conscious link between the establishment and the masses, expressing and conveying the views and feelings of the people and explaining the state's policy to the citizens... We want information to affirm freedom in its most noble sense and resist injustice, exploitation and enslavement everywhere. We want information to defend the gains of the popular masses and the goals and cause of the Arab nation. We want information to exercise its role in keeping a watch on the state machinery and exercise criticism in complete freedom. We in this country welcome criticism. By criticism we mean objective criticism which uses constructive work as a yardstick for its judgements.

Statement by Prime Minister Rifai of Jordan explaining the purpose of his forthcoming visit to the US¹²⁴

Amman, August 3, 1974

The aim of this visit I am making to Washington is to discover if it is possible to achieve disengagement on the Jordan-Israel front, which the Jordanian government regards as fundamental because it will be a start on full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territory.

If it seems clear to me from the talks I have with Dr. Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State, that disengagement on the Jordan-Israel front can be achieved, we shall see it as complementing what has already been achieved on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, after which we shall be able to proceed, in coordination with Egypt, Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization, to confront the coming stage.

If, as a result of my talks, I find that it cannot be done, the Jordanian government, as His Majesty the King has already declared, will not consider itself justified in taking part in the coming peace talks at the Geneva conference because of Israel's failure to withdraw from the occupied West Bank.

It is on this basis that Jordan will decide her attitude in the coming stage, and after my visit to Washington and my talks there with Dr. Kissinger I shall lay the results before His Majesty the King so that a clearly defined attitude may be adopted on the basis of these results, after which we shall communicate it to the Cairo and Damascus governments and the Arab countries as soon as possible.

Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia (excerpts)¹²⁵

Cairo, August 7, 1974

His Royal Highness King Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia paid an official visit to the Arab Republic of Egypt at the invitation of his brother President Muhammad Anwar Sadat of the Arab Republic of Egypt in the period Rajab 11-19, 1394 AH, corresponding to July 30-August 7, 1974 AD.

Having seen the extent of the destruction left by the Ramadan war in the Suez Area, His Majesty King Faisal believes it to be his duty and that of his brother Arabs who are able to do so to prepare to give support to Egypt in this critical period as soon as possible.

With a view to developing economic cooperation between their countries the two leaders agreed that there should be exchanges of visits by officials of the two countries at all levels.

With this end in view the First Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Abd al-Aziz Higazi, will shortly visit Saudi Arabia to discuss with Saudi officials how appropriate foundations can be laid for cooperation in all fields that, God willing, will be of benefit to both countries. In Saudi Arabia there will be discussion of the establishment of a joint Saudi-Egyptian bank, a joint company for construction development and a joint investment company to finance joint projects.

His Majesty King Faisal decided to provide immediate financial aid to the value of three hundred million dollars to meet the demands of reconstruction and the urgent needs of the people of Egypt and as support for the Azhar University.

In the Arab field the two leaders made a profound study of the situation in the Arab world, and His Majesty King Faisal praised the heroism of the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces on the Sinai and Golan fronts and the Arab armies and the Palestine resistance which took part with them in the Ramadan war under the command of His Excellency President Muhammad Anwar Sadat

¹²⁴ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), August 4, 1974.

¹²⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), August 8, 1974.

and His Excellency President Hafiz Assad, who insisted on continuing the struggle until victory was won whatever the cost and however great the sacrifices.

His Majesty King Faisal praised the attitude of the leaders of all the Arab countries who united their ranks, mobilized their resources and rose above their differences to gain the honour of participating in winning the victory, to the admiration of all countries in the world.

His Excellency President Muhammad Anwar Sadat expressed his gratitude for the attitude of His Majesty King Faisal and the role he played in the battle and for the support received from His Majesty and from the Saudi Arabian people, which effectively influenced the outcome of the fighting.

The two leaders believe that the disengagement that has been achieved on the Sinai and Golan fronts is only a first positive step on the road to peace and that it must be followed by other steps, from our belief that we are faced with a cunning and malicious enemy who cannot be trusted. Therefore the Arab armies must always be on the alert for surprises that might turn the victory won by the Arab nation in the Ramadan war into a terrible defeat, if we are not always on our guard until, God willing, final victory is won.

The two leaders also believe that the Palestine resistance must be supported in its struggle to liberate its territory and recover its legitimate rights. They also believe that they should support the relevant resolutions of the Algiers Arab summit conference¹²⁶ and the Islamic summit conference in Lahore.¹²⁷

The two leaders reviewed the attitudes of the Arab countries to the Arab summit conference it is intended to hold in Rabat on September 3.¹²⁸ They affirmed their belief that the victory won by the Arab nation was, firstly, thanks to almighty God, and then thanks to the solidarity and unanimity of the Arabs and the coordination of their efforts and that the Arab countries should continue this coordination so that the enemy may not find a breach through which to penetrate and divide their ranks and destroy their unity.

With a view to supporting the efforts that are being made to ensure coordination between the

confrontation countries and the Palestine resistance His Majesty King Faisal believes that further consultations and contacts are required to ensure the right fraternal atmosphere for the convening of such a conference, which should be characterized by a spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding. The two leaders therefore believe that the conference should be held immediately after the Id al-Fitr, and should be preceded by a conference of the Arab Foreign Ministers.

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Communiqué issued by the Second Conference of the General Union of Palestinian Women (excerpt)¹²⁹

Beirut, August 10, 1974

The General Union of Palestinian Women, as an important base of the Palestinian revolution, struggles for the sake of defeating all liquidation settlements and emphasizes the revolutionary line which rejects reconciliation, recognition and negotiation with the enemy. The Union also reaffirms its condemnation and rejection of the Egyptian-Jordanian Communiqué which:¹³⁰

1. Represents a reversal from the resolutions of the Algiers Summit Conference which stated that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people wherever they exist.¹³¹

2. Calls for the division of the Palestinian people, the killing of its character and the obliteration of its national identity, which is the guarantee of its revolutionary march and armed struggle against Zionism, imperialism and reactionary forces.

3. Accepts the proposal for liquidation based on a United Arab Kingdom which was condemned and refused by the Arab masses, and the Arab national forces.

The continuity of the revolution, until the destruction of the Zionist enemy and the liberation of all occupied Palestinian soil, requires the struggle

¹²⁶ Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹²⁷ Doc. 65 above.

¹²⁸ See doc. 308 below; the summit conference was held in October.

¹²⁹ Institute for Palestine Studies, Archives.

¹³⁰ Doc. 264 above.

¹³¹ Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

for the establishment of a revolutionary base on all liberated land that will guarantee the continuity of the revolution and offer more conditions for its success.

The achievement of the revolutionary fighting power of the people over the land liberated by armed struggle cannot occur except by a change in the balance of power between the revolution and its enemies—which is something that cannot be achieved except by armed struggle.

The revolutionary power must in the first place guarantee the continuity of the revolution. Therefore we must refuse, as a price for its acceptance or continuity, negotiations with the enemy, recognition of the legitimacy of the Zionist occupation over any part of Palestine, acceptance of the authority of the Jordanian conspirators over any part of the nation, succumbing to the international and Arab official acceptance of the division of the Palestinian people, or silencing the revolutionary shotgun.

The dangerous situation which the Palestinian cause and Palestinian existence are facing, emerges from the fact that this imperialist reality has found its way to existence. The Alexandria Communiqué was not the result of a miscalculation and that is why we must face the real event and not its symptoms. This requires from us the following:

1. We must depend basically on our own potentials, for it is necessary to develop and solidify our national unity. The unity of the revolution is the practical answer to the efforts which take place, and will take place for the sake of liquidating the revolution, and destroying the gains of our Palestinian people, including the right of representation.

2. The unity of the revolution will strengthen the cohesion with the Arab masses, the international liberation movement and the socialist countries, namely the Soviet Union and China. Such forces are capable of destroying all Zionist and imperialist plans.

3. The formation of the national Jordanian-Palestinian front in Jordan, and the exercising of armed struggle against the institutions and symbols of the conspiratorial regime for the sake of overthrowing it and replacing it by the national democratic rule is the practical answer to its conspiracies, and is capable of changing Jordan into a secure base of the revolution and a starting point for liberation.

4. It is imperative to continue escalating the political, military and popular struggle in the occupied land.

5. We must intensify the work with the Arab liberation movement groups for the sake of strengthening the cohesion of the revolution, in order to defeat the conspiracy against the Arab liberation movement, namely the Palestinian revolution.

6. We must move widely on the international level, especially with the socialist countries, non-aligned countries, and liberation movements in order to gain support for the point of view of the revolution.

In concluding the Second Conference of the General Union of the Palestinian Women:

—We salute all the martyrs who fell on the road of liberation, namely those who gave great example of heroism and sacrifice in Khalisa, Nahariya, Tarshiha and Um al-Aqarib.

—We salute the martyrs of the Arab world who fell on all the fighting fronts.

—We salute the hundreds of prisoners in the prisons of the Israeli and Jordanian enemies.

—We salute the struggle of our sisters in the occupied land and Jordan, and reaffirm that the organization of the efforts of the Palestinian women is a basic pillar in the battle of liberation.

Let us strengthen our attacks, and our cohesion with Arab and international liberation movements in Dhofar, Oman, Vietnam, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Angola, South Africa and liberation movements in Latin America and Southeast Asia.

We also salute our fighting sisters in the world, and our sisters who participated in this conference.

We urge more cooperation and struggle for the sake of defeating imperialism, and achieving victory for all oppressed peoples.

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Statement by an official spokesman of Jordan condemning the arrest of Greek Catholic Archbishop Capucci of Jerusalem¹³²

Amman, August 20, 1974

From the information at its disposal, from its knowledge of the arbitrary measures taken by the occupation authorities against our people in the occupied territory and from its study of the statements issued by the occupation authorities in this respect, it is clear to the Jordanian government that the arrest of Archbishop Capucci was a put up job based on a trumped up charge with the object of getting rid of a prominent religious leader who has stubbornly resisted the occupation and to put an end to his activities in world Christian circles aimed at bringing peace to his country.¹³³

The arrest today of Archbishop Capucci follows the banishment, persecution and arrest of other religious leaders, both Christian and Muslim, who have resisted the Israeli occupation since 1967 and courageously opposed all the occupation authorities' plans to Judaize the Arab city of Jerusalem and evict its population.

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Statement by the Committee of the General Islamic Conference condemning the arrest of Greek Catholic Archbishop Capucci of Jerusalem (excerpts)¹³⁴

Amman, August 22, 1974

The Arab people of Jordan, both Muslims and Christians, along with the Arab and Islamic peoples and those who believe in God in all countries, condemn in the strongest terms the iniquitous measures taken by the Israeli occupation authorities, which are incompatible with international custom and the principles of justice observed in all civilized countries. In particular they condemn the arrest of religious leaders, headed by Archbishop Capucci,¹³⁵ and the way they have been

intimidated by trumped up charges to make it impossible for them to exercise their religious freedoms and protect the interests of their flocks.

It is to be observed that these arbitrary measures have coincided with a resumption of organized violations of both Islamic and Christian holy places, such as the continued excavations below the Aqsa Mosque and the reports of the desecration of the Holy Sepulchre by Israeli youths, not to mention many other incidents reported by the local and international media. All this makes it certain that the recent arrests, including that of Archbishop Capucci, are part of a comprehensive plan directed against both Muslims and Christians in the Holy Land.

This flagrant Israeli aggression against Christianity and Islam confirms the fears long felt by us that the ultimate aim of the colonialist Zionist movement is to extinguish the characteristic features of these two great religions in the Holy Land. It is therefore essential that we Muslims and Christians confront this danger to our creeds, our holy places and our existence. These actions also strengthen our firm conviction that if the Holy City remains much longer under these tyrannical authorities it will lead to the certain destruction of all that is most sacred to the hearts of hundreds of millions of believers throughout the world. It is therefore our duty and the duty of the civilized world to do all that is in our power to end this occupation as soon as possible, so that the Holy City may be restored to its former status under just Arab rule which has always safeguarded the freedom and security of the holy places and of all the believers who come from all parts of the world to worship and perform their spiritual duties.

¹³² Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), August 21, 1974.

¹³³ See docs. 146 and 192 above.

¹³⁴ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), August 23, 1974.

¹³⁵ See docs. 146 and 192 above.

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Statements by President Boumedienne of Algeria denouncing Jordan's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict and affirming that only the PLO represents the Palestinians¹³⁶

Algiers, August 22, 1974

The Arab East will never know peace until the essential problem is solved, and even if Israel were to withdraw from the whole of the Golan and the whole of Sinai this would not solve the basic problem.

It has therefore always been our view that Arab solidarity—and this is a point that has to be raised at this stage—centres on three elements: the Egyptian people, the Syrian people and the Palestinian people, the peoples that have territories under occupation.

The basis of solidarity between the Arab countries in the coming stage must be the Palestinian cause, for there can be no real solidarity if there is no agreement to aid and support the Palestinian people in all sincerity and integrity and without reservations until their full rights are recovered.

This is Algeria's position, and so when the last Arab summit conference was held in Algiers we made it a precondition for any future unified Arab action that the Palestine Liberation Organization should be recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, because what concerns us above all else is the problem as a whole, the mother problem. We still abide by this attitude and by the resolutions of the Algiers summit to the effect that the Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.¹³⁷

By this resolution, brothers, we believed that we could escape from the obscurity that prevailed in the past. For the Palestinian cause, which is part of the Arab revolutionary struggle, had been in a vicious circle where it was not exactly known who represented it, making it possible for certain quarters to use it as a bargaining counter. We therefore wanted to replace this obscurity with

greater clarity, so we insisted on the importance of the Liberation Organization being the sole legitimate representative of the people of Palestine. Thus, when King Hussein was mentioned we said that his territory was not occupied and that he had no problem. During the September massacres we said that we would never shake a hand soaked with the blood of innocents. This is what we said and we decided not to take part in the mini-conference of Cairo¹³⁸ which was allegedly held to put an end to the massacres. The Palestinians attended it against their will and it was their duty to do so, but we could not attend it because King Hussein, having killed, imprisoned and expelled whomever he wished, came to the conference to regain his position, as he always does—he never changes. Hussein refused to enter the battle when the Ramadan War broke out on the pretext that he had not been given the green light at the start. Then a few days after the war broke out and he was given the green light, he again refused to fight on the pretext that he had no air cover. He put out this story about air cover for a time, and then sent units of his army to Syria to liberate the Golan with Jerusalem still occupied before his eyes. From all this we can only conclude that Hussein does not believe Jerusalem to be a part of his kingdom or the West Bank to be a part of the Hashimite Kingdom, because had he really believed this he would have defended them until he had nothing but stones left to fight with. The war was being fought in Sinai and the Golan and enemy planes were bombing and destroying Damascus and villages in Egypt, while the King of the Hashimite Kingdom looked on as if it were none of his business.

I therefore believe that logic and history determine that this man has stepped aside from the issue once and for all and accepted the *fait accompli* and the fact that the frontiers of the Hashimite Kingdom are once more restricted to Transjordan.

And so, when this issue is raised, I say that King Hussein has no role to play in events in the Arab East.

I am expressing here the view of Algeria which has been stated at all Arab conferences, and it must not be attributed to a desire to criticize any Arab leader or any Arab policy.

This is our belief, our analysis and our view of

¹³⁶ Made in a speech at the 7th National Conference of the General Union of Palestinian Students; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Shaab* (Algiers), August 23, 1974.

¹³⁷ Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹³⁸ Doc. 504 in *International Documents on Palestine 1970*.

the problem. Today, in the light of what has happened with King Hussein in Washington, we are entitled to ask what is intended by this. What is behind this operation; and by bringing King Hussein into the game again is the intention to reshuffle the cards or to leave the door open to someone, who may be Kissinger or may be someone else? We are not opposed to the peace efforts that currently are under way, nor are we in favour of war for the sake of war and we know that we live in a world governed by circumstances, facts that are not easy to change, but what we fail to understand is why the King of Jordan should now be given a role to play.

Let us suppose that the negotiations supervised by Kissinger achieve their object and that Israel withdraws from the whole of Sinai and agrees to withdraw from the whole of the Golan, what would remain? The West Bank.

Supposing America put pressure on the Zionist administration and that it agreed to withdraw from the West Bank on condition that it should not return to Palestinian control. What would the solution be then? The Americans might say to the Arabs: We have made every effort and achieved great successes. We have retrieved your occupied territories—Sinai and the Golan—for you, but Israel will not have a Palestinian government in the West Bank, therefore the West Bank must be returned to King Hussein. Then the problem would be a Palestinian-Arab one, or an Arab-Arab one, just as the Vietnam problem was Vietnamized and as happened in the case of Lon Nol's Cambodia and the government of Prince Sihanouk.

Therefore brothers, I fear—though I hope that this will not happen—that the emergence of King Hussein at this particular stage may do more to complicate the problem than help to solve it.

We consequently believe that there are four parties to the problem, Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Israel, and that there is no fifth party. After these four parties there comes the role of the United States and that of the USSR since, if the solution must be in this way, it must not be an American solution, otherwise the whole situation in the area will change and the area itself will lose its present so-called balance of forces. This means that we must make every effort to support and reinforce Arab solidarity on behalf of the cause as a whole on condition that it centres on another solidarity,

that between those Arab countries whose territories have been occupied, the parties I have just mentioned.

We are suspicious of any continuing solidarity outside this framework.

I have said to a Palestinian leader that we as Arabs support the Arab cause as a whole, but if we have to choose between the interests of the Palestinian people and those of another Arab country we shall be obliged to choose the Palestinian people rather than any other interests.

As representatives of the Algerian people we promise to stand by you and to support all your moves. In other words, Algeria's attitude corresponds to that of the Palestinian people. We shall never deceive you, brothers, we shall never outbid you, we shall never presume to give lessons to the commandos and members of the resistance. We respect the blood of those young men who condemn themselves to death as they leave their comrades on their way to perform their sacred duty. I have read all the messages of those commandos who laid down their lives in the occupied territory and went out in the certain knowledge that they would never return because they were going out to perform glorious and honourable deeds. We must honour the will of these young men, we must honour the goal for which they sacrificed themselves.

We are surprised that some Arab countries and Arab parties should have tried in the past and should still be trying to create party factions among the Palestinians. We would have hoped that the Palestinians might be left alone, but unfortunately we do not always get what we want.

We do not want you to belong to the Liberation Front, nor to be Nasserites or Baathists; all we want is that you should above all else be Palestinian.

In conclusion I wish you every success. Peace be with you.

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Press interview statements by Fatah Central Committee member Khalaf (Abu Ayyad) commenting on the status of the Palestine revolution in Arab countries¹³⁹

Algiers, late August, 1974

Q. It is reported that the Palestine resistance is passing through an acute crisis at present. There are several trends and several ideas, even within the resistance, on the fundamental solution of the Palestine problem. How does the Palestine revolution look at this crisis and these ideas?

A. I do not deny that there is a crisis, but it is not inside the Palestine resistance. It is a crisis about the resistance, because it is not up to the Palestine resistance to solve the Palestine problem. At present it is faced with serious efforts to liquidate the problem, so that the present crisis is about the resistance, not within it. As we know, the causes of the crisis arose after the October war and the developments that took place in the Arab arena. Therefore the resistance had to reappraise the situation to see how to confront the coming stage, involving the adoption of a new method. This new method is the one drawn up in the form of the ten points included in the resolutions of the recent session of the National Council.¹⁴⁰ Some people, with either good or bad intentions, have tried to interpret these ten points as being a retreat from the strategic goal announced by the Palestine revolution, which is the complete liberation of Palestinian territory and the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state. This has led to this interim operation being confused with the strategic line. In our view there is no contradiction at all between the interim stage and the strategic goal, on condition that there are no gaps in the interim action that could affect the strategic goal.

Even within the resistance there are people who have sought divergencies with a view to making out that they are gaps, so as to justify certain attitudes.

I therefore stress that the crisis is not so much within the resistance as about it, because we know very well that even if the resistance proposed this interim line it would be rejected by Israel,

by America and by all the reactionary regimes in the Arab area. Even the recent Egyptian-Jordanian communiqué¹⁴¹ has clearly shown that this demand is rejected. The same applies to the recent American-Jordanian communiqué,¹⁴² which made this quite clear. In my view the stand taken by the resistance after the October war was a good one. Now even if King Hussein's forces enter the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, we must continue to raise both an interim and a strategic slogan; they are complementary and both serve the Palestine revolution.

Q. What do you mean by the interim line and the strategic line?

A. The ten points more or less cover the interim-line for the post-October war stage, meaning that there are Palestine territories covered by the Security Council [242] resolution calling for withdrawal, that is, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. At the same time the Palestine revolution absolutely rejects the Security Council resolution because it does not express even a minimum of our legitimate rights. What then are we to do to confront this stage? We have had to lay down an interim line without relinquishing our basic objectives. We therefore said that a Palestinian national authority must be established on any piece of Palestinian territory the liberation or evacuation of which is secured by any means whatsoever, so that it may not return to King Hussein. But this authority must not be at the expense of the continuation of the revolution: there can be no recognition of or peace with Israel and no secure frontiers with her. I want to stress that the Palestine revolution believes that any settlement in the area that does not take into account the unliberated territory of Palestine will be a temporary truce and not a real settlement at all.

Q. This is why some people interpret the fact that there is a clause calling for the establishment of a national state in the territory from which Israel withdraws as meaning that the Palestine revolution has abandoned certain principles it advocated, as for example: the complete liberation of the territories, and of not being satisfied with the establishment of a state in Gaza and the West Bank. What are your views on this?

A. I have more or less answered this question

¹³⁹ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Shaab* (Algiers), August 24, 1974.

¹⁴⁰ See doc. 246 above.

¹⁴¹ Doc. 264 above.

¹⁴² Doc. 141 above.

in the course of our talk. However, let me make myself more clear. We have never proposed the establishment of a Palestinian state. We are proposing the establishment of a national authority on condition that it does not recognize Israel, make peace with her, or ever think of establishing secure frontiers with her, or even making a truce with the enemy. In our view this authority is an interim action in the revolution. This is very natural because there we have many examples in the history of revolutions—not to go too far back, there is the Vietnamese revolution, for example.

Although there are differences between the Vietnamese revolution and ours, there is interim action as a political line in every revolution on condition that, as I said, the interim action is not incompatible with the strategic objective.

If we take all the ten points we find that they cover both the strategic objective and interim objective set for the present stage. There is no contradiction or incompatibility.

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Q. Some of these rejection quarters say that if the revolution proposes the establishment of a state or an authority, that means in the long run that it is prepared to go to Geneva. What do you say to that?

A. I want to be really frank on the subject of Geneva. As I said, we have not refused for a reason related to the first question, which is that we have not refused at all. In other words, Geneva is one of the subjects on which we have not declared our attitude, but we have three conditions:

The invitation: because we cannot talk about something if we have not been invited to do so. If I did talk about it and rejected it, my rejection would be weak, and if I accepted I should lose a political card without its having been shown to me. Thus we have not declared our attitude to Geneva in the sense that we have not said whether we are going there or not.

From another point of view we also have conditions for settlement. On what basis are we to be invited? On the basis of resolution 242 or on the basis of recognition of and peace with Israel? I cannot accept the invitation but I cannot say so before we are invited, so the question of Geneva is not relevant as far as we are concerned.

What is relevant at present are the conditions to be found in the ten points, because the Security Council does not mention our people's rights,

nor even a minimum of these rights.

If we are invited not on the basis of the Security Council resolution, I do not know what the answer will be. But I am certain that there will be an answer.

Q. The resistance has received many solutions from Arab and non-Arab quarters. What is the purport of these solutions?

A. In fact there are no such solutions. As I said, secret meetings have been proposed to us, and solutions could have been put forward during these meetings, but we have refused such secret meetings. We refuse to have anything to do with secrets, we want everything to be public.

Q. You said when you arrived in Algiers that the resistance does not want the Rabat summit to be postponed,¹⁴³ and that there are pressing problems that must be raised urgently. What are these problems and why do you not want the conference postponed?

A. Attempts are being made at present to liquidate the Palestine revolution politically and materially.

Another Black September is awaiting us in more than one place in the Arab countries. The postponement of the Rabat conference is clearly linked with the continuation of the Jordanian-Israeli disengagement operation.

In our view such postponement would confront the Arab nation and the Arab regimes with the *fait accompli* of "Jordanian-Israeli disengagement." We believe that conferences do not solve the Palestine problem and experience has taught us that the resolutions of conferences are not implemented. For example, the largest Arab country, Egypt, has reneged on the resolutions of the Algiers conference,¹⁴⁴ and other Arab countries have started to do so.

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Q. How important do you think were the Palestinian delegation's recent visit to the socialist countries and the series of recognitions that followed them in the Palestinian and Arab fields from the point of view of confronting the attempts at liquidation?

A. We believe that the socialist countries have a great political credit balance with the liberationist

¹⁴³ The Rabat Conference was postponed from September to October.

¹⁴⁴ Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

forces of the world. We differ with them sometimes but the socialist countries support us and stand by us. The Palestinian delegation's visit to the socialist countries has given us an important political credit balance through recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization and has given us backing that will help us in the coming stage, but I think that recognition is more important than anything else.

Q. Some people believe that the fact that some sections of the resistance have links with certain Arab governments and regimes has injured the Palestinian revolution.

A. I do not deny the existence of Arab influence within the resistance. This influence will be important as long as it remains in the shadows, because the final solution must always be Palestinian. We may tolerate this influence in certain secondary issues but not in vital issues. Without being bigoted I can say that Fatah is not linked to any official regime at all. From the start it has employed the slogan of rejecting tutelage by and dependence on any Arab regime.

Q. It is now certain that Israel was a party to the recent incidents in Cyprus, and certainly this will have repercussions on the Arab arena in general and the Palestine problem in particular.

A. If we analyze the recent situation we find that attempts are being made through the proposed solution which is obviously exclusively American. The Soviet party to it is weak while the American party is seeking through this settlement to recover its influence in the area in one form or another. So what is wrong is not so much the American settlement that is now being put forward as the fact that things in the area are being so arranged as to lead to the restoration of American influence in the area for the second time. This will be in various forms, the form of economic openness and dealings with all; it will also involve the abandonment of socialist attitudes and decisions in certain Arab areas; and then there are the events in Cyprus. In my view the most serious thing about the events in Cyprus is that they have stressed that imperialism does not want neutral countries but countries that are its agents; it wants rulers that are its agents.

We must study what has happened in Cyprus very carefully. Was Cyprus a revolutionary regime that frightened the whole area? No, it was a neutral regime. They do not even want neutral

regimes. They want the whole area to be dependent on them. It is true that Cyprus is a small island but it is in a strategic position. And notice how when the war started it affected all air traffic, so that whoever controls the island controls a sensitive spot as regards the area. I am certain that the United States and Israel took part in the events of Cyprus because America and Israel are one and the same thing.

Therefore the policy is trying to arrange the situation in the area and to restore the political geography of the area to ensure the American presence in it.

All I can say is that we must be watchful and vigilant or the liberation movements and the revolutions in the area will be destroyed; it is not impossible that similar events will take place in the area.

*Q. Abu Ayyad, how do you explain the recent series of visits to Washington by Arab officials—Hussein, Fahmy, Khaddam, and Saqqaf?*¹⁴⁵

A. I think that Washington has become a place of pilgrimage. What I believe is that from the start America has seduced the Arabs with the idea that she can recover their territory for them. This was not just a joke but a carefully laid plan to exclude any other quarter in the area, and from this point of view even the Soviets have been excluded. They do not want the problem to be a single problem, as they will gain more by immediate partial solutions, and they do not want all the problems to be linked together. In my view disengagement means stopping the fighting and ending the state of belligerency. There will be a great deal of bargaining before they withdraw from all the territories, and the previous stagnation will return.

But despite of all this we believe that there are Arab masses moved by a strong will—a will that cannot be destroyed however hard America tries. On the contrary, the extension of American influence might create revolutionary feelings and new energy, which may well unite the masses more closely, so that they will confront the new challenge more strongly and with greater resolution. There can be no doubt that this time the revolution of the Arab masses will be violent and will bring about

¹⁴⁵ Docs. 141 and 142 above.

radical changes, not merely formal and superficial changes. It is true that there will be setbacks as a result of this American tide, but we shall benefit from them and go on the offensive again.

Here I want to say that whatever conspiracies are concocted against it no one is going to play about with the Palestine revolution.

Q. In the light of all these new factors in the Arab arena and the Palestinian arena in particular, how does the Palestine revolution see the coming stage?

A. To make a long story short we are preparing for the worst in the coming stage, and I say this because we alone cannot crush all the conspiracies in the Arab area. But in all humility I say that we shall protect ourselves and defend our revolution to the last. I am sure that every drop of Palestinian blood that is shed is taken by the Arab masses as a sign that they must move. By preparing for the worst I mean that, although it is possible that the Palestine revolution may be destroyed in one place, it does not mean that it will be completely destroyed. Frankly, we have created a generation of armed struggle. We have implanted this idea in our youth and we are delighted with the discussions our young men have about national authority.

At the students' conference I pointed out that we must listen to our young men and students if we are to know what they want, and to stress the significance of our links with our bases, because the bases are a living image of every Arab individual and every Arab youth, whose aspiration is to be prepared to protect the revolution.

Every movement sustains blows and setbacks, but in view of the Palestine revolution its strength lies not only in the number of its armed men and the bases it has, but in the strength of its masses and also in the strength of its cause, because it is the cause of the masses. In Algeria, for example, what do they know of the Arab cause except the cause of Palestine? What is it that moves this people? It is their adherence to the Arab cause, and I can assure you that the masses in Algeria support the Palestine cause with all their strength and more if ever any attempt were made to liquidate it. I am sure that all the Arab masses are with us, although they may be prevented from expressing their views.

Therefore we are confident that whatever the conspiracies and however difficult the course—and we may be attacked and expelled—at the end of

the day I am sure that as long as there are still weapons, it will be said in every Arab capital and area and any capital in the world that the Palestine revolution exists.

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Political communiqué issued by the Fifth General Conference of the General Union of Palestinian Workers (excerpt)¹⁴⁶

Damascus, August 25, 1974

In the light of the above, the Palestinian working class, which is one of the revolutionary mass bases of the Palestine revolution, as represented by its Fifth Conference, stresses the following fundamental issues:

1. Continued armed struggle by the Palestinian revolution is the natural response to all the conspiracies aimed against the struggle of our Palestinian Arab people and their national cause as they advance towards the complete liberation of Palestinian territory and the establishment of a democratic state in the territory of the homeland. The Palestinian rifles will surmount all the obstacles placed in their road so as to continue the fight until our people's goals of liberation and victory are realized.

2. The Palestinian working class, which has the strongest interests in the revolution, asserts its firm rejection of Security Council Resolution 242, because it deals with the Palestine problem on the basis of its being a problem of refugees, and because it does not comply with the national hopes and aspirations of our people and their right to self-determination in the territory of their homeland. We also affirm the Palestinian working class's inflexible opposition to any settlement based on this resolution.

3. In the light of its full understanding of the conflict that is in progress in the Arab area, and from its appraisal of the premises of the present stage of Palestinian and Arab struggle, the Fifth Conference of Palestinian Workers strongly supports the resolutions of the Twelfth Palestine National Assembly, and in particular the ten

¹⁴⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), August 27, 1974.

points¹⁴⁷ which constitute the interim programme for the struggle of our armed revolution under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people wherever they may be, as they advance towards the achievement of their strategic objective, which is the full liberation of Palestinian territory and the recovery of our people's right to self-determination in the territory of their homeland.

The Palestinian working class therefore stresses the need to establish a national authority in any area from which the Zionist enemy withdraws, because in our view this is the national and revolutionary retort to all the solutions that imperialism and its agents in the area are proposing for the area, with a view to ending the Palestine problem in the interests of the occupiers and the agents.

4. The Palestinian working class, as represented by its Fifth Conference, affirms that the United States of America, the leader of world imperialism, is the principal enemy of our Palestinian Arab people, stressing that the Zionist entity which is occupying our homeland is an advance base for America in the Arab homeland. We also affirm that the subservient Jordanian regime, which is linked to the Zionist enemy and America, is still engaged in implementing imperialist conspiracies in our Arab area. This regime which conspires against our people and which carried out the September massacres against them and their revolution, is still daily committing crimes against the masses of our Palestinian and Jordanian people and especially the Jordanian working class. This working class is struggling under the leadership of the legitimate General Federation of Jordanian Workers within the framework of the Jordanian National Front to establish a democratic national regime in Jordan to act as a base for the liberation of the territory of the homeland.

The attempt to achieve disengagement on the Jordanian front, which is being cooked up in Washington and Aqaba, is the culmination of the conspiracy against our people's cause and revolution. For the traitor regime in Amman, which did not fire a single shot in the October war and forcibly prevented the forces of the Palestinian revolution from engaging the enemy on the Jordan-

ian front, is implementing the plan of imperialism and Zionism, claiming to represent our struggling people. It intends once more to divide up their national territory with the Zionist enemy and to obliterate the national identity of our people which was realized through their cruel and bitter struggle and the death of thousands of martyrs, mostly at the hands of the traitor regime in Jordan. Therefore, now that most countries in the world have recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people both at home and in the diaspora, and in the light of the resolutions of the non-aligned countries at Algeria,¹⁴⁸ of the Arab summit conference in Algeria¹⁴⁹ and the Islamic conference at Lahore,¹⁵⁰ we condemn the forces which are trying to strike at the struggle of our Palestinian Arab people through the subservient regime in Jordan so as to push through the American plan for our Arab area.

We call on the Arab masses everywhere to stand by the Palestine revolution and to do all in their power to frustrate and destroy this dangerous conspiracy.

5. This conference salutes our workers in the interior and the masses of our people who are groaning under the yoke of the occupation and suffering coercion and torture. We salute their endurance and lofty patriotism and promise them that we shall escalate the struggle until the hateful occupation passes away from our occupied homeland.

6. The Fifth Conference of the General Federation of Palestinian Workers salutes all progressive and revolutionary forces in the world, the countries of the socialist camp, headed by the USSR and people's China, and all peoples who are struggling for their freedom in America, Asia and Latin America. This conference appreciates their solidarity with the just struggle of our people.

¹⁴⁸ Doc. 87 above.

¹⁴⁹ Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹⁵⁰ Doc. 65 above.

¹⁴⁷ Doc. 246 above.

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Message from the Palestine National Front in the Occupied Territory to the Executive Committee of the PLO supporting the decisions of the twelfth Palestine National Council¹⁵¹

Late August, 1974

To the Members of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization:

Greetings,

The Central Committee of the Palestine National Front in the Occupied Territory has studied the situation in the light of the decisions of the Twelfth Palestine National Council¹⁵² recently held in Cairo, and also in the light of events that have occurred in the area.

From its desire to make a positive contribution to the crystallization of a unified Palestinian view by transmitting the impressions of our people in the occupied territory and from its appreciation of the fateful circumstances in which our people are living and the challenges that confront them, the Front submits its views and ideas as follows:

1. The Palestine National Front supports the interim programme approved by the Palestine National Council at its recent session in Cairo.

2. The Front believes that the challenge to the Organization from the Jordanian regime is no less serious than the challenge it faces from Israel and the United States of America: the attitude of all of them is determined by their refusal to recognize the Organization's right to represent the Palestinian people and their legitimate rights. Our people's aspirations to liberation are in conflict with Jordan's intentions. This being the case, it is not to be expected that a popular national command like the Liberation Organization should be able to coordinate with the Jordanian government. It would be different if it was a question of co-ordination between the Jordanian regime and a Palestine provisional government, for in that case the Jordanian regime would be obliged to admit explicitly that it did not represent the Palestinian people either partially or wholly. Therefore the Palestine National Front believes that the fundamental precondition for any coordination with

Jordan must be its explicit recognition that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole representative of the Palestinian people wherever they may be and of its right to exercise national sovereignty, on behalf of the Palestinian people, over any Palestinian territory freed from occupation.

3. The Palestine National Front condemns in the strongest terms the Egyptian-Jordanian joint communiqué issued after King Hussein's recent visit to Alexandria.¹⁵³ It also condemns Egypt's departure from the resolutions of the Algiers summit conference¹⁵⁴ and the Lahore conference¹⁵⁵ recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, regarding what the communiqué has to say on this matter as:

An attempt to make the struggle of our people abortive and to exploit all it has achieved in the interest of the Jordanian regime. The Front regards Egypt's approval of disengagement on the Jordanian front which she previously condemned, as both surprising and reprehensible.

Egypt's desire to reach a settlement cannot justify such a withdrawal from her previously declared position. Such haste will lead to a settlement that favours Israel and imperialism at the expense of the sacrifices made by our people. It must therefore be rejected by us, and therefore, under these circumstances, there can be no solution.

In the light of these intentions it is impossible to go to Geneva. It is only possible if there is full and explicit admission that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people wherever they may be.

Therefore the Front affirms its support for the Organization's attitude to the Alexandria communiqué and reaffirms its rejection of the dangerous trends it reflects.

4. The Palestine National Front believes that it is absolutely necessary to expand the base of cooperation and coordination with all progressive Arab countries, with the countries of the socialist bloc and with all countries of the world, and their peoples and nationalist movements which sympathize with the struggle of our people and their aspirations and legitimate rights.

5. The Front wishes to reaffirm its previously expressed opinion that it is essential to use sound

¹⁵¹ Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut) September 3, 1974, p.3.

¹⁵² Doc. 246 above.

¹⁵³ Doc. 264 above.

¹⁵⁴ Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹⁵⁵ Doc. 65 above.

democratic methods in dealings between all sections of the revolution, that these methods must be made more effective, and that all other methods which are incompatible with them or with the character and aspirations of our people must be rejected.

It also hopes that the horizon of Palestinian action may be expanded to include within its ranks the other struggling sections of our people in the occupied territory, so that the ranks may be closed in the face of malevolent forces.

Revolution until victory.

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Press interview statements by Progressive Socialist Party leader Junblat of Lebanon warning of a conspiracy against the Palestinians¹⁵⁶

Beirut, early September, 1974

Junblat: I smell a conspiracy against the Palestinians and all the Lebanese.

Q. Who do you mean?

A. The Phalangists and the National Liberals, in agreement with Jordan, are planning a confessional conspiracy in Lebanon.

Q. Have you information?

A. Certainly. I have accurate information. According to my information this conspiracy is going to be carried out in a few months.

Q. What sort of conspiracy?

A. The most serious thing, I think, is the conspiracy that is now being prepared in Lebanon against our Palestinian brothers, which is using Pierre Gemayel and Camille Chamoun as its spearhead. America, Jordan and Israel are in agreement that it is in their interests to destroy Palestinian political representation. And all the information indicates that the Phalangists and the Chamounists are going to start provocations. They have started to build underground operations rooms and they are planning to divide national and Muslim public opinion.

Q. Do you think that what is going on here is connected with the 1976 presidential election?

A. I don't know. It is connected with the Arab situation in the area.

Q. What situation?

A. It is connected with the Arab situation and with the American and Israeli efforts to make peace with the Jordanian regime, and to prevent the Palestinians from returning to the West Bank and taking control of it.

Q. Then you think that the situation is very dangerous?

A. Of course. Believe me, a kind of confessional hysteria that is quite irrational and unacceptable has taken over the extremist elements of the Phalangists and the Chamounists. They do not appreciate the consequences, because they only consider their own electoral interests directly. I am sorry to say that while I speak of these things because I am absolutely convinced that this is the case, I read that the Lebanese Prime Minister is in Libya trying to finance defence projects before achieving, as he promised to do the day he came to power, a national balance in the administration that is implementing this plan. For it is not in the interests of Lebanon or of the Arab world that any state institution should work in the interests of one section of the Lebanese to the exclusion of the other.

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Press interview statements by President Assad of Syria discussing the current state of the disengagement agreement with Israel and future developments¹⁵⁷

Damascus, mid-September, 1974

Q. The Israelis say you have failed to bring the civilian population back to the city of Kuneitra on the Golan, that Syria is constantly violating the disengagement agreement and is preparing for a new war.¹⁵⁸ What is your answer?

A. Let's get a few facts straight. The return of the civilian population to Kuneitra is strictly an

¹⁵⁶ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Beirut), September 9 15, 1974.

¹⁵⁷ Interview conducted by Arnaud de Borchgrave, *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), September 16, 1974. Copyright International Herald Tribune 1974.

¹⁵⁸ Doc. 115 above.

internal affair and nobody has the right to interfere in our internal affairs. Moreover, after signing the disengagement agreement and before actually evacuating Kuneitra, the Israelis blew up or flattened by bulldozer all but half a dozen of the town's habitable dwellings. You have seen yourself one collapsed house after another. In some cases this was done by putting large chains around these small houses and then pulling them down with a bulldozer. Kuneitra is now a completely leveled city—not 95 per cent but 100 per cent. So where are the civilians supposed to dwell? And even if they could dwell there, what are they supposed to live off? Kuneitra was an agricultural town before. Now all of the arable land is still occupied by the Israelis.

Q. Why don't you send civilian workers back to rebuild Kuneitra?

A. You've seen the situation there. If you were a Syrian civilian, would you want to work right under enemy weapons, in some cases only a few meters away? And would you want to rebuild a new city before the Israelis have returned its lifeblood, namely its agricultural land? It would be a pointless endeavor. Before giving up Kuneitra, the Israelis made sure it would remain unfit for human habitation for a long time, and now they are accusing us for not repopulating it. Let's be serious.

Q. Are you violating the disengagement agreement? What about the new road the Israelis say you are building to the top of Mount Hermon?

A. There is nothing in the agreement that says we cannot build a new road. But for your information, I want to tell you that we are not building a new road now. With the exception of a few hundred meters, we built this road during the Golan war. The Israelis shelled the equipment which opened the road with thousands of bombs and shells from their planes and artillery, but this didn't stop us and we managed to get tanks and other vehicles to a number of peaks on top of the mountain. The Tourism Ministry is now even planning touristic sites along this road. So you see how the Israelis attempt to distort facts to serve their propaganda purposes. We signed the disengagement agreement in good faith and with a very clear understanding that it constitutes a step toward complete withdrawal from our territory in implementation of Security Council Resolution 338.

Since then Mr. Rabin told you [in a Newsweek interview] that even if Syria was willing to concede to Israel the kind of peace agreement it claims to want, Israel would still not give up Golan. That is a flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of the agreement as well as Resolution 338. So, as we see it, the Israelis are deliberately trying to provoke Syria in the hope of finding a pretext to launch what they call a pre-emptive strike.

Q. The Israelis claim there has been a massive buildup of Soviet weaponry in Syria, which has accelerated in recent weeks, and that you are now stronger than prior to the October war. Is this correct?

A. The U.S. knows the situation perfectly well from satellite observation. Our wartime losses have indeed been made up by our Soviet friends and I would certainly hope that we are stronger than before. However, I think you should see Israeli propaganda against Syria as an attempt to get still more arms from America and to try to repolarize the Middle East situation with the Soviets on one side and the Americans on the other. And by waving this alleged Soviet threat, they are hoping to justify to their public opinion and to American public opinion a return to their strategic doctrine of June, 1967. I am convinced that your administration can see through Israel's game.

Q. Israel thinks you will ask the Security Council to remove the 1,250 UNDOF [United Nations]¹⁵⁹ contingent and resume the war of attrition?

A. If Israel remains obstinate and refuses to give up what does not belong to her, it seems rather obvious to everyone—including distinguished American commentators—that the Middle East will be heading for war once again. After all, that's what the October war was all about—the liberation of the occupied Arab lands. Whether there is yet another war is entirely up to Israeli leaders. In the light of what we read and heard, there were people who expected that Rabin would set a new style and that he would present to the Arabs a new face of Israel. Now it is already obvious that it was all cosmetics to disguise the same old bankrupt policies—and bad cosmetics at that. The leaders of Israel are even calling for a mobilization of friends of Israel in your Congress against further withdrawal from Arab lands. As far as we know, they

¹⁵⁹ Doc. 32 above.

have never been more blatant about their interference in America's internal affairs.

*Q. Will UNDOF remain another six months after its first mandate expires at the end of November?*¹⁶⁰

A. The agreement stipulates that UNDOF's mandate is for six months, renewable subject to our consent. And UNDOF, let me remind you, is not here to police a cease-fire but to observe it.

Q. But will you give your consent for a second mandate?

A. First, let us see if there is going to be progress.

Q. Rabin said a few days ago that Israel will not withdraw further from occupied territory without significant progress toward peace, and cannot accept Arab terms for a settlement because it would mean the "beginning of the end of Israel." So do we have another deadlock?

A. Justice, which is based on the UN Charter approved by all nations, requires that no nation occupy anyone else's territory and consequently this means withdrawal from Arab lands. And if such withdrawal leads to the end of Israel, as Rabin says, then this means that Israel itself is based on an invalid foundation. This is the only conclusion we can draw from Rabin's statement. No people in the world can imagine or expect that the man who is the first responsible official in the state of Israel would insist that the carrying out of justice and the implementation of the UN Charter would lead to the end of that state in whose name he speaks. Nor can we imagine that the world would defend a state based on an invalid foundation.

Q. Three months ago you were hopeful that the disengagement agreement you negotiated with Dr. Kissinger was but a first step that would lead to further withdrawals. In fact, you explained the agreement by saying there is a link to subsequent stages. Do you feel you've been deceived or misled?

A. We did indeed sign the agreement on this understanding and in this sense. But its implementation requires continuous efforts. And unless this understanding is realized, then there is a clear violation of the agreement—and a deviation from the road that can lead to peace. If there isn't complete withdrawal and the occupation continues, we will have conditions not for peace but for a new war—or the same conditions that prevailed prior to the October war.

Q. How do you think the current deadlock can be broken?

A. Israel does not have any choice. It has to move forward on full withdrawal—unless it is certain of full support from the United States. I don't mean to suggest here that America should exercise pressure against Israel in order to break the deadlock. It would be enough for Israel to realize that the United States will not exercise any pressure in its favor.

Q. But even if Israel could be persuaded to end its occupation of the West Bank of Jordan, the Arabs cannot seem to agree among themselves on whether King Hussein or the PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization] has the responsibility for negotiating the territory's return. Do you have any suggestions?

A. Interim problems can be solved among the Arabs themselves and, believe me, there is no problem which is so complicated that we can't reach agreement on it.

Q. But what are your own ideas? Do you think King Hussein should relinquish what he regards as his responsibility, as the representative of Palestinians living in Jordan, to the PLO—and then let the PLO try to negotiate with the United States and/or Israel? Or should King Hussein be given the mandate by the Arab states?

A. With regard to the Israeli aggression as a whole, the PLO has a role to play and so does King Hussein. But the limits of each role is a thing which is now under discussion among the parties concerned.

Q. If the West Bank avenue remains blocked because of this impasse, would you favor the next step taking place in Sinai?

A. No, we are against any partial solutions. It wouldn't serve the purpose of peace. The problem should be treated as a whole—with radical treatment in order to achieve, at long last, a real and just peace.

¹⁶⁰ Doc. 34 above.

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Press interview statements by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia stressing US responsibility for keeping up the momentum towards a Middle East settlement¹⁶¹

Riyad, mid-September, 1974

Q. Saudi Arabia and the U.S. now have a "special relationship" which is being institutionalized in all fields from defense to finance and technology—and which has been compared to the special relationship the U.S. had with Britain during and after World War II. Will this relationship have a life of its own, or does it remain contingent on America's ability to produce a settlement in the Middle East?

A. Naturally everything is predicated on a settlement, and that settlement can only be full Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, the restoration of Arab sovereignty over Arab Jerusalem, the right to self-determination for the Palestinian people and their right to return to their homeland. We are not making any threats. We believe the special relationship is in the interest of both countries and the entire Arab world. We will do our utmost to make this relationship a success. But America must understand that nothing can work properly as long as the Israelis remain obstinate and try to hang on to their conquests.

Q. It is being said that there is little danger of a major crisis in the Mideast until next spring. Do you share this assessment?

A. Precious time has already been wasted in recent months. If there has been a loss of momentum and of the sense of urgency, we not only deplore it but feel it is very dangerous. There is not a moment to be lost. We hope and pray that the United States will be able to make Israel see the light and withdraw.

Q. Some Arab leaders I have talked to fear that the U.S. only acts decisively when it is faced with a crisis, and they say that real American pressure on Israel to withdraw will only come when there is another crisis.

A. We hope America will muster the wisdom to see that a full and prompt Israeli withdrawal must be accomplished without a crisis. Because if

this cannot be done without another crisis, the next one will be far more severe than the last one.

Q. Are you prepared to use the oil weapon again to bring about Israeli withdrawal?

A. We do not want to impose or reimpose an oil embargo against our friends. But our friends must realize where their strategic interests lie. The decision is in their hands.

Q. I have heard that you will not authorize long-term investments in America with the kingdom's surplus petrodollars until the Israelis have evacuated the occupied territories. Is this correct?

A. We do not want to do anything that will hurt America. But if our new special relationship is to remain viable, the U.S. must not do anything that will hurt us and the Arab world. And the continued occupation of Arab lands, including Arab Jerusalem, not only hurts us but poisons the international atmosphere.

Q. What do you think should be the next step—disengagement on the West Bank of the Jordan or a further withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula?

A. The next step should be total withdrawal from all the occupied territories. Piecemeal solutions are inappropriate. The time has come for radical treatment of the problem.

Q. How long do you think it will take to bring this about?

A. We would like to see the Israelis leave Arab lands tomorrow morning. Once the decision to withdraw has been made—and only the U.S. can make Israel see the wisdom and imperative necessity for this course—it can be implemented in a few weeks. We do not wish to set deadlines but one should not forget that a year has elapsed since the October war. And it is not unreasonable to expect that Israeli evacuation should begin before the end of this year.

¹⁶¹ Partial text of the interview conducted by Arnaud de Borchgrave, *Newsweek* (New York—International edition), September 30, 1974, p. 17.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Iraq of a delegation of the PLO (excerpts)¹⁶²**Baghdad, September 19, 1974**

In the period September 17 to 19, 1974, a delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization headed by Mr. Khalid Fahum, Chairman of the Palestine National Council, and including Mr. Hamid Abu Sitta, head of the Department for the Affairs of the Occupied Territories, Mr. Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar, head of the Department of National Pan-Arab and Returnees Affairs and official spokesman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Mr. Abd al-Aziz Wajih, head of the Department of Administrative Affairs, paid a visit to the Iraqi region to conduct discussions with the Arab Socialist Baath Party.

The two parties arrived at the following conclusions:

1. In view of the ferocity of the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary attack in the Arab area, and in view of the vital importance of continuing the struggle for the goal of the Arab revolution, the two sides affirm the following:

a) Absolute rejection of Security Council Resolution 242 and all its implications at the Arab and international levels, including the Geneva conference.

b) The importance of popular conferences of all Arab nationalist and progressive forces to reinforce the national struggle.

c) Efforts to consolidate and strengthen relations and solidarity with the socialist countries and all progressive movements.

2. The two sides stress the importance of a unified Palestinian attitude aimed at the total liberation of Palestinian territory. They also stress the need for the employment of democratic dialogue to resolve all differences of viewpoint, and to condemn all acts of violence and undemocratic methods in dealing with any differences of viewpoint between the different sections of the resistance.

3. The two sides declare that the Palestine Liberation Organization, as comprising all sections of the resistance and nationalist and progressive forces and individuals, is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people wherever they may be.

4. The two sides condemn the repeated Iranian aggressions against the Iraqi region, which are part of an imperialist plan to strike at the progressive Arab forces. They call on all the Arab countries to resist Iranian expansionist ambitions in Oman and the Arab Gulf.

5. The two sides condemn the moves of the enclave of agents in northern Iraq and support all measures taken by the revolutionary government of Iraq to maintain the unity of the territory of the Iraqi Republic.

6. With a view to supporting the struggle of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the endurance of our Palestinian Arab people, the Command of the Party and the Revolution resolved to provide financial aid to the Palestine National Fund to the sum of four million dollars to cover the commitments of that fund for all projects related to the endurance of our people in the occupied territory, for building shelters in the Palestinian camps and for the organization, as the Iraqi region's contribution to these projects.

7. The delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization salutes the frank resolute attitude of the Party and the [Iraqi] Revolution to the Palestine problem and their fidelity to their commitments to provide the Palestinian struggle with material and moral support.

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Statement by Greek Catholic Archbishop Capucci of Jerusalem to the Jerusalem District Court at the start of his trial¹⁶³**Jerusalem, September 21, 1974**

I will transmit to the court what comes into my heart at the end of a long period of torment.

From the crest of the Mount of Olives, Jesus, You once looked on Jerusalem and said the day

¹⁶² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), September 20, 1974.

¹⁶³ English text as transmitted to the UN Secretary-General by Morocco in the annex to a letter dated December 19, 1974, UN doc. A/9991.

will come when you will be surrounded on all sides and when they will destroy you and your children.

If you look from heaven you will find your land and Jerusalem exactly as you cried over it and you will find your true son in chains and you will cry.

I am incarcerated in the torment of the conquerors. I am the victim of the force of the rulers.

We are all human, mortals on the bridge to eternity. But your land is eternal and will remain stronger than the power of the conquerors and their laws, your ways are stronger than their injustices.

You have taught us to love your land, our land, and defend it, and we have done so. We have obeyed because we are your soldiers.

Jerusalem, the cradle of Christianity, will remain free forever despite their deeds.

Mr Lord and Master Jesus you are love and they are oppression. You are light and they are darkness.

Your flag, my Master, is a symbol of love and freedom. And your flag will remain on high.

Shame and disgrace unto those who defile the Holy Land. My Master Jesus. I sanctify our land, our precious land, whose name is Palestine.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of a meeting of Foreign Ministers Fahmy of Egypt and Khaddam of Syria and Executive Committee member Qaddumi (Abu Lutf) of the PLO¹⁶⁴

Cairo, September 21, 1974

A meeting of delegations representing the Syrian Arab Republic headed by Mr. Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, the Arab Republic of Egypt, headed by Mr. Ismail Fahmy, Foreign Minister, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, headed by Mr. Faruq Qaddumi, Head of the Political Department, was held in Cairo on September 20 and 21, 1974.

In the light of their profound belief in the unity of the Arab nation and its fateful battle in the present historic state, those attending the meeting reviewed the current situation at both the Arab and international levels. They also discussed

the grave situation arising from continued Israeli aggression against the Arab nation, the Palestinian Arab people and all peace-loving forces.

In view of the fact that the battle against aggression and occupation will only end when all the objectives of the Arab nation are achieved, those attending the meeting reviewed recent developments in the context of their determination to maintain the great gains achieved by our nation during the October war.

In the light of the resolutions of the Sixth Arab Summit Conference held in Algeria,¹⁶⁵ those attending the meeting agreed on the following:

1. That action should continue to achieve the objective of the Arab struggle, which is withdrawal from all the occupied territories and the recovery of the national rights of the Palestinian people.

2. Not to accept any attempt to achieve partial political settlements, in view of the fact that the cause is indivisible.

3. To reinforce Arab solidarity in such a way as to ensure mobilization of the Arabs' political, economic and military resources and their use in the various fields of confrontation.

4. To insist on the establishment of an independent Palestinian national authority in any Palestinian territory that is liberated by either political or military means.

5. To continue to support the Palestine Liberation Organization as being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and to assist it with a view to ensuring endurance in the occupied areas.

6. Agreement on coordination was reached as follows:

a) Regular monthly coordination between Egypt and Syria.

b) Coordination at regular intervals between Egypt, Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

c) Coordination and contacts with the other Arab countries.

7. Every effort will be made to ensure that the General Assembly of the United Nations adopts a resolution on the item of the Palestine problem on the agenda for the 29th session, on the basis of the above principles set out below, and which have been approved by the Arab League Council at its 62nd session held in Cairo in September 1974.

¹⁶⁴ Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), September 21, 1974.

¹⁶⁵ Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

a) Affirmation of the firm fundamental rights of the Palestinian people and rejection of any attempt to invalidate or usurp them.

b) Affirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination without any outside interference and the safeguarding of their national independence and their right to return.

c) Affirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to use all available means to obtain their basic rights in accordance with the principles and objectives of the United Nations.

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Statement issued by the government of Jordan rejecting the principles of the Egypt-Syria-PLO joint communiqué and freezing its political activities as regards the Geneva conference (excerpt)¹⁶⁶

Amman, September 22, 1974

Having studied the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the so-called coordination conference held in Cairo on September 20 and 21, 1974 by delegations of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Palestine Liberation Organization;¹⁶⁷

The government of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan announces its decision, as from today, to freeze all Jordanian political activity undertaken on the basis of Jordan's agreement to participate in the Geneva conference and the activities deriving therefrom, or from the results of Jordan's acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, or of its being invited to attend the Geneva conference by both the USSR and the United States of America, as being a country part of whose territories was occupied in the June 1967 war.

His Majesty the King communicated this decision to the ambassadors of the USSR and the United States of America in Amman at noon today. This decision is an interim step pending the meeting of the Arab summit conference which is to be held in Morocco on Shawwal 10, 1394 AH, (October 26, 1974).

The Jordanian government's decision to adopt

this attitude stems from Jordan's realization of its historical responsibilities, its devotion to the memory of its martyrs who fell in Palestine territory, and its awareness of its duty vis-à-vis the sacred rights of all Palestinians to their Palestine territory.

Jordan's attitude to the struggle continues to be the following: that all the territories occupied in 1967 must be recovered and that Arab sovereignty over Arab Jerusalem must be restored, after which the Palestinian people may be allowed to exercise their full right to self-determination under neutral international supervision.

Jordan believes that the decisions mentioned in the tripartite communiqué issued by Syria and Egypt, which are confrontation countries participating in the Geneva conference, together with the Palestine Liberation Organization, are so important that such an attitude to them is inevitable. In anticipation of the coming Arab summit conference¹⁶⁸ Jordan hereby resolves that if the conference adopts this communiqué Jordan will be absolved of all political responsibility and all direct connection with the problem, and that the responsibility for this communiqué and its consequences will have to be borne by all the Arab countries.

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Statement by the official spokesman of Jordan on his government's refusal to attend the four-power coordination conference with Syria, Egypt and the PLO¹⁶⁹

Amman, September 22, 1974

The Jordanian government has been unable to accept the invitation brought by Mr. Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Syria, to Mr. Zaid Rifai, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, to attend a four-power coordination conference to be attended by Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization, because of the situation that has arisen from the so-called three-power coordination conference attended by dele-

¹⁶⁶ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), September 23, 1974.

¹⁶⁷ Doc. 286 above.

¹⁶⁸ Doc. 308 below.

¹⁶⁹ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), September 23, 1974.

gations representing Syria, Egypt and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the joint communiqué issued by it.¹⁷⁰

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Statement issued by the Catholic hierarchy of Lebanon appealing for justice for the Palestinians¹⁷¹

Beirut, September 24, 1974

We, the Catholic Patriarchs and Bishops of Lebanon, to all our brother bishops, greetings and peace in Christ Jesus, the dispenser of true peace.

For a quarter of a century now this area of the world, the cradle of faith for so many millions of believers, has witnessed sharp painful attacks of violence, the miseries of exile and hatreds born of injustice. At the moment, however, due to a heightened sensitivity of human conscience, there seems to be some reason for hoping that a sense of justice and right may begin to dispel hatreds and repair injuries, and that, in an atmosphere of growing harmony, mutual confidence may be restored.

We believe the occasion opportune to issue our appeal to you, our fellow bishops, and through you to your churches and to your fellow citizens throughout the world, especially in the West and particularly in those countries which bear a more direct and heavy responsibility for justice and peace among men.

The Situation Today

Certainly there are many events which justify such hopes in the hearts of some good men. But it would be completely illusory to believe that the Arab-Israeli conflict is about to arrive at a definite and complete solution. Dangers continue to threaten this region, especially our own country, and the most diverse kinds of violence persist.

Neither the efforts undertaken for the disengagement of armed forces nor the prospects for an eventual Geneva peace conference constitute a sure and definite guarantee against outbreaks in other sectors and by other means. No matter how promising the peace initiatives may be, one may

not ignore the fact that a long road lies ahead, a road full of obstacles and pitfalls. For every one should be aware that crucial problems have not yet received even the beginnings of a solution.

Our own country, even as it is skirted by messengers of peace, is still, in fact, the scene of violent aggressions; they leave behind ruins and bring death to the innocent civilian population.

The Double Standard of Judgement

In such unhappy circumstances, so frequently repeated, alas, we are deeply distressed by the double standard of judgement too often applied in the West, in the evaluation of such human tragedies, by some political and intellectual leaders and in some of the mass media, a double standard very prejudicial to the Arabs generally and especially to the Palestinians and Lebanese.

Although it is consoling to note that outstanding exceptions to this prevailing point of view are increasing, nevertheless it devolves on us to make an appeal to conscience, an appeal to the West to understand the situation as it is and to judge it justly and impartially. Without question, it is necessary to condemn injustice, but fair criteria must be observed: the kind of condemnation should match the kind of oppression and the more serious and flagrant the injustice, the more strong and solemn should be its reprobation.

In this connection, it is entirely proper to ask, for example: which recourse to violence is more to be condemned, that carried out by individuals or that organised by a state? Man's moral sense cannot fail to be outraged by crimes and extortion perpetrated against the fundamental rights of citizens. But when these rights are of the kind violated by regular armed forces implementing an official policy set out by a state, is not the offense against morality in this case more outrageous than if such activities, while worthy of condemnation in themselves, are the work of small uncontrollable insurgent groups? And what open society today can boast of being entirely free of uncontrollable elements?

In such circumstances, it becomes necessary to establish a fundamental distinction—and some have successfully formulated one—between the violence exercised by the oppressors and the violence of the oppressed in revolt. The oppressors generally have at their disposal the powers and resources to impose systematically and without letup a kind of process of terrorism. The oppressed

¹⁷⁰ Docs. 286 and 287 above.

¹⁷¹ English text as published in Lebanon National News Agency, *Bulletin* (English edition), September 24, 1974, pp. 3–13.

then believe they have the right to resort to terrorist attacks, to shake the yoke of this institutionalised violence if they cannot, in fact, shake it off.

It is certainly to be deplored that relations between men and groups once again in our time are marked by such a stigma, so humiliating for civilization. But reflecting on how often the West hastened in the case of violence to disparage and to condemn the oppressed alone, one cannot but experience a profound sadness at this situation; it goes a long way to explain why the oppressed pay little attention to "world public opinion" which they judge to be so partial and unjust.

The Right to Return VS the "Law of Return"

Such discrimination is also illustrated by the attitude of the West on the problem of "return". There are many who refuse to understand the determination of Palestinians to return to their land, but very few, on the other hand, have the courage to raise doubts about the famous "law of return" invented in favor of the Jews of the world, a return that cannot be realized except at the price of unjust spoliations.

Why, for example, does a Jew, recently emigrated from the Soviet Union, have the right to preferential and racially segregated housing in Jerusalem erected on land recently confiscated from Palestinians in an area not long ago annexed by the State of Israel in defiance of the opinion of the world community of nations and in clear violation of the Geneva conventions? Such injustices are frequently committed, yet why are they so rarely condemned?

Often public opinion in the West, touched by the plight of Jews wishing to leave the Soviet Union, cites in their favor the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But this Declaration recognizes not only every one's right to leave any country, including his own, but it also proclaims the right every one has to return to his own country. These are two inseparable aspects of the same reality.

World public opinion, then, in order to be faithful to this human truth, ought to support as the only proposals for the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, those which look to the return of the Palestinian people to their land.

A People and Some Values

The unjust violence which must be outlawed everywhere is not, alas, something which only

happened a very long time ago. Its ravages continue, even to today.

When the Palestinians have recourse to violence here and there, the world loftily condemns them. But why does not the world condemn even more strongly this continual violence of which the Palestinians are the permanent victims?

Despite the abundant documentary proof available, this situation which has lasted for a quarter of a century is often passed over in silence. To excuse the oppression, one calls it "control", or, to avoid the enormity of this inconsistency, one says: reprisals. We in Lebanon know what terrible realities these fallacious euphemisms cover; they can no longer deceive any one, except him who wishes neither to see nor understand.

The Palestinians Face the Future

What future can one predict, when the past and the present are so charged with violence?

The Palestinians are far from confident. Not without reason, they fear that arrangements will be made by which the despoliation of their rights will take an institutional—and therefore definitive—form. This form, moreover, will be considered quite satisfactory by very many in the West due to their double standard of judgement. No wonder Palestinians mistrust this mentality.

By the hundreds of thousands, these Palestinians live in our midst on Lebanese soil and our civilian population shares with them the sudden sharp attacks of pain that reprisals bring. Thus, to the unjust lot of these people, who were exiled by force, is added the unjust fate of becoming victims of violence.

We cannot fail to speak to you of the future of these people.

We think, indeed, that the future of the Faith and of Charity in this region of the world is linked to a just settlement of the future of the Palestinians. How to believe and love if the resort to the force of arms is to be the supreme arbiter? Besides, what future Christian presence can one look forward to in these countries when the Palestinians must remain at the mercy of an explosion of religious or racial fanaticism of a State which claims to be founded only on religious and ethnic principles? It has been said with good reason: "Full respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace".

To the recognition of and respect for these

rights, the fate of Jerusalem and the Holy Places is equally tied. Our Christian delegation to Lahore has spoken in these terms to the Heads of Moslem States and to the entire Islamic world.¹⁷² We have promised to speak to you in the same language and we here carry out that promise, fulfilling the role which devolves on Christians of the East to be a link of understanding and charity between the great spiritual families of the East and the West.

Only in such an atmosphere can efforts and forces join together to find a worthy, just and stable solution. This solution should correspond "to the demands of the special character of this city of Jerusalem, unique in the world, and to the rights and legitimate aspirations of the adherents of the three great monotheistic religions", particularly "to the legitimate religious and civil rights of the persons, the places and the activities of all the communities present in the land of Palestine."

The problem of the Holy Places is in fact one of "presence". This is exactly what our delegation at Lahore has set out in bold relief. "If the faithful of the country where these shrines have been set up were no longer to reside there, would the Holy Places continue to have any authentic meaning? With these believers gone, the Holy Places would be reduced to merely skeletal remains for some age gone by.... For it is proper to man to make presence real, in the full sense; stones of themselves cannot do so."

In this sense, we believe it is necessary to undeceive the many sectors of the West which ignore or misunderstand the true position of the Palestinians. For the Palestinian desire is to see in Palestine the establishment of a state, secular in its government and profoundly believing in its sons, adherents of the three great monotheistic religions. The testimony of life which the Lebanese experience offers permits one to foresee the most prosperous future for such a state, if the fanaticism of races, of traditions and of interpretations has been banished from it.

"Repression is Not Peace"

In such perspectives peace is possible. We are all convinced with Pope Paul VI that peace is more than possible, it is a duty. This attitude stigmatizes as unworthy the politics of fear and of the balance of forces, both of which have their

origin and find their outcome "in the unspoken and skeptical conviction that, in practice, peace is not possible".

The Arab-Israeli conflict provides a sad illustration of the words of the Pope who rejects "the confusion of peace with weakness (not just physical but also moral), with the renunciation of genuine right and equitable justice, with the evasion of risk and sacrifice, with fearful and submitting resignation to another's domination, and hence with acquiescence to enslavement". Pope Paul continued: "This is not real peace. Repression is not peace. Cowardice is not peace... true peace must be based on a sense of the untouchable dignity of the human person, from which arise inviolable rights and corresponding duties."

We have believed it to be our duty, venerable brothers, to issue this appeal at a time when the world sees some glimmer of peace in the Middle East. We are firmly convinced that this appeal will be heard and welcomed in the spirit in which it was written. Is it not for the Church of Jesus Christ to work for the establishment of what was for the Psalmist a messianic vision only: "Kindness and truth shall meet, justice and peace shall kiss"? *Peace Lives by the Support People Give It*

We warmly invite each person and group among our own faithful to cooperate in this work. Let us go further, venerable brothers, and invite all the pastors of the church throughout the world to direct their attention towards this human drama which we have described, whose solution is bound up so seriously with the future of so many men and so many sacred values.

"Peace", the Pope stated, "lives by the support, though individual and anonymous, that people give it... The affirmation of peace must progress from being individual to being collective and communal, it must become the affirmation of the people and of the community of peoples. It must be translated into conviction, ideology, action."

In this evangelical and authentically missionary context, we entrust to your kind attention the words of this fraternal message. Assured, as we are, of finding among you and among the priests, religious and faithful of your churches and the most favourable echo and the most generous response to the hope which we place in your devotion to the cause of peace, we invite you to join us in this invocation of our oriental liturgies: "May the Love of God the Father, the Grace of

¹⁷² See doc. 216 above; the resolutions of the Islamic summit are docs. 65 and 66 above.

the only Son, and the Fellowship and Presence of the Holy Spirit, be always with us, brethren, now and for ever".

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Press statement by the PFLP announcing its withdrawal from the Executive Committee of the PLO (excerpts)¹⁷³

Beirut, September 26, 1974

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine announces its withdrawal from the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, so that it may not be held responsible for the historical deviation in which the leadership of the Organization has become involved, and so that it may continue to struggle in the ranks of the masses to correct this deviation, to express the will of the masses and to impose the sound revolutionary political line on the leaderships that have become mere appendages to the reactionary and surrenderist regimes.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has taken this step only after earnest and responsible attempts to establish national unity at the present stage on clear national foundations, after earnest and responsible attempts to confront the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization with the revolutionary course and after earnest attempts to warn the leadership of the Organization against continuing in its dependence and deviation. Having made all these attempts the Front was no longer able to remain on the Executive Committee and bear the responsibility for the dangerous gradual deviation in which it is involved, for the suspect American contacts which, as we have learned, have recently been made, or for misleading the masses to the extent that they daily find themselves more deeply involved in the slough of the imperialist settlement which American imperialism, Arab reaction, the lax, and the surrenderists have been planning in a gradual and misleading manner with the object of pushing through a liquidationist settlement piecemeal, in which our struggling masses do not realize the danger of the deviationist course which Arab and

Palestinian events have been following for some time.

We therefore wish to set before our Arab and Palestinian masses the reasons for our withdrawal from the Executive Committee so that the situation may be absolutely clear and that we may perform our duty of opening up the revolutionary road to the movement of the masses.

1. After the October war an international and Arab situation came into existence which was favourable to a so-called political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. America was the power most enthusiastic for this settlement and made every effort to impose it, relying first and foremost on the approval of Egyptian and Saudi reaction. It was perfectly clear what results this settlement was likely to lead to: As the price for submitting Israel to every American pressure, America would be allowed to increase her influence and safeguard her interests in our territory. The price Israel would be paid for withdrawing from all Arab territory would be support for her economy and armed forces, the reinforcement of her security and stability and steps towards the consolidation of the legality of her existence in the area. It is no longer possible to dispute this picture now that its consequences have taken tangible form before the eyes of the masses of our people.

In the light of this situation the Palestinian revolution should have submitted to all the Palestinian and Arab masses a precise analysis of this picture and its consequences, insisting that they be laid bare, fought against, and made known to all, so that our revolution might be the torch of the revolution for millions of Arabs rather than a cover for the laxness and surrenderism of certain of their rulers.

Since the October war ended and the picture of the imperialist liquidationist conspiracy has taken shape, the Front has called on the Palestine revolution to announce its analysis of the new political situation, to declare its opposition to the liquidationist settlement and to affirm that it would not permit the Liberation Organization to be used as a cover for the laxness of certain surrenderist Arab regimes. The Palestinian revolution should have revealed the truth about the Geneva conference and the consequences it would lead to. It should have placed itself unambiguously outside

¹⁷³ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), September 28, 1974.

the framework of this liquidationist settlement and continued to mobilize the masses to continue fighting for dozens of years, whatever is involved.

The value of the Palestine revolution is that it should provide the pattern in accordance with which the masses of the whole Arab nation can settle their conflict with their enemies by force of arms through a people's war of liberation, rather than through laxness and surrenderism under the auspices of a balance of forces which means that the price paid for every piece of land we recover is higher than the value of the land itself.

The Front has made every effort to ensure that this period should provide an opportunity to strengthen the revolution and consolidate its national unity on the basis of the unambiguous and definitive rejection of the Geneva conference and the liquidationist conspiracy, and of continuing on the line of revolution. But the leadership of the Organization has persistently evaded defining any attitude, on the pretext that they have not been officially invited to attend the Geneva conference, although there has been every indication that many international and Arab forces want to contain the Organization and to frustrate its revolution by forcing it on to the road of surrender.

The Organization has maintained an attitude that is no attitude thereby losing its vigour for revolutionary action and influence in Palestinian, Arab and international circles.

2. On the eve of the twelfth session of the Palestine National Council which was held in Cairo last June, the leadership of the Liberation Organization started talking about national unity and its importance at this stage. It showed that it was prepared to move from an attitude which was no attitude to an attitude of (temporary) refusal to attend the Geneva conference, employing a deceitful "tactic" aimed at suggesting to the forces that reject the settlement that it knew the truth about the liquidationist conspiracy but that it wanted to frustrate it by cunning rather than by confrontation. Profoundly aware as it is of its responsibility for taking any opportunity to achieve national unity seriously in this critical situation, the Front decided to show that such an opportunity existed and to see what actual consequences it would lead to. This is why it gave its approval to the ten points, although in fact they were a compromise and threadbare formula for national unity, after having placed on record in the minutes

of the session our understanding of them to the effect that they involved rejection of the Geneva conference and set the Liberation Organization outside the framework of the liquidationist settlement.

At the end of the twelfth session of the Palestine National Council it was clear what the surrenderist leaderships intended by their acceptance of the ten point programme. They regarded it as legalising their pursuit of the course of deviation and surrender. They started to interpret it as they wished, later making statements as they wished, in a manner incompatible with the Organization's charter and with the resolutions adopted at the sessions of its National Council, including those adopted at the eleventh and twelfth sessions.¹⁷⁴

The deception was disclosed and it became clear that what the surrenderist forces were talking of was the tactics misleading fellow-travellers and the masses, rather than misleading the enemy.

We continued to struggle within the framework of the Liberation Organization and the Executive Committee in the hope of establishing a sound understanding of the Organization's charter and the resolutions of its national councils, but it daily became clearer to us that the leadership of the Organization was involved in the settlement operation and hope to impose it on the masses piecemeal and to continue on their course of deviation step by step in the hope of ultimately confronting the masses with a fait accompli.

3. The leadership of the Liberation Organization started to represent the possibility of its attending the Geneva conference—"the conspiracy"—as a great victory won by it over Jordanian reaction and Israel. They also started to talk of the possibility of coordination with the reactionary subservient regime in Jordan if certain conditions were met, thereby coming into conflict with the resolutions of previous sessions of the National Council which insisted that the regime should be overthrown and a democratic nationalist regime established in its place. At a session of the Executive Committee held before the issue of the Egypt-Jordan joint communiqué, the Executive Committee decided to coordinate with the subservient regime of Jordan on condition that it recognized firstly the Palestine Liberation Organization as the

¹⁷⁴ Docs. 223 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973* and 246 above.

sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and, secondly, the Cairo Agreements, although these agreements did not prevent the subservient regime from destroying the resistance movement and putting an end to its overt presence. It might have been thought that the Palestine revolution had not had a long history of experience of this regime, and that the National Council had never adopted resolutions calling for the regime to be blockaded until it collapsed totally.

4. It was not long after the National Council had ended its session, and the leadership of the Organization had interpreted its resolutions in so lax a manner that in fact they became the loyal followers of the surrenderist regimes, that the Egyptian-Jordanian communiqué¹⁷⁵ came as a cruel slap in the face both to the leadership and its policy.

The issue of such a communiqué gave the leadership of the Organization a chance to face up to all the policies it had pursued since the October war in general and since the twelfth session of the National Council in particular. Three organizations represented on the Executive Committee of the Liberation Organization therefore presented a memorandum to the leadership of the Organization calling on it to conduct an operation of reappraisal and criticism, with a view to learning the lessons taught by past experience and defining its relations with the Arab regimes in the light of their attitudes to the imperialist liquidation proposal, and on the basis of reliance mainly on the masses of our Arab nation rather than on the agents of America in the area.¹⁷⁶ But the leadership of the Organization persisted in its deviationist view of things. Heedless of the truth of the points raised in the memorandum, it refused to accept them, and maintained its previous policy. It conceived the idea that its principle battle was not that against the imperialist liquidation solution with a view to frustrating it and to insisting on the continuation of Palestinian and Arab combat, but a battle over its share in the settlement operation as compared with the share of the subservient regime in Jordan.

5. The leadership of the Liberation Organization is now trying to make our masses forget their essential national battle, which concerns the

imperialist liquidationist settlement and the need to frustrate it. It is making every effort to distract the attention of the masses from their principal battle so that they may devote all their attention to the battles of the leadership of the Liberation Organization with the subservient Jordanian regime over its share in the settlement. It wants the masses to rally sympathetically around it if the Jordanian regime gets a larger share at its expense, and to applaud it if it gets a larger share at the expense of the subservient Jordanian regime—and all this within the framework of the imperialist liquidationist settlement.

The leadership of the Liberation Organization is at present making every effort to make out that the battle is exclusively between Israel and Jordan on the one hand and the Liberation Organization on the other and to suggest that in that battle it is entitled to seek any allies and to enjoy the support of the masses. We hereby declare most emphatically that this is a grave distortion of the battle and of the map of the conflicts. The battle is a continuous one and is being fought between Israel, Jordan, Arab reaction and the surrenderist forces on the one hand and the Palestinian and Arab revolution on the other, and no power on earth will be able to keep this fact from the masses.

The Palestinian masses do not want the leadership of the Liberation Organization to win their battles against Jordanian reaction within the framework of the settlement, so that it may compete with the subservient regime in negotiating with the Israeli enemy.

The Palestinian masses want the leadership of the Liberation Organization to win their battles against all the forces that are seeking to impose this imperialist liquidation settlement so that they may continue their popular revolution against Israel, the subservient regime in Jordan, imperialism and all reactionary surrenderist forces.

6. The leadership of the Liberation Organization ignored the memorandum of the three organizations, and when it had had time enough to anaesthetize and deceive the masses it attended a tripartite conference in Cairo.¹⁷⁷ This the advocates of a settlement represented as being a major victory for the Liberation Organization, although the communiqué issued after the conference makes no mention of opposition to disen-

¹⁷⁵ Doc. 264 above.

¹⁷⁶ Doc. 269 above.

¹⁷⁷ Doc. 286 above.

gement on the Jordanian front; indeed, it stresses the need for coordination with the other Arab countries, including the subservient régime in Jordan.

It was to be expected that the subservient rulers in Amman would make such an outcry and would suspend Jordan's political activities until the Arab summit conference meets. It can be easily understood in the context of the formula of competing over the share each party will obtain as a result of this settlement which America is conducting with the aim of imposing "permanent" stability in the area, while ensuring the continued existence of Israel and safeguarding her security and stability.

Our masses will not allow deceptions and play-acting to be foisted on them again. They are not prepared to allow our battle to be restricted to the framework that the leadership of the Liberation Organization is now establishing so as to ensure sympathy for itself if it gets a smaller share in the settlement and applause if it gets a greater share.

7. Nor is this all. The leadership of the Liberation Organization has denied that any secret contacts have been made with America, the enemy of peoples. But we have established that such secret contacts have been made, without the knowledge of the masses. We submitted these facts to the Central Council of the Liberation Organization at its recent session, and we now place them before the Palestinian and Arab masses.

We regard this as amounting to secret contacts with the imperialist enemy without the knowledge of the masses of the revolution and its forces and bases. If some commands have started to regard such contacts as normal and natural, we leave it to the masses to decide their own view and understanding and to make their own appraisal of this matter.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, having become acquainted with these facts, would be failing in its duty to the masses if it did not place them at their disposal so that they may judge the situation in the light of them. The time is past when the commands could regard the masses of our people and the bases of their revolution as so many sheep.

8. These are the most important reasons for our withdrawal from the Executive Committee. There are other reasons, but we do not wish, at

this juncture, to touch on the organizational and administrative situation of the Liberation Organization. Nor do we wish to consider the repercussions of such a policy on a number of matters, such as the building of shelters, the fortification of the camps in Lebanon, and other issues.

In the light of the above, how can we continue to bear any responsibility within the framework of the Executive Committee?

Our withdrawal from the Executive Committee is now unavoidable.

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Statements by Phalangist Party leader Gemayyel of Lebanon expressing concern about the Palestinian presence in Lebanon¹⁷⁸

Brummana, September 27, 1974

Of course I do not want to cause a wave of panic in the country when there has been so much talk about the "Cyprification" of Lebanon and so on. Such methods are not to my liking, quite apart from the fact that Lebanon is not Cyprus.

My intention in asking this question is that we should rise above our egotisms somewhat, because if we allow them to control and dominate the country, the conflict between them will become as acute as the conflict that has torn the neighbouring country to pieces.

I also want it to be borne in mind that the dismemberment of Lebanon is not to be ruled out—it is one of the possibilities engendered by the struggle in the area.

To sacrifice Lebanon so as to be rid of the Palestinian resistance is an evil idea that always tempts evil men.

There are people who still dream of the area being fragmented again on the basis of origin, descent and religion.

All this surely means that we are faced with an extremely critical situation that could lead to a catastrophe which, if it befalls, will affect us all in equal measure.

¹⁷⁸ Made in a speech at the annual congress of the Phalangist Party; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Nahar* (Beirut), September 28, 1974.

It is a situation that requires the utmost solidarity and the shelving of all disputes, whatever their causes and motives.

Our problems must be national problems, and our attitudes to them must change; indeed, we must all see them from a single point of view so that we may unite to repel the common danger.

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There remains the other major problem on which all the other problems depend. I mean the problem of Palestine and the people of Palestine.

For is not this the problem that has robbed the area of its happiness, impeded the course of our peoples, delayed their renaissance and sparked off coups and revolutions, and even wars, on four occasions? Lebanon is in a state of war. It is in the arena of a revolution with all that this means and implies, so that you might think that it has become Palestine with its people, its revolution, and even, to a certain extent, its land.

In other words, Palestine, with its people, its sorrows, its aspirations and its insurrection, has moved into Lebanon!

So the destiny of Lebanon depends on the destiny of Palestine and vice versa, and that at a time when the conflict is at its most ferocious.

What are we going to do? What is our position at this crossroads? What is our role? What are our tasks? What lies in wait for us? Where is Lebanon going? And where is Palestine going?

The answers to these questions would be a matter of conjecture, if our role continued to be one of submission, submission to the roles of others, submission to events, calamities, stratagems and disasters.

But supposing that, in answer to these questions, we adopt a clear line, a view that is the embodiment of unambiguous attitudes that are active in the conflict so that it may develop as we wish it to, not as Israel, for example, wishes.

Obviously the "return" of the Palestinians is our principal goal. Not only because they have the right to return, but because their return will mean a "return" for us too, a return which if not on the same plane is just as fatefully important.

There is no longer any point in asking whether this linking of the two destinies is essential to Palestine, or if we and the Palestinians want it or not.

What is past is past. We must now look ahead to

find the best and shortest road to return, the one involving the least calamities and disasters to the two peoples.

Our first concern is that the two peoples should be united heart and soul. Obviously nothing can do so much to prevent return as a difference between the Lebanese and the Palestinians, a difference that, God forbid, could lead to clash and mutual liquidation. This is the "ideal" solution that Israel is seeking, the solution that would cost her least trouble! And who knows but that international circles would, if need be, assent to such a solution, reached spontaneously, so that they could "relax." If it is impossible to reconcile the security of Lebanon with a political settlement, the sacrifice of Lebanon and its people could be a "reasonable" way out.

Faced with such a possibility our common safety depends on our common will and on our being united, Lebanese and Palestinians. This is as clear as the noonday sun.

This being the case, is it not strange that Lebanese-Palestinian relations should not always be as close as this situation demands, that they should not be unruffled by any misunderstanding, tension or disturbance?

Or is it precisely because their destinies are interlinked in this way that so many pressures are exerted on the two peoples and so many plots and conspiracies are directed against them?

More probably it is our mistakes that are to blame, and the breaches that we ourselves, Lebanese and Palestinians, leave open to plotting, conspiracy and exploitation.

The first mistake was to regard mention of the mistakes as involving censure and as indicating hostility. This has been the case since the start of the revolution and commando action.

For example, our objection to certain practices has always been interpreted as meaning that we object to the revolution itself, and sometimes even to the Palestinian cause.

The strange thing here is that nearly all our criticisms have been justified as the revolution itself has admitted, though belatedly. The wearing of camouflage uniforms and the bearing of arms in public, the erection of barricades on the roads and the burning of tyres in the streets and residential areas, and other such practices which we objected to, the revolution has forbidden, and it has greatly cut down on other similar practices.

Not to mention commando action itself, which has started to regain its secrecy, to return to its true character and its proper principles and to penetrate into Israel, just as we said it should, instead of remaining on our frontiers for display purposes only.

Had the revolution listened to us from the start it could have saved us and itself that long series of incidents, disturbances and clashes whose fruits we are reaping today; conduct would have been correct from the start and greater harm would have been done to Israel.

We recall these facts so that we may not continue in our errors and so that our criticisms, observations and attitudes may not be interpreted by the same old standards.

The revolution cannot do without people to keep an eye on it and disclose its shortcomings and mistakes.

At all times, if our observations have not always been correct, they have certainly always been honest and sincere. So may we not be allowed to exercise a right which is at the same time one of our duties to the cause and its revolution?

We believe that our situation and that of the Palestine revolution are among the reasons for the clashes and strife.

The first and most important reason is that the state has become the weakest party in our country, whereas common interest requires that it should be the strongest of the strong. If there is any incident, disagreement or clash, the state is incapable of settling things before they reach dangerous proportions, get out of control and general strife breaks out.

Moreover, the state is also incapable of preventing infringements of security, the security of the revolution and the security of Lebanon.

Thus, what should be the essential task of the state has been divided up and distributed between several quarters. Security, safety and so on, have come to depend on the different parties that divide up this task among themselves without authority.

It is impossible that all of them should perform this task as responsibly and honestly as is required by the situation of the state and the country.

Of course this is not the time to discuss what has brought the state to this pass. It was unwell before the Palestine revolution became another party in our land. But instead of aiding and

supporting the state, from the start the Palestine revolution has been in dispute and conflict with it. It was only natural that it should always want to be victorious and the state to be defeated.

It was also natural that we, the Lebanese, as individuals, should start to be concerned for our safety, once the dispute started diminishing the status, the role and the effectiveness of the state.

But the revolution did not realize the dangers of this involvement until it was too late, when the role and the responsibilities of the state had already been divided up and armaments and militias had become the order of the day.

This has been the situation, the state of affairs, which threatens to lead to the most disastrous consequences. What is to be done?

Before all else the attack on the militias, if it is not to be unjust, must be directed against the old deep-seated reasons for their existence. Otherwise it will be a provocative move and will result in the militias being increased rather than in their being cut down to size to the greatest possible extent.

If justice was done to us our attack on the anomalous situation would be seen as a directed and effective attack on the militias. In all events, we are opposed to the principle of violence in conflict, opposed to the material revolution and opposed to the militias. We also believe that a country in which arms are borne by others than the security forces is extremely backward and more like a tribal society than one in an advanced stage of civilization.

So we must seek a formula that will restore its roles to the state—at least its role at the security level, so that it may prevent the strife that harms the revolution as much as it particularly harms us.

We believe that this is no longer impossible, now that there is no longer any reason for the revolution to believe that the state is trying to liquidate it, and the voices that suggested this have been silenced.

Is it impossible that we should cooperate—"the revolution", we, and all parties concerned with this issue—to establish a strong and effective authority in Lebanese territory, that we Palestinians and Lebanese consent to an authority that all are satisfied is capable of protecting people's lives and honour, and also protecting the revolution and its honour?

We, certainly, are prepared to relinquish the

role that rightly belongs to the state, but which has reverted to us—that of protecting ourselves, as well as militias and arms, at the first indication that we are really under the protection of the state.

We do not bear arms just for fun, and our concerns are those of a group that wants Lebanon to be a stable country and a state in the proper sense of the word. This has been the attitude of the Phalanges; although the words were spoken in jest, it was no mistake to call them the “State Party”. But would the mere fact of our disbanding the militias, or handing them over to the authorities, mean that they became strong and capable, and that security would be ensured?

If this was the case the authorities would have taken action spontaneously to suggest that this was so, so that there would no longer have been any justification for the existence of the militias—or they themselves would have done so of their own free will.

But the problem is that the capacity of the state does not depend on our submission to any confidence in it; it requires the submission and confidence of the other parties too.

So let us all act on this basis—unless it be that the revolution is on the point of victory, and that the “return” is near. In that case, why should it be distracted from more important things, as some people choose to say? It would be better for us and for it if we let it direct its efforts exclusively to Geneva conference and the United Nations, where the conclusive diplomatic battle awaits it.

This would be a reasonable course of action if the road to Geneva and elsewhere was safe.

But the opposite is the case. Because the present stage is decisive, and because the diplomatic battle is at its height, destroying the resistance is the best way of stopping its advance. Thus its security here in Lebanon, and the security of Lebanon itself, are indispensable conditions if victory in the battle and what comes after it is to be ensured.

But what if the decision is deferred, if the return is postponed, if there is a long time to wait and the revolution takes a long time to be victorious, and remains in the state it is in now?

Certainly there must be a certain degree of solidarity between us, so that it may not one day become a heavy and wearisome burden on Lebanon.

This solidarity is also essential so that we may

not continue to suffer from the conditions and consequences of the revolution without having any say in what it is planning and building.

If we have a common destiny, if we are destined either to survive together or to fall together, then surely it is not a proper partnership if the share allotted to us is that of suffering without being consulted?

Are we not partners in the “capital”? Are we not also partners in the effort, in the adventure, in the wager, in profits and losses?—perhaps in the losses more than in the gains?

Every step the revolution decides to take determines our steps and affects our destiny, which requires that we should be allowed to share in taking the decisions.

If the revolution is on its guard against any tutelage being imposed on it, we are just as anxious, if not more so, that this should not happen. What is required, then, is cooperation between two equal parties, between brothers, and we do not ask for more.

This is what my comrades and I believe, and perhaps because we believe this, perhaps because we see the issue from the standpoint of our convictions, we sometimes speak strongly and are excessively frank.

It is also, no doubt, because we do not distinguish between Lebanon and Palestine so that we fear that Lebanon may not continue to offer itself as a model for the radical solution that will save Palestine and also save peace in the area.

Yes, indeed, we look at Palestine through Lebanon; our concept of Palestine is based on our concept of Lebanon, for the sake of Palestine, for the sake of real peace in the area and for the sake of Lebanon and all the Arabs, and for the sake of the Jews, too, in that Israel is as great a calamity to them as she is to others.

Also because we want no fresh inducements to establish racist or religious states in the East. We want the Lebanese formula to remain the sole inducement, we want her to continue to be the testimony that refutes the testimony of Israel and proves it false.

This does not mean that we are opposed to peaceful negotiations and political settlement, if the Palestinians and the Arabs see them as a first step towards relief and deliverance. We know

very well what is meant by the talk about the Palestine national entity, disengagement agreements, and so on. The logic of the conflict suggests this, as does the balance of forces, not to mention the Arab and Palestinian capabilities which cannot build in a year what was destroyed over a whole century.

All this is clear and understood. But so far we have been unable to conceive of the Palestinian entity on one hand and the Israeli entity on the other, living as good neighbours, recognizing each other and having any kind of dealings with each other. The Hebrew state is bound to reject such a settlement and to resist it to the death.

Furthermore, the Palestine entity project looks like a project for a fifth war, a proposal that can only be born by a Caesarian operation. This is in the logic of things and the logic of the conflict.

If the liberation of Quneitra, for example, and of the Suez Canal, required a destructive war in which tanks and planes fought each other in thousands and in which hundreds of thousands of combatants were engaged, not to mention the oil weapon which shook the world from end to end—if partial liberation required all this effort, how much grater will the effort have to be if we are to impose the Palestinian entity on the mind of Israel, and before that, of course, on the world?

What I mean is that we should not be too optimistic about the diplomatic battle that is now being fought in various places. The problem is not as easy as that. Nor is it as simple as one might think from the attitudes adopted by the Arabs in general, when they suggest that everything has become possible.

There are many problems awaiting us and awaiting all the Arabs before peace can be established or there can be a real armistice.

In any case the October war has not yet ended, inasmuch as its aim, as stated at the time, was to melt the ice that had started to freeze the conflict and its real causes.

The intention was to provoke a new dynamism in the struggle which could induce the world to reconsider its attitudes and views. The adventure did achieve some of its objectives, but not all of them.

Therefore solidarity must continue and be reinforced.

This is the first problem.

The second is one that has been repeatedly

raised here in Lebanon. This too is, before all else, a problem of solidarity. I began my speech with it, and I want to end with it. And it is the beginning and end of my concern.

What I want to say is that the tragedy of our Palestinian brothers in Lebanon started when some of us started to be indulgent to their revolution and to their mistakes—and every revolution makes mistakes—not so much with the object of serving their causes as from other motives, and the Palestinians thought that those who were indulgent were their friends, and those who were not were their enemies.

We too believed that the revolution was a revolution against us rather than against injustice, expulsion and Israel.

This is how the tragedy began. But the Palestinians did not notice this involvement until it was too late.

It is not easy for us to return to the starting point as if nothing had happened and far less so if this tendentious indulgence continues to increase accompanied by serious provocations.

Through solidarity alone can we curb the political exploitation of their cause and cooperate to avoid mistakes, on condition that what is said about the mistakes is acceptable to both sides and is not interpreted as hostility.

At the Lebanese level we propose an honourable pact in which we all declare our belief in the Palestinian cause—if it is still necessary to declare this!—and our solidarity with the Palestinian people till the end, and also our obligation to distinguish completely between the local political conflict and everything related to the Palestinians.

In other words, the cause of Palestine and everything related to it must not be a constituent, a theme, or a cause of this conflict.

If this proposal seems for some of them too idealistic, the fact that the Palestinians have been silent for some time and absolutely refused to enter into any controversy between the Lebanese proves beyond all shadow of doubt that my proposal is extremely realistic. It is a challenge to the extent of our loyalty to their cause and of our ability to dispense with the credit balance of their cause so as to increase our own credit balance.

Long live Lebanon.

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Speech by President Sadat of Egypt reviewing the new situation brought about by the October war (excerpts)¹⁷⁹**Cairo, September 28, 1974**

We can tell you today that the most important thing in the calculations we made for the battle was not how many kilometres of land we were going to liberate. The destruction of Israel's theory of security was more important than the destruction of the Bar-Lev line, and surmounting the world's lack of confidence in us, in what we say and in our ability to act, was more important than crossing the Canal, and proving that an unconquerable Israel was a mere delusion was more important than winning more kilometres of land by inflicting the greatest possible losses by our armed forces.

And this in fact is what did happen. In spite of all the factors that were in their favour hundreds of thousands of men were mobilized in their sight and hearing without their realizing what was going on. The legendary reputation of their intelligence was smashed, that unique water barrier was crossed, the huge earth screen was pierced, the Bar-Lev line was completely destroyed and all they had built up during seven years and spent millions of dollars on collapsed. Our ability to plan, design, keep secrets and invent was established and there were direct combat confrontations between our armour and theirs, between their aircraft and ours, between their missiles and ours, and between our unprotected infantry and their tanks, and we defeated them in all these confrontations. The theory of the invincible Israeli soldier also collapsed—from the most junior soldier who fled or surrendered, to the Prime Minister who telephoned for help from America—none of them was invincible. We and the world saw what we could do and what could happen to them, and this was the crux of the matter. Israel had lived on delusions rather than reality. She had won victories because of the carelessness and fragmentation of the Arabs rather

than thanks to her own efforts. The world's view of the area was that Israel was an invincible force and that the Arabs were a sleeping force that never wakes. A blow had to be struck to upset all these appraisals and delusions. Blood had to be shed to prove what all the information media, the tribunals of the United Nations and the outbiddings of those who fight with microphones had failed to prove, as they were bound to fail.

After that the world was again surprised by the strong Arab reaction not only with money, arms and men, but also by the wise and courageous use of the oil weapon for the first time, whereas the mere mention of the use of oil as a weapon in the battle had caused the strongest misgivings even in the Arab world itself.

Brothers and sisters,

Now that a year has passed since the October War you are certainly entitled to expect that we should ask an important question. It is: Where do we stand now?

I have already answered part of this question in my rapid review of the complete change in the Arab position in the world. If nothing else, we can all see that the revenues of the Arab oil companies have increased many times and that the whole of our international position has greatly improved. I repeat: I say this responsibly, not vaingloriously. A widescale campaign is now being waged, fostered by Zionist circles throughout the world, in an attempt to make out that Arab money is the cause of all the political, economic and social problems that confront the world.

Of course this is not true. Those who invented the market laws of supply and demand have no right to complain if for once these laws do not operate in their favour, and those who have allowed the distance between them and the countries of the developing world, or rather the starving peoples of the world, to grow so vast, have no right to talk about aid and relief.

The Arabs do not want to destroy the foundations of economic stability of the world, as they claim; they only want their rights. They are aware of their duty to the international community, but the international community must realize its duty to us and join us in putting an end to the injustices that have been done against us, with as little as possible bloodshed, disturbed situations and general international alarm.

¹⁷⁹ Made at a joint session of the ASU and the National Assembly on the anniversary of President Nasser's death; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), September 29, 1974.

Moreover, the Palestine issue, which is certainly the crux of the problem, has started on a new course, and huge new opportunities have obtained through their thousands of martyrs and through our fighting, along with the Arab nation in the glorious October war.

For the first time the world has really recognized that there is a Palestinian people who have legitimate rights that must be responded to; Israel alone does not share this conviction. And even in Israel influential voices have for the first time been raised calling for recognition of this new reality. The world is now unanimously agreed that there can be no solution of the so-called Middle East problem and no way of preventing its becoming a cancer poisoning the whole body of world peace, unless the problem of the Palestinian people is solved. The recovery of Sinai and the Golan are not enough to solve or even postpone the problem. We and the Syrians, who are the owners of Sinai and the Golan, say this, and the world has come to be convinced of it.

There has also come to be something like *de facto* recognition of the fact that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the living embodiment of the Palestinian people, that it expresses their will and that it is the quarter with which there must be dialogue.

Today the Palestine problem stands on its own before the United Nations for the first time in a quarter of a century and is finding increasing support which it never did when the Arabs had nothing to take to the United Nations but memoranda and speeches.

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Our cause cannot stand argument, delay or procrastination.

We want a just peace in the area, and for this there must be full withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and recognition of the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine to their land.

We do not pin our hopes for the realization of these demands on this country or that, and even less on the coming of this ruler or the going of that. As I said, we always try to have the best possible relations with others, and we do not want the sky of our area to be overcast with the clouds of war, cold or hot. But ultimately we are in the right, and it is our duty to weigh our friendships in the balance of support for this right.

We are being patient and more than patient, but there can be absolutely no return to the state of no peace and no war that existed before October. We were patient for a long time before October 1973, and unfortunately many powers in the world misunderstand our patience. Let us hope that the lesson taught by October is that no one will misunderstand our patience again.

May God grant all of us success, and peace be upon you.

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Statement issued by the PLO Central Council concerning the withdrawal of the PFLP from the PLO Executive Committee and Central Council¹⁸⁰

Damascus, September 30, 1974

At the request of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Organization's Central Council held a meeting on Monday, September 30, 1974, to discuss the decision of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine to withdraw from the Executive Committee and the Central Council.

The statement to this effect issued by the Command of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was examined and a study was made of the dangerousness of its timing and the political positions and concepts it contains, which the Command of the Popular Front regards as being inconsistent and incompatible with the general political line of the Palestine Liberation Organization and therefore sufficient to warrant the Front's withdrawal from the Executive Committee and the Central Council.

The Central Council discussed all these concepts in the course of a detailed analysis of the general political situation in the area. The analysis included recent developments and the great political victories won by the Liberation Organization, the latest of which was its success in having the Palestine problem included on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly.

¹⁸⁰ Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), October 1, 1974, p.14.

¹⁸¹ Doc. 290 above.

It was clear to the Council that the facts mentioned by the Popular Front in justification of its withdrawal are neither true nor reasonable. They are no more than information fed to the Popular Front by suspect and guilty quarters. This information cannot justify charges being brought against anyone.

It was also clear to the Council that the Command of the Popular Front bases its attitude on convictions and data with no foundation of logical fact. Indeed, events and developments confirm that these convictions and data are erroneous, as is the statements' expression of despair, which can only injure our people's morale and fighting spirit.

In the light of the above the Council stressed the need to engage in dialogue with the Popular Front and to discuss these convictions with it. The Council called on a special committee composed of some of its members to undertake this task, so that the Popular Front may return to the united national line within the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Council also reaffirmed the importance of reinforcing and consolidating national unity and establishing organizational and front relations between all the sections. This is considered a national necessity required by the interests of the revolution and essential for its protection and security.

It is also required by concern for the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization as being the sole national command of the Palestinian people. The Council also observed with satisfaction the escalation of combat operations in the occupied territories and stressed the need for them to be further escalated and developed. It once more expressed its approbation and approval of the intensive political efforts that have been made by the Command of the Palestine Liberation Organization in this period and also the important victories it has won, the latest being the important statement issued by the tripartite meeting held in Cairo on September 20.¹⁸² In addition, the Council condemned the Jordanian regime for departing from Arab consensus and continuing to adopt attitudes hostile to the Palestinian people and their national cause.

It called for continued resistance to the Jordanian regime's schemes, proposing that it be

isolated and that its links with the conspiracy be shown up by strengthening relations of cooperation with the two nationalist confrontation countries, Egypt and Syria. These countries constitute, together with the Palestinian people, the principal front of clash with the Zionist enemy. The cohesion of this front is a basis for the affirmation of the unity of national struggle and the consolidation of the unity of Arab solidarity.

The Central Council, while holding the Command of the Popular Front responsible for the repercussions of its attitude on the safety and security of the revolution, again calls on it to reconsider its attitude and once more to participate in the responsibilities of the national action and of dealing with all problems and differences within the framework of national institutions.

Long live free Arab Palestine.

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Statement by the Arab Liberation Front on the withdrawal of the PFLP from the PLO Executive Committee and Central Council¹⁸³

Beirut, early October, 1974

National unity in the Palestinian arena can only be built through serious and effective participation within the frameworks and institutions of the Palestine Liberation Organization. For this participation to be effective and serious it must be allowed to operate and express itself in a democratic atmosphere that permits interaction and dialogue. Otherwise what is called national unity will be no more than delusion and self-deception.

The absence of clear and sound foundations for real national unity has resulted in each of the participating sections exercising it in accordance with its own ideas and its own wishes.

It is in this spirit that we understand the step taken by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,¹⁸⁴ with which we are in agreement on one point—the necessity to resist proposals for settlements intended to liquidate our cause and to frustrate the struggles of our people which started more than half a century ago.

¹⁸² Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), October 5, 1974.

¹⁸⁴ Doc. 290 above.

¹⁸³ Doc. 286 above.

On this basis we shall continue to join the Front in resisting the enemies of our cause and our nation—the imperialists and Zionists and their agents in the area. Attitudes to the Palestine Liberation Organization, which has relinquished its vanguard role in Arab struggle and contented itself with being subservient to the Arab regimes which accept settlement, are subject to many considerations, in the light of which each of the sections must decide its attitude.

Revolution until liberation.

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Statement by Defence Minister Ismail of Egypt describing the strategic objectives of the October war¹⁸⁵

Lake Nasser, October 6, 1974

Permit me, Mr. President, to disclose today, for the first time, a small part of that historic text of the document which you issued to me immediately before the battle:

The strategic objective which I am politically responsible for entrusting to the Egyptian armed forces, on the basis of all I have heard and learned of their state of preparedness, may be summed up as follows:

To challenge the Israeli theory of security by military action, to the extent of the capacities of the armed forces, with the aim of inflicting as heavy losses as possible on the enemy and convincing him that his continued occupation of our territories will cost him too much. This will show him that his theory of security on the basis of psychological, political and military intimidation is not a shield of tempered steel that can protect him either now or in the future.

If we succeed in challenging the Israeli theory of security, this will lead us to achieve certain short-term and long-term consequences.

For the sake of secrecy I will quote no more of your instructions to me, until circumstances permit all of those historic documents to be published to the world at large.

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Appeal by the PLO to international organizations to take action on behalf of Archbishop Capucci¹⁸⁶

Beirut, October 11, 1974

Archbishop Hilarion Capucci, the Greek Catholic Archbishop of Jerusalem, yesterday told a Zionist court that an Israeli intelligence agent threatened that he would be killed if he did not make a deposition which would convict him of the charges brought against him.

In the face of this familiar conduct on the part of the occupation authorities, Archbishop Capucci is threatened with death at any moment.

The Palestine Liberation Organization views with the greatest concern this dangerous threat to the life of Archbishop Capucci and does not exclude the possibility of his liquidation by the occupation authorities, as has already been the case with hundreds of detained freedom fighters.

The Palestine Liberation Organization calls on the Human Rights Commission, the International Red Cross and the international bodies and nationalist and progressive forces throughout the world to put an end to this new Nazi crime and to take action to safeguard the life of Archbishop Capucci and to secure his release from the prisons of the occupation.

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Letter from Syrian Nationalist Social Party (PPS) leader Saada of Lebanon to the PLO expressing support for the submission of the Palestine question to the UN General Assembly (excerpts)¹⁸⁷

October 11, 1974

The Syrian National Socialist Party is well aware of the dangerous turning point the Palestine problem has reached in the conspiracy of peace and surrender aimed at annihilating our

¹⁸⁶ Translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), October 11, 1974. For other material regarding Capucci see docs. 146, 192, 275, 276 and 285 above.

¹⁸⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), October 13, 1974

¹⁸⁵ Made in a speech at a ceremony celebrating the first anniversary of the October war; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 7, 1974.

national right to the whole of Palestine. The efforts of some regimes to recover some or all of what was usurped by the 1967 aggression must not be at the expense of the basic national problem, which is the problem of our right to the whole of Palestinian territory. The recovery of Sinai, the Golan and the West Bank by war activation, oil policy and diplomacy must not be within the framework of resolution 242, which stipulates that the original usurpation of Palestine must be accepted.

Resolution 242 is basically unacceptable both in form and content from the point of view of national right because it stipulates dealings with the Zionist usurpers, recognition of their existence and the safeguarding of their survival.

It is from this national viewpoint that we declare our support for the Palestine problem being submitted to the United Nations as a problem of national liberation and right to self-determination. The Palestine resistance is the vanguard of the embodiment in revolutionary struggle of the will of the nation for a war of national liberation.

Considering the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people is fundamentally linked to the declared strategic goal of the Palestine resistance, which is "the full liberation of the usurped national territory by armed struggle and escalating revolution". In adopting this strategy the resistance is expressing the general national will, for if it ignores this it will lose all claim to such legitimacy. The homeland is common property; no individual, group or generation has the right to dispose of it in a manner that could annul national sovereignty over any part of it.

Any interim tactic for the liberation of part of the territory must not be at the expense of the strategic goals of the national war of liberation. In the past, from 1947–1973, the Palestine problem had been submitted to the United Nations on the basis of a *fait accompli*.

Struggle against the Zionist entity, which is the most dangerous kind of racist colonialist settler entity, is a national duty as far as we are concerned and a human duty as far as the conscience of the world is concerned. For this entity is not only a danger to our country, it is a danger to the values of justice and freedom of the whole of

humanity. For it is an entity that lives by the usurpation of societies and the separation of their minorities. The consequences of its activities are sapping the strength of the two greatest powers in the world, the USSR and the United States of America, making them liable to clash with each other and provoking the fanaticism of the minorities in each. War against this entity and its ideas which conflict with the spirit and values of the age is a war on behalf of the whole of humanity. Our people are waging this war by their national struggle in support of their national right and their right to self-determination and also in support of human values. It may help to deliver the Zionists from the complexes that are eroding their minds and gravely endangering the area and the world.

The aim of the Palestine Liberation Organization in submitting the Palestine problem to the General Assembly of the United Nations in the context of these national and revolutionary principles and values, is to obtain international support with a view to securing the nullification of previous colonialist United Nations resolutions which were intended to provide a cover for usurpation.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Iraq by a delegation representing the Palestine rejection front (excerpts)¹⁸⁸

Baghdad, October 12, 1974

At the invitation of the National Command of the Baath Party a Palestinian delegation, headed by Dr. George Habash and representing the Palestinian rejection organizations, which are the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front (General Command), the Arab Liberation Front and the Popular Struggle Front, paid a visit this month to Iraq from October 6 to 10.

In the course of talks there was a general review and an exchange of viewpoints on the Palestinian,

¹⁸⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad). October 13, 1974.

Arab and international situation. The two sides agreed on the following:

1. To condemn all the settlement plans that are being proposed as being imperialist liquidationist and surrenderist proposals aimed at securing recognition of the Zionist entity, freezing the conflict that is in progress in Palestinian territory in the interests of Zionism and imperialism and strengthening the positions of Arab reaction. The two sides also condemned the deviationist trends in the Palestine arena aimed at enticing the Palestinians to participate in the liquidationist settlements.

They agreed that these proposals must be opposed and combated and not be allowed to be pushed through. They also agreed that this requires the establishment, on a firm scientific basis, of a unified front comprising the sections of the resistance, all mass bodies and organizations and patriotic persons that reject surrenderist solutions. They agreed that this step should be taken only after a radical and comprehensive reappraisal of the whole course of the struggle of all the sections of the resistance in the previous stage, and after the lessons taught by that stage have been absorbed. They also agreed that the forces in favour of holding out should strengthen their relations with their allies in the Arab world and the world in general.

The two sides stressed the need for continued strenuous efforts on behalf of Palestinian national unity with a view to total liberation and rejection of all surrenderist proposals.

2. That efforts should be made to check the deterioration of the Arab situation that set in after the ceasefire in the October war. Since then the regimes that favour a peaceful solution have been bent on the Geneva conference and a solution in accordance with resolution 242 which was intended to liquidate the cause of our people and to perpetuate the Zionist usurpation of Palestine. This trend is being followed in spite of the positive achievements of the October war, as a result of which the myth of Israeli supremacy was smashed, the courage and intelligence and readiness for sacrifice of the Arab fighter became so conspicuous that world opinion was won over to support Arab rights and it became clear how great was the possibility of mobilizing the Arab masses and sparking off their energies and resources through continued fighting.

6. In view of the ferocity of the imperialist, Zionist and reactionary attack in the Arab area, and in view of the importance of escalating the struggle against this attack, the two sides stress the importance of holding an Arab conference of all nationalist and progressive forces to strengthen our people's endurance and their struggle on behalf of the goals of the Arab revolution.

7. The two sides agreed on the importance of strengthening the links of friendship with revolutionary forces throughout the world, especially the socialist countries and the liberated countries of the third world.

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Statement by Chief Mufti Khalid of Lebanon pointing to Arab achievements as an example for Lebanon¹⁸⁹

Beirut, October 17, 1974

We are not calling for a revolution, for experience has taught us that revolutions in Lebanon, however sincere and disinterested, are quickly taken over by this system and its politicians, who at once proceed to haggle over their dead bodies when the blood shed by their martyrs and victims is still not dry.

The will for change must deal with the essence of things, not their manifestations, with the causes of crises, not their consequences. Therefore, the will for change must deal with the regime and not the consequences of the regime. If the regime consists of freedom and confessionalism and the results of this make themselves felt at the level of politics, administration, the economy, education and morality, first confessionalism must be abolished and then the regime of freedom must be examined to discover the sources of its shortcomings. These must then be dealt with objectively, wisely and honestly.

For us the desire for change means a quiet changeover, through reform, from the regime of

¹⁸⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), October 18, 1974.

domination left behind by the mandate to a regime of equality of the kind the Palestine revolution is now advocating.

The desire for change means to us a changeover from the pre-Israel regime to a regime like that which was capable of winning victory in the Ramadan war.

The desire for change means to us a changeover from a regime of dependence on the good offices of others to a regime of personal responsibility that is practising struggle responsibly like Archbishop Capucci in occupied Jerusalem.

It also means a changeover from a regime of inflexible and isolationist ideas to a regime based on openness to the ideas of others like that displayed by the conflicting Arab regimes after the Ramadan war on behalf of higher Arab interests or, indeed, the openness which led to the meeting of East and West with the object of realizing the interests of humanity as a whole.

Briefly, the desire for change means to us the changeover from the regime of the past to the regime of the future which pleases God and safeguards the interests of His servants.

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Interview statements by Foreign Minister Fahmy of Egypt reviewing the results of his visit to the USSR¹⁹⁰

Moscow, October 18, 1974

Q. What are the most important results of your visit?

A. President Anwar Sadat allotted me a specific task and a clear mandate to invite Mr. Leonid Brezhnev to a summit conference in Cairo and to make efforts to develop all aspects of Egyptian-Soviet relations.

On the basis of this mandate I went to Moscow, where I was met by Mr. Leonid Brezhnev, who issued a statement from his office in the Central Committee accepting the invitation and welcoming it, stressing the importance of this historic visit. I agreed with my colleague and brother Andrei Gromyko, the Foreign Minister of the USSR, that

the Egyptian and Soviet sides should make all the preparations necessary for an historic summit meeting of such importance, to ensure that it had the desired positive results.

The Soviet leader gave me a message for President Sadat. I observed and read the comments that followed the publication of the Kremlin statement on Mr. Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Cairo.

The importance of the visit and the surprise it has given rise to are due to the fact that this visit will be the first conference Brezhnev has attended in the Middle East, and in Cairo in particular, since October 6. In spite of the rumours that have been spread about Egyptian-Soviet relations, these efforts have not prevented Egypt from being the first country Mr. Brezhnev visits in the Middle East, ten years after he took up his important post as Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.

Q. What is your impression at the end of your visit? Was your mission successful?

A. I had a clear commission from the President. All his instructions were carried out, and I am happy at the results achieved. It was a success for Egypt and a success for the cause of right and justice. I went to Moscow because it was necessary after our contacts with the United States and after the United Nations General Assembly debates. Before we started discussing the Middle East problem we had to contact the friendly USSR.

The USSR's support for us is very valuable, as being one of the two super-powers that are guaranteeing the solution.

Q. But did the USSR agree to all the steps we have taken in connection with solving the problem, or did it object to some of them?

A. No one said anything to me to that effect, but that does not mean that we did not discuss the details.

Q. Have we agreed with the USSR on when the Geneva Conference should meet?

A. The Geneva Conference will meet soon and at the proper time.

Q. Why was an independent statement issued on the Palestinians?

A. This attitude affirms the unanimity of the two countries [Egypt and the USSR] as regards the Palestine Liberation Organization. We issued

¹⁹⁰ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 19, 1974; for other material regarding the visit see docs. 155 and 157 above.

the statement to stress that the Organization is entitled to take part in the Geneva conference on an equal footing with the other countries.

Q. And the military problems?

A. You had better ask General Gamasi.

General Gamasi: I have no comment; ask the Foreign Minister and head of the delegation.

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Press interview statements by President Boumedienne of Algeria affirming that any solution to the Middle East problem must be decided by the Palestinians¹⁹¹

Algiers, mid-October, 1974

For us, in what has come to be known to the world as the Middle East crisis, the Palestine problem is the root problem. It has always been so, and it will continue to be so until it is completely settled. Why? Because the problem of Sinai will certainly be solved and because the problem of the Golan will certainly be solved.

To be exact, then, the problem lies in the Palestine problem and the dangerous role Jordan is playing in connection with it. In this connection we are as clear as daylight and as trenchant as the sword. If King Hussein wants us to choose between him and the Palestine revolution and its people, without hesitation and without any reservations we choose the Palestine revolution.

The objective fact I want to focus attention on is that, by its very nature, the Palestine problem is one of two things: either it is the cement that binds the Arab countries together or the bomb whose explosion drives them apart.

We are with the Palestine revolution and its political entity which is founded on unity and national alliance on the basis of a common programme to which all sections of the Palestine revolution subscribe, within the framework of the Liberation Organization. We are committed to the [Algiers] summit conference resolution to the effect that the Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people both inside

and outside.¹⁹²

We appreciate the glorious role the revolution has performed and is still performing on behalf not only of its people but also of the whole Arab nation.

We are opposed to any tutelage, Arab or non-Arab, over the Palestine revolution and its right to conduct the revolutionary movement at both tactical and strategic levels. Our duty to support it and give it aid does not give us the right to take its place or to decide on its behalf. That would be a denial of the revolution and of the Palestinian people; it would be falling into the same error as the Israeli and imperialist theory that denies the existence of the Palestinian people and of Palestinian territory. The fact that the revolution is Palestinian is in no way inconsistent with its being all-Arab; indeed this strengthens it objectively. In this we are not relinquishing our direct and indirect responsibility for the Palestine cause: we are consciously allowing the Palestinian entity to reinforce its strength for the confrontation of imperialist Israel. We are averting from it the perils of useless conflicts which, however important, are secondary as compared with the ferocious conflict of destiny with Zionism.

Therefore our movement is based on the full affirmation of the strategic objective of the Palestine revolution—establishing a non-racist democratic state. We regard the national authority in such Palestinian territory as is liberated as being a Palestinian choice that must be respected.

An objective analysis of the present situation and the power relations between Israel and the Arabs since the October war confirms to us that we are confronted with a very important stage in our long and extended conflict with Zionism and imperialism. The tide of events is flowing in a direction favourable to us. There is therefore a real possibility of reaching not a "satisfactory solution" but a comparatively honourable solution. Israel is in a predicament, and so is America; for the solution to be honourable it must have nothing to do with attempts either to fragment the issue or to mix fighting with political action.

To be perfectly frank I do not agree with some of our brothers who make a mechanical distinction between a "military solution" and a "political solution". There is no distinction, either in theory or in practical reality. This has been confirmed

¹⁹¹ Interview conducted by Lutfi Khawli; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 19, 1974.

¹⁹² Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

by the experiences and in the literature of all liberation revolutions throughout history.

Do not throw down your arms, but at the same time do not abstain from any political action that can be of service to your cause. Such abstention is romantic, not revolutionary.

There is something else we must not be ashamed to face up to. We are reasonable and revolutionaries. The Geneva conference? In my view it is unsound and misleading to raise the question on the basis of: Are you for or against the conference?

This is not the question. The question is what are you going to propose if you go to the conference. All combatants in international wars and wars of liberation go to conferences during or after the war. We are not exceptions just because we are Arabs or because our enemies are Israel and imperialism.

We must stop hanging on to the form and forgetting the substance and the essence. We must be prepared to engage in revolutionary political action. We are always anxious to be in a strong position, and determined that the solution should ultimately be an Arab one within a framework that is essentially Palestinian, not an Israeli or an American solution. I also say not a Soviet solution, in spite of our friendship with the Soviets and the fact that they accept what the Arabs accept.

The fact is that we Arabs alone can have the solution, which is the non-racist democratic solution. The only solution Israel has to offer is occupation and racism. This is her weak point and what will eventually lead to her destruction.

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**Speech by Arab League General Secretary
Riyad to Arab Foreign Ministers on issues to
be discussed at the Arab summit conference
(excerpt)¹⁹³**

Rabat, October 22, 1974

Gentlemen, there is no doubt that our nation is living through one of the most important stages in its history. Since the glorious October war, our nation has come to know itself. It has used its resources and potentials. It is effectively influencing the course of world affairs to liberate its occupied territories, to restore its usurped rights, to guarantee its security and progress and to support free world co-operation and a just peace.

The world has clearly seen Arab policy, based on the call for the victory of the principles of freedom, justice and peace in the face of the collapsing Israeli security claims, which are based on ambitions of expansion and aggression.

The Middle East problem has continued to force itself on the international community despite the attempts to obliterate it and to reverse it [to the situation before] the October war. The Palestine issue has emerged to impose its independent entity and the rights of the heroic Palestinian people. The international community has recognized it despite the hatred poured out by Israel and world Zionism.

But the occupied Arab territories are still under Israeli occupation. The national rights of the Palestinian people have not yet been restored. The enemy is continuing to proclaim his insistence on occupying the occupied territories or parts of them and his neglect of the national Palestinian rights as if he had forgotten the lessons of the glorious Ramadan war.

Our nation cannot relinquish an inch of its precious soil. It cannot relinquish an iota of its national rights. The enemy's military strength is greater than before. He is continuing to receive generous military and financial support. His supporters continue to stress their protection and support for him.

¹⁹³ Broadcast on Rabat radio in Arabic; partial English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4737/A/2-3; reprinted by permission.

Brothers Foreign Ministers, your council is facing three main tasks:

First, to prepare for the forthcoming summit conference in three days' time for its role in following up the implementation of the Algiers resolutions¹⁹⁴ and defining the course of the coming stage of our battle to liberate the territories, to retrieve the rights and the political military and economic solidarity.

Second, to continue the firm national (qawmiyah) task of bolstering the joint Arab action in order to guarantee collective security and to promote economic and social development. This requires an amendment of the Arab League Charter in order to make it conform with Arab aspirations and to harmonize international developments.

Third, to continue the work for Arab-African solidarity in order to stress our unity of struggle, principles, aims and fate, and to strengthen Arab co-operation with the international community, particularly in the field of world economy for the prosperity of the world and the peoples. The Arab dialogue with Western Europe is a live example of the Arab intentions in the field of international relations.

In conclusion of my speech, permit me to summarize the points of our discussion. They are:

1. The possibility of the renewal of the battle with a renewal of the phenomena of Israeli aggression; the military evaluation of our attitude and our joint responsibilities in that respect.

2. International intervention for the sake of peace on two fundamental issues: complete withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, and the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people.

3. The Palestine issue and its effect upon the Arab and world arenas and within the framework of the United Nations.

4. The strengthening of joint Arab action, particularly in regard to the Arab economy and its weight in the world, and ways to confront the attempts at imposing foreign economic domination and shackles on our freedom to dispose of our resources and our sovereignty over our sources of strength.

Brothers, your responsibilities are great. The world's eyes are on you. Your nation pins its

hopes on the summit conference for which you are preparing. May God guide your steps, and thanks.

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Speech by PLO Executive Committee member Qaddumi (Abu Lutf) made at the Arab summit conference (excerpts)¹⁹⁵

Rabat, October 22, 1974

Gentlemen, the glorious Ramadan war had many positive results. In our view probably the most important of these results was the restoration of the balance in the Arab structure and the upsetting of the balance in the structure of the enemies. This has appeared clearly in the military and political victories that have been won, in Arab solidarity, in the recovery of Arab self-confidence and the ability of the Arab nation to confront and defeat hostile challenges. Therefore the Zionist enemy and its ally, America, have made unrelenting efforts since the Ramadan war to obliterate and sidetrack the consequences of that war, in the hope of neutralizing its effects and impairing Arab combat strength among the forces of Arab confrontation—Egypt, Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization—against the Zionist enemy and of restoring the situation that prevailed before the war. The enemy's strategy for the present stage may thus be defined as follows:

1. The Zionist enemy is trying to restore the balance of his structure. This is shown by his huge armaments programmes, his internal propaganda campaigns, his efforts to gain more time and his constant aggressive attacks on Palestinian refugee camps and Lebanese villages.

2. The enemy is trying to upset the balance of the Arab structure by his efforts to sap Arab solidarity and to isolate the Arabs from their friends, and by his attempts to deprive the Palestine resistance of its true role and to prevent the Palestine issue recovering its natural status.

3. The opportunity is being taken to carry out a new military strike as a result of which he will be

¹⁹⁴ Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹⁹⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *Wafa* (Beirut), October 24, 1974.

in a better position to impose conditions on the Arab nation.

4. The enemy is trying, with overt American support, to shirk his responsibility for the Palestine problem, to maintain that any solution of it falls outside confines of the 1967 previous armistice, and to make out that it is an internal Arab problem. This is part of his evil plans to disarm the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and to deprive our people of their right to return to their homeland. As a substitute for this right, the enemy plans to execute projects aimed at obliterating the Palestinian existence, the Palestinian identity and the independent Palestinian entity and solving the problem through Jordan, as has been explicitly stated in Israel and America. We unreservedly and in the strongest terms condemn these schemes and from our concern for the interests of our people and their cause and also for the interests of the Jordanian people, shall make every effort to frustrate these schemes. It is to be observed that since the Ramadan war the Palestine resistance has won great victories over the enemy in their armed struggle, as in the commando suicide operations at Maalot, Naharia, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and elsewhere in the heart of occupied Palestine. Similarly, the Palestine Liberation Organization has achieved major gains at the political level, culminating in the major gain achieved at the United Nations, whose political and psychological consequences have had such a great impact on the Zionist enemy, increasing the imbalance of his structure which was already upset by the consequences of the glorious Ramadan war.

Brothers, in the light of the above we can now define our objectives and strategy as follows:

1. To affirm the resolutions of the sixth Arab summit conference.¹⁹⁶

2. To affirm the unity of the Arab cause and to prevent its being fragmented; also to prevent the acceptance of individual solutions of the problem from whatever quarter they derive.

3. To affirm the right of the Palestinian people to establish their independent national authority in any part of Palestinian national territory that is liberated, in corroboration with the resolutions adopted by the Palestine National Council at its twelfth session;¹⁹⁷ further political, military and

material support for the Palestine Liberation Organization.

4. To maintain and consolidate Arab solidarity at all levels, political, military, economic and information, on the basis of full national commitment to the goal of Arab struggle, which is complete liberation.

5. To continue building up Arab combat capacity for the confrontation of all eventualities.

6. To exploit the results of the October war in the right way and as soon as possible, and to prevent the enemy from gaining time or benefiting from it.

7. To strive by all available means to effect further imbalance in the enemy's social structure.

8. To establish Arab-European dialogue on political and economic bases with the object of achieving stability in the European attitude to the Arab cause, and to organize Arab-European co-operation on this basis.

9. To pay attention to the African attitude and to make every effort to find the best way of maintaining this attitude unchanged by providing financial aid to the African peoples and participating in the economic development of the African countries.

10. To make every effort to strengthen relations with the friendly countries—the Islamic countries, the non-aligned countries, and the socialist countries—and to make more friends among the countries of the world. In conclusion I should like to thank all the Arab brother countries that have stood by us in our political battle at the United Nations, and all friendly countries. I should be glad if this conference would express its gratitude to these countries as an expression of Arab solidarity and the united Arab attitude. I also want to express my deep gratitude to the Arab foreign ministers for the great efforts they have made to ensure the victory at the United Nations of the Arabs' major cause, the cause of Palestine.

I thank you.

¹⁹⁶ Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

¹⁹⁷ Doc. 246 above.

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Speech by President Sadat of Egypt describing Egypt's domestic and foreign political situation following the October war (excerpts)¹⁹⁸**Cairo, October 23, 1974**

The battle is still going on. This is the first and greatest fact that we must always remember when dealing with any of our affairs. The October war did not end occupation, but it did end despair. It did not liberate the territory, but it did liberate our minds from neuroses, inferiority complexes and the spirit of defeatism. Therefore, in spite of all that our great battle achieved we must continue to bear arms until the territory is liberated and the rights recovered. But as you know, arms are terribly expensive, in money and men, in both financial and manpower resources. Our enemy is treacherous. He is falling back, but he has not yet submitted to justice. Anyone who thinks or acts in ignorance of this fact is committing a great crime against the present and future of this homeland. While offering peace with one hand, we must see to it that the other hand is full of the most modern weapons we can get. Without this, our cause will stagnate again and we shall turn inwards to our internal problems, forgetting that the enemy is still at the gates, indeed within the gates. I believe that all groups and all categories of our people realize this fact and are prepared to bear its consequences.

I am speaking to you, brothers and sisters, as the first constitutional institution, and I am speaking through you to all our constitutional institutions and all the masses.

Political stability is the first and essential precondition if we are successfully to confront the difficult stage that faces us, and political stability is not the same as stagnation.

We have granted freedom of the press and freedom of speech; we have repealed the exceptional measures, and the prisons and concentration camps have been liquidated. Our political life during this period has witnessed heated discussions about many questions. Some people were

afraid of the experiment but I have always been confident that our people are apt to follow the course of freedom and democracy responsibly and maturely. If there have been exceptions here and there, they have been exceptions that do not negate the rule and they will soon be forgotten.

But it is the duty of all of us, as we exercise the freedom we have won, not to forget the main fact that I have mentioned: the battle is still going on, political stability is our first weapon in the stage that faces us, and this stability which we want to be vital and creative, not stagnant, must also be profound and mature and free of anomalies or deviations.

We are engaged in an extremely critical political confrontation with the occupying Israeli enemy, with the superpowers and with the whole world. The Israeli enemy wants to get out of the trap of the political confrontation resulting from our military victory. He wants to prevaricate so that the whole world may not believe what we have proved by demonstrating the falsity of his security claims and disclosing his expansionist goals. He is hoping to find a breach caused by instability here, or a moment when we turn our attention away from him and look behind us to our internal affairs, but we shall never allow him to do so.

But of course it is natural that whenever we draw near the achievement of our goals, and whenever the hour of decision draws near to us, deviant voices are raised and movements of division and exchanges of accusations take place.

As for us, we are quite clear about our course and we shall never turn aside from it. As we have stated many times, we shall never relinquish an inch of the Arab territory, in Sinai, the Golan, the West Bank or Jerusalem. Nor shall we ever agree to bargain over the rights of the people of Palestine or over anything that impedes their right to self-determination or the achievement of their national aspirations.

Committed as we are to these two conditions, or these fundamental obligations, we believe that we are entitled to maintain our freedom of movement. We hope that others will realize this as long as we continue to move forward towards the achievement of these two goals over which there can be no discussion or bargaining.

¹⁹⁸ Made at the opening of the new session of the National Assembly; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 24, 1974.

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Speech by President Bakr of Iraq expressing concern that the policies pursued by the Arab states are avoiding basic issues (excerpt)¹⁹⁹**Baghdad, October 25, 1974**

One of the basic problems in our view is that the colonialist forces that have conspired against us for so long and have been the cause of our backwardness, the fragmentation of our homeland and the depletion of our resources, were also the cause of the Zionist entity being imposed on our Arab territory in Palestine by force and treachery. These colonialist forces do not change their main attitudes to us unless we force them to do so by our unity and strength and by continuing to use all the weapons and resources available to us fully and correctly. It is wrong to trust in the superficial aspects of their attitudes and in their promises, which are not supported by reality nor by the basic facts of their characters and their relations with the Zionist enemy. American imperialism, which has long led the front of the colonialist forces which support Zionism and which has provided the Zionist entity with everything it needs to increase its strength and continue its aggression and was its main support in the 1967 aggression as also in the last war, has changed its basic attitudes to the Arabs to the extent of being able to strive seriously and sincerely to safeguard their rights, or even some of their rights. In our view what has obliged American imperialism to adopt its present hypocritical course is the fact that for a short time we used the struggle methods that we should always have used, therefore it sought and is still seeking to explain the Arab upsurge, to contain it and to turn it to its own interests.

We believe that the right way to force American imperialism and the like to reconsider its position is for us resolutely and comprehensively to continue on the course of all-out struggle.

We do not believe that what has been going on in the Arab arena, especially since the ceasefire, is enough to force the imperialists to adopt a different attitude which could ensure the Arabs of

some of the advantages they desire. We believe that this is a great danger to the interests and rights of the nation and that sincere and effective study must be devoted to this problem.

There is another basic problem which must not be disregarded or underestimated in the tumult of verbiage and information activity. This is the current confusion between planning and attaining our goals on the basis of stages related to our real and objective resources, on the one hand, and on the other, relinquishing many of our legitimate ambitions in the hope of realizing a small part of them.

Certainly, brothers, from our position of national responsibility we appreciate that objective reality has its own laws and requirements. We also know that a wise policy vis-à-vis any problem must take into account the question of stages. But there is a difference between dividing up our struggle into stages and relinquishing a great part of our historical rights in our national territory for the sake of recovering a small part of it.

I do not want to conceal from you that I am extremely worried because the moves that are being made and the policies that are being pursued in the Arab arena are not based on enough concern for or a sufficiently balanced scientific appraisal of this important issue. This is something so important that it must never be disregarded or underestimated, in spite of the difficulties it involves, and in spite of all the fuss that is at present being made about it with the object of covering up the essential aspects of the problem.

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Joint communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit to Egypt of Emir Sabah of Kuwait (excerpt)²⁰⁰**Cairo, October 25, 1974**

The two leaders reviewed bilateral relations. They noted with satisfaction the continued growth in these relations. They stressed that they con-

¹⁹⁹ Made at the opening of the twelfth conference of the Arab Lawyers Association; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Baghdad), October 26, 1974.

²⁰⁰ Broadcast on Cairo radio in Arabic; partial English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4740/A/3: reprinted by permission.

tinue to reinforce their constructive co-operation in various fields and their sincere desire to strengthen the fraternal ties between the two fraternal peoples.

The two leaders discussed the Palestine issue, the Middle East crisis and its developments and the situation resulting from the continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories. They agreed that peace could not be established in the area except by ending the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories and the regaining by the Palestinian people of all their legitimate rights in their territories and homeland. By challenging the UN and international community resolutions, Israel was responsible for the consequences that could stem from the development of events and which might endanger world peace.

They also reviewed the situation of the Palestine Resistance. They stressed the need for the Resistance's cohesiveness and unity and for support for it in its struggle to liberate the Arab Palestinian territories, and to restore the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

The two leaders expressed their satisfaction over the resolution issued by the UN General Assembly at its 29th session inviting the Palestine Liberation Organization, in its capacity as the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in the General Assembly discussion of the Palestine issue.²⁰¹

The two sides stressed their support for all the steps being taken to co-ordinate Arab efforts and solidarity and mobilize Arab resources to confront the imperialist and Zionist challenges.

The two leaders discussed the Arab situation. They praised the heroism of the armed forces and Arab solidarity during the Ramadan war. They expressed the hope that this solidarity would be a guiding principle for Arabs in all fields.

The two leaders wished every success to the forthcoming Arab summit conference in Rabat.

The two leaders also reviewed the international situation. They expressed their thanks to all the countries which stood with the Arabs during the blessed Ramadan war. They stressed their adherence to the UN Charter and principles, particularly those liquidating colonialism giving the right of self-determination to all peoples and combating racial discrimination.

There was full agreement between the two leaders on the need to consult in all matters serving Arab causes in general and the fraternal relations between the two countries in particular.

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Speech by King Hussein of Jordan at the Seventh Arab Summit Conference explaining Jordan's military strategy in the October war and commenting on the decision to recognize the PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (excerpts)²⁰²

Rabat, October 27, 1974

Remarks have been made about Jordan's subsequent attitude of not opening the Jordanian front automatically after the Egyptian and Syrian fronts were opened. This has been discussed, clarified and explained and the facts and cause have been made clear to our brother Arabs, and it has been shown that we were not in the picture as regards the operation, the preparations and dispositions made for it, or its timing, so that we were not in a position to take advantage of the surprise element. Then there was the question of the limited strategic depth of the vital territory on which we were facing the enemy's forces, in addition to the fact that it is the longest front and forms the protective line, since the heart of the Arabian peninsula lies behind it—and that is the enemy's goal. Then there was the line of thinking we adopted in the light of what I previously mentioned to the effect that territory and positions must be defended, especially on a front like ours, until our right wing is finally safeguarded, at least against any possible threat, and our conviction that turning over from defence to attack at a time when we have lost the element of surprise and when we were suffering, as we still are, from certain basic military shortcomings, especially in the field of effective air defence, for material reasons beyond our control, would be a reckless adventure whose consequences are only too obvious,

²⁰¹ Doc. 20 above.

²⁰² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), October 29, 1974.

in that it makes possible a serious military setback in which any Arab gains achieved by the fighting on the other two brotherly fronts would be lost. All this led us to concentrate on defence, for, in addition to the fact that this would clearly provide greater opportunities of inflicting heavier losses on the enemy should he attack us when we are in our fortified defensive positions, our mobilization in confrontation of the enemy obliged him to tie down a considerable part of his forces in front of us and made it impossible for him to deploy them on the other fronts where some of the best of our forces later had the honour to fight beside our brothers in defence of the dear Syrian territory.

When the Geneva conference agreed to form the military working committee for the disengagement of forces, at the third session of the conference on December 22, Jordan asked that the disengagement operation should cover the Jordanian front, giving its reasons. The conference acceded to this request by not opposing it, and clearly disengagement of forces is a kind of initial Israeli withdrawal and a start on the application of the principle that Israeli forces should retire from the occupied territories, especially in the Jordan Valley, the area in which Israel still insists on maintaining a military presence for security reasons.

Then Dr. Henry Kissinger came to the area and started travelling between the Arab capitals and Israel, and completed the disengagement operation on the Egypt-Israel front²⁰³ and then on the Syria-Israel front.²⁰⁴ He then started to make preparations to deal with the problem on the Jordan-Israel front.

From my trips abroad, and in the United States of America in particular, I have observed that the method approved by the United States in working for peace in the Middle East is that things should be settled by stages, dealing with the problem piecemeal; every time one step has been taken it waits a while until it can start to take the next step or—as the expression has it—getting a piece of land in return for a piece of peace.

It is to be observed that while I thought that disengagement on the Jordanian front meant, according to the Jordanian view, that Israel would

withdraw some distance beyond the river and withdraw completely on the front, as a start for complete withdrawal, Israel was bound to oppose disengagement in this form, seeing that it has to be a territorial settlement under which a large part of the West Bank would be returned to Jordan and that, as I have already said, she should maintain a military presence in the part that is to be returned, and this we have rejected in the strongest terms.

However, while I was in Washington in the first week of last August, on my first visit to the new American President and the first Arab meeting with him after he had assumed his presidential duties, seeking to strengthen the Arab position and to ensure the success of the disengagement operation, certain Arab statements followed or preceded me declaring opposition to the restoration of the Jordanian administration to the West Bank or to any part of it that should be liberated.

On this point—the restoration of the Jordanian administration to the West Bank or to any part of it that is recovered—I want to make it clear that the Jordanian administration in fact exists in the West Bank today. The administrative structure in the West Bank is linked to the central administrative structure in Amman, and the district governors, the civil servants and the judges, the Waqfs, the municipalities, the labour unions, the passport department, education and so on, are all attached to the central government in Amman, and the Jordanian government pays all the salaries, expenses and loans arising therefrom out of its general budget. The only thing is that the West Bank is separated from the East Bank by the Israeli occupation and its military authorities. Hence, if the occupation is removed from part of that territory, we shall not be introducing a new Jordanian administration.

This brings me to the question of the representation of the Palestinian people.

This problem of representation of the Palestinian people has been introduced into the general problem prematurely.

So there is nothing in our position incompatible with the Palestine Liberation Organization's wishes if it wants to participate in the current political talks at the Arab and international levels for the defence of the Palestinian cause and the rights of the Palestinian people and to speak on behalf of

²⁰³ Doc. 50 above.

²⁰⁴ Doc. 115 above.

that people, or if it wants, to join in the discussions at the Geneva conference.

The Liberation Organization alone decides for itself if the time has come for it to take part in the talks or if it should wait until it becomes clear what the prospects are and the course becomes clear.

But, brothers, with this positive and open minded course which we have been following, we cannot go so far as to accept that the Palestine Liberation Organization represents all the Palestinians who live in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and who have become citizens of the state and a large part of its people in the two banks, who have held Jordanian nationality and become organically absorbed in all aspects of life, in all departments and institutions. We cannot accept that the government of these citizens does not represent them and speak for them, is not entrusted with their cause and does not embody their hopes and aspirations, and that the Palestine Liberation Organization should do all this regardless of the authority and rights of the state.

Which of these citizens are to abandon their attachment to the state which they have helped to build up? Those Palestinians who crossed the river from west to east in 1924, when nationalities were allotted, and played their part in establishing the state? Or those who came as refugees in 1948 and chose to take up residence among their people and their brothers and founded, built, and raised the structure? Or those who left their homes in 1967, or were expelled by the arbitrary tyranny of the occupation? Or those citizens who live in the West Bank only, not the East Bank, or those Palestinians who hold Jordanian nationality but live outside the confines of the Hashemite Kingdom?

We also want to ask what reasons and motives lay behind the idea that the Palestine Liberation Organization should be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people? How was it that this new formula—"the sole legitimate representative"—was put forward at the sixth Arab summit conference at Algiers²⁰⁵ and was taken as a slogan to be raised at every international conference in order to obtain support? What is the object of putting forward this formula, especially after Jordan and other Arab countries had already

recognized the Liberation Organization as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, but not the sole representative?

It may be that our brother Arabs think at this summit conference that the Hashemite Kingdom cannot legitimately speak for the Palestinians who live under its protection, bear its nationality, and have become part of its institutions, nor defend the rights of this people, nor bear the responsibility for taking action to restore their usurped territory nor for freeing it of occupation and aggression. It may be that they think that only the Liberation Organization enjoys this legitimate right. If this is so, on behalf of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan I hold them alone responsible for their view and their decisions and all the consequences thereof, and I regard this as absolving us from the present fundamental political responsibility, and we shall leave it for history to pass judgement on this decision, should it be taken. In that case, brothers, it will be necessary for us to withdraw from participation in the Geneva conference and from all diplomatic or international action or activity we have taken part in as a result of our acceptance of Security Council resolutions nos. 242 and 338 and from all our duties and responsibilities arising therefrom. For in that case, as far as the conference and the political talks are concerned we will have no position recognized by our brother Arabs. In that case—and in any case—we shall maintain our national attitude to the cause of Palestine, which is the cause of the whole Arab nation.

But if the conference decides to maintain unity of effort, to integrate action and to coordinate attitudes, and to prepare to confront the coming stages with all our resources, then the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has planned the course it will follow in this field, which is based on the following principles:

1. Jordan will continue to work for full Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories and, first and foremost, Jerusalem. It rejects any peace that is not on this basis and on the basis of ensuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

2. Any territory recovered by Jordan, even through so-called disengagement, will be with the knowledge of the brother Arab parties to the confrontation, and Jordan believes that this should also apply to the other confrontation countries.

3. So that its attitude to the West Bank after

²⁰⁵ Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

liberation may be clear, Jordan hereby undertakes to leave the choice to the people of the West Bank, so that they may decide what status and future they want in full freedom and under neutral international supervision. Other than this, I do not think that it would be right for us to impose on the people of the West Bank a situation in which they have no say. And while not claiming the right to impose ourselves on them after liberation, we do not believe that others have the right to impose on them a situation they have not chosen and decided on themselves. We therefore give them our undertaking to respect their right to self-determination and we shall allow them to exercise this right when liberation is achieved.

4. We are surprised that it should be seriously proposed that the authority of the Palestine Liberation Organization should be established over any part of the West Bank that is recovered through disengagement, and we believe such a proposal to be quite unscientific and unrealistic.

5. Discussion of the future of the West Bank cannot be justified at present or before the West Bank is delivered from the hands of the occupier. The Jordanian government realizes that the greatest obstacle and the most intractable challenge it faces as regards the recovery of the West Bank and the restoration of Arab sovereignty over Jerusalem is Israel's well-known inflexibility, *via-à-vis* this point in particular, and her undisguised designs on this beloved portion of land. In its efforts to confront these difficulties and challenges the Jordanian government expects full and comprehensive Arab support to enable it to meet its responsibilities and to perform its role effectively and efficiently. It believes that its chances of success depend on the extent of Arab support it receives to this end. It is prepared to discuss seriously, effectively, continuously and with an open mind the coordination of action and efforts within this framework, and on this basis only, with Egypt, Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

6. In the light of the above, Jordan supports the Palestine Liberation Organization at all international gatherings in its defence of the rights and the cause of the Palestinian people, believing that such support is only natural in the service of the cause.

This, Your Majesties, Highnesses, and Excellencies, is our attitude, in which we set forth our

rights and obligations at the level of what we believe to be the right and scientific way of performing our common national duty as regards the armed Israeli aggression which has laid hands on our homes, our people, our rights and our holy places, and still has them in its clutches—an attitude which requires that we avoid all disputes and divisions, or we shall fail and be utterly lost.

If God permits us to follow this course of action, we shall proceed in obedience to Him and as He pleases. If you insist on what we believe to be inconsistent with our rights, our role and our responsibilities, and neutralize our capacities, we shall declare from this conference that this was your will and that it has been done.

From here I shall return to my country to plan, along with my people, our new course, in the light of the dictates of our living conscience and with God's help.

The Jordanian people will never in any circumstances allow their rights or their honour to be infringed by members of their own people, when they have such a shining example of patriotism, honour, self-sacrifice and martyrdom, nor will they allow their reputation to be defamed or damaged, or any action to be taken to weaken them when they have borne so much out of loyalty to their covenant and to the history of their struggle, and in maintaining their standards of chivalry and honour. Jordan's intrepid armed forces will never allow their history to be criticized or permit themselves to be turned aside from their aspirations.

Should this conference decide that the Palestine Liberation Organization is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and thus terminate Jordan's direct participation in political action and negotiation, despite its position, its rights, its efforts, despite its sacrifices and all it has done for this cause throughout history, and in spite of the situation in which it is now living, Jordan will nonetheless maintain its national position on behalf of this cause, its strength and its victory, that cause which it has had the honour to serve generation after generation, age after age, from the first Arab conquest until the modern Arab renaissance. Jordan will remain firmly stationed on the longest and most dangerous line, breathing the sweet scent of the Creed from the hills of Palestine and hearing the call to prayer from the minarets of the al-Aqsa Mosque.

I am sure that the great responsibility that each

of us bears at this esteemed conference requires that each of us define his attitude clearly, frankly and honestly in accordance with God's wishes and with the dictates of our conscience, and in response to the demands of generations.

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Resolution on Palestine adopted by the Seventh Arab Summit Conference²⁰⁶

Rabat, October 28, 1974

The Seventh Arab Summit Conference after exhaustive and detailed discussions conducted by their Majesties, Excellencies, and Highnesses, the Kings, Presidents and Amirs on the Arab situation in general and the Palestine problem in particular, within their national and international frameworks; and after hearing the statements submitted by His Majesty King Hussein, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and His Excellency Brother Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and after the statements of their Majesties and Excellencies the Kings and Presidents, in an atmosphere of candour and sincerity and full responsibility; and in view of the Arab leaders' appreciation of the joint national responsibility required of them at present for confronting aggression and performing duties of liberation, enjoined by the unity of the Arab cause and the unity of its struggle; and in view of the fact that all are aware of Zionist schemes still being made to eliminate the Palestinian existence and to obliterate the Palestinian national entity; and in view of the Arab leaders' belief in the necessity to frustrate these attempts and schemes and to counteract them by supporting and strengthening this Palestinian national entity, by providing all requirements to develop and increase its ability to ensure that the Palestinian people recover their rights in full; and by meeting responsibilities of close cooperation with its brothers within the framework of collective Arab commitment;

And in light of the victories achieved by Palestinian struggle in the confrontation with the Zionist enemy, at the Arab and international levels, at the United Nations, and of the obligation imposed

thereby to continue joint Arab action to develop and increase the scope of these victories; and having received the views of all on all the above, and having succeeded in cooling the differences between brethren within the framework of consolidating Arab solidarity, the Seventh Arab Summit Conference resolves the following:

1. To affirm the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to return to their homeland;

2. To affirm the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent national authority under the command of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in any Palestinian territory that is liberated. This authority, once it is established, shall enjoy the support of the Arab states in all fields and at all levels;

3. To support the Palestine Liberation Organization in the exercise of its responsibility at the national and international levels within the framework of Arab commitment;

4. To call on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Palestine Liberation Organization to devise a formula for the regulation of relations between them in the light of these decisions so as to ensure their implementation;

5. That all the Arab states undertake to defend Palestinian national unity and not to interfere in the internal affairs of Palestinian action.

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Speech by President Numairi of Sudan made at the closing session of the Seventh Arab Summit Conference (excerpt)²⁰⁷

Rabat, October 30, 1974

There can be no doubt, brother Kings and Presidents, that the firm decisions taken by our conference at this historic meeting will be a prominent landmark on the road leading to the realization of our hopes and aspirations.

Similarly, the full awareness of the requirements of this decisive stage in our struggle, not to

²⁰⁶ *Wafa* (Beirut), October 29, 1974; English translation, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), IV, 3 (Spring, 1975), pp. 177-178.

²⁰⁷ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ray al-Amm* (Kuwait), October 31, 1974.

mention the spirit of love, brotherhood, frankness and sincerity that has prevailed at our meeting, have made it easier to reach these results and decisions. They will ever be an inspiring source of satisfaction and an occasion for joy, though the road of liberation is long and hard and requires alertness and vigilance, greater cohesion and unity. In the light of these principles and ideals it is our duty to press forward along the road to the liberation of our country and our territories and to the resurgence of our people and our nation. It is the duty of all of us, brother Kings and Presidents, and others attending the conference, to abide by these principles and ideals. Our Palestinian brothers in particular who are the conscience of the nation should be a model and an example to all of us in all the principles we have committed ourselves to this year, and advocates of the victory of Palestine which has become an actual fact. Now so many states and international organizations have realized what we have been working for so long: that it is essential to recognize the legitimate entity of Palestine and its right to fulfil the responsibility required of it as a legitimate international entity. As such it has responsibilities which it must perform in conformity with its national and international responsibility to do its duty and abide by the law on all occasions and in all circumstances.

Brother Kings and Presidents and others attending this conference, it is my pleasure, while talking of the Palestine Liberation Organization as being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, to praise the lofty spirit of patriotism, of our brothers who are directly affected by our resolutions. Let me praise those devoted men and also the lofty spirit that inspired them and enabled the conference to remove obstacles that have impeded the course of the Arab struggle. They merit the thanks and esteem not only of individuals and conferences, but also of history and peoples.

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Statements by Prime Minister Sabah of Kuwait reviewing Kuwait's contribution to the Arab cause²⁰⁸

Kuwait, October 31, 1974

In implementation of its policy in the field of the unity of Arab ranks and of action to eliminate all secondary conflicts and differences so as to ensure that all efforts are devoted to dealing with the main problems and achieving common Arab goals, Kuwait has spared no effort to ensure constructive cooperation with the other Arab countries within the framework of close solidarity. With this end in view Kuwait took part in the Sixth Arab Summit Conference in Algeria²⁰⁹ and the Seventh Arab Summit Conference in Rabat.²¹⁰ It has made a point, both at these meetings and others, of fulfilling all its obligations as regards the requirements of the present critical stage of Arab struggle.

We are happy to be able to report that, with God's help, the Seventh Arab Summit Conference achieved great and extremely important results within the framework of the national goals which consolidate the Arab position in general and the cause of Palestine in particular. One of its most important and encouraging achievements was to put an end to the differences between brothers within the framework of reinforcing Arab solidarity and affirming the right of the Palestinian people to establish a national independent authority led by the Palestine Liberation Organization as being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in any Palestinian territory that is liberated.

Our meetings with our brother Arab Kings and Presidents and our visit to the Arab Republic of Egypt have had excellent results as regards consolidating Arab solidarity and surmounting the obstacles in the way of joint Arab action at this critical stage through which our Arab nation is passing.

²⁰⁸ Made in a speech opening the fifth session of the Kuwait National Assembly; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ray al-Amm* (Kuwait), November 1, 1974.

²⁰⁹ Doc. 332 in *International Documents on Palestine 1973*.

²¹⁰ Doc. 308 above.

Honourable members;

Arab oil was destined to emerge at the international level at the end of 1973 and the beginning of 1974, in a distinctive guise—that of a deterrent to be used against those who permit themselves to attack the Arab nation and to make a mock of all that is most sacred to that nation. Kuwait and its brother Arab oil countries exercised their legitimate right to employ all aspects of their economic strength to repel the aggression. We did this on the basis of the right of a non-combatant country to defend itself with all the means available to it, as affirmed by international custom and precedents. We shall not hesitate to resume all-out struggle with all elements of unified Arab strength in every form if the aggressor continues to delay and procrastinate and if the occupied Arab territories are not restored to their legitimate owners, and if the forces of injustice do not see the error of their ways.

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Press interview statements by King Hussein of Jordan reacting to the decision of the Arab summit conference regarding the PLO's position in the occupied territories²¹¹

Early November, 1974

Q. Many Arab heads of state reportedly told you privately before the summit that they believed only Jordan could obtain the return of the West Bank in negotiations with Israel. Then they went to Rabat and decided to turn responsibility for the West Bank over to the Palestine Liberation Organization. What happened?

A. It is the Arab conviction that a Palestinian entity is an imperative necessity. Israel has been doing its best to wipe out the very name of Palestine. The decision will compel Israel—if not today, sometime in the future—to recognize the Palestinian reality.

Q. And you decided to acquiesce?

A. There is an Arab verse which says, in effect, where my tribe goes, I go. I was able to present

my convictions to all responsible Arabs. As a part of the Arab nation, ever seeking its unity, I go with the general consensus—regardless of any previous feelings.

Q. But you often said you would never agree to prejudge the future of the West Bank without a referendum to allow the Palestinians living there to exercise their right of self-determination. Now, the PLO has the automatic right to take over any liberated part of the West Bank. What changed your mind?

A. We didn't change our mind. We have always said we would be willing to give our support to either option—our way, or the PLO way. The collective Arab will was to choose the PLO option. And we support it, regardless of the consequences. But there will be no change in our attitude toward all Palestinians on the West Bank. For as long as is needed, we shall honor our obligations to help them in every way.

Q. When the PLO forms a government-in-exile, as it is expected to do shortly, will it then become responsible for all the Jordanian civil servants who are working on the West Bank under Israeli occupation?

A. We will continue to support materially all of the people there as we have been doing throughout the occupation, and we will do so until our help is no longer required.

Q. Will you recognize a PLO government-in-exile?

A. We will do so without hesitation. We might even be the first.

Q. PLO representatives told me that Yasir Arafat, as head of this government, would like to make his first state visit to Amman. Would you have any objections?

A. Not at all. He is welcome to do so.

Q. Can I infer, then, that a reconciliation took place at the summit between you and Yasir Arafat?

A. Yes, it did.

Q. How will creation of a Palestinian government-in-exile affect the status of Palestinians now living in your country as Jordanian citizens?

A. All Jordanians of Palestinian origin will be given the choice of keeping their Jordanian nationality without jeopardizing their rights to their properties in Palestine when they are recovered, or the choice of opting for Palestinian nationality and continuing to live with us until it is possible for them to go home.

²¹¹ Partial text of the interview conducted by Arnaud de Borchgrave, *Newsweek* (International edition), November 11, 1974, pp. 32–33.

Q. Does Jordan now consider itself relieved of any further responsibility for the liberation of the West Bank?

A. If Israel refuses to negotiate with Jordan on the ground that whatever Palestinian territory is returned will be turned over to the PLO, then there won't be much we can do about it. An entirely new situation exists now.

Q. Does this new situation created by the Rabat summit constitute a step toward peace—or a step toward war?

A. Peace or war is entirely Israel's choice. If it chooses to continue the occupation of Arab territories taken by force and to ignore the need to meet the legitimate rights demanded by Palestinians in their homeland, then war is indeed inevitable. If, on the other hand, Israel opts for peace, then it must withdraw from all Arab territories occupied in June 1967 and accept the Palestinian reality.

Q. Under the circumstances, will you go to the Geneva peace conference if it is reconvened, and what will Jordan's role be there?

A. That's pretty academic at this point. A new fact has been introduced into the equation for peace in the Mideast. If Israel agrees to negotiate with Jordan on behalf of the PLO, why then shouldn't it negotiate directly with the PLO?

Q. What role, then, do you see for Jordan in all of this in the months just ahead?

A. Jordan remains a confrontation state on the longest front with Israel until a final, just settlement is achieved.

Q. After the October 1973 war, the three confrontation states (Egypt, Syria and Jordan) were ready to concede the existence of Israel as a permanent fixture in the Mideast in return for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories. What seems to have changed their minds, now that they are backing the PLO, which is dedicated to the dismantling of the Israeli state?

A. They haven't changed their minds. But if the momentum toward peace, which was generated by the U.S., does not pick up again quickly on the basis of complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, then the threat of war becomes very real.

Q. How do you see the future of Jordan without the West Bank?

A. Within the next three to four years, with our huge mineral resources and willpower, we will have an annual income of about \$1 billion. We will not only survive but, God willing, thrive.

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Statement by Foreign Minister Saqqaf of Saudi Arabia insisting on complete Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967²¹²

Riyad, November 6, 1974

It has been customary so far for the Secretary of State to start speaking and to give his impressions of his visit to our country. I feel it my pleasant obligation now to turn the tables on him and start expressing my appreciation for the Secretary's visit, if he agrees.

Dr. Kissinger's visit was a good one, a useful one; and it came at an appropriate time, following several activities in the Arab area. For instance, I would mention the Arab summit conference, which was a big conference. This was an international Arab summit conference pertaining to the Arabs, the heads of states, their countries, in which they discussed affairs of concern to their respective countries and also discussed world problems and problems of interest to the rest of the world. This was the nature of that Arab summit conference.

This conference was successful, constructive, and effective. It had nothing new that we demanded different from what was the case during the Algiers conference last year. The attitude we took in Algiers was still the same. Our conviction is still the same; namely, that the way followed by Dr. Kissinger is a way that would in the future realize the complete, expeditious Israeli withdrawal based on justice. We would never do without his efforts or those of the great country he represents.

Our two countries are friends—the United States of America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We insist on being friends. We insist on challenging or defying problems and surmounting them. We do not accept that the

²¹² Statement made at the departure of US Secretary of State Kissinger; *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXI, 1849 (December 2, 1974), pp. 758–759.

problems challenge us and beat us. That is why we wish all success to our friend Henry and his mission toward which he expended a lot of energy, a lot of intellect, and, what was more important, his having put to work without any restraint his deep convictions in bringing about justice.

Our policy is the same. We want to see complete withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the return of Arab Jerusalem to its people and the restoration of their legitimate rights to the Palestinian people. I have no new demands. This is what I said even before the Rabat conference. I am saying this and repeating it simply because we have no new demands.

There is another topic touched upon by my friend Dr. Kissinger; namely, that of oil. I repeat that the policy of my King and my government is still the same as it was; namely, to keep the prices as they are and to try to reach a reduction, albeit a symbolic reduction, or if we can, a greater reduction—and we would be doing this because of our awareness and of the welfare of humanity at large.

Finally, I greet our guests, the Secretary of State and the colleagues who came with him, and look forward to seeing him in the not too distant future when at least part of these problems we have been discussing will have been solved.

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Memorandum from Palestine resistance organizations to the President of the Palestine National Council on the need for holding a session to discuss the political line of the PLO command²¹³

Beirut, November 8, 1974

To the President of the Palestine National Council and the Chairman of the Central Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization:

Revolutionary greetings.

It is obvious that by the adoption of a wrong political line and by its unscientific interpretation of the developments and events that are being enacted on the stage of our Palestinian cause, which must inevitably lead to consequences of the

greatest gravity for the whole of our national struggle, the command of the Palestine Liberation Organization has deviated from the Palestinian National Pact, the political programme and all the resolutions adopted by our National Council at its successive sessions. It has also deviated from the basic principles of armed struggle. It has ignored the aspirations of our people and the values and goals for which the heroes of the Palestine revolution have laid down their lives, and for which thousands of individuals of our revolution have been cast into the prisons of the usurping enemy and malevolent reaction, which have long been engaged in conspiracies against our cause.

The time has come when everyone who sincerely believes in and is committed to the objectives and principles of our revolution must warn against the deviations which the command of the Liberation Organization is pursuing. Such a warning must be given in a sincere and genuine attempt to save our revolution from the dangerous error into which this command is drawing our cause, at the same time trying to distract attention from its moves by exaggerated claims of the so-called victories. It seems to believe that our people are unaware of the historical questions: "What next?", "Where are all these 'victories' leading?", "What results can be expected from them?", and "What will be the fate of our revolution after all this?"

We firmly believe that this command has fallen into the trap of surrenderist schemes and that, consciously or unconsciously, it is advancing to a situation which will lead to the disarming of our revolution, the abandoning of its objectives and its following a course that will end in the recognition of the Zionist enemy, his existence and his usurpation of the territory of our homeland, in the following manner:

1. It is following the course of the American-reactionary political settlement and helping to facilitate its implementation. This is clearly a deviation from the National Pact, the political programme and all the attitudes adopted by the revolution.

2. It is trying to come to terms and coordinate with the subservient reactionary regime in Jordan, jettisoning all the resolutions of the National Council calling for the overthrow of that regime and the establishment of a democratic nationalist regime in Jordan. For this it is ignoring the explicit

²¹³ Translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), November 16, 1974.

and unambiguous attitude of the Palestine revolution, which is based on a profound analysis of the reactionary and conspiratorial nature of the Jordanian regime. It absolves that regime of its responsibility for the deaths of our martyrs and its odious massacres of our people, whose effects are felt by our revolution to this day, as if the subservient Jordanian regime had suddenly become a friend of the revolution, with nothing on its conscience.

3. It is coordinating and cooperating with the reactionary and surrenderist Arab regimes, ignoring the fact that the long-term aims of these regimes are to cripple the revolution and its extensions among the masses and to deprive it of its arms, which are a threat to these regimes, impede their continued spoilation of the resources of their peoples and are an obstacle to the stability for which they are constantly striving with the aim of safeguarding their interests and maintaining their control over the destinies of their peoples.

4. At the international level its efforts are being directed to ensuring that the Palestine resistance may be ready to coexist with and recognize the usurping state, so that it may fall into the morass of international pacts and agreements that have been a fundamental factor in consolidating Israel's position in the territory of Palestine.

For all these reasons and many others, the most important of which, at the Palestinian level, is the PLO command's wrong and superficial treatment of the issue of Palestinian national unity. Such treatment has led and will continue to lead to the destruction of confidence between the different forces of the resistance, and between them and the masses of our people on the basis of the last paragraph approved by the National Assembly at its twelfth session.²¹⁴ This states that an extraordinary session of the National Council should be called in the case of developments affecting the destiny of our people, and inasmuch as the intention to form a Palestinian government in exile, that would be prepared to start negotiations with the enemy—under the surveillance of American imperialism, either in Geneva or elsewhere—is an extremely serious development, we request you to call on the National Council to hold an extraordinary session and propose:

1. That the Council should meet not later than

the end of November.

2. That the extraordinary session should be held either in Algeria, Iraq, Libya or Democratic Yemen.

We hope that the President of the National Assembly will appreciate the importance of this request and realize how true and important are the issues we have put forward in our memorandum. We hope that, consequently, he will come to a speedy decision on convening the council at the time and in the place we have proposed.

Revolution until victory for the full liberation of the territory of Palestine. Carry on the struggle. [Signed:]

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
The Arab Liberation Front
The Popular Front—General Command
The Palestine Popular Struggle Front

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Press interview statements by Prime Minister Muhammad Hasani of South Yemen on his government's attitude to the Palestine problem²¹⁵

Beirut, mid-November, 1974

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Q. Democratic Yemen is well known for its resolute attitude to the cause of the Palestinian people. What is your appraisal of the stage through which the Palestine resistance movement is now passing?

A. In recent years the Palestine resistance movement has been confronted with vicious conspiracies on the part of the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary alliance. As events have shown, these conspiracies have been aimed at massacring the Palestine revolution, after which the expulsion of the Palestinian people would be a *fait accompli*. But the way the Palestine revolution has held out and its heroic resistance to the Zionist enemy and to the liquidationist conspiracies directed against it have proved that the will of the Palestinian people is invincible. From this the Palestine revolution has obtained increasing solidarity and support at the Arab and international levels, as against the growing isolation of the Zionist enemy.

²¹⁵ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), November 16, 1974.

²¹⁴ Doc. 246 above.

Democratic Yemen's firm attitude to the cause of the Palestine revolution is based on principles. We shall never abandon it. We regard support for the struggle of the Palestinian people with all available material and political resources as being a revolutionary duty which we must discharge until the Palestine revolution fully attains its goals. The relationship between the Palestine revolution and the revolution in Democratic Yemen is based on a common struggle which is the embodiment of the unity of the objectives and principles for which we are struggling. It is now certain that the victory of Democratic Yemen has had a positive effect on the whole of all national liberation movements and, likewise, the victory of the Palestine revolution and the consolidation of positions mean, in the final analysis, the strengthening of the positions of the revolution in Democratic Yemen and of the forces of revolution everywhere.

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Press interview statements by Deputy Prime Minister Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia discussing oil as a factor in the current Middle East situation²¹⁶

Riyad, November 13, 1974

Q. You would thus become the bankers of the world. Your power would go far beyond the oil weapon.

A. We have always thought that oil, for the Arab cause, is a much more efficient instrument when it flows freely onto the consumer market than if deliveries were stopped. We refuse to see things only in their negative aspect. Energy and the industries using oil derivatives are too important for the world economy to be treated carelessly. We have never seen the US, which possesses nuclear weapons, brandish them on any occasion.

Q. Is it true that Saudi Arabia promised the US that the price of oil would be lowered if Israel evacuated the occupied territories?

A. We have made no such promise. But, I believe that if Israel evacuated these territories, all would go better. It is undeniable, for example, that a solution to the Middle East problem would allow the Arab countries to reduce their military budgets, and it would thus be easier to envision a lowering of the price of oil.

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Statement issued by the Foreign Ministry of Syria accusing Israel of using its propaganda campaign to disguise preparations for military aggression²¹⁷

Damascus, November 16, 1974

In the last few days, and in particular within the last 24 hours, Israel has been escalating its tendentious campaign against Syria with the aim of misleading world public opinion and concealing its real intentions from it. By means of all this uproar it wants to cover up an aggression which it is preparing against Syria under the pretext that Syria is preparing for a military action against it. At the same time, Israel seeks to distract its citizens from domestic problems by diverting their attention to an alleged danger.

By disclosing to world public opinion the truth behind the aggressive aims of the Israeli campaign, the Arab Republic of Syria wants to clarify its commitment to the cease-fire and to assert at the same time that it will strongly and firmly repel any aggression to which it might be subjected by Israel.

²¹⁶ Excerpted and translated from the interview conducted by Jean-Jacques Faust, *L'Express* (Paris), November 18-24, 1974, p. 31.

²¹⁷ Broadcast on Damascus radio in Arabic; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/4758/A/2; reprinted by permission.

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Statement by the PFLP on its attitude to the submission of the Palestine problem to the United Nations (excerpt)²¹⁸

Mid-November, 1974

The "national authority," the "right to self-determination," "submitting the problem to the United Nations," a "government-in-exile" and other such proposals are being made by the command of the Palestine Liberation Organization to disguise its real intentions. These proposals are being exploited to deceive, confuse and mislead the masses with the object of pushing through the liquidationist conspiracy and of covering the surrender, deviation and treason of certain Arab regimes.

A "national authority" is not something to be begged for either from the Geneva conference, or at the feet of Kissinger or from the tribunal of the United Nations General Assembly.

The "right to self-determination" is not something for which to beg, either from the subservient Jordanian regime at the Rabat summit, or from Rabin and Peres, or from the Israeli Knesset.

The "submission of the problem to the United Nations" and the "formation of a government-in-exile" can only take place when the revolution has imposed its will and is on the point of victory, only when the balance of forces is in its favour, and not in favour of its enemies, as is the case at present.

The "submission of the problem to the United Nations" and the "formation of a government-in-exile" can only take place when the Palestinian people have a revolutionary leadership like the Vietnamese leadership; one that mobilizes, organizes, trains and arms the people and engages in long-term popular armed struggle under the leadership of a unified national front that neither bargains nor hesitates, that is inflexible and does not surrender, a leadership that believes in the people and their ability to win victory and relies on the people rather than on Kissinger's "jet" diplomacy.

An arrangement of the operation of submitting the Palestine problem to the United Nations

will make it perfectly obvious that its aim is to "fabricate" a resolution that will qualify the Palestine Liberation Organization, or the government-in-exile formed by it, to attend the Geneva conference which is to be held on the basis of resolution 242 which is rejected by the Liberation Organization and accepted by Israel and the Arab regimes. It is a resolution on the basis of which Israel can accept the government-in-exile as an acceptable party to the Geneva conference.

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Letter sent by King Hussein of Jordan to Prime Minister Rifai calling on him to reorganize the government (excerpts)²¹⁹

Amman, November 23, 1974

We in this country, both before and after the two banks were unified, have never been concerned as to whether we are Jordanians or Palestinians. Our sole concern has been, and will always be, that we should all belong to our country and to Palestine. The Palestinian was the first victim of the Zionist conspiracy against the Arab world. The Jordanian has been the closest brother to the victim and the most intimately connected with him and the most prepared to sacrifice himself on his behalf.

When circumstances arise which require a reappraisal of our situation in the light of new premises, it is our duty to ensure that every step we take is taken with a view to achieving further gains for our common cause and to providing greater chances for the victory and triumph of our common course.

Since the Rabat Arab summit conference²²⁰ not only the people and the homeland have had the right to expect that we should reorganize the Jordanian family; it is also the right of our common destiny and our interlinked and inseparable interests, the right of our national mission and of the lofty goals of our Arab nation. All this requires that we should be part of the wider

²¹⁸ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), November 23, 1974.

²¹⁹ Translated and excerpted from the Arabic text, *al-Dustur* (Amman), November 24, 1974.

²²⁰ Doc. 308 above.

framework within which such reorganization is carried out. Building the Palestinian personality and establishing the Palestinian entity and the firm establishment of the Palestinian identity through the Palestinian national authority did not and never should mean at any time, anywhere, to anyone, the obliteration of the brotherhood existing between the two peoples. If the political unity of the two banks has been affected by the course of events determined by the Arab path, the unity of blood and destiny that unites the two peoples is the eternally established fact that can only be made stronger, firmer and more solid by the course of events.

Therefore reorganization is intended to give the resolution of the seventh Arab summit conference held in Rabat its significance, to embody our acceptance of the resolution and to translate our positive attitude to it into tangible facts.

6. We are part of the Arab nation and we work with it on behalf of its interests. We struggle with it on behalf of its strength, and our strength is 'its strength in all its parts. Therefore all moves we make at the Arab level are determined by the following principles:

a) Full support for the people of Palestine and for their legitimate representatives in their efforts at the national and international levels to recover the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people within the framework of general Arab commitment.

b) Absolute support for Arab struggle to recover the Arab territory and to liberate it from the yoke of Israeli occupation and from the clutches of aggression. Especially in this field we stand truly and courageously by our brothers in the other confrontation countries, making available resources that our circumstances permit and that our position requires of us.

c) Continued coordination and cooperation with all our Arab brothers and the reinforcement of joint Arab action in every field.

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Press interview statements by General Secretary Muhsin of Saiqa discussing possible developments after the Arab summit conference in Rabat²²¹

Late November, 1974

Q. The Rabat summit decided upon the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Does this imply that the PLO is giving up all its claims to other territories?

A. The decision does not specify the West Bank and Gaza Strip; it rather refers to the creation of a Palestinian state on *all* the liberated territories. Perhaps the West Bank and Gaza will be liberated before Haifa, or perhaps not. Important is only the fact that no other state establishes its sovereignty on the liberated territories but that sovereignty is immediately transferred to us. For a Palestinian to give up his claim is unthinkable. The minimum that should be given to us is a state as it was envisaged by the 1947 UN resolution. In the long run, however, peace and security can only be assured in the establishment of a democratic state in Palestine. A state in which Jews, Christians and Muslims will live together on basis of equality.

This would be the best precondition for cooperation in the whole region. The fact that the PLO succeeded in Rabat was a first step on the way to a solution of the problem.

Q. All the world regards Yasir Arafat as the leader of the Palestinian people. Was he elected by the people?

A. In no revolution were the leaders elected in prior parliamentary elections. The leadership is legitimized through its ability to win the revolutionary support of the people. The Yugoslav people did not elect Tito during its struggle for national liberation. Remember Vietnam or Ben Bella's role in Algeria. The leadership comes from the people; Yasir Arafat and Zuhair Muhsin cannot dictate to the people. Because we only represent the interests of our people and therefore it rejects any other leadership than the PLO.

²²¹ Excerpted and translated from the German text of the interview conducted by Claus Happel, *Quick* (Munich), November 28, 1974, pp. 24-25.

Q. Which political line will this Palestinian state have? People claim that hundreds of Palestinians are trained in Moscow. Will this state be pro-Soviet?

A. The problem is not whether we are pro-Moscow or pro-Peking. For us the question is, where can we train our cadres politically, militarily and technically. The Soviet Union gives us this opportunity, the others not. We would be ready to send our people to any country that offers us the opportunity. This state will not be pro-American, pro-Soviet or pro-China but an Arab state dedicated to the liberation and future of the Arabs. It is only natural that we cannot treat countries that help us in the same way as those that aid our enemies. We would prefer to maintain friendly relations with all peoples if they are based on reciprocity. The extreme nature of the USA's fight against our people and its rights can only lead to a deepening of our friendship with the Soviet Union and all other enemies of the USA.

Q. If such a state is formed on the West Bank and Gaza, what kind of a relationship will it maintain to Jordan and Israel?

I. Concerning its relations to Jordan, we already had preliminary talks with Jordan at the Rabat meeting. There the PLO suggested an economic federation. These talks are being continued by the Quadripartite Commission of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the PLO. Israel will only be recognized after it has implemented the 1974 UN resolution. Our policy regarding Israel will naturally be part of Arab policy. In the long run I believe that the Arabs will always talk to Israel with one voice. Again back to Jordan: the relations will be closer for the simple reason that many Palestinians live there and because of our economic interdependence. Naturally our relations will improve if the political system in Jordan is changed.

Q. Will King Hussein and the PLO work together?

A. This all depends on King Hussein, how seriously he implements the decision of Rabat and if he fulfils his agreements with the PLO. For sure, it also depends on how King Hussein cooperates with the other Arab states against the common enemy, Israel.

Q. Do you believe that after Rabat a peaceful solution is further off and that another war is imminent?

A. It seems to me that this is the general im-

pression. But I do not believe that it depends on Rabat. War and peace depend on the evacuation by Israel of all the occupied territories and Israel's willingness to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people. Therefore, the prospects for peace are dim. Unless of course, a prophet descended on the USA who would get America to pressure Israel to recognize realities. At least the USA would have to stop its arms deliveries.

Q. How do you view the following problem: Even after the creation of a Palestinian state hundreds of thousands of Palestinians will remain in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and other countries. Do you regard their return as a necessity? How do you imagine future relationship with them?

A. In principle their return is a necessity. But since not all will find a place in the new state, many will have to remain for the time being where they are. From there they must insist on their rights. Israel denies them the right. One of our main tasks will be to aid them in gaining their rights.

We do not want to force anyone to return. The relationship of these people to the new state will be just as good as that to the PLO.

Q. Will the new state maintain friendly relations to the Federal Republic of Germany? Or do you regard the Federal Republic of Germany as pro-Israel?

A. This all depends on the Federal Republic of Germany and not on us. If the Federal Republic of Germany extends us its hand and if it does not maintain special relations with Israel, then I foresee no difficulties. I think the Federal Republic of Germany is able to assess its own interests in the Near East. I believe it is in the interest of your country not to aid the Zionists but to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people. We regard it as a positive step that the Federal Republic of Germany in the UN did not cast its vote on the side of Israel and the US imperialists.

Q. Airplane hijacking and operations in foreign countries have during the last years brought the Palestinians into the headlines of the world press. By these operations they have achieved two things:

1. The world now knows about a Palestinian people fighting for its rights.

2. Many people regard the Palestinians as murderous terrorists.

Do you want to and are you able to do away with such operations?

A. If airplane hijackings really drew the public's attention to the Palestine problem, then we have to reconsider this. But, from the beginning we were against operations that were directed against civilians. The existence of the Palestine problem was not manifested through airplane hijacking, but through four wars. The phase in which we had to publicize our cause is behind us. Our problem will again be brought before the UN. But now we can count on more than 105 states that will vote for us. By the way, it is now over a year since airplanes were hijacked by Palestinians. Now that the operations are stopped in foreign countries, those against Israel can be intensified.

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Statement issued by the Bir Zeit College Faculty Association appealing for solidarity with institutions in the West Bank and protesting "arbitrary actions" of the Israeli occupation authorities, with the reply of the Israeli authorities²²²

Bir Zeit, November 28, 1974

The news media have carried details of the recent waves of civil disobedience by institutions and large segments of the population in the Israeli-Occupied Arab territories. These expressions of support for Palestinian self-determination took place during the U.N. General Assembly debate on the Palestine issue.²²³ We would like to clarify the impact of these events on Birzeit College, one of the highest academic institutions in the West Bank.

Members of Birzeit College and other educational institutions participated in the popular outbursts in the second half of November (1974). These protests were intensified as a result of the killing of two students (from Jenin and Nablus) by Israeli soldiers during these demonstrations. Following the death of the students, the repressive measures initiated by the military authorities reached a new peak with the deportations of Prof. Hanna Nasir, the College President, and Dr. Alfred Toubassi, member of the College Board of

Trustees and chairman of the West Bank Dental Association, and three other residents of the West Bank. In the wake of the deportations, troops of the Israeli army attempted several times to provoke College faculty members and students who were participating in peaceful marches and sit-ins to protest illegal and irrational Israeli actions. Finally the occupation army forcibly entered the college campus grounds, a grave violation of academic sanctity. Consequently, an atmosphere of confrontation and intimidation prevailed which disrupted normal academic activities for several days.

This is the second time, within one year, that the military occupation authorities have resorted to such tactics; in both instances using Birzeit College as a scapegoat to rationalize its own inability to control the political situation in the occupied territories.

We call upon you to voice your solidarity with Birzeit College and other institutions in the West Bank during this critical period, and to protest against the arbitrary actions of the military government. These actions include: armed assaults on students, indiscriminate arrests of civilians and the levying of excessive fines and/or long prison sentences, "administrative detention" without trial for long periods, and above all the *Deportation of West Bank Citizens* outside their country, an act which violates all recognized international agreements. We urge you to act to ensure the return of the deportees and to bring about the cessation of similar illegal and inhumane measures.

We call upon you as individuals and representatives of a significant portion of Israeli society, to raise your voice against all acts of national oppression and undemocratic practices being carried out against Arab citizens and educational establishments. These policies impede the initiation of a dialogue aimed at mutual understanding and retard the instituting of a just peace safeguarding the rights of all people of the area.

Bir Zeit College Faculty Association

APPENDIX

Reply by the West Bank Military Authorities

1. Beirzeit College is known as a college which, on different occasions in the past, has transgressed the law by disturbing public order and harming the security in the area. Their anti-Israeli propaganda is very strong. The teachers and students identify completely with the terrorist organiza-

²²² English text, *New Outlook* (Tel Aviv), XVIII, 1, January 1975, pp. 50-52.

²²³ Docs. 9 to 18 above.

tions and give full expression to this identification.

2. The college was a center for strikes and other activities which disrupted order and threatened security.

3. Because of those activities the College was closed one year ago, on the 15th of December 1973, and reopened two weeks later, when its directors pledged that henceforth the students would engage only in curricular activities and that the College and its students would not participate in any activity against law and order.

4. In November 1974 the students of the College started a series of strikes inside and outside the College. Most of the manifestations were violent and included, among other things, attacking with stones the security men and building stone-barricades on roads outside the College area.

5. The College was the element that started demonstrations, strikes and disturbances of public order, and caused other schools in Beirzeit and Ramalla to join in.

6. The director of the college, Dr. Hanna Nassir, was expelled from the area for having organized and directed strikes and demonstrations in the College.

7. Dr. Alfred Toubassi, the second man expelled, was a member of the leadership of the PLO in the Ramalla area and was named leader of this organization in Judea and Samaria. Dr. Toubassi signed a petition asking for the recognition of the PLO as the only organization representing the Palestinians in the territories. Dr. Toubassi was one of the men who incited others to disturb public order and to strike in Ramalla.

8. The expulsion of Dr. Nassir and Dr. Toubassi was in the framework of duties of the military government, to preserve order, observance of the law and security, and to permit normal living conditions in the area of Judea and Samaria.

9. During the manifestations and violent demonstrations that took place in the College, the military government asked the direction of the College to restore peace and order in the institution. Since the direction did not do it, and with the worsening of the violent behavior, the security forces had to enter the College yard, but they were confronted with violent antagonism on the part of the students.

10. Beirzeit College has no academic immunity and the municipality will not allow the institution to serve as a center of ferment, disturbance of

order, and participation in the actions of terrorist organizations.

11. In the College's declaration appear some claims and accusations which are completely senseless. For example, it is written there that the demonstrations started as a result of the killing of 2 girl-students of Shechem and Jenin by soldiers. In reality, the student from Jenin was killed by stones thrown by the demonstrators themselves and the student from Shechem was hurt in a road accident several days before the start of the demonstrations and died of her injuries at the end of the demonstrations.

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Press interview statements by permanent UNESCO delegate Wakil of Egypt explaining the recent UNESCO resolutions regarding Israel²²⁴

Beirut, early December, 1974

Q. Why has Israel been expelled from Unesco? Could you explain the reasons for its expulsion? And what is the detailed background of the resolutions adopted with regard to it?

A. In fact Israel has not been expelled from Unesco at all. The word "expulsion" does not appear in any of the resolutions adopted by the General Conference of Unesco. Israel implies that it has been expelled from Unesco because of two resolutions adopted by the Eighteenth General Conference held in Paris in October and November 1974. I should like to explain the significance of these resolutions and why they were adopted, for neither of them involves the "expulsion" of Israel. Both, however, were adopted in accordance with the powers granted to the General Conference by virtue of the Charter of Unesco and in conformity with the general principles of international law.

Q. I think that the first resolution relates to the city of Jerusalem.

A. Yes, the first resolution concerns Jerusalem and its protection against disfiguration. The Seventeenth General Conference of 1972 adopted

²²⁴ Interview conducted by Hisham Sharabi, *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Beirut), IV, 2, pp. 3-11; for the resolutions in question see docs. 39 and 40 above.

a resolution calling on Israel to stop changing the historical character of the city of Jerusalem and to refrain from carrying out any excavations in it.²²⁵ Since this resolution was adopted the Director General has been requested either to visit Jerusalem himself or to send a representative, and to ensure that Unesco has a regular presence in the city to supervise the implementation of this resolution. But Israel has continued to carry out its excavations and to change the historical character of Jerusalem. The Executive Council of Unesco kept an eye on these infringements and again condemned Israel, at its ninety-fourth session in the spring of 1974, for continuing to violate the Charter of Unesco and to infringe the resolutions of the General Conference, and referred the matter to the Eighteenth General Conference.

To all this must be added the series of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations utterly denying Israel's right to change the face not only of Jerusalem but of all the occupied territories.

Q. What resolutions are these?

A. There is a whole series of resolutions, the latest and most important of which is No. 3092 of December 7, 1973, which states that the General Assembly "reaffirms that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition and institutional structure of the status of the occupied territories or any part thereof are null and void," and the following section, which is the most important:

Calls upon all states, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories and to avoid actions, including actions in the field of aid, which might be used by Israel in its pursuit of the policies and practices referred to in the present resolution.

This means that the United Nations General Assembly explicitly calls on member states, international organizations and specialized agencies, including Unesco, not to recognize any change carried out by Israel in any occupied city or territory and calls on these states to avoid any action, including actions in the field of aid to Israel, which might enable her to continue what she is doing. Thus the Constitution of Unesco, the resolutions of the General Conference of Unesco,

the resolutions of the Executive Council of Unesco, and the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, all censure and condemn the attitude and actions of Israel in the city of Jerusalem. This attitude is also a violation of The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflicts which in no way permits any state that has occupied territory in a state of armed conflict to carry out excavations therein.

Q. Exactly what changes has Israel made in Jerusalem?

A. On the admission of its delegate to the last General Conference, Israel is still carrying out excavations. The representative of the Director General of Unesco, Professor Lemaire of the University of Louvain, an expert on antiquities and excavations, says of the excavations that Israel is carrying out that some of them are "technically sound" while others are "endangering certain sites." Of course, the real issue is that it is illegal for Israel to make encroachments on the cultural property of other countries at all, let alone damage parts of it, and the question addressed to the Director General of Unesco—and thus his representative—was specific: Has Israel refrained from carrying out excavations? Of course, it has not.

As far as the excavations and changes themselves are concerned, the focus is on several actions of Israel in Jerusalem. Its excavations in the Aqsa Mosque area have endangered the Aqsa Mosque itself. It has bulldozed about 600 buildings in Jerusalem, including religious endowments and mosques; it has erected hundreds of buildings on confiscated Arab land and has a plan to build 35,000 new housing units around the city. All this is wholly destructive of the traditional character of Jerusalem. In an article published by *Le Monde* on the day the General Conference was discussing the case of Jerusalem, M. Rene Maheu, former Director General of Unesco, stated that:

The changes which have taken place since 1967 in the appearance and atmosphere of the city are very grave. If this process were to continue, the character of Jerusalem, its unique charm, and the extraordinary physical splendour of its spirituality, would all undoubtedly be condemned to quick extinction.²²⁶

²²⁵ Doc. 21 in *International Documents on Palestine 1972*.

²²⁶ *Le Monde*, November 21, 1974 [orig. note].

The changes and modifications that are now taking place in Jerusalem threaten the historic appearance and the beauty of the city. That is to say, by the admission of the former Director General, the authentic historical character of the city of Jerusalem, the Jerusalem of the whole world, the Jerusalem of the whole of humanity, is vanishing.

Q. Because of the excavations?

A. Because of the excavations and because of what Israel is doing in the city.

It was agreed by a majority of the delegates at the General Conference of Unesco, including those of certain friendly European countries, that the matter required more than a repetition of the resolutions condemning Israel, and that a permanent international commission should be formed at the highest level to say in Jerusalem to prevent Israel from carrying out excavations and continuing to change the character of the city. It was agreed by the Conference, except for a small minority, that Israel was guilty and that she was still defying the resolutions of the General Conference of Unesco and the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, so that the only course open to us was to demand that new measures be taken. We therefore demanded that all financial aid to Israel in the field of education, science and culture be stopped, until such time as she obeyed the resolutions of the General Conference. Here I should like to point out that during the debate I made it clear that this resolution was a temporary measure, meaning that it would lapse when Israel stopped its excavations and the action it was taking to change the character of Jerusalem. Thus the measure can in no way be said to amount to the expulsion of Israel. Israel still takes part in the General Conference, is still a member of Unesco and still exercises her right to vote and to debate, like any other member of Unesco.

Q. Why then this strong reaction from Israel and its friends if it is merely a temporary and limited measure?

A. This is an important question. In my opinion there are a variety of reasons for Israel's reaction. Firstly, although it was adopted within the framework of a scientific and cultural organization like Unesco, this resolution does have political dimensions, which cannot be ignored, concerning Israel and her international isolation. Here let me stop

and say that one of the nonsensical allegations that has been made is that Unesco has deviated from its goals, that it has become immersed in political activities and that the Organization is on the way to being "politicized." No one can prevent any international organization from adopting attitudes that are within the limits of its powers even if such attitudes do have political repercussions. In my opinion what annoyed Israel was the fact that world public opinion's insistence on denying Israel's right to do what she is doing in Jerusalem has a political significance. The world will not accept Israel's claim that Jerusalem is her capital. Through the resolutions of the international organization, adopted with such a large majority, it is telling Israel that it is only an occupying power in the territory it is occupying, and that it is not entitled to do what it is doing now. As I said in the debate of the General Conference, Israel is dealing with Jerusalem as someone who doesn't own something deals with a thing that he does own. This is something fundamental, because as we all know, by a unilateral decision Israel has declared the whole of Jerusalem as her capital. The Hebrew University has published an atlas called "Atlas of Jerusalem" which contains plans of the Jerusalem of the distant future. Therefore, when world public opinion, time and time again and in one resolution after another, tries, through the international organizations, to prevent Israel from doing these things in Jerusalem, Israel resents it and attempts to create a stir about it.

So much for the first reason. The second is that the Eighteenth General Conference of Unesco accepted the Palestine Liberation Organization as an observer member and adopted other resolutions to the effect that Unesco should be granted facilities to supervise all aspects of educational affairs in the occupied areas, that peace must be made and racialism abolished. The General Conference also expressed the hope that in the near future it would see Palestine a member of the international community and of the international organizations. All these resolutions have made Israel resentful and bitter so that it is distorting them and using certain sections of the press to feed the world the old traditional tune—to the effect that the Arabs are trying to destroy Israel and so on. We thus find Israel and her allies making every effort to create the impression

that Unesco has deviated from its goals and that the international organizations are no longer performing their true mission. Israel has started something new by saying that the Arabs can get any resolution adopted because they can get an "automatic majority." What does this automatic majority mean? All international organizations act in accordance with the democratic principle of the majority in voting. In 1947 there were not many members of the United Nations and many of the countries that are now members were still colonies. Israel came into existence under the auspices of this minority and under the control of the forces that ruled the United Nations. But now that the United Nations and the international organizations represent all the peoples of the world and express the will of the whole world, and the previously colonized countries are a majority, I say that the resolutions adopted by the United Nations and its affiliated organizations are the true expression of the will of the international community. This, of course, does not please Israel or certain other states.

Q. As regards this "automatic majority," could you give us an idea of which way voting went at the last meeting of Unesco?

A. The resolution on Jerusalem was adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the states that voted—64 in favour, 25 against, the remainder abstaining. Let us consider the significance of this ratio. The majority represented the Arab states, the great majority of the African states, the group of the socialist states and a large group of the Asian and Islamic states. The states that abstained would in fact have been prepared to condemn Israel had the resolution been a matter of condemnation only, but they abstained because, for political reasons, of course, they were reluctant to adopt an attitude as regards the stopping of aid to Israel. Every state is free to take what political stand it likes in an international organization.

On the other hand, some of the states that voted against the resolution were not voting against condemnation, but against the idea of stopping aid to Israel. The point of view of some of these states was that Israel should be given another chance. Take some of the friendly European delegations, for example; they were in full agreement that Israel's attitude should be condemned,

but hoped that the resolution, which they regarded as too strong, would not be adopted, and that Israel would be given another chance. My reply to this was that to give Israel another chance would be a waste of time, as the issue had been before Unesco since 1967 without anything being achieved. So far large numbers of resolutions have been, are being and will be adopted by the United Nations and Unesco without Israel paying any attention to them.

Q. How far has Israel succeeded in establishing the picture that suits it in world public opinion?

A. Unfortunately, at the information level, it has succeeded in giving certain sections of the world press and political and intellectual circles this impression. Within the framework of Unesco itself, and among the member states, Israel has of course failed. Moreover, Israel's information success is linked to a corresponding Arab failure at the level of the world press to explain and interpret the true position—that is, to make world opinion understand that the resolutions adopted on Israel have been in implementation of international law and the result of Israel's persistent violation of the international organizations and defiance of all their resolutions.

Q. How do you explain the attitude of the American Congress, which has decided to withdraw the financial aid provided by the United States to Unesco?

A. This is indeed a regrettable attitude. In fact I saw what was going to happen during the General Conference. We have of course become accustomed to the way America uses the financial weapon to impose its will on international organizations. As regards Unesco's budget, America has always opposed its being raised, and threatened that, if it were, she would not be able to contribute to it. These were mere threats that were never carried out. But what amazed me during the last General Conference was the American delegation's affirmation that Congress might adopt a negative attitude to Unesco if it adopted its resolution on Israel. This amazes me. I ask myself if it is permissible that a state should impose a financial penalty on an international organization of which it is a member? Unfortunately I believe that it was not an expression of the will of the American government, but the result of submission to groups that, as we know, exert pressure in Congress.

Q. What do you think of the letter written by Sartre and a group of French intellectuals on this subject?

A. As you know, I have no wish to attack these writers who have undeniable weight and influence in the world. But unfortunately I feel that they have always rightly or wrongly been willing to place their signatures at the disposal of Israel at periods when Israel wishes to arouse the sympathy of the world. What I would like these thinkers to do is to examine themselves, to study the resolutions of Unesco and demonstrate or explain to us why Israel has been condemned.

This question brings me to the other resolution that I referred to at the start of this interview. I mean the General Conference's rejection of Israel's request to be attached to Europe for purposes of regional activity and European regional meetings, because Israel is not a European country. Israel then made a terrible fuss and said that this was depriving a member of the exercise of a fundamental right and consequently amounted, as the Israeli representative said, to expelling Israel from the international organization.

Here I should like to ask: Where has Israel been all these years, for this is the first time it has asked to be attached to Europe? Does it mean that for all these years during which Israel has not been taking part in European activities, it has been expelled from Unesco? Moreover, the criterion of attachment to regional activities has not yet been agreed on by the member states of Unesco. For example, at this year's Conference France objected to the United States and Canada being attached to the European area. But no one said that in so objecting France was proposing that the United States or Canada should be expelled from Unesco. China, too, for political reasons, rejected the USSR's request to be attached to the area of Asia. Thus there is no established procedure, and just as some countries objected to Israel being attached to Europe, so there were objections to other countries being attached to the area of Europe and the area of Asia.

To make things clearer, the Arab view of the question is that as long as the present situation in the Middle East continues we cannot agree to Israel being attached to our area. As for the area of Europe Israel conforms neither with the geographical nor the cultural criteria, and in view of this Israel's situation will continue to be linked

to its anomalous political situation and to the fact that no just peace has been made in the Middle East area, and Israel will remain in this situation until the basic political problems of the area are solved.

Q. In what circumstances would Unesco revoke its decisions on stopping aid to Israel? That is to say, what must Israel do for Unesco to revoke its decisions?

A. The resolution on Jerusalem is perfectly clear. It calls for a Unesco presence in Jerusalem so that Unesco may see for itself what is going on in the occupied city and may keep an eye on Israel's attitude to the excavations and the other activities for which she was condemned. If in the future the Director General of Unesco submits a report to the Executive Council and the General Conference saying that Israel has ceased changing the historical character of the city and ceased the excavations, the resolution stopping Unesco aid to Israel will automatically lapse.

Q. Israel says that the sums cut off from her by Unesco are less than the funds she contributes to Unesco.

A. In fact we are not at all interested in these sums because it is not a material question; it is an issue of moral significance inasmuch as it makes world opinion aware that if a member state of an international organization defies the resolutions of that organization, measures must be taken against it to make it change its attitude. It is true that Israel receives \$24,000 from Unesco but that is not the point. It may receive many times that amount from elsewhere. As we all know, it is not a question of money.

Q. The press attitude at present in Europe, and especially in America, is that Israel must be brought back into the fold of Unesco or else Unesco itself may collapse and split.

A. Is it reasonable to believe that Unesco is going to split and collapse because measures are taken by a majority of its member states against a state that has defied the resolutions of its General Conference? I repeat, it is the attitude of the United States that is so regrettable. Europe's attitude has been very moderate, for in fact it is convinced that Israel is performing illegal acts in Jerusalem, even though it has hesitated to join in the resolution. But the United States has rejected the whole resolution and said that it is not permissible for Unesco to adopt it. Yet in adopting

this resolution Unesco was acting entirely within the powers granted it to enable it to protect the world's cultural heritage, which is Unesco's *raison d'être*.

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Press interview statements by Prime Minister Rifai of Jordan discussing Jordan's position after its acceptance of the Arab summit conference decisions²¹⁷

Amman, December 6, 1974

Q. Jordan appears to have applied the Rabat Summit decision in some of its recent measures—like the recently formed Jordanian cabinet and senate, in which Palestinian representation is minimal.²²⁸ Would you explain?

A. In keeping with the decision made at the Rabat Summit Conference in relation to the West Bank, the Jordanian government had to take certain measures to indicate its acceptance of that decision and its determination to implement it, give it substance.

The new reality after Rabat is that the West Bank is not part of Jordan anymore, although Jordan will continue to subsidize the West Bank and maintain its previous level of financial, administrative and other commitments to it.

It thus became necessary to dissolve Parliament, because 50 percent of that body's members represented West Bank constituencies. The new cabinet that was formed recently also took that point into consideration, and the Palestinian ministers included in it are not "West Bank Palestinians", so to speak. The same principle has been applied to the Senate. And we expect that the electoral laws, which are to be amended, and the coming elections, will be restricted to the East Bank.

Q. Is it true that certain measures were taken against Jordanian ambassadors and high-ranking civil servants who are West Bank Palestinians?

A. The changes we have introduced and the changes we intend to introduce are limited to the political institutions and political structure of

the country. They will not in any way apply to the civil servants in the country.

We did recall some ambassadors, but that action had nothing to do with the Jordanian-Palestinian matter. As a matter of fact, some of the recent governmental appointments have involved Palestinians.

Q. Will you be amending the naturalization laws of the country?

A. No, we will not.

Q. What criteria do you use to determine who is Palestinian and who is Jordanian?

A. It is really difficult to say who is Palestinian and who is Jordanian. Palestinians and Jordanians were one unity, one people even before the political unity which was effected 27 years ago. Laymen say that "East Bankers are the Arabs who live in the East Bank".

Where the Palestinians are concerned, there are various categories. About half a million Palestinians came to the East Bank in 1948. Of these, half came as refugees and lived in camps which, in time, developed into the suburbs of one city or another, and the other half was integrated in the life of the country. We also have 200,000 refugees who came in 1967. These are two-time refugees: they became refugees in 1948 and lived in West Bank camps, and then they fled to the East Bank in 1967. There are also 200,000 more West Bankers who came here in 1967 from various West Bank towns and villages, and there is a smaller number of Palestinians who came here from Gaza in 1967.

Q. Who will have the right to vote in the Jordanian elections that will be held in six months' time?

A. This question has to be carefully studied when we amend the electoral laws, but, for example, if we maintain the voting lists of the last elections, this will automatically exclude the West Bankers and other Palestinians who came to the East Bank in 1967, because all of those voted in the West Bank.

Q. Would you describe your reaction and the reaction of the Kingdom in general to the reconciliation between Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization? Many people are keeping their fingers crossed, saying that this reconciliation is too good to be true, and that this is only the lull before the storm.

A. As far as we are concerned, we never really

²¹⁷ Excerpted from the text of the interview conducted by Maha Samara, *Monday Morning* (Beirut), December 9, 1974, pp. 9–14.

²²⁸ See doc. 308 above and appendix C.

gave much serious thought to PLO's differences with us. We accepted the situation as one of the inevitabilities of Arab politics. As a result of the Rabat conference, the PLO decided to end its differences with Jordan, and we were quite pleased about this, because we thought that this development will contribute toward the concentration of all Arab energies and resources on our common objective: the liberation of occupied Arab territory.

So I don't regard the present period as the lull before the storm. To me, it is one of the good signs which we hope will continue to appear all over the Arab World as a result of the Rabat conference.

Q. How would you visualize the relationship between Jordan and the projected independent state of Palestine?

A. I cannot envisage an independent state of Palestine on the West Bank that is not connected with the East Bank in one way or another. The type of connection it is to be—unity, federation, confederation—will be determined in the future.

Q. Is it true that King Hussein and Mr. Arafat were supposed to meet after the Rabat conference? If so, why has the meeting been delayed?

A. The only meeting that is expected to take place in the near future is a meeting between the confrontation states—Egypt, Syria, the PLO and Jordan. There were no plans for a meeting between His Majesty and Mr. Arafat.

Q. When will the meeting between the confrontation states be held?

A. We agreed to hold this meeting in principle, and obviously a lot of preliminary contacts have to be made before it is actually held.

Q. Was the sending of Jordanian envoys to Arab capitals part of these preliminary contacts?

A. Yes it was.

Q. What would Jordan's attitude be, should she be asked to go to Geneva?

A. Before I answer that question, we have to ask in what capacity and for what purpose Jordan's going to Geneva would be. Jordan has no occupied territory anymore. Since we have committed ourselves in Rabat to the principle of creating an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank under the leadership of the PLO, we doubt whether anyone would want to negotiate

with us. And if Israel accepts in principle that the Palestinian state will be the outcome of the negotiations, why should Israel not negotiate directly with the PLO?

Q. Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the prospects of the Geneva conference?

A. I prefer to be neither optimistic nor pessimistic, but realistic. The Geneva conference is not an end in itself. It might be quite an easy matter to convene a conference in Geneva or anywhere else. What is important is what is going to happen in Geneva, if the conference is held as the situation stands today. It will break up from the first meeting, simply because Israel has not decided so far to withdraw from all Arab territories it occupied in 1967 and unless there is total withdrawal there will be no peace in the Middle East. His Majesty the King said as early as August 1967 that Israel can have either peace or territory, never both. The formula still applies, I believe, and the prospects of peace depend entirely on Israel.

Q. In the event of a fifth round of fighting in the Middle East, what will Jordan's role be? Will it participate, or will its attitude be similar to the one it adopted in October, 1973?

A. Unfortunately, some in the Middle East and many outside it insist on talking about war between the Arabs and the Israelis in terms of "rounds", as if war is a boxing match—the first round starts, the bell rings, then the second round starts three minutes later. . .

War cannot be thought of in terms of a boxing match. It is a serious thing. The fate of nations, new generations, may depend on it. It's not a matter of who will join the "round". War is the result of preparations, careful political decisions, coordination, joint planning, agreement on objectives, be they tactical or strategic.

It is a fact that Jordan has never "stayed out" of an Arab-Israeli war, despite the absence of the prerequisite conditions for fighting. But frankly, or perhaps boldly, we believe that we should fight to win, not to lose, and unless we are satisfied that the chances of success in battle are heavily in our favor, we do not involve ourselves in battles which we hear about only on the radio. An individual may have the right to commit suicide, but a country, a state, a nation has no such right.

Jordan will continue to play a major role in the

long struggle against Israel, provided that our Arab brothers enable us to do so with their continued and necessary support.

Q. Jordan was promised 300 million dollars in assistance in Rabat. Have you received this amount, or were there specific terms of payment?

A. Jordan has not received this amount or any part of it. No, there were no specific terms. The fact is, however, that although 300 million dollars was agreed on, what was collected in terms of countries was much less.

Q. Some are saying that Saudi Arabia, Jordan's major Arab ally, "sold Jordan out" in Rabat. Would you comment?

A. It is inaccurate to say that what happened in Rabat was a victory for one side and a defeat for another. I believe that the Rabat decision was a victory for the cause of the joint Arab approach to the Palestinian problem. We had our reservations about the wisdom of making that decision at the time it was made, but we accept it as the view of the majority of the heads of state and we hope that the future will prove that our misgivings were ill-founded. We do not at all consider what happened a "sell-out" by Saudi Arabia.

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Press interview statement by Sheikh Zayid of the United Arab Emirates considering the use of oil as a weapon in the struggle with Israel²²⁹

Abu Dhabi, early December, 1974

Q. How far do you think the Arabs succeeded in using oil as a political weapon, and could this weapon be used better should it be necessary?

A. There can be no doubt that oil had a great success in the Ramadan war, and it will be an essential weapon in any future battle. This weapon is at the service of the battle, whether it is military or political, or even if it is the Arab nation's battles for development and progress. If there is

any instrument that can be of advantage to the Arab nation there is nothing to prevent that instrument being employed.

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Interview statements by Foreign Minister Shatti of Tunisia on his country's attitude to the Palestinian struggle in the present circumstances (excerpts)²³⁰

Kuwait, early December, 1974

The Tunisian way is to take facts, not only feelings, into account. We are fully aware of our rights in Palestine but we know that the facts make it impossible for us to recover them at present in any way but that which I have mentioned. We always believe in this theory and believe that if it were supported by the Arab countries at the United Nations Israel would be in a very embarrassing situation. From the point of view of international legality, she would then be in the position of a usurper of Arab territories. Of course in our view she has usurped those territories, but for the other countries in the world she is a state. If we accepted the United Nations resolution she would have to return to the 1947 frontiers and all the territories she has occupied since then would be considered as usurped. Then our position would enjoy greater support in the world. There is also the question of the continuation of the struggle inside occupied Palestine. There have been positive results which enable us to continue the struggle so as to achieve more and more results until we reach our goal. This is the way in which Tunisia obtained her independence—the way of successive stages, with firm principles, clear goals and the determination to attain them.

We were the first to advocate, several years ago, the formation of a Palestinian government-in-exile. We believed that such a framework would enable the countries of the world to recognize this government as the legitimate government of the people of Palestine, and to deal with it on that

²²⁹ Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Thawra* (Damascus), December 10, 1974.

²³⁰ Made on the occasion of Foreign Minister Shatti's visit to Kuwait; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Ray al-Amm* (Kuwait), December 12, 1974.

basis. So much for the past. As for the present, government-in-exile is essential now that the Palestine Liberation Organization has been accepted as an observer member of the United Nations; the Arab countries have recognized it as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, and the United Nations has, by its recent resolution, conceded the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. I think that the harder our Palestinian brothers work for the formation of this government the better it will be.

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Q. What about the Israeli threats to the Arab countries which imply that Israel will be using nuclear weapons if an Arab-Israeli war breaks out?

A. Even if Israel actually possesses nuclear weapons, it cannot open the door for the desperate and violent repercussions which it is more likely to suffer due to its small and densely inhabited areas. Therefore the use of classical weapons against Israel would destroy it without resort to the use of nuclear weapons. This, and the fact that nuclear weapons are not accepted by the whole world, will prevent Israel from using them.

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Press interview statements by President Sadat of Egypt commenting on the attitude of the European countries to the Middle East crisis (excerpt)²³¹

Cairo, December 18, 1974

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Q. Mr. President, to what extent and in what way can the Western European countries contribute to the achievement of peace in the area? Are you satisfied with the Middle East policy of the governments responsible for that part of the world?

A. Well, we should like to see Western Europe adopting a more realistic attitude to the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially as they have interests here in the area. Moreover, European security is greatly affected by security in the Middle East. . . . anything that happens here affects European security.

In fact when you ask me about the attitude of the European governments we have a good example in the attitude of France, which follows a line of great understanding and we are trying to ensure that others adopt the same attitude.

But what we also want at present is that the countries concerned should understand the facts of this situation. The situation in the area is explosive; we have declared that we will make every conceivable effort to defuse the bomb that may be about to explode.

When I talk of this the practical question then is whether Israel intends to use the land as a bargaining factor or with a view to reaching a compromise solution.

If Israel intends to use this method the situation will continue to be explosive. But if Israel shows that she really wants peace she must leave the question of occupation of territory out of account, and evacuate extensive and essential areas on all the Arab fronts as a step towards peace. After that we shall go to the Geneva conference to lay the foundations of a permanent peace.

In the light of this I should like the European countries to make every effort to achieve this aim, and to exert pressure to achieve it.

Q. Mr. President, what do you think of the relations between the Arab countries and the Scandinavian countries as regards this issue, and the Palestine problem in particular?

A. Well, we really respect the Scandinavian peoples; they are well known in the Arab world for their neutrality; they are always neutral. However, it sometimes happens that signs appear on the horizon of a misunderstanding of the Arab cause and of what is happening here in the area. Therefore we should like closer relations between us and the Scandinavian peoples and their governments, so that they may learn the new facts. Also a number of people interested in these problems should come here, as you have done. You have come to learn so that you can give the Scandinavian peoples a true picture of the situation.

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²³¹ Interview conducted by Anders Sandvig; excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Jumhuriya* (Cairo), December 19, 1974.

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Press interview statements by President Boumedienne of Algeria noting changes in the attitudes of various states on the Middle East conflict²³²

Algiers, mid-December, 1974

Q. Do you not think that, in view of the ideology upon which Israel was founded, its leaders may feel that a withdrawal even to the borders of 1967 and recognition of the national rights of the Palestinians, would represent an unacceptable defeat for their state? Hence, they may prefer any alternative, including a new war?

A. I cannot, nor do I wish to, enter into the minds of Israeli leaders. What I can state is that they must understand that there are two basic facts confronting them which are not going to change, namely, the extent of the Arab world and the number of its populations. To refuse to recognize the rights of the Palestinians, whose legitimacy has become obvious to everyone, is nothing but a suicidal standpoint. Nor will the Israelis gain anything by threatening another war, which may be a nuclear one. If matters reach this point, Israel will not be the only power capable of using nuclear arms. In any case, Israeli leaders must come to realize that the nerve centres of their country, unlike in the past, are not far from direct assaults.

Q. If Israel accepts the creation of a Palestinian state, can this state arrive at some sort of modus vivendi with the Israelis?

A. It is not up to me to answer this question. I will confine myself to saying that the first and

important step is the establishment of the Palestinian state. I am personally convinced that the only way to arrive at a realistic solution in the long run is to create a democratic state where Christians, Muslims and Jews can live together. In general, when this Palestinian state comes into being, it would become the duty of its leaders to determine the stand to be taken with respect to Israel.

Q. What are the chances of any developments in that direction instead of in the direction of a new war?

A. No one can foretell this. All that can be said is that much depends on the stand of the Europeans and Americans. Perhaps it will all depend on them.

Q. The Europeans too?

A. Definitely. In the past, the Europeans gave Israel and its aggressive policies every psychological and material support and viewed Middle Eastern problems only from a Zionist viewpoint. Nonetheless, there have been some positive changes in the policy of some Western European countries. Hence it would be accurate to state that the United States today represents the major obstacle.

Q. Have you felt any changes in attitude among American leaders in your recent meetings with them?

A. I cannot speak of a change of attitude. I can only state that I felt the Americans too were beginning to realize that they were not supermen. Naturally, this basic ambition remains to hold power over us, even if this is to be accomplished in ways different from what was employed before. But some of the earlier conceit has disappeared and it has been replaced by the realization that America too must settle its accounts with the Arab world in one way or another.

²³² Excerpted and translated from the Arabic text, *al-Balagh* (Beirut), December 23, 1974.

Appendices

A. Egypt's Cabinet in 1974

<i>Head of State</i>	Muhammad Anwar Sadat
<i>Prime Minister</i>	Muhammad Anwar Sadat
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Information</i>	Muhammad Abd al-Qadir Hatim
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Interior</i>	Mamduh Salim
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Finance</i>	Abd al-Aziz Higazi
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Waqfs</i>	Abd al-Aziz Kamil
<i>Defence</i>	Ahmad Ismail Ali
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Ismail Fahmy
<i>Planning</i>	Sayyid Sayyid
<i>Education</i>	Ali Abd al-Raziq
<i>Azhar Affairs</i>	Abd al-Aziz Isa
<i>Cabinet Affairs</i>	Abd al-Fattah Abdallah
<i>Communications</i>	Mahmud Riyad
<i>Reconstruction</i>	Uthman Uthman
<i>Civil Aviation</i>	Ahmad Nuh
<i>Power</i>	Ahmad Sultan
<i>Information</i>	Muhammad Ghalib
<i>Social Affairs</i>	Aishah Ratib
<i>Irrigation</i>	Aziz Saad
<i>Land Reclamation</i>	Uthman Badran
<i>Health</i>	Mahmud Mahfuz
<i>Manpower</i>	Salah al-Din Gharib
<i>War Production</i>	Ahmad Badri
<i>Culture</i>	Yusuf Sibai
<i>Justice</i>	Fakhri Abd al-Nabi
<i>Agriculture</i>	Muhammad Zaki
<i>Government and Popular Organization</i>	Fuad Muhy al-Din
<i>Housing</i>	Mahmud Abd al-Hafiz
<i>Oil and Mineral Resources</i>	Ahmad Hilal
<i>Industry</i>	Ibrahim Muhammadin
<i>Insurance</i>	Hasan Sharif
<i>Supply and Internal Trade</i>	Ahmad Thabit
<i>Higher Education</i>	Muhammad Layla
<i>Marine Transport</i>	Abd al-Muti Ismail Arabi
<i>Transport</i>	Al-Husayni Abd al-Latif
<i>National Assembly Affairs</i>	Albert Salama
<i>Tourism</i>	Ismail Fahmy
<i>State for Planning</i>	Ismail Sabri
<i>State for Youth</i>	Ahmad Magd

NEW CABINET: APRIL 25

<i>Prime Minister</i>	Muhammad Anwar Sadat
<i>Deputy Prime Minister</i>	Abd al-Aziz Higazi
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Interior</i>	Mamduh Salim
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Defence</i>	Ahmad Ismail Ali
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Waqfs</i>	Abd al-Aziz Kamil
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Ismail Fahmy
<i>Communications</i>	Mahmud Riyad
<i>Planning</i>	Ismail Abdallah
<i>Tourism, Civil Aviation</i>	Ibrahim Ibrahim
<i>Power</i>	Ahmad Sultan
<i>Information</i>	Ahmad Abu al-Magd
<i>Social Affairs</i>	Aishah Ratib
<i>Education</i>	Mustafa Hilmi
<i>Irrigation</i>	Ahmad Kamil
<i>Health</i>	Mahmud Mahfuz
<i>Manpower, Public Works</i>	Salah al-Din Gharib
<i>War Production</i>	Ahmad Badri
<i>Culture</i>	Yusuf Sibai
<i>Justice</i>	Mustafa Abu Zaid
<i>Agriculture</i>	Muhammad Zaki
<i>Oil</i>	Ahmad Hilal
<i>Industry and Mineral Resources</i>	Ibrahim Muhammadin
<i>Insurance</i>	Hasan Sharif
<i>Supply and Internal Trade</i>	Hadi Maghribi
<i>Azhar Affairs</i>	Abd al-Aziz Isa
<i>Higher Education</i>	Ismail Ghanim
<i>Marine Transport</i>	Abd al-Muti Ismail Arabi
<i>Reconstruction, Housing</i>	Uthman Uthman
<i>Finance</i>	Muhammad Ibrahim
<i>Foreign Trade</i>	Fathi Madbuli
<i>State for Presidential Affairs</i>	Abd al-Fattah Abdallah
<i>State for Cabinet Affairs</i>	Yahya Gamal
<i>State for National Assembly Affairs</i>	Albert Salama
<i>State for Local Government and Popular Organization</i>	Fuad Muhy al-Din
<i>State for Sudanese Affairs</i>	Uthman Badran
<i>State for Youth</i>	Abd al-Hamid Hasan

CHANGES: JUNE 7

State for Foreign Affairs

Muhammad Anwar

SEPTEMBER 25

Prime Minister

Abd al-Aziz Higazi

Health

Fuad Muhy al-Din

Supply and Internal Trade

Rahman Shazli

Agriculture

Mahmud Akhir

Industry and Mineral Resources

Mahmud Hasan

Economic Cooperation

Tahir Amin

Implementation of Cabinet Decisions

Abd al-Fattah Abdallah

NOVEMBER 25

Finance

Hamdi Nashshar

Insurance

Muhammad Ibrahim

DECEMBER 26

Muhammad Gamasi appointed Minister of Defence after the death of Ahmad Ismail Ali on December 25.

B. Israel's Cabinet in 1974*Head of State*

Ephraim Katzir

CARETAKER CABINET*Prime Minister, Justice*

Golda Meir (Labour-Mapai)

Deputy Prime Minister, Education and Culture

Yigal Allon (Labour-Ahdot Ha'vodah)

Foreign Affairs

Abba Eban (Labour-Mapai)

Defence

Moshe Dayan (Labour-Rafi)

Labour

Joseph Almogi (Labour-Mapai)

Commerce and Industry

Haim Bar-Lev (Labour-Mapai)

Interior

Yosef Burg (National Religious Party)

Social Welfare

Michael Chasani (National Religious Party)

Police

Shlomo Hillel (Labour-Mapai)

Tourism

Moshe Kol (Independent Liberal)

Immigrant Absorption

Natan Peled (Mapam)

Communications and Transport

Shimon Peres (Labour-Rafi)

Finance

Pinhas Sapir (Labour-Mapai)

Housing

Ze'ev Sharef (Labour-Mapai)

Health

Victor Shemtov (Mapam)

Religious Affairs

Zerah Warhaftig (National Religious Party)

Without Portfolio

Israel Galili (Labour-Ahdot Ha'vodah)

Agriculture

Haim Gvati (Labour-Mapai)

NEW CABINET: MARCH 6

<i>Prime Minister</i>	Golda Meir (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Education and Culture</i>	Yigal Allon (Labour-Ahdot Ha'vodah)
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Abba Eban (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Defence</i>	Moshe Dayan (Labour-Rafi)
<i>Labour</i>	Yitzhak Rabin (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Commerce and Industry</i>	Haim Bar-Lev (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Interior</i>	Yosef Burg (National Religious Party)
<i>Social Welfare</i>	Michael Chasani (National Religious Party)
<i>Police</i>	Shlomo Hillel (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Tourism</i>	Moshe Kol (Independent Liberal)
<i>Immigrant Absorption</i>	Shlomo Rosen (Mapam)
<i>Communications</i>	Aharon Uzan (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Transport</i>	Aharon Yariv (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Finance</i>	Pinhas Sapir (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Justice</i>	Haim Zadok (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Housing</i>	Yehoshua Rabinowitz (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Health</i>	Victor Shemtov (Mapam)
<i>Religious Affairs</i>	Yitzhak Rafael (National Religious Party)
<i>Agriculture</i>	Haim Gvati (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Information</i>	Shimon Peres (Labour-Rafi)
<i>Without Portfolio</i>	Israel Galili (Labour-Ahdot Ha'vodah)
<i>Without Portfolio</i>	Gideon Hausner (Independent Liberal)

NEW CABINET: JUNE 3

<i>Prime Minister</i>	Yitzhak Rabin (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs</i>	Yigal Allon (Labour-Ahdot Ha'vodah)
<i>Defence</i>	Shimon Peres (Labour-Rafi)
<i>Education</i>	Aharon Yadlin (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Labour</i>	Moshe Baram (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Commerce and Industry</i>	Haim Bar-Lev (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Interior, Police</i>	Shlomo Hillel (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Social Welfare, Health</i>	Victor Shemtov (Mapam)
<i>Tourism</i>	Moshe Kol (Independent Liberal)
<i>Immigrant Absorption</i>	Shlomo Rosen (Mapam)
<i>Housing</i>	Avraham Ofer (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Transport</i>	Gad Yaacobi (Labour-Rafi)
<i>Finance</i>	Yehoshua Rabinowitz (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Justice, Religious Affairs</i>	Haim Zadok (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Agriculture</i>	Aharon Uzan (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Information</i>	Aharon Yariv (Labour-Mapai)
<i>Without Portfolio</i>	Israel Galili (Labour-Ahdot Ha'vodah)
<i>Without Portfolio</i>	Gideon Hausner (Independent Liberal)
<i>Without Portfolio</i>	Shulamit Aloni (Civil Rights Movement)

CHANGES: OCTOBER 28

Resignation of Shulamit Aloni

OCTOBER 29

<i>Interior</i>	Yosef Burg (National Religious Party)
<i>Social Welfare</i>	Michael Chasani (National Religious Party)
<i>Religious Affairs</i>	Yitzhak Rafael (National Religious Party)

C. Jordan's Cabinet in 1974

<i>Head of State</i>	King Hussein ibn Talal
<i>Prime Minister</i>	Zaid Rifai
<i>Defence</i>	Zaid Rifai
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Zaid Rifai
<i>Development and Reconstruction</i>	Subhi Amin Amr
<i>Justice</i>	Salim Mas'ada
<i>Interior</i>	Abd al-Karim Tarawna
<i>Economy</i>	Umar Nabulsi
<i>Communications</i>	Muhy al-Din Husayni
<i>Tourism and Antiquities</i>	Ghalib Barakat
<i>Information and Culture</i>	Adnan Abu Awda
<i>Finance</i>	Dhuqan Hindawi
<i>Transport</i>	Nadim Zaru
<i>Social Affairs and Labour</i>	Yusuf Dhihni
<i>Public Works</i>	Ahmad Shawbaki
<i>Agriculture</i>	Marwan Hammud
<i>Health</i>	Fuad Khaylani
<i>Education</i>	Mudar Badran
<i>Religious Affairs</i>	Abd al-Aziz Khayyat
<i>Municipal and Rural Affairs</i>	Fuad Qaqish
<i>State for Foreign Affairs</i>	Zuhayr Mufti
<i>State for Occupied Territories</i>	Tahir Masri
<i>Prime Ministerial Affairs</i>	Marwan Dudin

CHANGES: FEBRUARY 19

<i>Supply</i>	Sadiq Shari
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NEW CABINET: NOVEMBER 23

<i>Prime Minister</i>	Zaid Rifai
<i>Defence</i>	Zaid Rifai
<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Zaid Rifai
<i>Economy</i>	Raja Muashshir
<i>Interior</i>	Tharwat Talhuni
<i>Justice</i>	Naji Tarawna
<i>Development and Reconstruction</i>	Subhi Amin Amr
<i>Communications</i>	Ahmad Shawbaki
<i>Information and Culture</i>	Salah Abu Zaid
<i>Education</i>	Dhuqan Hindawi
<i>Transport</i>	Khalid Hasan
<i>Social Affairs</i>	Sami Ayyub
<i>Tourism</i>	Ghalib Barakat
<i>Supply</i>	Ali Hasan Awda
<i>Agriculture</i>	Marwan Hammud
<i>Religious Affairs</i>	Abd al-Aziz Khayyat
<i>Public Works</i>	Mahmud Hawamda
<i>Health</i>	Trad Qadi
<i>Municipal and Rural Affairs</i>	Muhammad Zabin
<i>State for Foreign Affairs</i>	Sadiq Shari
<i>State for Prime Minister's Office</i>	Rakan Jazi

D. Syria's Cabinet in 1974

<i>Head of State</i>	Hafiz Assad
<i>Prime Minister</i>	Mahmud Ayyubi (Baath)
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs</i>	Abd al-Halim Khaddam (Baath)
<i>Deputy Prime Minister, Economic Affairs</i>	Muhammad Haydar (Baath)
<i>Defence</i>	Mustafa Tlas (Baath)
<i>Interior</i>	Ali Za'za (Baath)
<i>Supply and Internal Trade</i>	Ahmad Qablan (Baath)
<i>Public Works and Water</i>	Abd al-Ghani Qannut (AS)
<i>Planning</i>	Mustafa Hallaj (SU)
<i>Education</i>	Shakir Fahham (Baath)
<i>Higher Education</i>	Muhammad Hashim (Baath)
<i>Oil, Power and Mineral Resources</i>	Jabr Kafri (Baath)
<i>Finance</i>	Nurallah Nurallah (Independent)
<i>Culture and National Guidance</i>	Fawzi Kayyali (ASU)
<i>Tourism</i>	Abdallah Khani (Independent)
<i>Industry</i>	Shutaywi Sayfawi (Baath)
<i>Municipal and Village Affairs</i>	Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi (SU)
<i>Economy and Foreign Trade</i>	Muhammad Imadi (Independent)
<i>Justice</i>	Adib Nahawi (ASU)
<i>Communications</i>	Umar Sibai (Communist)
<i>Euphrates Dam</i>	Munir Wannus (Baath)
<i>Waqfs</i>	Abd al-Sattar Sayyid (Independent)
<i>Health</i>	Madani Khiyami (Independent)
<i>Information</i>	George Saddiqni (Baath)
<i>Social Affairs and Labour</i>	Husayn Kuwaydir (Baath)
<i>Local Administration</i>	Adib Milhim (Baath)
<i>Frontline Village Affairs</i>	Muayyad Jazzan (Baath)
<i>Cabinet Affairs</i>	Fayiz Nasir (Baath)
<i>State</i>	Anwar Hammada (ASU)
<i>State</i>	Zuhayr Abd al-Samad (Communist)

CHANGES: SEPTEMBER 1

<i>Housing and Utilities</i>	Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi (SU)
<i>Transport</i>	Numan Zayn (Baath)
<i>Power</i>	Hani Sawwaf (Independent)
<i>Finance</i>	Muhammad Sharif (Baath)
<i>Information</i>	Ahmad Ahmad (Baath)
<i>Agriculture</i>	Mursil Abu Umar (Baath)
<i>Oil and Mineral Resources</i>	Adnan Mustafa (Baath)
<i>Euphrates Dam</i>	Subhi Kahhala (Independent)
<i>State for Planning</i>	Nurallah Nurallah (Independent)

The portfolios of Municipal and Rural Affairs and Frontline Village Affairs were abolished.

Abbreviations: ASU: Arab Socialist Union

AS: Arab Socialist

SU: Socialist Unionist

E. Palestine Liberation Organization, Executive Committee in 1974

Yasir Arafat (Fatah) — Chairman
 Faruq Qaddumi (Fatah)
 Zuhayr Muhsin (Saiqa)
 Adib Abd Rabbou (PDFLP)
 Ahmad Yamani (PFLP)
 Abd al-Wahhab Kayyali (Arab Liberation Front)
 Yousef Sayegh (Independent)
 Hamid Abu Sitta (Independent)
 Muhammad Nashashibi (Independent)
 Salih Ra'fat (PDFLP) — honorary member

NEW COMMITTEE: JUNE 8

Yasir Arafat (Fatah) — Chairman
 Faruq Qaddumi (Fatah)
 Zuhayr Muhsin (Saiqa)
 Adib Abd Rabbou (PDFLP)
 Ahmad Yamani (PFLP)
 Abd al-Wahhab Kayyali (Arab Liberation Front)
 Talal Naji (PFLP — General Command)
 Hamid Abu Sitta (Independent)
 Muhammad Nashashibi (Independent)
 Abd al-Aziz Wajih (Independent)
 Elia Khoury (Independent)
 Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzir (West Bank)
 Abd al-Jawwad Salih (West Bank)
 Walid Qamhawi (West Bank)

CHANGES: SEPTEMBER 26

The PFLP withdrew its representative, Ahmad Yamani.

F. Voting on UN General Assembly resolutions, 29th session

Y = Yes N = No A = Abstention NP = Not Present

RESOLUTION	3210	3211		3236	3237	3240			3263	3330	3331				3336
		A	B			A	B	C			A	B	C	D	
Afghanistan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Adopted without vote	Y			Y	Y
Albania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP		NP			Y	Y
Algeria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Argentina	Y	Y	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Australia	A	A	A	A	Y	A	Y		Y			Y	A
Austria	Y	A	A	A	Y	A	Y		Y			Y	A
Bahamas	NP	A	A	NP	NP	NP	Y		Y			A	NP
Bahrain	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Bangladesh	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Barbados	A	A	Y	A	A	A	Y		A			N	A
Belgium	A	A	N	A	Y	A	Y		Y			A	A
Bhutan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Bolivia	N	N	N	N	A	N	Y		Y			N	A
Botswana	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Brazil	Y	NP	Y	A	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Bulgaria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Burma	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A		Y			Y	Y
Burundi	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Byelorussian SSR	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Cameroon	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Canada	A	A	N	A	Y	N	Y		Y			A	A
Central African Rep.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		NP			NP	NP
Chad	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Chile	NP	N	N	A	Y	A	Y		Y			A	A
China	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		NP			Y	Y
Colombia	A	A	A	A	Y	A	Y		Y			Y	A
Congo	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Costa Rica	A	N	N	A	A	A	Y		Y			N	A
Cuba	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Cyprus	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Czechoslovakia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Dahomey	Y	Y	Y	NP	NP	NP	Y		Y			Y	Y
Democratic Yemen	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Denmark	A	A	N	A	Y	A	Y		Y			Y	A
Dominican Republic	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			A	A
Ecuador	A	A	NP	Y	Y	A	Y		Y			Y	Y
Egypt	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
El Salvador	Y	A	NP	A	Y	A	Y		Y			A	A
Equatorial Guinea	Y	Y	Y	NP	NP	NP	Y		Y			Y	Y
Ethiopia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		NP			NP	Y
Fiji	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		NP			NP	Y
Finland	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	Y		Y			Y	Y
France	Y	A	A	A	Y	A	Y		Y			Y	A
Gabon	Y	Y	Y	NP	NP	NP	NP		Y			Y	Y
Gambia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y

RESOLUTION	3210	3211		3236	3237	3240			3263	3330	3331				3336
		A	B			A	B	C			A	B	C	D	
Germany, Dem. Rep.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Adopted without vote	Y			Y	Y
Germany, Fed. Rep.	A	A	N	A	Y	A	Y		Y			Y ¹	A
Ghana	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Greece	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Grenada	NP	A	Y	Y	A	A	Y		Y			A	A
Guatemala	A	A	NP	A	Y	A	Y		Y			A	A
Guinea	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Guinea Bissau	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Guyana	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Haiti	A	A	A	Y	NP	A	Y		NP	NP	A
Honduras	NP	A	A	A ²	NP ²	A	Y		Y	Y	A
Hungary	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Iceland	A	N	N	A	Y	A	Y		Y	A	A
India	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Indonesia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Iran	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Iraq	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP		Y	Y	Y
Ireland	Y	A	N	A	Y	A	Y		Y	Y	A
Israel	N	N	N	N	A	N	A		A	N	N
Italy	Y	A	N	A	Y	A	Y		Y	Y	A
Ivory Coast	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	Y		Y	Y	Y
Jamaica	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y		Y	Y	Y
Japan	Y	A	A	A	Y	A	Y		Y	Y	Y
Jordan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Kenya	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Khmer Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Kuwait	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Laos	A	A	A	A	Y	A	Y		Y	Y	A
Lebanon	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Lesotho	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Liberia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Libya	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP		Y	Y	NP
Luxembourg	A	A	N	A	Y	A	Y		Y	A*	A
Malagasy Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Malawi	NP	A	A	A	A	A	NP		A	A	A
Malaysia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Maldives Islands	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP		NP	NP	NP
Mali	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Malta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Mauritania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Mauritius	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Mexico	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Mongolia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Morocco	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		NP	NP	Y
Nepal	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y		Y	Y	A
Netherlands	A	A	N	A	Y	A	Y		Y	A	A

¹ This country later informed the Secretary-General that it intended to "Abstain".² This country later informed the Secretary-General that it intended to vote "Yes".

RESOLUTION	3210	3211		3236	3237	3240			3263	3330	3331				3336
		A	B			A	B	C			A	B	C	D	
New Zealand	Y	A	A	A	Y	A	Y	Adopted without vote	Y	Adopted without vote	Adopted without vote	Y	A
Nicaragua	A	N	N	N	A	N	Y		Y			N	A
Niger	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Nigeria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Norway	Y	N	N	A	Y	A	Y		Y			A	A
Oman	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Pakistan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			Y	Y
Panama	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y			A	Y
Paraguay	A	A	A	A	Y	A	Y	..	Y	A	Y
Peru	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Philippines	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Poland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Portugal	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Qatar	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Rumania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Rwanda	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Saudi Arabia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NP	..	Y	Y	Y
Senegal	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Sierra Leone	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Singapore	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Somalia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
South Africa	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	NP	..	NP	NP	NP
Spain	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Sri Lanka	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Sudan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Swaziland	NP ²	A	A	NP	NP	NP	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Sweden	¹ Y	A	A	A	Y	A	Y	..	Y	Y	A
Syria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Thailand	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Togo	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	NP ²	NP ²	Y
Trinidad & Tobago	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	NP	NP	Y
Tunisia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Turkey	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Uganda	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Ukrainian SSR	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
USSR	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
United Arab Emirates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
United Kingdom	A	A	N	A	Y	A	Y	..	Y	A	A
United Rep. of Tanzania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
United States	N	N	N	N	Y	A	Y	..	Y	N	N
Upper Volta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Uruguay	A	A	A	A	Y	A	Y	..	NP	A	A
Venezuela	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Yemen (North)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	NP	NP	Y
Yugoslavia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Zaire	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y
Zambia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	..	Y	Y	Y

¹ This country later informed the Secretary-General that it intended to "Abstain".² This country later informed the Secretary-General that it intended to vote "Yes".

G. Chronology

January

- 11–21 US Secretary of State Kissinger visits the Middle East.
- 12 Libya and Tunisia announce the formation of a shortlived Arab Islamic Republic.
- 18 Egypt and Israel reach agreement on the disengagement of their forces (*see doc. 50*).
- 21 The UK lifts its arms embargo against Israel and the Arab front line states (*see doc. 51*).
- 18–23 President Sadat of Egypt tours the Arab States of Syria, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria and Morocco.

February

- 13–14 In Algiers a meeting of the heads of state of Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria calls for Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines and the restoration of Palestinian rights (*see doc. 212*).
- 22–24 The second Islamic summit conference meets in Lahore (*see doc. 65–67*).
- 27 USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko begins a visit to Syria and Egypt ending March 7.
- 28 Egypt and the US resume diplomatic relations (*see doc. 73*).¹

March

- 6 Prime Minister Meir of Israel announces the formation of a new government (*see Appendix B*).
- 18 Arab oil ministers announce the lifting of the oil embargo against the US (*see doc. 222*).

April

- 2 The interim report of the Israel Commission of Inquiry into the October war is published (*see doc. 92*).
- 11 Guerrillas of the PFLP-General Command raid Kiryat Shmona.
- 11 Israeli Prime Minister Meir announces the resignation of her government.
- 12–13 Israel raids a number of villages in South Lebanon destroying houses and taking villagers captive.
- 23 Former Israeli ambassador to the US Yitzhak Rabin is nominated Prime Minister.
- 24 The UN Security Council condemns Israel's recent raid on South Lebanon (*see doc. 31*).
- 25 A new Egyptian cabinet is announced (*see Appendix A*).
- 29 US Secretary of State Kissinger starts a 33-day visit to the Middle East.

¹ The entry under November 7 in Appendix G of *International Documents on Palestine 1973* should read: "The US and Egypt agree to resume diplomatic relations in the near future."

May

- 15 Guerrillas of the PDFLP raid Maalot.
- 16 Israel mounts air raids on Palestinian refugee camps in South Lebanon.
- 31 Syria and Israel reach agreement on the disengagement of their forces (*see doc. 115*).
- 31 US Secretary of State ends his visit to the Middle East.

June

- 1–9 The Palestine National Council meets in Cairo for its twelfth session (*see docs. 245–248*).
- 3 A new Israeli cabinet led by Yitzhak Rabin is approved by the Knesset (*see Appendix B*).
- 12–18 US President Nixon visits Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel and Jordan (*see docs. 121, 124, 125, 250, 252, 253 and 255*).
- 16 Syria and the US announce the resumption of diplomatic relations (*see doc. 254*).
- 18–19 Israel attacks villages and refugee camps in South Lebanon.

July

- 3 The Israeli government decides to establish a number of new settlements in occupied territory.
- 3 US President Nixon ends a visit to the USSR (*see doc. 131*).
- 10 Arab oil ministers announce the lifting of the oil embargo against the Netherlands (*see doc. 261*).
- 18 King Hussein ends a visit to Egypt (*see doc. 264*).

August

- 9 Gerald Ford succeeds Richard Nixon as US President.
- 28 France announces the lifting of its arms embargo against Israel and the Arab confrontation states (*see doc. 144*).

September

- 1–2 Arab Foreign Ministers meet in Cairo.
- 3 Greek Catholic Archbishop Capucci of Jerusalem is indicted on charges of arms smuggling (*see doc. 146*).
- 20–21 The Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Syria and the PLO's Faruq Qaddumi meet in Cairo (*see doc. 286*).
- 25 Prime Minister Takieddine Solh of Lebanon tenders his resignation.
- 26 The PFLP withdraws from the PLO Executive Committee (*see doc. 290*).

October

- 9–15 US Secretary of State Kissinger visits the Middle East.
- 14 The UN General Assembly invites the PLO to participate in the forthcoming debate on the question of Palestine (*see doc. 20*).
- 22–29 The Arab summit conference in Rabat accords the PLO the right to establish its authority in any occupied territory liberated from Israel (*see doc. 308*).
- 31 A new government under Rashid Solh is announced in Lebanon.

November

- 5–8 US Secretary of State Kissinger visits the Middle East.
- 13–22 The UN General Assembly debates the question of Palestine; the debate is opened by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Yasir Arafat (*see docs. 9–18*).
- 22 The UN General Assembly grants the PLO observer status (*see doc. 23*).
- 23–24 US President Ford meets Soviet Communist Party Chairman in Vladivostok (*see doc. 182*).

December

- 9 Greek Catholic Archbishop Capucci of Jerusalem is sentenced to twelve years in prison by an Israeli court (*see doc. 192*).
- 10 Three PLO offices in Beirut are hit by rockets set off by timing devices.
- 14–16 The PLO Central Committee meets in Damascus.

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